

**DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION
AND REINTEGRATION
OF EX-COMBATANTS
IN A PEACEKEEPING
ENVIRONMENT**

Principles and Guidelines



**UNITED NATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS**

***DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN A
PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT***

Principles and Guidelines

Lessons Learned Unit
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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PREFACE

1. For the last decade, United Nations peacekeeping operations have been deployed in countries caught in internal, civil conflicts being waged with large numbers of small arms and light weapons. Sustainable peace has been difficult to establish in such environments for several reasons. One of them is the high level of armaments within the country, which constitutes a major cause of instability even after a peace has been negotiated. Reducing the level of arms in the country, therefore, has become a crucial precondition for the consolidation of peace and stability.
2. However, experience has shown that disarmament alone has no long-term benefits if not accompanied by demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society through economically viable alternative lifestyles, as well as overall socio-economic development for the country as a whole. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants form a continuum that is itself a part of the entire peace process: Where disarmament ends demobilization must begin and must eventually lead to reintegration, if sustainable peace and development are to be secured in countries emerging from conflict.
3. The United Nations has gained extensive, probably unparalleled, experience over the past ten years in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment. Operations that have contributed to this experience include the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia; the United Nations Observer Group in Central America; the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia; two United Nations Angola Verification Missions; the United Nations Operation in Somalia II; the United Nations Operation in Mozambique; the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala; the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium; and the United Nations Observer Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These operations have been extensively studied by both the United Nations itself and outside experts with a view to identifying lessons learned.

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4. In total, experiences from 14 United Nations missions and several national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts have helped inform this document.
5. The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted its study of United Nations experiences in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in a peacekeeping environment with the aim of providing a coherent framework of general principles and practical guidelines for the effective planning, management, implementation and monitoring of this process.
6. This report sets out general or guiding principles that have been drawn from lessons learned in several disarmament, demobilization and reintegration experiences. Practical guidelines and procedures on how to plan, implement, monitor and coordinate the various phases and components of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process are also provided. Particular emphasis is placed on an integrated and coordinated approach to the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. Where appropriate, the principles and guidelines are supplemented by sample forms and generic outlines.
7. The report should be read in conjunction with *General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations* (UN/210/TC/GG95) and *Guideline Standard Operating Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (UN Restricted 91-15137).
8. The terminology used in this report is consistent with established United Nations practice. The following methodology was used in the preparation of this report:
 - Review and analysis of academic literature;
 - Review of existing case studies;
 - Undertaking of field missions to host countries of former and current peace support operations;
 - Interviewing of United Nations officials involved in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises, external experts, academics and researchers working in this field;

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- Visits to academic institutes also conducting research in this area; and
 - Peer and expert review of the overall approach.
9. The Security Council, which has the primary responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, considers disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment to be a topic of foremost importance. The statement by the President of the Security Council of 8 July 1999, which is reproduced in Annex A of this report, exemplifies the importance the Council places on this subject.
 10. Each conflict is unique. Consequently, each peacekeeping operation is different and planning must be tailored to the particular situation. It is not possible to create a blueprint or generic model that is applicable to every peacekeeping operation. General guidelines, flexibly applied, are the hallmark of an effective planning process for peacekeeping operations. Authorities at all levels will need to exercise their judgement in applying these principles and guidelines for the accomplishment of their specific missions.
 11. Two consultants, General Emmanuel Erskine, former Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, and Ambassador Peggy Mason, Director of Council Development, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, were engaged by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to work closely with the Lessons Learned Unit in developing principles and guidelines for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment. The Department expresses its appreciation to General Erskine and Ambassador Mason, as well as to their research officers, for the dedicated efforts they applied in preparing this document.

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12. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes form part of a natural continuum in the peace process and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach in their planning and implementation. Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences.

A) General factors enhancing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should be entrenched in the peace agreement and the overall national post-conflict recovery and reconstruction strategy.
- Key elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should be specified in the peace agreement, including the following:
 - Timeframe and benchmarks of the process;
 - Mode of disposition of collected weapons and ammunition;
 - Requirement for restructuring the defence and security establishments; and
 - Institutions charged to plan, execute, coordinate and supervise the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.
- The role of children in armed conflicts should be acknowledged and children's rights should be identified as a priority in conflict resolution and peace-building processes and should be entrenched both in the peace agreement and in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan.
- The parties to the conflict should have a strong political will to abide by and respect the protocols on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration concluded in the peace agreement. All parties to the conflict should participate in building mutual confidence and trust.

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- The United Nations and its agencies should provide effective peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building intervention.
- Regional/sub-regional organizations/ arrangements and their Member States should participate in the implementation of the programmes.
- Local non-governmental organizations and civil society should participate to the maximum extent possible in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises, particularly in the reconciliation and peace-building process.
- Adequate financial and logistical support, ideally provided in the framework of holistic and long-term assistance, should be made readily available by the international community, including Governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations.
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should be sustained in the post-peacekeeping period through State institutions and local non-governmental organizations, with the active support of the international community.
- Efficient planning, implementation and supervisory institutions/structures should be established and operated as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities.
- Public information and sensitization programmes should be set up as an integral part of the overall disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.
- Sound post-conflict peace-building programmes should be developed to consolidate peace.

B) Planning

- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises should be integrated into the framework of general rehabilitation

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programmes that provide assistance, protection and opportunities for development.

- The roles of the peacekeeping military and humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations should be seen as complementary in providing assistance.
- Given the diversity of actors involved in the various stages of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and its overlapping nature, integrated planning mechanisms should be set up that allow for effective coordination and unity of command.
- An inter-agency multidisciplinary planning committee, composed of representatives from the United Nations, specialized agencies as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the implementation process should be established as early as possible.
- A United Nations integrated technical mission should be deployed early in the peace negotiations to assess fully the specific requirements of a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan.
- Local and national capacities should be enhanced through active consultation, engagement and participation in the planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

C) Disarmament and Weapons Management

- Disarmament and demobilization programmes should be undertaken in a timely fashion to avoid a relapse into war.
- A secure environment should be established to encourage complete disarmament.
- Disarmament planning should address the following variables:
 - Scope (target audiences, numbers and types of weapons to be collected);

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- Information needs for planning disarmament and weapons management;
 - Realistic and sufficiently flexible timetable for disarmament that allows for gradual confidence-building;
 - Preparation of assembly areas/cantonment sites that fulfil key requirements (accessibility, security, general amenities, storage facilities/armouries and communications infrastructure);
 - Implementing and supervisory structures (including e.g. roles and tasks of the parties, the peacekeeping operation, the independent monitoring body, etc.);
 - Procedures, timing, methodology for weapons collection/recording/disposal, location of sites,
 - Expertise and technical requirements;
 - Mechanisms and institutions for monitoring, verification of compliance, etc.;
 - Elements of a public information programme; and
 - Funding.
- Post-demobilization and mopping-up mechanisms, including “turn-in”, “buy-back”, “swap” or “weapons-for-development” programmes, should be developed to collect weapons that have not been surrendered.
 - After the collection of weapons and ammunition, interim secure storage or immediate destruction should be provided for, taking into account the most appropriate destruction technique for the circumstances.
 - Effective mine-awareness and demining programmes should be set up to complement the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

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- Successor arrangements should be put in place to continue disarmament, demobilization and reintegration related tasks after the termination of the peacekeeping operation.
- Effective weapons-management programmes with a comprehensive long-term national policy should be developed, including the following:
 - Clear national legal framework for ownership and possession of small arms and light weapons;
 - Effective and impartial enforcement mechanisms;
 - Control of inter-State transfers; and
 - Establishment of regional/sub-regional mechanisms to control illicit arms-trafficking.

D) Demobilization and Reintegration

- Ex-combatants should undergo pre-discharge and reorientation programmes with briefings, counselling and training to prepare them for the transition to civilian life. These programmes should be tailored to the specific needs of the former combatants and should reflect their different political, social, economic and educational backgrounds and should cover topics such as accommodation, education and training, economic activities, medical and health issues, psychological assistance and legal and civil matters.
- All demobilization and resettlement efforts should include provisions for aid packages that relate directly to the immediate, day-to-day needs of the demobilized ex-combatants, such as food, clothing, shelter, tools, transportation and education.
- Governments, United Nations agencies, international and local non-governmental organizations should participate actively in the planning and implementation of vocational training programmes. These programmes should be tailored to build or enhance the marketable skills of the ex-combatants and to suit

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the immediate demands of the communities/districts or areas of permanent residence of the demobilized soldiers.

- The national Government should assist in difficult reintegration processes of demobilized ex-combatants, particularly in the acquisition of land, vocational training and the provision of employment opportunities.
- Projects undertaken to alleviate poverty, to provide employment and economic livelihood for veterans should also be open to civilian members of the community, including returning refugees and the internally displaced persons.
- Planning for reintegration programmes should reflect the following variables:
 - Programme objectives (in the context of the national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development);
 - Scope, priorities and goals, and timeframe of the programmes for each target group;
 - Preliminary needs assessment (both of ex-combatants and receiving communities) and establishment of baselines for the reintegration programmes;
 - Institutional framework and mechanisms for implementation, coordination and ongoing monitoring, evaluation and adjustment of programmes;
 - Expertise and technical requirements;
 - Input for the public information, sensitization and reconciliation plan;
 - Potential constraints to the process, including institutional, financial, socio-economic or cultural issues; and
 - Funding;
- In the demobilization and reintegration process, special attention should be devoted to families and orphans of combatants killed in action, the disabled and the chronically ill, the wounded

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and their families, as well as to female ex-combatants and child soldiers.

- Demobilization of child soldiers should not merely be the formal exercise of surrendering a weapon to obtain a benefits package but rather a process that ensures the physical and psycho-social recovery and social reintegration of children affected by armed conflict. Children must be consulted at all stages of the demobilization and reintegration process and strategies and programmes should reflect their specific needs and concerns.
- Family reunification, a principal factor in effective social reintegration particularly of children and child soldiers, should be supported by specific tracing procedures and community and family sensitization programmes.
- Reconciliation between ex-combatants and civil society should be vigorously pursued through intensive information drives and sound public relations campaigns among both the rural and the urban population.

E) Post-Conflict Peace-Building

- For the consolidation of peace and the promotion of stability, post-conflict peace-building should be perceived as complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
- To bring about durable peace and stability and to prevent further outbreak of hostilities, the underlying causes for the conflict should be determined and resolved. All parties to the conflict should participate in the search for lasting peace.
- Reconstruction, restructuring and rehabilitation of government, public and private institutions, political institution-building and the participatory political process in particular, should be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency, in order to facilitate the promotion of security and the reactivation of economic sustainability of the country and the people.

SECTION

1

INTRODUCTION

I. DEFINITIONS


13. In the context of peacekeeping, **disarmament** is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
14. **Demobilization** is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.
15. The terms “cantonment sites”, “encampment sites” and “assembly areas” have been used interchangeably in various operations and reports¹. For the purpose of this exercise, the terms “**cantonment site**”, “**encampment site**” and “**assembly area**” will be used interchangeably to define locations for disarmament and demobilization processes.
16. **Reintegration programmes** are assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families’, economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration programmes could include cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and income-generating activities.

¹ In analysing some peace processes, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research refers to “cantonment sites” as locations where combatants go through disarmament and demobilization processes. Describing the Mozambique experience, the UN Department of Public Information uses the term “assembly areas” to mean “cantonments”. In the Somali exercise, however, both terms were used to distinguish different kinds of venues: “cantonment” referred to locations where heavy weapons, including crew-served and anti-tank weapons and rockets, were stored. “Transition areas”, on the other hand, referred to locations where combatants underwent disarmament and demobilization processes.

II. *NEED FOR DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION*

17. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes form part of a natural continuum in the peace process and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach in their planning and implementation. Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences. Reintegration programmes can overlap with long-term peace-building programmes and some activities can start at any stage in the peace-making process, even as early as the initial ceasefire.
18. In the short term, the failure to disarm and demobilize former combatants effectively may contribute to an immediate relapse into war. In the medium and long term, incomplete or ineffective reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society may lead to armed criminality by those former soldiers who have no other means of earning a living. In States where internal structures for civil order have already been weakened by an internecine conflict, this increase in armed criminality would be a further detriment to consolidating peace.
19. Given their importance in contributing to a sustainable peace in both the short and long term, measures for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants will continue to demand importance in international and national peace efforts. Peacekeeping operations, and the international successor arrangements that follow their termination, are likely to continue to be mandated to perform disarmament, demobilization and reintegration related tasks or assist national authorities in performing them.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the Continuum of the Peace Process



**III. *DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION IN PEACE AGREEMENTS***

20. Disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants should take place in the earliest stages of the peace process and reintegration programmes should be ready for implementation when discharged former combatants arrive at their intended settlement areas. Therefore, every effort should be made to develop a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan during peace negotiations with the intent to incorporate it into the final peace agreement. If that is not possible, at least a framework for the plan should be agreed to, together with an appropriate mechanism for the plan's subsequent finalization, implementation and verification. This framework should also serve as the mechanism through which adjustments to previously agreed elements could be made, when necessary.
21. In post-conflict situations where there is a complete victory by one party or group, the victorious party should enact a law to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, upon assuming control of the country.
22. Several elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should be pre-determined and clearly spelt out in the peace agreement. These include the following:
- Number of cantonment sites;
 - Timetable for the ceasefire to come into effect;
 - Timeframe for the commencement and completion of the disarmament and demobilization phases (however, target dates set for the commencement and completion of disarmament and demobilization should be flexible, to achieve the principal objectives of complete disarmament and demobilization);
 - Early disposition of collected weapons and ammunition;
 - Requirement for restructuring the defence and security establishments; and

- Establishment of institutions that are to plan, execute, coordinate and supervise the entire disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.
23. The United Nations should be involved early in the negotiating process, particularly those departments and agencies that would be required to implement elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. Internal to the United Nations, a planning committee comprising relevant departments and agencies should be established as early as possible. The interdepartmental task force, established for potential and actual peacekeeping operations, is an existing mechanism that could be used for this purpose.
24. The United Nations should encourage and assist the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan as well as its incorporation in the peace agreement. The United Nations should be in a position to provide negotiating guidance to the parties in the form of the following:
- Substantive inputs to the design of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
 - Advice on the appropriate mechanisms for its planning, implementation and verification; and
 - Identification of the need for, and where necessary, provision of the necessary technical expertise in support of the planning process.
25. The peace agreement should also authorize a third party, such as the United Nations or the relevant regional organization, to monitor that provisions on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are being honoured in full by all parties, that violations are checked and that the welfare of ex-combatants is being adequately addressed. Moreover, the monitoring authority could enlist international support to put pressure on a party that is reluctant to disarm and to ask for international economic and financial assistance for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

IV. *COMMITMENT OF THE PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY*

26. The success of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process will rest on the will of the warring parties to agree on the terms of the peace agreement and commit to the peace process. To determine the scope of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise, accurate and up-to-date information on the numbers, types and locations of forces and armaments, including storage depot sites, stockpiles and weapons caches, is needed. The figures will greatly affect the planning and should, ideally, be provided at the time the peace agreement is signed. Past experience has demonstrated that gathering this information later has caused considerable delays in the implementation of the peace process.
27. Although technical inputs to the planning and negotiation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan are important, they cannot substitute for the full involvement and commitment of the parties themselves. In addition to the political leadership, the participation of the military leadership of all the warring parties and factions will be fundamental to the development of an acceptable and feasible disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan.
28. Further, the parties should be willing and able to provide information on disarmament and demobilization specifics to their respective forces, such as such as the numbers of combatants to be demobilized; the timing of the demobilization at each site; and even the locations of the sites.. In the pre-implementation period, however, even the most committed parties will not be ready to divulge sensitive information relevant to the security of their forces. Hence, it is essential that the United Nations has reliable, independent sources of information. These include its own technical reconnaissance and information shared by Member States, particularly weapons-supplier States.
29. United Nations military observers, deployed throughout the mission area, are an excellent tool for gathering independent data. Military observers could also be part of the integrated technical mission or used as monitors of an interim ceasefire during the negotiation phase.

In the latter stages of the negotiating process, the parties could be asked to agree to the deployment of United Nations military observers to verify the accuracy of information on depots and stockpiles provided by each of the parties.

30. Additionally, liaison with local sources, such as community elders and local aid workers, could be useful for gathering independent information for disarmament and demobilization. Whenever possible, the involvement of civil society should be encouraged, particularly in the reintegration process. Successful reintegration of former combatants into civil society will only be possible with the cooperation and acceptance of those with whom they seek to live and work. The participation of civil society will also be necessary if the general population also has to be disarmed.

V. CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICTS

31. Today, as many as 300,000 children under the age of 18 serve around the world, largely in armed groups but also in national armed forces. Children have reportedly participated in 33 ongoing or recent armed conflicts in almost every region of the world. Their experience is generally characterized by heightened risk to their physical, emotional and social well-being. However, their role and even their very presence in the armed groups are rarely acknowledged, much less addressed, resulting in their exclusion from the benefits attached to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise. The role of children in armed conflict should be acknowledged from the very onset of peace negotiations and children's rights should always be identified as a priority in peacemaking, peace-building and conflict resolution processes, both in the peace agreement as well as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plans.
32. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto of 1977, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), provide the fundamental law and guiding principles that should underpin initiatives on behalf of children, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. Of particular

importance in the preparation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan are the principles of non-discrimination, gender equity, non-institutionalization and non-stigmatization of the children, family reunification, and gender equity. Children must be consulted at various stages of the demobilization and reintegration process. In particular, children should participate in determining their fates with regard to issues of family reunification, vocational or educational opportunities.

33. Relevant international humanitarian and human rights law requires that, at a minimum, the following steps should be taken:
- Parties to the conflict should neither recruit children fifteen years of age or younger nor allow them to take direct part in hostilities;
 - States should support measures to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment that fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child; and
 - Children who take part in hostilities and are captured retain their right to special protection.

SECTION

2

INTEGRATED APPROACH

I. INTEGRATED APPROACH IN PLANNING

34. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are complex and sensitive inter-linked processes, demanding considerable human and financial resources to plan, implement and monitor. Given the diversity of actors involved in the various stages, and the overlapping nature of many of the phases, integrated planning, effective coordination and unity of command are essential. Past experiences have highlighted the need for the various actors to work complementarily, avoiding unnecessary competition for funds and visibility.
35. The roles of the peacekeeping military and humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations should be seen as complementary in providing assistance during the demobilization and reintegration phases. The integrated approach in planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes is essential, and mechanisms for coordination should be included as soon as possible, for example when translating the peacekeeping mandate into Standard Operating Procedures.
36. Disarmament and demobilization are important components of the reform of the State security apparatus, including the reform of the national military, police and judicial/penal systems. This reform is in furtherance of a broader process of democratization. Hence, disarmament and demobilization should be an integral part of the national post-conflict recovery strategy. Similarly, the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life should be planned and implemented within the national reconciliation, rehabilitation and resettlement strategy, and as part of the first stages of the national post-conflict development plan.
37. The enhancement of local and national capacities through active consultation, engagement and participation should be outlined and promoted in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. Experience has shown, however, that in the early stages of the peace process, the integration of local and national agencies is often problematic. For example, it is unlikely that warring parties would

- willingly disarm to each other or to a governmental authority they may have opposed in the recent conflict. Even if local and national agencies were acceptable to all parties, they may not have the immediate capacity to implement the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures necessary. Over time, however, this capacity could be built up and supported; as it may further the national reconciliation process and have a beneficial effect on the entire post-conflict reconstruction effort.
38. All disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures need to be fully integrated in an overall framework for the provision of assistance and opportunities for development. Regular consultations should be held between the peace support operation and humanitarian actors in the field, starting as early as possible in the planning process. Existing arrangements for humanitarian coordination should be considered and basic principles and mechanisms for cooperation and a division of responsibilities should be established, for example, through a memorandum of understanding between the peace operation and humanitarian organizations.
39. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should include child-conscious components designed in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other relevant agencies and non-governmental organizations with expertise in this field. These components should be planned, executed and evaluated within the framework of the central disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committees and monitoring bodies provided for in peace agreements. Interagency forums should be constantly apprised of how former child combatants' needs are being addressed.

II. INTEGRATED TECHNICAL MISSION

40. The United Nations should establish an integrated technical mission early in the peace negotiations to assess fully the specific requirements of a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. The mission should have expertise in the following areas:
- The political/diplomatic dimension, including the underlying causes of the conflict and the potential role of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in addressing them;
 - The military aspects, such as disarmament verification including data management, assembly and demobilization procedures, explosive ordnance disposal, etc.;
 - The humanitarian dimension of demobilization, encompassing food, water and medical requirements and psychological counselling of ex-combatants and their families during the quartering in the assembly areas, and the specialized needs of female and child fighters and the war disabled;
 - The reintegration dimension, including programmes for civic education, human rights and vocational training, agriculture and other income-generating activities for ex-combatants; and
 - The international funding dimension, which would include assistance that could be provided by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks.
41. The integrated technical mission should also identify the minimum political, military and socio-economic conditions necessary for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to succeed, particularly the responsibilities to be assumed by the conflicting parties.
42. The findings of the integrated technical mission should be reflected in the pre-deployment and in-mission training of the peacekeeping personnel and should be considered when drafting the standard operating procedures.

III. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION

43. It is essential that ex-combatants be aware of their rights and obligations in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process if they are to act in accordance with them. Similarly, armed groups and individuals outside the formal demobilization process must be made aware of specific disarmament and weapons management measures aimed at them. Therefore, support for the entire process must be generated among the general public by way of public information and civic education campaigns. In this context, the following information should be disseminated widely:

- Main provisions, overall objectives and context of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
- Specific rights and obligations for each target group;
- Specific procedures, timing and duration for each group, including relevant security measures.

44. The United Nations peacekeeping mission should be an impartial source for and active participant in the dissemination of such information, both through its public information component and its military observers.

45. While planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, specific provisions should be made for the public information and civil education needs, as they are one of the first requirements of the implementation phase. To this end, the planners could identify the most effective channels of communication and develop suitable information products for timely dissemination on the ground.

IV. FUNDING

46. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is capital intensive and adequate funds are required for all its stages, if the process is to be truly successful. Items requiring funding include, among others, the following:

- Logistics of the physical management and administration of cantonment sites/assembly areas;
 - Maintenance of large numbers of ex-combatants, and often their families, while they await the end of the process;
 - Transportation of ex-combatants to cantonment sites and later to their areas of resettlement, as well as
 - Cash and other incentive packages offered to encourage combatants to disarm and demobilize.
47. The cost of disarmament, including the destruction of collected armaments, can be kept down, with advance planning, especially on destruction techniques. However, assistance to post-conflict States for long-term weapons management is much more costly, as is enabling neighbouring States and regional organizations to enforce United Nations-mandated sanctions. The relationship between security and development should be impressed upon potential donors, as should the consequences of failing to control weapons effectively, particularly the detrimental effect on all other efforts to build a sustainable peace.
48. Measures to mobilize adequate funds should commence along with the planning process. Bilateral and multilateral donors and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are the key players in resource mobilization. Liaison should be established between the group planning the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan and these key players. The multilateral financial institutions could be asked to participate in the United Nations interdepartmental task force.
49. Donors must be urged to take a holistic and long-term approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, social healing and economic development. International programmers should plan for long-term assistance, and community capacity to sustain the essential services should be developed. While the typical funding period in emergencies is six months to a year, a three year commitment of resources and staff to ensure reintegration of former-combatants is considered much more reasonable and effective.

SECTION

3

**MAIN ISSUES IN PLANNING FOR
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION**

I. KEY ISSUES IN DISARMAMENT PLANNING

50. This section addresses the main issues to be considered in planning the disarmament and weapons management aspects of a generic disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. For ease of planners, a list of suggested fundamental variables for the disarmament phase has been drawn up that should be considered when designing a specific plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration:

- Definition of what constitutes disarmament: who is to be disarmed and what weapons are to be collected;
- Who will be implementing oversee and coordinate the disarmament aspects of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, including the role of the parties; role of peacekeeping operation; and role and constitution of independent monitoring body, among others;
- Procedures for disarmament, such as timing, methodology for weapons collection/recording/disposal, location of sites, etc.;
- Expertise and other technical requirements for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- Procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance;
- Broader weapons management considerations, including enforcement of an arms embargo and/or cooperative measures with neighbouring countries and arms suppliers;
- Elements of a public information programme;
- Information needs for planning disarmament and weapons management; and
- Funds needed for the disarmament phase.

51. The type of body or group that will negotiate and plan the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan is also a key issue. Joint bodies consisting of representatives of the parties, the United Nations and all other relevant participants are the ideal

forums for negotiating, not only the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, but almost all aspects of the peace process. A joint body will also maximize the opportunity for an integrated and coordinated approach to the development of the plan during the negotiating process. Further, it will improve the chances for its incorporation into the peace agreement.

52. It is essential that the joint planning group reflect all the expertise — political, military, disarmament, humanitarian, development, and public information — necessary to plan a comprehensive disarmament programme.
53. Experience has shown that despite the best efforts of the parties and negotiators to conclude a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan during the peace negotiations, there will be aspects of the plan that will not have been finalized. These will have to be considered during the implementation period. Thus, the joint planning group, which may have been transformed into a joint commission for the implementation phase, will need to maintain a planning capacity to tackle unresolved issues and new developments.
54. One of the major challenges to the planning of the disarmament and weapons management aspects will be to ensure adequate public inputs from the outset of the planning process. Great care must be taken to ensure that representatives of civil society, who could advise the negotiating and planning groups, are truly representative of their constituencies. Additional insight could be gained by holding broad-based conferences and by employing other consultative mechanisms that would better inform the negotiating process and build support for it.

II. DISARMAMENT AND WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

55. Experience has shown that a sustainable peace requires a disarmament and weapons management programme that would address the requirements for bringing and maintaining stability in the short term, as well as peace consolidation in the long term. The

importance of disarmament and good weapons management to the peace process should be reflected in the following:

- Negotiation of the peace agreement;
- Design of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;
- Mandate of the peace operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council to oversee the peace implementation process;
- Mission planning and implementation of the weapons management process;
- Post-implementation follow-up processes; and
- Provision of adequate funding for these tasks.

56. A clear disarmament mandate requires the inclusion of specific disarmament obligations and procedures in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan and their subsequent incorporation into the peace agreement. The United Nations should encourage the parties to include provisions for weapons destruction in the peace agreement.

57. Disarmament of former combatants must be complemented by a comprehensive weapons-management programme that includes measures targeting irregular armed groups and individuals. Procedures for controlling, to the extent possible, the influx of new weapons into the country should also be included. Neighbouring countries and key weapons supplier States must respect these arrangements, if the disarmament is to be genuine. Every effort must be made to enforce United Nations-mandated arms embargoes.

58. The United Nations experience has been that the weapons surrendered in the first waves of disarmament are either useless or of very poor quality. The quality and calibre of the weapons improves as the disarmament proceeds and mutual trust and confidence is gradually being built. The best weapons and forces are held in reserve for the last stages of the process, usually as a hedge against a return to conflict.

59. The best confidence-building measure for disarmament is a manifestly fair process, well planned and executed with transparent monitoring and verification. As it is hard to predict how fast confidence will grow, a reasonable measure of flexibility must be built into the timetable for the assembly phases.
60. To encourage complete disarmament, the security of the disarmed former combatants must be ensured. In States where the national public security forces are either non-existent or unreliable, the security will have to be provided by the peacekeeping force. Hence, the peacekeeping force must have sufficient police monitors, backed up by military forces appropriately armed and equipped.

III. DEMOBILIZATION

61. Cantonment sites are a vital requirement for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, especially when ex-combatants have to wait for extended periods before they can be transported to their homes for resettlement. For a comprehensive and efficient disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, it is, therefore, imperative that peacekeeping missions and other implementing agencies are well informed and guided in the construction and preparation of cantonment sites. Wherever possible, it is advisable to provide joint cantonment sites with shared facilities to further early reconciliation of the parties to the conflict. Listed below are factors to be kept in mind when selecting and setting up a cantonment site.
- (a) **Accessibility** The site should be easily accessible and not too distant from the ex-combatants' bases or concentration areas in order to encourage participation in the disarmament and demobilization exercise. Proximity to roads, airfields, rivers and railways, should also be considered.
- (b) **Security** The site and its environs should be secure; ex-combatants should be made to feel safe. Sentries should guard both inner and outer perimeters at all times and acts of intimidation and harassment should not be tolerated. An internal

security system should be in place to alert authorities in case of any emergency.

- (c) **General amenities** Cantonment sites should be set up with the following basic amenities:
- Possibility for joint accommodation and sharing facilities to further reconciliation;
 - Adequate potable water supply;
 - Washing and toilet facilities;
 - Cooking and feeding facilities;
 - Lighting, both for security and functionality;
 - Health and medical facilities, including first aid;
 - Transportation of demobilized ex-combatants to communities of choice for reintegration into civil society;
 - Recreation facilities, including sports, TV/video viewing facilities;
 - Training facilities and lecture rooms for guest speakers and counsellors invited to give talks on topics such as resettlement, reintegration and other social issues; and
 - Specific programmes to address gender-specific needs.
 - Specific facilities and programmes to address the needs of child soldiers.
- (d) **Storage facilities/Armoury** Properly secured and guarded facilities/armouries for temporary storage of collected weapons should be set up. Transportation should also be organized as soon as possible for surrendered weapons and ammunition which is to be moved out of camp to permanent storage sites.
- (e) **Communications infrastructure** A line of communication should be established between the site and the implementing agency or supervising authority, which may be located outside the site. Internal communication facilities within the site should also be established, if possible.
-

62. Periods for cantonment should be brief. This can be achieved only when funds and logistics to support the programmes are readily available and adequate. Extensive cantonment periods often lead to boredom and disenchantment among the ex-combatants. These frustrations can result in occasional demonstrations and rioting with attacks on peacekeeping personnel protecting the ex-combatants and looting of food and other supplies.
63. Experience has shown that families often accompany the ex-combatants to assembly areas and congregate around the cantonment sites. However, in most disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises there has been no clear policy regarding these families. Clear guidelines should be developed in regard to the following questions:
- Who looks after the families of the ex-combatants during the demobilization exercise;
 - What kind of support, if any, will they be given; and
 - What will be the eligibility criteria for assistance to families and who will determine that criteria.

IV. REINTEGRATION

64. While disarmament and demobilization procedures require hard data on weapons and forces, reintegration planning requires information on skills, aptitudes, intentions and expectations. Reintegration planning should reflect the following aspects:
- Objectives of reintegration programme as a component of the national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development;
 - Preliminary needs assessment and establishment of baselines for the programmes;
 - Scope, priorities and goals, and time-frame of the programmes for each of the target groups;

- Constraints to the process, including institutional, financial, socio-economic or cultural issues;
 - Design of institutional framework necessary for reintegration, including national, regional and local oversight and field structure and data management systems;
 - Mechanisms for implementation, coordination and ongoing monitoring, evaluation and adjustment of programmes;
 - Funding mechanisms;
 - Planning needs — planning mechanisms, information and technical support needs; and
 - Inputs for the public information, sensitization and reconciliation plan.
65. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration require significant changes in attitude on the part of the former combatants and the rest of the civilian population, particularly those in the communities to which the ex-combatants return. Priority must be given at all stages of the planning and implementation process to the public information dimension, not only in terms of basic information on the content of the programme but on the sensitization and reconciliation aspects as well. National and local inputs to this campaign are essential. Building indigenous capacity for continued public and civic education is also necessary.
66. Reintegration programmes should be comprehensive and should include specific provisions for child soldiers. Peace negotiators, donors and child advocates should agree early on as to how much reintegration assistance is adequate or appropriate for former child soldiers; to what end; in what form; for how long it should be provided; and how it will be funded.
67. Policies and strategies to address the situation of demobilized child soldiers should be developed and implemented on the basis of an assessment of the impact of the conflict on children and their families. Programmes must promote the best interest of the child. They should seek to enhance the children's self-esteem and

integrity and ability to participate actively in the lives of their families and communities. Activities must take into account the age and the developmental stage of the child and accommodate the particular requirements of girls and children with special needs. Programmes can only develop through relationships of trust and confidence. They require adequate and sustained commitments of time and resources, and necessitate close and ongoing cooperation among all relevant actors.

V. SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

68. Following a peace agreement, termination of hostilities or a policy decision to embark on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, institutions and mechanisms should be established to exercise the following administrative functions:

- Plan, execute and supervise provisions relating to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the peace agreement or other document;
- Ensure that violations of agreement are detected and checked through verification;
- Mediate in any dispute arising out of a misinterpretation and misunderstanding in the implementation of the agreement;
- Serve as intermediary between the parties to the conflict and implementing authorities;
- Coordinate programmes of humanitarian agencies in the field;
- Provide all necessary assistance to ex-combatants and dependants during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process;
- Monitor the progress of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise.

69. As a first step in setting up management structures, the principal implementation authority should be identified, instituted and acknowledged. To ensure effective and efficient execution of its

SECTION 3 ***MAIN ISSUES IN PLANNING FOR DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION***

tasks, full support and cooperation should be extended to the implementing authority by parties to the conflict, the United Nations, regional organizations, other interested Governments and donors.

70. Experience shows that the role of the implementing authority can be assumed by different bodies, such as:

- A peacekeeping mission of either the United Nations or a regional organization; or
- A national mechanism or committee on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

71. Based on previous experiences, the following management and supervisory techniques can be recommended. However, in view of cultural diversities in conflict areas, these structures may be modified to suit particular environments.

(a) *Supervisory and Monitoring Commission* The commission would be composed of representatives of the parties to the conflict, the United Nations or regional organizations peacekeeping mission, and representatives of other States that are guarantors of the peace process or have an interest in consolidating the peace (such as members of a Group of Friends). The tasks of the commission would be as follows:

- To guarantee the authentic implementation of the peace agreement and respect for the timetable specified for the ceasefire and elections;
- Settle disputes between the parties to the conflict; and
- Guide and coordinate the activities of the subsidiary regional commissions.

(b) *Ceasefire Monitoring Commission* This commission would be composed of representatives of the parties, donor and other Governments with influence on the parties, and should be chaired by a representative of the peacekeeping mission. The commission could have subordinate sub-commissions in some

regional headquarters, and monitoring groups at the cantonment sites. Its tasks would be as follows:

- Monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and the disbandment of private and irregular armed groups;
- Collect weapons and ammunitions;
- Verify and ensure security of strategic and trading routes; and
- Supervise the ceasefire and demobilization process.

(c) *Reintegration Commission* The composition of this commission would be the representatives of the parties, the United Nations, regional organizations as well as donor and other Governments with influence on the parties. Its structure should include offices in the regions and districts. Its tasks would include establishing rules of procedure and the planning, organization, direction, supervision and monitoring of the economic and social reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants.

(d) *Joint Commission for Formation of Unified Defence Force* This commission would be composed of representatives of the parties and of countries selected by the parties to advise on the formation of the new, unified army. The United Nations could be asked to participate and assist in selected areas, following an authorization from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks of the commission would be as follows:

- Oversee the process of forming the new, unified defence force;
- Prepare directives on the phasing of the forces' establishment;
- Prepare the budget for the force;
- Provide criteria for selection of personnel from the different formerly warring parties; and
- Identify commanding officers for the new force.

72. To ensure fairness and justice, all parties to the conflict should be adequately represented in all decision-making institutions involved in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

73. A *technical unit* composed of mission personnel with specific mechanical, technical, electronic communication and management skills could be established to provide logistic and administrative support for field operations. This unit would be responsible for the day-to-day management and the administration of the cantonment sites and for the coordination of programmes associated with the demobilization process. Its tasks would be as follows:

- Supervise construction of cantonment sites;
- Provide communications;
- Maintain utility and service facilities at cantonment sites;
- Deliver supplies from warehouses to cantonment and other operational sites, including food, clothing, blankets, tents, cooking facilities, medical and health-care products;
- Deliver water;
- Register ex-combatants earmarked for demobilization and issue personal documents to demobilized ex-combatants;
- Process all information and documentation pertaining to each phase of the demobilization programme and maintain such details in a database;
- Organize payment of demobilization subsidies and other benefits to ex-combatants;
- Provide transportation facilities for demobilized ex-combatants returning from cantonment sites to home bases;
- Coordinate pre-discharge orientation and counselling activities associated with reintegration programmes with the active support of national institutions and international agencies.

SECTION

4

**PROCEDURES FOR DISARMAMENT AND
WEAPONS MANAGEMENT**

I. PRE-ASSEMBLY STEPS

74. Before the assembly process gets under way, the following steps should be initiated:

- A United Nations-mandated arms embargo should be in effect and a United Nations or regional peacekeeping operation, possibly with border monitors, and sea interdiction and over-flight capability, should be deployed;
- Permanent ceasefire should take effect, in accordance with the timetable in the peace agreement;
- Organizational mechanism for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be established and policymaking bodies and working groups dealing with the various aspects of the peace process should be constituted, with the participation of all relevant actors;
- Guiding principles and procedures should be prepared to define the scope of work and responsibilities of the policymaking bodies, including a requirement to report on progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process;
- Joint commissions to oversee the peace implementation process should be established;
- United Nations or regional peace operation should be in place to monitor compliance with all military aspects of the agreement, including the disarmament obligations;
- International civilian police to monitor public security forces should be deployed;
- Agreed rules for carrying weapons in public should be published;
- Cooperative measures with neighbouring States and arms suppliers regarding weapons management should begin;

- Separation of forces should be initiated, under United Nations supervision, as well as withdrawal of any foreign forces and their weapons;
- Concentration of the forces of each party should begin;
- Information programmes to accompany the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should begin;
- As part of initial confidence building, United Nations military observers should establish working contact with local commanders and their formed units that have to be demobilized; and
- Preparation of assembly sites should begin.

II. ASSEMBLY AND DISARMAMENT

75. In a phased process, and in accordance with the agreed timetable, an initial screening of each force to be disarmed and demobilized under United Nations monitoring should take place. Disarmament includes:

- Surrender of weapons and ammunition;
- Registration and disposal of weapons and ammunition;
- Immediate destruction of armaments *in situ*;
- Safe and secure interim storage of weapons and armaments pending destruction or transfer to the unified national defence force, in accordance with specified conditions to be in place at the termination of the United Nations peace mission;
- Transfer of registration data from United Nations monitors to the data management unit of relevant assembly (for opposition forces) or discharge centre (for government forces); and
- Transportation of ex-combatants from opposition forces to encampment areas and transfer of former government forces or civil defence militias to discharge centres near places of residence.

76. In accordance with the demobilization procedures, all groups subject to the formal demobilization process will be required to assemble at designated sites — assembly areas — en route to locations where the formal demobilization and discharge processes will take place.
77. To ensure that disarmament takes place as early as possible in the peace implementation process, every effort should be made to plan for the disarmament of all ex-combatants to take place immediately upon their arrival at the designated assembly areas. Planning should proceed on the basis of phased arrivals, with lesser numbers initially followed by a gradual increase.
78. Planners must be aware, however, that if ex-combatants are tired of fighting and are looking for a viable alternative and they see a manifestly fair, well-implemented programme with adequate security, there may be a sudden, drastic increase in the numbers arriving at the assembly areas. This may happen despite carefully negotiated timetables for phased arrivals. In order to take full advantage of this momentum, planning must attempt to build in as much excess capacity as possible at the assembly areas.
79. At the other extreme is the very real possibility that some forces will be held back until the very last stages of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Planners must be prepared for a quick resurrection of the disarmament phase if this happens, even though the bulk of the ex-combatants will be in the later stages of the demobilization and reintegration process.
80. To avoid situations where the bulk of the forces of one party are disarmed while those of another party are not, planning should strive for parallel processes with roughly proportional disarmament occurring of the various opposing forces.
81. A realistic timetable for disarmament should be established that takes account of the time needed to build confidence and allows for delays in completion of the disarmament process.

82. Techniques for physical disarmament may vary, depending on the strength of combatants to be disarmed at a particular time and the type of weapons, either small arms or heavy weapons, to be collected. Ideally, the combatants are regrouped and conveyed to the cantonment sites with their weapons and ammunitions. If the sites are not too distant from their bases, they may walk. At the disarmament office/tent/table, the combatants surrender their weapons and ammunition. Procedures for collection and registration of proscribed categories of weapons, ammunition and ancillary equipment should provide for the following:

- Surrender of all proscribed weapons, ammunition and related materials in the possession or under the control of each ex-combatant or related units or sub-units immediately upon their arrival at the assembly area;
- Registration of each weapon; and
- A record kept of all available information relevant to its proper identification and immediate disposal, including the following:
 - Type of weapon and related equipment, including quantity and type of ammunition;
 - Serial number of weapon(s);
 - Serviceability of weapon(s), including any modifications;
 - Site where handed in;
 - Handed in by whom (name, rank, unit and military ID # or equivalent);
 - Handed in to whom (representative of the international or regional force responsible for the security of the weapons);
 - Verified by whom (signature and identification number of international monitors and monitors of each of the parties); and
 - Weapon history if known, including manufacturer, details of export and import, details regarding its issuance to the ex-combatant in question.

- A prototype of a disarmament form is attached as Annex B1.
83. In the experience of the United Nations, the types of small arms and light weapons mostly used in civil conflicts can be categorized as follows:
- Small arms, such as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, light machine-guns;
 - Light weapons, such as heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm;
 - Ammunition and explosives, such as cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades.
84. For crew-operated (section/platoon) weapons, such as heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft, guided weapons and heavy mortars, etc., two to five men may be considered disarmed.
85. Any entrant who is unable to surrender any weapon or ammunition and is unable to prove combatant status should not be accepted for demobilization and reintegration.
86. Eligibility requirements for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should be child-conscious. Most formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are conceived as opportunities to disarm individual soldiers in factions (one man/one gun). Yet, disarmament procedures that require weapons to be surrendered as a criterion for eligibility have often excluded children, especially girls. Child soldiers must be eligible to enter the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process irrespective of whether they present themselves at the assembly points with weapons or not.
87. As a general rule, military-style weapons, both heavy and light, should be confined to authorized military and, in some cases, public security forces. Disarmament procedures are, therefore, required

for all those in possession of these weapons. Whether or not to cover non-military-style firearms in the disarmament process will depend on a number of factors, including:

- Degree to which of the country has become saturated with arms, especially in comparison with the pre-conflict situation;
- Who is holding these weapons — criminal bands, minority groups, citizens in general;
- Danger posed by the numbers of arms being held to public security in general and/or to specified groups, such as demobilized opposition forces;
- Public attitudes towards the level of arms being held and relevant local custom and culture; and
- Degree to which public security can be reasonably assured and can be perceived to be assured.

88. As a general rule, hunting rifles and traditional weapons, such as spears and machetes, will not be included in the disarmament process. However, this approach may need to be reconsidered in circumstances where these types of weapons constitute a substantial threat to members of the general public or identifiable sub-groups.

89. Upon completion of the registration, the fighters are pronounced disarmed. Now they are officially considered ex-combatants and receive a personalized disarmament note/card, which they take to the office/tent in charge of demobilization. Disarmament may be effected in barracks or in the camps where the combatants live, train or work. This may be more convenient for the disarming of well organized and disciplined armed groups. Ex-combatants disarmed in military installations can also be demobilized from these locations.

90. It is important to keep exact records on the strength of disarmed personnel. Exact figures are required for three principal reasons:

- Assessment for appropriate logistical support during cantonment;

- Assessment for adequate funds required to effect severance payments and other reintegration benefits;
- Reconciliation with officially declared figures to ascertain the completeness of the disarmament programme.

III. TARGET GROUPS FOR DISARMAMENT

91. Potential targets for disarmament include government forces, opposition forces, civil defence forces, irregular armed groups and armed individuals. Further, foreign forces and their weapons need to be escorted out of the country. Foreign irregulars to be escorted out of the country by international monitors should be subject to the same disarmament requirements as nationals bearing arms.
92. Planners should not hesitate to consider if it is feasible for the parties themselves to participate in the collection and destruction of weapons in the assembly areas, bearing in mind the technical and safety requirements of the process. The visible participation in the disarmament process of known and trusted officers of the force being disarmed can be a powerful contribution to the credibility of the process.
93. Public participation in the implementation of weapons collection programmes targeting groups outside the formal disarmament and demobilization process may significantly enhance their effectiveness. Such participation will also help build a solid foundation for further national efforts, after the international peace mission has withdrawn. However, the desirability of the parties being responsible for as much of the implementation process as possible must be balanced against their ability and willingness to carry out particularly sensitive aspects of the process. Past experience demonstrates that, even with independent monitoring, serious problems may arise if the planning has proceeded on the basis that the parties themselves have the sole responsibility for the security of their respective forces in the assembly areas.

IV. *INCOMPLETE DISARMAMENT*

94. Experience has shown that formal disarmament conducted by peacekeeping missions of either the United Nations or regional organizations does not lead to the complete elimination or collection of proscribed weapons. Even with post-demobilization verification conducted by peacekeeping missions, large quantities of weapons remain either in hidden storage sites, arms caches or in unauthorized private hands. Arms often remain unreported because the parties are not entirely confident in the peace process and hold back some of their best weapons for a possible renewal of hostilities.
95. Resurgence or increase in banditry, violence and other forms of criminal activities in post-conflict areas can be partly attributed to the ready availability of these weapons. In order to help reduce these criminal acts and consolidate peace and stability, necessary for the promotion of sustainable development, it is imperative that mechanisms to collect these weapons are evolved and implemented after the peacekeeping operations have withdrawn. At the conclusion of disarmament, a law against the illegal possession of arms should be promulgated.

**V. *MANAGEMENT OF WEAPONS COLLECTED IN
DISARMAMENT PROCESS***

96. Improper management of weapons collected through the disarmament processes can create security risks similar to those caused by incomplete disarmament. If armouries and other arms storage facilities are not fully secure and well protected, the collected arms can easily be stolen. Rearmament of ex-combatants, increase of violence and crime and the export to other conflict areas might be the consequences.
97. Security of storage sites for arms, ammunition, explosives and all military hardware used for combat should always be a top priority. Decisions on the control of keys to storage facilities should be made

keeping in mind the political and military situation prevailing in the country.

98. Public security forces have too often proven unable or unwilling to provide even minimum security for the general public and/or specific sub-groups such as disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants of opposition forces trying to reintegrate into the community. Planning for disarmament must therefore seriously consider the need for an armed military force, international or regional, with responsibility for the security of collected weapons, the assembly areas and the ex-combatants from their arrival until their final discharge at the end of the demobilization process.
99. Consideration should be given to providing international police monitors with certain executive policing powers, which may necessitate that they be armed. In extremely hostile public security environments, planners may have to consider provision of armed military back-up of the police monitors in the exercise of their executive policing functions.
100. While a reasonable quantity of collected weapons may be reserved for use by the new, unified army or re-organized defence force and other state security bodies, determined effort should be made to destroy the rest, as soon as practicable. Details about the disposal and destruction of weapons should be explicitly stated in the peace accords.

VI. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEASURES FOR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

101. Effective weapons management, in the long term, will require a comprehensive national policy, in addition to periodic amnesties and other forms of weapons collection. The policy should include the following:
- Clear national legal framework for ownership and possession of permitted weapons and the prohibition of proscribed weapons;
 - Effective enforcement mechanisms;

- Impartial law enforcement and an independent judicial system;
 - Control of inter-State transfers through customs controls, such as export and import permits; and
 - Regional cooperation on weapons management, including the introduction of a moratorium on the transfer of specified categories of weapons in conjunction with, or upon the expiry of, a United Nations-mandated arms embargo.
102. Given the training requirements and the cost of such measures, during the planning process for disarmament every effort should be made to alert potential donors of the need for assistance. The funding should not only cover immediate disarmament needs but should also support effective weapons management over the longer term, as it is essential to sustain the peace process after the termination of the United Nations mission.

VII. PREVENTION OF ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING

103. Well-planned and executed national disarmament efforts will ultimately prove futile if no attention is paid to cross-border arms flows. Cutting off supply routes for illegal inflow of small arms, explosives and ammunitions should be part of all disarmament exercises as a failure to stem the flow of weapons into a still volatile area may fuel continued fighting and undermine all efforts to secure binding agreement to a peace pact. It is almost impossible, however, for a State, acting on its own, to control successfully the flow of small arms, light weapons, ammunitions and explosives into its territory. Individual action is inefficient for several reasons:
- Abundance of small arms and light weapons on the international and black markets at affordable prices;
 - Contiguity and porosity of borders allows for smuggling of small arms, small weapons and ammunitions across State lines; and
 - Extensive shorelines or borders over difficult terrain and the prohibitive cost of maintaining comprehensive surveillance.

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104. Collective regional and sub-regional security mechanisms with appropriate protocols on non-aggression and control of the flow of weapons, particularly small arms, should be involved in the process of comprehensive disarmament. Strong political will and commitment of all involved Governments is necessary if the mechanisms are to be effective.
105. The importance of the arms transfer dimension is exemplified by the fact that one of the first actions of the Security Council in dealing with a conflict situation is often the authorization of an arms embargo prohibiting transfers of weapons into the conflict area.
106. In addition, during the negotiation process, every effort is usually made to secure the formal commitment of neighbouring countries and key arms suppliers not to transfer arms into the conflict area, and to actively enforce the embargo in their respective territories. In furtherance of both mandated and cooperative measures to control arms transfers, border monitors may be deployed and overflights and sea interdiction undertaken. Regional organizations may also be tasked with specific enforcement responsibilities.
107. While these measures demonstrate recognition by the international community of the importance of stemming the tide of weapons into the conflict area, the level of effective enforcement varies significantly from one case to another. In most instances, it is almost completely ineffective. Recognizing the significant difficulties inherent in such enforcement, particularly in the case of long land borders over difficult terrain, the goal must still be to achieve the maximum level of enforcement possible in the circumstances. In recommending to the Security Council the type of enforcement to be authorized, serious consideration must be given to the type of sanctions that could be levied against transgressing countries, particularly their senior officials.
108. In addition, the following measures might be recommended to the United Nations Security Council in order to strengthen enforcement:
- Ensure that the scope of the sanctions and the obligations on targeted government and non-State actors are clear;

- Urge countries to incorporate the embargo into their national laws so that non-State actors can be held accountable for sanctions-busting;
 - Establish a database, specific guidelines and standardized reporting procedures to enable the sanctions monitoring committee to monitor the embargo effectively;
 - Consider the deployment of observers at key airfields, ports and crossing points in countries under embargo, once violations are reported; and
 - Urge the international community to make available funds and expertise to enhance the customs inspection capabilities in countries neighbouring an embargoed State, and for sanctions enforcement by regional organizations willing to undertake such activities but lacking adequate means.
109. The concept of a regional/sub-regional collaborative effort to prevent the flow of small arms demands the political attention of regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the established sub-regional bodies dealing with the problems of weapons proliferation.

VIII. WEAPONS DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

110. Once the weapons have been collected, two options for their disposal are available:
- Interim secure storage in the sole control of the international or regional peacekeeping force pending destruction; or
 - Immediate destruction on site by an explosive ordnance unit, which could be a unit of the international or regional peace force or of the party whose forces are being disarmed.
111. If weapons collected in the disarmament process are to be stored, they should be placed under the sole control of the international or regional force responsible for the security of the weapons, rather than under a dual-key arrangement. During the planning stages,

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- procedures need to be established that define the specific conditions under which the stored weapons are to be turned over to the control of the unified national defence force. These procedures should include a final approval mechanism by the supervisory and oversight commission.
112. Given the importance and potential sensitivity of the data collected, the collection procedures should give United Nations military observers overall control of the disarmament data collected at the assembly sites. Given the volume of data that will be collected, in relation to both the disarmament and the demobilization processes, a data management system will be required. If this is not available at assembly areas, there should be simple, clear procedures for ensuring that the completed registration forms are transferred, as soon as possible, to the respective data management units in each of the assembly areas or discharge centres.
113. Every effort should be made to plan for destruction *in situ* at the assembly areas. This approach avoids the problems that may arise regarding the safe and secure transportation and storage of large quantities of small arms and light weapons. A profusion of destruction techniques exist, ranging from cheap and simple — perhaps, less reliable and environmentally friendly — to advanced, very reliable and very costly methods. An evaluation of many of these methods and the expertise needed to apply them are discussed in the *Guide to Weapons Destruction Methodologies* that is attached as Annex C to this document.
114. Taking into account the relative merits of each of the techniques described in the *Guide*, the most appropriate destruction technique for the circumstances in question should be identified, keeping in mind such factors as:
- Numbers and types of weapons and ammunition involved;
 - Degree of urgency of the disarmament/destruction process;
 - Level of reliability of the destruction technique under consideration;

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- Environmental impact of the destruction technique under consideration;
 - Type, availability and cost of the equipment required for the destruction technique;
 - Level and availability of the requisite destruction expertise;
 - Political, psychological and publicity factors, and
 - Associated costs and funds available.
115. Using cost-benefit analysis to determine the best destruction procedure is difficult and sometimes unreliable, even if one can account for all the variables, as the direct cost might not always reveal the final expenses of a particular mode of destruction. Indirect costs, including, for example, the cost of weapons buy-back incentives; can be significant. Moreover, it is difficult to weigh the costs of destruction against the political and psychological benefits that may accrue from destruction.
116. Weapons destruction in a public ceremony has been noted to have a powerful psychological effect on populations. Bonfires, which have been used successfully on a number of occasions, are both a cheap method of disposal and a political and sociological statement on the commitment to reducing violence and increasing public security.
117. A peacekeeping mission that has a disarmament mandate must include an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit. These military specialists will have the skills necessary for efficient and safe destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives and will need to be provided with appropriate equipment. EOD teams should also have the capacity to train and supervise other non-specialists for simple destruction tasks.

SECTION

5

**VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND MOP-UP
ACTIVITIES**

**I. MONITORING AND POST-DISARMAMENT
VERIFICATION**

118. If the peace agreement provides for the United Nations peacekeeping operation to have a monitoring role for the disarmament and demobilization phase, this will usually be exercised through chairmanship of some of the key monitoring bodies. These would include the supervisory and monitoring commission, and most of its main sub-commissions and committees.
119. General procedures for the monitoring and post-disarmament verification should be developed by the United Nations interagency planning committee during the initial, mission-planning phase. These procedures would then be submitted to the ceasefire monitoring committee.
120. A duly authorized representative of each of the parties should have the right to be present and to oversee physically each part of the weapons collection and disposal process. Through this representative, each party should be required to establish a reporting mechanism that keeps the relevant oversight committee or commission fully informed.
121. The independent monitoring of compliance with the peace agreement is a vital part of its monitoring function of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. United Nations military observers should monitor the disarmament process in the assembly areas and public collection sites, while its civilian police monitors should monitor the role of the public security forces in providing adequate public security for discharged ex-combatants and the general public. The military observers play a vital role in building confidence among the ex-combatants during the disarmament process. They do this by their presence, their neutrality and their efforts to ensure that the ex-combatants fully understand their rights and obligations throughout the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

122. Both during and after the formal disarmament process, it is necessary to verify that the disarmament provisions of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan have largely been met. Verification procedures include the following:
- Data cross-checking and reconciliation and follow-up by United Nations monitors, accompanied by party monitors, on information regarding non-surrendered weapons;
 - Reporting to ceasefire monitoring commission on non-compliance with disarmament obligations; and
 - Supplementary actions by United Nations military or regional force, if necessary, including search for weapons caches, seizure and destruction/storage.
123. Procedures for data cross-checking and reconciliation would involve a comparison of the numbers of serviceable weapons actually collected with estimates of weapons held by each force, based on information from all sources. Where there are large discrepancies, a follow-up investigation of known weapons caches and stockpiles should be conducted by post-demobilization verification teams, with a view to seizing the weapons. Information should also be sought from the parties and other independent sources, including local authorities, on the possible location of further caches and stockpiles.
124. These procedures should be as transparent as possible and should generally provide for the participation of the duly authorized monitors of each of the parties. They should be incorporated into the standard operating procedures for the peacekeeping mission and should be made known to the parties.
125. In order to build confidence in the disarmament process, the procedures must allow for flexibility and discretion in the timing of searches for weapons caches. Initially, every effort should be made to encourage the parties to bring these weapons in themselves. At the same time, the procedures must make clear that non-cooperation will result in search and seizure of the weapons. To maintain the credibility and integrity of the disarmament process, it

is essential that the procedures specifically provide for searches and seizures of undeclared weapons caches, once they are known to exist.

126. If there is resistance from any party or faction to the seizure of the weapons, the situation can become very difficult. As a general rule, disarmament should only proceed with the cooperation of all the parties. The procedures should provide for persistent and serious refusals to cooperate to be referred to the joint body charged with such matters, generally the ceasefire monitoring committee, first, and then to the supervisory and monitoring commission.
127. If the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan were to contain disincentives for non-compliance with the disarmament provisions — such as temporary disqualification from pre-election campaign financing for the party that is breaching the agreement — it may convince the parties to comply. Although such disincentives may be hard to negotiate into the plan, every effort should be made to explore how they could be included. Major donors, international development organizations and international financial institutions could be asked to assist in this effort. The views of local authority figures and civil society representatives should also be canvassed as to how the parties could be made to respect their disarmament obligations.
128. Even where the parties themselves may be committed to the peace process, experience has demonstrated that there may be situations where the entire disarmament process may be jeopardized by the non-cooperation of a small number of military units operating outside the control of any of the parties. In such situations, forcible disarmament may be the only reasonable course and it is essential, therefore, that the planning process include specific procedures to this end. In short, it must be made absolutely clear to the parties in the negotiating process that a serious disarmament plan must include a coercive element, albeit to be used only in very specific circumstances.
129. Voluntary disarmament will be conducted during a period of amnesty. It is only when the amnesty period has expired that

coercive measures should be used. This, in turn, will affect the level of robustness, in terms of training and equipment, of the military force to be deployed to verify the disarmament process. It is imperative that standard operating procedures are well understood and uniformly applied by all the different national contingents or sub-units of the international or regional force, when and if coercive disarmament is undertaken.

130. In a militarized environment with many irregulars and other individuals in possession of weapons, it will be necessary to institute uniform rules for the bearing of arms in public. These rules should take effect upon the deployment of the international peacekeeping mission. Every effort should be made to secure agreement among the parties to these rules as an essential part of the overall disarmament plan. Optimally, the enforcement of these rules will be by the public security forces, which will be monitored by international police monitors. However, as discussed earlier, there may be a requirement for their enforcement by the United Nations mission in accordance with agreed procedures, developed for this purpose.

II. GUN BUY-BACK SCHEMES AND WEAPONS-FOR-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

131. When disarmament is incomplete, several incentive programmes can be used to mop up weapons not surrendered or hidden away. These programmes include “turn-in”, “buy-back”, “swap” or weapons-for-development programmes, where weapons can be traded in for cash, or swapped for food, housing and construction material, among other things. These programmes may be effective if they do not themselves create a market for arms. The concept of buying back weapons from ex-combatants has been criticized by some donors as a scheme that rewards irresponsible armed personnel who may have done much harm to society and innocent civilians. If the warring parties are preserving a military option — in case the peace agreement fails — an exchange of cash for arms may

- achieve little more than to provide cash for purchasing new weapons by turning in old ones.
132. Therefore, weapons-for-development programmes, where the payment is made by way of job training and other vocational support, are the most desirable. These programmes also contribute to economic development, which is so desperately needed to consolidate peace in post-conflict societies.
133. Measures for voluntary disarmament outside the formal demobilization process also require careful planning, which should be based on the technical parameters (numbers and types of weapons); the security situation; the socio-economic circumstances; and cultural and historical factors. Community inputs are absolutely essential throughout the planning process, with the aim of identifying the most suitable programme and then ensuring broad public support for it. Close liaison with the humanitarian community should also be maintained for the same reasons.
134. While every situation will be unique, extensive analysis of successful buy-back schemes and weapons-for-development programmes suggests close consideration of the generic best practices mentioned below:
135. **Timing** Disarmament of former combatants and disarmament incentive programmes for civilians should not be carried out simultaneously. If soldiers see that civilians are being compensated to hand over their weapons, they, too, may demand payment for disarming. Civilian gun buy-back schemes or weapons-for-development programmes undertaken by the government should, therefore, only be implemented once the disarmament of combatants has been completed.
136. **Duration** It is important that the programme be of a relatively short duration with a specific end-date to reduce the opportunity for weapons to be smuggled into the country for the purpose of being turned in for the buy-back cash.

137. **Essential Preconditions** For arms buy-back schemes and weapons-for-development programmes to be meaningful and true incentives, the gun's value as security and its relevance to the owner's economic prospects will have to be reduced. In the aftermath of a conflict, the establishment of a reasonably secure environment, together with humanitarian efforts to address immediate basic needs, will be necessary pre-conditions for the weapons-buy-back schemes and weapons-for-development programmes to have any draw. Some attention to cross-border arms traffic will also be essential. The executing agency should also enjoy the full support of the Government and the security apparatus, which includes the military and the police.
138. **Specific Incentives** In exchange for his weapon, the owner should be given practical development assistance, such as job training, food or housing support, education. These are preferable to cash or commodities that could easily be converted to cash. However, if a buy-back scheme with a cash incentive is chosen, prices for each returned weapon and for ammunition should generally be just above black market value and slightly below their commercial value. Price scales should be developed for each category of weapons and ammunition, with values depending on the condition of the weapons or ammunition. Incentives should also be considered for grouped turn-ins, which helps create peer pressure for the collective return of weapons.
139. Another powerful incentive can be the publicized intention to complement the voluntary disarmament programme with a follow-up weapons search-and-seizure programme that would include confiscation of weapons and stiff penalties for holders. Such an approach, however, requires the appropriate legal basis — generally national legislation — and the capacity to implement and monitor such non-voluntary measures fairly and effectively. It may be particularly problematic in circumstances, when public security forces are unable or unwilling to enforce these measures against armed irregulars or quasi-military groups.

140. **Location of sites** Accessible, well-protected weapons collection sites should be established in rural as well as urban areas in an effort to reach as much of the armed public as possible.
141. **Clear turn-in procedures** should be established based on a no-questions-asked policy conducted with absolute impartiality. The identity of informants and individuals surrendering weapons should be safeguarded. Turn-in procedures could include the requirement for the owner of each returned small arm or light weapon to fire ten rounds of ammunition to show that it was still serviceable. This would also help use up ammunition. Local groups should be involved in the collection process to the maximum extent possible.
142. **Monitoring** From the outset, independent monitoring and verification procedures and mechanisms should be in place.
143. **Public Information Plan** Accurate and timely information to the target groups and the general public on the objectives of the buy-back schemes and weapons-for-development programmes is critical for success and should be given due priority in the planning process. Provision should also be made for the ongoing promotion of the programme during the implementation phase, with the aim of building confidence in the process and creating peer and public pressure to participate in it.
144. **Weapons Disposal** Weapons should be destroyed on the spot or quickly removed by secure transport to a heavily protected weapons storage area.
145. **Public Ceremony** Experience has demonstrated the importance of holding a public ceremony at the termination of the weapons exchange programmes and/or at the termination of the overall disarmament collection and destruction programme. Such ceremonies could involve destruction of the remaining weapons collected and/or the creation of a public monument from parts of the weapons destroyed. Given their symbolic power in helping the public develop confidence in the peace consolidation process, provision for such ceremonies should be included in the design of the disarmament programme.

SECTION

6

**PROCEDURES FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION**

146. Demobilization begins where disarmament ends. After years of active duty as regular soldiers, freedom fighters, guerrillas or rebels, the ex-combatants go through an orientation phase that will guide them into a new life as civilian and unarmed members of society.

I. DOCUMENTATION

147. On presentation of an ex-combatants disarmament note/card to the official in charge of demobilization, the discharging process commences. In the course of this exercise, the personal and military details of each individual should be recorded to facilitate demobilization and the social and economic resettlement of the ex-combatants.

Personal Data would include the following:

- Name;
- Date of Birth;
- Sex;
- Marital Status;
- Immediate family, such as spouse, children, next of kin;
- Home Address;
- Educational background;
- Pre-service occupation;
- Newly acquired skills/vocation;
- Resettlement plans;
- Physical disabilities/health problems.

Military Data would include the following items:

- Rank;
- Regimental Number;
- Regiment/movement of service;
- Date and place of recruitment;
- Date of demobilization/discharge;
- Reasons for demobilization/discharge;
- Conduct on demobilization/discharge.

Other details may be included to suit specific environments or situations. (For sample screening questionnaire, see Annex B1).

148. The participation in the comprehensive pre-discharge orientation programme should be certified in an additional document.
149. Before departing the cantonment site, the ex-combatant receives a demobilization certificate/discharge book. This document is to be presented whenever the ex-combatant requests benefits during the reintegration process.
150. Ex-combatants have to surrender their military clothing and all other equipment of military nature before leaving the site.
151. As part of the registration, the ex-combatants declare their acceptance of participation in an orientation programme on demobilization and reintegration as well as to the terms of benefits. By signing or thumb-printing a declaration form (for sample form, see Annex B2), the ex-combatants commit themselves to refrain from any future military activity. Violations of the declaration constitute a criminal offence and will be prosecuted. Therefore, it is important that the terms of acceptance are fully explained to the ex-combatant and that each document is verified and endorsed by the implementing authority.

II. ORIENTATION, BRIEFING AND COUNSELLING

152. Ex-combatants come from a range of political, social and economic backgrounds, and therefore, have varying perceptions, expectations and problems in regard to their future life. Reorientation programmes with briefings, counselling and training should take these different personal situations into account and offer assistance for a return to civilian life. It is also important that the marketable skills to be acquired by ex-combatants be as relevant as possible to the labour environment in which they live.
153. Teams of professionals, experts and agencies should be invited to the cantonment sites to address ex-combatants and their spouses on the following issues:
- (a) **Accommodation** Finding shelter is one of the major difficulties that ex-combatants have to face on discharge from active duty. When possible, ex-combatants should resettle in family homes after leaving the cantonment site. Additionally, information on rental accommodation should be provided.
 - (b) **Education and Training** Education officials should be invited to address ex-combatants on educational and training issues. Ex-combatants should be given assistance in securing admission into schools for their children or themselves.
 - (c) **Economic Activities** Only a small number of ex-combatants have skills outside their military experience that allow them to earn a livelihood in civilian life. Many need training prior to seeking employment in small-scale businesses, commerce, trade or technical and mechanical workshops. Representatives from labour and employment offices, financial institutions, commerce and industry should brief ex-combatants on employment opportunities; income generating activities; investment, finance and economic related issues; practical assistance (account management, provisions for pension, etc.).
 - (d) **Medical and Health** Medical and health officials should talk about health care issues, including AIDS awareness; effects of drugs on the body and on society; family planning and

immunization; medical and health benefits for ex-combatants and families; prevention of diseases endemic in the area; and sanitation.

- (e) **Psychological Assistance** Psychological barriers should be broken down before the ex-combatant goes back to civil life. Psychologists should be invited to the cantonment areas to address topics such as overcoming stress resulting from war; building confidence and developing a sense of security in civil life; conquering fear of transition and change from a protective military system to an exposed civilian life; dealing with serious atrocities committed in the course of duty; returning to a hostile civilian environment that has suffered acts of harassment and intimidation inflicted by ex-combatants abusing their power; and adjusting to the loss of privileges held by virtue of rank and appointment. If needed, counselling and psychotherapy should be continued for as long as necessary after the ex-combatants have returned to their home communities.
- (f) **Legal and Civic Matters** Legal and municipal/district council officials should brief ex-combatants on their civic rights and responsibilities, such as the national constitution and respect for it; civil rights and duties (with special regard to gender issues); electoral rights and general civic awareness; financial obligations (paying taxes, rents, utilities etc.); sanitation; and environmental protection.
- (g) **Miscellaneous** Women's groups, welfare societies, institutions from civil society and other consultants may be invited, as appropriate, to brief and guide the ex-combatants on their new role as responsible members of civil society.

III. SUBSIDIES AND BENEFITS

154. In most demobilization and reintegration experiences, ex-combatants are given some form of material and financial assistance before leaving the cantonment sites. The principal objective of these aid packages is to assist the ex-combatants in their initial transition from a military to a civilian environment.

155. As the political, social and economic environment differs from country to country, even region to region, there cannot be a blueprint for the contents of an ideal aid package supporting the resettlement of ex-combatants. All resettlement efforts should include provisions for an aid package designed to assist the ex-combatants in starting their civilian life. The content of this package should be directly related to the immediate, day-to-day needs of the demobilized ex-combatants such as food, clothing, shelter, tools, transportation and education.
156. Benefits and subsidies for ex-combatants should meet their specific needs without engendering resentment on the part of their communities and society in general. This is particularly important for child soldiers. If benefits create the perception that former child soldiers are getting privileged treatment, they may unwittingly entice large numbers of children to re-enter the conflict should hostilities resume.
157. Demobilization subsidies and benefits, particularly those for children, must be of a long-term, sustained nature, ideally with a minimum three-year commitment, rather than an immediate reward.

IV. SENSITIZATION

158. Ex-combatants returning to their communities are not always welcomed by the people. This attitude has to be reversed to allow veterans to live peacefully within their communities and society.
159. When undertaking reintegration programmes, the implementing agencies should aim at winning the hearts and minds of the people. It is only by way of building confidence in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process that durable support for the resettlement of ex-combatants can be won. Understanding and appreciating the rationale behind reintegration programmes helps to generate public support. Reconciliation between ex-combatants and the civil society should be vigorously pursued through intensive information drives and sound public relations campaigns among both the rural and the urban population.

160. Existing positive publicity about the peace process and public support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be intensified, especially in situations where the public is not sympathetic towards the veterans. Various organizations, such as women and youth groups, the media and churches, should be encouraged to participate in these efforts. In the past, cartoons and newspapers printed in tribal dialects have proven to be effective.
161. Community elders, tribal chiefs and established institutions play key roles in their communities and can be the focal point of successful reconciliation. They should be involved in all phases of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to ensure the successful and durable social reintegration of ex-combatants.

V. *ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION*

162. Economic reintegration is a complex economic and psycho-social process that involves families as well as the community. Unless adjustments are made in the individual households and in the community to integrate the returnees, former combatants may return to their communities but never fully adapt to a civilian way of life.
163. Severance pay and reintegration subsidies are designed to facilitate the immediate resettlement following discharge from active service and are not to satisfy long-term needs of the ex-combatants. After having fully settled down in their permanent homes, the veterans must find employment to support themselves and their families. Since most of these ex-combatants may have known no life other than fighting, it becomes extremely important that the vacuum which disarmament automatically creates in the means of survival is filled through the reintegration programme. Failure to reintegrate the former soldier could result in a return to combat.
164. Reintegrated former child soldiers must be able to contribute to the social and economic life of the family. Programmes must anticipate the increased impoverishment of these children's families in the aftermath of the conflict and acknowledge the linkage between education, employment opportunities, and the economic security of

the children's families as factors that determine successful social reintegration and help prevent re-recruitment or delinquency.

165. Ex-combatants who served in service support units, such as communications, supply and transport, engineers and ordnance, already possess skills for civilian employment. The majority of the ex-combatants, however, served in positions that provided them with only combat skills. They often lack qualifications for civilian professions. It requires capital-intensive training programmes to provide ex-combatants with marketable skills for employment in civilian life. Countries that have demobilized their fighters after prolonged periods of civil war are usually incapable of financing these programmes. The United Nations, donors from the international community, humanitarian non-governmental organizations as well as to bilateral and multilateral agencies may be approached for assistance grants and loans. The support requested for the training programmes may include not only the funding but also the provision of training teams and training facilities.
166. Planning for economic programmes in the long-term reintegration phase should cover the following aspects in some detail:

(a) **Organization**

- Identification of suitable projects: group projects enhance reconciliation while community-based projects provide employment and, consequently, improvement in the quality of life for the community dwellers;
- Early identification of the agency that is to plan and implement reintegration support schemes;
- Development of supervisory and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that inputs are utilized efficiently and wastage is avoided; and
- Identification of a coordinating body for all humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in various assistance programmes.

(b) **Training Infrastructure**

- Assessment of the aptitude of each ex-combatant: knowledge of the level of education and types of skills each has will help to determine potential areas of training;
- Compilation of data on vocational and artisan training facilities and their locations. Since these training facilities will not be available in all the communities of resettlement, alternative programmes should be devised;
- Identification of workshops and industries, both public and private, on-the-job training/apprenticeships, especially for mechanical, technical, electrical and plumbing skills;
- Identification of agencies that can organize and provide training.
- For effective follow-up action, States should be encouraged to reflect in their economic programmes the long-term integration of combatants, and secure domestic resources for such activities supplemented by external support.

(c) **Vocational Training**

- In the prevailing tight labour market/environment, provision of training should be aimed at enhancing the self-employment capacity of the ex-combatants;
- Development of skills should be related to the social and economic environment of the country and the people;
- Vocational training that groups villages and communities together promotes reconciliation and should be encouraged; and
- Training should include the following general skills and vocational fields: management and administration; micro-business; record and book-keeping, including accounting and loans management; plumbing; masonry; electrical; automobile mechanics; driving; carpentry; dress-making; agricultural (including animal traction to support agricultural production); and small-

scale cottage industries, e.g. soap-making, cooking, oil extraction.

- Traditional apprenticeship models (where the trainee is taken in as part of the master craftsman's family) should be promoted, in particular for the training of former child soldiers.
- Group and community-based programmes are particularly successful in bringing about social reintegration and durable reconciliation and should be encouraged.

(d) **Funding** Governments and implementing authorities, such as the United Nations, should ensure that sufficient funds for reintegration training programmes are available early enough to avoid delays in implementing the programmes.

VI. ADDITIONAL ISSUES CRITICAL TO SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION

167. **Credit Schemes** Ex-combatants usually do not have a strong capital base to start businesses. Due to high interest rates, they are unable to secure loans from commercial banking houses and lending institutions. Credit scheme mechanisms should be instituted to facilitate ready access to loans to help promote individual income generating activities.

168. Ex-combatants forming cooperatives to undertake group projects augment the spirit of reconciliation and should be encouraged. These projects should be supported by a funding mechanism. As much as possible and with adequate international support, reintegration projects should be dispersed to cover as many geographical sectors of the country as possible, and not to be concentrated in a few selected areas.

169. **Community Benefit** To make reintegration programmes more appealing to civil society, projects undertaken to alleviate poverty, to provide employment and economic livelihood for veterans should also be open to civilian members of the community.

170. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercises should be integrated into the framework of general rehabilitation programmes that provide assistance, protection and opportunities for development. In this context, special attention should be given to internally displaced persons and returning refugees as they are major sufferers of civil conflicts and often constitute a sizable portion of the afflicted society.

171. **Land** The single most attractive option for economic survival in rural areas, where most demobilized ex-combatants resettle, is the cultivation of land for agricultural purposes. In some cultures, however, the acquisition of land is a difficult undertaking. In situations where land is a vital factor in the economic reintegration process, governments should assist ex-combatants in its acquisition. Community elders and chiefs are the custodians of land in the rural areas. They should be integrated into the sensitization programmes to promote the reintegration process and to make land accessible to ex-combatants.

172. **Landmines** and unexploded bombs cause serious problems in most countries that have suffered from prolonged periods of armed hostilities. Apart from their fatal impact, mines impose restriction on the movement of people from going to their farms to grow food, transport from moving on the roads to carry food from the rural areas to the urban centres and cattle from grazing and getting to water points to drink water. Information on dangers associated with landmines should be disseminated to the general public through schools, the media, lectures, community organized meetings, posters and other awareness-creating programmes.

173. Mine clearing is a capital intensive and hazardous exercise, but it has to be vigorously pursued to encourage farming by both ex-combatants and civilians. Clearing landmines from fields to facilitate agricultural activities should be considered a major component of reintegration programmes. Besides mine clearance and destruction, an integrated mine action programme should also include victim assistance and reintegration of mine victims into civil society. Appropriate technical and financial assistance from regional

and international bodies should be provided for this task. Peacekeeping missions should establish cells to plan and execute programmes on disarmament, demobilization and demining.

174. **Employment Opportunities** Ex-combatants that endure long periods of unemployment after demobilization become frustrated and pose a threat to state security. Providing them with marketable skills does not always solve the problem of unemployment. They will still have to compete with thousands of skilled civilians for the limited jobs available in the labour market.
175. In view of the potential dangers that frustrated, skilled, unemployed ex-combatants could pose to the society, Governments should endeavour to create jobs for veterans as their due share of the peace dividend. Development projects to reconstruct community services and public utilities, such as hospitals, schools and state buildings, roads, water pipes, electricity cables and telecommunication networks, could absorb a good number of ex-combatants. In addition to labour-intensive public works, income-generating activities in the environmental field, such as garbage collection and reforestation should be considered.
176. The establishment of security agencies, which can employ ex-combatants on security duties in guarding commercial premises, such as banks, embassies and private institutions, should be considered as one practical approach to overcome the unemployment of ex-combatants. National veteran associations should be involved in setting up such agencies.
177. Quick-impact projects should be planned in conjunction with development actors on the ground to ensure their sustainability in the long run.
178. Training programmes are often limited in reach and duration and are usually evaluated in terms of number of participants and duration of the courses. It would be helpful to also monitor and evaluate the success rate of job placement and investigate why some eligible candidates do not attend or complete the offered courses.

VII. DEMOBILIZATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS

179. Priority must be given in practice to child-soldier demobilization. Even when the principle of child demobilization is recognized at the policy level and within the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, experience has been that concrete implementation of child-conscious demobilizations plans often lags behind or is forgotten entirely. This can lead to up to 18 months of delay in the release of children from the armed forces.
180. Children who escape or are released from any armed forces or groups, or are detained, captured or wounded during ongoing hostilities have special needs that must be addressed. UNICEF and other agencies should ensure that the programmes in place for these children take into account the fact that the war is ongoing and the children's security remains at risk. Consideration should be given to dispersing the children or transferring them from the zones under the control of their former commanders to avoid re-recruitment or reprisals. Experience demonstrates that opportunities to demobilize children during conflicts do arise or can be negotiated.
181. Demobilization of child soldiers should not be merely the formal exercise of surrendering a weapon to obtain a benefits package but rather a process intended to ensure the physical and psycho-social recovery and social reintegration of children affected by armed conflict. The demobilization process should respect the human dignity of the child and the need for confidentiality. There is a need to ensure that adequate time and appropriately trained personnel are provided to impart a sense of security to the children and facilitate the sharing of information and concerns. When appropriate and possible, the staff dealing with the children should be locals.
182. Children must be consulted at all stages of the demobilization and reintegration process and strategies and programmes need to reflect their needs and concerns. In particular, children should participate in determining their fates with regard to issues of family reunification, vocational or educational opportunities.

183. Some demobilization exercises are conducted by the Ministry of Defence or a demobilization commission in which the military plays a key role. This can lead to situations where the children continue to be fostered in a military environment. Demobilization exercises should not be used as a means to support the establishment of cadet military academies and there should be a clear break with the military way of life.
184. The demobilization process should be as short as possible. Particular attention should be given to removing children as soon as possible from the formal encampment site. The process of documentation at the encampment site should be reduced to 48 hours after which they should be transferred to an interim care site or centre under civilian control. Essential services such as health, counselling, and psycho-social support should be provided to the children at the civilian interim care site.
185. At assembly or demobilization sites, children should be interviewed and basic data should be gathered on their health, educational background, aspirations, family members, etc. Former child combatants should be issued identity cards at the start of the demobilization process, or earlier if they enter a spontaneous demobilization process. Systems should be designed to analyse and store the data on each child and to enable continuous reporting on the progress of the demobilization effort.
186. Children should be interviewed individually and away from their commanders and peers by staff trained in data collection, interview techniques, and sensitization to the particularities of child combatants. It is generally inappropriate to raise sensitive issues in the initial interview. All children should be informed throughout the process of the reasons for collecting the information, of the confidentiality of the process, and about what will happen to them at each step of the process. Wherever possible, communication and information should be in the mother tongue of the child.
187. Obstacles to information gathering and monitoring should be foreseen. Child soldiers may not want to reveal their place of origin

and intended resettlement destination for fear of re-recruitment or reprisals.

188. All children should undergo a physical health assessment and receive necessary treatment as quickly as possible during the demobilization process. Encampment affords an opportunity to pay special attention to the physical, emotional, psychosocial and social needs of girl soldiers as well as girls who participated in armed groups or forces in capacities other than combatants. Their needs should be borne in mind when planning for encampment facilities and staff.
189. Psycho-social support to children affected by armed conflict should not be reduced to individual psychological assistance and the attendant focus on trauma. Priority attention should be paid to providing support for social reintegration, including psychological support to those most in need.
190. Specific responses are also needed for children with disabilities, child soldiers with children of their own, children with sexually transmitted diseases, among others. Linkages between the demobilization programme and existing programmes for addressing children's health needs should be ensured.
191. Stigmatizing of former child soldiers must be avoided. Within the framework of programme assistance, support should be provided to all war-affected children.
192. Consideration should also be given to programming for those child soldiers who demobilize as adults, having grown up within the armed group, whether during the conflict or within the formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.
193. The most efficient way to protect children from further abuse at the time of demobilization is to separate them immediately from adult soldiers. To guarantee that this happens on the ground, coordination must be ensured among relevant agencies involved in the demobilization process. To avoid post-conflict exploitation of child soldiers, the rights of children involved in armed conflicts must at all times be respected, in particular by the media.

194. Contingency plans should protect demobilized children from the risks of re-recruitment should violence recur and of retaliation from former foes once they return to their communities. This might require follow-up well beyond the close of the formal demobilization process. To ensure that re-recruitment does not occur, any assembly area must be sufficiently far from the conflict zones to ensure security for the children. The likelihood of re-recruitment can be reduced if children are returned to their caregivers as soon as possible and under conditions of safety.
195. An estimated 30 per cent of the child combatants routinely do not enter the formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In addition to planning child-specific components of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, efforts should be made throughout the conflict to identify and address the needs of children who spontaneously separate from an armed force or group and return directly to their communities, or seek refuge elsewhere.
196. Monitoring and follow-up of the demobilized children should take place to ensure reintegration and receipt of the rights and benefits. Follow-up will depend on community resources and capacities, such as local non-governmental organizations, catechists, teachers or others. Programmes to prevent, demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers should be jointly and constantly monitored and evaluated with communities. Strategies and the overall impact of the programme — for example, the social reintegration of young people — should be evaluated as a whole.

VIII. REHABILITATION CENTRES AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION

197. It is a widely held view that children should be reunified with their families and communities as soon as possible. Nevertheless, there is a debate over whether to send child soldiers home as soon as family members are located and have expressed willingness to receive the child. Some argue for immediate reunification and that all support should be channelled through the families and communities; while others contend that greater benefits might

accrue from providing the former child combatant with a stable and protected interim environment before family reunification. A brief period in an interim care centre would arguably enable treatment of particular health problems and identification of any other special needs. It would also give time to begin to break ties to a military hierarchy and command structure, as well as to conduct family and community sensitization.

198. Rehabilitation centres or programmes should be based on careful assessments of the need for such services and prior experience with similar efforts. A number of circumstances might militate against such an approach or render it unnecessary, in which case family reunification and community reintegration should not be delayed.

199. Some of the drawbacks to the creation of rehabilitation centres for child soldiers are the following:

- The centres tend to provide better living conditions and services (education and vocational training) than those available in the children's communities; experience has shown that children frequently refuse to be reunified in order to continue to benefit from such conditions.
- Families may be enticed to abandon their own children to the centres when they perceive that better care will be provided by the institution.
- Artificial environments may delay reintegration into communities and may prolong the originally anticipated period of stay.
- These centres could easily be targeted for forced recruitment or abduction of children.
- The distance between the centre and the child's community may limit the ability of families to visit their children and to become involved in the centre's activities.
- Some of these centres may lack the expertise to conduct family tracing activities and may not always consider family reunification as a priority intervention.

- Experience has shown that often little support is provided in conjunction with the centre's activities, to prepare families ultimately to receive the children.
 - Facilities may be inadequate (lack of hygiene, playgrounds, among others).
 - Staff may be inadequately trained on child development issues, counselling, child rights, and other relevant issues.
 - Traditional coping mechanisms, such as the participation of traditional healers, are rarely integrated into the activities of the centre.
 - Due to high operational costs, sustainability of such centres cannot be secured over time.
200. Family reunification is the principal factor in effective social reintegration and most often corresponds with the desire of children. Specific tracing, community and family sensitization, and follow-up procedures must be firmly in place.
201. There should be contingency planning when reunification is impossible. The possibility of a former child soldier being rejected by his or her family or community must be foreseen and provided for. When children cannot be reunited with their family, their need to establish and maintain stable emotional relationships must be recognized. Institutionalization should be a last resort, for the shortest possible time, and efforts to find family-based solutions should continue.
202. Community-based rehabilitation might be feasible in certain cases. However, there are very few trained community counsellors to provide adequate support and follow-up. Foster care programmes lacking proper supervision risk becoming abusive environments for children. Offering financial remuneration to community counsellors and foster families as an inducement to receive and care for children is a controversial issue.
203. Community sensitization for early family reunification is essential. An early and clear commitment must be made to develop community sensitization activities, such as advocacy with

communities, reconciliation procedures, etc., to ensure expectations are adjusted in advance of a former child soldier's return. United Nations humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organizations, and local communities should be involved in this effort. Procedures to follow up on progress with reunified children should also be in place from the early stages.

204. Strengthening community capacity to care for and protect children is particularly important. Reintegration programmes should be developed with the communities of origin, build on existing resources, and take into account community priorities, values and traditions. Dialogue with communities will help understand their main concerns for their children and their perception of their own roles and responsibilities with regard to those children. Assistance should focus on the child in the context of his/her community.

205. A challenge in most post-war scenarios is the absence of referral structures for those children in need of specialized psychological support. As part of the general psycho-social response, the capacity of the family and community to care for and protect the child should be developed and supported. Existing support structures, including parents or other significant adult caregivers such as grandparents, community leaders and teachers must be reinforced. Traditional resources and practices in the community should be identified and incorporated as appropriate into the psycho-social reintegration programmes for former child soldiers. Recreational activities are essential for psycho-social well being and should be included in all reintegration programmes.

IX. WELFARE OF CHILDRE, WOMEN, DISABLED AND CHRONICALLY ILL

206. The social problems affecting special and minority groups in society as the result of armed conflicts are extremely serious and demand special attention and care.

207. *Former Girl Soldiers and Female Ex-Combatants* Demobilization programmes tend to focus narrowly on the needs of boys and to ignore the existence of girl soldiers, who in some countries

comprise up to 40 per cent of all child soldiers. Hence, gender equity in demobilization should be maintained. The presence and needs of girl soldiers should be systematically assessed in a way that reflects their roles serving armies — as fighters, cooks, messengers, spies, to perform labour and as wives and sexual slaves.

The reticence of the girls themselves to raise these issues must be foreseen and particular attention must be paid to the health and psycho-social implications of their experiences during the conflict. Work must begin early to sensitize communities to the plight of these girls and the obstacles to their successful family and community reintegration should be identified and addressed.

208. Special protection measures must be implemented to respond to girl soldiers' and female ex-combatants' needs. Reintegration programmes must consider the provision of training or services to address the special vulnerabilities of female ex-combatants and their children, especially when the mother is a very young former combatant.
209. Female ex-combatants often find it more difficult than male ex-combatants to achieve economic reintegration. Special measures may have to be instituted to ensure that female beneficiaries have equal training and employment opportunities. For example, funding for childcare and provision of training to women in their areas of professional interest and in the villages where they reside should be considered.
210. In addition, female ex-combatants who have become accustomed to an independent and egalitarian life in the military may find it hard to adapt to the expectations of traditional communities. This change of roles may cause considerable tensions and often leads to dysfunctional social structures. Women's groups should provide counseling and guidance to widows and female ex-combatants on gender-specific issues.
211. Women and girls who have suffered sexual abuse or rape, have been forced to serve as "wives" or participate in violence, especially those bearing the children of their abusers. They risk rejection or denigration by their communities, and may be unacceptable to their

families. Community sensitization and special responsive interventions for these cases are called for.

212. *Wives and Children of Ex-Combatants* The children and families of adult ex-combatants should be identified and their special needs addressed within the demobilization and reintegration process. Among the issues to address are the following:
- The ability of the female partner of an ex-combatant to adapt to or be accepted by, a new community that may have distinct linguistic, ethnic or cultural traditions;
 - The economic ability of the ex-combatant to send his or her children to school, especially girls who tend to be the first deprived of education in times of severe hardship; and
 - The ability of children and wives who have been long separated from the former combatant to cope with his new attitudes or behaviour.
213. *Widows and Orphans* Women who have lost their husbands in action need financial and material assistance to support their orphaned children and themselves. They should be assisted in setting up micro-business ventures, such as food trading in market places and shops selling fast-moving items. Widows should be made active participants in the reintegration training programmes and should also be able to benefit from the credit schemes.
214. *Disabled and Chronically Ill Veterans* Ex-combatants who have been wounded or disabled in action or have become chronically ill due to combat exposure, deserve to be cared for. Governments should assume full responsibility in providing medical care and rehabilitation facilities for them and provide vocational training that is geared to their specific needs.

SECTION

7

POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

215. For the consolidation of peace and the promotion of stability, post-conflict peace-building should be perceived as complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. To bring about durable peace and stability and to prevent further outbreak of hostilities, the underlying causes for the conflict should be determined and resolved. All parties to the conflict should participate in the search for lasting peace.
216. Post-conflict peace-building should be well planned and adequate funds should be made available for its implementation. To assist the reconciliation process and to create confidence in the implementation of the peace agreement, it is recommended that the following steps be taken:
- An effective, objective public information campaign be promoted to sensitize the public to the peace process;
 - National dialogue be encouraged and intensified through reconciliation programmes in the consolidation of peace;
 - Measures aimed at enhancing public involvement through education and awareness programmes conducive to the promotion of peace be encouraged;
 - Measures to strengthen coordination among governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be implemented for the smooth transition from emergency humanitarian assistance and post-conflict assistance to long-term development.
217. Extended hostilities generally result in the total collapse of political and administrative structures. The institutions of government, with the central authority, regional and district councils, courts, police and penal services have completely broken down. In war-torn countries, the social and economic infrastructure is destroyed. Regional and international assistance is required for the daunting task of reconstruction. Yet, such assistance may not be forthcoming unless there are reassuring commitments by the political leadership to reconciliation, institution-building and good governance. Post-

conflict peace-building obligations should therefore be woven into the peace agreement.

218. Reconstruction, restructuring and rehabilitation of government, public and private institutions, political institution-building and the participatory political process in particular, should be undertaken, as a matter of utmost urgency, in order to facilitate the promotion of security and the reactivation of economic sustainability of the country and the people.
219. Rehabilitation of the service sector, in particular the restoration of medical facilities, basic public utilities, communication and transportation infrastructure, should be given priority.
220. Post-conflict peace-building programmes aimed at restructuring institutions of State, reconstructing and rehabilitating of public utilities and services and of the State economy must be undertaken concurrently and should be linked to the economic reintegration programmes.
221. In most theatres that suffer from long armed hostilities, the indigenous population, in particular women, children and the elderly, become the major victims of the conflict. Some are internally displaced and some flee their national borders, becoming refugees in the neighbouring countries. In consequence, hunger, diseases and malnutrition become endemic.
222. The international community should be motivated to assist the International Committee for the Red Cross, appropriate United Nations agencies, in particular the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and other humanitarian relief organizations in facilitating the early resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons. Adequate medical services and health care should be provided. Specific assistance is needed if humanitarian agencies are denied the access to demobilized ex-combatants.
223. Peace-building efforts should be undertaken to promote the respect for human rights and to reconcile opposing political, ethnic, religious and other aggrieved groups in society. Chiefs, elders, churches, trade unions, media, professional and entrepreneurial bodies and all

other influential institutions of society should be actively involved in this process.

224. To the extent that national efforts to seek the truth or achieve justice in the aftermath of conflict involve children — whether as witnesses, victims or perpetrators — measures might be called for to ensure that they are not re-traumatised in the process.
225. Children who have participated in hostilities should benefit from amnesty or special legal procedures that provide all judicial guarantees owed to children. Children who abandon the armed forces should not be considered deserters. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme staff should document the use of children within armed groups and forces, with a view to facilitating legal processes aimed at ending the impunity of those who recruit and use children in hostilities.
226. In the aftermath of conflict, national legislation and practice must be reinforced to ensure that children under eighteen years of age are not recruited or enlisted into any armed force.
227. If a post-conflict society requires a restructured defence/security system, it is imperative that the newly formed body adequately represents the opposing parties, but is forged into a unified force that sees itself as serving the country as a whole, rather than specific groups. Training is a crucial element in helping soldiers develop this new perception of themselves.
228. If a unified defence force is to be created, the following aspects should be considered in the planning process:
- Role of new defence force, including guiding or basic principles such as non-partisanship, size and structure;
 - Composition of force, including numbers to be incorporated from government and opposing forces or fresh recruits;
 - Criteria for the selection of the government and opposition forces for the new, unified force;
 - Timetable for formation new force;

- Procedures governing the process of unification, including necessary screening mechanisms and training measures;
- Rules to govern the operation of the new force;
- Budget of the new force, from the time of its creation until peace implementation process is substantially completed and a new government has taken over;
- Mechanisms for implementation, coordination and oversight, including facilitation by third parties designated by parties; and
- Inputs for public information, sensitization and reconciliation.

ANNEXES

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

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S/PRST/1999/21

8 July 1999

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 4021st meeting of the Security Council, held on 8 July 1999 in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council recalls its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council also recalls the statements made by its President in relation to activities of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

The Security Council has considered the matter of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment as part of its overall and continuing effort to contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building activities in conflict situations around the world.

The Security Council is seriously concerned that in a number of conflicts, armed fighting among various parties or factions continues despite the conclusion of peace agreements by the warring parties and the presence of United Nations peacekeeping missions on the ground. It recognizes that a major contributory factor to such a situation has been the continued availability of large amounts of armaments, in particular small arms and light weapons, to conflicting parties. The Council emphasizes

that in order to achieve settlement, parties to a conflict must work towards the successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers whose special needs should be seriously addressed.

The Security Council recognizes that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration cannot be seen in isolation but rather, as a continuous process which is rooted in and feeds into a broader search for peace, stability and development. Effective disarmament of ex-combatants represents an important indicator of progress towards post-conflict peace-building and normalization of the situation. The demobilization effort is only possible when there is some level of disarmament and its success can only be achieved when there is effective rehabilitation and reintegration into society of ex-combatants. Disarmament and demobilization must take place in a secure and safe environment, which will give ex-combatants the confidence to lay down their arms. Taking into account that the process is closely linked to economic and social issues, the question must be addressed comprehensively so as to facilitate a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace-building.

The Security Council emphasizes that for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to be successful, there must be political will and a clear commitment by the parties concerned to achieve peace and stability. At the same time, it is vital that such commitment by the parties be reinforced by political will and consistent, effective and determined support from the international community to guarantee the achievement of sustainable peace, including through its contributions of long-term assistance for development and trade.

The Security Council affirms its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in conducting peace-building activities, and the need for States to comply with their obligations under international law. Bearing this in mind, the Council stresses the need for the implementation, with the consent of the parties, of practical measures to promote the success of the process which, *inter alia*, may include the following:

- (A) The inclusion, as appropriate, within specific peace agreements and, on a case-by-case basis, within United Nations peacekeeping mandates, of clear terms for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely disposal of arms and ammunition;
- (B) The establishment by Governments contributing to peacekeeping operations of databases of experts on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. In this context, training in disarmament and demobilization could be a useful component of national programmes for the preparation of peacekeeping troops;
- (C) The prevention and reduction of the excessive and destabilizing flow, accumulation and illegitimate use of small arms and light weapons. In this context, the relevant Security Council resolutions and existing United Nations arms embargoes should be strictly implemented.

The Security Council is of the view that techniques for executing and coordinating programmes related to the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the problems associated with it should be given in-depth consideration. It takes note with appreciation of the efforts by the Secretary-General, United Nations bodies, Member States and international and regional organizations aimed at developing general principles and practical guidelines for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment.

The Security Council underlines the need to address this issue on a regular basis, and in this regard, requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, within a period of six months, a report containing his analysis, observations and recommendations, in particular those relating to principles and guidelines as well as practices, experiences and lessons learned to facilitate its further consideration of the matter. The report should pay special attention to the problems of disarmament and demobilization of child soldiers and their reintegration into society.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PERSONS AT LUNGI
DEMobilIZATION CENTRE, SIERRA LEONE**

UNOMSIL

UNOMSIL registration number

Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _

		Codes and categories	Instruction	Answer
1	Section 1: Identification			
1.1	AFSL number			
1.2	Name		If applicable	1.1
1.3	Sex	Male =1, Female =2		1.3
1.4	Age			
1.4.1	Self-reported age		Age in years	1.4.1
1.4.2	UNOMSIL assessment	Child combatant =1	Fill in '1' if age assessed to be below 18	1.4.2
1.5	Home address			

ANNEX B1

1.6	Home district	1 non-national 2 Freetown 3 Bo 4 Bombali 5 Bonthe 6 Kailahun 7 Kambia 8 Kenema 9 Koinadugu 10 Kono 11 Moyamba 12 Port Loko 13 Pujehum 14 Tonkolili	Fill in code from list	1.6
1.7	Chiefdom		1.8 Village/Town:	
1.9a	Father's name		1.9b Father's age	
1.10a	Mother's name		1.10b Mother's age	
1.11	Name of next kin			
1.12	Address of next kin			
1.13	Marital status		married	not married
1.14	Number of living children			__boys __girls
1.15	Educational qualifications:			
1.16	Main professional skills:			

ANNEX B1

2		Military information		
2.1	Army/fighting force:	AFSL = 1; RUF = 2; CDF=3		2.1
2.2	When did you join?		Fill in entry year to AFSL for AFRC	2.2
2.3	Where did you join (district)	See codes above		2.3
2.4	How did you join?	Voluntarily=1; Forced = 2		2.4
2.5	Rank:	01 Pte 02 L. Cpl. 03 Cpl 04 Sgt 05 WO 06 2Lt/Lt. 07 Capt. 08 Maj. 09 Lt. Col. 10 Col. 11 Brig. General. 12 Maj. General 13 Lt. Gen/Gen		2.5
2.6	D Number in fighting force			2.6
2.7	Units served	From	To	Commander's name
a)	1.	1.		1.
b)	2.	2.		2.
c)	3.	3.		3.
2.8	Places of combat	Types of engagement		
a)	1.	1.		
b)	2.	2.		
c)	3.	3.		
2.9	Date and time of surrender			2.9
2.10	Place of surrender			

ANNEX B1

2.11	Type of surrender	Voluntary = 1; Captured = 2			2.11
	Brief description of circumstances of surrender				
2.12	Weapons turned in:				
2.13	Quantity and type of weapon(s):	Registration Number	Condition: Serviceable Unserviceable		
2.14	Weapons accessories turned in:				
	Quantity and type of accessories	Remarks			
a)	___ {type}				
b)	___ {type}				
c)	___ {type}				
d)	___ {type}				
2.15	Ammunition turned in	Remarks			
a)	___ {type}				
b)	___ {type}				
c)	___ {type}				
d)	___ {type}				

3.	Future Plans				
3.1	Where do you want to settle?	Fill in District code			3.1
3.2	With whom do you want to live?	Name: Chiefdom: Village/Town:			

ANNEX B1

3.3	What are your future plans?	1. Join Defence Forces 2. Farming 3. Continue education 4. Vocational training (specify) _____ 5. Others (specify) _____		3.3
3.4	Do you know that the Government has made terms and conditions for your return to civilian life?	Yes = 1 No = 2		3.4
3.5	How well do you understand these?	I do not understand = 1 I know a bit but am uncertain = 2 I'm confident I understand = 3		3.5
3.6	Are you familiar with the Government's terms and criteria for persons to be enrolled in a new national army?	Yes = 1 No = 2		3.6
3.7	How well do you understand these?			3.7
3.8	Miscellaneous/Interviewers comments			

Interviewer's signature

Interviewer's name printed

Interviewee signature (or Thumb Print)

**NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION**

Given that you surrendered within the Government of Sierra Leone amnesty period March 1998-August 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone through its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme offers you a unique opportunity to engage in meaningful life as civilian after your participation in the armed conflict. If you have been detained for your role in the armed conflict the Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) may require from you to participate in a social rehabilitation programme prior to your release.

Terms of your acceptance to enter into this programme are the following:

1. In accordance with the Amnesty Conditions you will be exempted from criminal prosecution, with regards to any crimes committed prior to your surrender.
2. You will be treated in accordance with International Human Rights Conventions.
3. You are entitled to the provisions of assistance of basic needs during your stay at a Demobilization Centre as designated by the Government of Sierra Leone.
4. You will become ineligible for engagement in military service.
5. You will be entitled to the provisions of a reinsertion package and have access to reintegration programme under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme as determined by the Government of Sierra Leone.
6. The National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization will facilitate your return to your home communities, provide access to training and skills development as well as facilitate employment opportunities.

As a participant of the DDR programme, the terms of your benefits are conditioned upon the following:

1. Surrender of all weapons and ammunitions.
2. Cooperate fully with the Government's efforts to recover illegal weapons and arsenals.
3. Respect the National Pledge and Constitution of Sierra Leone.
4. Acceptance of and conformity with all rules and regulations as stated by National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
5. Pledge to protect and support the peace and security of Sierra Leone.
6. Pledge to protect and support the peace and security of Sierra Leone.
7. Refrain from all criminal activity and to contribute positively to the Nation's development.
8. Cooperate and participate in programmes designed to facilitate your return to civilian life.

Any violation of the aforementioned conditions will result in incarceration and/or criminal prosecution in accordance with the National Law and Policies of the Government of Sierra Leone.

I hereby accept and will adhere to the above terms and conditions and request to be considered as a beneficiary of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme as explained to me by representatives of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the Government of Sierra Leone.

.....
 (Location) Date Temporary NCCDDR Registration Number

Verified and endorsed by:-

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GUIDE TO WEAPONS DESTRUCTION METHODOLOGIES

A. Small Arms and Light Weapons

1. **Burning** is an established procedure that has been tested in the field. It has the advantage of being simple and inexpensive. The essential ingredients are fuel (wood or coal), a flammable substance to enhance rapid heat generation (gasoline or diesel oil), and some care and a modicum of skill in stacking the firearms to maximize destruction. Procedures can be improved upon through trial burns and the use of crude furnaces. It also provides a visible and tangible statement, in symbolic and real terms, to the general public and has a positive political and psychological impact. This method may be appropriate for less developed States and for States emerging from severe internal conflict where a new direction and new hope must be symbolically and concretely demonstrated.
2. The procedure is labour intensive, however. It also runs the risk of being less effective in terms of total destruction and the resulting scrap is less desirable for recycling. Some experts have questioned the ability of open fires to produce enough heat to adequately destroy all firearms. However, firearms burned in this manner would probably be unusable even if there were no visible damage, as the metal would be sufficiently affected to make firing them dangerous, if not impossible. Nevertheless, it is not a completely guaranteed disabling procedure, unless the barrels and receivers are visibly bent, twisted or otherwise deformed. This shortcoming can be overcome through spot checks and re-burning, if necessary. If only a few weapons escaped unscathed, they could be destroyed by other means, such as sledgehammers.
3. Recycling is cost-effective only if a State has an indigenous capability to recycle weapons scrap to its steel mills. Otherwise, any potential savings through recycling may not offset even transportation costs. In such situations it might be better to bury

the weapons scrap *in situ* or, if appropriate, use it to construct a peace memorial or monument.

4. Another perceived disadvantage of burning may be the environmental concerns of smoke pollution and scrap metal pollution. But this pollution will be extremely small in comparison with what is already being generated by the State and its citizens. The benefits that would accrue from the destruction of the weapons would far outweigh any pollution concerns.
5. **Cutting** is another method of weapons destruction and there are a number of cutting methods. Three of the most common methods are using oxy-acetylene torches, plasma torches and saws.
6. *Oxy-Acetylene Torches* Oxy-acetylene cutting is a well-established and proven method for destroying weapons of all types and sizes. It can be used for destroying weapons from the smallest handgun to large calibre systems. It has the advantage of being relatively simple to use. Personnel can be trained to use the cutting torch in a day, including safety lessons. The equipment can be purchased or leased for use by the security forces or supervising agency personnel. Alternatively, local contractors can be employed under supervision. The equipment is available on a worldwide basis and is portable enough to be flown to isolated spots by helicopter or light aircraft or moved by light truck. It is relatively maintenance-free and spare parts are normally easily available. If procedures for cuts are followed — at least one cut through the receiver — the cut plus the resulting slag from the congealing of metal usually makes the weapon useless. To be absolutely certain, a second cut could be made through the barrel at or near the chamber. Two cuts would ensure that the weapon would be useless.
7. The main disadvantage of this method is the number of weapons that can be cut in a given time. Operator skill is also relevant. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect to cut more than 40 to 50 in an hour, or 400 to 500 in a 10-hour day, even with changes in

operators. The scrap metal should be disposed of to prevent parts being used for spares.

8. When determining the cost of the exercise, one should expect to get 15 to 20 hours of cutting from medium-sized tanks of oxygen and acetylene before requiring a refill. The user ratio of the two gases is about two parts of oxygen to one acetylene. This would require changing an oxygen tank every 10 hours and an acetylene tank every 20 hours. Tanks must be leased but it is not cost-effective to lease the ancillary equipment. When destroying a large number of weapons, a purchase of the equipment is recommended. The costs of transportation, collection, labour and supervision are other variables that must be considered.
9. *Plasma Torches* A plasma torch or cutter is more expensive than an oxy-acetylene torch, in terms of equipment, but it is a much faster method. A plasma torch can cut weapons twice as fast, is easier to use, and provides a much cleaner cut. The cleaner cut, because it does not produce a large slag component, may make the weapon more susceptible to repair, but this is a relatively small concern. Again, double cuts are more practical and more certain to destroy the weapon. A plasma cutter requires a 220-volt electric current and can be run off a portable generator. It also requires the use of compressed air or compressed nitrogen. Compressed air is cheaper, but a compressor and tank would be required with each torch.
10. *Saws* Electric bench saws with special carbide blades have also been used successfully in weapons destruction. These saws can be mounted in the back of a truck to provide a mobile collection and destruction site.
11. **Mechanical methods of cutting or bending** have often been used as a destruction method for disabling weapons. They are relatively simple procedures and are environmentally friendly.

12. *Cutting/Crushing with Hydraulic Shears* Shears can cost from a few thousand to tens of thousands of dollars. The price reflects both their capability in terms of the size of steel they can cut or bend and the speed with which it can be done. The machinery can be custom designed to meet the needs of portability and capability. Crew-served weapons, e.g. 50 mm calibre machine gun barrels, require an expensive shear capability. The best equipment would be a hydraulic alligator shear. Such machines can be self-powered (diesel generator), can be sent into the field and are available in a variety of blade sizes (8-24 inch or 20-61 cms) that produce a 30 to 90-ton cutting force. They are easy to use and this method would be able to take advantage of low-cost labour, under the supervision of security personnel. Depending on size, these machines can make from 8 to 50 cuts per minute. Thus, a few persons at a well-organized site could easily destroy a stockpile of 5,000 small arms in a day.
13. *Crushing/Bending with Vehicles* Heavy tracked military vehicles and/or bulldozers of various sizes can be used to crush or bend weapons under their tracks. The weapons could be laid crosswise on logs or cement blocks or simply laid lengthwise and the vehicle run over them. Even heavy-wheeled vehicles, such as loaded tandem dump trucks, could perform the same task if the weapons were laid across beams, logs or blocks. Bulldozers or front-end loaders could also use their blades to bend weapons in the same manner as shears. A competent authority will be able to identify with a visual inspection whether or not the firearm is destroyed and if the process needs repeating.
14. **Shredding** is perhaps the quickest and most effective way to destroy small arms and light weapons. In some cases, it is often the preferred final step in destruction. This procedure has several advantages over other methods. The first is capacity — a giant shredder can literally destroy thousands of firearms a day. The second is finality — a weapon that goes through a shredder is rendered completely useless, not only for operation but also as

a source of spare parts. Another consideration is that shredder scrap metal is normally destined for recycling because of where the bulk of the shredding is done, i.e. scrap metal recycling depots. Under some circumstances it might be feasible to contract commercially for a mobile shredder to destroy weapons *in situ*. In other instances it might be more effective to transport the weapons, either disabled or intact, to a giant shredder location. Shredded scrap that consists of non-metallic refuse does not have as high a scrap metal value as scrap that is 99 per cent metal. On the plus side, the high speed and high capacity of destruction offset the lower value.

15. The main disadvantages of this destruction mode are expense and availability. Even in countries with extensive recycling capabilities, large capacity shredders can be found in only a few fixed locations. These machines cost several million dollars. Smaller, more mobile, shredders are also available, but these are not cheap either. Their purchase for destruction of weapons would be cost-effective only if they were to be used to destroy many thousands of light weapons a year.
16. In some countries the use of the shredder is the final step in a destruction process that entails initial disabling, secure transport and supervised destruction. Operating weapons can be transferred intact in locked trucks, with access through removable tops, to a shredding site. There, under supervision, they would be destroyed immediately. In most countries, security required for transporting the weapons need not exceed that needed for transporting large sums of money — a driver, two security guards and a supervisor, with the requisite accounting logs. In less stable countries, of course, more security would be necessary. An alternative would be to bring mobile shredders to weapons depots for destruction within a secure environment. Where the economic and industrial infrastructure of a country permits, this type of destruction procedure may be the most efficient and cost-effective, particularly for large quantities of weapons.

17. **Dumping at Sea** Although several international conventions and laws prohibit the dumping of industrial waste at sea — and firearms and ammunition would be considered industrial waste — there are provisions for an exemption to be granted. Permits for disposal of waste at sea can be issued where it would be the environmentally preferred and practical option.
18. **Dumping small arms and light weapons at sea** may be a viable destruction method for some countries, but only if other alternatives were not economically feasible. Used small arms and light weapons are unlikely to have significant amounts of lubricant, perhaps 2-3 ml or less of light oil per weapon. The dumping of 100,000 light weapons, even without decontamination of lubricants, would mean about 250 litres of diffused light oil being dumped along with the firearms. If the ecological consequences of dumping at sea were to be compared to the potential air pollution that would be caused by burning or even cutting with oxy-acetylene torches the same number of weapons, then dumping would be the least detrimental to the environment. The use of a dump barge or containers would seem to offer the best procedure for dumping. Semi-trailer truck containers could pick weapons up at various points and transport them to a port facility for loading onto ships and disposal at sea. The containers would be locked and guarded. Dumping at sea would have to be done in deep water where retrieval would not be economical or possible. This would be a relatively inexpensive method of destroying large quantities of small arms and light weapons. It might, therefore, be worthwhile to seek exemptions for such dumping, excluding ammunition and explosives.
19. **Other Methods** The destruction methods listed above are most useful for large quantities of small arms. Other simple and feasible methods are using a sledgehammer and anvil (particularly useful for handguns); hacksaw, grinder, band saw and bench saws with special carbide blades; direct disposal into blast furnaces or foundry furnaces; and plugging barrels with

metal welds. Their primary drawbacks are that they are either labour intensive, time consuming, dependent on special resources or expensive, or may not be entirely effective. Nevertheless, they should be considered as options where appropriate.

B. Ammunition and Explosives

20. The destruction of ball ammunition and explosive ordnance does not lend itself to as many choices as the destruction of small arms and light weapons. In the case of ball ammunition, it requires destruction through burning. For explosive ordnance, destruction is through open detonation. Destroying small amounts of ball ammunition is neither particularly expensive nor complicated.
21. The destruction of large quantities of munitions through burning and detonation may cause the emission of particles, suspected carcinogens and nitrous oxides, which could present health and environmental concerns. However, since the ammunition handed in to United Nations peace missions has been relatively small, its disposal has not been hazardous.
22. **Ball Ammunition** A field furnace provides a basic procedure that is both simple and inexpensive for destroying ball ammunition. The furnace consists of an all-steel cabinet and is designed with a removable cover, a side door for removal of burned by-products and a removable tray, which serves as the fire box. The furnace is designed to burn small arms ammunition and some pyrotechnics, but not black powder and high explosives, due to the risk of a violent explosion. The field furnace should be set on a hard platform, such as concrete or rocks, and all flammable material should be cleared within a radius of 7.5 metres. When a burn is taking place, all personnel should move back to a distance of 45 metres.
23. Items to be burned must be removed from their packaging, as burning, even under slight confinement, may result in an explosion. All ball ammunition — except 20 mm multi-purpose,

high explosive, high explosive incendiary and depleted uranium — and ammunition containing ethyl centralite as well as smokeless powder, may be burned. Small quantities of detonators, bulk primers, blasting caps, explosive bolts and relays may also be burned. This method can be used to dispose off almost all ammunition that is likely to be recovered during a peace support operation.

24. Fuel or motor oil or other suitable combustion material may be used to aid burning. Ignition may be electric or non-electric. The furnace should be observed, but not approached, while burning is in progress. The furnace must be allowed to cool before opening and removing refuse. A waiting period of 30 minutes is recommended. The refuse will be inspected and if necessary re-burned.
25. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)** The destruction of explosive ordnance, particularly high explosive, such as grenades, mines, mortar bombs and artillery shells, is more complex, time consuming and costly than the destruction of ammunition. The normal procedure is to use explosive detonation *in situ*. There are several reasons for doing this; an important one is the volatility of some ammunition, which presents safety problems for storage and movement. Procedures for disposal are taught to specialists — combat engineers and selected ordnance personnel — in all professional militaries and are annotated in various EOD manuals. Disposal procedures using plastic explosives, such as C4, are generally acceptable for the relatively small quantities of explosive ordnance dealt with by United Nations peace missions.
26. **Ancillary Equipment** Spare parts and other ancillary equipment, such as night vision aids, telescopes and mounts, are not difficult to destroy. It is important to keep appropriate destruction records.
27. Recycling the scrap from weapons destruction programmes could, in theory, be used to reduce the cost of the programmes.

However, most of the destruction programmes have not defrayed any costs from scrap recycling. The cost of transporting the scrap to a recycling plant must be deducted from sale income. In many instances, it may not be a cost-effective proposition.

28. Consideration should be given to purchasing and maintaining equipment in United Nations storage depots for the destruction of small arms and light weapons. This equipment could include cutting torches, saws, hydraulic alligator shears and field furnaces. In addition, establishing a verification capability for small weapons destruction within the United Nations could be considered. Such a capability would assist in developing the expertise necessary to maximize effectiveness of the various destruction techniques. It could also develop suitable expertise in ammunition and explosive ordnance disposal and develop the requisite safety and identification knowledge to either implement or supervise destruction. Such a capability could be developed on the basis of the standby forces arrangements.