

Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Eastern DRC



Hans Rouw (IKV Pax Christi)

Rens Willems (CCS)

Working Group Community Security and Community-based DDR in
Fragile States

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Working Group Members:

Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS), Utrecht University

Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Radboud University Nijmegen

Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'

European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)

IKV Pax Christi

Netherlands Ministry of Defense

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries)

Dutch Council for Refugees

Authors:

Hans Rouw (IKV Pax Christi)

Rens Willems (CCS)

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Executive Summary

This report is based on 11 weeks of field research in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), between September and December 2009. Its aim is to connect community security and Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in a context specific way based on the insights of “Security Promotion in Fragile States: Can Local Meet National?” (Willems, Verkoren, Derks, Kleingeld, Frerks and Rouw, 2009) that was produced in the PSD network on community-based DDR. Through various approaches, such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews, and participatory observations a total of about 750 persons were interviewed in Ituri, and North and South Kivu.

The report opens with the background of the conflict in eastern DRC and the rounds of DDR programmes that were done in this context. As large-scale insecurity continues it has proved difficult in the past to disarm people and future attempts are being seriously hampered. The local perceptions on security are put forward to enable linking these insights to DDR programme requirements. The encountered perceptions of community members and ex-combatants alike widely range from the absence of war and violence to the ability to have their children schooled. Land conflicts, ethnic identities and the incapacity of the FARDC and MONUC to provide security are important sources feeding into insecurity. The various actors and organizations, such as local initiatives, traditional chiefs, police, army and MONUC are assessed in relation to security based on local perceptions. Their relative role and effect on security varies but it becomes clear that, even while acting in concert, these actors rarely attain security for communities.

DDR efforts in this insecure environment are moreover complicated by aid-chains that make organizations financially accountable to donors through sub-contracting, rather than accountable to ex-combatants and recipient communities. Diverging benefits and limited criteria for enrolment for ex-combatants lead to frustration and possibly re-mobilization. Stigmatization of ex-combatants, which is specifically a problem for former female and child combatants, feed into the phenomenon of auto-demobilization (functional demobilization without outside assistance). The perception of broken promises on the DDR programmers’ side leads to frustrations among both ex-combatants and community members. The lack of *suiivi*, or follow-up, after demobilization is seen throughout as a large issue for continuing insecurity. The general view of DDR as a stop-gap measure by DDR programmers is locally seen as missing the point as engaging ex-combatants rather than attempting to rid an area of firearms is judged more constructive by locals

Based on local perceptions there are many actors that influence DDR processes with their attitude and actions. Reasons ex-combatants gave for mobilizing in the first place are awkwardly reminiscent of stated reasons why frustrations after demobilization now lead to contemplating re-mobilization. Contacts between active militias and ex-combatants could provide inroads for engaging active militia. Local communities often work with traditional systems to resolve conflict and these can be geared towards acceptance between community members and ex-combatants. The local initiatives and organizations that are linked (indirectly) to international donors are, however, often pressed for quick results whereas this is seen by locals as counterproductive when DDR programmes seek to attain community security. Perceptions from national governance actors on DDR requirements varied throughout in role and function. Whereas some consider taking weapons away to be sufficient, as the communities would take care of reintegration, others claimed more help should be provided to make

DDR programmes more sustainable. International donor organizations are criticized for broken promises of assistance and development. Organizational costs of international donor agencies are often too high to leave sufficient money for executive local organizations. Moreover, international organizations are viewed to be lacking local knowledge and field presence. While local organizations have more capacities in this regard, they often have problems with financial and organizational management. Capacities on both local and international level should thus be geared towards complementing each other in order to be more effective with regards to security.

The discussion analyzes perceptions put forward by ex-combatants and recipient communities on (in-) security in eastern DRC in relation to DDR programmes and process requirements. Both formal and informal actors in security compete for funds and legitimacy in security provision. And while local actors are not capable of addressing the security issues in their entirety, on the other hand the FARDC, police and MONUC are not capable and/or willing to address the issues either. This prevalent security gap has serious consequences for disarmament. Coupled with a lack of follow-up after demobilization, a lack of connections between DDR and wider peacebuilding activities, limited criteria for participation in DDR programmes, and the overtly centrally orchestrated DDR effort, improvements in the effectiveness of DDR programmes on community security remain absent. Specifically the reintegration phase in DDR programmes is problematic. The amount of ex-combatants relative to the recipient community, more attention for and participation by local initiatives, and updated contextual knowledge should all be understood and acted upon for improved security. Contextual knowledge and creative collaborations could enhance economic feasibility of reintegration. Issues, such as misinformation and stigmatization, can be reduced in effect through collaboration between local actors and international donors. Also, the lack of clarity over what the concepts 'reintegration' and 'reinsertion' entail and the difference between DDR *programmes* and DDR *processes* pose a great problem for the effectiveness of the 'R' phase, not only in eastern DRC but in DDR programmes in general. Participation in programmes from each side should be problematized, as participation can indicate a wide range of possibilities in practice some of which are seen as less than constructive. Concluding the discussion, various ways of connecting community security and DDR within the Congolese context are highlighted.

The collected perceptions are analyzed in the discussion aiming towards practical recommendations for DDR programmers, the international community and local initiatives involved in DDR processes. The most pertinent recommendations that follow for DDR programmers are: to not be afraid of having local actors take the initiative and to play a more facilitative role; to include all relevant actors and to actively engage them; to find creative solutions within the context in conjunction with local actors; and to see capacity development as a two-way approach. The international community is recommended: to take funding for reintegration more seriously; to be clear about the envisioned approach to reintegration and its promised benefits; to provide diplomatic pressure on the countries involved in DRC's regional insecurity; and to help protect the borders of DRC with its eastern neighbours. Local initiatives and organizations involved in DDR programmes are advised to work inclusively with all relevant actors; to establish networks with relevant organizations and to share knowledge and insights; to work on downward accountability; and to reduce misinformation and stigmatization at the local level.

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Abbreviations

AFDL	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</i>
ARD	Association for Rural Development
CBR	<i>centres de brassage et recyclage</i>
CI-DDR	<i>Comité interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de DDR</i>
CGDDR	<i>Comité de Gestion des fonds de DDR</i>
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense de la Peuple</i>
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
CO	<i>Centre d'Orientation</i>
CONADER	<i>Commission Nationale du Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion</i>
CRC	<i>Centre Résolution Conflit</i>
DCR	Disarmament and Community Reinsertion
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
FAPC	<i>Forces Armées Populaires du Congo</i>
FARDC	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>
FAC	<i>Forces Armées Congolaises</i>
FAZ	<i>Forces Armées Zairoises</i>
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FIPI	<i>Front pour l'Intégration et la Paix en Ituri</i>
FNI	<i>Front Nationalist et Intégrationist</i>
FPDC	<i>Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie au Congo</i>
FPJC	<i>Front Congolais pour la Justice au Congo</i>
FRPI	<i>Force de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri</i>
HnA	<i>Haki na Amani</i>
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	International Governmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
MLC	<i>Mouvement de Libération du Congo</i>
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i>
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PNC	<i>Police Nationale Congolaise</i>
PNDDR	<i>Programme National de DDR</i>
PSDN	Peace, Security and Development Network
PUSIC	<i>Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo</i>
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>
RCD-K-ML	<i>RCD-Kisangani- Mouvement de Libération</i>
RCD-ML	<i>RCD-Mouvement de Libération</i>
RDC	<i>République Démocratique du Congo</i>
SMI	<i>Structure Militaire d'Intégration</i>
UE-PNDDR	<i>Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de DDR</i>
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPC	<i>Union des Patriotes Congolais</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. Introduction

“Thank you for asking me this. You are the first who comes here and asks my opinion.”¹

“Why are you only here for half an hour? Do you really expect to know our problems that way?”²

The connection between community security and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a largely omitted topic in most current policy approaches and is relatively unexplored in both academic and policy literature. Aware of this knowledge gap the working group *Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States*, which is part of the *Peace Security and Development Network (PSDN)*, started its activities in September 2008. The Dutch partners involved in this working group are: the Centre for Conflict Studies of Utrecht University (CCS) (co-chair Georg Frerks), IKV Pax Christi (co-chair Jan Gruiters), the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM) of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (CRU), the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries) and Dutch Council for Refugees, and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

In August 2009, the working group published the report “Security Promotion in Fragile States: Can Local Meet National?” (Willems, Verkoren, Derks, Kleingeld, Frerks and Rouw, 2009) to examine the current state of affairs with regard to community security and DDR policies and programmes, whether initiated from above by state or multilateral agencies or from below by NGOs and communities. The report concludes that one-size-fits-all approaches do not work and that, although greater convergence has value with regard to coordination and rapid implementation, this must be balanced with the objective of promoting community security. Finding complementarity between community security and centralized DDR may be difficult, but it can overcome some of the shortcomings of DDR programmes. Local actors currently have only limited involvement in DDR and their role should be enhanced. As the context is very important for the success of DDR, more holistic thinking on DDR is necessary, and this should include local knowledge as well. The report also proposes five ways of connecting community security with DDR programmes. First, community security can be seen as the overall aim of DDR processes, implying that DDR programmes would take a broader focus than merely ex-combatants and become an active component of long-term peacebuilding and development. Secondly, when community security is viewed as a process in which communities participate in the development and implementation of appropriate responses for security needs they prioritized, this can also become a characteristic of the DDR process. This would imply taking community participation more seriously. A third and related way is then to connect DDR programmes with community security initiatives, for example traditional security systems and local peace committees. Fourth, state-centric DDR programmes could be connected to community-based DDR efforts. And finally, community security could also, to some extent, be a precondition for DDR, as the level of community security can play a role in combatants’ decision to lay down their arms. Throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6 it will become evident that these connections between community security and DDR are rarely made in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

¹ Ex-combatant, Tchofi, south Kivu, 3 December 2009

² Community member, Lusheberi, North Kivu, 25 November 2009

Chapter 7 will elaborate on how these connections potentially could be established. These different ways of connecting community security with DDR will be highlighted in the chapter 8.

The desk study has brought forward the importance and necessity of linking DDR to community security, based on a large amount of literature (both academic and policy) studied. This report is the first out of four field studies to be undertaken by the working group, and builds upon the knowledge acquired through the desk research.

The aim of the field research is not to make an assessment of DDR in eastern DRC, but to look at the linkages between DDR and community security in the case of eastern DRC and to find context-specific approaches for community-based DDR and follow-up activities. The research was undertaken for a period of 11 weeks from 26 September until 12 December 2009 in DRC and focused on the Ituri region and North and South Kivu provinces. A variety of ethnographic techniques were used, such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and participatory observation. In total, over 70 formal interviews were held and up to 50 group discussions, reaching about 750 people. The work was mainly undertaken through local NGOs and partners, as this greatly enhanced the accessibility of the field and the possibilities to reach target groups, such as community members and ex-combatants. Interviews were also held with the staff of local NGOs, international organizations, Congolese government officials, *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) officers and militia members. Interviews covered the following: the perceptions of security on a local level; the actors involved in security provision; the linkages between local security issues and DDR; the way in which DDR programmes involve communities and take into account community security issues; and the potential improvements for DDR programmes from a community security perspective.³

The report begins with a brief background of the conflict in the DRC and the DDR programmes that have been implemented, with a focus on the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu provinces. This report moves away from the more technical and quantitative views that are commonplace, towards a qualitative analysis of the perspectives of those involved in or affected by DDR programmes. Where most policy documents take the point of view of the international organizations implementing the programmes, the main focus here lies with the receiving communities and ex-combatants, while state and international actors are secondary. Taking such a focus, numerous differences between the various groups involved, between provinces, certain regions within these provinces, as well as between communities can be observed. For the sake of readability distinctions between regions or groups throughout the report are only mentioned in a few specific cases, but further elaborated on in chapter 8. The report then starts with an analysis of what security is considered to entail and what factors can influence security, both positively and negatively. This was deemed necessary to assess the relation between community security and DDR programmes. The perceptions put forward during the research will be put forward throughout this report in the form of quotations. These individual quotations always cover a greater occurrence in the responses from interviewees but are singularly used for clarity. The following chapter focuses on the problems as experienced by those involved, such as chains of contractors, diverging benefits, stigmatization, and broken promises. Furthermore, according to interviewees, the lack of proper follow-up for reintegration was believed to be one of the most important reasons for DDR's lack of success in eastern DRC. The proceeding chapter looks at the actors involved in DDR in eastern DRC. Specifically, it investigates the perceptions of the various actors on the DDR programmes and processes, and on each other's role therein.

³ For additional information on the methodology see annex 1.

Having elaborated on local perspectives on security and DDR and the perceptions of the actors involved on the programme, the report continues discussing a number of issues in closer detail. First, the linkages between the security situation and DDR programmes are highlighted. A distinction is also made between DDR *processes* and DDR *programmes*.⁴ This approach is then used towards programming recommendations in the conclusions. The reintegration phase receives specific attention throughout the paper as this phase is critical for the relation between DDR and community security in DRC. The process requirements for DDR as put forward during the research will be related to programming practice and its limitations. Economic contexts and specifically the availability of work will then be discussed in relation to reintegration. Underpinning and often undermining these issues are the levels of information available to all actors. Hence, specific attention will be paid to sensitization and stigmatization as they connect to the information available at the local level. Finally, it is mentioned by international organizations that local organizations generally face capacity problems. Further, investigating this issue reveals that this is only one side of the coin, the other being a lack of understanding and knowledge of the local situation and circumstances on the ground on the side of international organizations. In theory, therefore, local organizations have a capacity – i.e. local knowledge and understanding of the context – that international organizations are lacking, and vice versa, local organizations lag behind where international organizations are stronger – i.e. financial and organizational knowledge.

The conclusions relate the outcomes of the discussion on DDR processes and programmes to practical recommendations for improved links between community security and DDR. Major topics highlighted include:

- The connection between community security and DDR could be improved by the active engagement of communities, ex-combatants and local initiatives in DDR related activities.
- Local structures play an important role in security provision and communities and ex-combatants should organize themselves to jointly address their common concerns. This can be, for instance, issues regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants or *tracasseries* of the FARDC and police.
- Reintegration is considered to be missing connections to local realities and lacking proper follow-up, leading to criminalization and remobilization.
- There is much divergence over what constitutes reintegration, what constitutes reintegration assistance, and to whom this assistance should be given. To improve reintegration processes the concept of ‘reintegration’ needs clarification.
- Based on the capacity gap on both sides, local organizations should be leading in DDR related programmes and international organizations should act in a supporting and complementary role, assisting local efforts to deal with the problems at hand.

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⁴ Here we refer to the distinction between the DDR *programme* that is implemented and the DDR *process* that it aims to influence. This is not to be confused with the distinction between community security as a *process* and as an *end state*.

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2. Background of the Conflict in Congo

“Congo is discourse.”⁵

“ And the hatred, it is internal, it is in the heart.”⁶

Congo was colonized by the Belgians, and ruled from 1885 to 1908 by King Leopold II who regarded the Congo Free State as his personal fiefdom. His violent rule set a precedent for the atrocities to come. In 1960 the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained independence with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister. Later that year Lumumba was overthrown with support of the West who feared his move towards the USSR, and was killed by elements of the army loyal to Joseph Mobutu. Mobutu took full power in 1965, renamed the country Zaire in 1971, and embarked on a politics of ‘Zairianization’ in 1973, nationalizing all foreign businesses. This ensured Mobutu of a large amount of resources to distribute among his patrimonial network of clients, and he gave everyone a free hand to ‘*debrouillez-vous*’ – fend for yourselves – reinforcing the corruption that would become characteristic of the Congo. With the ending of the Cold War international pressure on Mobutu increased to end his one-party rule and Mobutu’s international support also dwindled, and from 1990 the opposition was given a little more space.

The Congolese Wars

In general, the origins of the Congolese wars are located in North and South Kivu. In the 1990s conflicts over land issues started escalating as a result of discrepancies between traditional and state law, most notably the Bakajika Land Law (1966) and the General Property Law (1973). Ancestral land was being bought up by state functionaries and wealthy entrepreneurs. This also increased ethnic tensions, as some groups were better able to take advantage of the land laws. The final drop was an influx of refugees and *Interahamwe*⁷ after the 1994 genocide and the taking of power by a Tutsi government in Rwanda, after which Hutu militias allied with *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ) and started attacking Tutsis in eastern Zaire. The weakening of Mobutu’s regime had encouraged the interest of Zaire’s eastern neighbours, who eagerly started supporting the rebellion of Laurent Kabila’s *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo* (AFDL) in an attempt to access Zaire’s mineral wealth. Kabila’s AFDL, joined by Tutsi militias, started marching towards Kinshasa and ousted President Mobutu from power in May 1997 and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Once in power, Kabila attempted to curb the influence of his former allies and demanded that Rwanda’s and Uganda’s troops leave the country. In reaction Uganda and Rwanda formed a new rebel movement: the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) and occupied eastern DRC, igniting Congo’s Second War in August 1998.

⁵ Ex-combattant, Butembo, North Kivu, 29 October 2009

⁶ Community member, Kibumi, North Kivu, 24 November 2009

⁷ The Hutu *Interahamwe* that fled into the DRC would later be the basis of the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR).

Banyarwanda⁸ and Banyamulenge⁹ increasingly felt alienated from and threatened by the rest of the population, being seen as ethnic strangers. The arrival of Hutu refugees since 1994 further emphasized ethnic differences. The Rwanda Tutsi government hence easily found a constituency among those groups looking for protection. In the Kivus, the ethnic card was played as the Rwandan Tutsi government looked for support among the Tutsi Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, and Kabila started calling for a fight against the foreign invasion, including their Tutsi supporters. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia supported Kabila, while Rwanda and Uganda supported various rebel groups. Negotiations had started almost immediately after the start of the war and in July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the governments of Angola, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. But Ugandan and Rwandan troops remained present in Eastern DRC. In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, which created new room for negotiations. In July 2002, a peace agreement was signed in Pretoria stipulating the withdrawal of the Rwandan Army and the dismantling of ex-FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaise) and Interahamwe. On 6 September, a similar agreement was signed in Luanda with Uganda. In December 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition of the DRC was signed by the parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, including the government, the RCD, *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC), the RCD-Kisangani- *Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-K-ML), RCD-National (RCD-N), the Mai Mai and the opposition. The 'Final Act' was reached in Sun City in April 2003, in which all previous agreements were brought together.

The Ituri Conflict

In Ituri, local conflicts over land escalated as many Lendu were dispossessed by Hema entrepreneurs, who were often backed by the Ugandan Patriotic Defense Forces (UPDF) occupying the region since November 1998. "Ituri increasingly became the target of local strongmen who tried to reestablish themselves in the military powergame" (Vlassenroot and Raeymakers, 2004: 395). One of these local strongmen was Wamba dia Wamba who had been ousted by the RCD and moved to Kisangani, but quickly regained his position when Rwandan and Ugandan troops clashed in Kisangani in May 1999, parting the former allies. The mainstream RCD was backed by Rwanda and became known as RCD-Goma, and Wamba dia Wamba created the rival RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), supported by Uganda, and renamed RCD-*Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-ML) in September 1999. The RCD-ML then controlled North Kivu and Orientale province, while Uganda's other proxy, Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC, was the dominant force in Equateur province (IRIN 2002). After an internal power struggle within the RCD-ML in 2000, the splinter groups RCD-N of Roger Lumbala and the RCD-K-ML of Mbusa Nyamwisi were formed. In 2001, Thomas Lubanga launched the *Union des Patriotes Congolais* (UPC), and after gaining the support of Uganda he took Bunia in August 2002. Lubanga then further ignited the ethnic tensions by promoting a discourse distinguishing *originaires* (South Hema and Gegere) from *non-originaires* (especially Lendu, Ngiti, Bira and Nande), meaning a death sentence for *non-originaires* (Pottier, 2006: 158).¹⁰ In January 2003, the UPC switched its alliance and signs an agreement with the RCD-Goma. To counter Rwanda's growing influence in Ituri, Uganda then supported Chief Kahwa (who previously took part in the UPC) in the formation of the *Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de*

⁸ 'Banyarwanda' means those who speak Kinyarwanda and refers to both Hutus and Tutsis of Rwandese origin living in the DRC.

⁹ Banyamulenge' refers to Tutsi Congolese in South Kivu, who in the 1960s had renamed themselves to the hill where they first settled to distinguish their Congolese identity. For more on the Banyamulenge's conflicting fight for Congolese citizenship rights and their need for Rwandan support, see Vlassenroot (2002)

¹⁰ Although neither Lendu or Hema originate from Ituri, it is generally agreed that the Lendu migrations preceded the Hema migrations (Vlassenroot & Raeymakers, 2008: 388).

l'Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC). Uganda also backed the *Forces Armées Populaires du Congo* (FAPC) of Jérôme Kakwavu Bukandu, a Tutsi commander from North Kivu. PUSIC and the *Front Nationalist et Intégrationist* (FNI) led by Floribert Njabu (Lendu) then joined forces together with Alur militia *Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie au Congo* (FPDC) to form the *Front pour l'Intégration et la Paix en Ituri* (FIPI). FIPI, supported by the UPDF, took Bunia on 6 March 2003 and weeks later the Ituri Pacification Committee (IPC) was sworn in. The constitution for this IPC was agreed upon in Luanda, Angola in September 2002 and had representatives on board from all armed groups except Mbusa's RCD-K-ML. As the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (MONUC) pulled out of Bunia, fighting erupted again between the UPC, again supported by chief Kahwa's PUSIC, and the FNI and the *Force de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri* (FRPI). Bunia was cut in half with the northern part controlled by Hema militias UPC-PUSIC and the south controlled by the Lendu FNI-FRPI. In May 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1484, agreeing on the deployment of French-led operation Artemis in June, which quickly secured Bunia. Hereafter, MONUC was boosted to 5,000 troops and mandated to respond to enemy fire. In May 2004, representatives from PUSIC, UPC (now split into UPC-Lubanga and UPC-Kisembo), FNI, FRPI, FPDC, and the FAPC signed the Dar es Salaam Agreement, including the *Acte d'Engagement de Kinshasa*. Lubanga has been arrested for trial in The Hague, and other generals have been appointed in the FARDC. However, splinter elements from various militias, such as the FRPI and the *Front Congolais pour la Justice au Congo* (FPJC) still roam around in Ituri and ethnic tensions remain high.

Trouble Continues

The Final Act of Sun City led to the integration of the government and the armed groups into the Transitional National Government with Joseph Kabila as president and four vice-presidents from the government, the unarmed opposition, the RCD-Goma and MLC. The fighting in the Kivus nevertheless, continues, most notably by the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), *Congrès National pour la Défense de la Peuple* (CNDP) and various *Mai Mai* groups. The FDLR, fearing repercussions upon returning to Rwanda, continues to pillage communities and is controlling mineral rich areas. Remaining an important security issue and major concern for communities in the Kivus, the FARDC's operation Kimia II targeted the FDLR, to which FDLR responded by attacking communities. Unable to protect civilians, MONUC temporarily ceased its support to Kimia II. It renewed its support for the succeeding military operation 'Amani Leo' which officially started on 1 January 2010 (UN, 2010).

Mai Mai is a collective term for the self-defence militias that claim to fight against foreign oppression, and are highly feared for the magic powers they derive from water. The capacity and structures differ greatly between the various groups, and where some cooperate with the FARDC, others fight together with the FDLR against their common Tutsi enemy. While most *Mai Mai* groups originated as self-defence groups, many of them have started to trade ideological goals for economic ones, such as pillaging and occupying mines and forests to trade the resources.

The general elections held in July 2006 brought the demise of the RCD-Goma. Triggered by this loss of Rwandan influence, Laurent Nkunda stepped up and formed the CNDP, claiming to protect the Congolese Tutsi and fight the FDLR. Before that, Nkunda had already been fighting the FARDC, even capturing Bukavu for a short period in 2004. In January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda declared that he was taking the leadership of the CNDP. After being unable to defeat the CNDP militarily, a new alliance was formed between former foes, Congo and Rwanda, allowing Rwanda to chase the remaining FDLR in eastern Congo in return for Nkunda's arrest. In order to neutralize the threat of the CNDP, the

Congolese government subsequently reached out a hand to Bosco Ntaganda, despite an ICC warrant for his arrest. The CNDP has now started to integrate into the FARDC, although certain elements remain loyal to Nkunda. Furthermore, the elements integrated into the FARDC are continuing to exert private control over mines and have established parallel systems of revenue and local administration (UNSC, 2009: 46).

3. Background of DDR in DRC

“The DDR programme has forgotten its mission.”¹¹

“The idea is good, but the execution is poor.”¹²

The DDR programme in Congo can be divided into four different strands: the national programme, the Ituri DDR programme (of which the second and third part fall under the national programme), a programme for the demobilization of child soldiers, and the DDRRR programme for the repatriation of foreign combatants on Congolese soil.

On 18 December 2003, President Kabila issued three decrees: creating the *Comité interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de DDR* (CI-DDR), an inter-ministry committee tasked with the orientation and conceptualization of DDR; the *Comité de Gestion des fonds de DDR* (CGDDR), in charge of the finances and procurement, and the *Commission Nationale du Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion* (CONADER) in charge of the planning and execution of the *Programme National de DDR* (PNDDR). The resulting lack of clarity led to competition and conflict between the organizations over finances and influence, which in turn led to delays in the programme and the termination of the CGDDR. Reacting to the nature of “Africa’s First World War”, the Lusaka agreement (1999) instituted the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) programme, aimed at repatriating the foreign combatants on DRC soil.¹³ MONUC disarmed combatants and transferred them to their countries of origin where the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) assisted them in national reintegration programmes. The MDRP also contributed US\$ 200 million (50% from the World Bank and 50% from the donor community) to CONADER for the civilian components¹⁴ of DDR (Kasongo and Sebahara, 2006).

In addition on 24 January 2004, a decree created the *Structure Militaire d’Intégration* (SMI) military reform programme. Together with the SMI, CONADER also manages the combined *tronc commun* element of the PNDDR and military reform programme. In an attempt to monopolize violence, a law was passed on 12 November 2004 regulating and unifying the new national army, *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC). Included in this law was article 45, which recognized the incorporation of a number of armed groups into the FARDC, including the former government army *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC), the members ex-FAZ also known as former President Mobutu’s ‘*les tigres*’, the RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N, MLC, the *Mai-Mai*, as well as other military and paramilitary groups (as determined by the government). All these combatants were to enter the *tronc commun* before either being demobilized or reintegrated into the FARDC. In this process, they were first assembled at *centres de regroupement* (operated by the military) and then transferred to *centres d’orientation* (COs, operated by CONADER) where adult soldiers were asked to choose between demobilization or entry into the FARDC. Those opting for enlistment moved on to *centres de brassage et*

¹¹ Ex-combattant, Butembo, North Kivu, 29 October 2009

¹² Community member, Luvangire, Ituri, 19 October 2009

¹³ The Agreement would only go into effect in 2002 after bilateral agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and the DRC and Uganda, signed in Pretoria and Luanda respectively.

¹⁴ The civilian components according to the MDRP include demobilization and reintegration.

recyclage (CBRs, operated by the military) where they received a short basic training, after which they were integrated into the FARDC. Children that were judged incapable of serving for medical reasons, and those suspected with “war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity” were not allowed to choose for integration in the FARDC (Gouvernement de la RDC, 2006: 25). However, both Amnesty International (2007: 38) and a UN official in Bunia¹⁵ were unaware of any cases where soldiers were prohibited to join the FARDC on “moral” reasons. Those opting for demobilization then received “assistance with the socio-economic reinsertion in the communities” (Gouvernement de la RDC, 2006: 26). The army reform programme suffered delays, leading to an emergency plan, “which diluted the principles of identification and the simultaneous nature inherent in the two processes of DDR and army reform” (Amnesty International, 2007: 39).

Due to various reasons, most particularly CONADER’s inefficiency, the national demobilization programme also suffered delays. In reaction to these delays, the government and the other international partners set up two pilot projects, one of which was the *Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire* (Disarmament and Community Reinsertion, DCR) in Ituri. The programme was designed specifically for the region where the armed groups had not signed the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement in Sun City and it was the first programme of CONADER, with a leading implementing role of UNDP (Puijebroek et al, 2008: 9-10). The programme targeted 15,000 members of the armed groups in Ituri that signed the *Acte d’engagement de Kinshasa*. The main objectives of this programme were to disarm the combatants, decrease the proliferation of weapons and ensure pacification of the region. To do so there were three phases: awareness-raising; disarmament; and community reintegration. While the DCR ended in June 2005 after demobilizing 15811 combatants, only an estimated twenty percent of the firearms had been collected, insecurity remained a pressing issue, and the reintegration process proved to be rather weak causing many to return to the bush (Ibid, 14). Problems noted included a limited number of reinsertion staff, as well as insufficient and uncoordinated information on benefits for ex-combatants and receiving communities (Bouta, 2005: 28).

After the Disarmament and Community Reinsertion programme, the national programme (PNDDR) commenced in Ituri in June 2005,¹⁶ while in other provinces the PNDDR had already started. Although in this national programme CONADER contracted international NGOs to carry out the reintegration phase, insufficient means were granted to them and local NGOs were left out of the process (Puijebroek et al, 2008:16-17). In 2007, yet another phase of DDR under the PNDDR had commenced in Ituri to respond to the remaining active militias in the region.

In 2008, the MDRP programmes, including that of the DRC, were dissolved into national programmes. CONADER, which was originally responsible for overseeing implementation of the PNDDR, was now replaced by a new implementation unit, the *Unité d’Exécution du Programme National de DDR* (UE-PNDDR). With new financing the UE-PNDDR was tasked with (1) the demobilization of an estimated 23,000 combatants from the FARDC who have not yet gone through the *tronc commun* and providing them with transitional safety allowances; (2) providing socio-economic reintegration support to 40,000 previously demobilized ex-combatants who were demobilized in 2006-2007 and an estimated 23,000 yet to be demobilized ex-combatants; (3) providing reintegration support to approximately 9,000 children from the armed forces; 4) providing specialized assistance to an estimated 5,000 disabled demobilized ex-combatants; and (5) providing limited reintegration

¹⁵ Interview, Bunia, 12 October 2009.

¹⁶ This first phase of the NPDDR is referred to as the second phase of DDR in Ituri, as the DRC programme was considered Ituri’s first phase.

support to about 40 percent of an estimated 19,000 militia armed group members in the East following their disarmament (MDRP, 2008). In the Kivus the Amani programme started in January 2008 after the signing of the Goma Agreement between 22 militias and the government. The Amani programme was part of the national programme, but designed specifically for the Kivu provinces. However, the combination of the DCR programme in Ituri, the Amani programme in the Kivus, and the PNDDR that implemented programmes in both regions has failed to resolve the presence of active militia in eastern DRC. Overall, with the lack of positive results of DDR programmes the DDR process in eastern DRC can therefore be regarded as a failure.

4. Security

“The war maybe over but there is still the hatred. And the pillaging continues, but now without real motives.”¹⁷

“We are concerned with justice and the police want money. We have no money and the police are not interested in justice.”¹⁸

In order to assess the relationship between community security and DDR it is pivotal to analyze what is considered to be security by the communities. Therefore this chapter first will look into what factors influence security and how these threats are understood and possibly dealt with by the communities.

The following factors are important for understanding the collected security perceptions. First of all, the geographical position of specific communities proved significant in relation to security. Proximity to national borders with for example Uganda and Rwanda has consequences as the generally porous borders are no obstacle for illegal trespassing and arms trade. “Illegal refugees carrying arms are coming from Rwanda. This creates insecurity”. According to local students, about 12,000 people have entered through the parks. “They come without control. They herd their cows and set up tents. They are not real refugees.”¹⁹ This will have direct and negative influences on the security situation as more people will have to share scarce resources. Moreover, rumours that the neighbouring countries are about to invade are rampant throughout the border areas, which increases perceptions of insecurity. The import of foreign goods, which undercut the market for local goods, furthermore hampers the economic development of eastern DRC.

Refugee camps are often dotted along the roadside, which in practical terms makes it easier for MONUC to protect its inhabitants. On the one hand, community members consider this protection as a benefit; while on the other hand the return of IDPs can have an adverse effect on local security. Security concerns here relate to giving back land and property to returning IDPs; an adapted ethnic balance in the recipient community; and scarcer resources by increased numbers of residents after IDPs return, which can lead to conflict. In terms of distance to roads, local community members more generally complained that the more distance between their daily activities and roads the more insecure they are as armed elements can plunder rape and murder without interference. National parks are often considered insecure as these are used by armed elements as a source of revenue and as a hiding place. This obviously will have an adverse effect on community security in those areas. It is worth mentioning here that, besides direct insecurity, the local population is often not able to extract resources from the national parks, undermining their livelihoods.

Other relevant factors include ethnicity, economic position and the difference between day and night. In general, ethnicities have their own source of income, such as cattle herding or agricultural activities. Tensions arise, for instance, when cattle feed off crops of agriculturalists and thus the perception of what is considered security often relates to ethnicity, because ethnicities oftentimes coincide with differences between cattle herders and agriculturalists. Moreover, many conflicts are seen to be

¹⁷ Community member, Rugari, North Kivu, 24 November 2009.

¹⁸ Community member, Uguru, Ituri, 1 October 2009

¹⁹ Students, Masisi, North Kivu, 25 November 2009

framed along ethnic lines whereas economic benefits are often the underlying reason. One community pointed out, “people who point their finger at others often have profited from the war.”²⁰ A firmer economic position obviously increases the coping possibilities as, for instance, mobility is enhanced when danger lurks. The difference between day and night refers to the often mentioned phenomenon that militias and bandits keep their activities to night and patrols by the police, FARDC or MONUC only occur during the day. This leads to “nightly incursions on our paths and theft of animals. There are also thefts after which they are contacted by the thieves to buy back their goods [especially animals].”²¹

Security perceptions

This section will highlight the various security perceptions held at the community level. The issues will be complemented by factors contributing to insecurity. The communities interviewed often showed an intimate understanding for the relation between security and development. Both were commonly seen as influential on each other, and physical security was often prioritized as this would widen possibilities for development at the local level. Furthermore, during the interviews, trust in physical security for the future was stated to relate strongly with the confidence for future development.

War and violence were most pertinent in analyzing the security perceptions. War is a relative concept when assessing the security situation in eastern DRC after the peace agreements. Moreover, actors that posed insecurity varied upon geographical location. It was mentioned, for instance, that the FARDC, active militia and demobilized combatants are often perceived to create similar insecurity on a practical level for the communities.²² The *tracasseries*²³ from armed elements take several forms. There are roadblocks where people have to pay for passing, people have to pay to enter a market place and theft and armed robberies are rampant. A case in point was brought by an IDP who stated that, “if I go back to my village they pillage and rob me. They will allow me to work the land, but every time when the time for harvest comes the militias pillage our produce.”²⁴

Sexual violence ranked high, which is not unexpected in a region where “23 percent witnessed an act of sexual violence, and 16 percent reported having experienced sexual violence. One-third of the respondents said they would not accept victims of sexual violence back in their community” (Vinck et al, 2008: 9). Indeed, communities commonly agree that the security situation for women is worse but they are often incapable of addressing this type of violence as perpetrators are often armed. UNFPA assesses that 90 percent of cases of sexual violence in eastern DRC are perpetrated by men with arms, of which half is estimated to be FARDC (UNSC, 2009: 79).

Disappearances are often named as a source of insecurity. Besides the obvious effect on security, disappearances also play into rumours about what happened and who could have been a perpetrator. The wide availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is named as an obvious source of insecurity but this phenomenon requires some further explanation. Not every community considered SALW as a problem, as SALW are not found in every community. Or, as communities are aware, there

²⁰ Community members, Luvungire, Ituri, 19 October 2009

²¹ Community members, Batale, Ituri, 19 October 2009

²² Lendu community member, Machuja, Ituri, 17 October 2009

²³ *Tracasseries* is often and widely used as a general term for example illegal taxes, fees for entering markets, roadblocks, theft and rape. More generally it relates to harassments and annoyance.

²⁴ Refugees around Sake, South Kivu, 23 November 2009

were hidden caches of weapons in the vicinity but without direct reasons for usage, these would remain there. Furthermore, violence is often perpetrated with *armes blanches*²⁵, which in part might explain this phenomenon. Other communities related high levels of violence to the readily available weapons, which easily exacerbated small disputes into armed violence. “When I cannot get my ground (back) legally, ‘voilà’, I will get it with a gun.”²⁶ Interestingly, a community also mentioned the possession of ‘the right weapons’ to protect themselves against physical insecurity. We will return to the value of weapons in relation to DDR programmes and community security in the next sections. Finally, the absence of health clinics and readily available medicines furthermore decreases physical security in general and directly in relation to victims of armed violence.

Security was assessed by the communities in a wider sense than physical security. Safe water, healthcare and usable roads are often mentioned as components of security. Also the ability for kids to go to school, having work and the ability to choose a job of preference, and hunger were responses to what constitutes security. Jobs are specifically needed for the adolescents as “youngsters without perspective stand a large chance to mobilize again.”²⁷ Then there are many issues that relate to economic circumstances. For a secure situation accessible lands and markets are necessary. This means roads leading to lands and, markets and the lands and markets themselves should be free of obligatory payments to armed elements. Many communities host returning demobilized and there should be enough activities to keep the demobilized engaged in activities other than armed violence. Many community members saw the lack of respect for national law and human rights as a threat to security. More generally, the lack of respect and love in the community were mentioned in relation to insecurity. Remedying this would, according to interviewees, lead to a situation where people do not live in fear and are able to sleep at night. It moreover was indicated that the ability to sleep in their own houses is a security component, as people regularly are too afraid to sleep at home because most violence and theft happens at night. An open dialogue with other communities is furthermore often mentioned as a way to harmonize communities in order to enhance security.

Sources of insecurity

The aforementioned components of security in fact stem from different sources. Land conflicts are the main underlying source of conflict. It was estimated that 85 percent of the issues the *tribunal du paix* dealt with concerned land issues.²⁸ Ownership of land is difficult as official ownership titles (since 1973’s General Property Law discussed above) now compete with customary rules creating much confusion and heightened tensions. Two issues that are related to the land conflicts are ethnicity and the gap between rich and poor. Ethnicity often dictates livelihood. In general, the Hema in Ituri and Tutsis in the Kivus herd cattle, whereas the Lendu and Hutu tend to be agriculturalists. The ground conflicts then pertain to the practical inability to herd cattle and grow agricultural products on the same location.²⁹ This practical issue is often framed along ethnic lines, which then can be seen as the most relevant source for tensions and conflict and the driving force behind inferiority and superiority complexes that follow. The gap between rich and poor is apparent when cases are brought to the *tribunal du paix*, where French is spoken and money is perceived to matter greatly due to numerous accounts and occurrences of corruption. Specifically worth mentioning here is the effect in part this

²⁵ *Armes blanches* refers to machetes and knives (i.e. non-SALW).

²⁶ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2010

²⁷ Local NGO, Bukavu, North Kivu, 23 November 2009

²⁸ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 22 October 2009

²⁹ For an elaborate report on various land conflicts in Ituri, cf. Mongo, E., D. Nkoy and J. van Puijenbroek (2009) *Conflicts Fonciers en Ituri: Poids du passé et défis pour l’avenir de la paix*.

has on the relation between Tutsi's and Nande (as well as other ethnic groups) in North Kivu. Tutsi's are seen as being favoured by outsiders, which creates tensions. "Nowadays even a five-year old will say; look, that is a Tutsi, he is considered to be better."³⁰ The problem of land conflicts also relates in part to the return of IDPs. Upon return, these people often find their home and land destroyed or taken over by someone else. The IDPs are sometimes even seen as well off since they stayed in the refugee camp and were taken care of by INGOs and protected by MONUC.

Many communities deem it necessary for the FARDC to remain in the compounds while not on a mission. Many of the problems with security for communities relate to the presence of FARDC. For instance, they harass the population and rape women. More generally, people feel abandoned by the Congolese state since the state cannot or will not enhance security for the communities. Impunity is rampant in eastern DRC and this clearly contributes to the perception that crime and violence pays. Members of the FARDC are perceived to almost never appear in courts to be judged on their behaviour, whereas according to local actors their witnessed behaviour gives ample reason. "There even was a soldier of the FARDC in Masisi who was looting some houses and setting them on fire. A woman was protesting and he then threw her baby in the fire."³¹ Militia members are not often brought to justice either, which feeds into the perception that both FARDC and militia are merely bandits. Indeed, of the 3,106 cases of sexual violence reported in the Kivus between January and June 2009, the military prosecutor had prosecuted less than 100 cases between February and August of that same year (UNSC, 2009: 80). A UN official in Bunia explained that while in the "constitution and [its] plans, the government claims to be fighting impunity and strengthen justice, [but] justice receives only 0,29% of the budget."³²

During the research it became apparent that misinformation and stigmatization play an important part in security perceptions. In a fragile context with so much violence and injustice it stands to reason that factually correct information is hard to find and trust. This relates to who did what as it is often not clear to which groups perpetrators belong. Stigmatization is an accompanying problem as conflict lines are often reified and intensified by bias. It can play into the relations between communities and; demobilized combatants; raped women; ethnic groups; other communities; and many other relations. Stigmatization causes tension within and between communities, which feeds into the many conflicts that exist. More attention will be paid to the phenomena of misinformation and stigmatization in chapters 6 and 7.

Actors in security

The following actors were named by the communities and ex-combatants to play a role in security provision. This certainly does not mean that these actors are also able to provide security or that these actors coincide with the typical Western security visions. Reasons for this and the mutual relations between these actors will be highlighted in chapter 8. Although the options are limited, local communities do indeed have various ways to cope with violence. There are many geographical variations in who is held responsible for what security issue, but the actors discussed below paint the general roles in security in eastern DRC. The actors that were analyzed in this research include; the communities without external assistance; the local chief on different levels; the police (PNC); the army (FARDC); and MONUC. The security issues were related to each of these actors and the ongoing relations with and between these actors was assessed by the researchers. Specific attention here is

³⁰ FOPAC, Butembo, North Kivu, 22 October 2009

³¹ Former Amani Programme official, Bukavu, South Kivu, 7 December 2009

³² UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 9 October 2009

given to *Haki na Amani*³³ (HnA) in the Ituri region and *Kyaghandanda*³⁴ in Northern Kivu province. The activities of *Haki na Amani* were assessed by talking to its members and its coordinators directly whereas the *Kyaghandanda* system could only be assessed through anecdotal evidence provided by local organizations working with this structure.

The communities themselves are, albeit sometimes with outside assistance, capable of resolving some conflicts and security issues. HnA can be seen as a system based on traditional mechanisms that serve as interlocutors between the communities and relevant actors in security and development. They mediate in conflicts, organize *barzas*³⁵ where people can vent their frustrations, and accompany victims of violence to relevant institutions. HnA's approach to community security starts with,

Community meetings, so-called barzas communautaire, during which all parties concerned can express their security concerns. At the end of the barza communautaire candidates for local security meetings are identified. Finally a round of voting among the participants of community security meetings leads to the selection of security committee members. (Frerks and Douma, 2007)

Basically, according to one interviewee, they "are doing the work the government is supposed to do. The government should handle things like we do. The *barza* really helps solving conflicts."³⁶

Kyaghandanda is a traditional Nande system that is most influential in the Beni-Lubero axis in North Kivu, and has now developed into a more modern structure. The communities in this system "talk about development related issues (health, food, schooling), security and [it] has a large role within the community."³⁷ *Kyaghandanda* meets weekly and besides its regional headquarters in Beni is internationally supported by the Nande Diaspora community in Europe, the US and Canada. As a "socio-cultural organization to give dignity to its people,"³⁸ *Kyaghandanda* does not address DDR directly, but it "can support the youth and help with the acceptance and integration of former militia members."³⁹

Reciprocal trust between people participating is needed for local systems to be effective. "We need confidence in the system or it will not work."⁴⁰ Both HnA and *Kyaghandanda* are, in part, based on traditional systems of the communities. Neither address DDR directly, but their role during reintegration of ex-combatants and the ensuing follow-up are seen as beneficial for the sustainability of DDR programmes by the people involved at the local level. Its organization is judged to be less corrupt as people have a direct dampening effect on this phenomenon by being members.

³³ *Haki na Amani* means Justice and Peace in Swahili

³⁴ The *kyaghandanda* is the traditional veranda at the Nandes. It is a sacred cultural place that affirms itself to be the support of the "vision sociétale" Nande. It is dedicated to meetings, to the customary rituals and to endless discussions. Every clan or each family has her *kyaghandanda* (Mwana wa vene, 2005).

³⁵ Forum where issues in the community are discussed.

³⁶ Community member, Bedu Ezekere, Ituri, 16 October 2009

³⁷ CRC, Butembo, North Kivu, 23 October 2009

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Coordinators HnA, Djupuganda, Ituri, 6 October 2009

Chief

The local chief exists on many levels in Congolese society. Besides province level (and district in the case of Ituri), formal state structures are *territoires*, each headed by an *administrateur*. These then are divided in *collectivités* with a *chef de collectivité* designated for each. *Collectivités* consist of villages clustered together in *groupements* or *localités*, each again with a corresponding *chef*. Community members often see the local chief as the first line for solving problems. They go to him with land issues, customary problems such as violence within the family and sorcery, involuntary displacement, issues stemming from the return of IDPs, and the development of the community in general.

The chief is often seen as the one with oversight of the problems and, thus, capable of making the first steps. The chief often remains in contact with actors like police, military and other chiefs, which qualifies the chief as an interlocutor between conflicted parties. This does not mean the local chief is always seen favourably. "We bring things to him, but he never brings anything back."⁴¹ According to community members the chiefs sometimes ask extra money for their services and sometimes they seem more concerned with their own power than with the problems of the community. Interestingly, the communities often assess their relation with the local chief as positive, even when he is judged to be ineffective for the community. This might hint at two things elaborated upon in chapter 7; that the closer to the community an actor is placed, the better relationship the community has with that actor; and that customary actors are preferred over newer state institutions. Oftentimes the chief brings security issues to the appropriate actors when he is not capable of or relevant in solving security issues. Cases of murder and armed violence, for instance, are often seen as too complicated for the chief.⁴²

Police

In general, communities will take burglary, theft, sexual violence, suicide, debt reclamation, traffic accidents and drug use to the police. This, however, depends on the perceived capabilities of the police and the relationship between the community and the police. Often police are perceived to be implicated in *tracasseries* or seen as corrupt. Another problem oftentimes is their lack of proximity to the community so that communities do not feel any connection with them or are incapable of working effectively together due to geographical distance. The police are not often seen as capable of solving security issues due to a lack of means. Complaints over bribery and paying for processing are widespread in Congolese society, or in the words of one community member, "they do not intervene where troubles are, but where the money is."⁴³ In general, however, police seem to be more valued by communities than the FARDC, as the police are often closer to the communities, which enhances the personal relations. In one specific case, the police were favoured over the FARDC because they simply demanded less money for their services.⁴⁴

Army

Communities often contact the FARDC when armed violence occurs, although this depends on the context.. Armed robberies and the presence of militia in the area are sometimes brought to the FARDC and sometimes hidden caches of SALW are reported to the FARDC. One of the main problems

⁴¹ Community member, Batale, Ituri, 19 October 2009

⁴² While according to the law such cases are to be dealt with by the police, the questions during the research focused on who people prefer to go to with their security issues; not who they should go to by law.

⁴³ Community member, Luvangiri, Ituri, 19 October 2009

⁴⁴ Ibid.

underpinning the relation between communities and the FARDC is the FARDC's lack of a positive presence and the violent behaviour of the FARDC among the communities. Moreover, the longstanding norm of *debrouillez-vous* within the army led to the situation where the FARDC basically takes whatever it needs from the local population. Coupled with this norm is the practical problem of timely payments for the FARDC. Days after the completion of a EUSEC programme to streamline the payments for the FARDC in Ituri, the accountant fled with the monthly payments of all FARDC soldiers in the Ituri region.⁴⁵ And as the principal of a local school explained:

*I still [on 24 November] haven't received my 30.000 CF [30 US\$] salary for October. That is two months of salary I'm waiting for. For me that is a problem, thus it will be the same problem for those carrying a weapon, like the police or the army. Why not go to the local population then? Not because you want to, but because you have to survive. I would too.*⁴⁶

The FARDC is implicated in numerous *tracasseries* and they are often seen as a source of insecurity rather than a source of security. Most communities are not able to contact them in case of insecurity due to the simple fact that they are nowhere to be found in walking distance.

MONUC

Assessing what type of security issues are taken to MONUC proved difficult as most communities interviewed were too far away from MONUC. MONUC was said not be around anymore after the main fighting stopped or they pass by without communicating with the communities. However, many people knew human rights violations can be brought to MONUC or related UN agencies. It is striking that, for instance, rape and murder are always brought to the police, which begs the question what human rights violations are brought to MONUC. The fact is that many people interviewed did not see a constructive role for MONUC in relation to their security problems. MONUC oftentimes was described as people who "are paid as observers to see us die."⁴⁷ Note here that these are perceptions that do not necessarily relate to actual practice. MONUC is oftentimes seen as ineffective in tackling security issues but their perceived benefit is that they do not demand money for their potential services.

DDR effects on security

The effects of DDR programmes on community security are diverse and relate to several factors. These factors are: the amount of demobilized integrating into the community; whether they are seen as victors or losers; and the follow-up given after demobilization. On average, people appreciate that security has improved in their surroundings due to DDR programmes. This, however, often relates to direct effects rather than a long-term increase in security.

Demobilized

There are "many problems with the ex-combatants. They are a source of insecurity because they are used to intimidate the people in the communities. And with a weapon it is easy for them to find

⁴⁵ UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 09 October 2009

⁴⁶ School principal, Kibumba, North Kivu, 24 November 2009

⁴⁷ ALPN/PADI, Goma, North Kivu, 12 November 2009

money and food.”⁴⁸ Phrases such as, “the demobilized are just dumped into the community” and “they still have a military spirit,”⁴⁹ can be frequently heard during interviews. This is not surprising when some demobilized reminisce their past as militia, saying, “When we are hungry we steal. When we encounter problems we kill.”⁵⁰ There is also the perception that DDR breeds insecurity for the community as “DDR is the main reason there are still active militia out there.”⁵¹ The followed logic is that as long as militia are paid for handing over their weapons, they will have an interest in cycling through various programmes only to return to the bush when the benefits of the programme stop. Specific attention here should be given to the phenomenon of auto-demobilization. This is often caused because the demobilized are not eligible or willing to participate in a DDR programme or do not want to be registered as a demobilized person. The effects on community security are most severe because “auto-demobilization is the worst for security as their command structures still exist and nothing is done about their behaviour.”⁵² Going through a DDR programme will at least increase chances of breaking down command structures while alternatives to violence should be formed through reintegration.

Militia

Active militias often pose more community security risks than the demobilized for obvious reasons. However, the communities often do have a difficult time distinguishing who is an active rebel, who is demobilized, who belongs to the security forces, and who is simply an armed bandit. This confusion on the communities’ part seems justified when UN officials state, “when I pursue cases I find most of the time that it is people in uniforms, not demobilized.”⁵³ Besides the security threat stemming from militias, the communities also suffer from being in between the militia and the FARDC.

*They both pillage the population and they both perceive them to be spies for the other side. If a farmer has to go from one place to the other, passing from rebel territory into government controlled territory they will be hassled by the FARDC and blamed for being from the other side and accused of supporting the rebels. Moving the other way they get the same treatment from the rebels.*⁵⁴

The various links between community security and DDR programmes will be elaborated upon in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this report.

⁴⁸ Panel discussion, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁴⁹ Family of demobilized and community members, Bunyakiri, North Kivu, 2 December 2009

⁵⁰ Ex-combatants, Mudaka, South Kivu, 3 December 2009

⁵¹ Community members, Luvangiri, Ituri, 19 October 2009

⁵² Panel discussion, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁵³ UNDSS official, Bunia, Ituri, 9 October 2009

⁵⁴ Panel discussion, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

5. DDR: Complications on the Ground

“They first went out to loot and steal, and now they receive support through DDR. They gain twice while the communities suffer.”⁵⁵

“With a weapon it is easy for them to find money and food. The reintegration programmes are not competing with that.”⁵⁶

The presence of DDR programmes is generally known among the population, and it is believed their aim is to bring peace in the community. Positive impacts noted by communities are: fewer robberies and roadblocks; and ex-combatants taking part again in the community. Also, where communities have more trouble with ex-combatants and militias, they often do see the *potential* of DDR, as it is thought to be positive to help ex-combatants reintegrate into the community.

However, the general opinion on DDR is far from positive, which is underscored by the few independent assessments of DDR in the DRC (cf. Bouta, 2005; Amnesty International, 2007; Van Puijenbroek, et al 2008). According to a UN official involved in DDR, disarmament had not been successful given the number of arms in communities. Reintegration has also failed, and because demobilized “only have to pick up their arms and go back” demobilization cannot be seen as successful either.⁵⁷ One of the troubles of the DDR programmes in the DRC is that they are taking place during an ongoing conflict, implying a constant possibility for demobilized combatants to return to fighting. Militias continue to fight for various reasons: because of their commanders’ frustrations over not getting the high positions in the FARDC like their fellow warlords; because they feel threatened by another ethnic group, or feel the others are better off; and, most notably, in order to control natural resources for private gain.

Chains and numbers

Besides the complicating matter of a continuing war, there are several issues hindering the success of DDR. One of which is the contracting chain through which DDR is generally managed and financed (cf. Douma and Van Laar, 2008; Klem and Douma, 2008: 28; Willems et al, 2009: 61). For instance, USAID works in the DRC with two American profit organizations (ARD and MSI), who in their turn work with international NGOs, who in their turn work with local NGOs.⁵⁸ A local NGO worker explained that DDR “functions from an echelon with multiple steps to us (...) which makes the process unclear.”⁵⁹ It not only makes the process unclear for the ‘lower levels’, but also hampers the flow of information upwards to the higher ‘echelon’. For instance, a complaint among both international organizations and local NGOs was that the UNDP often provides incorrect lists of ex-

⁵⁵ Community member, Akara, Ituri, 2 October 2009

⁵⁶ Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁵⁷ UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 12 October 2009

⁵⁸ USAID, Goma, North Kivu, 27 November 2009

⁵⁹ Local NGO, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 1 December 2009

combatants and that they select the wrong beneficiaries for projects.⁶⁰ Communities are also criticizing the way success of a DDR programme is measured: “Long lists of names do not say anything about security.”⁶¹ Often only a part of the weapons (the older ones) have been collected and violence continues. And apart from being an inappropriate measure, they are also often believed to be incorrect in favour of international organizations’ purposes. “The UN is fine with this system as fewer combatants remain and their numbers fit their purposes.”⁶²

Diverging Benefits

Within and around DDR programmes there are some demobilized and communities that benefit more than others, which in some cases causes tension between these groups. In cases where ex-combatants have successfully reintegrated into the community, people more often viewed the support ex-combatants received as something positive; they are now contributing something to their community again. In other cases, however, it is felt that those who committed crimes are being rewarded, and that those who have suffered are left out. “They should all get less, and everyone should get the same.”⁶³ It was also mentioned that not all ex-combatants have been treated equally, for instance, when one group entered the DDR programme after different negotiations than another, or when certain ex-combatants lived in more distant regions and were not able to access benefits.

Among ex-combatants, there are also large groups of auto-demobilized or, as they are sometimes referred to in the DRC, deserters. For instance, in Bunyakiri it was mentioned that there were about 550 registered ex-combatants, but also about 1200 who had not registered.⁶⁴ According to a local NGO, the large amount of auto-demobilized “hints at the uselessness of DDR programmes and what they try to attain.”⁶⁵ However, the large amount of auto-demobilized may very well be partially caused by confusion over which DDR programmes are for whom, and where one is eligible for support. Those who want to demobilize go to a *centre de transit*. There they choose for integration into the FARDC or reintegration into civilian life through the PNDDR. From the PNDDR they receive up to 6 months of training, a reintegration kit, and a *filet de sécurité*.⁶⁶ However, if they do not have a firearm, they are not eligible for the PNDDR. They can then try to apply for one of the programmes of the UNDP, which consists of 2 or 3 months paid manual labour (e.g. road construction), after which most ex-combatants have to reintegrate on their own due to the lack of follow-up programmes. Especially among the *Mai Mai*, most combatants were armed with *armes blanches* rather than firearms, sometimes sharing a firearm with 30 others.⁶⁷ There are even reports that *Mai Mai*, frustrated by their limited options to receive support, are stealing the ID cards from demobilized to acquire benefits.⁶⁸

Although the differences in support are a cause for frustrations on the one hand, on the other hand there are also groups with specific needs that in many cases are not (sufficiently) addressed. There

⁶⁰ Chef de coutumier, War Palara, Ituri, 1 October 2009; Chef de chefferies, Djokot, Ituri, 3 October 2009; USAID, Goma, North Kivu, 27 November 2009; Local NGO, Bukavu, South Kivu 30 November 2009; Local NGO, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 1 December 2009

⁶¹ Community member, Luvangire, Ituri, 19 October 2009

⁶² Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁶³ Community member, Machuja, Ituri, 17 October 2009

⁶⁴ Local NGO, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 1 December 2009

⁶⁵ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 23 October 2009

⁶⁶ Ex-combatants in the government programme are entitled to a monthly financial allowance for a period of 12 months, referred to as *filet de sécurité*.

⁶⁷ Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

⁶⁸ Ex-combatant, Muhongoza, South Kivu, 3 December 2009

have been many women involved, as active combatants but also for cooking, carrying of equipment or/and for sexual services. Female ex-combatants complained especially about the lack of support they received within the DDR programme. When not directly involved in the militia, they often encountered difficulties in being accepted as dependants. Also in need of special attention is the large contingent of child combatants. Local NGOs claim that there are simply too many demobilized children for them to support. Moreover, according to another local NGO, there were about 3,000 auto-demobilized children south of Butembo, which fall outside the mandate of MONUC and INGOs focusing on children.⁶⁹ The ongoing conflict around their communities of return is mentioned as the most common reason for children to go back into the armed groups. And with a lack of *encadrement*⁷⁰ and education, they are easy targets for re-recruitment.

Stigmatization

A problem faced by ex-combatants is stigmatization by other community members. Women and children especially encounter many difficulties in their interactions with the community. Children who were involved – often by force – in militias are regarded as troublemakers, and in some cases, even casted out by their families. Women face similar problems, and are often regarded as having been involved in a role – i.e. combatant – considered not suitable for women. For instance, in one community female combatants explained that they did not receive a dowry, and were not being allowed to join the women’s organization.⁷¹ Stigmatization also causes many women and children to auto-demobilize, which further complicates their reintegration because they receive no support through DDR programmes.

While demobilized women and children are facing the most problems with stigmatization, this is also a problem faced by ex-combatants in general. This is less of a problem in cases where: ex-combatants have been sent out by communities for protection; when it is a relatively small group compared to the size of the community; and if there is employment through which ex-combatants can again take place in community life. However, in many cases they are viewed as a different and uncivil group that has kept a military morale. “After demobilization they remain demobilized rather than being part of civil society.”⁷² Indeed, having experienced the ease with which money and food can be acquired in the bush, and the lack of an income outside the bush, there are large numbers of demobilized causing problems in communities. However, ex-combatants and communities alike have mentioned that they are also often wrongly accused being ‘the usual suspects’. As an ex-combatant explained, “it is hard to live with the word ‘demobilized’ attached to you. We have to do something to change this name. For instance, if we can work as carpenter, the word demobilized can change to the word carpenter.”⁷³ Adding to this problem is, according to ex-combatants, the demobilization card they received during DDR. Intended to monitor the distribution of DDR benefits this card reinforces their identity as being an ex-combatant. “Now we are no longer soldiers; we are civilians. But because we still carry our demobilized card with which we have to identify ourselves, we remain demobilized.”⁷⁴ The ‘demobilization cards’ could perhaps be replaced with ‘civilian ID cards’ that are not exclusively reserved for ex-combatants, but where a small demobilization number can be used to identify ex-

⁶⁹ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2009

⁷⁰ *Encadrement* is often used in terms of (re-)integration, generally including schooling, work and social acceptance.

⁷¹ Female ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

⁷² Community member, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

⁷³ Ex-combatant, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

⁷⁴ Ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

combatants for benefits. The issues of stigmatization and information will be further dealt with in chapter 7.

Broken Promises and a Lacking ‘Suivi’

There are many frustrations in communities and among ex-combatants about the many broken promises of the government and international organizations. Many had been told there were reintegration projects available and that they would receive a reintegration kit, but they in fact did not. “Many promises were also made by the government and the NGOs, but to our regret very little came from that. This risks that they will go back into the militias. (...) The false promises are making matters worse.”⁷⁵ As a UN official explained, CONADER has been poorly managed, and many of the benefits never got into the hands of ex-combatants.⁷⁶ Ex-combatants were also forced into programmes that did not match their needs or desires, causing, in part, the motivation to sell their reintegration kits. Also, international organizations often paid the promised benefits after several delays, if at all, which led to many frustrations. A UN official involved in DDR said that the UN had to do a lot of “crisis-management, as ex-combatants would go on a rampage.”⁷⁷ Part of the problem lies in the incapacity to deal with the large number of people that are trying to lay claims on assistance. Indeed, there were reports of ex-combatants being sent away by international organizations and applying somewhere else. In other cases, euphemisms describing programmes are hiding the impact they actually aim to make. In one case, what was called ‘a community-based reintegration project’ was described by those designing and implementing it as “a pay off,”⁷⁸ rather than durable reintegration.

Most criticism is on the lack of *suivi* – follow-up – during the reintegration process and the fact that reintegration is treated as a technical exercise.⁷⁹ Especially in areas where there is little work, it is felt that, “demobilized are just dumped in the communities while they still have the *esprit*⁸⁰ of the military.”⁸¹ Combatants who could not hand in a firearm are eligible for the programmes managed by the UNDP. Most of these projects consist of three months of helping in the rehabilitation of roads. Afterward, ex-combatants are unemployed again, having had some salary for three months, but no training or other job perspectives. There are some durable activities, including training to follow-up on UNDP programmes, but these only take place in a small number of easily accessible cities⁸² and most ex-combatants do not find their way into these programmes. According to a UN official involved in DDR, the lack of follow-up is “a big flaw in this programme, and in all DDR programmes. There needs to be follow-up, but donors are in too much of a rush.”⁸³ The reintegration of ex-combatants who carried firearms is undertaken by the UE-PNDDR, which communities and ex-combatants alike criticized for not including any ‘intellectual baggage’. The phenomenon of intellectual baggage will be taken up again in chapter 7. Also, many of the reintegration kits were sold, either for the quick cash pay-out – “maybe you get a few goats, but it takes at least ten months before a new goat comes out which can sold for maybe \$50”⁸⁴ – or because of their impracticality - the inability to graze a goat in

⁷⁵ Community member, Tchofi, South Kivu, 3 December 2009

⁷⁶ UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 9 October 2009

⁷⁷ UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 12 October 2009

⁷⁸ International aid organization, Goma, North Kivu, 27 November 2009

⁷⁹ The concept of ‘reintegration’ has also been discussed in Willems *et al* (2009: 43) and will be further elaborated on in chapter 8 of this report.

⁸⁰ *Esprit* here refers to mindset.

⁸¹ Community member, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

⁸² E.g. in South Kivu in Bukavu, Uvira and Kalehe.

⁸³ UN official, Bunia, Ituri, 12 October 2009

⁸⁴ Ex-combattant, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

the city. A UE-PNDDR officer in Ituri explained that after the reinsertion assistance it is up to the communities to accept ex-combatants and further reintegrate them,⁸⁵ and indeed the 'R' in the French acronym stands for reinsertion; not reintegration. Security issues stemming from the reintegration of demobilized in the communities, such as theft and rape, are thus not considered an issue for the programme but for the community. However, according to communities and ex-combatants, the key for successful reintegration is proper training followed by work. What is lacking, therefore, is equipment and follow-up support after completing the training at the *centre de transit*.

*If a demobilized has been in the centre de transit and has chosen a trade, they often have forgotten it when they come back to the communities. (...)The formation they receive in the centres de transit should continue when they come into the communities. There should be support centers in local communities that can assist in the reintegration. Right now the programmes are too far away. If they would be closer, this could improve the follow-up.*⁸⁶

As opposed to some policy makers' vision of DDR as a stop-gap measure to quickly – and temporarily – neutralize large numbers of armed men, at the ground level, there is a great demand for alternative job-training that includes follow-up in terms of technical assistance and monitoring in the field. A lack of proper training and support in the labour market are thought to be among the main causes for failing reintegration and a return of combatants to the militias. Especially as the reintegration kit or the *filet de sécurité* are only short-term benefits; they do not ensure a steady source of income. The UNDP community reintegration programme in Ituri involved “a three-day course in preparation for civilian life and provides each former fighter with a \$50 allowance and each family with one month's supply of food.” (*emphasis added*, Marriage, 2007: 292). Indeed, an FNI-spokesman asks whether such “marginal” assistance is really believed to change their war-mentality (quoted in: Bouta, 2005: 28). Community members and ex-combatants alike argued that with an AK-47 – which costs between \$25 and \$50 depending on the condition and including accessories – one can easily make much more money than the value of the reintegration kit, which is often sold. As explained by one local community member, “the bush gives direct results but a goat does not.”⁸⁷ The lack of proper reintegration and follow-up is therefore one of the largest causes for 'revolving-door' combatants in regions with ongoing conflict. The following chapter will continue with this issue and chapter 7 will address both remobilization and the scope of DDR in more detail.

⁸⁵ UE-PNDDR officer, Bunia, Ituri, 14 October 2009

⁸⁶ Community member, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

⁸⁷ Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

6. Conflicting Roles in DDR

“Not knowing the problem is the problem”⁸⁸

“The state has fled us”⁸⁹

This chapter looks at the actors involved in DDR in eastern DRC. Specifically, it investigates the perceptions of the various actors on the DDR programmes and process, and on each other's roles therein.

Ex-combatants

When looking to demobilize combatants, an important factor to take into account is the reason why they were fighting. The reasons for joining an armed group differ from combatant to combatant. In eastern DRC many have been frustrated over land issues. In such cases they joined a militia to protect the land they perceived to be ancestrally theirs, and fight against foreigners or whom they perceived to be foreigners. Others joined militias to protect themselves against other armed groups, including the armies of Mobutu and Kabila. In general, people joined because they perceived that “the country was sick”⁹⁰ in various ways. They have joined either out of their own conviction, or with pressure from their home communities. There have also been many cases of abduction into armed groups, especially among children. Many have also joined for economic reasons, which have increasingly become the most important reason for many individual combatants to continue fighting.

The decision to demobilize came for some as peace agreements were signed and they entered a demobilization programme, forcing them to either reintegrate into civilian life or to join the FARDC. Others were forced to leave as minors as a result of campaigns against minors in armed forces.. Again, others simply left the militia because they felt the job was done, or they had gotten tired of the war and wanted to return to their communities. Although promises made by DDR programmes are often perceived to have not been kept, the incentives DDR offers nevertheless influenced some combatants' decision for demobilization. For combatants who were fed up with the hard life in the bush, the promised benefits of DDR sometimes outweighed the benefits of being in the bush. Furthermore, “DDR gives a reason to quit the armed forces without being seen as a traitor. Then ‘everybody’ does it and you can participate without being seen as a traitor.”⁹¹ Moreover, DDR can convince regular foot soldiers to demobilize by offering benefits to them directly. Typically, the commanders of militias generally take the largest share of the spoils of war, leaving little benefits for the rank and file (cf. Bouta, 2005: 28).

However, there is much dissatisfaction among ex-combatants, which creates a serious threat of remobilization. A female ex-combatant exemplified this by showing her demobilization card and at the same time showing her combat pants she was still wearing under her traditional skirt; she was

⁸⁸ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2009

⁸⁹ Community member, Bishange, North Kivu, 24 November 2009

⁹⁰ Ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

⁹¹ Ex-combatant, Mangange Nogeru, North Kivu, 28 October 2009

demobilized, but could go back any time if she decided to.⁹² Some ex-combatants are disappointed in the way they are treated by their communities, feeling they deserve more appreciation for defending the country. Some have trouble letting go of their military mindset. Another reason to consider taking up arms again is insecurity, either due to other militias or *tracasseries* of the FARDC. The most common reason mentioned in interviews with ex-combatants for remobilization, however, is economic insecurity. Although life was hard in the bush, without a job in civilian life, it is felt that it was often much easier to get food and other items in the militias. An ex-combatant explained, “many of the young ones turn back as they do not have much future perspective and, thus, it is more difficult to convince them to stay.”⁹³ And in South Kivu, ex-combatants said that without development aid they would return to the bush and steal for sustenance.⁹⁴

The obvious problem of the frustrations over poor reintegration is that it leads to large numbers of new potential recruits – without any political goals – for the militias. The direct result of this is that, not only it can lead to more insecurity, but it also increases the costs of DDR, as combatants are entering DDR programmes more than once. And not only do these frustrations cause remobilization, they also prevent demobilization of current militias. Several ex-combatants mentioned they are still in regular contact with their brothers (sometimes literally) in the militias.

On the positive side, however, the contact ex-combatants maintain with current militia members can potentially be geared towards convincing these militia members to give up their arms and return to civilian life; “they will come in when we tell them we have a good life.”⁹⁵ And also ex-combatants themselves can greatly improve their reintegration within the community. There are instances in which ex-combatants have organized themselves in associations to promote their interests and enhance the communication and cooperation with other community members. Such associations can be used to settle differences between ex-combatants themselves, as well as between ex-combatants and the community members. Moreover, a local NGO argued, “for the improvement of security, ex-combatants also have much value as they have many ideas.”⁹⁶ Where they existed, the success of such associations differed greatly, depending for one on their acceptance by the community. For instance, the most successful one in terms of decreasing conflict involved regular community members along with ex-combatants. It also depends on the associations’ acceptance by the government, who often prevented ex-combatants from forming associations in the first place, fearing they might start a new militia.

Local communities

The communities in which ex-combatants are to integrate naturally play a vital role in the reintegration process. To have communities accept the DDR programme and the reintegration of ex-combatants it is therefore important to involve communities in the programme. Not only as beneficiaries, but also by involving them through information sharing, which can dampen the negative role of rumours. Various communities and community leaders (e.g. traditional chiefs) complained about not being informed about the moment and number of ex-combatants returning. This risks excluding an important partner in the reintegration of ex-combatants. It is not only a possibility for communities and families but it should also be their task to contribute to the

⁹² Ex-combatant, Mangage Nogera, North Kivu, 28 October 2009

⁹³ Ex-combatant, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

⁹⁴ Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

⁹⁵ Ex-combatant, Kavumu, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

⁹⁶ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2009

reintegration process “It is very difficult for them to change their mentality and therefore the family is needed to soften the change. Feeling home is one of the most important factors in reintegration.”⁹⁷ The communities are the ones in the field. They can bring in the civil alternative to an armed life and provide an alternative value system. It is necessary for them to accept and pardon ex-combatants that went through disarmament and demobilization, as stigmatization is a significant issue hindering reintegration. As one community member explained, “the role of communities is to defend and assist the reintegration process. They can give advice and counselling and help ex-combatants to re-orientate and help them to stay in civilian life.”⁹⁸ Communities should therefore also be supported in this process, specifically when keeping in mind their capability to operate in areas that are difficult for DDR programmers to reach.

Of course communities and community members cannot all be treated alike. Yet many seem very open to playing a larger role in the reintegration process. They themselves see sensitization as one of the main tasks to which they can contribute. Generally, this refers to sensitization of the community and promoting the acceptance of ex-combatants. However, in some cases this also referred to teaching ex-combatants the law of the country, teaching them a trade, or even taking them in for a traineeship. Communities also know their environment much better than any organization at a higher level, such as the national government or international organizations involved in DDR. This input can be used in the design of the programme, for instance when deciding what kind of vocational training will be offered. Some local communities also said they were able and willing to monitor reintegration, having much more visibility on the process. Moreover, communities often are very much aware of who possesses illegal firearms, which can be helpful either for disarmament in DDR, or following community disarmament programmes. Indeed, this function of the community seems largely untapped. One community posed the question to whom they should go, right now, with their knowledge of illegal firearms; the FARDC or MONUC?⁹⁹ Although at differing levels from community to community, there is, thus, a will and capacity among many communities to play a role in DDR. There should be inroads to steer this willingness and capacity into practical actions.

Local NGOs

Many local NGOs are active in DDR programmes, often as a sub-contractor at the end of the aid supply chain. This often leads to frustrations on the side of local NGOs who often feel forced to adjust their projects or comply with the donors’ demands, leading to local NGOs’ perspective of projects not matching the realities on the ground. “What we miss is a dialogue. Now they [donors] are just dictators who impose themselves on us.”¹⁰⁰ Another local NGO mentioned, “internationals often do not trust the local organizations.”¹⁰¹ Further complaints had to do with the limited amounts of money their reintegration projects often had to work with. Reportedly, this could be as little as \$30 per ex-combatant for a 2 or 3 month project, which is seen as completely inadequate to set up a durable reintegration project.

Some local NGOs have caved under international pressure to set up quick result projects, and others got in simply to make a living. Nevertheless, there are many local NGOs that manage to set up durable reintegration projects, training ex-combatants in carpentry, car mechanics, sewing, farming

⁹⁷ Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁹⁸ Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

⁹⁹ Community member, Akara, Ituri, 2 October 2009

¹⁰⁰ Local NGO, Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 November 2009

¹⁰¹ Local NGO, Goma, North Kivu, 12 November 2009

and many other trades. These trainings sometimes included internships at the end of the course, and were always followed by support in looking for a job or helping combatants set up their own business (often grouped with other ex-combatants and other community members). Often they also received technical support after placement in the form of trainers and mechanics for broken equipment. Other local NGOs work outside the regular DDR funding chain, taking a more holistic approach to what constitutes DDR. For instance, *Centre Résolution Conflict (CRC)* functions as a medium between the actors involved in DDR (ex-combatants, active combatants and civil society), aiming to stop the cycle back into the militias by supporting ex-combatants in their reintegration and sensitizing the communities. Moreover, they involve ex-combatants and current militias in peacebuilding activities. According to the CRC,

*DDR is a mechanism that brings about a durable peace; a programme that engages combatants for peace. Disarming and giving a reinsertion kit is what the programme constitutes for the government and the international community. For us it is about making conflicts non-violent. Most importantly it is about engaging armed groups for peace. We need connections with all levels, also the ones far away from government.*¹⁰²

It is also argued that local NGOs are more capable of dealing with the problems, because they have more history at the local level, a better understanding of local issues, and are actually present in the field at the community level.

National government

The national government is hypothetically viewed as the first entity responsible for security and development issues over international organizations or local organizations. However in practice, the government of the DRC is highly criticized, both in general terms and in relation to its DDR activities. The UE-PNDDR and its predecessor CONADER are blamed for not living up to their promises as benefits often do not make it to the beneficiaries. Corruption within the government is a significant cause for this, and at the local level, the government is perceived to be “mafia who steal money from the demobilized and, with that, from the community in total. They eat from the people *en bas*.”¹⁰³ A local NGO in Bukavu was frustrated over the harsh taxes imposed on projects that aimed to help ex-combatants to earn a living, as the government considered them a business. The UE-PNDDR also does not include any support or inclusion of communities, which is the reason the UNDP mentioned for refraining from becoming a partner in the programme.¹⁰⁴ A local NGO in South Kivu even felt that perhaps they should set up a structure with the UNDP to deal with things the government would or could not.¹⁰⁵ And an officer in the FARDC disclosed that his main source of information is not his own government or his superiors, but the UN’s radio station Okapi.¹⁰⁶ In effect, due to its failing the national government is thus getting even more sidelined.

The perceptions of government officials on their role, and the role of the DDR process in general, differ greatly. An UE-PNDDR official in Bunia explained that according to him, “DDR is an urgent post-conflict measure and therefore has no connection with a peace process or development.”¹⁰⁷ A small donation of cash, in his view, had to be sufficient for reintegration and he had no knowledge or

¹⁰² Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2009

¹⁰³ Ex-combatant, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

¹⁰⁴ UNDP official, Bukavu, 8 December, 2009

¹⁰⁵ Local NGO, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

¹⁰⁶ FARDC official, Beni, 11 November 2009.

¹⁰⁷ UE-PNDDR official, Bunia, Ituri, 14 October 2009

interest in the results of a questionnaire that was supposed to help the government assess reintegration. In general, he perceived the programme to be successful. An official of the UE-PNDDR in Goma was less positive, explaining that the programme was not sensitive to the local context, took insufficient time for reintegration training, and that they have trouble coping with the size of the programme and the context of an ongoing conflict. According to him, the programme was not that successful, with many combatants returning to the militias.¹⁰⁸ An official of the former Amani programme¹⁰⁹ was also very critical, explaining there is only partial disarmament and demobilization, but no reintegration. "From the UE-PNDDR they may get some money, but in the end what are you going to do with \$110 or \$120? How can you change your life with that?"¹¹⁰

International organizations

Through international organizations such as UN organizations and INGOs, many contributions are being made to at least stabilize the situation and bring humanitarian support. However, despite many positive contributions, there is also much criticism on the role of the international community in the DDR process. As already mentioned earlier in this report, international organizations are often reprehended for not keeping their promises, both regarding to security provision and reintegration and development projects. There is also much resentment over the perceived favouring by the international community of the eastern neighbours, most notably Rwanda. Whether perhaps due to a feeling of guilt for the inaction during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, or the better connections of Tutsis in international organizations, it is thought that the international community "has an *esprit* of favouritism for the Tutsi."¹¹¹ Mentioned most often in this regard was the need for the international community to start pressuring Rwanda to commit to an inter-Rwandan dialogue, "just like the international community did with the inter-Congolese dialogue."¹¹² Without this, repatriation of the FDLR to Rwanda will remain an illusion.

Another point of contention is the way the large amounts of money are spent for organizational costs, and a UN official admitted that at least one third of the MONUC budget is used for transportation.¹¹³ Related to the contracting chain mentioned earlier, much money is reported to be sticking in the higher levels. Examples were given of international NGOs operating multiple four-wheel drives with drivers and salaries of UN personnel, in contrast to the limited finances local NGOs were assigned for their projects. Local organizations reported amounts ranging from \$300 to as little as \$30 per combatant for a reintegration project, which sharply contrasts the \$1,333 per person DDR costs on average in the DRC (Caramés and Sanz, 2008: 24).

In the eyes of communities, ex-combatants and local NGOs, international organizations are considered to be bureaucratic, difficult to approach, and disconnected from local reality. Complaints were made about the fact that the international community's DDR activities concentrated themselves mainly in the cities. This also causes international organizations to misinterpret the realities on the ground. One ex-combatant complained that they were given reintegration kits that they could not use, but "a Congolese won't refuse things"¹¹⁴ he or she gets. And another ex-combatant explained, "the UNDP

¹⁰⁸ UE-PNDDR official, Goma, North Kivu, 18 November 2009

¹⁰⁹ The Amani programme was set up to enforce the Goma Agreements of January 2008. In July 2009 it was followed by the STAREC programme.

¹¹⁰ Official Amani Programme, Bukavu, South Kivu, 7 December 2009

¹¹¹ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 22 October 2009

¹¹² Community member, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

¹¹³ UN official, Bunia, North Kivu, 9 October 2009

¹¹⁴ Ex-combatant, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

gave a radio, but you cannot eat a radio. I will probably sell it off for food.”¹¹⁵ Also local NGOs complained about the lack of local knowledge of international organizations. “When they make a field visit they only visit our office and not the terrain. They have no idea how different it is there where we work.”¹¹⁶ This aggravates frustrations over mismatching projects, such as the placement of an electrical mill in a village without electricity or growing crops in the wrong season. The following chapter will elaborate on the distance between DDR programmes and intended beneficiaries.

At the local level it is felt that “the international community should *complement* the work of local NGOs,”¹¹⁷ and give them more space for local initiatives to grow. Moreover, there is a demand for stronger pressure on the national government, and halting the financial support to the “bandit level”¹¹⁸ as Kinshasa is also referred to. As mentioned, strong diplomatic pressure on Rwanda by the international community is also favoured.

¹¹⁵ Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

¹¹⁶ Local NGO, Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 November 2009

¹¹⁷ Community member, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

¹¹⁸ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 22 October 2009

7. Discussion

“The source of peace is the grass roots level.”¹¹⁹

“Peace means work, but peace also means life.”¹²⁰

This chapter will discuss and reflect on the perceptions of security and DDR presented in the previous chapters. The outcomes of these discussions will then be used to formulate more practical recommendations for the DDR programmes in the conclusions.

Chapter 4 provided an overview of security problems encountered by the communities. The importance in analyzing the security perceptions lies in understanding what DDR should address in order to establish a link with community security. Throughout eastern DRC these problems are manifold and not adequately addressed by the security actors. There are geographic, ethnic and economic variations in the security perceptions but overall security is not attained throughout eastern DRC. This has a direct and negative influence on the ability to develop and decreases trust and confidence in a peaceful future, which in turn retards security and development.

Actors and relations

The FARDC is often implicated in human rights violations and MONUC has not been capable of reversing the security situation by filling the gap the FARDC leaves or even creates. Local actors and structures such as the chiefs, HnA and *Kyaghanda* are often not capable of addressing security issues beyond the local level. Moreover, the strength and capacities of such structures varies greatly between regions. Police structures could fill the gap between community initiatives and military capabilities of the FARDC and MONUC, but Congolese police are understaffed and often do not have a presence at the community level. The main problem in addressing community security then is that locally trusted actors such as the chief and local initiatives are not able to address the higher spectrum of insecurity, whereas the actors potentially able to do so are perceived to be too far away, both in geographical and social terms. Interestingly, the communities did often indicate a good relation with the local chief whereas they did not judge him to be effective in mitigating insecurity. Most of these communities do not have other accessible actors such as police in their immediate surroundings and traditionally the chief is the first in line to address community issues. Overlooking the local chiefs in DDR programmes thus risks cutting out a familiar actor for the communities, which then, theoretically, is replaced by police or, in cases of worse violence, the FARDC assisted by MONUC. This, however, is not happening in practice as the FARDC has diverging goals and MONUC is not capable to protect the local population everywhere. Moreover, a lack of training and slow payment of salaries – if payment is made at all – may cause the FARDC and police to be another part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. More fundamental and difficult to overcome is the absence of state institutions such as functioning local governance and police at the local level in DRC, whereas the logic behind interventions is often a focus on state institutions. The assessment of what security problems are brought to what actor indicates a large role for non-state actors in dealing with

¹¹⁹ Community member, Ezekere, Ituri, 16 October 2009

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

insecurity. This indicates that dealing with insecurity at the local level will have its own contextually-defined ways and these are generally overlooked by centralized DDR programmes. This would provide an argument for seeing community security as a *process* in relation to DDR, as such a perspective would include the local non-state actors in the DDR programmes. The inclusion of local actors, be they recognized by Congolese state and international donors or not, is however not unproblematic. Just as with the FARDC and the police in eastern DRC, the protection of community members is not always a priority for local actors. Competition between traditional chiefs, police and local initiatives is not uncommon. Status in society and financial gain often form the core of this competition, both of which are issues the local population does not benefit from in terms of improved security. The legitimacy of these actors furthermore often seems derived from past experiences, which explains the general popularity of local initiatives and chiefs in certain areas. The security gap for the local population remains, as local actors are not capable of addressing the security issues in their entirety and the FARDC, police and MONUC are not capable and/or willing to address the issues.

Oftentimes the local problems are linked to larger issues by the local Congolese such as border control, corruption and impunity, the influx (both legal and illegal) from eastern neighbours, the lack of dialogue on all levels with Rwanda and the lack of economic cooperation between DRC and its neighbours. These issues are perceived to form a task list for the international community as they go beyond what local actors can achieve. But the international community is often seen as inadequate or unwilling in this sense.

Insecurity and DDR programmes influence each other in two ways. First, DDR programmes are seen to have two effects on security; a positive effect as oftentimes the amount of SALW is reduced and the overall security situation improves; and a negative effect as 'benefiting the perpetrators' will enhance the perception that violence is rewarded. Vice versa, the general level of security has an effect on the willingness of ex-combatants to disarm. It is clear that indeed community security is seen as a precondition by many combatants to disarm. The perception should minimally be that a secure life (as indicated in the broad sense of the word) can be attained by disarming and reintegrating. When the situation is judged to be insecure this will have a negative effect on the will to disarm in the first place, or the will to continue unarmed.

DDR general issues

This chapter will look both at DDR *processes* and *programmes* to relate required processes for DDR to recommendations for programmes. This approach is chosen because the required processes for successful DDR that were found in general do not match programme constrictions such as manageability and timeframes. Another benefit this approach realizes is more clarity on what DDR programmes should address when a link with community security is to be attained.

First, there is the dichotomy between the required scope of DDR processes and the limitations of DDR programmes in practice. Both recipient communities, including related local initiatives and ex-combatants alike, claim that an actual link between DDR and community security, and hence broader issues, should be established in programmes. The argument put forward is that rather than seeing DDR as a technical short-term approach, which merely takes weapons out of society, DDR should aim at securing communities by constructively engaging both ex-combatants and recipient communities. The view that the DDR programmes "lack intellectual baggage"¹²¹ was found throughout Congolese

¹²¹ Chef, Malio, Ituri, 23 October 2009

society. This indicates that DDR processes require social and mental components to be successful, whereas DDR programmes do not sufficiently provide for these components. These activities should minimally consist of psycho-social activities to address traumas and reconciliation activities between ex-combatants and community members. Specifically, the follow-up in the reintegration phase is criticized for being too short and incomprehensive because it is argued that reintegrating into insecure environments without assistance will dramatically increase the chances of combatants returning to the militias. Auto-demobilization forms a specific problem in this regard as no assistance whatsoever is received by these ex-combatants. This divergence between process requirements and the limited programming scope should be reconsidered when community security is the aim of DDR programmes.

The second issue is the limited acceptance in DDR programmes and the stated wider criteria needed for DDR processes to actually link to community security. For instance, different criteria are used for ex-combatants who hand in a firearm and those who do not. Those with a firearm receive \$180 and are reintegrated through the PNDDR programme and those without receive assistance with reintegration for 3 months by working on the roads for \$60 in total.¹²² However, ex-combatants who did not hand in firearms claimed that the received assistance is not sufficient or long enough to reintegrate. Due to the large amount of *armes blanches* and the way some “fought with an average of one firearm on 30 combatants”¹²³ these combatants do pose more threats to community security than their short and limited assistance seems to suggest. A practical effect of the limited criteria for DDR programmes is auto-demobilization, which is specifically a large phenomenon among women and children in DRC. The programme reality, however, is limited by financial and managerial issues that practically limit the amount of people able to participate. Thus, the criteria for participation are stricter than the DDR process requirements would indicate. The underlying question here is whether the limited scope of DDR programmes, with the limited criteria as a result, does indeed address the most dangerous elements in Congolese society or whether these criteria miss the point by excluding people who do not have a firearm.

The vast territory of eastern DRC and the ensuing difficulties of managing DDR in this area resulted in centralized DDR camps, often located near the major cities. The locations of eligible ex-combatants throughout the area and their contextualized differences would require decentralized assistance to cater for their specific needs. Oftentimes the complaint is made that “right now the programmes are too far away. If they would be closer, this could improve the reintegration.”¹²⁴ A problem related to the large distance between DDR centres and the actual location of ex-combatants is that ex-combatants are often harassed on the roads by FARDC soldiers who make them pay for passing or threaten them physically. These issues could, at least in part, be mitigated by having DDR assistance centres closer to the communities which would not only diminish the geographical distance but also the perceived social distance between DDR programmes and DDR beneficiaries.

DDR processes need connecting programmes in sensitization, reconciliation, and development (in effect, wider peacebuilding processes and longer-term development) beyond what current DDR programmes are available to deliver. This follow-up during and after reintegration can diminish the risk of return to the militias, the risk on conflict within the community, and, with that, increase effectiveness of DDR programmes in relation to security. However, DDR programmes do not have the means to execute these follow-up programmes themselves. Rather, attempts are made to connect to

¹²² UNDP official, Bukavu, South Kivu, 8 December 2009

¹²³ Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

¹²⁴ Ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

programmes initiated by others, as is stipulated by DDR guidebooks.¹²⁵ In practice this seems more problematic due to lacking capacity on behalf of programmes initiated by others, managerial issues and financial restrictions. Based on these issues and the practical reality of lacking a connection to follow-up programmes, the DDR programmes cannot connect to community security in the way DDR processes seem to require. Moreover, without these connections, the programmes will be less sustainable and effectively undermine the provision of security by the DDR programmes.

Reintegration succeeding/failing

Based on the research, the phase of reintegration is the most problematic for long term effective DDR when assessing its value in relation to increased community security. Besides ample requirements mentioned by community members and demobilized alike, there are several factors that complicate reintegration.

First of all, the amount of reintegrated demobilized relative to the size of the recipient community is pivotal. The balance of power can be easily distorted with large influxes of ex-combatants. The community members' responses throughout the research indicate that the fewer the number of demobilized the fewer chances were of conflict and other complications for the reintegration process. The demobilized combatants' level of education furthermore was often related with the ease of reintegration, as more education enhances adaptation to the facets of community life and widens possibilities for the future. Furthermore, the perception of demobilized, as defenders of the community or perpetrators of violence against the community, is important. Some communities have sent out the combatants to protect the community and reward them upon return with some land and resources.¹²⁶ However, most communities seemed less positive and rather perceive integrating ex-combatants as a threat to community life.

More generally, we can relate the requirements for constructive reintegration to, social factors, contextual knowledge, time-scales and economic requirements. The social requirements relate to the level of acceptance, the initiation of local structures to enhance dialogue and cooperation, and sensitization. Ultimately, the level of acceptance within the community of returning demobilized and the willingness of demobilized to reintegrate into community life remains pivotal. This is no easy feat as many ex-combatants spent years in the militia, and many communities suffered from their violence for years. This social complication is, at times, addressed at the local level by initiating councils that discuss the problems between community members and ex-combatants. These councils are often appreciated by both community members and ex-combatants to the extent that "without these councils [many ex-combatants] would return to the bush."¹²⁷ The main argument here is that these councils will have a dampening effect on conflict by managing disputes in the community, rather than assuming these councils will suffice for reintegration without other assistance for development. Sensitization, then, is used to enhance dialogue and diminish the chances of conflict, as it is seen as "knowing all sides of the conflict and being able to understanding all sides."¹²⁸ Ideally, these activities should take place at both the levels of the ex-combatants and the community, before attempts at reintegration are made as both ex-combatants and community members made continuous reference to the need for these activities. Furthermore, inclusiveness is key in these activities, as they should

¹²⁵ Cf. the UN Integrated DDR Standards (UN IAWG, 2006); and the UNDP Practice note on DDR (UNDP, 2005)

¹²⁶ Ex-combatant, Muhongoza, South Kivu, 3 December 2009

¹²⁷ Ex-combatant, Kavumu, South Kivu, 4 December 2009, also ex-combatant Mudaka, South Kivu, 4 December 2009

¹²⁸ PNDDR, Goma, North Kivu, 18 November 2009

pertain to all relevant actors put forward by community members, ex-combatants and DDR programmers and perceptions to avoid alienation. An inclusive approach can enhance capacities with these actors; can enhance trust in the programme; and can increase the sustainability of the programme outcomes.

Due to variations in the number of ex-combatants, ethnicities of communities, varying social structures and accessibility of communities, it stands to reason that it is necessary to have a deep understanding of the context before attempting reintegration. However, based on the interviews during the research, contextual knowledge underpinning DDR programmes often seemed to be missing to a large extent. In other words, “not knowing the problem is the problem.”¹²⁹ Deep knowledge about the involved ex-combatants, the communities, ethnic compositions, governance actors, and the balance of power between these are needed to enhance effectiveness of the reintegration phase and “the ‘laws’ of the bush must be understood in order to break the cycle of returning to the militia. The reintegration must thus connect to life experienced by the combatants.”¹³⁰ This unfortunately rarely seemed to be what was done in practice in eastern DRC. The inclusive approach put forward in the previous section can increase the context specificity of the programme as it is based on insights of the people involved at the local level.

A complaint, again underlying all previous requirements for reintegration, regards the insufficient amount of time spent for reintegration programmes and ongoing assistance to the communities and ex-combatants. Programmes commonly have a cycle of a few months, whereas both community members and ex-combatants often require more time. This time can relate to the type of job as “farming needs a different time than cattle keeping. If you assist us to get work it is fine. You don’t have to support us our whole life.”¹³¹ Besides economic reintegration there is a definite need for social reintegration, which was said to take much more time. “Someone who has taken up arms has changed something in his head. This takes a long time, about six years,”¹³² although this estimation varied throughout the responses. This perceived requirement for reintegration is a *process* view that does not need to correspond to the timeframe of the DDR *programme*, because social reintegration is very contextualized and difficult to address when designing programmes exclusively from outside. Specific attention in relation to time should be given here to adolescents and children. They form a vulnerable group and, at the same time, will play an important role in the future security situation. When they return home, sometimes after a long period of forced mobilization, they sometimes find their houses destroyed or occupied, and their parents fled or killed. As noted before, this category is often impatient with reintegration, as they are used to getting their sustenance quickly and are not used to being checked by and working together with communities. This phenomenon should warrant DDR programmers’ reconsideration of timing issues.

Underlying the above issues is the lack of follow-up that is provided in general after disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion. This follow-up should thus consist of social and financial assistance with the acceptance and reintegration of ex-combatants. Capacity development should take place at both the community and the donor level, as the mismatch that is often found can only be resolved by enhanced capacity from both sides. This will be elaborated upon below. The follow-up should furthermore relate to the finances required or technical assistance to support the necessary issues as described above. The frustrations described earlier in relation to promises not met for ex-combatants

¹²⁹ PNDDR, Goma, North Kivu, 18 November 2009

¹³⁰ CRC, Butembo, North Kivu, 21 October 2009

¹³¹ Ex-combatant, Mwenga, North Kivu, 5 December 2009

¹³² Ibid.

also relate to recipient communities who often state feeling abandoned by the international community. These frustrations, whether justified or not, will diminish the positive relation between DDR programmes and community security and can possibly lead to remobilization and hence the necessity for even more DDR programmes in the future.

In relation to the above-mentioned problems with reintegration, there is also a lack of problematization and conceptualization of reintegration. As mentioned earlier, there is a difference in the meaning of 'R' in DDR, referring to 'reinsertion' in the French acronym for the national DDR programme in the DRC and to 'reintegration' in the general understanding of DDR. Indeed, the concept of reintegration is still under-conceptualized and poorly understood by the various actors involved in orchestrating and executing the reintegration phase of DDR programmes (Muggah, 2009: 19). The meaning of reintegration in DDR programming has also shifted over the years. The UN DPKO Guidelines for DDR (UN DPKO 1999: 15) defined reintegration as the "assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families', economic and social integration into civil society."¹³³ A year later, the Secretary-General of the UN widened the concept further and stated, "the goal of ensuring that warring factions can once more join civil society may require not only direct assistance to demobilized combatants, but also broader support to the country's efforts to adapt the social and economic environment so that it can reabsorb them" (UN, 2000: 15). In the IDDRS published in 2006, however, the distinction was made between reintegration and reinsertion, with the first being defined as what previously was covered under reintegration, and reintegration now being seen as a long-term process, taking place at a local level, and being part of the general development (UN IAWG, 2006: 1.10, 2). Regarding reintegration as a long-term social process, to which reinsertion programmes contribute, also means that the success of reintegration - and the contribution of reinsertion assistance thereto - is extremely difficult to measure. Although a first attempt was made in Muggah (2009), clear indicators have yet to be found. And while policy documents increasingly emphasize the importance of integrating reintegration into long-term planning (CICS, 2006), it continues to be sidelined in the rush to secure peace. In the DRC the 'R' in DDR is perceived by local communities and ex-combatants to stand for long-term reintegration assistance; assistance that still falls under the UN definition of reintegration. On the other hand the 'R' as reinsertion is also used as a reason for not giving any further assistance; after all, reinsertion only contributes to reintegration and the rest is up to communities.¹³⁴ In the context of eastern DRC, local realities are clearly posing huge challenges for successful reintegration of ex-combatants into society and reintegration is much more than external assistance programmes. From a local perspective the reinsertion/reintegration assistance - whatever name it is given - does not connect to the reality of the reintegration process on the ground. Reintegration actually entails a change in identity of ex-combatants, and a change in the relation between the individual ex-combatant and society, and a change in society's perception of the demobilized as a collective group. The lack of clarity over the concepts of reinsertion and reintegration, and about what these concepts entail for assistance within DDR programmes, pose great problems for the effectiveness of the 'R' phase, not only in eastern DRC but in DDR programmes in general.

Re-recruitment

The frustrations with lack of follow-up after reintegration, and the idea often held within communities that the perpetrators are paid for their violence, create potential new recruitments for the militia. This

¹³³ The UN uses the notion 'civil society' here as a synonym for civilian life. This research uses civil society as a reference to the social midfield in society; i.e. NGOs, faith-based organizations, etc

¹³⁴ PNDDR, Bunia, 14 October 2009.

specifically refers to the adolescents as they often were (sometimes forcibly) recruited into the militia at a young age and in the mean time grew accustomed to the quick benefits of bearing arms. The insufficient attention to the reintegration phase on the part of DDR programmers was indicated by ex-combatants to lead them to joining the militia again, out of sheer economic considerations. Effectively, the failure of DDR to connect to community security can then be seen to contribute to the culture of “*debrouillez-vous*” and provides predatory warlords with new recruits with military experience. This phenomenon makes for a situation where combatants are cycling through more than one DDR programme effectively increasing the cost of DDR per combatant. The type of assistance given by the international community can also play into the willingness to return to the militia. This may be the case when ex-combatants are trained for jobs without economic perspective or when they are trained for jobs they do not aspire to. For example, the ex-combatants in Mudaka disapproved of agricultural activities “as they just came from the bush!”¹³⁵ Context specific insights like these should be adequately addressed to diminish the chance of re-recruitment.

Economic context

The local economic situation is often judged to be important for the success of reintegration of ex-combatants. Indeed, chances of conflict are said to be lessened when ex-combatants are able to participate in economic activities that benefit the whole community. Outside assistance could provide some assistance in this regard, but “the projects there are now are not living up to their promises and expectations. And the ex-combatants are not satisfied with their engagement. They can work in a project for maybe two to six months and are back on the street. This is a big problem.”¹³⁶ While it is not directly a task of DDR programmes to create employment, the lack of employment exacerbates the frustrations with DDR programmes. As described before, the economic situation is negatively influenced by the lack of security in eastern DRC and systematic improvements are not to be expected as long as security does not return. Although ex-combatants might be well received socially, “the problem is that there are limited resources. There are also limited resources for jobs they do. The formation some of them have received is to get a job, but what if there are no resources to do this work? We don’t get any assistance or help here.”¹³⁷ The direct consequence of this could be that more creative ideas to assist economic reintegration based on contextualized realities should be devised in cooperation with local communities. For instance, ex-combatants came up with the following initiatives in a context where there is no local economy.

*The goods here are not worth much so we need to sell them elsewhere but that is currently not possible. We need proper production tools here to increase productivity and sell the production where they lack our products. They could also have given a motor-bike to four people (cost is about \$600 and they would easily make a quick profit out of that by working it with the four of them. This is only one example how we can be smarter about production and economics.*¹³⁸

This means that with more attention for local circumstances more contextual development could be attained with less assistance. These ideas are however contrasted with practice in which ex-combatants only work on a road for several months as economic reintegration. The limited outside input is not judged sustainable and without security for basic development these projects will continue to have a limited impact.

¹³⁵ Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, 04 December 2009

¹³⁶ Official Amani programme, Bukavu, South Kivu, 7 December 2009

¹³⁷ Ex-combatant, Muhongoza, South Kivu, 3 December 2009

¹³⁸ Ex-combatant, Mangange Nogeru, North Kivu, 28 October 2009

Informational issues and DDR

The fragile security context in eastern DRC complicates gathering factual knowledge on the situation on the ground. This is a specific problem for DDR programmes in two ways; the required contextual knowledge for DDR actors is often difficult to obtain and both community members and ex-combatants are often not adequately informed beforehand about the DDR programme. Interviewees often claimed that they were not consulted before DDR took place about the specific contextual factors pertaining to DDR assistance, which could have avoided mistakes such as training electricians in villages without electricity. Another complaint pertained to the lack of information on how many ex-combatants would return and what their benefits would be. As was mentioned in chapter 5, broken promises lead to frustrations with the ex-combatants who, in turn, may start considering going back to the militia.

Since it is difficult to access factual information in fragile security situations there is ample room for rumours and ensuing stigmatization. The continuously dynamic factions of militias and other armed groups make it difficult for community members to judge who is responsible for what violence. The current situation, in which community members find it hard to distinguish between bandits, militias, deserters, FARDC personnel and other armed elements, creates many rumours. One example would be that reintegrating ex-combatants are often perceived by the community as spies for their former militia groups or when ex-combatants have meetings, “[the community and the government] think we are forming a militia again.”¹³⁹ Stigmatization of ex-combatants then often is the result, which hampers acceptance within the community. Specifically, women bear the brunt of stigmatization when leaving the militias, as their fighting role within the militia is more often perceived as downright prostitution by the community.¹⁴⁰ The general logic is that lack of information or misinformation will lead to confusion and stigmatization, which can be reduced by sensitization activities for all involved actors.

Local Involvement and Capacity Issues

The need for involving local communities and organizations in DDR has been generally acknowledged and is stressed in the current guidelines to DDR programming, the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). Indeed, the IDDRS refer 698 times to terms such as ‘community-based’ and the ‘community’ (UN IAWG, 2006). Nevertheless, real community involvement is often still lacking in practice. As discussed earlier, this is partially due to the contracting chain used to implement the large scale DDR programmes, which impedes downward accountability. This causes local NGOs to claim they miss a dialogue and feel that projects are imposed on them. And indeed, an international aid organization acknowledged that the international organization they work with bulked the proposals of local organizations together into one large proposal, thereby altering the individual project proposals.¹⁴¹

The proposed linkage between community security and DDR should be seen as *process*, in which communities participate in the development and implementation of appropriate responses for security needs they prioritized. It then can also become a characteristic of the DDR process. It is, however, pivotal here to note what participation indicates, as participation is commonly used without

¹³⁹ Ex-combatants, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

¹⁴⁰ Female ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 December 2009

¹⁴¹ International aid organization, Goma, North Kivu, 27 November 2009

explanation of what this means in practice. The typologies of Pretty (1994) are used here to relate this report's approach to participation. The typologies range from passive participation to self-mobilization.¹⁴² Taking the *process* view on community security means that *interactive participation* is required. This entails that;

People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It tends to involve interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systematic and structured learning processes. These groups take control over local decisions, and so people have a stake in maintaining structures or practices. (Pretty, 1994)

Another reason for a continuing lack of local involvement is a lack of trust in local organizations. Many international organizations work with international NGOs, which are thought to be more 'credible' and are more familiar with western-style report writing. On the local level, it is argued, there is a lack of capacity. However, digging deeper, the lack of capacity often seems less insuperable than international organizations make it out to be. An international aid organization explained local NGOs often have a high capacity to formulate their problems and find creative solutions for them. The capacity problem lies in the fact that they have a limited capacity to put clear planned steps on paper. "They probably know it, but they can't put it on paper properly."¹⁴³ Some international organizations therefore give capacity trainings - generally focused on improving report writing and financial administration. Other organizations, however, sideline local involvement and set up their own parallel structures.

From a Congolese viewpoint, however, one could also talk of a capacity problem on the side of international organizations. As already discussed, on a local level, international organizations are often considered to be too disconnected from local realities and hard to reach. Much criticism was also raised about the lists of weapons collected and ex-combatants that passed through a programme as a measure for DDR's success, as these "do not say anything about security."¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the timeframes used by the international community were considered too short to make a difference. Given this lack of local knowledge, as well as absence at the local level, there were calls for more trust in the knowledge of local organizations. As a local NGO expressed, "how can they have all these ideas of how we should work? They don't know the environment, but do know to tell us how to work."¹⁴⁵ And indeed, a UNDP official admitted that one of their limitations is their inability to always go into the field for proper follow-up, due to problems with accessibility and security.¹⁴⁶ And apart from an often lacking local knowledge and field presence, the capacities that local organizations are dismissed for - i.e. organizational, financial, etc. - can also be found among international organizations according to local organizations.

Simply going local is not the solution to all problems, as indeed many local organizations - if organized at all - have capacity problems that limit their capabilities to deal with the issues at hand such as competing interests and limited legitimacy among the local population. The other side of the coin, however, is that from a local perspective it is international organizations that lack capacity - namely the capacity to understand the complex local realities. Local organizations argue that they know the reality on the ground, and have much more history with the beneficiaries of the projects

¹⁴² Pretty's complete typology is taken up in Annex 3.

¹⁴³ International aid organization, Goma, North Kivu, 27 November 2009

¹⁴⁴ Community member, Luvangire, Ituri, 19 October 2009

¹⁴⁵ Local NGO, Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 November 2009

¹⁴⁶ UNDP official, Bukavu, South Kivu, 8 December 2009

compared to international organizations who leave after a few years. If both sides acknowledge their own weaknesses and the other's strengths, they could complement each other.

However, there are of course difficulties arising from leaving more to local organizations and trusting more in their knowledge of the situation. For one, this would imply for international organizations to take a step back, which may be difficult considering the high political and economic interests involved in many international interventions. On a practical level, it would also be much harder to centrally manage as the variation of approaches will increase with local organizations adjusting programmes to their specific needs. Moreover, increasing local involvement also risks competition or overlapping mandates. This could perhaps be limited by dialogues and inclusiveness in the process from the start onwards, but not entirely prevented. Also, it does not mean that involvement will necessarily be more 'democratic,' but it will be closer to people's lives with increased chances on influence from below. That said, it is nevertheless important to realize who one works with on local levels, as their political and/or ethnic backgrounds is likely to be of a conflictual influence at that level. Finally, such an approach should not be about short-term interventions, but rather more about long-term processes. This then relates to both dialogue and financing the local initiatives.

Linking community security and DDR

The desk-study underpinning this field research identified five ways to connect 'state' DDR programmes to community security. These are "community security as an aim; community security as a characteristic of DDR; connecting state DDR to community security arrangements; connecting state DDR and community-based DDR; and community security as a precondition for DDR" (Willems *et al*, 2009). Community security as an aim for DDR programmes would require a focus on the wider community, empowerment of people and communities, be part of broader peacebuilding activities and connect to longer-term development. Despite the many theoretical claims about these connections the reality found on the local level in eastern DRC seemed to indicate that these connections were rarely made, if at all. Analyzing community security as a characteristic of DDR would require participation and empowerment of the community including ex-combatants and an intimate knowledge of what constitutes community security for the targeted community. Research at the community level indicated that perceptions on community security are hardly assessed and people feel rarely empowered as participation is limited to the actual ex-combatants going through the cycles of pre-determined DDR programmes. Connecting state DDR to community security arrangements such as in the case of DRC HnA, *Kyaghandanda* and the local chiefs, seems logical considering the Congolese state hardly has a presence at the eastern local level as far as security provision goes. However, security arrangements such as the *barza* in case of HnA are not unproblematic to connect to, as they reflect diverging views within the community and at times are perceived as competition for local power by the chiefs, local governance and the police. Yet many people interviewed, who were involved in community security in one way or the other, indicated that they felt left out of the DDR programmes.¹⁴⁷ Local influence through actual participation is not attained in this way, which undermines the effectiveness and sustainability of implemented DDR programmes in relation to community security. Attempting to connect state DDR and community-based DDR would entail connecting top-down and bottom-up processes of DDR. The research found many informal arrangements, such as councils for reconciliation activities between community members and ex-combatants, and more formalized ones such as local NGOs addressing DDR issues. Both the formal and informal systems overall lacked sufficient linkages and funds to increase their capacity due to a

¹⁴⁷ Chef de chefferie, Djokot, Ituri, 3 October 2009; Chef de chefferie, Alur Djuganda, 6 October 2009; Panel discussion, Goma, 17 November 2009; Civil society representatives, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, 2 December 2009

lack of partners or insufficient funds disbursed by these partners. These systems often address both needs from the ex-combatants and the recipient community. The apparent failure to connect to and support these initiatives “will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a special group outside society, retarding their effective reintegration into local communities” (UNDP, 2005: 5). Despite this issue being referred to in policy notes, the practice at the local level is different. Lastly, community security can be seen as a precondition for DDR, which the research found to be an important issue. Ex-combatants often indicated the lack of security in the broad sense – i.e. more than only physical security threats – within the community to be the reason for going back into the militia. Indeed, the overall security situation in eastern DRC is not conducive for reintegration, but when more assistance would be given on the local level at least a non-violent perspective could be given to ex-combatants. Informal councils can provide a minimal future outlook as elaborated upon above.

This discussion has put forward several arguments for enhancing links with local dynamics.. There security situation and its outcomes are devastating for the local population and this obviously leaves its traces at the local and non-state structures. Also many problems of corruption exist; trust often lacks on all sides; many security problems go beyond the influence of local actors; and there are simply many capacity problems. This, nevertheless, is the reality where DDR programmes take place in eastern DRC. The reality as is perceived by all the actors relevant in DDR programmes makes the situation even more complex. Dismissing the local situation as too complex to handle in terms of manageability or finances, and falling back on a generalized logic towards DDR programmes has not produced sustainable results. Despite all complications DDR programmes will have to deal with these realities, and the local actors in it, in order to actually create security. Taking community security as a *process* in relation to DDR would provide inroads to constructively deal with the context in which programmes take place. This would mean including all relevant community security actors in DDR programmes.

8. Conclusions and recommendations

“Do you think just because they ask you to make a report they will actually do anything with it?”¹⁴⁸

“There is a *méli-mélo* (muddle) of problems.”¹⁴⁹

Based on the discussed discrepancies between DDR *processes* and DDR *programmes* in the previous chapter, we now come to the conclusions and recommendations that can be derived from this research. The requirement of connecting DDR to community security in a context specific manner – the stated focus of the working group and elaborated upon in its earlier report (Willems *et al*, 2009) – means assessing and adapting to the local security situation. This requires knowing perceptions of what security is and the actors involved, and thus involves a context-specific approach. The report first analyzed what is considered to be security on a local level. It was found that security is locally perceived in a very broad sense, including not only issues relating to direct physical security such as violent threats of armed elements and *tracasseries* by the army and police, but also issues such as hunger and a lack of healthcare and schooling. A large number of sources of insecurity continue to pose a threat in eastern DRC. Land conflicts, which are considered to be among the root causes of the Congolese wars, have not been dealt with properly and remain a problem. The wars have also severely increased ethnic tensions and polarization between the various groups in the region, and ethnic violence persists. Moreover, the culture of *debrouillez-vous* introduced by Mobutu and the *brassage* process by which militias have been integrated into the national army, combined with the lack of training and payment of salaries, cause the national army and police to be a large source of insecurity. With high levels of impunity, it remains hard to address the sexual violence, illegal taxation and extortion, among other crimes, committed by government security forces. Although they are not issues that can be addressed through DDR programmes, it has to be realized that continuing land conflicts, ethnic violence and impunity are seriously hindering the potential success of DDR programmes. Not only should DDR enhance security, but also a minimal level of security is necessary for ex-combatants to be willing to participate in DDR.

Although the options are limited, local communities do have various ways to cope with violence. Local actors and structures play an important role in security provision that cannot be neglected. However, they're often not capable of addressing security issues *beyond* the local. The police – and the FARDC with regard to border security and militia– should fill this gap, yet the above-mentioned adverse practices and connected problems with impunity are an obstacle to this. Apart from addressing impunity and training national security providers, communication should also be improved between local structures and national security providers to solve and prevent problems with overlapping jurisdictions.

The research finds that when reintegration assistance fails to materialize, this is perceived on a local level, as promises made by international actors or the government that are not kept. This has to do with promises that are indeed not kept due to corruption in the government agencies involved in DDR, mismanagement on the side of international organizations and ‘wishful thinking’ when setting project targets, or with misunderstandings due to a lack of information on the side of local actors. The

¹⁴⁸ Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, 22 October 2009

¹⁴⁹ Local NGO, Goma, North Kivu, 12 November 2009

problem of perceived broken promises not only relates to DDR, but also to international interventions in a broader sense. For instance, the strong mandate of MONUC and it being the most expensive UN mission worldwide bring about many expectations for security provision among local communities. When an increase in security fails to substantiate, communities perceive this as a failure, and in some cases even blame the UN for siding with the militias.¹⁵⁰ International actors intervening should therefore be realistic, honest and open about benefits and intended goals in order to prevent the perception of broken promises or failure.

Diverging benefits – both between communities and ex-combatants and between different groups of ex-combatants – are adding to already existing problems with stigmatization. Support for communities should also, in the communities' eyes, be directly and clearly linked to the DDR programmes to minimize the perception of DDR as supporting the perpetrators. Moreover, support should be focused on *engaging* communities and ex-combatants in reintegration, peace and development, rather than focusing on indirect targets that do not measure improved security qualitative terms (e.g. numbers of weapons collected, numbers of ex-combatants passing through a demobilization site). Sensitization activities should play a role in decreasing mistrust and stigmatization. On the one hand, ex-combatants could be sensitized about the circumstances they will have to reintegrate into and with what assistance, and on the other hand, the recipient communities could be sensitized about the number of ex-combatants about to reintegrate and what their added value for the community can be. Ex-combatants should also be supported to organize in committees or councils on a local level to discuss their problems. In order to mitigate the often perceived threat of such committees forming the basis of new militia groups, these groups would need to have regular meetings with community members, and preferably even involve them within the committee.

Most criticism mentioned on DDR programmes in eastern DRC related to the reintegration phase being too short and lacking follow-up support, and reintegration not being properly adjusted to context specific needs of ex-combatants in different areas of return. If vocational training is given, it is often deemed to be insufficient by communities and ex-combatants alike, and it rarely includes follow-up after the training has been completed. Small setbacks – such as broken materials, problems relating to the acquired training or inexperience in the working field – can be sufficient for ex-combatants to discontinue their work and give up, causing the post-training small businesses envisaged to fail.

The failing of DDR in connecting to community security, and specifically the insufficient attention paid to the reintegration phase, is contributing to frustrations over lack of development and economic opportunities, which can encourage demobilized ex-combatants to *remobilize*, mainly for economic purposes. In an environment where both state and international security actors are unable to provide stability, the opportunities created by reintegration are, for some ex-combatants, outweighed by the benefits that life in a militia brings. Effectively, the failure of DDR to connect to community security incites frustrations, which help to provide predatory warlords with new recruits with military experience. Not only does this increase the level of insecurity, but it also creates a cycle of ex-combatants going through several DDR programmes. This both increases the cost of DDR for donors and diminishes the credibility of DDR programmes. DDR donors and practitioners should therefore seriously enhance support in the reintegration phase of DDR, better adapt it to local realities, and increase the length of reintegration.

¹⁵⁰ The researchers came across two instances in which protests against MONUC took on violent forms in which UN vehicles were burned (Lubero, North Kivu on 30 October 2009) and the main road had been blocked by protesters (Kavumu, South Kivu on 3 December 2009).

Critical factors for successful reintegration include: opportunities to find work in communities of return; the level of education of ex-combatants; the relative number of ex-combatants in a community of return; and the perception of ex-combatants as having been perpetrators of crime and violence or as defenders of the community. Specific attention is also needed for child and adolescent ex-combatants, as they have specific needs and play an important role in the future security situation. Of course there is, as noted, a discrepancy between the requirements of DDR *processes* and the possibilities that DDR *programmes* can bring. Indeed, not all these issues can be addressed by DDR programmes, but they can and should be taken into account when designing programmes. Low levels of education have to be addressed with proper reintegration support including training and follow-up. Proper training can also reduce stress on the labour market, as ex-combatants widen their job opportunities or set up small businesses of their own. Where large numbers of ex-combatants return, communities should receive higher levels of support and more efforts should go to sensitization. If DDR is to be successful, a holistic approach is required to properly connect DDR programmes to other programmes that are able to address the issues that DDR is not designed for. This also means DDR should be designed and implemented with a broader and long-term perspective; not just as a short stop-gap measure to quickly deal with armed male combatants.

Hindering local input in DDR programmes is the implementation through chains of subcontractors, which creates an upward accountability towards the benefactor rather than downward to the supposed beneficiaries. This severely limits the dialogue international and government agencies have with local organizations and implementing partners. It also stifles the flow of information from the ground upward, leading to a disconnection of DDR from local realities and security issues. Looking at the five ways to connect community security with DDR as described in the first report of the working group (Willems *et al*, 2009), the involvement of local actors, and the connection of DDR to local security arrangements is very limited. To achieve a higher success rate of DDR in eastern DRC – i.e. higher levels of security and more successfully reintegrated ex-combatants – better involvement of local actors and security arrangements is needed. Not only does this improve the connection to the local context, but this also could contribute to the sustainability and the legitimacy of the intervention.

Often mentioned reasons for limiting local involvement are capacity problems on the side of local partners, which are an issue of concern. Cooperation and support can address these issues and help build local capacity. Capacity issues should not, however, be harnessed as a reason for less local involvement. This leads to the creation of parallel structures of international organizations, with less connection to local realities and less sustainability. Including local partners in programmes can function as a way to address their capacity issues. And on the other hand, local organizations have local knowledge, are more able to adapt and find creative solutions fitting to the issues at hand, and are present on the ground. In theory, therefore, local organizations have a presence and a capacity – i.e. local knowledge and understanding of the context – that international organizations are lacking, and vice versa – i.e. financial and organizational knowledge. Moreover, cooperation with local organizations will enable decentralization of DDR programmes and bringing DDR assistance centres closer to the communities.

The above-mentioned conclusions are partially issues regarding DDR in general and partially specific for eastern DRC. However, this research has focused on the micro-level and the specific differences between communities should not be overlooked here. For instance, where in the Kivus groups such as the CNDP and the FLDR are heavily armed, the *Mai Mai* often have more traditional weapons than firearms. The presence of militias with little firearms is higher in some regions (e.g with a high presence of *Mai Mai*), hence the problem of these ex-militias stealing demobilized cards from other ex-combatants is often more prevalent there. A difference between Ituri and the Kivus is the foreign

influence of their respective neighbours. While Ituri has issues with Uganda about the border and military incursions, the complexity seems larger in the Kivus, where Rwanda has a presence in several ways. The CNDP remains active and retains its parallel structures of governance and battles the FDLR. Moreover, Rwandese are crossing the border occupying territories the CNDP emptied of previous inhabitants. Influence of Kigali in this matter has yet to be proven but is not to be considered unlikely. And while land conflicts are the root of the conflict in both the Kivus and in Ituri, the (hugely complex) relations between the ethnic groups connected to this matter are highly different between regions. Moreover, while in one region militias remain active and problems concern mainly their banditry and the remobilization of ex-combatants, in other regions the *tracasseries* of the police, the FARDC as well as demobilized are the main issue, and yet in other regions both issues are at hand. Moreover, the availability and potential of local structures for security provision varies greatly. The Nande, for instance, have an institutionalized structure with an annual international conference and support from diasporas from all over the world, while other ethnic groups have no structure at all. And whereas the security structure of HnA is present throughout Ituri, the strength of the structure is different in each community. Where structures developed over a larger region do not exist, communities have sometimes developed their own localized structure. Such structures involved, for instance, night patrols to prevent burglary and committees to assist the reintegration of ex-combatants. What also comes in great variety is the security capacity of a local chief and a chief's contact with the community and other actors such as the police and the FARDC. In some communities (e.g. around Kalehe, South Kivu), ex-combatants were said to be welcomed back as protectors of the community. While in other communities (e.g. around Masisi, North Kivu), they were often considered to be criminals by many respondents. Highly relevant differences to DDR are thus found between groups, provinces, and even communities. All these differences between groups and regions within eastern DRC again make clear the need for a connection of DDR to community security. This requires an extensive mapping before undertaking DDR and building upon the discovered variations. Without proper local connections the specific issues at hand in every region cannot be taken into account, let alone be addressed.

Based on the findings of this report we have the following recommendations:

For DDR programmers:

- To not be afraid to let local actors take the initiative, and have international organizations take on a more complementary and supportive role. While this may involve more risks, as it means partially giving up control and decision-making (e.g. unknowingly supporting local actors fuelling conflict), these risks can be reduced through an improved knowledge of the local context and dynamics.
- To be keenly aware of local dynamics and contexts, invest in local knowledge, and keep this knowledge updated.
- To realize there are local organizations and structures active and to take time for a capacity assessment to identify which of these can provide the much needed local input.
- To include all relevant local actors, even when they seem to lack any kind of capacity in the managerial sense; they still can be effective in attaining community security.
- To focus on the active engagement of communities, ex-combatants and local initiatives in DDR related activities, rather than on targets that do not measure improved security (e.g. numbers of weapons collected, numbers of ex-combatants passing through a demobilization site).

- To find creative solutions for the problems DDR in eastern DRC is facing by listening to what ideas involved local actors have for improvement. For instance, the lack of follow-up can, among other issues, be tackled by connecting ex-combatants to local businesses for internships, stigmatization issues can partially be dealt with by handing out civilian identification cards to ex-combatants instead of demobilized cards, and the contacts ex-combatants have with their friends and family still active in the militias can provide inroads for engaging these militias in the DDR process.
- To realize that promises not kept are worse than promises never made.
- To support communities and ex-combatants to organize themselves, for instance in committees, where they have not done so already. In this way, they can address their concerns and problems together through dialogue, e.g. problems regarding reintegration of ex-combatants, stigmatization or *tracasseries* of the FARDC and police. However, it should be left up to these local actors themselves which problems they wish to address and in what order.
- To be clear about the level of support these communities can expect (financial, technical, etc.) to prevent disappointment or worse, frustration.
- To act in a monitoring role with organized groups of ex-combatants to prevent the perception on the side of communities and the government of ex-combatants organizing themselves for rebel or criminal activities.
- To approach cooperation with local actors as two-way traffic, in which international organizations can help to enhance organizational, logistical, administrative, and economic capacities, and where local organizations can assure field presence and contextual knowledge, and help to facilitate locally appropriate solutions.

For the international community:

- To take funding for reintegration more seriously and let go of the exclusive focus on the disarmament and demobilization phases. Also, donor pledges should be kept to decrease broken promises.
- To problematize the notion of ‘reintegration’, to investigate the relation between reintegration as a *process* and reinsertion as a *programme*, and to investigate in which way reinsertion assistance can positively contribute to reintegration.
- To stop approaching DDR as a stop-gap measure in a rush to secure peace, and to better connect DDR, especially reintegration assistance, to wider peace, security and development activities, such as reconciliation, reconstruction and SSR.
- To provide diplomatic pressure on Rwanda, DRC and surrounding countries to address the regional security issues. In particular, call upon Rwanda to start an inter-Rwandan dialogue, which should, in part, address the issue of the FDLR.
- To help control the eastern borders of DRC to prevent the smuggling of firearms, the trade of valuable resources funding the conflicts, and the crossing of civilians occupying land of others.
- To support the functioning of the *Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs* (CEPGL) to help stabilize the region.

For local initiatives and organizations:

- To work inclusively with relevant actors such as communities, ex-combatants, local chiefs, and other organizations.

- To take initiative and establish networks with other local organizations in order to take up a more pro-active role vis-à-vis international organizations.
- To share experiences and cooperate with other local organizations to enhance effectiveness.
- To work on downward accountability and resist simply sub-contracting for donor institutions.
- To distance yourselves from organizations who abuse the donor system for their own enrichment, for instance by skimming benefits for ex-combatants.
- To stimulate and support local communities and ex-combatants to organize themselves into local committees to address their security issues through dialogue, e.g. problems regarding reintegration of ex-combatants, stigmatization or *tracasseries* of the FARDC and police.
- To work on stigmatization and misinformation within communities and support regular meetings of communities and ex-combatants during which problems can be discussed.

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Annex 1: Note on Methodology

The aim of the field research is to find context-specific approaches for community-based DDR and follow-up activities. The research was undertaken for a period of 11 weeks from 26 September until 12 December 2009 in DRC and focused on the Ituri region and North and South Kivu provinces. In total over 70 formal interviews were held and up to 50 group discussions, reaching about 750 people.

A variety of ethnographic techniques were used, such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and participatory observation. A semi-structured approach was taken in interviews to be able to adapt to local variation through changing the order of questions, an increased perception of speaking on their terms, and in general to have a structured conversation rather than extraction of knowledge that did not pertain to local circumstances. In essence the content of the interviews remained the same and only the presentation of the questions was adapted to local circumstances and variations. Focus group discussions were held mainly with community members and ex-combatants. These group interviews on average lasted between one and two hours, depending on the amount of information put forward by the interviewees, and again took a semi-structured approach. A large part of the interviews furthermore required translation to French from various local languages which increased time needed. Access to community members and ex-combatants was mainly provided by local organizations and civil society actors, who arranged and assisted community visits. The choice for particular communities depended on a number of issues, such as the researchers' interests, availability of local contacts, accessibility and security. Key informant interviews were held with those with knowledge of the issues and questions at hand, including school and university teachers, religious leaders, and personnel of international organizations and embassies.

The work was mainly undertaken through local NGOs and partners as this greatly enhanced the accessibility of the field and the possibilities to reach target groups, such as community members and ex-combatants. Interviews were also held with the staff of local NGOs, international organizations, Congolese government officials, *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) officers and militia members.

Limitations of the research included security issues, which prevented a complete random sample of visited communities. Moreover, the researchers were obstructed in travelling to Uvira and undertaking the research further south in the Kivus. Another limitation was that some interviews had to be conducted in local languages with interpreters, and some arguments and evidence may have got lost in translation.

Main questions¹⁵¹ that guided the interviews and focus group discussions included, but were not limited to:

Community members

The information gathering consisted of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with these main leading questions;

¹⁵¹ These were questions that guided the researchers. Not necessarily directly questions asked to the interviewees.

What does security mean for you; Who do you turn to with what security issues when not secure; What are the benefits and downsides to DDR programmes according to you; What is needed for constructive reintegration of ex-combatants.

Ex-combatants

The information gathering consisted of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with these main leading questions:

Why did you mobilize; Why did you demobilize; What kind of benefits did you receive; What is needed for constructive reintegration; what should be improved in DDR programmes; What would be needed for remaining combatants to disarm.

Local (non-state) governance

The interviews with actors in local governance were more structured than the group interviews with community members and ex-combatants. These interviews were commonly facilitated by members of civil society organizations and typically lasted for about an hour. The tradition to register new arrivals with local governance also provided less structured opportunities to interview people within local governance. The main questions posed were:

What are the most pertinent security issues; Are you able to resolve these; what is the impact of DDR on local security; Did you have any role in DDR programmes; What should happen to improve DDR programmes;

Local initiatives and NGOs

These interviews were extensive as their work pertained directly to this research and relevant knowledge on the subject was abundant. Contacts were often made through informal social networks. As these organizations facilitated our access to community members and ex-combatants there was ample time to pose questions during travel. The added benefit of the often extensive travel periods was that information provided at the local level could be discussed and placed in the correct context.

The main questions posed were:

What is your role in relation to DDR; Who are your partners; what are the main problems with DDR; What is needed to address insecurity; What would be your recommendations for more effective DDR

International NGOs and DDR programmers

This group formed a secondary priority as researching the local issues concerning DDR was the main focus. The main questions were:

What is your role in DDR programmes; What is needed for DDR in DRC; What is your relation with local initiatives:

Annex 2: List of Communities and People Interviewed

Groups interviewed (and chiefs)

Ituri, Orientale

Chef de Chefferie, Collectivité War Palara, Mahagi, Ituri
Groupement Niarube, Collectivité War Palare, Mahagi, Ituri (12 p.)
Groupement Uguru/Gosi, Collectivité War Palare, Mahagi, Ituri (10 p.)
Groupement Pakar, Collectivité War Palare, Mahagi, Ituri (17 p.)
Groupement Akara, Collectivité Pandor, Mahagi, Ituri (14 p.)
Groupement Rona, Collectivité Pandor, Mahagi, Ituri (8 p.)
Groupement Nioka, Collectivité Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri (44 p.)
Groupement Ngot, Collectivité Pandor, Mahagi, Ituri (7 p.)
Chef de Chefferie, Collectivité Djokot
Groupement Dronju, Collectivité Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri (5 p.)
Groupement Ameer, Collectivité Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri (40 p.)
Groupement Luu, Collectivité Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri (4 p.)
Groupement Ang'Hal II, Collectivité Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri (5 p.)
Groupement Djupuganda-Est, Collectivité Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri (7 p.)
Chef de Chefferie, Collectivité Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri
Groupement Djupuganda-Ouest, Collectivité Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri (3 p.)
Groupement Ezekere, Collectivité Walendu/Tatsi, Djugu, Ituri (10 p.)
Groupement Babyasi, Collectivité Bahema Sud, Djugu, Ituri (6 p.)
Groupement Bedu Ezekere, Collectivité ????, Djugu, Ituri (10 p.)
Chef de Chefferie, Collectivité Mambisa, Djugu, Ituri
Groupement Taratibo, Collectivité Mambisa, Djugu, Ituri (14 p.)
Groupement Machuja, Collectivité Walendu/Djatsi, Djugu, Ituri (9 p.)
Groupement Tendey Agonema, Collectivité Banjalli Kilo (6 p.)
Groupement Batale, Collectivité Baboa/Bokowe, Djugu, Ituri (4 p.)
Groupement Luvangire, Bahema Nord, Djugu, Ituri (10 p.)
Groupement Jili, Collectivité Walendu/Tatsi, Djugu, Ituri (8 p.)

North Kivu

Mangange Nogueira, group of community members (28 p.) of which 25 were demobilized
Group of former child combatants, Butembo (24 p.)
Chef de groupement Malio, Beni, North Kivu
Group of former combatants in Butuhe, Groupement Malio, Beni (27 p.)
Group of refugees returning to communities around Sake (14 p.)
Localité Rugari, Rutchuru, North Kivu (24 p.)
Localité Rugari, Rutchuru, North Kivu (4 p.)
Localité Bweremana, Masisi, North Kivu (5 p.)
Administration, Ville de Sake, Masisi, North Kivu (6 p.)
Localité Rwibiranga, Groupement Kibumba, Nyiragongo, North Kivu (33 p.)
Localité Lusheberi, Masisi, North Kivu (25 p.)
Localité Kitsule, Masisi, North Kivu (27 p.)
Administrateur de Territoire de Masisi
Group of students in Masisi (22 p.)
Localité Bishange, Kalehe, South Kivu (47 p.)

South Kivu

Group of former combatants, Bunyakiri, Kalehe, South Kivu (4 p.)
Group of family of former combatants and community members, Bunyakiri, Kalehe, South Kivu (5 p.)
Group of former combatants, Muhongoza, Kalehe, South Kivu (28 p.)
Group of community members, Muhongoza, Kalehe, South Kivu (32 p.)
Group of former combatants, Ville de Kalehe, Kalehe, South Kivu (11 p.)
Group of community members, Ville de Kalehe, Kalehe, South Kivu (4 p.)
Group of former combatants, Tchofi, Kalehe, South Kivu (4 p.)
Group of community members, Tchofi, Kalehe, South Kivu (3 p.)
Group of former combatants, Mudaka, Kalehe, South Kivu (8 p.)
Group of former combatants, Kavumu, Kalehe, South Kivu (15 p.)
Group of former combatants, Ville de Mwenga, Mwenga, South Kivu (10 p.)
Group of community members, Ville de Mwenga, Mwenga, South Kivu (8 p.)

Other people interviewed

Ituri, Orientale

Olivier Vanderveeren, Human Rights Officer, MONUC/HCHR-UN bureau for Human Rights
Padre Yvo, living and working in Ituri for 40 years.
Jean-Charles Dupin, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Head of Office/Prov. Orientale, OCHA
Krishna Bandhu Das, UN DSS
Léonid Igor Zohoundgbogbo, Operations Manager, UNDP
Sheku Jalloh, Team Leader DDR/RR, MONUC
Musa Amin Kasereka, DDR/RR officer, MONUC
Abbe Eric Adilembe, Diocese Mahagi, CDJP
Colonel Xavier Duku, Executive officer Ituri, PNDDR

North Kivu

Captain Ekway Bernardin Mwassa, Chef instructeur AI, Centre de Brassage Kirumba, Beni
Paluku Mivimba Méthusalah, President, Federation des Organisation des Producteurs Agricoles du Congo (FOPAC) Nord Kivu
Goerges Hounga, Agronome, Welt Hunger Hilfe (AAA)
Henri Bora Ladyi, Executive Director, Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC)
Blaise, Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC), former CONADER official.
Elexis, member Task Force Butembo, Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC)
Matsande, former commander *Mai Mai* militia "Pareco", member Task Force Butembo, Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC)
Colonel Muhindo Musavuli Koger, Leader of *Mai Mai* militia "Pareco", involved in Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC)
Colonel Eric Mwatsi, leader of *Mai Mai* militia "Vurondo", involved in Centre Résolution Conflit (CRC)
Director SYDIP
Etienne Mbakulirahi Kyalenga, Secrétaire Exécutif, FOPAC Nord Kivu
Gustav Kampale Gakeka, animateur, FOPAC Nord Kivu
Samson Kekendu, technical advisor, FOPAC
Iganele Takamba, animateur, FOPAC
Kakunda, Microfinance, COOPEC
Francois Kaykiza, FOPAC
Roger Kutozo, FOPAC
Joss Makwa, Administrative Clerk, MONUC Butembo
Mumbere Kisoto, coordinateur, Passion, Soul and Mission (PSM)

David Paluku Kaposho, Président du C.A., Cooperative Centrale du Nord Kivu (COOCENKI)
 Faustin Yange Ambaya, President ex-combatants organization, Butembo city
 Delico, Secretary ex-combatants organization, Butembo city
 Member ex-combatants organization, Butembo city
 Etienne Mbakulirahi Kyalenga, secrétaire executif, FOPAC
 Joseph Ndebo Balikwisha, Secrétaire exécutif de Programme d'Action pour le développement Intégré (PADI),
 Vice-president du CODIC
 Claude Kakombi, Coordinateur de Action de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté et Protection de la Nature (ALPN)
 Frans van Hoof, Assistant Technique d'Agriterra auprès des O.P. de la Région Africaine des Grands Lacs,
 Advisors For African Farmers Organization (AFAFO)
 Jean Marie Delor, Assistant Technique, Direction Generale de l'Aide Humanitaire - RD Congo, European
 Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)
 Gédéon Kasekeka, ex-combatant Mai Mai
 Pascal Paluku Katsandivwa, Responsable AI du groupes armée Grand Nord
 Mumbere Musayi Matthieu, Coordinateur de la compassion pour les déshérités du monde rural (CDR)
 Ndebo Balikwisha Joseph - Secrétaire exécutif, PADI
 Kimbere Kithaka, Chef de travaux enseignant á l'Université de Goma, Faculté de Science Sociale, Université de
 Goma
 Norbert Khasindi, Chef de Bureau, PNDDR
 Claude Ami Muhuma, President former refugee camp Buhimba
 Bavukirahe Matabaro, Directeur de l'école Primaire Rwaza, Rugari, Rutchuru
 Sylvestre Ndeze Mayabo, Greffier du Tribunal Secundair, Kibumi, Rutchuru
 Georges Ntakaburinvano, Directeur de l'école primaire, Kibumba, Rutchuru
 Jabibi Mapinai, Pasteur localité Kalangala, Kibumba, Rutchuru
 Jason Juneno, President Coordination Société Civile North Kivu
 Sheryl Anderson, USAID
 Donna Kerner, CRC-A: DDR Specialist, USAID

South Kivu


Pasquale Mulamba, Fondation de Solidarité des Hommes (FSH), Bukavu
 Serge, Assistent coordinateur technique, Groupe d'Apuis des personnes Vulnerables (GAV)
 Clauvise, Chef du Centre, Educational Centre disadvantaged youth, Bukavu
 Pasquale, coordinateur d'Action Communautaire pour la Défense et le Progrès des Agriculteurs (ACODEPA)
 Juvenah Zozo, assistant technique, Association des Mamas pour la Lutte contre la Délinquance Féminine et
 l'encadrement des enfants abandonné et orphelins (AMALDEFEA)
 Programme du Développement Sociale (PRODES)
 Murhabazi Namegabe, Director, Bureau pours le Volontariat au service de l'Enfance et la Sante, BVES
 Joël Bamwisho-Ihomro, association of ex-combatants, Bunyakiri
 Jacques Manjak, President, Associations de Développement de Bunyakiri (PADEBU)
 Clauvice Kitumayi, Secrétaire, Associations de Développement de Bunyakiri (PADEBU)
 Padre, Paroche Bunyakiri
 Paulain Bayongma, Secrétaire executive d'Association des Démobilisé á Bunyakiri (ADEBU)
 Roger Mufunyi, President Societe Civile de Bunyakiri
 Célestin Bamwisho, Secrétaire Permanent du Comité Provincial de Gestion/Sud-Kivu, Programme Amani
 Michel Dubois, Head of Office, South Kivu, UNDP, Bukavu
 Harouna Dan Malam, Coordinateur du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté PNUD/Sud Kivu, UNDP,
 Bukavu

Annex 3: Typology of Participation¹⁵²

Typology	Components of each type
Passive Participation	People participate by being told what is going to happen or has already happened. It is a unilateral announcement by an administrator or project management without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
Participation in Information Giving	People participate by answering questions posed by extractive researchers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the findings of the research are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.
Participation by Consultation	People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. These external agents define both problem and solutions, and may modify these in the light of people's responses. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
Participation for Material Incentives	People participate by providing resources, for example labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Much on-farm research falls in this category, as farmers provide the fields but are not involved in the experimentation or the process of learning. It is very common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging activities when the incentives end.
Functional Participation	People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project, which can involve the development or promotion of externally initiated social organisation. Such involvement does not tend to be at early stages of project cycles or planning, but rather after major decisions have been made. These institutions tend to be dependent on external initiators and facilitators, but may become self-dependent.
Interactive Participation	People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It tends to involve interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systematic and structured learning processes. These groups take control over local decisions, and so people have a stake in maintaining structures or practises.
Self-Mobilisation	People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. Such self-initiated and collective action may or may not challenge existing inequitable distributions of wealth and power.

¹⁵² This framework is based on Pretty (1994).

Annex 4: Map of Visited Locations in Eastern DRC



Map of visited locations, adapted from ULC-Geomatics (2006, Louvain-la-Neuve)

Participating partners:

Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS), Utrecht University

The Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) at Utrecht University comprises an interdisciplinary focal point that has a unique expertise in the emerging international field of conflict studies. The Centre is working on a programme of cutting edge research themes that are closely linked to its educational programme comprising undergraduate and graduate courses. Its work reflects contemporary and innovative trends in academic thought. Its studies aim at contributing to intellectual debates with regard to current conflict and to prevailing policy practice in the fields of conflict prevention and management, and peacebuilding



Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Radboud University Nijmegen

The Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management conducts research and offers academic courses on the dynamics and transformation of contemporary, large-scale conflict, focusing in particular on practices of peacebuilding intervention and the role of international organizations, the state, and international and local civil society.



Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute (CRU)

The Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute conducts research on the nexus between security and development with a special focus on integrated and comprehensive approaches on conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in fragile and post-conflict states.



European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)

The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is a non-governmental organization that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and actively supports and connects people who work for peace worldwide



IKV Pax Christi

IKV Pax Christi works as a movement of concerned citizens and partners in conflict areas on the protection of human security, the end of armed violence and the construction of just peace.



Netherlands Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense coordinates the military of the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces have a threefold mission: to protect the integrity of the territory of the Netherlands and that of allied countries; to help maintain stability and the international legal order; and to help civil authorities enforce the law, control crises, respond to disasters and provide humanitarian assistance either in the Netherlands or abroad.



Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands abroad. The Ministry coordinates and carries out Dutch foreign policy at its headquarters in The Hague and through its missions abroad. It is likewise the channel through which the Dutch Government communicates with foreign governments and international organizations.



PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries)

PSO is an association that consists of fifty Dutch development organizations. The association focuses on capacity development at civil society organizations in developing countries.



Dutch Council for Refugees

Dutch Council for Refugees defends the rights of refugees and helps them to build a new life in the Netherlands.

