From Rebel to Taxpayer?
Working together for successful DDR

International Conference
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Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

The Carlton Beach II Conference: "From Rebel to Taxpayer? Working together for successful DDR" was organised by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and NGOs in order to explore possibilities of cooperation in the field of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.

To give a peace process a serious chance, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration processes needs to address the full range of implications on the security situation. The security risks of armed groups, rebel militia, guerrilla groups and former warring parties need to be diminished to create the stability needed for the peaces process to be successful. This is achieved by removing their capability to use force and restoring the monopoly on the use of force to the government or its equivalent. Disarmament and demobilisation automatically leads to large groups of former combatants needing to provide themselves with a new livelihood. Traditionally the disarmament and demobilisation part of the process is taken care of by peacekeeping forces. This does not address the problems that arise from large groups of un-adapted and unemployed ex-combatants. The programs of reintegrating and re-socialising are usually the domain of development agencies including non-governmental organisations.

The Dutch foreign policy advocates an integrated approach towards peace, security and development related issues. This entails that every stakeholder participates in the process on the basis of its own comparative advantages. Two years ago, the first Carlton Beach conference was organised as a first attempt to bring together policymakers and practitioners with a diplomatic, defence and development background to discuss possibilities in working together. This meeting was considered a success though the main outcome was that all parties saw the necessity to work together. Carlton Beach II has been the follow-up with slightly higher ambitions when it comes to the results of the conference.

Objective
The aim of the conference was that all parties can, on a working level, agree on a set of practical working principles that can be applied to the cooperation between ministries of defence, foreign affairs, development and NGO's when dealing with DDR programs.

The conference started with an overview of DDR lessons learned and generic guiding principles followed by a presentation from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Dutch general policy/strategy towards DDR. After this broad introduction, case studies were used as a starting point for identifying possible ways of cooperation and for drafting DDR working principles. There were three sessions discussing experiences and lessons learned in DDR from different parts of the world (Aceh, DR Congo and Afghanistan) in order to:
- give a brief overview of the experiences and/or possibilities of DDR in general
- identify the lessons learned in the cooperation (or lack thereof) between military and civil partners
- formulate from the lessons learned some draft working principles (as practical as possible) for cooperation between military and civil partners

The sessions discussed several draft working principles and tried to reach agreement on which working principles could be acceptable to all parties.

During the conclusion a number of draft principles have been presented to the participants to take 'home' and discuss internally. In a follow-up meeting (Carlton Beach III) these principles might be discussed and endorsed by Director Generals of the two ministries and directors of participating NGO's.

2.   Summary per session

Session 1:   DD and R: Two worlds apart? Lessons Learned from the field.

Presentation by Kees Steenken and Irma Specht

This session provided an overview of the key components of a DDR program and presented many thought provoking issues and challenges based upon international lessons learned from DDR programs around the world. Annex I is providing a summery of the main issues presented. In Summary, the following dimensions were highlighted:

'The objective of the DDR is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process. In this regard, DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security and development. It is important to note that DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can however help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a recovery and peace-building strategy can proceed"[1] DDR is not for everybody.   DDR is for one specific group of people. It must be noted that there are also IDPs, refugees, remainees and numerous others that must be taken care of by other programs in order to address their needs and concerns.

Disarmament is the first D in DDR and is here defined as the controlled collection of weapons. Irregular and regular armies, individual combatants and civilians can be the target for disarmament activities. Disarmament is essential as it is a confidence-building measure aimed at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a nervous population. Everything must be aimed at the mindset of participants whether they are standing armies, guerrilla groups, paramilitary or militia forces or civilians. Disarmament is regarded as the first step of a DDR process for in order to remove weapons as a highly symbolic act that signifies the termination of an individual's active role as an arms bearer in a conflict; and to control and manage weapons in order to create a secure environment in which Demobilisation and Reintegration can take place as part of a long-term peace building strategy

Demobilization can be seen as the opposite of recruiting (mobilizing) combatants for an armed group. In the military sense, demobilization can serve to disband an armed unit, to reduce the number of combatants in an armed group or to assemble an army, be it regular or irregular, anew.

The importance of disarmament and demobilization as stated earlier lies with the concern for security of the opposing groups' fighters. Thus demobilization and disarmament have to be accompanied by a plan to make political power sharing possible for all parties to the conflict in order to respect their interests. That way they will feel less need to revert to violent action.

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[1] Integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), module 1, August 2006

Following DD the next step is the sustainable socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The reintegration of ex-combatants is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. According to the definition of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), "Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance". It must be stressed that we need to be more sensitive to context specific programming and stressed that every country needs its own strategy.

In order to prepare for Reintegration the crucial assessments need to be organised as soon as possible. The presenter lobbied strongly for a long pre-DDR preparation phase where not only these assessments need to take place, but also the capacities of the future service providers needs to be build. In most scenarios we have more time than we think, if we only start earlier.

There are two major challenges to improve economic reintegration: to provide much longer support to starting entrepreneurs in order to increase their chances of success; and to invest simultaneously in increasing the employability of former combatants and on creating the enabling environment for local economic development. Without targeted investments in local economies economic reintegration fails. In addition, investing in local economies also has great benefits for the local communities as all people will live in an environment that has more potential for business development. This is one way to make DDR less unfair and more successful.

Finally, there are numerous actors play a part in DDR activities. A good understanding of their interests, needs and capacities is required in planning DDR. In most cases, collaboration between these actors will enhance the effectiveness of DDR programs.

Finally, the presenters suggested the 10 following guiding principles:
1. Clarify objectives and expected results with all parties
2. Start planning and preparing for reintegration as soon as possible
3. Ensure community participation
4. Develop national capacity
5. Consider regional implications
6. Understand and address root-causes
7. Engage donors for longer programs beyond formal UN DDR programs
8. Address security and punishment of crimes in the time between DD and SSR.
9. Balance equity with security
10. Ensure that reintegration assistance to ex-combatants is also accessible to other local people.

Session 2: Mind the Gap: How to Create Synergy Between the Various Actors?
Presentation by Yaron Oppenheimer, MFA Netherlands

The aim of the presentation was to stimulate discussion on the way different stakeholders in DDR can cooperate better in order to improve the effectiveness of their actions. Mr. Oppenheimer presented the paper: Mind the Gap: How to Create Synergy Between the Various Actors? (see annex E).

So far the major lesson learned for all stakeholders is to take the specific context as a starting point. There is no blueprint for DDR as we are dealing with different countries in different continents, different post-conflict contexts, different target groups and different receiving communities. The important difference between a DDR process and a DDR program was highlighted again and thereby the potentially different goals, duration and target groups in the program versus the process.

The most important issue is the current gap between DD and R and the potential solutions to closing the gap, especially in relation to linking ex-combatants needs to community development programs and the timeframe to do so. In general, there is too much emphasis on DD and too little on R. In closing the gap it is important to access the comparative advantage of the different 3Ds actors (Diplomacy, Defence and Development). The added values of the different actors can and should be mobilised to improve DDR programming, funding and implementation.

The following draft working principles to work together were presented for further discussion:

1)   Involve all actors in the design (and implementation) of a program
2)   Share information prior to reintegration to prepare both ex-combatants and communities
3)   Connect the local security situation with national plans to create sustainable security

Summary of comments and discussion to session 2

Firstly, the point was highlighted again that there is a need to draw the **DDR discussions into a larger discussion** on State Building. This has four elements:
1. Political Capacity building which is important for ex-combatants in terms of the most desired access to power positions and power sharing in general (actor Diplomacy)
2. Establishing rule of law, crime must be addressed, punishments of war crimes but also re-establishing law and order (Actor Justice and Defence)
3. SSR and DDR, establishing a monopoly of violence
4. Socio-economic development, exchanging income through blackmail, looting and plunder by constructive work. (actors private sector and NGOs)

Although it has been said the DD is relatively simple, this is not really true, especially because it should be linked to Security Sector Reform (SSR). DD is about **sequencing the DD with the SSR,** the arms management, justice, rule of law etc. DDR must be linked to the strategic view to overall security.

Practically it will be extremely challenging to **involve all actors** at every stage of the process. The sharing of information is the most crucial. The question remains how to select what the right actors are, who is most relevant and who should get which type of information? In addition, DDR-related information is often sensitive, secret and difficult to share.

When discussing the actors there is a tendency to speak about **civil society as one set of actors**. However, the question was raised if civil society has a common logic? The reality is that you cannot

bring them together. We have a too mechanic view, things are changing all the time. We see civil society as one group of organisations but in fact you have two clusters: the peace building NGOs that focus on lobby, and those implementing programs. In addition we have the INGOs, the national NGOs, the CBOs etc, they are all part of that category. Finally it was stressed that **NGOs often already have presence** on the ground at the time a DDR program starts. It is crucial when we look at the reintegration of ex-combatants, to link this to the return of other people (e.g. IDP's, refugees, etc.). We need Quick Impact programs and alike and these should be coordinated.

The third element of the discussion focussed on the need for **Pre-DDR preparation**. Assessments are very crucial in order to get a clearer sense of return patterns. There is a lot of migration ongoing in these contexts, people go back but in their survival strategies and it is not at all certain that they will stay there. This makes, for example, community based programming challenging. The question was raised how to start R preparations (assessments and capacity building of service providers) before DD? Is it safe? Can it be done? The answer is that only in few examples the situation is actually too violent. In most cases we have a lot of time. When we look at Sudan now, and North Uganda, a lot can be done at this point in time to prepare for R. Also in the Great Lakes MDRP program, time to get ready for R was there but not used. The group concluded that we have more time than we tend to think. The question than is: can funding be made available for R before DD?

Clarification was requested on working principle 3, national versus **local security**. On a political level the focus of the international community focuses on national processes, while there is lots of instability at the local levels. NGOs know this, but the DD actors must take this up as well. The problem with the issue of linking national with local security is that the actors are often part of the problem themselves.

The point was stressed that we need a **reality check** all the time. We should not dress-up a DDR program too much as we cannot sustain that. What can and cannot be done, that is crucial. We must set realistic objectives. If already in the pre-war there situation there was hardly any development and capacities were weak, what can realistically be achieved? The suggestion made was more rigorous priority setting. However, in the room strong opposition and discussion occurred on this point. The counter argument is that analyses from limitations are risky, like we see in the MDRP. **Limitations do not drive solutions**. We can improve in many areas, for example, information on r comes too late, while this can be done much earlier. The right information at the right time will make that we can do better, such as information on the ex-combatant's aspirations. In addition DDR is part of Conflict Transformation and the aim is not to recreate the old situation but to build a better society.

Several participants highlighted **that Programs should be flexible** enough to adapt to the changing context. We formulate DDR and recovery strategies beforehand which might be wrong later on. We need phasing and financial flexibility to reposition ourselves. This is an institutional challenge! One example of more flexibility in DDR programming and execution is the concept of RDD, first R and than DD. It was requested that we collect information on where and how this worked? Another example of the need for more flexibility is that the pre-set duration and exit strategy for DDR should be reviewed on the ground. Like in Liberia now, DDR is closing while R is in desperate need for continuation in order to consolidate the results in order to avoid they will all be back on the streets.

Finally, several pledges where made to especially include women. Ms. Vanessa Far has written a lot on **Gender** and DDR. We must include 1325, at the practical level. How can we involve women early? (Please see Gender DDR Checklist in Annex C). In Albania there are good experiences that show that working with and through women is helpful and needed. Women often know where the weapons are and they can negotiate disarmament with their families. They must be empowered to do so.

Session 3: Case Study: DR Congo, Complementarily between NGOs, national authorities and donor initiatives

Presentation by Sami Faltas and Maurice Namwira

The paper *DDR and Army Reform in Congo Kinshasa* was submitted but not discussed in full during the session (see annex E). The paper stresses important lessons learned in the DRC such as the problem of impunity, the inadequate involvement of local communities and civil society and the need to link DDR to security sector reform. Based upon lessons learned from DRC the following issues were stressed:

Indeed DDR is unfair, as said before, but it also lays the fundaments for stability. While we must acknowledge that we cannot avoid doing some harm, we must try to be as fair as possible. The less harm DDR does, the more effective it will be, and the better the prospects for sustainable peace.

Reintegration is properly a community issue: the rehabilitation of ex-combatants together with the rehabilitation of communities. Communities should be in the driving seat. Privileges for ex-combatants should be avoided as much as possible and we need to focus on long-term reintegration. The voucher system (used in the Central African Republic) that ex-combatants can use to reintegrate into a community is interesting as it marries their needs with community needs. The approach is new and we do not know, for example, if it can work in urban communities. Ultimately, society decides whether to accept ex-combatants in its midst. Local communities, especially those affected by the war, should be given encouragement and help to admit and, as appropriate, rehabilitate ex-combatants. Wherever possible, the ex-combatants should be involved in the rebuilding of war-affected communities, as part of their reintegration.

Disarmament is essential. If the combatants are diverted to peaceful activities, but their weapons and ammunition remain in circulation, this will undermine the benefits of demobilization and reintegration. However, Official Development Assistance funds and the World Bank may not be used to fund disarmament, weapons control, security-sector reform or any other activities related to arms or the military. Therefore all World Bank and ODA programs that support demobilization and reintegration should be accompanied by and closely coordinated with an effort to recover, and preferably destroy, the arms and ammunition held illegitimately by the combatants and the population.

Accountability is important. Even if crimes committed during the war cannot be prosecuted, it is essential that as soon as the war is over, crimes are punished, and seen to be punished, in order to create effective and accountable security. Civil society and public opinion must be on board to support Human Security and SSR. Transitional Justice (TJ) is not part of DDR but we cannot avoid it. DDR should not harm TJ processes by providing blanket amnesties. Conditional amnesties are more appropriate. If possible, they could oblige the beneficiaries to tell the truth and help provide reparations to the victims. Finally, reparation programs for victims funded by others, e.g. the international community, will also make DDR less unfair.

Linking DDR with SSR is crucial. DD is an emergency operation, while SSR is a Government-led long term project. They are similar in their ultimate goal, but very different in nature. One clear link is army reform as a part of government reform. If the government as a whole is corrupt and dysfunctional, one can hardly expect a reform of the security sector to be successful. DD is usually a quick and dirty effort to dismantle fighting forces so as to prevent mass violence. Like transitional justice, it is an attempt to overcome the legacy of war. Such post-conflict measures can clear the way for peace, security and justice in the long term. But for these to be sustainable, other kinds of measures are needed. The government agencies responsible for providing security and justice must be made effective, neutral, responsive, transparent and accountable. They must both apply the law and obey it. By doing so, they will gain the

confidence and cooperation of the population. By monitoring and supporting the government's security *sector*, the media, civil society and public opinion become essential parts of the wider security *system*.

Summary of comments and discussion on session 3
The first issue that was stressed is that **we are part of the problem**. Why can we not implement the programs effectively? Why can we not achieve the principles we set? Ownership is the most crucial issue, but whose ownership do we mean? The people's, the national Government's, the local and provincial authorities? It is partly the international architecture that defeats our efforts, despite all the manuals. Within our own organisations, taking risks to pilot new approaches is generally not rewarded, while implementing a failed DDR program does not seem to bother anybody. We must reward risk taking.

Peace building changes as time goes on and DDR must be better linked to broader processes. In terms of Human Security the non-relapse into full fledged conflict does not necessarily mean the situation on the ground is better, as there might be a lot of violence and organised crime. We must therefore better link Reintegration to Reconstruction and economic transformation. DDR is also a social process. One third of post conflict societies relapse into armed conflict, two third does not, what are the conditions for relapse or not? We need more comparative evaluations, to disseminate their findings and have more training courses like those offered by the members of the IDDRS training group (IDDRTG). We also need a bigger variety of courses such as on DDR linkages with TJ, SSR and the role of communities.

The second part of the discussion focussed on the **justice versus amnesty** dilemma. There is too much emphasis on punitive measures and too little on restorative **justice**. Prosecution can be an obstacle to peace, as in Uganda today. The suggestion that we can provide combatants with amnesty during DDR but that the amnesty can always be overruled is a potentially dangerous option because if the ex-combatants do not trust the amnesty they will not sign peace agreements or engage in DDR. Vetting is however crucial, too many ex-combatants holding high positions jeopardise peace and DDR. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation is crucial and trust building is important, which might include rebuilding the houses of victims. The important thing is to change the behaviour of former combatants; they need something to do after DD, like to get involved with Quick Visibility Projects. The problem was raised that justice is manipulated, some are immune. With children the opinion was expressed that the parents are responsible, not the children associated with fighting forces and armed groups (CAAFG) themselves.

A third point was the emphasis put on **Community based approaches** in the presentation raised many suggestions and concerns. Firstly, does community based DDR mean that only the communities will receive assistance, not the individuals? If combatants see no direct peace or demobilisation benefit, they will take up arms again. Need for both individual and community benefits. We must boost local economies as well to create a conductive environment for Reintegration but still need to target ex-combatants as well. The issue of labelling ex-combatants remains difficult. Long term development perspectives need to be on board from the beginning. We need more evaluations on the voucher system, more pilots. One issue is that often youth are very dissatisfied with their communities, which limits the appropriateness of community based approaches.
Another concern raised is that dealing with ex-combatants is profitable for NGOs and CBOs, this has a tendency to gear them away from services to the overall population

Finally the issue of **cash payments** to combatants was discussed. The overall opinion was that no cash should be paid during Reinsertion, as it makes DDR even more unfair, it creates a lot of problems and negative site effects, it spreads the wrong message etc. It is advised in the IDDRS as well, in all manuals in fact, no more, or as little possible, cash for ex-combatants during Reinsertion. Ex-combatants

receiving 700US$ while other people work for years without pay. The result is that everyone wants to become an ex-combatant for dollars. The market was created. Cash creates many problems and if they come home with cash this gives the wrong signal. Priority access to labour based reconstruction work with a daily salary is much better, that way they are occupied, they earn some money and communities start seeing they no longer destruct but construct. In that case we must mix the workforce of these projects with ex-combatants and civilians. It was suggested that it should be examined if we can expand our civil/military collaboration on this?

In addition, it was stressed that we need to work on violence and **security** after the conflict, after DD and that **context specifics** must be stressed!

Session 4: Aceh: The link between international agencies with civil society

Presentation by Lina Frödin and Hendra Budian

The paper: Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the European Commission (EC) in post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia (see annex E) was presented. Ms. Frödin explained the mandate and operational experience of the AMM to work on DDR in Aceh. Mr. Budian complemented her overview stressing the complete absence of civil society in the formal process. Ex-combatants were provide cash payments up to 2500 US$ per combatant and the result is disintegration, not reintegration. Local civil society was there but the process was dominated by internationals. In fact the Tsunami projects are more effective; where ex-combatants are also part of.

The following points based on the lessons learned from Aceh were highlighted:

1. The development of guidelines on monitoring of reintegration is particularly important in civil-military missions where monitors have different backgrounds and different understanding of their roles and the mission mandate. The mission has to decide on types of monitoring, as well as having a clear understanding of the goals of the reintegration process.

2. Monitoring and peace observation missions need more clearly defined goals for the mission. It has to be clear when the situation or context is such that the mission can be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the mission should be through a well prepared exit strategy in order to avoid unnecessary unrest or un-stability.

3. Trainings is needed on the locations, specially adapted for the mission needs. Training can also be a means for coordination between donors and peace missions, with thematic focus.

4. There has to be a good balance in a mission between persons with security focus and others with development focus, if the monitoring covers DDR. Reintegration is much closer linked to development work than to security operations.

Emphasis was put on the lack of formal dialogue with civil society organizations and limited dialogue with development agencies. The main challenges in this respect were the issues of power balances (access to budgets, capacity to raise issues, access to forums) and the risk of international agencies undermining and replacing local structures (civil society and Aceh government). There was very little openness to talk to civil society as stability was the issue, avoid criticism and questions. The main objective was security, with no incidences. Civil society was weak and more responsive than with their own agenda, they did demand clearness about AMMs exit strategy.

One success story was mentioned where former GAM started a cooperative and are doing well. Maybe one of the secrets of this success is that they were former business men. The presenters concluded that the link between EC and the AMM was bad; there was no link between security and development. Reintegration is a long term process and includes changing mindsets. Aceh was a long conflict, how to rebuild Aceh with for example challenges as fragmentation between the police and the military in upholding the law, conflict destroyed the social structures of Aceh; a stigmatized civil society. Don't create dependency, the transition process is important, the exit strategy is about power sharing at early stages, capacity building of national consultants etc. If the peace process collapses, we the Aceh people must have the capacity to resist.

Summary of comments and discussion on session 4

In the Aceh MOU, it is foreseen that **victims of conflict** receive benefits. The fact that they receive money, does that not mean they feel that they are paid off? GAM insisted that victims got served first, later this changed. In fact, the cash payments for victims is creating a big problem, certainly everyone claims to be a victim.

Reintegration through cash is obviously not working. GAM did not reintegrate through the cash they received. The question was put at the representatives of the Ministries if one donor can have the courage to stand up and say, we no longer provide funding for cash payments, only for short quick projects ex-combatants can work on? In the discussions around refugees the Dutch are lobbying for more cash in order to provide more freedom, we must look at that development as well. This is interesting, but is the returning refugee, often trained or educated while in refuge, in the same state of mind as a recently demobilised combatant in order to spend their money wisely? Also for refugees it does not give the wrong message as in DDR context: that violence pays.

Gradual ownership from international to national/local still has dilemmas. Strategic coordination is crucial, allowing local groups to set priorities. There must be a balance between capacity building of local government and civil society at the same time before the government structures get to strong. The dilemma in Aceh is that you have no alternative groups. You had the Aceh free movement but now they are mainstream. Should we support local government of will Jakarta misuse them? And how will Jakarta react if we support them too much? Concerning the monitoring of Reintegration processes, it was stressed that it is crucial to involve NGOs from the start. If the DDR program closes, NGOs and state actors must have quick response mechanism after DDR. Strengthen civil society will also reduce risks of them becoming completely project-budget driven.

The point was made that **Local businesses** get too little attention while there is great potential. They are the employers and likely to create jobs, development and security. The involvement of the private sector as an important actor in DDR deserves more emphasis.

Finally it was examined if the Tsunami projects help to **fill the gap** between DD and R? According to the presenters Aceh was flooded with projects and money but there was also the downside that the GAM dominated the Tsunami relief. We must understand that ex-combatants still hold power positions in the communities as people know that they are capable of violence. The war-economy does not just simply end by a DDR process. Also, before there was a great culture of voluntarism among the people in Aceh but this has now been undermined, especially through the "cash for work" projects. Now people do not even attend meetings without payment.

Session 5:   Afghan perceptions on DDR

Presentation by Ilse du Pied
The paper: DDR/DIAG: carrot and stick or stick and carrot? (see annex E) was presented. The author highlighted the following points based upon the research: What Afghans think about DDR:

The first point was on the role of PRTs in the DDR process. The presenter stressed that PRTs should have a clear policy and mandate, not only towards the broader objective of for example SSR and reinforcing state authority and security but also towards DDR components and the different stakeholders in the process. PRTs should not only support disarmament but be involved in all the components of DDR, either visible or less visible for stakeholders. The Dutch slogan towards civil-military cooperation is "As military as necessary, as civilian as possible" can be kept in mind (Leaflet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006:14).

The presenter expressed the opinion that PRTs role in hiring ex-combatants for short-term security and cash-for-work activities is undermining and counterproductive towards long-term state security and peace-building. She suggested that PRTs should be supportive to the reintegration component of DDR in terms of creating economic opportunities.

Dialogue, discussion and cooperation between PRTs and stakeholders in DDR such as UN/ANBP and NGOs is essential for the DDR process. Complementarily is not optimal yet and introspection of all stakeholders on own strengths and weaknesses should be incorporated into policy and implementation.
In Afghanistan, both international military forces and civil parties seem to have underestimated the complexity and importance of the DDR process. DDR is part of the broader five-pillared Security Reform Strategy. Japan being the lead nation and main donor of DDR could constitutionally not support the military-related disarmament and demobilization but only the reintegration component. Notwithstanding the importance of the reintegration component as an economic incentive, it is less effective and even counter-productive to separate the components of DDR as these are interwoven and should support each other.

It is therefore no surprise that the newly established PRTs encountered difficulties and challenges in the DDR process. One of the challenges is the interpretation of the PRTs policy and mandate, being defined by PRTs as supporting SSR and not specifically DDR. The fact that SSR is considered mandate and objective for PRTs does not necessarily exclude PRTs role and mandate being DDR as well. DDR should be not considered an objective but a means for reinforcing the authority of the state and rule of law and within DDR disarmament is not only about collecting weapons but also about transformation of Afghan society through demobilization and reintegration as well.

Some commanders used the reintegration component of DDR as means of patronage or simply confiscated the grants and reintegration packages. Instead of feelings of insecurity and distrust, Afghans should have felt that the law can be enforced and the ones that are doing so can be trusted. It is in this vacuum that the PRTs and ANA could have been supportive either by being mandated to enforce the law or in gaining and sharing with DDR players deeper understanding of the structures of the legal and illegal armed groups and their command chain in detail and in all parts of provinces, districts and villages. In general terms, a deeper understanding of military actors of the Afghan context is often lacking, as intercultural training is not (yet) considered an essential part of the preparations of mission. One of the conditions should be to start in time with the preparations to support DDR, an issue that is relevant for all DDR components that should start in parallel.

Summary of Comments and discussion on session 5

A discussion took place on the relationship of DDR with the **PRTs**. For example, the Dutch PRTs did not have the mandate for DDR, in fact the mandate was not so clear. They do provide support to the UN DDR program, but many DDR actors also did not want to link with the military. PRTs previously had no role in the Reintegration part of DDR, but now they have an active role in coordination of longer term development. The question was raised when looking at the role of civil society and the need for long term reintegration, what would be the link with PRTs as they are there for a short time. Now PRTs are involved with the DDR of illegal groups but the problem is that the incentives are missing. The approach of the new DDR program DIAG (Disarmament of armed groups) was discussed with mixed views among the participants. The approach is to provide the former Taliban with a new identity in another environment where reintegration takes place in the new communities. It was stressed that the Taliban must be provided with alternative livelihoods. However, the R-part of the approach is currently weak.

The second issue is if the people in Afghanistan express **the will** to get the DDR process on its way? According to the presenter, based upon her research, generally people do want peace and there are certainly some success stories. A related discussion focussed around the question on how the decision for DDR was taken? Was it right to do DDR? In Afghanistan DDR was needed to get illegal and legal groups with the potential to destabilise the country into a formal structure in order to have control. Control was also needed before the elections. The question is not if, but more how it is implemented.

The question came-up if it is positive to include ex-combatants in the **new forces**? In Afghanistan there were different results: the police had a bad reputation while the army was received better.

It was stressed that the Afghan program was **well designed**, so the problem seems not to be to get it right on paper in the beginning…so the question is: what goes wrong from there?

While DDR was partly positive, the real issue is how to support the ongoing process after the end of the formal program. How come they closed the R while we know we need **long term**? How do people approach Recovery support based upon lessons learned from the DDR? Again this discussion demonstrated the need for closer communication and information sharing among the different sets of DDD actors, also with regards to the exit strategy of DDR, with relation to the Development and SSR processes that will continue.

Session 6.   DDR Workshops: Towards concrete Working Principles

Four groups were formed to discuss 4 distinct topics that were distillate from earlier discussions. All groups contained members of Diplomacy, Defence and Development related organisations. The groups were requested to come up with some guiding principles in relation to the topic discussed.

Group 1 How to prepare the ground for DDR?

The group decided to refine the question to: How to prepare the ground for post-conflict and security building, which will probably include DDR

Guiding Principles

1.   Promote shared assessments, understandings, and co-ordination mechanisms from the beginning
Ensure that detailed multidimensional and integrated assessments are not only developed but also shared amongst key stakeholders and external partners at an early stage; and promote the development of a 'core' group of particularly engaged and knowledgeable actors to facilitate co-ordination and leadership in promoting peace and security.

This recommendation thus emphasises the early development and use of shared assessments and understandings amongst key partners; and the early development of a more or less informal 'core group' of particularly engaged external and local agencies to facilitate dynamic co-ordination and leadership for peace and security building. In practice, this must be a nuanced and multilevel process, involving confidence-building and dynamic processes. For example, the 'core group' will normally be a mixed and contingent set of actors, rather than a particular institution. Overall, it will include a number of local and external actors, with local and external sub-groups of representatives of states and institutions operating flexibly according to context. Their engagement and influence should be sufficiently substantial and long-term that shared understandings developed amongst them are influential in the planning and implementation of peace and security-building and DDR programs. The combined capacities, knowledge and influence of the members of such a core group should have sufficient scope and political weight to facilitate co-ordination within and between programs.

This recommendation is important at the level of the overall peace and security building process. It is also important at the level of preparing the ground for DDR programs, as well as designing and implementing them. A core group of external and local actors need actively to commission and consider joint assessments and examine and developed shared understandings of the relevance, role and priorities for DDR-related processes and programs at an early stage. It's members need subsequently to work together , and to help to ensure that any DDR programs do not become 'stove-piped' or stalled, but remain properly supported and adapting flexibly to changing circumstances. Similarly, they need to ensure that re-integration , demobilisation or disbarment processes and programs are

2.   Map and support local capacities from an early stage
Local organisations or movements often develop even before conflicts end the aims and capacities to limit violence, promote peace and security, and prepare the ground for DDR. Yet they are often marginalised, or even undermined, during the process of assessing, planning and implementing DDR or wider peace and security-building programs. This recommendation emphasises the importance of avoiding such mistakes, and instead prioritising promotion and support of relevant local capacities from the earliest stage.

In practice, this recommendation has a variety of possible implications. Before large scale violent conflict ends, or in its immediate aftermath, it implies at least working to protect and expand 'safe spaces' in which such local groups can work and develop; and engaging them in the various information gathering, consultation, and preparation processes to prepare the ground for DDR and for the development of wider peace and security building programs. It implies supporting generic capacities of local groups with an interest in and sympathy for DDR and peace-building processes to organise, develop and articulate assessments and recommendations; and to contribute to subsequent programs.

3.   Follow-on recommendation to Netherlands Government

That the Netherlands government should allocate specific resources to plan and prioritise activities in line with these two recommendations in at least one of the following countries/regions: South Sudan; Darfur; Somalia; Northern Uganda.

Summary of the discussion

This Working Group was asked to focus on the question 'How to prepare the ground for DDR'. It had a rich discussion on a range of issues relating to this question. The following notes briefly outline some of the main issues and conclusions discussed by the Group.

The Group agreed that it was very important to embed any DDR programs within a wider post-conflict security-building strategy, which addresses security of individuals and communities as well as state stabilization and regional security.

The Group also emphasized that the design, development and implementation of DDR programs should be carefully customized according to the specific country, context and wider security-building strategy. Although DDR processes can be expected to be important in most post-conflict contexts, the requirement for full DDR programs (as envisaged for example in the UN IDDRS) should not automatically be assumed.

Thus, the Group decided to refine the question it would address to: 'How to prepare the ground for post-conflict peace and security-building programs, which will probably include DDR programs'. In line with this, the Group focused on a two level discussion:

(i)   how to design and prepare for assistance to war-torn societies through post-conflict security building programs;

(ii)   how to prepare for possible DDR programs, within the context of such wider peace and security building strategies and programs.

The group discussed several issues in relation to the revised questions above. These included:
- The importance of conducting comprehensive, integrated and detailed assessments at the earliest feasible stage.
- The importance of providing for follow-on assessments of a similar nature once the peace agreement is signed (or the war has otherwise ended); and regularly thereafter: since war termination and peace building processes are highly dynamic, and emerging problems and opportunities need to be identified and responded to in a timely manner.
- Such assessments need to be multidimensional, including: detailed conflict assessments; stakeholder analyses; scenario-based analyses; regional/transnational contexts analysis; etc.
- Viable or optimal strategies for external assistance for peace and security building; and DDR, depend on the potential for co-operation, co-ordination and like-mindedness amongst external stakeholders, including allies and donors. The interests and capacities of such external actors and partners need to be realistically assessed when developing both the wider peace and security-building strategy and possible DDR programs.

- The development of wide 'local ownership' of peace and security-building programs is complex, and it is important to balance short-term priorities and power-realities against longer-term objectives to enhance and extend local capacities, participation and legitimacy. In this context, it is important at the earliest stage systematically to identify and assess capacities, potential, and legitimacy of the full range of local actors; and to get started as soon as possible with local capacity-building and empowerment activities (within the framework of the wider peace-and security building strategy and assessment)
- It is important to develop and take full account of realistic and frank assessments of external capacities to assist with peace-and security building, and with DDR processes.
- The importance and risks involved in developing the capacity, influence and legitimacy of local actors.
- The importance of infrastructures for information generation and dissemination, and associated confidence-building, in post-conflict contexts.
- The importance of prioritizing the development of consultation, co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms at he earliest stage: amongst key national and local actors; amongst external agencies and stakeholders; and between these types of groups.
- The importance of focusing on developing shared understandings of the situation, priorities and strategy amongst all key actors from the earliest possible stage: too often insufficient attention is devoted to developing such shared understandings, leading to avoidable problems with trust, information sharing, consultation and co-ordination later on.
- The importance of customizing DDR programs to the specific situation and wider post-conflict security building strategy, and for maintaining close and dynamic links between the development and implementation of DDR and wider peace-building priorities.
- The importance of preparing for re-integration of ex-combatants at the earliest feasible stage, including taking opportunities I(with appropriate safeguards) for relevant data-collection, information gathering and multi-level consultation processes relevant to re-insertion and re-integration issues, even before assessment and planning of DDR programs themselves are undertaken.
- The importance of linking consultations and information-sharing for DDR with those for related agendas, including SSR, arms reduction and control, IDP return, youth issues, etc.

Group 2 How to design a DDR program that ensures that long term reintegration works?

Guiding Principles

1. The programs and the funding should be more **flexible,** and more long-term. We should be truly context-specific and let go of our own Western views sometimes to make room for other views on reintegration programs, for example the way this was done in Rwanda.
2. There should be a beforehand **analysis**, which includes:
   Possibilities and capacities, analysis of target-group; differentiate between ex-combatants.
   Context: culture, but also population(growth), land availability etc.
   Identify risk factors, Choices for benefits, where will/should our money go to
   Analysis should be conflict sensitive and should take into account: fairness, ownership, transitional justice, reconciliation.
3. The design of the reintegration program, including the development of human security indicators, should be a **comprehensive process** that includes all the stakeholders. Stakeholders should identify the components, indicators and goals of reintegration. A post-conflict country is fragmented, so there are a lot of views. They cannot all be granted, would fall within the range of what is possible. We should manage the expectancy level. They should realize and be aware of their own context. Not everything can be done or is possible. It should be a visible process, visible progress breeds hope and trust.

Summary of the discussion

If we take the example of Afghanistan: the DDR program was well designed, but no sustainable reintegration took place. Something must have gone wrong between the design and the implementation phases. What are the requirements to make a program that works in the long term?

- There should be an **analysis made beforehand**.
  The analysis should be both of the individual ex-combatants and the situation in the country / region.
  What is the *capacity* in the country? What information is available already?
  Actors to make this analysis may vary, depends on who has the best access. Local civil society and local government should play a role.
- Should this be done through individuals? Asking them their hopes and dreams? Be careful not to create false expectations.
  It should look at the specific context (what is possible).
- We should determine what the end goal should be of the reintegration process. This links with the need to develop indicators (such as for fairness, restoration, justice, reconciliation, inclusive ownership, etc.).
- Disarmament is overrated. 'Weapons away' is not security. This may be culture-specific as well.
- Maybe sometimes RDD is more appropriate. Start with reintegration. Disarmament can follow later.
- Reintegration is not just about security, it has important **social components**. We should get all the *stakeholders* to give their views on all components of reintegration, with emphasis on **human security** and social processes.
  When we look at the stakeholders, we should try to include the groups that are often at risk of being forgotten, such as *women* (not only ads victims!) and *civil society*. Civil society is not just an implementer, it should also be *consulted* in designing the program and be a countervailing power. Some contexts may also call for religious leaders to be consulted.
- Beforehand an analysis should be made to identify all the stakeholders and the context.

- But when all the stakeholders are consulted, there can never be a consensus. They all have different views. Nevertheless, it is important that people are consulted and feel they have been part of the development of the process.
- There should be an objective overseer, who hears the views and then designs an appropriate program. Who should do that, depends on the context.
- Victims of the conflict also need to be consulted.
- In terms of involvement of the local government, not only the Ministry of Defence should be involved, but also different ministries such as planning, social affairs, labour, justice / human rights, etc.
- If possible the local government should be involved and if they are unable to, there should be capacity building within the local government. Builds *ownership*.
- But then government may not be neutral, the may have their own goals to reach.
- An open-ended process is nice, but realistically there *are limitations to resources, time and mandate.*
- Strike a *balance between what is desirable and what is possible.*
- There first should be research into the possibilities, and then consultation can start, within this range.
- Start design of a reintegration program during the peace process. Try to link where possible with the socio-economic paragraphs in the comprehensive peace agreements.

- We should look at it from the livelihood perspective. There are too many stakeholders, for their own good, some need to be sidelined. We should decide without them, because their opinions vary and there is always the possibility of **spoilers**.
- We should **differentiate** within the group of 'ex-combatants'. This is not one homogenous group. There is not enough attention for the reintegration of the mid-level command structure. Some people possibly cannot be reintegrated ("rotten apples").
- So, analysis should also include analysis of target group; who are these ex-combatants?
- But, sidelining some stakeholders may lead to other problems; fairness, ownership and reconciliation?
- Analysis should be focused on risk factors, and recognize these as priorities. Risks may include these spoilers within the ex-combatants.
- Another element of the risk analysis should be that we need to be more aware of the motivation of the ex combatants to start fighting in the first place. This is important to know in the design phase: were there economic motives to take up arms, or was there pressure by political leaders (possibly because of international conflicts).
- Major problem is that intervention and its programs are **inflexible**. Decisions should be made ad hoc. The mandate should put people in charge that are allowed to make these ad hoc decisions.
- Funding should be flexible
- Donors should be flexible and willing to invest longer.
- But, who do we send to make these decisions? What is our capacity and willingness?
- We should link much more with local values (although they might be fragmented in war torn societies). Reintegration programs should not be designed with western values in mind.

Group 3: **What is the added value of the various stakeholders in the DDR process and how can we mobilise these values?**

Guiding Principles
1. Should have series of negotiations with all relevant actors who must be flexible
2. Analyses can be made together to enhance cohesion, but 'together' has its practical limitations.
3. Possibility of experiencing with risky business in The Netherlands with relatively large finances for ODA. This can lead to more flexibility and long term goals.
4. Analyses at an early stage (going back to the negotiations) can open up grievances again after peace agreements.
5. Early warning missions are effective for development.
6. But, do the assessment and identification of actors, roles and goals early, in advance, there are plenty of possibilities to do so (proven by experience)
7. Let DDR programs be flexible in structures and processes, adapt them frequently to new realities
8. Let funds be flexible as well (risk money, no log-frame thinking)
9. Make analyses on conflict and conflict transformation together, with the different stakeholders, without re-opening agreements)

Summary of the discussion
Defence:
- Responsible for phase between conflict and post-conflict and should facilitate fluid transition. Military often one of the first to arrive on the scene: can secure the environment, have knowledge of the area. Weakness is that they start operating on themselves, "doing too much, too long", thus creating the gap.
- The campaign plan doesn't involve all necessary partners and military cannot accomplish end state on their own. Not task of military to attain Good Governance.
- In Afghanistan, military take over some work from NGO's, have more contact with Kara than NGO's.
- Long-term for military is 4 years, for reconstruction this is closer to 20 years.
- Military strengths; intelligence, mobility and educated. This versatility can lead to too much expansion of the mission. Local capacity is undermined if military take over too much. Especially Disarmament and Demobilisation through expertise on the ground and huge logistics.
- Easier for military to look through eyes of combatants and military often attain more respect among combatants than other stakeholders.
- Military can identify tribal structures in DD-phase in order to provide information for R-phase.
- **CSO**'s: Will this information actually be shared with us? CSO's often also in early phase on the ground. Military could use their information as a starting point for planning. Should respect each others role and mandate and look for complimentarity.
  Need more discussion in preparation phase.

Civil Society:
- CSO's know locals, where conflict is going and they stay for the long term. However, cultural mapping and local knowledge are two different things.
- Board of elders in community also belong to CS. Private sector doesn't belong to CS. Also uncivil elements within SC. Armed groups can be freedom fighters or terrorists, depending on perspective. Armed groups that provide services (Hama's, Fatah) don't belong to CS. NGO's often can have access to rebels that are regarded as terrorists which is an added value.

- There is sometimes also dialogue between military and rebels through sense of legitimacy and recognition. Ex-combatants can help combatants in process. Constituencies (and their perspectives) can be mobilized by talking leaders into DDR.
- R in DRC; work with all partners, all societal groups have suffered through linkages and only a holistic approach can reach whole spectrum, which is necessary to succeed
- CSO's on their own can highlight fairness of process through knowledge of the society.
- Legitimacy can be imposed on constituency by elite (example Charles Taylor). Elites have more clout for doing so than other actors.
- Local CSO's in conflict area often don't have strong associations, but are in better position to read situation than outsiders. These groups should be involved from negotiations on.
- Issues in conflict are there where organizations exist which can be used by outsiders
- CSO's can correct blueprints and models through knowledge of context.
- Faith based organizations can help in reconciliation through traditional cleansing, confessing and the likes. In Congo and Cambodia the combatants were convinced to give up arms by faith based organisations and Buddhist monks respectively.
- Negative components CS: Even in West CS is messy, difficult to understand its dynamics. This is even worse in post-conflict situations. Difficult to affiliate with organisations when their roles are not clear, poses moral dilemma.
- In Africa, NGO's need a certificate from the government to operate. The danger is that NGO's will start mouthing the government to attain such a certificate.
- Example of Liberia; CS initiatives commonly in capital and urban areas. Initiatives sometimes go against customs in villages which hinders capacity building. However, capacity for peace is there, but not always taken into account.
- Military are trying to create role within their plans for CS and dialogue throughout process is required for bridging this gap.
- In Afghanistan it is needed to connect to the invisible CS structures in the villages in order to empower them. The opportunities are there, but not always used.
- In Aceh, this opportunity was missed and the right people were not involved. R only became central in last three moths. Should think of right partners at the earliest stage.
- Conclusion:
    - Involvement of CS can give more legitimacy to DDR processes
    - Severe knowledge of CS can help a better understanding of the risks
    - CS can provide good networks for warning, and dissemination
    - CS can take role in mapping and pin-pointing
    - CS can help translating international blueprints into local context
    - CS do have good intrinsic capacities on traditional justice, reconciliation, disarmament, participation, etc
    - CS can provide democratic conditions, values and tools

Diplomacy:
- Have the largest finances, but commonly conditional. Difficulties within ministries with regard to quick results.
- R is more messy than DD and thus harder to finance, because it's hard to point at concrete results
- They set the parameters and give support on conditions or active opposition
- Have, through large budget, great clout (both positive and negative) through which demands can be made. Furthermore represents sovereign state which is most important actor.
- More coherence and clarity would lead to effective setting of parameters.

Group 4. How to determine jointly that DDR is the proper instrument for a peace and/or transition process?

Guiding Principles

1. Deciding whether DDR is the <u>proper instrument</u> for a peace process is in itself the main question and should not be taken a priori; is the peace agreement considered well designed to include a DDR program? Are required effects considered realistic?

2. Based on a proper <u>analysis/assessment</u>, by the relevant actors (at donor side and at local level) involved, of the conflict, the country and the regional setting a DDR process should be designed. <u>Donor agencies</u> are primarily responsible for this comprehensive assessment, and need not to make use of expertise provided by civil society organisations at home and local.

3. DDR is a flexible process and should be adapted to the emerging developments with regard to an <u>enduring stable security situation</u> (the end effect).

4. All donor actors (state and non-state; local and donor), however, need to <u>keep assessing</u> whether the effects to be obtained are still realistic and reachable.

5. Any DDR process starts and ends with the <u>willingness</u> of the relevant parties involved, which explicitly beholds the danger that the DDR process is being taken hostage by some parties (stakeholders).

Although, we did not touch upon the 'how' question, we suggest some items that might be considered in conjunction with the above principles

How to decide:
- Compiling a comprehensive list of relevant armed parties
- Assessing for each of the parties their level of willingness (interests) to engage in their own DDR
- Assessing for each of the parties their level of 'willingness to change behaviour'
- Based on an assessment, deciding which parties are required for the DDR process to start.
- Putting pressure on (providing carrots) those parties that are not (yet) willing to engage in DDR

Ensuring the willingness of donor agencies to really support the process, and not just funding whilst ignoring the real estate of the process. <u>Donors need to stay engaged in the DDR process itself</u>.

Summary of the discussion

Three key issues:
- jointness (meaning: from donor side)
- proper instrument (coherent with the required effects)
- peace process (reference framework for any DDR process)

A DDR process is a proper instrument…
…when it is needed
…when it is included in a peace agreement

Starting point is a right <u>analysis</u>. What, then, do you need to know?

- who are deciding that or when a DDR process starts? This answer leads an analysis of the actors involved and the spectrum of actors you need to analyze;
- what is the focus of the program? In any case: <u>stabilization</u>.
- at the bottom-line, by consequence, it does not matter whether you start with disarmament, demobilization or reintegration (question of how to reconcile the interests of the parties involved)

<u>When</u> do you start a DDR process? Only, when time is considered ripe.
(need for benchmarks, based on lessons learned?)

| time's ripe | ⟶ | start DDR |

| situation is being ripened (by local and external actors) | ⟶ | time's ripe | ⟶ | start DDR |

Issues to be considered in a decision-making process on DDR:

- DDR versus criminal activities. Determining a line between "legal" armed groups and "illegal" armed groups (criminals)? So, one needs to have a quiet detailed idea of which groups exist and what their status is.
- Awareness of responsibility of donors in creating 'armed groups' themselves.
- Low cost of SALW (Small Arms, Light Weapons) creates 'trade in DDR activities' (handing in weapon, receiving allowance, buying new weapon, handing in, receiving allowance etc.)
- Awareness that parties might not be willing to DD, because of (economic) interests in DDR.
- Taking into account the status the DDR'ed people receive in their new role.
- There is no clear answer to the question whether the centre of gravity of decision-making with regard to DDR should take place at village level or at the level of national government. In the end, this is largely dependant on the country or conflict in question. (→ need for situational awareness/assessment)

3.   Conclusions and Follow-up

The conference was an enormous success in terms of improving relations among the different actors from Diplomacy, Defence and Development focussed ministries and organisations. The discussion resulted in a clearer understanding of the different views, mandates and goals of the various actors involved in DDR. The need for more information sharing was stressed over and over again and a good start on this has been made at the conference.

Furthermore, it became clear to all actors that we still have enormous challenges ahead, both in terms of improving DDR programs as such and very much so in improving cooperation and collaboration. The working relations between the UN DDR programs with the development agencies and their relationship with NGOs is still challenging to improve. More clarity in this is required in determining the roles of NGOs, as informers, designers, monitors or implementers of DDR related activities. The need to consult NGOs present in the country before DDR is started was stressed as an important first step. Also, the working relations between CIMIC and International NGOs needs more work in terms of understanding each others mandates, limitations and comparative advantages in order to complement each other to improve of DDR.

A wealth of technical issues of DDR have been discussed and presented in earlier chapters. All these areas need further discussion in order to come to agreement on best approaches to take. However, it became clear once again that the context specific needs and limitations will be an important determent of how a specific DDR program should look like. Therefore, the most crucial aspect remains to develop collaboration and consultation mechanism that can be set in motion during the design of a specific DDR program.

Finally, several presenters and participants stressed the need to see DDR in the broader context of security and peace building. DDRs linkages with SSR and Development processes need to be understood by all actors and needs to be part of the planning process right from day one. DDR has its limitations and is unfair towards the victims and community members. Therefore, DDR can only be one step in the conflict to peace transition and in order for a DDR program to be successful, SSR processes need to start as early as possible, security at the local levels must be guarantied, justice and police has to be put in place soonest in order to stop the culture of impunity. Economic recovery processes need to boost local economies in order to create the enabling environment for reintegration to succeed, and for non-combatants to also have possibilities to rebuild their lives. Timing is one of the most important factors in this, and this demands effective structures of collaboration between the 3 D actors.

Many draft principles and recommendations were provided and discussed during the conference. The draft working principles below are a clustered summery of the most important points. These draft principles need further polishing and the "how question" needs further work. They do however serve as a basis for further discussion, sharing and as an input to the future DDR policy of the Dutch Ministries of foreign affairs, development and defence.

1. Deciding **whether DDR is the proper instrument** for a peace process is in itself the main question and should not be taken a priori; is the peace agreement considered well designed to include a DDR program? Are required effects considered realistic? Any DDR process starts and ends with the willingness of the relevant parties involved, which explicitly beholds the danger that the DDR process is being taken hostage by some parties (stakeholders).

2. **Involve all actors in the design of a program**. The design of the reintegration program, including the development of human security indicators, should be a comprehensive process that

includes all the stakeholders. Stakeholders should identify the components, indicators and goals of reintegration. A post-conflict country is fragmented, so there are a lot of views. Analyses can be made together to enhance cohesion, but 'together' has its practical limitations.

3. We should be **truly context-specific** There should be a beforehand analysis, and consultations with actors already on the ground prior to DDR.

4. Discuss, decide and share the **exact goals** of a specific DDR program and set joint priorities. Identify risk factors, potential harm and analyze how the DDR program will contribute to Security (SSR), peace building and development. Design a flexible exit strategy and prepare national actors for a smooth hand0-over of ongoing reintegration assistance.

5. **Start as early as possible with the pre-DDR preparations**
   Do the assessment and identification of actors, roles and goals early, in advance, there are plenty of possibilities to do so (proven by experience). Then start building their capacities long before DDR starts.

6. **Share information** prior to reintegration to prepare both ex-combatants and communities. Based on a proper analysis/assessment, by the relevant actors (at donor side and at local level) involved, of the conflict, the country and the regional setting a DDR process should be designed.

7. Balance support to ex-com with other groups, **make DDR less unfair** by enlarging the target group in reintegration services and by ensuring direct benefits to receiving communities. Reduce or stop cash-payments to combatant during Reinsertion but engage them in reconstruction work. Invest in boosting local economies.

8. Let DDR programs be **flexible** in structures and processes, adapt them frequently to new realities. Let funds be flexible as well (risk money, no log-frame thinking). DDR is a flexible process and should be adapted to the emerging developments with regard to an enduring stable security situation (the end effect). All donor actors (state and non-state; local and donor), however, need to keep assessing whether the effects to be obtained are still realistic and reachable.

9. The Reintegration programs and the funding should be **more long-term in order to ensure sustainability**. Wherever possible, the ex-combatants should be involved in the rebuilding of war-affected communities, as part of their reintegration. DDR programs should involve local communities and civil society and funding must be made available for longer reintegration at the community level.

ANNEX A   **Program**

Wednesday, 30 May:		
16.15	Registration	
16.45	Welcome	**K.M. Davidse** (MFA) Dep. Director Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department
17.00 Session 1:	**DD and R: Two worlds apart?** Lessons Learned from the field.	**Cornelis (Kees) Steenken** Swedish National Defence College **Irma Specht** Director, Transition International
18.30	Dinner & Key Note Speech	**Gen. Patrick Cammaert** (MONUC)

Thursday 31 May:		
09.00	Welcome	**Cornelis (Kees) Steenken** (Day Moderator)
09.30 Session 2:	**Mind the Gap:** How to create synergy between the various actors	**Yaron Oppenheimer** (MFA) Policy advisor Peacebuilding and Good Governance Division
10.30 Session 3:	**Case Study: DR Congo** Complementarity between NGOs, national authorities and donor initiatives	**Sami Faltas** Analyst, CESS Groningen **Maurice Namwira** Héritiers de la Justice
11.30	Break	
11.45 Session 4:	**Case Study: Aceh** The link between international agencies with civil society	**Lina Frödin** Reintegration & Justice Adviser to the EC in Aceh. Former member AMM. **Hendra Budian** Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institute
13.00	Lunch Break	
14.30 Session 5:	**Case Study: Afghanistan** Afghan perceptions on DDR	**Ilse du Pied** Freelance Analyst, Afghanistan
15.30	Break	
15.45 Session 6:	DDR Workshops: Towards concrete Working Principles	
17.00	Conclusions: Discussion Findings	**Cornelis (Kees) Steenken**
17.45	Closure	**Maj. Gen. Eikelboom**
18.00	Reception	

ANNEX B   **Participants & Organisations**

Steenken	Cornelis (Kees)	Swedish National Defence College
Specht	Irma	Transition International
Swart, de	Marco	Oxfam Novib
Rooijmans	Eveline	Oxfam Novib
Spaarman	Piet	Cordaid
Broek, v.d.	Kees	Cordaid
Deventer, van	Fulco	Cordaid/ICCO (facilitator)
Beeck	Christine	BICC
Faltas	Sami	CESS Groningen (DRC speaker)
Goor, vd	Luc	Clingendael Institute, Conflict Research Unit
du Pied	Ilse	Afghanistan (speaker)
Frodin	Lina	European Commission, Europe House Aceh (speaker)
Budian	Hendra	Aceh Judicial Monitoring (AJMI) (speaker)
Ort	Caroline	ICCO (facilitator)
Soede	Sjarah	ICCO
Gabrielse	Rob	MFA Security Policy Department
Oppenheimer	Yaron	MFA HR & Peacebuilding Department (speaker)
Koper	Martin	MFA Sub-Sahara Africa Department
Wieren, van	Jelte	MFA HR & Peacebuilding Department (facilitator)
Kelkes	Bernhard	MFA Asia and Oceania Department/ Afghanistan
Quarles van Ufford	Robert	MFA DSI Gender and DDR
Gaag, van der	Jet	MoD Advisor Development Cooperation
Vries, de	Hugo	MoD Assistant Advisor Development Cooperation
Woerdt, v.d.	Jan	MoD BS/DOPS/J9
André de la Porte	Hans	MoD BS/DOPS/J9
Siccama	Jan-Geert	MoD HDAB
Grisnigt	Marcel	MoD D-OBBP, KLTZ
Lodder	Hans	MoD D-OBBP, KLTZ
Monderen	Henk	MoD
Staalduinen, van	Peter	MoD Int. Military Cooperation
Heuvel, vd	Ella	MoD, Genderforce
Hazelzet	Hadewych	Federal Foreign Office, ESDP-div. Berlin
Watson	Charlotte	International Alert, Brussels
Greene	Owen	Bradford University, DfID project
Hoebeke	Hans	Egmont Inst. Brussel
Namwira	Maurice	Heritiers de la Justice (DRC speaker)
Kulve, te	Maarten	Medecins sans Frontieres
Brocades Zaalberg	Thijs	Netherlands Institute for Military History
Lafreniere	Luc	UNDP/BCPR Small Arms & Demobilization Unit
Blair	Stephen	Cranfield Uni, Dep of Def. Manag. & Security Analysis
Hilhorst	Thea	Wageningen Uni, Dept. of Disaster Studies
Lijn, van der	Jaïr	Wageningen Uni, Dept. of Disaster Studies
Strand Holm	Alexandra	Dutch NGO Network for Afgh./ Cordaid
Douma	Pyt	Independent consultant
Klinkenberg	Stan	Save the Children
Kamphuis	Herman	ZOA Refugee Care

ANNEX C.   Donor Checklist on Gender and DDR[2]

This 'Donor checklist on gender and DDR' has been designed by UNIFEM. The author of this report, though, has slightly revised the checklist to assist Dutch policy-makers in particular in their discussions with the United Nations, the World Bank and other agencies on the gender dimensions of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). It aims to guide them on how best to address gender issues in the planning and implementation of specific DDR programs.

The focus of the checklist is on the active participation of women in (ir)regular armies during conflict, and on the need to target these women in DDR programs and complementary development assistance programs after conflict. It distinguishes four groups of women in the (ir)regular forces: women combatants, women support workers, women who were abducted, and women dependants. It assumes that DDR programs provide assistance to women combatants, women support workers, and women dependants, and that complementary development assistance programs are available to address the needs of female abductees. Complementary assistance programs are also needed to provide a follow-up to DDR programs. While DDR programs can only deal with the initial reintegration needs of ex-combatants, development assistance programs can ensure their more sustainable reintegration and contribute to longer-term stability in the post-conflict trajectory.

The topics that the checklist addresses are: a) the assessment phase of DDR programs; b) mandates, scope and institutional arrangements; c) DDR package of benefits and incentives; d) assembly and cantonment phase (demobilization); e) disarmament; f) resettlement; g) social reintegration into communities; and h) economic reintegration trajectory. It does not elaborate on the incorporation of gender and DDR into the peace talks and peace accords. However, the relevance of gender in DDR programs should already be stipulated in peace accords, as these usually determine the framework of the DDR process. Finally, the checklist is meant to be indicative, not exhaustive. Users can best apply it in a flexible way, adding or deleting topics where they deem it necessary.

Planning DDR: the Assessment Phase

Planners at the (inter)national level should develop a good understanding of the legal, political, economic and social context of the DDR program and of how it affects women and men, both in (ir)regular armies and in the receiving communities. In addition, planners must understand the different needs of women and men, and the specific needs of women according to whether they are combatants, support workers, abductees, wives or dependants. Program-planners should take into account the fact that the choices that women make may be different from those made by men, in terms of post-conflict demobilization and reintegration.

- Gender expertise should be considered an essential element of any assessment mission undertaken by the United Nations, World Bank, or any other relevant body. This applies specifically to those teams with DDR-related mandates, and gender analysis and information should be adequately reflected in reporting;
- The number and percentage of women in ir(regular) armies, as well as their rank and the type of roles they have filled, should be ascertained. Examples of women in combat functions, in support roles (e.g. cooks, spies, messengers), and as soldiers' wives should be included;
- Evidence ascertained in the assessment mission on the prevalence of abducted women in ir(regular) armies, who joined owing to lack of protection, because they were trafficked, forced into marriage

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[2] This checklist has largely been derived from the UNIFEM publication *Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, UNIFEM, 2004, pp. 30-40.

and/or used as sex slaves, should inform planning. There are important differences in the services required by each group;

- The assessment team should identify local capacities of organizations already working on DDR-related issues and the key lessons they have learned;
- Along with these community peace-building forums, women's organizations should be routinely consulted on assessment missions, as they are often a valuable source of information for planners and public information specialists – for instance, regarding the community's perceptions of the dangers posed by illicit weapons, attitudes towards various types of weapons and the location of weapons caches, and other problems, such as the trans-border weapons trade. Women's organizations can also provide a window on to local perceptions about returning women in (ir)regular armies;
- Women interpreters familiar with relevant terminology and concepts should be hired and trained by assessment teams to provide assistance to women in (ir)regular armies;
- The assessment team should identify the range of existing attitudes on giving women ex-combatants the option of joining peacetime armies and other security institutions, such as intelligence services, border police, customs, immigration and other law-enforcement services;
- An ongoing assessment must be conducted of the range of attitudes at the local level towards returning female combatants, support workers, and dependants, to anticipate the kinds of obstacles to reintegration, so as to better prepare both the community and those returning to the community;
- Perceptions of the children of women combatants, support workers, and dependants must also be assessed;
- If the assessment team is given the task of identifying sites for cantonment, sites must be able to accommodate separate facilities for women and men as required. Sanitary facilities should be designed in a manner that allows for privacy in accordance with culturally accepted norms, and water and sanitary wear should be available to meet women's and girls' hygiene needs;
- Women's specific health needs, including gynecological care, should be catered for;
- When planning the transportation of ex-combatants to cantonment sites or to their communities, sufficient resources should be budgeted so as to offer women the option of being transported separately from men where personal safety is a concern;
- The assessment team's recommendations regarding personnel and budgetary requirements for the DDR process should include a dedicated international and local staff of female DDR experts, female interpreters, and female field staff for reception centers and cantonment sites to which female combatants can safely report.

Planning DDR: Mandates, Scope, Institutional Arrangements

DDR processes have traditionally focused on adult male, able-bodied combatants and paid scant attention to the needs of female combatants, female support workers, abducted women, and the wives and dependants of combatants. While a narrow definition of who qualifies as a 'combatant' as generally been excused as arising from budgetary constraints, it has meant that DDR programs have often overlooked or inadequately attended to the needs of a large segment of women participating in ir(regular) armies. By overlooking those who do not fit the category of 'male, able-bodied combatants', DDR activities are not only less efficient, but run the risk of reinforcing existing gender inequalities in local communities and exacerbating economic hardship for women participating in (ir)regular armies, some of whom may have unresolved trauma and reduced physical capacity due to violence experienced during the conflict.

- Regarding the mandate of the DDR program, the assessment team together with relevant personnel at UN, World Bank and other agencies' headquarters should draw up a mandate for a gender-sensitive DDR process in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). Specifically, the definition of a beneficiary should not be limited to armed combatants, but rather should include

those who fulfill support functions essential for the maintenance and cohesion of the (ir)regular armies.

- Definitions of who constitutes a dependant should be carefully examined. Where a male ex-combatant and a woman are living as man and wife according to local perceptions and practices, this should guarantee the woman's eligibility for assistance under the DDR program. The dependants of an ex-combatant should include any person living as part of the ex-combatant's household under his or her care. This may include, for instance, other wives, children, parents or siblings and members of the extended family.
- Definitions of who constitutes an abducted woman should be carefully drawn up. The definitions should make clear how abducted women differ from female combatants, female support workers, and wives and dependants of combatants. Those who are to be defined as abducted women may not have to be targeted by the DDR program itself but could be referred to complementary development assistance programs.
- When the Security Council establishes a peacekeeping operation with mandated DDR functions (or when the World Bank or other agencies establish a DDR program), components that will ensure gender equity should be adequately financed through the assessed budget of UN peacekeeping operations and not through voluntary contributions alone. From the outset, funds must be allocated for gender experts and expertise to inform the planning and implementation of dedicated programs serving the needs of female ex-combatants, support workers, and dependants.
- United Nations, World Bank or other donor representatives should facilitate financial support of the gender components of DDR processes, particularly in situations where governments are primarily responsible for disarmament.
- In situations where governments are responsible for the disarmament of ex-combatants, UN, World Bank and other representatives should encourage national DDR commissions to work closely with women's governmental machineries and ministries and women's peace-building networks.
- A gender and DDR component should be included in the training programs routinely arranged in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. There is a need to increase the technical qualifications of those in leadership positions regarding gender – and gender and DDR more specifically. The UN, World Bank, donor countries and troop-contributing countries should be encouraged to include women and gender issues in all training exercises and policy guidance provided to troops, technical experts and all holders of high-level appointments, such as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Accountability measures must be developed and applied to ensure that all staff are committed to gender equity.
- Troop-contributing countries should be encouraged and supported to fast-track women for deployment in peacekeeping operations and DDR processes.

DDR Planning: the Package of Benefits and Incentives

Benefits packages can include one or more of the following: financial resources, material resources and basic training. The overall aim should be to ensure that the distribution of benefits enables women to have the same economic choices as men. A good understanding of women's rights (e.g. regarding property ownership) and social attitudes relating to women's and girls' access to economic resources is needed when designing the composition of the benefits package. While DDR planners have assumed that financial packages given to male ex-combatants will be used for the benefit of family members, cumulative wisdom from the field asserts that demobilized men may go on 'spending sprees' in the discharge phase rather than share their money equitably. Sustainable reintegration cannot happen unless male ex-combatants are recognized as members of a larger community, which often means being part of a family unit, rather than as individuals.

- Planners should pay careful attention to budgeting: reintegration is the costliest and longest process in DDR and requires the largest allocation of resources;

- When planning the demobilization package, women and men should receive equitable basic demobilization benefits packages, including access to land and tools;
- Planning should include a labor market assessment so that a compilation of information of the different job options and market opportunities that will be available to men and women on discharge is available. This analysis should take place as early as possible so that training programs are ready when ex-combatants need them, and should reflect an understanding of local gender norms and standards about gender-appropriate labor, as well as changes in gender roles that may have occurred during conflict. Opportunities for women's economic independence as well as potential drawbacks for women entering previously 'male' workplaces and professions should be considered;
- If money is disbursed as part of the demobilization program, the different funding needs and spending patterns of women should be recognized and accommodated (e.g. do women and girls prefer large payments of cash or monthly disbursal? Does either form of payment place women and girls at additional risk?);
- Care should be taken to discuss and pay the financial portion of demobilization packages (if any) with women in private, away from male family members, but discreetly so as not to arouse suspicion and a potentially hostile and violent reaction;
- Women's traditional forms of money management should be recognized and supported (e.g. rotational loan and credit schemes) and, where available, access to banks and the opening of a private bank account to safeguard money should be facilitated;
- Education and training efforts should correspond to the needs and desires of the women and start as soon as possible during the demobilization phase, as experience has shown that women tend to be overwhelmed by household responsibilities and may face restricted mobility once they return home, and are therefore less likely to be able to attend training;
- In many low-income countries, women tend to have lower educational levels, and skills in less profitable occupational areas, than their male peers. Training provided should take this into account through the provision of additional resources for literacy and training in higher-earning skills for women.

Assembly and Cantonment (Demobilization)

Female combatants, female support workers, and female dependants are less likely to come forward to participate in demobilization programs than their male peers. This may be for a variety of the following reasons: a failure to adequately assess the number of women combatants, support workers, and dependants during the assessment phase so that women are neither expected nor catered for; women having poorer access to news sources, such as radios, and being less able to read than men in many peacekeeping contexts; the stigma of being associated with an armed group during peacetime; or perhaps the perception or fact that only those people with a weapon to hand in can participate in a DDR program. Efforts should be made to ensure that information about the DDR program reaches and is well understood by women in the (ir)regular armies.

- Men and women in (ir)regular armies should be equally targeted with clear information on their eligibility for participation in DDR programs or in complementary development assistance programs, including information about the benefits available to them and how to obtain them. Concurrently, information and awareness-raising sessions should be offered to the communities that will receive them, especially women's groups, to help them understand what DDR is, and what they can and cannot expect to gain from it;
- The geography of cantonment sites should be reconceived to accommodate the humanitarian and security needs of women, such as regular patrols, fencing, etc. Sites should accommodate the different ages and sexes of ex-fighters. If women are to take advantage of training and education opportunities, childcare provisions cannot be optional or perceived as non-essential;

- In order for women to feel safe and welcomed in a DDR process, and to avoid their self-demobilization, female protection workers at the assembly point are essential. Training should be put in place for female field workers whose role will be to interview female combatants, female support workers, women who have been abducted, and wives and dependants of male combatants in order to identify who should be included in DDR processes and to support those who are eligible;
- The physical layout of the reception centre should be structured so that abducted women may register separately from their male partners, and receive separate identity cards, which is important as the assembly point may offer a rare opportunity for escape from their captors. From the assembly point they could be referred to complementary development assistance programs;
- Men and women should be escorted to separate facilities, while being assured and shown that there will be frequent opportunities offered for contact in the initial stages of the demobilization processes, as families may have joint decisions to make about their futures;
- The threat of sexual violence must be fully recognized and appropriate placing of latrines, washing and kitchen facilities must reduce security threats to women. The provision of fuel and water decreases the need for women to leave a secured area, and is therefore an essential service;
- Secure food and water distribution and the provision of hygiene facilities and healthcare, including reproductive and psychosocial health services, are essential. Women may have specific health and psychosocial needs, for instance relating to gender-based violence. Health screening, including reproductive health screening, should be mandatory at all centers. Women who have suffered sexual assault during and after the conflict should be assisted by women who are trained in trauma management and offered counseling services where these are culturally acceptable and appropriate. Such assistance is essential to allow women combatants and women support workers to participate in training and receive any healthcare or counseling services required;
- Opportunities should be provided to educate women about their rights, e.g. the right to own land or the right to have recourse to the law;
- Men and women should be offered equal (but if necessary, separate) access to education about HIV/AIDS.

Disarmament

The disarmament phase in DDR is the first step in the process of turning combatants back into civilians. The efforts in this phase to collect the arms held by fighters are mainly to be seen as a symbolic prelude to a much longer and broader series of initiatives designed to convince a post-conflict society to disarm.

- Armed and non-armed combatants should be separated while weapons are collected;
- Experience has shown that commanders sometimes remove weapons from the hands of women prior to arrival at the assembly point. In the past this has denied women and girls access to services and benefits of the DDR program. Therefore, other eligibility criteria than that of handing in a weapon should have been developed in order to ensure, for instance, that women support workers are included in DDR programs;
- Weapons-in-exchange-for-development projects are preferred over weapons-in-exchange-for-cash projects, because they are seen as, among other things, an opportunity to target and train women. They often include the provision of services or goods that can alleviate the burden of care disproportionately placed on women in many parts of the world, such as responsibility for collecting water and fuel;
- Women's knowledge (both inside and outside the (ir)regular armies) of trading routes, weapons caches and other sources of hidden small arms and light weapons should be recognized and utilized in disarmament planning but, at the same time, attention should be paid above all to the risks that such disclosure can pose;

- Collected weapons should be properly guarded and, ideally, destroyed. The involvement of women's groups in monitoring weapons collection and destruction and as participants in destruction ceremonies can be a powerful way of solidifying community investment in the peace process.

Resettlement

After demobilization, mechanisms should be put in place to facilitate the return of women and men to their destination of choice via a safe means of transportation that minimizes exposure to gender-based violence, or re-recruitment and abduction into (ir)regular armies.

- Women in particular should be properly catered for and included in any travel assistance that is offered after encampment. If a journey will take several days, the needs of women and their children must be catered for, with separate vehicles made available if required;
- Women should be free to choose where they will live, electing to return to land from which they or their partner came, or to move to semi-urban or urban areas where they may have more freedom from traditional gender roles;
- Women and men should be equally informed about and able to access the local demobilization support office.

Social Reintegration into Communities

Although the primary intent of demobilization is to remove combatants from their combat and support roles as quickly as possible, even in the planning stages it is imperative to think about how returning combatants will be received by the civilian community. The period of reintegration will be a long one, and if it is not well planned, it is highly likely that ex-combatants will not reintegrate and that divisions between them and the receiving community will widen as time goes on. Therefore a combination between special reintegration programs for ex-combatants and more general development assistance programs for the receiving communities as a whole should be considered. Special attention is needed for the specific reintegration problems faced by female combatants, female support workers, and female dependants as these usually are even more complicated than those faced by their male peers.

- As part of the broad consultation undertaken with a wide variety of social actors, community awareness-raising meetings should be held to prepare the community to receive ex-combatants. Inclusion of women and women's organizations in these processes should be regarded as essential;
- Receiving communities should be informed about the intention and use of reintegration packages and their potential impact;
- Ex-combatants, their wives and dependants and receiving families and communities need to be sensitized to the difficulties of readjustment to civilian life of people who joined the (ir)regular armies. Messages of reconciliation should also address the plight of women who may have suffered abuse while in the (ir)regular armies and their specific needs;
- Women's organizations should be encouraged and trained to participate in healing and reconciliation work in general and, in particular, to assist the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants from different factions. Have women in the post-conflict zone already begun the process of reconstruction after war? Is this work recognized and supported?;
- The expertise of women combatants, women support workers, and women dependants—which may be non-traditional—should be recognized, respected and utilized by other women. The reintegration of these women should be linked to broader strategies aimed at women's post-conflict development in order to prevent resentment against fighters as a 'privileged' group;
- Radio networks should include women's voices and experiences when educating local people about those who are being reintegrated, and thus reduce any tensions there might be;

- Community mental health practices (such as cleansing ceremonies) should be encouraged to contribute to the long-term psychological rehabilitation of ex-combatants and to address women's specific suffering (often a result of sexualized violence).

Economic Reintegration

Female ex-combatants often find it more difficult than male ex-combatants to achieve economic reintegration. With few job opportunities, particularly within the formal sector, women have limited options for economic reintegration, which has serious implications if they are the main providers for their dependents. Female ex-combatants in particular, who may have become accustomed to a relatively independent and egalitarian life while away, may also find it difficult on their return to adapt to the expectations of traditional communities.

- Special measures have to be instituted to ensure that female beneficiaries have equal training and employment opportunities after leaving the cantonment site. This entails allocating funding for childcare and providing training as close as possible to where the women reside in order to minimize irregular attendance due to problems associated with transport (e.g. infrequent buses) or mobility (e.g. cultural restrictions on women's travel). Obstacles such as employers refusing to hire female ex-combatants, or narrow expectations of the work that women are permitted to do, should be taken into account before retraining is offered. Potential employers should be targeted for sensitization training to encourage them to train and employ these women;
- Measures should be put in place to prevent the 'ghettoization' of female combatants, support workers and dependants on the fringes of the economy. This includes excessive reliance on unpaid or low-paid NGO activity, which might become a substitute for long-term participation in the labor market;
- Women should be given a voice in determining the types of skills that they are taught. Options should be provided to allow women to build on skills acquired during their time with the (ir)regular armies, including skills that typically may not be considered 'women's work', such as driving or construction jobs. Vocational skills should be taught in economically viable areas, where there is likely to be a long-term market demand;
- One of the greatest needs of ex-combatants and their families is access to land and housing. In securing these, the specific needs of women have to be taken into account, particularly when traditional practices mean there is an unwillingness to accommodate female-headed households.

Annex D   Introduction into DDR

Kees Steenken and Irma Specht

'The objective of the DDR is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process. In this regard, DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security and development. It is important to note that DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can however help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a recovery and peace-building strategy can proceed"[3]

DDR is not for everybody.   DDR is for one specific group of people – combatants - who pose a security threat to society. It must be noted that there are also IDPs, refugees, remainees and numerous others that must be taken care of by other programs in order to address their needs and concerns.

Disarmament
Cornelis Steenken stressed the need for a comprehensive Peace accord within which the timing and scope of disarmament should be clearly specified. If it is not undertaken quickly, there is a risk of the agreement unravelling, but if insufficient time is allowed to prepare adequately, a flawed disarmament process could result in new violence.

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[3] Integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), module 1, August 2006

The parties must also reach agreement on the **procedures** to be followed. Procedural aspects of an agreement might include: the sequence of disarmament and extent to which it can be challenged or inspected by the other side. The ratio or **proportion of forces** to be disarmed at each stage in the process (this is important to prevent unevenly matched forces from taking advantage of a sudden change in the balance of military power) and finally, the disposition of weapons and arrangements for their supervision are important.

Disarmament measures in affected countries could be linked to regional undertakings in order to prevent a sudden outflow of cheap weapons from destabilizing **neighbouring countries**. Once the scene is set by agreement at the international level, planning at the **national level** (usually in a mission headquarters and in conjunction with any National DDR Commissions) must reconcile the continuing conflict between the interests of the parties. Sequencing, weapons surveys, hand-in policies, and funding, are some of the issues, which must be resolved by mission headquarters.

The disarmament process needs to be **transparent**, because parties will be at their most distrustful when yielding their weapons. Planning at the mission level must concentrate on fostering conditions of security in which weapons are no longer seen as the only guarantor of security. An international force to provide **security** in cantonment sites or quartering areas is one means to support such an environment. Parties will want to know how long the UN will stay. Irregular troops who have fought the government for decades will not be comfortable with the government re-assuming security functions after the demobilization phase.

The presence and misuse of weapons also affect and impede humanitarian organizations and their work and present a hindrance to the return of refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants to their homes due to threats of violence. The threat to humanitarian and development assistance exacerbates health risks of the local population while greater access to weapons than to jobs may increase crime rates and the danger of a reoccurrence of violence due to poor reintegration coupled with access to arms.

Thus **Information campaigns** and **amnesty** provisions can be used to condition expectations, and encourage individual combatants to report on arms caches and other attempts to violate agreements. Information campaigns must be given a high priority in planning and resources. The plan must be professionally managed, and implemented by members of the indigenous population using regional forms of communication in line with local culture and norms.

Disarmament is the first D in DDR and is here **defined as the controlled collection of weapons**. Irregular and regular armies, individual combatants and civilians can be the target for disarmament activities. Disarmament is essential as it **is a confidence-building measure** aimed at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a nervous population. Everything must be aimed at the mindset of participants whether they are standing armies, guerrilla groups, paramilitary or militia forces or civilians. Disarmament is regarded as the first step of a DDR process for two reasons:

- Removal of weapons is a highly symbolic act that signifies the termination of an individual's active role as an arms bearer in a conflict.
- Weapons control and management is essential to creating a secure environment in which Demobilisation and Reintegration can take place as part of a long-term peace building strategy

There are several types of disarmament depending on the circumstances of the Peace process. Site based disarmament should be considered when security is needed for the combatants. The disarming of combatants normally takes place when they arrive at **collection points,** or before entering cantonment

sites or as regular forces are disbanded when they leave their barracks. Mobile disarmament can also be used and may be more cost effective in certain secure environments. Longer term voluntary community-based disarmament and legislated weapons confiscation with or without a Peace Keeping mission will follow as the security situation improves.

The normal steps of disarmament are (1) a weapons survey, (2) weapons collection and accounting (3) weapons neutralization and storage, (4) weapons disposal or destruction,

Demobilization can be seen as the opposite of recruiting (mobilizing) combatants for an armed group. In the military sense, demobilization can serve to disband an armed unit, to reduce the number of combatants in an armed group or to assemble an army, be it regular or irregular, anew.

The fundamental steps of demobilization are (1) planning, (2) separation of forces, (3) concentration of forces or encampment (4) registration (5) pre-discharge orientation and (6) final discharge of the then ex-combatants. The chronological sequence of Disarmament and Demobilization and the relevance of the individual elements result first of all from the political situation of the peace process and will be different in most peace accords.

The importance of disarmament and demobilization as stated earlier lies with the concern for security of the opposing groups' fighters. Thus demobilization and disarmament have to be accompanied by a plan to make political power sharing possible for all parties to the conflict in order to respect their interests. That way they will feel less need to revert to violent action. The physical security of the ex-combatants has to be ensured throughout and after the DDR programs have been implemented.

Reinsertion is the final phase of demobilization and the first step towards Reintegration. It is a transitional phase during which time the needs or necessities of the ex-combatants are met by a Transitional Support Allowance (TSA). It consists of transport and emergency aid (food, seed, hoes, clothing, and cash). These packages should enable ex-combatants to take care of their own survival and possibly that of their direct family dependents. The services and the material value of the settling-in packages should be on par with the standard of living of the rest of the population. Otherwise there is a risk that combatants not yet demobilized will elude demobilization and that those already demobilized will take up their weapons again in order to ensure their own survival.

As Light weapons are cheap, easy to use and to transport, disarmament has been identified as a priority in the peace process. Therefore a peace agreement needs to address the issue of disarmament and demobilization which also leads to reintegration giving ex-combatants alternatives to gain income and live in dignity – in short to guarantee their personal "human" security. Otherwise peace will not be sustainable as no political, social or economic security is provided for the individuals that put their lives on the line to often achieve just that. They must be convinced that there is a better way to obtain their goals than taking up arms again.

Reintegration

"The reintegration process represents a particularly complex part of the DDR … the goal of ensuring that warring factions can once more join civil society may require not only direct assistance to demobilized combatants, but also broader support to the country's effort to adapt the social and economic environment so that it can reabsorb them …"

'The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR',
Secretary-General's report to the Security Council,

After a short brainstorming with the participants on the **end result** of a successful reintegration program, Irma Specht stressed the need for more clarity on the real goals of a country specific reintegration program and the necessity to make these goals explicit. Many actors, due to their own views, mandates and preferences, have different implicit goals within one program. This is one of the most important hurdles to overcome in improving collaboration. She than stressed the need to be more sensitive to **context specific** programming and stressed that every country needs its own strategy.

The reintegration of ex-combatants is the **process** by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. According to the definition of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), "Reintegration is essentially a **social and economic process** with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates **long-term** external assistance".

Irma Specht presented several strategic options for reintegration strategies, of which the most important points are summarised below:

In order to **prepare** for Reintegration four crucial assessments were explained namely:
- Conflict and security analysis
- Pre-registration beneficiary survey
- Identification and assessment of areas of return or resettlement
- Reintegration opportunities and services mapping

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The presenter lobbied strongly for a long **pre-DDR preparation phase** where not only these crucial assessments need to take place, but also the capacities of the future service providers needs to be build. For example the vocational training system in all DDR settings are not appropriate to suddenly provide the quality and quantity of market-related training that is required in DDR programs. It takes 6 to 12 months to reestablish a looted and destroyed training facility (including training of trainers, equipment etc), while currently the Demobilisation phase is as short as 5 days (Liberia). It is obvious that we need to start much earlier.

There are four main elements of **economic reintegration**:
1. Ongoing labour market analysis;
2. Education, training and skills development (including education and scholarships, vocational and business training, apprenticeships and on-the-job training and life skills.
3. Jobs and income generation (including employment in existing enterprises, micro-and small business start-ups, the provision of business development services)
4. Employment creation (including promoting the private sector and business development services, boosting local economies and infrastructure investments).

In economic reintegration two major issues where stressed: first of all the need to provide much **longer support** to starting entrepreneurs in order to increase their chances of success. Currently people are trained, get some introduction into management, receive cash to start a business and than the program closes. The success rate at that point in time is relatively high but drops seriously in the following year simply because the new, inexperienced business people need at least one or two year of mentoring and follow-up in order to make it in the tough post-conflict labour markets. These types of mentoring services should be provided to former combatants but also to local youth who have small businesses. There is a great need for longer Reintegration support to consolidate successes booked in terms of training, job placement and business start-up. We pull out too early.

The other important point stressed is the need to invest simultaneously in increasing the employability of former combatants and on **creating the enabling environment** for local economic development. We need to work more on creating opportunities. It is often said that not DDR but other programs should do this, but the reality is that there are no other programs operational during DDR. Without targeted investments in local economies, such as placing a well, fixing the roads to reconnect communities to the markets etc, economic reintegration fails. In addition, investing in local economies also has great benefits for the local communities as all people will live in an environment that has more potential for business development. This is one way to make DDR less unfair and more successful.

On **social reintegration** the following topics were discussed:
Land distribution, property rights, restoring social cohesion, rreconciliation, armed violence reduction, psycho-social assistance, ttransitional justice and the issues around bush-wives and children.

The need for much more capacity building, the timing and duration of R were elaborated. The presenter recommended to differentiate between programs and processes and to **enlarge the target group** when phasing out.

The waiting time between Demobilisation and real appropriate reintegration support is way to long, dangerous and the biggest failure in our DDR programs. The gap is filled with **cash**, but cash payments to ex-combatants during this "Reinsertion" period is highly problematic and create serious resentment among the population. It simply gives the message that violence pays….we need to discuss this!

The **gender** dimensions of DDR are many and the Dutch MFA has developed guidelines on Gender and DDR (see annex G). During the presentation the following gender dimensions were stressed:
• Reaching the women and girls
• Making R attractive to them
• Bush-marriages and children
• Promoting gender equality
• Differentiate between women ex-combatants and dependants (WAAFG)
• Violent Masculinities

Targeting ex-combatants exclusively is and has been a very lively discussion for many years. Trends in DDR programs shifted from strict targeted (Mozambique, Zimbabwe), to much more enlarged (Mali North, Liberia 1995) and currently we again see strictly targeted DDR processes (MDRP, Liberia 2006, Ivory Coast). The presenter explained the downside of exclusive targeted programs stressing e.g. that it makes DDR extremely unfair and that it actually does not help the reintegration process of the ex-combatants. She suggests that, in the light of our objectives of DDR, we design Reintegration programs on the basis of the profiles of the ex-combatants, but that at the community level the delivery of services will also be available to people with similar profiles. For example, training providers can have maximum 50% ex-combatants in their classroom, labour based reconstruction processes recruit local laborers including ex-combatant etc. The key questions to ask are: What other war-affected groups are there? What type of assistance will they receive? Can they be mixed with the combatants? And what about the members of the receiving community? She noted however that targeted approaches for ex-combatants are still needed and that they are measurable and less costly than more inclusive approaches. As a result, donors tend to prefer targeted approaches. Costs and social impact, however, must be well considered and balanced.

Actors

Numerous actors play a part in DDR activities. A good understanding of their interests, needs and capacities is required in planning DDR. In most cases, collaboration between these actors will enhance the effectiveness of DDR programs. These actors can be grouped into three clusters: participants in the DDR process; national actors and international actors.

Participants in the DDR process include those who pass through Demobilisation camps, i.e. male and female, adult, youth and child ex-combatants and their dependents; receiving communities, including IDPs, refugees and returnees and foreign combatants as well as mercenaries.

National actors, defined as those who shape the DDR process, also vary widely in terms of needs and interests. These include 1) the signatories of the peace agreement and their military branches, a group which may have differing objectives, possibly even to the detriment of peace; 2) Civil society organizations who can play a positive role as whistleblowers or in the creation of reintegration opportunities. Civil society includes NGOs, CBOs, FBOs etc. Last but not least, the national body(ies)-NCDDR or other suitable mechanism in charge of managing the DDR process need to take a lead role. While these might be compromised by partial political interests, or simply lack technical capacity, the UN system must guide, strengthen and support such structures, without losing sight of the fact that they are the legitimate authority in the country. It is crucial that all relevant ministries are represented in the National Commissions, including those responsible for R related interventions (labor, commerce, Education, Health, Infrastructure, Gender etc.)

Another group of important actors is the media, both local and international. They should be used as much as possible to spread the word on the DDR process for buy-in. Keeping them abreast of progress in the DDR process is important in order not to breed false expectations and misconceptions. A central tool to DDR is information, both in terms of management and diffusion. Local authorities, although usually weak in the post-conflict context, are a key partner in bringing DDR about.
International actors such as the peacekeeping mission, the UN specialized agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors as well as regional and other international organizations also play a key role in implementing parts of DDR. Although these organizations have the best interests of the host countries in mind, unless adequately coordinated, their work may have at best no impact and at worst may be detrimental to the consolidation of peace and security. It is important therefore to ensure that resources are channeled towards a common goal, especially in terms of DDR. This can be done by establishing coordination mechanisms and concrete partnerships early on during the planning stage for DDR.

All the actors outlined above influence DDR. Establishing partnerships, between local and international, civil and military, public and private players is an important aspect of conducting DDR.

One important group of actors in DDR are the NGOs. In the light of the objectives of this conference, more time was devoted to look into the current and potential roles of NGOs. First it was explained that there are many different actors in civil society and that roles are different for NGOs in DD and R phases. Furthermore, the most important differentiation to make when discussing the role of civil society is between national and international NGOs and the receiving communities. For the UN, NGOs are mainly regarded an implementers of their DDR programs, while many NGOs see themselves more as partners. How can we ensure NGOs become part of the designers as well? If DDR is nationally owned, as we keep stressing, is it than the role of NGOs to execute government programs? We must discuss these issues. NGOs are often on the ground before UNDDR missions come in, but they are hardly ever consulted. There is a need to capitalize on the knowledge and networks of, for example, Faith Based Organizations who are on the ground and know the local dynamics and sensitivities. Finally, the presenters challenged the audience to discuss who is doing what and who is good at what within civil society? As a last point

the risks were pointed out of both centralized top down DDR programs, but also the risks of the currently trendy approach of community driven DDR.

Finally, the presenters stressed the 10 following **guiding principles**:

11. Clarify objectives and expected results with all parties
12. Start planning and preparing for reintegration as soon as possible
13. Ensure community participation
14. Develop national capacity
15. Consider regional implications
16. Understand and address root-causes
17. Engage donors for longer programs beyond formal UN DDR programs
18. Address security and punishment of crimes in the time between DD and SSR.
19. Balance equity with security

Ensure that reintegration assistance to ex-combatants is also accessible to other local people.

Mind the Gap: How to Create Synergy Between the Various Actors?

Yaron Oppenheimer, MFA Netherlands

This paper has been written on the occasion of the DDR-conference, 'From Rebel to Taxpayer' at the Carlton Beach Hotel in Scheveningen, the Netherlands on 30-31 May 2007. The aim of the paper is to stimulate discussion on the way different stakeholders in DDR can cooperate better in order to improve the effectiveness of their actions. Therefore some generalities are accentuated for arguments sake rather than to prove a common truth about DDR processes, which all tend to be exceptions in their own right.

Over the past two decades, the donor community has gathered substantial experience with various DDR processes all over the world. If programs in Colombia, DR Congo, the Balkans, Angola, Rwanda, Aceh and Afghanistan have taught us one thing, it is that there is no one blue print for the successful DDR program. One of the most important lessons the international community has learned over the years is to take the particular post conflict context as a starting point for any DDR program.

This particular context also influences the timing, order and implementation of the individual parts of the DDR process. However, the initiative for a DDR program is almost always a political one, driven much more by short-term security related incentives than by long-term development arguments. This creates a division between the DD and the R phase of DDR that is even further complicated by the shift in target groups over time.

Where the focus in disarmament and demobilisation lies on the (individual) combatant, an effective reintegration should take the opinions, needs and often traumas of the receiving communities into account. This reintegration phase where the 'ex-combatant' should effectively lose this qualification and merge into the civilian population, is often neglected at the beginning of a DDR program.

Although there are valid arguments (linked to e.g. time, money or budget administrative constraints) for the set-up of current DDR programs, there remains a gap between disarmament and demobilisation on the one hand and reintegration on the other. The burden of sustainable reintegration is therefore imposed on other, more regular development programs which in many cases don't connect very well to the end of a DD phase because of time but also security related constraints. A solution in the form of so called reinsertion payments can solve part of this problem but should only be considered as a temporary measure which needs follow-up. Schematically the current situation looks as follows:

In an ideal world the DDR programs and development programs would merge and connect in such a way

DDR-
Program | **Disarmament, Demobilization, (Reinsertion)**

Long-term reintegration Development
Program

that long-term reintegration on a community level automatically follows the disarmament and demobilisation:

To close the gap and more effectively merge the different type of programs it is argued that all stakeholders should get involved in an integrated way from the beginning until the end of the program. This should be done in a way that:
  -   is most efficient;
  -   maximises the added value of each stakeholder; and

- prevents two stakeholders doing the same thing

| DDR-Program | Disarmament, Demobilization, Long-term reintegration | Development Program |

To do this we have to identify the different added values of the stakeholders. For the purpose of this conference we will limit ourselves to the Diplomatic, Defense and Civil Society actors.

The advantages of the diplomatic sector is the fact that it keeps a broad view of the political context, it can influence national authorities through diplomatic pressure and it often has access to substantial amounts of financial support. The defense sector can more easily than any other assess the security situation. It can also relate best to the mindset of combatants and the structures they are used to which can facilitate ways of communication. They are also best equipped to operate in volatile environments. Civil society has the advantage of being present in the field, very often long before and long after a DDR program takes place. It knows the situation 'on the ground' and can therefore give the best reality check to any plan developed on a more abstract level and influenced by unrealistic political positions. Civil Society is often formed by and for the local population which can make it a very trustworthy partner for local communities.

Given the abovementioned challenges DDR processes face and the particular added values of the different actors involved, we identify three actions that can be taken to improve coordination and cooperation.

1) **Involve all actors in the design of a program**
   To ensure a proper transition from demobilization to reintegration, the design of the program should take issues of long term reintegration into account. One possibility is to assess through labor market surveys possibilities for longer term employment. Another important step is gathering the right information on the ex-combatant (e.g. education, skills, preferred region/community for reintegration, etc) during disarmament and demobilization to allow reintegration partners to develop better suited programs in the right areas. Cooperation between defense and development actors to make sure the right information is gathered and shared should therefore be stimulated.

2) **Share information prior to reintegration to prepare both ex-combatants and communities**
   On the basis information provided in the abovementioned step, NGOs can also assess possibilities for reintegration into specific communities and the way ex-combatants are looked upon by the members of these communities. Possible bottlenecks can in this way be identified in an early phase. By again sharing this information with the defense actors dealing with the DD, they can in turn manage the expectations of ex-combatants facilitating a smooth transition into the communities.

3) **Connect the local security situation with national plans to create sustainable security**
   Volatile security situations on a local level can lead to risks of re-mobilization or re-emerging of violent conflict that in turn can destabilize a whole region or country. It is important that local security issues are linked to national strategies (if existent). This can be done by strengthening the position of regional/provincial authorities who can function as a bridge between local communities and the capital. Cooperation should be sought between development and diplomatic actors to stimulate this process through a bottom-up as well as a top-down approach.

Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the European Commission (EC) in post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia

Lina Frödin
Reintegration Adviser to the EC, Aceh Indonesia and former Reintegration Officer in AMM

AMM was an ESDP mission with the mandate to monitor disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Aceh following the MoU between the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia 15 August 2005. AMM consisted of, at its peak, 285 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries, the majority of the monitors had a military or police background, 12% of the monitors were women.

The first mandate covered a period of six months and was subsequently extended three times to a total of 15 months. AMM's mandate ended formally on 15 December 2006. The GAM disarmament was accomplished in phases over four months, following the same pace as the Government of Indonesia's withdrawal of its armed troops.

Parallel with its tsunami relief and funding to governance and police reform, EC allocated funding to International Organization of Migration (IOM) for a reinsertion and reintegration project. The project was intended to target 2,000 amnestied prisoners and 3,000 ex-combatants. The assistance included limited economic facilitation packages, a set of clothes, toiletries and medical check-up. The amnestied prisoners all received the assistance and were later on in the project offered help to start up small enterprises. However, GAM was not prepared to submit a list of names of 3,000 ex-combatants and as the hand-in of weapons was anonymous, the access to information on who the GAM members were was limited. IOM faced challenges in delivering the reinsertion assistance to the ex-combatants and the funding for that component was eventually returned to EC. With EC funding IOM also implemented support to villages with high numbers of returning ex-combatants for communal projects intended to strengthen the social fabric in the villages.

AMM's focus and primary mandate was to ensure stability and security, particularly during the first six months which also covered the disarmament and the withdrawal of troops. Security was predominantly defined from a military perspective and little attention was paid to the reintegration process that just started, parallel to the disarmament and withdrawal of troops. There were two major reasons for that: time and aim. Time wise, AMM was aware that the reintegration would only just start within the time of the presence of AMM in Aceh, whereas security as the reduction of armed incidences and political related violence had to be achieved before AMM could leave. The scope of AMM's mandate and aim also affected its communication with different actors beyond the most obvious stakeholders. A dialogue with civil society (at an institutional level, not depending on individuals contacts with civil society actors) only took place as AMM was leaving after Acehnese civil society organizations had demanded to be informed about AMM's exit strategy.

EC had established a sub-delegation office, Europe House, in Banda Aceh in October 2005, with the mandate to follow closely the implementation on the EC funded tsunami and post-conflict projects, thus having a time wise longer mandate than AMM as well as a less direct political role than AMM had had. Two permanent staff and two consultants are working in Europe House, two women and three men. Europe House plays a distinctly different role from AMM, supporting longer-term post-conflict recovery through program support to police and justice reform, governance and reintegration. These projects are implemented over a period of 2-3 years. The nature of EC funded projects is closer to development than immediate security and stabilization, and EC is playing the role of development donor rather than the political intermediary.

The staff of Europe House, working in Aceh for a longer time, have learnt the language (if they did not speak it before) and have established professional relationships with both government and civil society representatives, relevant to the projects. The immediate security phase is passed and there are now more technical discussions between donors, implementing agencies, government and civil society.

Recommendations

- Monitoring and peace observation missions: development of guidelines on monitoring of reintegration, a tool for systematical information gathering. Particularly important in civil-military missions where monitors have different backgrounds and different understanding of their roles and the mission mandate. The mission has to decide on types of monitoring, e.g. policy and implementation of monitoring, as well as having a clear understanding of the goals of the reintegration process.

- Monitoring and peace observation missions: defined goals for the mission. Even if it is only monitoring or observation, it has to be clear when the situation or context is such that the mission can be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the mission should be through a well prepared exit strategy in order to avoid unnecessary unrest or un-stability. For example, should the need arise, what the procedures for the involvement of the third party are.

- Trainings, also on the locations, specially adapted for the mission needs. For example, in Aceh the district team leaders facilitated weekly meetings between the parties at district level. The head of mission facilitated meeting between the parties at the highest level. The district team leaders would have needed trainings in facilitation and negotiation. Some of the team-leaders had no previous experience at all. The trainings can also be a means for coordination between donors and peace missions, with thematic focus.

- There has to be a good balance in a mission between persons with security focus and others with development focus, if the monitoring covers DDR. Reintegration is much closer linked to development work than to security operations.

DDR/DIAG: stick and carrot or carrot and stick?
Paper by Ilse du Pied (IdP), May 2007.

Introduction

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), a part of Afghanistan's five pillared Security Sector Reform strategy[4], was established in April 2003 and implemented by the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), managed by UNDP. Unlike African countries implementing DDR processes through UN Peacekeeping forces, this UN impartial force did not exist in Afghanistan. The DDR process in Afghanistan was overseen by the Ministry of Defense and implemented by ANBP with support from UNAMA and UNDP. Its mandate was the demobilization and reintegration of 100.000 combatants over three years, a number later revised downward. The complexity of DDR would have favored the UN-mandated ISAF[5] and US-led Coalition forces for implementation but both were respectively maintaining peace in Kabul or fighting against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the south and east. Instead, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were invented to promote stability and security in Afghanistan and support the authorities' reconstruction efforts through creating synergy of Diplomacy, Defense and Development, the so-called 3D's.

The DDR process itself focused on combatants from the Afghan Military Forces (AMF)[6] that had resisted and fought against Taliban but had to be decommissioned to give way to a new professional force, the Afghan National Army (ANA). Without fixing too much on often debated numbers, AMF estimated membership is 45.000 while 853 to 1000 so-called Illegal Armed Groups (IAG) fall outside of the scope of DDR. Therefore, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), often considered as a sequel of DDR, was launched in June 2005. DDR formally ended in June 2006, DIAG is supposed to end in December 2007. In addition, ANBP supports the government in heavy weapons cantonment and ammunition surveying through the Landmines and Ammunition Stockpiles Destruction Project that will end in December 2007.

Characteristics of DDR and DIAG in Afghanistan

According to ANBP (2006:3), "DDR addressed all AMF personnel voluntarily choosing to participate and had two main goals: to break the historic patriarchal chain of command existing between former commanders and their men; and to provide the demobilized personnel with the ability to become economically independent- the ultimate objective being to reinforce the authority of the government. In this respect, DDR was never mandated to disarm the population per se...". On the contrary, ICG (2005:2)[7] mentioned that "the primary objective is the effective disarmament and reintegration of the country's combatants." These two different interpretations about DDR's objectives at policy level might be a reflection of possible different interpretations in practice and implementation.

Being a highly political process, DDR aimed also at free and secure elections to support the authority of the government. Although DDR did not succeed to complete the disarmament and demobilization goals before the presidential elections of October 2004, the establishment of 14 Coalition PRTs and 5 NATO/ISAF PRTs, including the Dutch PRT in Pul-i-Khumri, and the 8 regional ANBP offices,[8] did take place.

The real boost for the DDR process in Afghanistan was based on the incentive of registration for the parliamentary elections of October 2005. Commanders with political aspirations were promised leadership of political parties once they cooperated within the DD(R) process. During the screening of the candidature of 124 candidates in Afghanistan, 32 of them were disqualified. In Baghlan province with 6 candidates on the list, commander Amir Gul was amongst the disqualified ones, being suspected of having ammunition and still fighting in the province with commander Basir Baghlani. Evidence could not be proved, in general highly difficult also for the possession of weapons. For commanders without political interests, not much incentive came from the parliamentary elections and it was much harder to convince their cooperation into the DDR process.

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[4] The Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy announced at the February 2003 Tokyo Conference on the Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan has five pillars: the establishment of the Afghan National Army (ANA); the establishment of the Afghan National Police (ANP); Justice Sector Reform (JSR); Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); and Counter Narcotics (CN).

[5] ISAF is the abbreviation of International Security and Assistance Force which were either operating under US or NATO. In addition, the Dutch PRT was led by NATO/ ISAF.

[6] AMF consisted mainly of the Northern Alliance.

[7] "Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track", International Crisis Group, Paper No. 35, 2005

[8] NATO/ISAF PRTs were located in Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimana, Kunduz, Faizabad and Pul-i-Khumri. The 8 ANBP offices were established in Gardez, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Bamiyan and Kabul/Parwan.

Fusato's paper (2003)[9] distinguishes between the three phases of DDR, each with different goals and different actors. While the general points of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are clearly described, the specific Afghan context will be introduced below.

In the disarmament phase in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defence prepared a list of the units under AMF and therefore under the Ministry itself that were eligible for disarmament. The list was presented to the Regional Verification Committee (RVC) that verified if the names on the list and checked if figures were correct. In general, there were more soldiers on the list than in reality, showing that commanders inflated the numbers to receive the salaries for fighters who did not exist. ANBP[10] mentioned that commanders having listed for example 500 soldiers came to the disarmament only with about 300 saying that "they absconded and left for the camps in Iran or Pakistan." The result was both a cut in the budget of DDR and the revision of the number of combatants downward.

After approval by the RVC, the Mobile Disarmament Units collected and registered the weapons after which they were transported to Kabul. Weapons of use were given to the ANA through the Ministry of Defence while others were stored in containers or dismantled. The combatants both received a medal and a certificate for their participation in the war and for not belonging to the army anymore.

In the demobilization phase that followed the disarmament, the combatants were informed about the DDR program and their future options. They were supposed to receive clothes, food, money (about US$15), a voucher that entitled them to career counseling, an interim job if necessary and one of several assistance packages. These packages could consist of livestock, agricultural or business support and vocational training. Unlike African countries, land was not included in these packages. Unfortunately, former commanders often seem to confiscate the grants and livestock in these assistance packages although commanders themselves were entitled to the Commander Incentive Program (CIP) including training for example by AITM and AGEF[11] in business marketing, human rights, management, peace-building, democracy, basic English, basic computer skills and indirectly in attitude and behavior towards 'civilians'.

The reintegration phase was completed in June 2006 with the exception of 5,899 officers being trained afterwards (ANBP, 2006). It has been decided to continue the reintegration part until 2006 to support the Afghan government in DIAG. ANBP figures show that 53,054 ex-combatants being trained by an implementing partner of which 7076 in Kunduz and a drop-out rate of 2754 and 183 respectively. To decide about which training or joining the ANA, the ex-combatants met with case-workers that counseled them in their choices and connected them to an implementing partner in the region.

With the disarmament of recognized 'legal' armed groups within DDR, it was also recognized that an estimated number of 120.000 armed fighters outside of the former AMF or unwilling to cooperate in DDR should be targeted. The DDR disarmament was voluntary while DIAG is mandatory and a government-led program implemented by the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, including representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate of Security, UNAMA, Coalition Forces and ISAF (ANBP, 2006). DIAG has three phases: a voluntary phase, a negotiation phase and an enforcement phase. Per province, 1 or 2 districts identified as possibly cooperative in DIAG are covered.[12]

It is said that DIAG lacks cooperation from both Illegal Armed Groups and government officials, the latter unwilling to put pressure and law enforcement on commanders. Forceful collection of weapons did not happen yet and might be difficult in future due to vested and interlinked interests of government and security forces. DIAG is considered more insecure than DDR and therefore ISAF is always present during implementation.

Disarmament and demobilization: analyses and thought from the field
The purpose of integrating many armed groups under AMF was to preclude the combatants from unemployment with no other possibility of earning money than violence and the related risk of insurgency movements throughout the country. Both ANBP and UNAMA[13] mentioned the fact that many combatants in DIAG have participated also in DDR showing that parts of the armed groups are not that different in itself. These combatants did not surrender

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[9] Fusato, Massimo: "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants". University of Colorado, 2003.
[10] Interview IdP with ANBP, May 2007.
[11] Interview IdP with AITM and AGEF in May 2007.
[12] In Baghlan, DIAG is implemented in Dagiuri and Khinjan districts.
[13] Interviews IdP with ANBP and UNAMA, May 2007.

all their weapons and/or still have many linkages with their former military groups. Their willingness to cooperate might be based on the combatants' livelihood strategies, including perceived or real risks, opportunities and treats.

Both ANBP (2007) and Thruelsen (2006)[14] mentioned that disarmament has been successful because DDR has been a pillar of SSR, the Ministry of Defense has been reformed, DDR being managed under one organization (ANBP), participatory planning and implementation between actors took place, there was financial support, the verification through national counterparts and the creation of mobile DD units and heavy weapon cantonment. Overall, 57,629 light weapons and 12,248 heavy weapons have been collected (Interview IdP with ANBP, May 2007).

As mentioned, especially before the parliamentary elections, the collection of both light and heavy weapons was increasing. The main success of DDR being the collection and dismantling of heavy weapons (Interview IdP with UNAMA, May 2007) although these weapons have often been more then 20 years old while modern weapons are existent in the country. According to ANBP[15]: *"Commanders did give up their heavy arms and tanks as they were highly visible. Where to hide a tank? It is true that we have found tanks literally under the ground but these become useless as tanks have to be maintained. For many commanders it was profitable to give up the tanks, get money, food and training in return and keep the light arms to protect their interests"*. Although the collection of heavy weapons had impact on open warfare, which was already more difficult with the presence of international military forces, the question arises how much impact heavy weapon collection had on 'hidden' warfare or violence in the country through lighter and smaller arms. In other words, both the validity of data and the validity of heavy weapon collection need a contextual analysis. Related to facts on weapon collection, an analysis is needed on the extent to which the government has established control over the means of violence through these weapon collections and the extent through which the government's authority is being reinforced.

Afghan army camps sometimes demobilized themselves as combatants were not paid and were therefore not present in the camp. The last years, combatants worked 'on request' and the rest of the time worked in agriculture, livestock, as daily laborers or in drug and weapon trade. While it may look like a demobilized group of combatants, in fact they might be still related to their former (sub) commanders and also involved in fighting, opium and crime whenever needed.

Besides, in the Afghan culture almost every household has a weapon for protection,[16] this reveals also that people feel insecure and have not enough trust in the government and partly the international forces. Commanders mention to have private enemies due to previous conflicts, often against Taliban. In addition, in many parts of the country there is no ruling government but commanders control the area and *"nobody can even engage their daughters without their permission"*(Interview IdP with ANP Chief, Pul-i-Khumri). The security situation in the south of Afghanistan is of great concern to the northern Afghans as well and causes feelings of insecurity and fear that are incentives to be linked to former commanders and to possess weapons. The latter being regulated by law: a household can have up to three weapons, beyond that are considered an illegal armed group.

"At the beginning of the DDR program, we have several reasons to be interested in the program. We were promised to have jobs in future, the world would help us against interference from Pakistan and Iran, they would disarm illegal groups and there was no need for weapons anymore. But our ideas changed. Pakistan provides Taliban in the south with weapons; therefore there will be no peace. If they come to the north, than what can we do? We should be prepared to fight again in 1-2 years and people who have delivered their weapons to DDR are unhappy and buy weapons again.... The government should discuss with the people they have called warlords/commanders and thieves on how to solve this problem. ...Foreign forces should not fight with the Taliban: what do they know about this country? It has been a big mistake to disarm the commanders that have fought against Taliban but (Afghan) factions are meeting each other regularly to talk about security. Foreign

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[14] Interview IdP with ANBP, May 2007. Thruelsen, Peter Dahl, "From Soldier to civilian: disarmament, demobilization, reintegration in Afghanistan. DIIS Report 2006:7.
[15] Interview IdP with ANBP, May 2007.
[16] In 2006, an incident happened that reflects the complex nature of DDR, security and anti-governmental elements: the women in a family being raped while the husband/father did surrender his weapons on the site. The interpretation of this incident by Afghans is: without weapon, it is easy to target you and you cannot protect your family and yourself while the government cannot either.

forces are necessary but for training ANA and ANP and construct the country" (Interview IdP with commander Pul-i-Khumri, May 2007).

Reintegration into what?
While reintegration was an essential component of DDR, DIAG does not have any individual reintegration component due to the opinion that people should not be rewarded for being involved in illegal activities. However, commanders that surrender their illegal weapons in the voluntary or negotiation DIAG phase will benefit their communities. A District Development Assembly and the community members prioritize the community needs such as the cleaning of an irrigation canal with local people in Kapisa and a hydro-electricity project in Taghar (Interview IdP with ANBP, 2007).

"I would be skeptical if reintegration works anywhere in the world" stated UNAMA[17]. *"Reintegration is so much linked to legitimate opportunities available and the law. It is about the economy and the state and about the development of the country. It is an article of faith..."*. A commander in Pul-i-Khumri[18] is of the same opinion: *"Reintegration was a good idea, but it was just theory and not practice. We performed the whole DDR process by telling the people to deliver their weapons and they will get a job. We could not keep our promise and people accuse us of being liars"*.

To each of the five SSR pillars was a donor attached. Japan was the leading nation for DDR even though Japan could not support military parts of DDR as disarmament and demobilization due to their constitution. However, Japan could support the reintegration part and the design of DDR and in is able to support and be involved in the development community projects under DIAG.

The reintegration component was developed late and implemented hastily to keep Japan involved as donor. Reasons mentioned were late funding, difficulties in finding partner organizations and the disinterest of NGOs for DDR and more specifically involvement in reintegration. NGOs might have overlooked the importance of reintegration as part of wider state-building or building up livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants while at the same time it has to be recognized that *"many groups are in economic crises, not only ex-military but also widows, farmers etc. It is not easy to make a choice to support this group or other groups in need....But if reintegration is not ready, people loose trust and move to other places. People got jobless or back to their agricultural land when possible. However a longer-term and deeper reintegration process would have been necessary".[19]*

The impact of reintegration, "to get ex-combatants back into civil society", is generally considered weak but disarmament without reintegration would have been ineffective or even counterproductive. Compare the two cases below:

"I am 42 years and a driver, working for shops. I have sold my weapon that was only good for killing mice for 700 Afs to get food, opium and alcohol. There is not much work for drivers so I also rob people. If someone gives me US$ 100, I can kill on request. My family is hungry and I am sick because I had been in the army and got hit twice by shrapnel of rockets that damaged my body and ears. After the army, we did not receive anything, no education or course. My 13-year old son tells me I have to kill myself but to find food for them first. I live for free in this house, the pharmacy gives free medicines and my relatives bring us left-over food. I am not sure about the future...there is a lack of jobs..."(Interview IdP with ex-combatant Pul-i-Khumri, 2007).

"I am very happy with DDR process: I did a 1-year tinsmith course through AGEF and we got paid for 9 months: first 3 months US$ 62, 3 months US$ 50 and last 3 months US$35. I worked in someone's shop until I had enough experience and borrowed 30.000 Afs from my brother-in-law to start my own shop 8 months ago. My shop is better than the army: I earn money and can eat with my family peacefully and I go to school again. In the army is no peace, just fighting even though I was taking care of furniture and clothes there. The commanders did not do anything for us, they just used us. I was forced into the army and we did not have salary. Since 2002 the battalion gave us 3000 Afs per month. I delivered my weapon voluntarily in DDR. I was depressed of it...never used it but it

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[17] Interview IdP with UNAMA, May 2007.
[18] Interview IdP with commander in Pul-i-Khumri, May 2007.
[19] Discussion with Tomoko Kubota, DIAG Unit, Embassy of Japan on 14 May 2007.

was registered on my name and therefore I had to bring it myself"(Interview IdP with ex-combatant, Pul-i-Khumri, 2007).

The two case studies show that reintegration is a matter of context and case-by-case inclusion and follow up of ex-combatants. While ex-combatants in the reintegration components had counseling support, there was no support for ex-combatants that were left out of the process, either voluntarily or not. At the same time, no market assessment of the region had taken place, no assessment of the skills of ex-combatants and there was no link with the private sector. Monitoring and evaluation tools developed in a late stage of DDR and DIAG and could have been useful to assess the impact on the household and community of ex-combatants. A gendered and household analysis would have been helpful in identifying the households livelihood strategies and address the needs properly.

Civil-military cooperation in DDR and DIAG
ANBP (May, 2007) noted that: *"In the Afghan context, none of the bodies involved could have done DDR by themselves. It would have been counterproductive"*.

The connection between the military and DDR is widely recognized as is the relationship between the military and civilian parts in DDR and DIAG. Main actors where the civilian UN/ ANBP and the military PRT, ISAF, ANA and Ministry of the Defense. The Ministry of Defense decided which AMF unit to be disarmed and a security assessment was conducted to identify the risks of a security vacuum in the area. In case of high-risk areas with possible attacks on ANBP mobile disarmament units, the ANA or PRT could be attached to the disarmament site to guard during that period. While after disarmament and demobilization the risk is high, PRTs could stabilize the regions by more or less regular controls. However, PRTs had no real capacity to enforce sanctions upon recalcitrant commanders while PRTs sometimes even undermined long-term state security and peace-building processes by hiring militia/combatants for short-term security to the PRT.[20] PRTs numbers and availability and the slow process to rebuild ANA influenced these processes.

ANBP and UNAMA (May, 2007) mentioned that the contribution of the PRT's towards DDR was highly dependent on the PRTs office manager and commander. In other words, there was no clear policy or mandate but cooperation happened on basis of private connections and the willingness of certain commanders to be involved in the DDR process. The consequence was that in one area of implementation, both the best and worst practices of DDR could take place as PRT staff rotated every 6 months. In a number of cases, this meant that PRTs stayed closed to their mandate by training the ANA, monitoring ANP and supports the heavy weapon cantonment. According to ANBP, in most cases PRTs without structured orders often assisted considerably in terms of DDR folder distribution, information collection from remote areas including strength and movement of armed groups and troops, ammunition collection and transport and indirect security of ANBP teams by coordinating the same overnight places for ANBP and PRT camps. However, most PRTs did not want to provide direct security and protect the ANBP or take proactive measures for the Afghan population and the international assistance community in Afghanistan. At the same time, this made that ANBP could keep their UN neutrality. An additional value of the PRTs is the status-related context: an Afghan commander is more willing to discuss or negotiate with international commanders as representatives of the international military forces than with civilians.

The Dutch PRT in Baghlan and Kunduz is remembered by the collection and transportation of ammunition, the accompanying of ANBP into remote areas, the establishment of ammunition containers in the provinces (although ANP also seem to use them as offices and storage) and the patrolling along ammunition depots in Pul-i-Khumri. ANBP had no idea how to transport the immense amount of ammunition collected and to make sure the safety (against thefts) of ammunition in the depots. Ammunition storage and lack of information on the danger of ammunition[21] was not only a problem in Pul-i-Khumri. It is said that Panshir has about 20 depots full of ammunition and mines. While heavy weapons are disabled either by ISAF or Halo Trust, assessed ammunition is still in depots in the Panshir Valley and not yet destroyed.

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[20] This hiring of militia is mentioned by several people interviewed and has for example happened in Badakshan province.
[21] One commander in Taghar had 2 million ammunition parts for Kalashnikovs in his compound while factors as dust, weather and instability of the area works against ammunition to be safe. In Bajgah, a village in Baghlan, an illegal munitions store exploded and killed 28 people and injured at least 60 others (BBC, 4 May 2005). This illustrates the need for clearer information about the security risk of ammunition.

Regular meetings existed between PRT and ANBP but it is also stated that dialogue could be more often and more in-depth, preferably in a neutral and non-threatening place. On both the UN/ANBP and the ISAF/PRT side, an understanding of the Afghan society and each others functioning in processes like DDR will be useful. Both actors and their positions have strengths and weaknesses. Where the UN is getting tired of updating every 6 months another PRT on DDR processes, the PRT lacks consciousness about stakeholders in the field. A clear mandate for both parties combined with a joint program that takes into account the cultural and security context, each others strengths and weaknesses and incorporates that into the planning and implementation phase of the program might work towards complimentarily of each other. Not only ANBP had to deal with insecurity and threats, PRTs needed back-up of NATO forces to withheld violent outburst of demonstrations in Taghar. In general, the presence of PRTs offers ANBP the opportunity to threaten ex-combatants and commanders that weapons could be collected by force. However, in the DDR process force could not be used, while in DIAG enforcement of weapons is the third phase in the process. In DIAG, ISAF passed instruction to all PRTs to help ANBP reach their goal.

DDR and Army Reform in Congo Kinshasa

By Sami Faltas, Centre for European Security Studies, Groningen, the Netherlands

Introduction

The war in Congo Kinshasa (1996-2003) has been described as Africa's first world war, because several other African countries were directly involved. More than three million people are believed to have died as a direct or indirect result of the conflict, and more than two million people were driven from their homes.[i]

In 1999, a long process of negotiation began with the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the establishment of a UN peace mission (MONUC). The war did not end until 2004, and sporadic fighting has continued. Even after the elections of 2006, the situation has remained tense. Today, the risk of a return to war has diminished, but it cannot be ruled out.

In November 2004, the government of the DRC launched a national plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (PNDDR). It is being executed by a national committee (CONADER) consisting of representatives of the government and rebel forces. Its funds (US $200 million) come from the World Bank and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a special program set up for Central Africa by several donor countries and coordinated by the World Bank. Its largest contributor is the Netherlands.

This program, which is linked to the reform of the Congolese army, is also supported by MONUC and the European Union, which in 2005 established a mission to support security sector reform in the DRC, EUSEC, as well as a police reform mission EUPOL.

The MDRP reports that "to date, the program has demobilized 116,675 adults, including over 2,500 women. 29,291 children have been released from armed groups, of which 80% have been reunified with family. Contracts have been signed to provide socio-economic opportunities for reintegration to 56,000 ex-combatants, and over 46,000 ex-combatants have completed or are receiving support."[ii] Clearly, the program will not fully achieve its targets as planned and indicated in the following diagram. But its results are not negligible.

Beneficiaries

	Actual	Target
Demobilized	116,675	150,000
Received Safety Transition Allowances	102,045	120,000
Reintegration Support Received	46,259	90,000

☐ Target ☐ Actual

Source: MDRP. See Footnote 2.

When the international community (or, to be more precise, the United Nations, the World Bank and the donors working together in the MDRP) set out in 2004 to support DDR and army reform in the Congo, its aim was to enable elections to be held. These, it was hoped, would help provide the stability and legitimacy needed for the peace to hold. The first part of this strategy was achieved in 2006, and so far the peace has held, despite sporadic fighting and deep divisions within government and society.

This is a very important result, and all the more remarkable considering the extremely difficult circumstances under which it was achieved. No one with any knowledge of DDR, the Congo, the World Bank, the UN and the donor community was surprised to see the PNDDR program run into problems. In the event, these have included:

1. Inadequate interest on the part of the Congolese authorities;
2. The refusal by several rebel forces to fully cooperate;
3. Pervasive corruption and inefficiency within CONADER, leading to overspending and delays;
4. Pervasive corruption and inefficiency within the defense organization, leading to a failure of army reform;
5. The lack of transport, financial, government and other infrastructure;
6. The inability and unwillingness of the World Bank to address disarmament, army reform and other military-related issues[iii];
7. Inadequate attention paid to the reintegration of ex-combatants;
8. Lacking involvement of local communities and civil society; and
9. A lack of attention paid to the need for transitional justice.[iv]

These and related issues have led the MDRP, and especially the donor governments involved in it, to demand a reorganization of the program. These changes are currently being effected.

Despite the limitations and failures listed above, the Congolese, the World Bank and the donor community managed in about two years to dismantle a major part of the rebel forces of the DRC, and began to reform the army. Perhaps the best way to assess the significance of this work is to imagine what would have happened without it. If the rebel forces had remained intact, and the government army had remained unchanged, the country would have remained

at the brink of civil war. Now that danger is gradually receding. Without DDR and army reform, nearly 30,000 children and over 100,000 adults would still be under arms, mostly in irregular forces. Even in peacetime, they would be a danger to human security and human rights. This danger is diminishing, thanks to CONADER and the MDRP. For all their problems and mistakes, they have helped the Congo and the region. In my opinion, any effort that helps prevent a return to the terrible war of 1996-2003 deserves at the very least the benefit of the doubt. I also agree with those who have said that there is no alternative for the current DDR/SSR process in the Congo. All we can do is try to keep it going and improve it.[v]

Now that I have paid credit where it is due, I will begin to comment on the process of DDR and Security Sector Reform in Congo Kinshasa. I will occasionally refer to good practice as defined by two recent publications:

- The **Integrated DDR Standards of the United Nations**, formulated in 2006. These are binding for all members of the UN system, but they are likely to serve as a guideline for all DDR practitioners, who will probably leave the three-kilogram reference work on their bookshelves and turn to the **Operational Guide** to the IDDRS instead. Both are available for downloading at the **UN Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre,** www.unddr.org.[vi]

- The authoritative reference work on SSR is the **OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice**, published in the Spring of 2007, and available at www.oecd.org.

Disarmament

The demobilization and reintegration of combatants is undermined if the weapons held by these combatants are not recovered, and, preferably, destroyed. Besides, DDR needs to be connected to the reform of the government security agencies.

However, the mandate of the World Bank prevents it from interfering in the military and defence affairs of states. This means that the Bank, and its MDRP program, can promote and fund the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, but not their disarmament. Nor can the Bank or the MDRP stimulate and support Security Sector Reform.

The result is often that when the Bank or the MDRP funds a demobilization program, the necessary measures to disarm the combatants and reform the armed forces fail. For instance, in Congo Brazzaville, the government promised to disarm the combatants, but did not. In 2004, I asked a senior government official why not. "Because the World Bank does not pay for it," he replied.

In the MDRP program for the DRC, disarming the combatants is also the responsibility of the government, with the help of MONUC. Here, too, the financing of disarmament is an issue. MONUC feels that the DRC government has been relying too heavily on the UN. In March 2007, the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General said that the DRC government needed to take the disarmament process into its own hands. "We cannot spend money indefinitely," he continued. "If they want the process to continue they need to find the money to pay for it."[vii]

Nevertheless, there have been serious efforts in Congo Kinshasa to disarm the combatants. Their effect is diminished by the continued trafficking of arms across the porous borders of the

DRC,[viii] in violation of the UN arms embargo of 2003 (that prohibits arms supplies to rebel forces) and the EU arms embargo of 1993 (that prohibits all arms supplies to the DRC).[ix] Also, the failure of the Congolese government and MONUC to destroy the weapons recovered has meant that some of the ordnance was pilfered and reused for illegal purposes.

Comment: I believe that if the World Bank and the donor community are in the business of supporting demobilization and reintegration of combatants, they will have to make a greater and more consistent effort to overcome their inability to use Official Development Assistance to promote disarmament and security sector reform. They should only engage in demobilization programs if they have iron-clad assurances that some reliable agency will assume the responsibility for disarmament and SSR, and if they cooperate closely with this agency.

Transitional Justice

DDR is one attempt to overcome the legacy of war. The fighting forces need to be dismantled in such a way that the risk of a return to war is eliminated, combatants can return to civilian life, and resources are freed for reconstruction and development.

Another attempt to overcome the legacy of war is the quest for justice and truth. Prosecutions, reparations, truth-telling and institutional reform are various elements of transitional justice. Some combination of such elements is needed in post-conflict countries to help in the process of healing, reconciliation and peace-building.

While DDR and transitional justice are both necessary for sustainable peace, they are difficult to combine. This may be why the enormous binder of IDDRS guidelines says virtually nothing about transitional justice.[x] Not only do the two efforts operate in different ways, according to different timeframes, and involving different actors, they can actually collide. In the process of DDR, combatants are given reassurance, help and to some degree impunity, so that they agree to lay down their arms and become civilians. By contrast, transitional justice requires that they be held accountable. It may not be possible to prosecute them or force them to pay reparations, but there will be a strong pressure on them to testify, confess any crimes they have committed, and if necessary apologize.[xi]

The need for transitional justice is often ignored in DDR programs, and the one in the DRC is a case in point. The National DDR Plan of 2004 makes no mention at all of justice. Strangely, it does exclude from its definition of combatants all persons prosecuted for warm crimes.[xii] However, on 19 December 2005, the president signed into law a blanket amnesty "for all Congolese" having committed "acts of war and crimes of politics or opinion" between August 1996, when the rebellion against Mobutu began, and June 2003, when the provisional government was installed. Some of President Kabila's friends noted with disgust that this law also pardoned the assassins of his father.[xiii]

In the past, such measures have often been justified with reference to article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions that call for "the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict."[xiv] However, in a 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice in post-conflict societies the UN Secretary-General urges that peace agreements and Security Council resolutions and mandates reject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, including those relating to ethnic, gender and sexually-based international crimes, and ensure that no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United-Nations-created or assisted court."[xv] However, in the same report, the UN Secretary-General notes that "carefully crafted

amnesties can help in the return and integration of both groups [i.e., former fighters and displaced persons, SF] and should be encouraged, although, as noted above, these can never be permitted to excuse genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights."[xvi]

This statement predates the blanket amnesty announced in the DRC in December 2005. I have quoted it at some length, because it highlights the enormity of providing freedom from prosecution for the innumerable atrocities committed in the Congo. In Maniema, I spoke to many local people who told me of widespread rape committed by Mayi Mayi fighters, not as warfare, but as an abuse of women of their own communities, for reasons only known to the criminals themselves.

Not surprisingly, women's groups and local communities have voiced their fury and frustration about the impunity for political assassins, *génocidaires* and rapists. Indeed, in their view, CONADER and the MDRP reward war criminals, while little or no assistance is available for their victims.[xvii]

Comment: In my opinion, if DDR ignores and obstructs the need to hold war criminals accountable, establish the truth about crimes committed during the war, and provide some form of satisfaction to the victims of war crimes, it will harm the prospects for sustainable peace. Stability in the short term must not be bought at the expense of peace in the longer run.

Ownership

One of the most important and challenging principles of international cooperation is that programs driven by the ideas and needs of foreign actors, e.g. donors and executing agencies, will not take root and be of lasting benefit to the recipient country. Hence the need for local ownership, a concept often misunderstood.

The World Bank and the MDRP operate according to the principle that sovereign governments are responsible for programs carried out on their territory, and must actively assume responsibility for them. The positive impact of this approach is that it encourages and helps governments to do what governments are supposed to do. Naturally, in weak states with a long record of bad governance, governments will often do a poor job. The World Bank is aware of this and seeks to monitor progress, suggest corrective action, and if necessary, withhold further aid. If confronted with clear evidence of misappropriation, the MDRP can and will require the money to be repaid by the government before any further aid money is disbursed.

This is not the time or place to discuss in any detail the pros and cons of the World Bank government-centered approach to development and post-conflict cooperation. However, I would like to make two points about ownership.

Comment: National ownership does not necessarily mean that governments must both assume responsibility for projects funded by the World Bank or anyone else and also execute them. In the DDR program for Congo Kinshasa, it may not have been a wise decision to create a whole new national structure to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate 150,000 combatants. A consortium of international and Congolese organizations could probably have done the job faster, better and (in the longer run) at lower cost.[xviii]

Comment: National ownership should not only mean government ownership. One of the lessons learned in DDR programs so far is that reintegration is the most critical and difficult

stage. Unlike the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, their reintegration cannot be imposed or organized by the program. In fact, it cannot even be achieved by the ex-combatants acting alone. It requires the ability and willingness of communities to accept the ex-combatants in their midst. This applies most of all in the kind of closely-knit communities that one finds in rural areas, but it is also true of urban life. Local communities and civil-society organizations can not only prepare the ground for the integration or reintegration of ex-combatants. They can also help the ex-combatants understand and prepare to meet the challenges of civilian life, especially if ex-combatants help each other. Thus it is desirable to involve local communities and NGOs in the process of DDR.[xix]

Security System Reform

The architects of the Congolese National DDR Plan (PNDDR) rightly assumed that a program to promote stability through the dismantling of fighting forces would need to also reform the national army. First, the army itself would remain a danger to the country if it remained divided into a faction loyal to the ruling regime and factions loyal to various rival politicians and leaders. These divisions had to be overcome, and the technique devised for this purpose was *brassage*, which means brewing or mixing. This involved moving soldiers around a lot, which was more difficult, time-consuming and costly than expected. Additional funds had to be provided, and timeframes adjusted. But this activity was moderately successful.

Second, the authors of the PNDDR believed that induction into the army was an appropriate form of providing lawful livelihoods for many of the former rebels. It was initially assumed that around 60% would choose to become government soldiers. Perhaps the architects of the PNDDR also doubted whether the civilian labor market would be able to absorb 150,000 former combatants. At any rate, in practice, there was little interest among Congolese rebels in becoming government soldiers. This is easy to understand if one considers the financial aspects of both options. Demobilized civilians were given a down payment of 110 US dollars, followed by 12 monthly payments of 25 US dollars. On the other hand, government soldiers were entitled to 10 US dollars a month, but often went unpaid.[xx]

DDR needs to be closely linked to the reform of the security sector, or the security system, as the OECD prefers to call it. DDR dismantles the machinery of war, while SSR adapts the structures of government to ensure that they provide the population with security and justice, under the rule of law. As I asserted above, the PNDDR was right to link DDR and army reform. But first of all, the army reform was only a partial success, and anyway, mixing the army to dilute ethnic and political allegiances falls short of security system reform.

Comment: The Handbook of SSR published by OECD DAC forcefully (and in my opinion rightly) claims that piecemeal approaches to reforming the military, the police or any other part of the security sector do not qualify as SSR. What the DRC needed, and still needs, is government reform that will not only provide the military, the police and the judiciary with the capability to do their jobs professionally, but will also make them transparent and accountable.

Annex F Welcome by K.M. Davidse

The Dep. Director Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace building Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) opened the conference by welcoming all participants.

Koen Davidse explained how DDR is linked to SSR in the broader framework of Peace and Security. The "three Ds" namely Diplomacy Defence and Development are all crucial actors in these processes. This conference follows-up on Carlton Beach 1 which brought together policymakers and practitioners with a diplomatic, defence, development and/or non-governmental background to discuss possibilities in working together. He stressed that the time has come to become more specific.

Koen Davidse explained the topic of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) was chosen as a focus of the conference because:

- we now have a lot of experience we can learn from;
- the Netherlands is developing a policy guidelines on DDR;
- we still are uncertain about how to get from DD to R, while we know that we might as well not have DD if we have no R;
- we have general prescriptions but also the realities of local contexts;
- the Netherlands is organising ongoing consultations on the MDGs and specific attention is required for fragile states and post conflict countries since the state of play on the MDGs there is alarming.

He concluded by expressing the hope for a fruitful conference.

Annex G Key Note Speech by Major General (ret) Patrick C. Cammaert

It is a pleasure to be here to talk to you at the start of the conference: "From Rebel to Taxpayer" Joint forces for a successful DDR. I must say with regards to the DRC, I think the title is a bit ambitious! I would like to discuss with you some aspects of DDR in general and in DRC in particular. I will try to avoid using lots of abbreviations and titles of all the factions, armed groups, and splinter armed groups because it is confusing and it makes you feel desperate for the food to be served.

Many DDR operations are conducted in the context of a UN Peacekeeping Operation as is the case in DRC with the deployment of MONUC. This is an integrated mission with a military component with armed forces, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, a police component and various civilian divisions like human rights, civil affairs, DDR and SSR etc. The World Bank is also involved in certain aspects of DDR operations, in particular through, the Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a multi-agency fund managed by the World Bank that supports the Demobilization Reinsertion of ex-combatants in seven countries of the Great lakes region incl. DRC. MDRP does not include direct financing for disarmament, SSR or expenses for military personnel prior to demobilization. Consequently, all disarmament components of a DR program must be funded independently of the World Bank. Nevertheless, the connection between disarmament and the downstream functions of demobilization and reintegration is so close that the bank is a major interlocutor of the whole DDR process. Whatever the level of international peacekeeping, the central government will need to establish its own dedicated organs for DDR. These will be its necessary interface with the World Bank and other international institutions like UNDP, UNHC, WFP and international and national NGOs. In the DRC the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission CONADER (*Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et Réinsertion)* is responsible for the Demobilization and Reinsertion while the Congolese Army, FARDC, is responsible for the disarmament of these troops.

Who are the people in the DRC who need DDR? In Ituri a district in the northeast of the DRC bordering Uganda, there are the Armed Groups and splinter AGs, militias very much involved in economic activities, tribal disputes etc. In the provinces Katanga the rich Southern province and the Kivus bordering Rwanda and Burundi, there are Mai-Mai groups, recruited along tribal lines among peasants armed in the past to help overthrow President Mobutu; ex-combatants from the former warring factions once and in a way still are supported by Uganda and Rwanda. I will not talk about the Foreign Armed Groups like FDLR/ex-Interahamwe since they are supposed to follow a DDRRR.(repatriation , reintegration resettlement)

What is the mandate of MONUC in the DR process? SCR 1565: " to contribute to the disarmament portion of the national program of DDR of Congolese combatants and their dependants, in monitoring the process and providing as appropriate security in some sensitive areas". SC 1756 reconfirms this task.

Disarmament. I would like to share a few experiences and observations with regards to the DDR process starting with the Disarmament phase. Each phase of the DDR program is fraught with pitfalls that threaten the transition to peace. Disarmament is delicate and urgent. It encompasses the handover of weapons and ammo, their safe storage and if required destruction. All of these steps have political, legal, administrative, organizational, financial, logistical and security aspects that must be taken into account. A disarmament program can be functioning relatively quickly if it is properly organized. On the other hand, seizing the moment when armed men present themselves with their weapon creates another set of problems. In MONUC this happened several times. When the reintegration program is unable to accommodate them, the disarmed former combatants find themselves jobless and often homeless, and can become extremely aggrieved when the promised food or work is not available or when the modest benefits provided under the program expires. There is an obvious risk that lacking a better alternative,

they will return to the bush and reacquire arms or will be recruited by other rebel groups. Over the years a rebel dissident BG Laurant Nkunda in the North Kivus recruits easily from dissatisfied former combatants either in DRC or even across the border from Rwanda. In the district of Ituri the same thing happened with the armed groups.

The issue of timing is critical in a conflict and post-conflict environment. Peace agreements and cease fires more so than political agreements are fragile and likely to go sour if not implemented quickly. Therefore maximum efforts should be made to use all possible measures to accelerate the process and avoid delays. The UN and other international organizations are often bureaucratic and slow but this varies from agency to agency. DPKO, UNHCR and WFP are among the most rapid, while UNDP and World Bank are often the most slowest as most of their plans are devised in Geneva and/or Washington DC. In the DRC, UNDP was initially given the lead role in national DDR. With the World Bank it should have had a rapid response mechanism in place in early 2003 but despite the fact that in Ituri several groups already prepared to lay down their arms, no actual presence on the ground was in place until the end of 2004 and no actual reaction mechanism until 2005. So crucially SSR and DDR are usually the foundation of any post-conflict situation. In DRC the FARDC and the Congolese Military Integration Structure (SMI) are responsible for the disarmament setting up regroupment centers supported by MONUC. Many times MONUC had to improvise to make things work on the ground accepting weapons and ammo but had to send the combatants away with a piece of paper telling to come back another time. Weapons and ammo were supposed to be handed over to the FARDC. However MONUC had to destroy old unserviceable weapons and unstable ammo.

Demobilization. As said the World Bank has been the most important contributor to the demobilization process through the Multi Country Demobilization and Reinsertion Program.
200 million dollars were earmarked for the process in the DRC; 100 million from the bank and the rest from donor countries amongst others the Netherlands. The National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER) had a rocky start. They did not understand the World Banks procedures and demands for transparency. They only became operational in mid 2005 nearly a full year after the operation started and at the end of 2005 only 29 million $ had been disbursed. Another part of the explanation of the slow start was the competition for control of the program between the World Bank and UNDP as the implementing agency. The uneasy coordination between the two and the repeated technical obstacles raised by the Congolese, which in my view was a lack of political will, produced serious delays in opening orientation centers where the demobilization should take place. This slowed down the whole process. That had a serious effect on the Army reform. South Africa came with emergency plans but the problems persist. For example in the province of Katanga, the Congolese failed to open Regroupment centers and therefore hundreds of Mai-Mai fighters who MONUC military forced to join the process, had to wait for weeks and sometimes months before they could be processed. Food, shelter and other provisions were not given. So often they picked up their arms and resumed operations. They turn to pillaging and banditry in order to survive. There is another reason why the Congolese were so slow and reluctant to speed up the process. The faster the officials of CONADER implemented the plans the sooner they were out of work. Also fraught by officials of CONADER in handling the funds were seen.

Reintegration. Reintegration of ex-combatants in the DRC means that they have the choice between joining the FARDC and going back to their villages. The FARDC is responsible for integration in the new army whilst CONADER and NGOs take care of the integration in society. A few words on the integration in the new army, the FARDC. The original *Program Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilization et de réinsertio*n was further supplemented by a *Plan National Stratégique d'intégration dans l'armée* managed by de Structure Militaire d'intégration (SMI) with the objective to integrate combatants choosing a future in the national army. Progress has been made to put together integrated brigades consisting of former combatants from all groups and who went through a brassage process.

However these programs have also suffered many setbacks due to logistical constraints, absence of clear operational and political guidelines, huge disciplinary problems, no training, low motivation and poor institutional management. No provisions were given to the dependants who have many times to survive in appalling conditions without food and shelter. At the expiring date of DDR program which was 30 June 2006 some groups had for all sort of reasons not taken part in the process. But those groups formed a security threat in Ituri and the Kivus. So the date was extended till the end of 2006. Donors from the MDRP trust fund voted against the disbursement of MDRP funds for DDR activities in Ituri. Bi-lateral partners were found willing to beef up funds to continue the DDR process for those groups. However as of today there is still a gap of $1 million. So unfortunately, the dual process of demobilization and army integration is still currently clogged due to lack of funding and poor institutional management. Discussions between the new Congolese government and the partners on additional funding are ongoing.

There is a considerable imbalance between demobilization and reintegration. This is one of the most problematic features of the army reform in DRC. The difference between army pay which is between $10-$25 per month or the demobilization allowance which is $110 plus $25 per month for a year. In the $110 was $50 for transport to go home which is in most cases inadequate in a country the size of Congo. Transport between many locations is not available on a daily basis, and the survival kit provided is inadequate for a long wait. Sometimes such as in Katanga, transport is available only once a month making many former soldiers reliant on NGOs to meet their immediate needs while they wait for relocation. When at home, it proved to be very difficult to locate those ex-combatants. Because disbursement facilities are virtually non-existent, the reintegration process is greatly compromised. There is a shadow side on this $25 cash payment. This payment tends to be unpopular with the communities the combatants have brutalized and can be seen as "reward" for their violence and lawlessness.

Way forward. I would like to mention a number of measures that could be helpful for the future in DRC but also in future missions. First, perhaps the most important single function of national bodies is to demonstrate a major aspect of national ownership of a program that is often enough conceived, planned, funded, and even largely carried out by foreigners. Yet despite, or even because of this, national ownership is crucial. The disarmament and demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into civilian society and its counterpart activity, the creation of a unified national armed force following a national conflict, are core functions of national sovereignty. A UN Peacekeeping operation deployed in the country might also be mandated to work closely with these government organs. The holding of regular coordinating meetings and the institution of internationally accepted methods of financial reporting and accounting are the norm.

Second, I would advice to avoid offering benefits directly to combatants. I would like to see them being offered to communities expected to host them following their demobilization. Such a system also has the advantage of avoiding the appearance of 'rewarding' armed combatants who, whatever their motivation, are invariably implicated in the civilian casualties, rape, looting and property damage that accompanied the conflict. Investing in the communities can also be more effective method of creating employment than for instance a one –off cash grant to an ex-combatant with limited experience in the management of personal finances.

Third, in a country like DRC in particular in the rural areas, very often, the workload is carried out by women. Women associated with and affected by the conflict should ideally be as fully engaged as possible in the development of the DDR process at different levels. As participants in the violence, victims often women and children, are strong vectors of peace, yet their need for inclusion and potential contribution is usually neglected. They can strongly influence the success of the disarmament process and play clear roles in the community reintegration and longer term reconciliation phases. Women tend

to relate more than men to the needs of the most vulnerable in the community and to contribute most to community security in addressing them.

Fourth, the Eastern Division of MONUC developed a Mobile Operating Base concept. This concept addressed the security needs of the humanitarian efforts to pacify areas of conflict, supporting the DDR of combatants and the return of IDPs to their home communities. For example in Katanga UNDP developed and financed a Community Recovery Katanga program. This program has demonstrated the benefits of civil-military collaboration for the pacification of volatile territories and facilitation of mass return and reintegration of IDPs. The MOB system proved also very successful in other provinces in the AO of the Division. However, it puts a lot of pressure on the UN Administration to provide the required logistics rapidly.

Finally, it is of utmost importance to get the combatants 'of the street' and do something useful. I call this: the short term reinsertion. Rapid Employment plans are needed without the bureaucratic procedures which smother any creative pragmatic solution. It took more than 2 years before this kind of approach was formally recognized in MONUC although hesitantly. Pay $2 a day for labor intensive programs like road building and maintenance, well digging etc. The practical difficulties of doing so in a society that never had an economic and social structure before the conflict are well known. Many young men and women who find themselves in the bush under arms were never integrated into society in the first place, which in many cases was the reason why they joined the armed groups. UN military can be helpful in assisting in the implementation of these rapid employment programs. I hope I have given you some insight in the DDR process in particular in the DRC describing some problems MONUC faced and still faces.

Annex H Closure by Maj. Gen. Eikelboom

Major General Eikelboom started by thanking the organizers for providing this platform for dialogue.

Knowing each other is very important. There are different experiences in our work, good ones, such as Bosnia but also bad ones like Iraq. We need new tools and new flexible funding mechanism. We are now much better at collaboration in The Hague, but challenges remain in places like Afghanistan, within the mission itself and at the different ministries that support programs. We still have problems called bureaucracy.

I am happy to hear that the need for analyses has been stressed, also analyses during the programs in order to adapt our efforts. In order to do so you need capabilities, you must invest in this, we must have good people. In Afghanistan we had the civil assessment with the different layers of conflict: tribal, power brokers, drugs dealers and the history. You must know who is supporting who! We need to invest in the right analyses so we can be effective.

If we have learned one thing from the past, to be successful we need to make sure our activities supplement each other and we need to minimize the gaps between them. No gaps, no overlap and with respect for each others limitations. We do not have to be the best of friends, our possibilities, capacities and tasks might be different but our goals are the same.

As said earlier it is vital to a, often delicate, peace process to have the tools in place for a comprehensive approach to DDR early in the peace process. This is what this conference is aimed at, to think about and produce the tools necessary to work together and supplement each others activities.

We need to have short term effects and also long term effects. We need both and you know that you must sometimes accept that short term activities do not have an entirely positive effect, but they often are needed to make sure that the long term programs can be effectively implemented and are often necessary to maintain stability. We must know each others capabilities to avoid gaps in order to make the societies where we work, which are in very bad situations, better.

We must invest in peace building for stability and economic development, so that they can do their own business.

[i] Congo Civil War, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm

[ii] *The MDRP in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, updated May 24, 2007. MDRP, Washington DC

[iii] This is part of a wider problem, because Official Development Assistance may not be used for purposes related to arms or the military

[iv] Based on various sources, including Bart Klem and Georg Frerks, *Evaluatie Stabiliteitsfonds 2005 en 2005*. Februari 2007 and personal observations and communications during a visit to Kindu, Maniema province, DRC, in August 2006

[v] Development Alternatives, *A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Mid-Term Review of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program.* Bethesda, Maryland, 2005 http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Midterm_Review.pdf. Also: Bart Klem and Georg Frerks, *Evaluatie Stabiliteitsfonds 2004 en 2005*. Februari 2007

[vi] This is not to suggest that the United Nations have an exemplary record in designing, planning and executing DDR programs. In fact, it was the weaknesses of UN-led DDR programs, including the poor coordination of the UN agencies involved, that led to the development of a common DDR doctrine for the UN. Time will tell how consistently and successfully it will be applied

[vii] Carmine Camerini, *The government should take the disarmament process into their own hands.* MONUC press release, 9 March 2007. http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=14055

[viii] *Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Internet site of the Escola de cultura de pau, University of Barcelona. http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/rdcongoi.pdf

[ix] http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/embargoes.html

[x] The UN plan to correct this omission with the help of the International Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org. Personal communication, 23 May 2007

[xi] The ICTJ has commissioned papers on DDR and Transitional Justice that are to be published in an edited volume

[xii] Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo, *Plan national de désarmement, demobilisation et réinsertion (PNDDR).* Kinshasa, 2004

[xiii] *RDC: le président Kabila a promulgué la loi d'amnistie votée par l'Assemblée*. AFP, 31 décembre 2005

[xiv] Quoted in Mark Freeman and Abdul Tejan-Cole, *DDR and Amnesties*. New York, 2007 To be published in an ICTJ book on DDR and Transitional Justice.

[xv] Ibidem. This is also enshrined in the UN's set of principles to combat impunity.

[xvi] Ibidem.

[xvii] Letter by Dutch NGOs working in Central Africa to the Netherlands parliament. *Kamerbrief inzake Grote Meren: Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) van 13 september 2006*

[xviii] The major requirements for a contractor could the following. One, the successful candidate must show a proven ability to carry out such projects. Two, the successful candidate must submit a feasible and detailed proposal with all the usual attachments (logistical framework, budget, timeframe, plan of action). Three, the contractor must be independent from the national government concerned, and must enjoy considerable freedom of action

[xix] Also see Wolf-Christian Paes and Sami Faltas, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Not Only a Job for Soldiers' in Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema and Juliette Verhoeven (eds), *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 2005; and Sami Faltas 'DDR without Camps: The Need for Decentralized Approaches' in Conversion Survey 2005. Baden-Baden, NOMOS. A French version was published as 'Le DDR sans camps !' in *DDR : désarmer, démobiliser et réintégrer. Défis humains-enjeux globaux*. Sous la direction d'Yvan Conoir et Gérard Verna. Lévis, Les Presses de l'Úniversité Laval, 2006

[xx] Bart Klem and Georg Frerks, *Evaluatie Stabiliteitsfonds 2004 en 2005.* Februari 2007, p. 60