



Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF)

Working Paper

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):
Conceptual approaches, specific settings, practical experiences**

Reto Rufer

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Abbreviations

ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginning Programme
AU	African Union
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CONADER	Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration (Kongo)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDRP	Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (Bosnia)
EU	European Union
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (former Rwandan Interahamwe)
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States (of the former Soviet Union)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDDRS	Integrated DDR-Standards
IDP	Internally Displaced People
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPA	International Peace Academy
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
LURD	Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy (Liberian rebels)
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Liberian rebel movement)
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NZZ	Neue Zürcher Zeitung
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (of the UNDPKO)
PELRP	Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project (Bosnia)
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation(s)
PSO	Peace support Operation(s)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (rebel movement in Sierra Leone)
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (of NATO in Bosnia)
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on DDR
SSR	Security Sector Reform resp. -Reconstruction
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	UN Security Council
USAID	US Agency for International Development

PREFACE

This paper, by Mr. Reto Rufer, is based on a Masters thesis submitted to the Masters of International Affairs and Governance (MIA) program at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, in 2005. It addresses problems of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in seven case studies: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Columbia. The case studies primarily reflect post-conflict and developmental contexts and thereby distinguish themselves from transitional DDR environments, such as South- and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and South Africa in the 1990's.

There are different understandings of the concept of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the existing literature and Rufer's paper has the merit of bringing some terminological and theoretical clarifications. Most important, the DDR concept is far from being static.

The paper goes beyond specificities and identifies traits that are common to various post-conflict and developmental DDR contexts. In its theorizing attempt, the paper rightfully points out to the existence of two military driven processes, disarmament and demobilization (DD). It considers reintegration (R) mainly a civilian driven process that can, in particular circumstances, be supported by ministries of defence. Most often, rifts and tensions between, on the one hand, DD, and, on the other hand, R appear. As DDR processes are directly contributing to the establishment of the rule of law and the formation of democratic structures, such tensions affect the whole post-conflict democratization process.

The paper is well researched and can without a doubt be utilized by future researchers as a reference paper, due to the significant amount of facts, data and questioning of past DDR thinking.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From Afghanistan to the Central African Republic, from Namibia (1989) to Burundi or Sudan (2005), from the poorest country in the world (Sierra Leone), the Balkans to the European Union (Northern Ireland): since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have been followed by dozens of DDR processes, programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of units and combatants involved in the respective conflicts. In numerous settings, DDR was and still is an integral part of ambitious, multi-fractional peace support operations (PSOs). These were not only to contribute to the consolidation and stabilisation of fragile ceasefire and peace agreements but finally to lead to the establishment of the rule of law as well as the formation of democratic structures and a market economy as preconditions for a sustainable, 'liberal' peace.

The disarmament and demobilisation of armed units and their combatants is a central precondition for the transformation of conflicts and disputes on a civil, political level. Reintegrative measures, such as stopgap payments, the reunification of families, training programmes, small loans to foster self-employment, or job offers in infrastructure projects should lead demobilised combatants to a productive civil life and, in the long run, keep them from going back to carrying arms. The relation of demobilisation and disarmament to reintegration is not devoid of tensions as both components differ fundamentally. Demobilisation and disarmament lie within the responsibility of the military, are exclusively geared to combatants and have short-term security goals. Reintegration lies within the responsibility of civilian actors. Time-frame, addressees and objectives are a lot more open and vague. Despite this fundamental difference, both 'DD' and 'R' strongly depend upon each other: successful reintegration measures are just as important for a sustainable success of demobilisation and disarmament as successful disarmament is the precondition for the beginning of a reintegration programme.

In the framework of this paper, seven case studies of current DDR processes were analysed in detail, and numerous other DDR programmes were evaluated. The objective of this study was to show the scope of possible settings and their implications for possible conceptual approaches of DDR programmes. The kind of (terminated) conflict, the structure and organisation of the armed units, the political and socio-economic environment as well as the capacities and interests of the intervening actors are, for instance, decisive categories

- i) whether DDR programmes ought to be carried out 'immediately and quickly' after the peace agreement or step by step and in parallel to the entire peace process,
- ii) how far local actors and parties to the conflict can, and ought to, carry responsibility,
- iii) how DDR is positioned against other instruments of the peacebuilding process, such as security sector reform (SSR) or strategies for democratisation.

As an overview, the following settings in particular can be differentiated:

- i) After a politically-agreed end of a political conflict (Mozambique, Burundi, Aceh, Sudan) it is decisive for a successful DDR process and a successful

transformation of armed units into political parties to ensure that the existing balance of power is kept and trust is built up. It is therefore of particular importance to position DDR measures at the right moment during the peace process. It is equally important to monitor carefully the full demobilisation of all armed units, to have the DDR process accompanied by intensive diplomatic efforts and to fully incorporate it into the build-up of political institutions and the reform of the security sector. The parties to the conflict ought to be comprehensively included in the DDR process.

- ii) If a PSO with a robust mandate can secure a ceasefire or a fragile peace in the context of a failed state (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan), generally DDR programmes will have to be introduced quickly, and immediately after the end of the fighting. Here, the goal is to profit from the right moment and to make a point that the war is over. Fragmented warring parties and the lack of state structures often necessitate a mostly external leadership of the DDR process. Security and stability often have to be 'bought'. In such a setting, DDR is even more geared to the necessities and demands of combatants and thus at immediate security- and stabilisation aims.
- iii) If there is no sustainable ceasefire, as is the case with failed states, and a PSO is lacking the funds to guarantee the country's security (Haiti, DR Congo, Liberia/Sierra Leone before 1999/2002), the PSO has to concentrate on a de-escalation strategy and the protection of civil society. Comprehensive DDR programmes can hardly be implemented. However, it ought to be guaranteed that combatants who are willing to be demobilised are received in voluntary, decentralised reintegration programmes. Coercive demobilisation of a few, particularly disturbing, splinter groups could be a means to unblock the situation.
- iv) Finally, in the context of a military victory (Angola, Rwanda, Uganda), DDR is first and foremost a measure taken by the victorious party to the conflict or the national government. International participation is generally limited to mediation and monitoring, logistical and financial support, and to protecting the defeated party. Due to the military outcome, the risk of a renewed outbreak of war is relatively small in the short term. DDR programmes can therefore be geared more directly towards development goals and conflict prevention than would be possible in the other settings.

It is undisputed that DDR ought to be part of a coordinated political strategy in view of the economic and social development as well as a future design of the security system, however, in the concrete orientation, design and implementation of DDR programmes, a number of dilemmas, conflicts concerning their purpose and clashing interests can be observed. In particular, it is about the multi-faceted question of the limit for the political price that is paid to combatants and their commanders when they turn in their weapons. How clean does a combatant's record have to be, how bloody may his hands be to be still entitled to a seat in the transitional government or to become part of the new national army? Which amnesty regulations are still justifiable? Should only ex-combatants be allowed to enter into reintegration programmes or also disadvantaged, vulnerable groups and war victims? How much 'justice' may one have to relinquish for security and stability?

Conflicting interests are another problem. Whose perspectives count when representatives of the parties to the conflict want to secure their own influence, when the EU – and Switzerland, too – have their own internal migration policy on the Balkans, when the United States fights the War on Terror in Afghanistan, and the governments of donor countries as well as humanitarian organisations are interested in quick, and visible, results?

Finally, it is also about the chances and aims of the entire peacebuilding strategy which DDR programmes are often an integral part of. Can and should, for instance, Afghanistan or the DRC be rebuilt into democratic states with a multi-party system and a social market economy? What are the minimum requirements for the deployment of a PSO?

There are no magic formulas or generally valid answers to these questions. "Putting these questions on the table does, however, build awareness of the dilemmas and challenges that eventually have to be met and resolved", as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR puts it.

Being aware of these dilemmas and the great scope of possible settings, the 'solution' cannot be to develop generally valid 'best practices' for DDR but rather to develop a basis for 'good practices' for each individual case. This also entails the phrasing of consistent and, most of all realistic, targets and the naming of the price which has to be paid for security and stability. In post-conflict settings, this price is high, very often too high for DDR to be able to additionally provide for justice, to eliminate existing discrimination and to enter a sustained fight against poverty. "It may be that when ex-combatants are 'as poor as the rest' and women associated with fighting groups are 'as oppressed as the rest' a DDR programme has achieved what it can" (Baare (2005), p.8).

DDR programmes therefore can, at best, open windows of opportunity for sustainable development, for social justice, and for reconciliation. It is not everything, but already something of an achievement if they successfully make the parties aware of the fact that weapons are no acceptable means of securing a living or of dealing with conflict and thus make a major contribution to stabilisation and confidence-building in difficult post-conflict settings.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR): CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES, SPECIFIC SETTINGS, PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES

Reto Rufer

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Hell and Heaven

"To be able to breathe better air, we go to the river of the Holy Paul. The river is the border between Monrovia and the world of the warlords. Across the river leads a bridge. On the Monrovia side, there are long rows of huts and tents of a refugee camp. Here, there is a huge market – the colourful kingdom of an exited crowd of female traders whose shrill voices mix with other noise. The people from the other side of the river, from within the warlords' hell, from the world ruled by terror, hunger and death, are allowed to come over to our side, but they have to turn in their weapons before they cross the bridge. I can see them stop, already on our side of the bridge, still suspicious and insecure, surprised that there is such a normal world. And how they stretch out their hands, as if they were something real, something that one can touch. Over there, I can see a man who is totally naked but is shouldering a Kalashnikov. People make room for him, evade him, assume that he is crazy. A crazy man with a Kalashnikov."

Monrovia/Liberia, 1990; from "Abkühlende Hölle" in: Ryszard Kapuscinski (1999), p.259¹

This side of the river: the "world of the warlords", the other side the "normal world". There the "inside of hell", here, if not paradise, but a humble "colourful kingdom". In between, the turning in of the gun as a precondition for the transition from hell into the kingdom.

DDR, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants as a means to cool down this 'hell', ruled by war and terror, to a civilian normality – quite dramatic and drastic words, which, however, correspond to the high expectations that the UN, for instance, holds in DDR. DDR has proven to be "vital to stabilising a post-conflict situation, to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence and to facilitating a society's transition from conflict to normality and development"²

These are ambitious goals, if one thinks of the disastrous post-conflict situation in Liberia, Afghanistan or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, but also an ambitious goal in view of Kapuscinski's single "man who is totally naked but is shouldering a Kalashnikov". In many regions of crisis, a weapon was the one and only known and trusted means of securing a combatant's naked physical and economic survival.

¹ All German quotes in this paper have been translated into English.

² UN Security Council (2000), p.1

Since the end of the Cold War, dozens of DDR programmes have been carried out, mostly under international leadership, often within the framework of a UN peacekeeping (PKO) or peace support operation (PSO), or at least with considerable financial and logistical participation of various international actors, such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and numerous other national development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in the area of development co-operation and peace consolidation.

A good number of these PSOs and DDR programmes have failed miserably. First operations in Angola or Liberia drowned between 1994 and 1997 in the blood of wars that flared up again, the UN intervention in Somalia in 1993 ended in anarchy, dominated by violence which is still going on today. Despite its long-lasting presence and a number of demobilisation efforts, the UN was not able to attain sustainable peace in the East of the 'Democratic' Republic of the Congo. Haiti, too, is still under the spell of armed gangs, despite an international presence. On the other hand, there is no doubt that there are also remarkable successes. In Mozambique and Angola, for instance, rebel movements were demobilised with the help of comprehensive DDR programmes; they were even transformed into political parties. In Burundi, Sierra Leone or Liberia there is hope for a more sustainable time of peace and normalisation after years – or even decades – of bloody conflicts. More DDR programmes have been or are being initiated, like in Aceh, Sudan or, with a totally different approach, in Colombia.

In the following, the author will give an overview of the numerous DDR programmes that have been started in and after situations of conflict since the end of the Cold War. The main focus is the discussion of the various settings in which such programmes have taken place, the conceptual approaches that have been chosen and the experiences that have been made. In particular, the approach of embedding DDR programmes into a broad development and democratisation perspective is analysed as well as the numerous clashing interests and conflicting goals upon initiation and during the implementation of DDR programmes.

1.2. Objectives

On 20 June 2005, I myself was disarmed and demobilised. I was allowed to return my personal weapon and equipment to the Swiss army and was dismissed from my duty while a military band was playing jazzy tunes. 'Reintegration aid' was limited to half-a-litre of mediocre (at best) red wine ("drink of honour"), a small pocket knife and a deck of cards. My demobilisation was due to a reduction in military personnel of the Swiss army the size of which is (and has been for long) no longer suited for today's threat situations.

This setting, of course, is not the focus of this paper. The purpose of this brief description is to show how great the scope of possible settings can be. DDR programmes can take place:

- within the setting of *developed industrial states*, where, as just described, orderly demobilisation is necessary due to a reduction in military personnel and the adjustment of the armed forces to a changed scenario of threats.

- within the setting of *transition*, as a reform of the security sector (SSR) combined with demobilisations which had been planned in the longer term during the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems based on the rule of law. Such a setting can be seen in DDR programmes in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These programmes contributed in a major way to the gaining of insights and further development of conceptual approaches, in particular with respect to reintegration programmes.
- Within the setting of *development*, where armies of threshold and developing countries are reduced by means of a long-term reform of the security sector (SSR). The thus freed financial resources can flow into the sectors of education, health and social development as well as projects fostering their infrastructure.
- Within the setting of *(post-) conflict* during and particularly after intra-state, inter-state or regional armed conflicts. In these settings, DDR is an instrument for the transformation of conflicts and an integral part of peacekeeping strategies and longer-term consolidation of peace within the framework of reconstruction (post-conflict peacebuilding³). To prevent war-like acts from flaring up again, large units frequently have to be demobilised within a few weeks or months.

The settings described above cannot always be seen as separated from each other, in practice there is a regular overlap and a combination of transition-, development- and peacebuilding processes. Wherever DDR programmes in post-conflict settings are part of comprehensive peacekeeping or peace support operations, they pursue goals of transition by building up democratic structures and structures promoting the rule of law as well as development aims by aspiring to the reconstruction process.⁴

The concepts and implementation of DDR programmes in different (post-) conflict settings are the subject of this paper. Transition and development settings are part of this study as PKOs and PSOs in post-conflict situations often also pursue democratisation and development goals, and extensive DDR programmes in the framework of the transition of socialist systems in the East of Europe and the former Soviet Union have proven central to attaining insights into the workings of these programmes. The term "(post-) conflict" is taken in a very broad sense so that the instrument of DDR in practice can be used during or after a conflict for peacemaking and conflict transformation as well as the securing of peace. It is true that most DDR programmes in a 'proper' post-conflict setting since 1989 have been launched after an agreed ceasefire and/or peace agreement. However, possible DDR efforts in the running conflict (for instance in Colombia, to a

³ On the origin and definition of the terms, cf. Section 2.2 and the Glossary in Appendix 3.

⁴ cf. the approach of the UN: "Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration exercises should be integrated into the framework of general rehabilitation programmes that provide assistance, protection and opportunities for development". UNDPKO(1999), p.7.

certain extent DR Congo) should not be ruled out⁵. A large part of DDR programmes in post-conflict settings that have been carried out since the end of the Cold War took place within the framework of multinational PKOs or PSOs, the appropriate term for which is "peacekeeping environment".⁶

It is the objective of this paper to describe the 'state of the art' of DDR in (post-) conflict settings, based on an extensive analysis of case studies and specialised literature and to particularly give an overview on possible settings, different conceptual approaches and practical experiences.

Central to this paper are political-conceptual questions and not technical aspects in the implementation of DDR programmes, such as how to run a demobilisation and disarmament camp as smoothly as possible, as to deal with questions like this would necessitate specialist practical experience 'in the field'.

It is not the purpose of this paper to sum up the 'lessons learned' and 'best practices' chapters most case studies and evaluations conclude with. In view of the great scope of possible settings, one can ask whether it would not be advisable to speak of 'good practices' that have proven to be 'good', i.e. successful and appropriate, in certain circumstances rather than 'best practices' that demand universal applicability. If this is the case, one should become more sensitive to the scope of possible context factors, their implications for the concept of DDR programmes and to arising conflicting interests and targets. Taking the principles and guidelines worked out by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)⁷ as a basis, with the aim of an integrated approach to DDR, the following questions are the focus of this paper:

- What are the factors and the settings influencing a conflict (kind of conflict, characteristics of the post-conflict situation but also the means and interests of possible multi-national intervention forces) that have a decisive influence on the chances and perspectives of DDR programmes?
- Which conceptual approaches have been chosen in which settings? What was the positioning of DDR within the peace process and in relation to other peacebuilding instruments? Which practical experiences, which implications made DDR programmes succeed or fail?
- If DDR programmes in post-conflict settings are an integral part of the peacebuilding process in view of the realisation of democratic conditions, a

⁵ Mason (2000) also speaks of DDR as a possible instrument of conflict prevention, p. 37. Despite the fact that the thought is not elaborated on any further, one can assume that the development setting, and thus longer-term conflict prevention, is meant.

⁶ cf. UNDPKO (1999), title "DDR in a Peacekeeping Environment". On the number of DDR programmes carried out in the framework of PKO/PSO, see Appendix 1.

⁷ cf. Chapter 2.3 and UNDPKO (1999). The "Integrated Approach", will soon be replaced by "UN Integrated DDR Standards" (IDDRS). See speech of J.M. Guéhenno, Under Secretary-General for PKO, to the 4th Committee of the General Assembly, 20 October 2005

market economy and the promotion of the rule of law⁸, what are the central conflicts of interest and aims that appear when the concept for and the implementation of such DDR programmes is designed, in particular in combination with other peacebuilding instruments? An important contrast, for instance, lies in the question whether DDR programmes have/need to limit themselves to primarily guaranteeing immediate security and stability (priority of a security perspective) or whether they should/can aim at a sustainable economic and social development (priority of a development perspective).

In a first step, Chapter 2 prepares the ground for a discussion of these questions: What is DDR today? What does the UN understand by an "integrated approach" of its DPKO? What understanding, which normative ideas and possibly 'hidden' interests form the basis for this approach?

The aim of the empirical-analytical part of the paper, in Chapters 3 and 4, is to shed light on the scope of possible settings and conceptual approaches. By doing so, cross-references between settings and concepts, that is the effects of certain context factors on conceptual possibilities of DDR, will be shown; the latter in particular with the help of practical experiences from actual case studies. Central to the final Chapter 5 is a discussion of conflicting interests and target conflicts as well as questions on the general direction of PSOs and 'embedded' DDR programmes.

1.3. Procedure and methodology

Since the end of the Cold War, dozens of DDR programmes have been carried out. (see Appendix). It would have been beyond the scope of this paper to analyse all of these DDR programmes in detail by evaluating the relevant studies. On the other hand, the aim of this paper ('Meta-study' on the current state of knowledge) requires the discussion of such broad analyses as a basis and thus a detailed evaluation of the experiences gained from DDR in post-conflict settings. When selecting the literature for this paper, I therefore chose a three-step approach: first, a detailed analysis of current case studies with the help of a differentiated, analytical pattern, second: a short analysis, summarising other important DDR processes and, third, the evaluation of the relevant 'general' special literature.

⁸ see, for instance Tschirgi (2004), p.5

i) Detailed analysis of case studies ('primary literature')

A select number of important, only recently terminated or started, DDR programmes has been analysed in detail with reference to various sources. The analytical pattern for this is characterised by the following:

- An analysis of the setting: conflict analysis, analysis of the post-conflict situation, profiles of the combatants and their units as well as characteristics of the actors responsible for demobilisation.
- An analysis of the conceptual approaches and an evaluation of the practical implementation (see Chapter 3 and 4 and a summary of these case studies' results in Appendix 2).

I have set great store by including 'external' evaluations, that is studies of institutes which were not involved in the implementation of the respective DDR programmes. To guarantee good comparability through a relatively homogenous criterion of assessment, I included, when possible, the reports of the renowned International Crisis Group (ICG) specialising in conflict analyses and –prevention. I was able to include results and studies up to the end of September 2005 (exception: current reports in the daily press).

Important, (but hesitantly) starting up DDR programmes or programmes that are currently in-line as well as programmes which have not yet been implemented decisively such as Haiti or DR Congo, have also been included in my evaluation. The attempt at answering the question why these programmes have been unsuccessful so far allows us to draw equally deep conclusions as an analysis of terminated DDR processes. All in all, seven DDR concepts and programmes have been analysed within the framework of detailed case studies – Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, DR Congo, Liberia and Colombia; the latter being of some interest due to its unorthodox approach. Due to the fact that these programmes have only just been terminated or started, they are hardly mentioned in the 'general literature' specialising on DDR ("secondary literature"). Furthermore, to include actual case studies is absolutely necessary if one wants to develop a fundamental understanding of DDR and to remain 'realist' in their evaluation.

ii) Short analysis, summarising further important DDR processes

Since the end of the Cold War, some DDR processes have been shown to be of particular importance for the design of concepts for following programmes. These are (1) post-conflict demobilisation in the framework of large-scale international military intervention on the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), (2) the DDR process during the PSO in Sierra Leone, (3) DDR programmes in Central America as of 1989/90 (in particular Nicaragua and El Salvador), and finally (4) large-scale demobilisation in Eastern Europe and the CIS after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These last settings are both directly connected with the end of the Cold War. Demobilisation in Eastern Europe did not take place in a post-conflict setting but became necessary in connection with the transition of authoritarian socialist systems and the reduction or the transformation of socialist mass armies, sometimes in view of their integration into the EU and/or NATO. Despite the

different setting, many approaches and experiences were valuable for the development of concepts of DDR programmes in post-conflict settings.

This short analysis is based on a broader pattern or analysis (context–concepts–experiences) and the evaluation of summarised studies, written in particular by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC).

Finally, I briefly looked at the soon-to-be-implemented DDR programmes in Aceh/Indonesia and Sudan and have ventured a prognosis as to their possible successes (see also Appendix 2).

iii) Evaluation of the respective specialised literature ("secondary literature")

The analysis and evaluation of DDR programmes in the 1990s resulted in a wealth of empirical information which is mirrored in an extensive 'general' specialised literature on DDR. The UN, and particularly its leading Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but also international organisations such as the World Bank or the International Labour Organisation (ILO), research institutes, national ministries and development agencies as well as private actors, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), have concerned themselves intensively with DDR and, in the course of this, also worked on guidelines on 'best practices' and drawn up 'lessons learned'. With this specialised literature and guidelines, most experiences gained with DDR programmes that have been completed for a number of years now have been analysed and collected. This holds true for both all in all successful demobilisations such as in Namibia, Mozambique or Rwanda and failed UN interventions in Somalia (1993), Liberia (1996) and Angola (1997).

In some countries, DDR programmes of comparatively moderate scope have been or are going on (for instance Central African Republic, Djibouti, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan). The literature on evaluations carried out there is limited and the 'general' specialised literature hardly refers to any of these programmes. This is why they were not considered in this paper, either. Another, very special situation and its influence on DDR programmes, namely that of Iraq has also not been included in this study.

Appendix 1 offers an overview of DDR programmes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War and their part in this paper.

iv) Interviews with one expert and one ex-combatant

To process, deepen and discuss the knowledge obtained from the case studies and the specialised literature, I have conducted two interviews:

- on 14 October 2005; an extensive telephone interview with Marc Remillard, Programme Manager for Parliamentary Assistance & Demobilisation of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), a

renowned DDR expert who was/is still involved in the design and implementation of DDR and SSR programmes, in particular in the Balkans;

- on 16 September 2005 in Aarau; Thomas Sunday Davies, who has been recognised as a political refugee due to the fact that he was a combatant of the former Liberian rebel movement ULIMO and later Head of Security with the Liberian Embassy in Lagos/Nigeria.

The purpose of these interviews was to include the perspective of an expert responsible for the design and implementation of DDR programmes as well as the perspective of a (former) combatant who was directly affected.

v) Forum and conference documents of the "Stockholm Initiative on DDR" (SIDDR)

"The ultimate goal of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR is to propose ways and means that can contribute to the creation of a predictable framework in which DDR processes can be planned and implemented"⁹: With this goal, the Swedish government brought numerous renowned experts and practitioners together. In three working groups, they discussed various conflicts and the conceptual makeup of DDR programmes, and worked out contributions to the most urgent questions. The SIDDR is limited to one year and its end is imminent.

The forum and conference documents, contributions and publications from the working groups as well as reviews of the meetings that have taken place are freely available and are therefore an important source of information, in particular with respect to the discussion of conflicting interests and targets as well as the general makeup of PSOs and DDR programmes. I used these records up to the end of October 2005.

⁹ see <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890>

2. DDR: TERMS, CONTENTS AND UNDERSTANDING

"The core of the problem is to replace the rule of men and guns by the rule of law and institutions"
Crocker (2005), p.60

To replace the rule of men and their guns by working institutions and the rule of law. This is how Crocker describes the overruling target of today's interventions in (post)-conflict settings. Which understanding is the basis for this approach, which is also known as "Peacebuilding Consensus" (see also Chapter 2.4)? What is the contribution of, the conceptual descriptions and the basic concept of DDR as an integral part of this consensus? A discussion of these questions forms the foundation and starting point in Chapters 3 and 4 for the analysis of settings and concepts.

2.1. What is DDR? (1): Terms and definitions

i) Some confusion: DR, D&R, DDR, DD&R, DRP, DDDR.... and DDDRR

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration – three terms which mostly stand for one joint process, three terms, which however, are used in literature in various combinations: DR, D&R, DDR, DD&R and DRP (Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes)¹⁰. One can even find the four- and five-letter abbreviations "DDRR" and "DDRRR", with the "Rs" standing for "Reintegration" and a subset of "Resettlement", "Repatriation" and "Reinsertion", thus naming additional parts of the reintegration process.

In the following, I will use the most common abbreviation "DDR", even if "disarmament" is basically a part of the demobilisation process¹¹ which, accordingly, would make the term "DR" to be more concise.

ii) The definitions of the components of DDR

The original definitions of the components of DDR – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – in their technical dimension first seem to be obvious and self explanatory. The following description of the terms and their contents is based on the common definitions of the UN, which are used in most literature and evaluation studies. The original definitions of the terms by UNDPKO can be found in Appendix 3.

- Disarmament is the – voluntary or coerced – turning-in of weapons. Not only combatants but also civilians can be in the focus of disarmament. Combatants

¹⁰ DR: see some publications of ICG, D&R: for instance Multi Country Demobilisation & Reintegration Programme (MDRP), www.mdrp.org, DDR: a large part of the literature, for instance Berdal (1996), UNDPKO (1999), DD&R: some publications by BICC, DRP: Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), DDDR and DDDRR: some publications by ICG.

¹¹ cf. Gleichmann et al. (2004), p.17 and Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.31

are often disarmed in especially established camps (the so-called "cantonment" or "encampment" principle).

- Demobilisation is the actual elimination of military structures and units and, on an individual basis, the discharge of the combatants from these units and the beginning of their transition into civilian life. This is regularly accompanied by support provided to fulfil their immediate needs. According to this definition, demobilisation is a short-term measure, geared to combatants (sometimes their families)¹².
- Reintegration is the process which should allow the demobilised ex-combatants to (re-)integrate themselves into family and society and to earn their living by productive work. Instruments for this are regular support payments, payments in kind, such as seeds, tools, education in schools or other training programmes, advice on which job might be suitable, whether self-employment or the foundation of small businesses could be an option. Reintegration is therefore a medium- to long-term measure both geared towards ex-combatants and civil society into which they are supposed to return¹³.

In the transition from demobilisation to reintegration, there are again other parts of processes, which originate from the 'long' abbreviation "DDRRR" mentioned earlier:

"Reinsertion" comprises the immediate, short-term needs of combatants and their relatives, if applicable, such as medical care, food aid, interim financial aid, etc.¹⁴.

"Resettlement" is the transfer and the repatriation of the demobilised combatant into his usual familiar surroundings or to a place of his choice. The term repatriation is used in particular with combatants involved in a conflict who are from another country and are being transferred to their home country after having been demobilised¹⁵.

DDR, however, is more than the sum of its technical components, more than the sequence of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. After a short digression to the change in the understanding of DDR which is closely linked with the development of 'modern' peace support operations (PSOs) and their normative funding, I will come back to the question of what DDR is in the interplay of its individual processes, what its contents and goals are or should be.

¹² cf. Adechi (2004), p.5

¹³ Adechi (2004), p.5

¹⁴ for instance B. Fusato (2003)

¹⁵ like, for instance, Rwandan combatants in the DR Congo, ICG Africa Report No.63 (2003)

2.2. "Old hat" or a "truly novel issue"?

"From Uniform to 'Civvies' "

The eighteen home-dispersal areas will each have its one or more "dispersal" stations.... The soldier will arrive here, of course, in his uniform.... Having handed in his arms, ..., he will receive a railway warrant for any further journey he may have to make, a cash payment on account of any pay outstanding, and an allowance for "civvy" clothes, also an out-of-work insurance policy and a ration book. From that moment the man will be automatically "on leave" for a month, during which his pay and family allowances will be continued. If he cares to get a job during that month, there will be nothing to stop him.

("How The Army Will Be Demobilised". The War Illustrated; 23 November 1918, by Basil Clarke; in: Baare (2004), p.1)

Handing in a gun, transition into civilian life, cash payment as a start to reintegration after the end of World War I in 1918 when the warring armies were able to drastically reduce their troops. DDR appears here as a well-known phenomenon the history of which goes back to whenever armies 'demobilised' their troops after a war. DDR, just old hat?

"DDR is a truly novel issue on the development and security landscape. Emerging in earnest in the late 1980s (the UN's first dedicated disarmament operation took place in Namibia in 1989 as part of the UNTAG initiative), it has now been applied as part of the standard 'post-conflict package' in dozens of conflicts."

(Pouligny (2004), p.14)

Here, DDR is presented as an instrument of the United Nations which was created only in 1989, after the end of the Cold War. Like this, DDR is indeed a "truly novel issue". The key to the solution of this apparent contradiction lies in the change of understanding and the goals of DDR.

While DDR in the quoted report of 1918 appears as a purely technical means to reduce the number of surplus troops at the end of a war, Pouligny presents DDR in an international development and reconstruction perspective, thus in a broader political context.

This change in the understanding and the direction of DDR is closely connected with the end of the Cold War and the evolution of peacekeeping interventions of the International Community. During the Cold War, demobilisation mostly took place after inter-state conflicts and by the (victorious or defeated) national army itself. The interests of national armies and (at best) their soldiers or veterans were in the focus of these activities. Peacekeeping then was an instrument for the containment and control of conflicts which could have presented a danger to the bipolar balance of power of the Cold War. Impartiality and national sovereignty were the most important principles. This peacekeeping approach of the so-called first generation consisted mainly of the dispatch of military observers that were to make sure that ceasefire agreements and the dispersal of troops in the context of intra-state conflicts, such as in Cyprus or Korea, were kept¹⁶. This principle of non-interference was of particular importance in security and military matters, therefore also for DDR.

¹⁶ see for instance Brahimi-Report (2000), p.3. Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.3f.

As of 1989, the "shadow of the Cold War"¹⁷ became less dense and there was a shift from inter-state "proxy wars" to intra-state conflicts, mostly in the so-called Second and Third world¹⁸. This led to a fundamental change in the understanding and concept of peacekeeping, namely towards a "complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars"¹⁹. With this, peacekeeping no longer limited itself to controlling peace in the sense of an absence of armed violence but, with an interventionist concept, laid claim to building the preconditions for a lasting peace in the sense of the establishment of a democratic background with the promotion of the rule of law. Modern peace operations increasingly represented complex interventions which are often referred to as peace support operations (PSOs). They transgress from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and comprise longer-term reconstruction and development operations²⁰. Originally, there was a sharp distinction between "peacekeeping" (operations of the so-called second generation without authorisation of the use of force, mandated by Chapter VI of the UN Charter; for example UNAVEM in Angola) and "peace enforcement" (operations of the so-called third generation which have authorisation for the use of armed force without a consensus of the warring parties to 'enforce' peace, mandated by Chapter VII of the UN Charter; for example Somalia)²¹. Recently, however, PSOs (in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, DR Congo) have been and still are furnished with a 'robust' Chapter VII mandate, therefore entitled to take military action to defend themselves, and to protect the population and humanitarian activities. However, one cannot speak of 'classical' peace enforcement, as the operations are conducted with the consent of the respective governments and (most) parties to the conflict. This change to a concept of missions that are consensus-based but with a robust mandate goes back to recommendations of the "Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" and its "Brahimi-Report" which was written under the influence of having seen Blue Helmets looking on helplessly or even being kidnapped themselves (Rwanda, Sierra Leone)²².

DDR developed into an elementary and integral part of this comprehensive and multi-functional, development-oriented and interventionist PSO approach, as is shown by the following selection of prominent declarations and statements from the bank of the East River:

¹⁷ Tschirgi (2003), p.2

¹⁸ Schlichte/Siegelberg (1997), p.132f.

¹⁹ Brahimi-Report (2000), p.3

²⁰ It is true that Brahimi does not use the term "PSO", however, he finds an excellent definition for it: "Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict." Peacebuilding there is "a term of more recent origin that defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war". Compare Brahimi-Report (2000), p.3. On the definitions of terms in connection with PKO/PSO, cf. glossary in Appendix 3.

²¹ cf. for instance Doyle (2001), p.532f.

²² see Brahimi-Report (2000), p.10: "Once deployed UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence." Doyle (2001) speaks of a "discrete" or "focused enforcement in the context of an agreed-upon comprehensive peace" and draws a sharp line between this approach and the peace enforcement approach in Somalia which was not consensus-based. p.533.

- Millennium-Declaration of the UN General Assembly: in the Chapter: "Peace, security and disarmament", the UN General Assembly declared "to take concerted action to end illicit traffic in SALW, especially by supporting regional disarmament measures"²³.
- UN Security Council: DDR is presented as a "well established feature of post-cold-war peacekeeping" that has proven to be "vital in stabilising a post-conflict situation, to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence ... and to facilitating a society's transition from conflict to normality and development"²⁴.
- Brahimi-Report: "The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants – key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence – is an area in which peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order." And: "Peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law; improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development; and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques"²⁵.
- UN Development Programme (UNDP): "The progress of demobilisation often becomes the heartbeat of a peace process, with success seen as the sine qua non for bringing renewed stability and its associated benefits"²⁶.

To sum up; since the end of the Cold War, DDR can no longer be understood as a broadly technical term in the context of troop reductions of national armies but as an integral part of modern PSO. Together with other instruments (such as reconstruction, democratisation, SSR, capacity-building, truth and reconciliation) DDR is therefore positioned in the broad development perspective of today's post-conflict peacebuilding.²⁷ The Integrated Approach for DDR of the UNDPKO – subject of the following section – is based on this and on the 'integrated' interplay of all actors involved.

2.3. The "Integrated Approach" of the UNDPKO

The UNDPKO has evaluated 14 DDR programmes that took place within the framework of PKO (until 1999). One of its main conclusions is: "Each conflict is unique". Nevertheless, the UNDPKO did formulate conceptual approaches with the title "Integrated Approach" which are supposed to be understood as general guidelines and

²³ U.N. Millennium Declaration, Resolution of the General Assembly (A/55/L.2); s. www.un.org/millennium/declaration (25 July 2005)

²⁴ UN Security Council (2001); confirmed in the UN Security Council (2005)

²⁵ Brahimi-Report (2000), p.7

²⁶ "UNDP and the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers", see www.undp.org/bcpr/archives/demobili.htm (20 July 2005)

²⁷ UN-DPKO (1999), p.26: DDR must be "fully integrated in an overall framework for the provision and assistance and opportunities for development."; see also Tschirgi (2003), p.2.

principles for DDR²⁸. In the past few years, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) within the UN has been given the actual job of coordinating the DDR section (monitoring, evaluation of practical experience, development of standards, etc.)²⁹. At present, the end of PBPU's cooperation with other organisations and agencies specialising in DDR seems to be imminent; the result of which is "Integrated DDR Standards" which are likely to replace the Principles and Guidelines of 1999³⁰.

In the Integrated Approach – or more precisely, the Comprehensive, Integrated and Coordinated Approach – DDR programmes represent a part of a "(n)atural continuum in the peace process"³¹. This implies on the one hand that a DDR process necessarily contains all three sub-processes and, on the other hand represents a time sequence where demobilisation follows disarmament and reintegration follows demobilisation³². The Integrated Approach of UNDPKO reflects a broad basic consensus on the conceptual direction of DDR; the same approach that is expressed in the well-known Practical Field and Classroom Guide on DDR – a co-production of the German GTZ (an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development), the Swedish National Defence College, the Norwegian Defence International Centre and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre³³.

i) Total concept

Disarmament and demobilisation are positioned at the beginning of the peace process, according to the above-mentioned Continuum, in the so-called Emergency Stabilisation Phase³⁴, while reintegration is to be allocated to the long-term development phase. At the transition of both central phases of the peace process is the repatriation of demobilised combatants into a civilian environment and the necessary interim financial aid (resettlement and reinsertion). To a large extent, disarmament and demobilisation are a matter of the military and mostly lie within the responsibility of a PSO. They are designed for a period of weeks or months and are accompanied by measures to secure the ceasefire and often the appointment of a transitional government. In contrast, in the longer-term reintegration process, different – mostly civilian – national and international actors are

²⁸ see UNDPKO (1999), p.23ff.

²⁹ "The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section serves as the home for Advisers and Focal Points"; cf. <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/> (20 Oct. 2005)

³⁰ cf. speech of J.M. Guéhenno, Under Secretary-General for PKO of 20 Oct. 2005 and <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/ddradv.aspx> (20 Oct. 2005): "In conjunction with other agencies and partners, the DDR Advisory team is currently developing DDR policies, guidelines, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and a DDR planning template". In addition, evidently a DDR Point of Contact has also been established that is to be understood as focal point for DDR activities within the UN; cf. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/PBPUDDR.htm (28 Oct. 2005; at that point no specific contents).

³¹ UNDPKO (1999), p.6

³² The following, however, opposes an absolute interpretation of this view. Despite the fact that indeed DDR processes mostly contain all components, one can most certainly imagine that demobilisation could happen without combatants having to turn in their weapons or demobilisation without a following reintegration aid, cf. Heinemann-Grüder (2005), p.178.

³³ Gleichmann et al. (2004)

³⁴ Gleichmann et al. (2004), p.25

involved. In parallel to this, peacebuilding activities, such as the holding of elections, capacity-building, economic and social reconstruction, etc take place (compare diagram of UNDPKO in Appendix 3). The following points are of particular importance within the entire concept³⁵:

- The most important basic data and framework conditions of the foreseen DDR process are to be anchored in the peace agreement (time-frame, organisation and implementation, responsibilities, monitoring, number of weapons to be collected and combatants to be demobilised, conditions for entry into the reintegration process, etc). With this a degree of transparency, security and predictability is to be created that binds the conflicting parties to the DDR process.
- An effective coordination of the various activities within the DDR process and also between DDR and various activities within the post-conflict peacebuilding process must be guaranteed. Central to the process in particular is the cooperation between military and civilian authorities and actors and the guaranteeing of a "smooth transition from emergency humanitarian assistance ... to long-term development"³⁶.
- The national, regional and local governments and civil society ought to be integrated as widely as possible and the political will of those directly affected is to be fostered.
- The needs of particularly vulnerable groups of persons both within the units of combatants (child soldiers, female combatants) and within civil society (victims of war, IDPs, etc.) must be taken into account.
- Adequate financing from the international donors is to be secured and the impartiality of the PSO must be guaranteed.

ii) Disarmament and Demobilisation ("DD")

"Disarmament and demobilisation should take place in the earliest stages of the peace process"³⁷. The purpose of disarmament and demobilisation is to prevent a relapse into war-like acts and to contribute to a secure environment for reconstruction to come.

In the Integrated Approach, the important elements of the disarmament and demobilisation process are:

³⁵ vgl. UN-DPKO (1999) p.5ff. and Gleichmann et al. (2004), p.21ff.

³⁶ UNDPKO (1999), p.95

³⁷ ibid, p.18

- An effective preparation and planning, in particular surveys on the number of combatants and weapons, the determination of a timeframe that is sufficiently flexible but also as precise as possible, the formulation of conditions for the admission of combatants to a DDR programme and the informing in advance of affected combatants and civil society.
- The construction of secure and functional assembly areas and/or quasi military cantonment sites in which the actual disarmament and demobilisation process is carried out, that is where combatants who are (willing) to be demobilised are registered, disarmed, questioned, advised, and finally dismissed and/or repatriated to a place of their choice.
- The granting of adequate reinsertion assistance such as cash payments, material aid, vouchers, etc. as well as the promotion of a family reunion.
- The establishment of structures for an effective control of the disarmament and demobilisation process with an equal participation of the parties to the conflict (national DDR and monitoring commissions with the participation of international and national actors as well as representatives of the parties to the conflict).
- If necessary, the implementation of weapons buy-back programmes (sometimes also called weapons-for-development programmes) with which, if necessary, weapons can be obtained from both the civilian population and not fully disarmed ex-combatants.
- Additional measures connected with the stemming of the use of and trade in weapons in the sense of an effective weapons management which, for instance, comprises laws, weapons embargoes or the control of transboundary weapons trade.

iii) Reintegration

While the Integrated Approach positions demobilisation at the beginning of the peace process, thus serving the formation of trust, the stabilisation of a fragile post-conflict peace and immediate security interests, reintegration – together with other peacebuilding activities – is seen in the long-term perspective of reconstruction and development. Reintegration programmes are not only geared to ex-combatants and their civilian perspectives but also to the development of civil communities to which combatants will return as well as the needs of victims of war and IDPs. In the Integrated Approach, reintegration programmes include in particular the following elements:

- a survey of both the wishes and capabilities concerning a future profession of ex-combatants and the needs of civil communities and their preparedness for accommodating ex-combatants,

- offering ex-combatants education and training (both in schools and vocational training), consulting and aid, support in self-employment and the granting of 'micro loans' for the foundation of small businesses,
- easier access to land with respect to a future activity in farming,
- the implementation of occupational programmes within the framework of work-intensive infra-structure and reconstruction projects, efforts in the fight against poverty, and the creation of jobs,
- considering at the same time not only the special needs of ex-combatants' relatives, child soldiers, female combatants and war-disabled combatants but of entire civil communities, particularly vulnerable persons as well as IDPs and victims of war,
- the fostering of the search for truth, justice and reconciliation.

In their extremely broad approach, the goals and DDR concepts contained in the Integrated Approach thus pursue equally short-term security goals and long-term development goals. This has two main implications which I will elaborate on a few times in this paper:

On the one hand there are major tensions between security and development goals. These can already be found in basic differences between the (military 'short-term') DDR process and the (civil, 'long-term') reintegration component of DDR³⁸. On the other hand, the goals of the Integrated Approach appear highly ambitious against the background of the difficult context of post-conflict societies in the developing world.

The Integrated Approach also stands for the change from the principle of non-intervention in 'internal affairs' to an interventionist role for the International Community – a change that itself mirrors the fundamental shift in the understanding of international policy.

2.4. Integrated Approach, Peacebuilding Consensus and Democratic Peace

PSOs want to bring peace, rebuild, and democratise³⁹. The focus of their activities is, at least it appears so, the pragmatic solution of political, social, humanitarian and economic problems in (post-) conflict societies in the developing world⁴⁰. The commitment of the International Community and particularly the rich industrialised countries is based on a special responsibility for humanity (and its protection) and human rights which results

³⁸ cf. Faltas (2005), p.8

³⁹ cf. UN Agenda for Peace, later complemented by Agenda for Democratisation and, Agenda for Development. S. Richmond (2004), p.88

⁴⁰ 'Problem-solving conflict resolution'; cf. Väyrynen (2001), p.6; similar: Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.2

from its privileged position⁴¹. From this responsibility to protect arises the concept of humanitarian intervention, with DDR being part of its standard remedies⁴².

It may be true that 'humanitarian interventions' are formulated as pragmatic problem-solving strategies and do not refer explicitly to certain normative concepts. However, when fulfilling this responsibility to protect, their aim is obvious: The end of armed conflict, the guarantee of (individual) human rights, democracy and the rule of law as well as, in general, principles and structures of a market economy. By attempting to disseminate and anchor certain values, 'humanitarian interventions' are implicitly based on strong norms, a 'hidden liberal agenda'⁴³ which became widely accepted worldwide in the 1990s. In allusion to the UN, various authors therefore refer to the 'New York orthodoxy', and to a "Peacebuilding Consensus" between the (Western) community of states, multinational organisations and NGOs⁴⁴.

While 'peace' during the Cold War mostly had a negative connotation and was understood statically as the 'absence of war', the liberal understanding of peace is broader by its attributed positive values and concepts of order, and more 'dynamic' due to the intended distribution of such values and concepts. A so-called 'democratic' or 'liberal' peace is the target.

This change and the emergence of the Peacebuilding Consensus was accompanied by a renaissance of liberal ideas under the collective term of International Liberalism after (neo)realist ideas on international policy dominating during the Cold War had lost their persuasiveness in the bipolar 'balance of fear'⁴⁵. The concept of democratic peace can in fact be attributed to the republican liberalism and spiritually goes back to the Kantian idea of "eternal peace"⁴⁶. The neo-realistic 'Westphalian' doctrine of non-interference which coined peacekeeping and DDR during the Cold War, gave way to the strong interventionist concept of humanitarian intervention aiming at establishing and distributing a so-called liberal or democratic peace⁴⁷.

When comparing different PKO and PSOs, it is noticeable that the International Community is not always prepared to provide the same amount of funds and willing to make the same sacrifices. First of all, it is obvious that, for instance, the cause for interventions in the Balkans was not exclusively the intrinsic responsibility to protect. Due

⁴¹ In this context, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) speaks of the "responsibility to protect" by which "democratic and peaceful states take a leading responsibility for ensuring the interests of common humanity"; cf. Chandler (2004), p.60, with reference to ICISS: *The Responsibility to protect. Research, Bibliography, Background*; International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001, p. 129-38

⁴² Tschirgi (2004), p.4f. The term "Humanitarian Intervention" is to be understood here in a broad sense and not purely limited to military interventions with a humanitarian mission (for instance NATO intervention in Kosovo).

⁴³ Bellamy (2004) p. 19

⁴⁴ "Peacebuilding Consensus": Richmond (2004), p.83; "New York Orthodoxy": Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.9

⁴⁵ Schiedler (2003), p.169

⁴⁶ Hasenclever (2003), p.204. Chandler (2004), p.60, defines 'Liberal Peace' as follows: Liberal peace theorists stress that an international peace and individual rights are best advanced through cosmopolitan frameworks whereby democratic and peaceful states take a leading responsibility for ensuring the interests of common humanity".

⁴⁷ Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.4, and Chesterman (2003), p.2, therefore also speak of a "post-Westphalian conception" in which national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention no longer have the same importance.

to their geographic closeness to Europe, conflicts and their victims in this region were more in the spotlight of the (media and) public. It was also in, at least, Europe's internal-, migration-, stability- and economic policy interest to intervene. In addition, after 9/11 both in Iraq and Afghanistan security deliberations of powerful UN Security Council member states in the 'War on Terror' have played and still play an important role⁴⁸. International commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Afghanistan was and still is a lot more comprehensive and – in the case of Bosnia with some delay – more decisive than in settings without comparable strategic importance, such as Rwanda, the DR Congo or Darfur. These discrepancies cannot be convincingly explained by the concept of humanitarian intervention – human rights would universally be of equal importance. From a critical perspective, such inconsistencies in the implementation of the peacebuilding consensus lead to the objection that the mentioned 'hidden' agenda does not solely defend liberal values but also a 'realistic world order'. "Modern versions of peacekeeping can be considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace"⁴⁹, as knowledge and concepts are never neutral but "always for someone and for some purpose"⁵⁰. As liberal peace is both a moral concept and a concept of order and constitutes an existing world order, its defence and distribution not only serve the 'liberal' responsibility to protect but also realistic world policy to maintain the status quo. Therefore, it has become very difficult since 9/11 and the implications connected with this, to clearly separate 'liberal' humanitarian interventions from the 'realistic' war against terror⁵¹.

2.5. What is DDR? (2): More than the sequence of "D-D-R".

Section 2.1 closed with the remark that DDR is more than 'just' the sequence of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. After having positioned DDR in the context of today's understandings of peacebuilding, I am now coming back to the question about the nature of the 'more'.

i) The phases of DDR and their interrelationships

We are dealing here with the complex interplay of very different processes and the relationship of D-D-R- to other instruments of the peacebuilding process (see Section 4.2), but also with the relationship of the phases 'within DDR'. There is inherent tension between demobilisation and disarmament on the one hand and reintegration on the other as there is a fundamental difference between both components. 'DD' is generally led by the military and clearly geared to combatants and their immediate demilitarisation. 'R' lies generally within the responsibility of civilian actors and is a lot more open and vaguer with respect to timeframe, addressees and targets. Nevertheless, a sustainable success of

⁴⁸ cf. Chesterman (2003), p.8, and Tschirgi 2004, p.1

⁴⁹ Pugh (2004), p.41

⁵⁰ "All theories have a perspective"; see Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.6f., with reference to the work of Robert Cox.


⁵¹ Chandler (2004) p.61f. In the case of Afghanistan, US interventions and the implementation of a DDR process are direct consequences of 9/11. Until today, strategic deliberations play an important role in the DDR process in Afghanistan where certain warlords are considered 'allies' in the fight against terror - or at least try to play this tune, which makes their demobilisation more difficult.

demobilisation and disarmament is just as dependent upon a successful reintegration as is entering a reintegration programme upon previous disarmament.

ii) Targets and contents

However, the contents and the short-, medium- and long-term targets of DDR also need to be addressed⁵², the various facets of which are shown in Figure 1:

Figure 1: 15 facets of DDR⁵³



⁵² cf. Berdal 1996, p.34 ff. and ICG Africa Report No.98 (2005), p.18, in which ICG delivers a refreshingly pointed presentation of DDR with respect to West Africa: "The DDR process can be broken into three stages. The first is that of buying peace.... the second stage is (or should be) that of community integration, which shifts the focus of disarmament from a numbers- focused "more is better" fantasy of mopping up all weapons (patently impossible in West Africa today) toward the more intangible but durable goal of "putting arms beyond use". It is part of rebuilding infrastructure and facilitating the process by which communities, and through them the national economy, come back to life, security is restored and people (including ex-combatants) start new lives. The final stage is that of long-term economic growth and the creation of jobs that will draw young men away from criminal and violent livelihoods."

⁵³ Sources of the quotes: 1) Pouligny (2004), p.6; 2) SIDDR; 3) Grüder (2005), p.180; 4) SIDDR; 5) SIDDR / Adechi (2004), p.6 / UNDP; 6) ICG (2005), p.18; 7) Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.30; 8) Baare (2005), p.31; 9) UNSC (2001), p.12; 10) ICG (2005), p.18; 11) UN-DPKO (1999), p. 8; 12) Specht (2003), p.5, and Nübler (1997), p.21; 13) ICG (2003), p.8, 14) Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.30; 15) Grüder (2005), p.178

The purpose of disarmament and the first step of the demobilisation process are to immediately keep and consolidate a ceasefire. They are therefore geared to short-term security needs and, in particular, confidence-building. Contrary to this, the purpose of reinsertion and first steps in reintegration, such as training, education, monetary assistance, transport to their home, etc is to point out to (ex-) combatants the perspectives of a new life without a weapon. The short-term objective to buy peace with disarmament, weapons buy-back programmes and cantonments takes second place to the goal of replacing armed violence as a means of supporting oneself and of settling conflicts ('putting weapons beyond use') with civilian alternatives. Finally, the goal of longer-term reintegration efforts that also have the community as their target (family, village, region, country) is to reduce the likelihood of conflicts flaring up again by creating economic and social preconditions into which ex-combatants can be integrated; an, at best, permanent life as civilians with which they can secure their livelihoods. All in all, DDR plays the *role of a 'hinge' between security and development policy*, and a key role in the reconstruction of *the state monopoly of violence*.

iii) Technique - Politics - Social engineering

The right technique – a 'good' technical and logistical implementation of DDR, the disarmament process, the establishment and management of camps, for instance, is essential. However, DDR is also a political instrument with which a fragile peace of a ceasefire can be sustainably consolidated, with which conflicts can be transformed from a violent to a civilian level. DDR finally is also 'social engineering'⁵⁴, a process within which – from a sociological view – attempts are made to "transform male aggression into productive energies"⁵⁵. Contrary to demobilisation activities during World War I which served the interests of the affected armies, DDR in a modern peacekeeping context have the aim to dissolve military structures and networks and to terminate the dependence of combatants on their commanders⁵⁶.

All measures (deterrence and incentives, political perspectives, peace dividend, prospects for reintegration) that are part of DDR must appear worthwhile for combatants and their commanders, and this both with regard to security and their economic situation. Weapons (and their use) "have always an economic as well as a security value for those who possess them"⁵⁷ it is the aim of DDR programmes to reduce this value and to offer more secure and promising civilian alternatives. Vice versa, successful demobilisation increases the costs for a resumption of the fighting considerably – combatants would again have to be recruited, weapons bought⁵⁸.

⁵⁴ Pouligny (2004), p. 14 and 19, who points out that a certain return towards considering DDR as a political technical tool of relief organisations has taken place.

⁵⁵ Pietz (2004), p. 18, with reference to Specht: "Channelling male aggression into productive activities"

⁵⁶ see Heinemann-Grüder (2005), p.190

⁵⁷ Berdal (1996), p.17

⁵⁸ cf. the case of failed demobilisation and peace negotiations in Angola 1994: "During the disarmament period, UNITA kept its military force largely intact and was able to move quickly on the offensive following the elections". Compare Hare (2004), p.219

DDR in its entity is finally both means (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as technical and political instruments) of the peace process and its end (demobilised ex-combatants who have definitely stopped using their weapons, are integrated in civilian life and participate productively in the civilian economy⁵⁹).

⁵⁹ "DDR both as a means and an end in a peace process"; compare SIDDR, Working group 1, "DDR aspects in Peace Processes and Peace Agreements" (www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890; 10 August 2005).

3. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF SPECIFIC CONTEXTS

"The nature of the war determines the nature of the peace" (Colletta/Nezam (1999), p.5)

Seen as "each conflict is unique"⁶⁰ a detailed analysis of the context of each case is of utmost importance. But it is not only the nature of a (current, stemmed or terminated) conflict which determines the peace the securing of which DDR wants to contribute to. It is also the economic and social situation of the respective post-conflict societies, the structure and organisation of the units to be demobilised or the means and interests of the intervening actors that have a major influence on the possibilities and conceptions of DDR.

It is obviously not the same to demobilise the Angolan UNITA after a military defeat and an agreed transformation to a political party, or to disarm an innumerable amount of militias in the anarchy of the 'Democratic' Republic of the Congo and to re-establish a certain amount of state control. Neither can reintegration programmes for the disciplined, mostly well-trained members serving under strict command structures of the Eritrean army be transferred to members of the infamous, drug-addicted "Small Boys Units" of the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. Finally, an SFOR unit of originally 32,000 men responsible for a good 50,000 km² in Bosnia had, or a US intervention force in Afghanistan in the War on Terror has, entirely different means at their disposal, than 200 Uruguayan peacekeepers⁶¹ covering an inaccessible expanse of Kivu and Ituri.

"Failure of analysis, at different levels of a mission, has a number of consequences"⁶². In the following, I will give an overview of sub-settings and factors influencing the DDR process which have proven to be critical for the evaluation and thus relevant for the conception of 'fitting' DDR programmes. This overview is based on the empirical evaluation of seven case studies (Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Colombia, DR Congo) and the short analysis summarising other DDR processes in Eastern Europe/CIS, on the Balkans, in Central America and in Sierra Leone (see Section 1.3 and Appendix 1). The patterns of classification used have been divided into the following sections:

- Conflict analysis: profile of conflicts, parties to the conflict and causes of a conflict.
- Post-conflict situation: security situation, peace process, state, economy and society as starting position for the DDR process on the macro-level.
- Combatants and units: 'mapping' of the various units of combatants, their organisation and structure as well as social profiles of combatants to be disarmed and reintegrated (characteristics of the 'objects' to be demobilised).

⁶⁰ UN-DPKO (1999), p.3

⁶¹ Sources: NATO (www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm) and www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/News/04/test.html (22 October 2005)

⁶² Pouligny (2004), p.12

- Mandate, capacities, profiles and interests of those actors responsible for DDR programmes (characteristics of the demobilising 'subjects').

The ascertained criteria are illustrated with the help of examples from the case studies. By cross-reference to the conceptual chances of DDR, an integrated analytical perspective is to be maintained.

3.1. Conflict analysis

There is no question about the fact that a detailed understanding of a conflict, and a resulting careful analysis of this conflict are indispensable preconditions for the design of peacemaking strategies and DDR programmes in post-conflict settings. "Conflict literacy" is "conditio sine qua non"⁶³.

Table 1 gives an overview of the most important criteria for an applied conflict analysis – illustrated with concrete examples from the case studies⁶⁴ – similar to the ones contained in known guidelines⁶⁵. While the German GTZ differentiates between the analysis of the profile of the conflict, the actor-related stakeholder analysis and the analysis of the origins and trends, the OECD guidelines differentiate between structural factors, decisive events and changes as well as phases of conflict and conflict dynamics. Once peace and demobilisation initiatives were implemented and have failed, an in-depth analysis of the causes of and reasons for the failure is indispensable.

Table 1: Context factors for the analysis of conflicts

Conflict settings	Criteria	Concrete examples
Conflict profile	Duration, expansion and complexity Kind of disputes, intensity, dimension of violence and polarisation Position and perception of parties to the conflict History of the conflict and its dynamics, conflict transformation, key events Special characteristics (such as 'communal conflict')	Conflict profile Angola: colonial war of independence turns into proxy war in the Cold War and resource-driven conflict about state power. Strong personal component: death of Savimbi, therefore, key event for the termination of the conflict. Conflict profile Burundi: political conflict about the control of state power. Strong polarisation along ethnic conflict lines. "Communal conflict" and deep-seated distrust between the parties to the conflict. Militarisation of civil society by the construction of "fortified villages"

⁶³ Colletta/Nezam (1999), p.7. Swisspeace (2004) uses the term "*conflict sensitivity*".

⁶⁴ This data is based on a synthesis of information from various sources. This is why now and in the following I will refrain from giving the sources on case-specific information – an exception are quotations. The used sources can be found in the bibliography in Appendix A5.

⁶⁵ cf. DAC OECD (2001) and GTZ (2001): The profile analysis is to answer the question on expansion and consequences ("What?"), the situation of the conflict lines ("Where?") and the origin and development ("When?"). The stakeholder analysis asks about primary, secondary, external actors and their interests and positions (conflict mapping, question "Who?"). The cause- and trend analysis deals with the reasons for conflict, factors prolonging conflict, transformations and scenarios ("Why?").

Conflict settings	Criteria	Concrete examples
Actors	Primary / secondary actors Interests, positions and profiles	Liberia: Primary actors: former army of Charles Taylor and rebel movements LURD, MODEL. Secondary actors: local warlords.
Causes of the conflict	Primary causes of the conflict Factors prolonging conflict	Eastern DRC: primary cause in Rwandan genocide and the flight of Rwandan units ("génocidaires") to the DRC. Secondary cause: prolongation by the exploitation of resources by various armies and militias
Mediation efforts	Reasons and causes for the failure of previous peace and demobilisation initiatives Tractability of the conflict	Sierra Leone, Liberia until 1999: disregard of the regional dimension of the conflicts and insufficient PKOs with a robust mandate Colombia: intractable conflict that has been going on for decades

Since 1945 more than 90 percent of all armed conflicts have taken place in the so-called Second and Third World. With the end of the Cold War, the number of intra-state wars has decreased significantly; since then, most wars have resulted from intra-state conflicts and still do. These wars are no longer interpreted as proxy wars in the bipolar system of the Cold War but mostly as ethnic, religious and/or cultural conflicts or conflicts driven by resources⁶⁶.

Typical characteristics of many such intra-state or transnational conflicts, also called 'post-national state' conflicts is their – often – long duration, the "sequence of armed disputes, fragile compromises and renewed armed conflict", a tendency to a decentralised, informal economy, militias and warlords instead of standing armies as well as lacking monopolies of violence. In such conflicts that are cynically called "low intensity wars", the categories of war and peace can no longer be strictly separated, and violence "diffuses into all areas of society"⁶⁷. Situations during which troops of the International Community have been acting as conquerors or warring parties, such as in Somalia, Kosovo or Afghanistan, are the origin of a very special conflict setting. Upon evaluation of the case studies and the known literature, the following characteristics or differences have proven to be critical:

i) "Greed vs. grievance"

The conflict in Liberia is often described as a 'resource war'⁶⁸. Looking more closely, however, one can find more differentiated reasons. During the dictatorship of President Samuel Doe, access to political decisions was monopolised by the clan of the President and its ethnic group. The exclusion, both socially and politically, from power due to ethnic considerations played a leading role in the cause of the conflict. After the overthrow of Doe, the conflict became increasingly 'commercialised' and criminalised by rival warlords who financed their activities through looting resources. The end of the

⁶⁶ cf. Bonacker/Imbusch (2005), p.115, Schlichte/Siegelberg (1997), p.132ff. The latter point out that when interpreting the causes for conflict, reservations are appropriate as the perception tends to generalise and neglect 'hidden' causes for the conflict. Ballentine/Nitzschke (2004), p.3, too, warn against models of explanation that are too reductionist. Also confer Münkler (2003), p.16: "War feeds on war, and so must be fed by war."

⁶⁷ Ehrke (2002), p.6.

⁶⁸ cf. for instance Studdard (2004), p.3

conflict was characterised by more political activity when the rebel movements LURD and MODEL, that is those parts of society and ethnic groups represented by them, again fought against the monopoly of power by Charles Taylor⁶⁹. This example illustrates how political and economic reasons for a conflict can be superimposed on each other and can take turns in the framework of one or more transformation processes. The categories 'greed' and 'grievance' represent the difference between conflicts that are driven by profit from lootable resources and conflicts which can be traced back to political and social opposition⁷⁰. The dichotomy 'greed vs. grievance' must not, however, be allowed to lead to reductionist attempts at finding an explanation for the conflict; critics, for instance, blame the UN for having concentrated far too much on the 'greed' approach in the mid-1990s in the framework of their efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone and Angola, thus neglecting underlying socio-political causes for and the complexity of the conflicts. A differentiated analysis therefore has to ask questions beyond the immediately visible motives for a rebellion, that is questions about the condition of state structures at the time the conflict started and possible hidden reasons for conflict.

ii) "Communal conflict"

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina reopened not only wounds inflicted by human rights violations in the name of Communism, but even older traumata which had been experienced by the (national, ethnic, religious or social) identity of parts of the population. Events in the pre-communist conflicts of the two World Wars have been deeply embedded in the "canon of a collective's remembrance". Communism could thus be compared to a superficial (and partly flaked-off) varnish applied to the population⁷¹. It is important in view of gaining an understanding of a conflict, and thus of designing current DDR programmes, to be aware of this and to recognise those conflict lines and causes which affect the collective memory and the identity of the affected peoples, ethnic or social groups. It is such conflict lines which stand out by a high degree of polarisation, and particularly a diverging perception of the part of the parties to the conflict⁷². Such "communal conflicts" are generally long-lived, difficult to solve and represent great challenges with regard to establishing mutual trust: trust that is a necessary precondition for weapons collection. Such aspects of a communal conflict have – unfortunately – been an important part of numerous intra-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War. One

⁶⁹ Interview with the former Chief of Security of the Liberian representation in Lagos, T.S. Davies, on 16 September 2005. Cf. ICG Africa Report No. 87 (2003)

⁷⁰ cf. Ehrke (2002) and Ballentine/Nitzschke (2004), p.3ff.; the latter use instead of "greed" the definition "loot-seeking rebellion" and for "grievance" the "justice-seeking rebellion". By doing this, they also point to the implication of certain resources. So-called "lootable resources" such as wood, alluvial diamonds or drugs which can be directly exploited without much investment in infrastructure encourage the extension of a conflict by self-financing as well as the fragmentation of the parties to the conflict (p.4f.).

⁷¹ cf. Diner (2000), p.233: "The memory of the past is connected to the effects of collective memories." Compared to the crimes of the Nazi regime, the crimes of Stalinism faded more quickly because they 'tied on' artificial classes and not to characteristics shaping the identity of historical collectives. On the 'collective memory', refer also to Ropers (1997), p.209.

⁷² cf. Crocker et.al.(2004), p.103 on the central meaning of perception: "It's the parties' perceptions...that shape their decisions"; and. Berdal (1996), p.12: "Communal conflict is perceived to involve fundamental questions of identity and the we-they distinction is clear-cut and overriding". Further on: "Of principal concern here is the perception of the nature of the conflict by the parties involved, and the extent to which these perceptions influence attitudes to, and the outcome of, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts".

characteristic example for this is Burundi where in the context of deep ethnic conflict, numerous massacres and the Rwandan trauma, years of persistent diplomatic mediation were necessary to soften the mutual mistrust and to induce both a workable peace- and a demobilisation process.

iii) Regional and transnational connections of conflict

Peacekeeping missions and DDR programmes mostly refer(red) to one state. In West Africa, this has proven to be disastrous due to the fact that DDR programmes in 1996 solely referring to Liberia not only failed but also contributed to the development of transnational networks of warlords who had evaded persecution with respect to illegal trade in weapons and the looting of natural resources. This in turn led to a surplus in cheap weapons and a major destabilisation of the neighbouring countries, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire⁷³. However, DDR programmes can also positively effect situations in neighbouring countries. It was only because of the peace process and the demobilisation of the RUF in Sierra Leone that the position of Charles Taylor in Liberia was weakened so decisively that an agreement could be reached that made him go into exile⁷⁴.

Therefore it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration influencing factors from neighbouring countries such as regional war economies, transnational networks and the meaning of 'borderlands' without clear state control when analysing conflict and when planning peace-making strategies, peace-bringing and DDR concepts, if necessary on a regional level. The "Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme" (MDRP) financed by the World Bank follows such a regional DDR approach in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the implementation of which, however, has mostly remained on a national level, apart from the exchange of experiences⁷⁵.

If a conflict is still ongoing, one has to pose the question in the framework of conflict analysis, whether the preconditions for a peacemaking initiative and/or implementation of a DDR programme apply or could be created. In the Colombian context, the conflict went on for decades; polarisation and mutual distrust is deeply seated. Additionally, the paramilitary and guerrilla commanders find themselves in a position of power, both in military and economic terms, which makes them consider the risks of the peace process to be high. Therefore, the conflict is considered to be 'intractable'⁷⁶. On the other hand, the lack of contact with people who have the authority to speak on behalf of the entire fraction can also make a conflict appear to be intractable, as seems to be the case in the DR Congo due to the fragmentation between and within the parties to the conflict.

⁷³ cf. Studdard (2004), p.4f. and 12f.

⁷⁴ Interview with the former ULIMO combatant and Chief of Security of the Liberian representation in Lagos, T.S. Davies, on 16 September 2005.

⁷⁵ Examples for such 'borderlands' (cf. Studdard (2004), p.10) can be found in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire) or between Afghanistan and Pakistan. See also www.mdrp.org (08 July 2005)

⁷⁶ On the "intractability" of conflicts, please refer to Crocker et al. (2004) and Crocker (2005), p.64ff.

3.2. Post-conflict analysis

While conflict analysis tries to determine the causes of a conflict from a historical point of view, post-conflict analysis describes those criteria that characterise the original situation and the concrete framework conditions for DDR. It is therefore a situative analysis of the present, at the time of planning and/or implementation of a DDR programme. The focus of post-conflict analysis lies in criteria and factors on the macro-level, that is the position and future prospects of the peace process, the security situation as well as the current state, economic, societal and social context. The actual 'subjects' and 'objects' of the DDR process, the implementing actors and the units and combatants to be demobilised will be dealt with later.

Table 2 contains an overview of the most important sub-settings and influencing factors with regard to post-conflict analysis as a starting point for the DDR process. These are deeply influenced by the characteristics of the preceding conflict. 'Post-conflict' does not mean that the causes for a conflict have been settled and that the conflict has been solved for good. 'Post-conflict' merely means that the parties to the conflict have decided to let events unfold and/or a transformation of the conflict into a different, mostly non-military, level has already happened⁷⁷.

Table 2: Context factors in post-conflict analysis

Contexts post-conflict analysis	Important factors	Concrete examples
Security situation	Ceasefire: agreements and their observance Power constellations Public security and order Capacities of national security and/or peacekeeping forces, monopoly of violence Security situation in the regional context Proliferation and availability of SALW, weapons trade	Burundi: various ceasefire agreements, step by step inclusion of most parties to the conflict Afghanistan: Stationing of international forces (ISAF), which, however, cannot guarantee security all over the country Angola: Military victory and superior strength of the government army Haiti: widespread banditry, general insecurity Liberia: unstable situation in the neighbouring countries Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Colombia: Wide proliferation of SALW in the drugs trade and rural civil population ('Self-defence committees')

⁷⁷ Berdal (1996), p.6f.

Contexts post-conflict analysis	Important factors	Concrete examples
Peace process	<p>The way that the conflict was terminated</p> <p>Peace agreements: Background, scope and context</p> <p>Political will, degree of trust of the parties to the conflict</p> <p>Veto players and spoilers</p> <p>Risk that acts of war will flare up again</p>	<p>Liberia: "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" between Charles Taylor, LURD and MODEL due to international pressure and mediation</p> <p>Burundi: Problem of enormous distrust between parties to the conflict and ethnic groups of the population</p> <p>Colombia: Paramilitaries in the power position of a 'veto player'</p> <p>Liberia: Sending of the main 'spoiler' (C. Taylor) into exile to Nigeria</p>
State, economy and society	<p>State institutions, capacities in administration and infrastructure</p> <p>Economic situation and structure, resources and perspectives, war economies and networks</p> <p>Society: social, ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics, war as social order</p> <p>IDPs, consequences from the war, traumata as well as reconciliation and communities' willingness to receive ex-combatants, for instance</p> <p>Size of territory and accessibility</p>	<p>DR Congo (Kivu, Ituri): 'Failed state'. Hardly any state presence and infrastructure</p> <p>Angola: War economy for years and monopolisation of the exploitation of resources by the parties to the conflict</p> <p>Liberia: "Daunting challenge of rebuilding from 'Ground Zero' " ⁷⁸</p> <p>Liberia: Patriarchal law on land and marriage resulting in a difficult situation for young men</p> <p>Burundi: Great population density, 1 million refugees and IDPs, major traumata and ethnic rifts due to massacres against civilians</p> <p>DR Congo: difficult access, great expanse of land</p>

Some particularly important sub-contexts and critical influencing factors will be analysed in detail in the following:

i) Key factors: security and political will

The intention of DDR programmes is to create peace and security, to consolidate in the longer term; their implementation, however, requires (generally) a secure environment, the keeping to a ceasefire as well as the will for peace of the parties to the conflict. Security is just as important a key factor for the prospects of success of DDR programmes as is the political will of the warring factions: "Political will among the parties involved remains the chief criterion for success". And: "Integral to any demobilisation programme is the need to establish a safe environment⁷⁹".

With respect to DDR programmes, the personal security of the (ex) combatant is an important factor. Precondition for their willingness to turn in their weapons is their trust in the 'fact' that their security is guaranteed when they have turned in their weapon(s) and after they have been demobilised.

The political will of the units and combatants to be demobilised can indeed complement the purpose of a PSO, namely to guarantee security in any case. In Bosnia, the political will of important circles within the former parties involved in the conflict has been and still is not very strong. Through an unequalled military presence and the deterring

⁷⁸ National Transitional Government of Liberia (2005), p.9

⁷⁹ Berdal (1996), p.21 resp. 24

potential resulting from this, however, NATO succeeded in taking over military control and in guaranteeing security – at least to a large degree⁸⁰. Contrary to this, UN forces in Burundi have a more limited military capacity by far. By the constant progress in the negotiation- and peace process, the political will of important parties to the conflict has, in the meantime, been strengthened to such a degree that it was able to carry out DDR programmes despite a smaller deterring capacity of UN forces.

ii) Peace after a military victory versus after "Symmetry of power"

The end of a conflict is decisive for the success of a peace process and the DDR programmes⁸¹ embedded therein. In Angola, for instance, a "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed in 2002 against the background of a military victory of the government troops over the UNITA guerrillas (who had been 'robbed' of their leader). In the following period, the government controlled both the peace- and the demobilisation process, and the role of international actors was limited mostly to mediation, observing and financing.

In Burundi, on the other hand, there was a complex balance of power between the parties involved before and during the peace process. Therefore, confidence-building measures are just as important in the negotiation and design of DDR programmes as the premise that the existing symmetry of power is not modified either in favour or against one party to the conflict. The question of the right moment for DDR is also a decisive factor. While it would often be disastrous to start comprehensive demobilisations which touch the military potential of the parties involved (so-called 'hard issues') too early, so-called 'soft issues', such as the demobilisation of child soldiers, would indeed be suitable confidence-building measures and could start early on⁸².

iii) (Post-) war orders

Wars and conflict cause their own social and economic orders that do not become null and void simply because fighting has ceased. They do not merely represent the collapse and disintegration of a peaceful order which needs to be re-built in the peace process. Therefore it is absolutely mandatory to recognise the patterns of the economic and social orders resulting from a conflict and influencing the post-conflict situation when planning and designing concepts for peace processes and DDR programmes⁸³. Part of these patterns are war and shadow economies by military and/or criminal networks which can

⁸⁰ According to Baare (2005) the great military presence and the deterring potential accompanying it was one decisive factor of the DDR concept which otherwise had hardly been coherent (p.27).

⁸¹ cf. for instance Heinemann-Grüder (2005). Berdal (1996) also makes the fundamental distinction between the situation of "comprehensive political settlements, agreed and negotiated under international auspices", and a sub-context in which "the responsibility for demobilisation has been assumed by governments victorious in civil war or otherwise not under direct military threat";p.9f

⁸² SIDDR, Meeting v. 10-12. Nov. 2004, Contribution of the OSCE; www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890 (19 September 2005), and Working group 1; www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890 (19 September 2005)

⁸³ cf. for instance Berdal (1996), p.14ff. "*Grassroot war economies*"

be found in particular in Liberia and Angola⁸⁴, social orders such as loyalties to local warlords in Afghanistan, or social disasters such as traumata and the problem of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which have a substantial impact, especially with regard to reintegration perspectives of combatants⁸⁵.

iv) Failed - and shadow states

The setting of a 'failed state' has not only proven to be particularly difficult with respect to a successful implementation of DDR programmes but also to be a cause of numerous conflicts when central state power has ceased to exist which would normally be vested with the monopoly of violence and which could uphold "law and order in the territories ruled by it"⁸⁶. In this constellation of failing or failed states in particular, one cannot separate conflict from post-conflict. Instead of clear conflict lines there is often a strong fragmentation and decentralisation which makes strategies more difficult both for the reestablishment of the monopoly of violence and for peace negotiations⁸⁷. Experiences made with peace processes and DDR programmes show that in this context the intervention of peace forces can only then be successful when they are able to build up a considerable threat potential – thus have the sufficient number of troops available and act with sufficient authority. Extensive PSOs with a robust Chapter VII mandate have succeeded in Afghanistan and Bosnia – with great effort to guarantee a minimum of security – whereas in Haiti and the DR Congo despite the presence of UN troops a situation of general violence prevails where not even the most immediate security goals (ceasefire, weapons-hand-in activities) are attained.

The sustained build-up of and the bringing of peace to 'failed states' can only be achieved if the same structures that have led to the failing of the state order are changed: "It is crucial to understand the potential for oscillation between shadow state and failed state." Therefore, during the peacebuilding process in the post-conflict setting, one must avoid the re-establishment of such a shadow state the institutions of which do not produce public infrastructure and services but largely serve to camouflage individual interests⁸⁸.

v) 'Veto-players' and 'spoilers'

Within the framework of a post-conflict analysis and when preparing for DDR programmes, it is extremely important to, on the one hand, identify those actors whose cooperation and support is absolutely necessary due to their position of power (so-called

⁸⁴ cf. for instance ICG Africa Report No.87 (2003) on Liberia, where it is pointed out that the war in Liberia was led by "the criminal elements of society" (p.29)

⁸⁵ cf. Pouligny (2004), p.7

⁸⁶ Ehrke (2002), p.15

⁸⁷ Berdal (1996) goes even so far as to state that "[w]here central authority has been too fragmented for a settlement to be reached and where the lack of nation-wide security has been deemed to require coercive action to disarm the warring factions" (p.7)

⁸⁸ cf. ICG Africa Report No.87 (2003), p.8, and Ehlers (2002), who in an economic analysis speaks of "shadow states characterised by the lack of public goods or the presence of arbitrary negative externalities" (p.17).

'veto players'⁸⁹) and, on the other hand, recognise– and if necessary isolate – those persons and groups which attempt to sabotage and thwart the peace process at any cost (so-called 'spoilers'⁹⁰).

Particularly difficult are constellations where both veto-players and spoilers are one and the same, that is when a person or group in the position of power of a veto player opposes the peace process, thus trying to thwart it. It is therefore no coincidence that the peace processes in Angola and Liberia only progressed after the death of Jonas Savimbi or the decisive weakening of the military power and the following ousting of Charles Taylor – also a result of the successful demobilisation of the RUF in Sierra Leone.

3.3. Characteristics of combatants and units ("Objects")

It is not only the number of combatants to be demobilised and their weapons that are decisive determinants for the planning and implementation of DDR programmes, but also the structure and organisation of the units and the social profile of the combatants. Generally in DDR processes combatants and their commanders have to be convinced of the fact that civilian perspectives outweigh the security and economic value of weapons ownership and use⁹¹. The decision of who needs to be offered which securities and perspectives ultimately depends on the structure of the units and the social profile of the combatants.

i) Profiles of combatants to be demobilised

While in the East European context demobilisation meant mostly the reintegration of officers of socialist mass armies with a relatively high social prestige, in Liberia countless child soldiers have to be reintegrated into civil societies and transferred to a working or training process. Polls in the framework of the demobilisation process in Angola showed that the majority of combatants to be demobilised wished to work as farmers in their home region and to return to their family and their home village community. Many uprooted Liberian combatants (many of whom have a university student background!) indicated that they wanted to remain in the capital, Monrovia. Such polls, carried out during many DDR processes, represent the foundation for the design of reintegration offers responding to the needs of those to be reintegrated. The demobilisation and reintegration of hardened, long-year combatants and commanders for whom war has been the usual and long-year business and basis for their existence and social status is particularly difficult. Liberia's most hardened fighters, for instance, have not only been fighting in Liberia but also took part in conflicts in neighbouring countries – and that to a significant degree. It is feared that they have again managed to evade the latest

⁸⁹ cf. Tsebelis (2002). The 'veto player' approach was developed by Tsebelis with respect to the functioning of democratic institutions. However, the term 'veto player' can also be used to adequately describe a corresponding position of power in post-conflict settings and peace processes.

⁹⁰ cf. Bellamy/Williams (2004/2), p.189, with reference to Brahimi, who also questioned the traditional neutrality and impartiality of peacekeeping forces towards so-called spoilers.

⁹¹ Berdal (1996), p.17

demobilisations and have fled to Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire⁹². The problem of 'what to do with such hardened fighters and commanders' is a particularly important issue in Northern Ireland. The demobilisation of the IRA's 'hard core' that for years created and kept a position of power (based on violence) within the Roman Catholic communities has proven to be extremely difficult up to today – and this against an economic background of an EU member state and not of a developing country.

ii) Organisation, structures and loyalties; profiles of fighting units

The characteristics of units are also a decisive factor for DDR activities – apart from the characteristics and individual needs of the single combatant. The actual state, their inner cohesion, the structures and the organisation are decisive factors that determine who agreements on DDR can be negotiated with and to whom incentives need to be addressed.

In comparatively strictly organised and hierarchical units and armies, such as those dominating in Burundi and Angola, DDR agreements can and have to be negotiated with the central command. On the other hand, it has shown in Afghanistan that loyalties with the mostly extremely heterogeneous units mainly lie on a local, tribal or even personal level. Correspondingly, it was and still is indispensable for the success of the DDR process in Afghanistan to induce the local authorities to cooperate. Finally, in failed states settings with highly fragmented and little disciplined units (for instance the 'criminal gangs' in the DRC, Liberia or Haiti) these incentives mostly have/had to be geared to the individual combatant.

Settings that are particularly difficult – surprisingly so at first sight – are power struggles within the units and weakened inner cohesion. The position of the commanders and thus the scope for action of possible contacts in the peace and DDR process is weakened considerably by this⁹³.

It is also important to know about the number of units that need to be demobilised and their relationship with each other. In Angola, only one unit, namely UNITA, was demobilised – by their victorious opponent – whereas in Burundi, in a context of deep mutual distrust between strictly organised militias, demobilisation had to be carried out separately, and each militia was responsible for the security of 'its' DDR camp.

iii) Transparency: the basis for successful DDR programmes

Problems and deficits of many DDR programmes lie in the lack of information and transparency concerning the number of combatants and weapons and the organisation of the units. While in Angola and Central America information on the number of combatants to be demobilised and the weapons to be collected was quite precise and reliable, and therefore formed the basis for the concept and implementation of DDR programmes, there were only estimates in the case of the DR Congo. In Liberia,

⁹² see ICG Africa Report No.87 (2004), p.11, on the "regional storm" in the eye of which Liberia is situated.

⁹³ see Crocker (2004)

uncertainties about the number of combatants and weapons led to an extensive misuse of the DDR programmes in the sense that, indeed, more combatants were prepared to be demobilised, that is to receive the respective payments, but only comparatively few weapons were actually turned in. By indicating much higher numbers of combatants in their fighting forces, warlords in Afghanistan tried to increase their political weight in view of imminent political negotiations. The implementation of DDR programmes remains insecure as long as there is no clarity on the numbers of combatants to be disarmed and their weapons to be turned in; therefore, a framework dealing with this problem ought to be put down in the respective agreements wherever possible⁹⁴.

Table 3 gives an overview of the most important criteria for the characterisation of combatants and their units:

Table 3: Context factors on the profile of units and their combatants

Settings, combatants and units	Important factors	Concrete examples
Mapping of the units	Number of units to be demobilised Relationship between the different units (polarisation, distrust)	Angola: Two units of combatants (government army and UNITA) Burundi: Fragmentation into numerous party militias; extreme political/ethnic polarisation
Characteristics of the units to be demobilized	Size, number of combatants, composition, weapons Information concerning the number of combatants and weapons (transparency) Command structures and organisation Current state and inner cohesion of the units Loyalties of the combatants Support and respect within the population, connection to civilian communities	Afghanistan: reasonable suspicion that numbers indicated by warlords of 'their' combatants are much higher than in reality. Only estimates of the number of existing weapons Burundi: Generally strict organisation of numerous party militias Afghanistan: Loyalties on a local, clan and personal level DR Congo: Weakening of and tensions within the Rwandan Hutu Kosovo: Members of the 'Liberation army' are generally perceived to be war heroes Haiti: "Criminal gangs"
Social profiles of the combatants	Social, geographical and ethnic origin Duration of fighting activities, influence by war Age structure Family background Female combatants and child soldiers, non-fighting members of units Needs, ideas about the future, preferences	Liberia: According to estimates and polls, 35% of combatants are former university students (!), 27% farmers. A 'hard core' of combatants that have been fighting for 10 years. "Small boy units" militia of Charles Taylor. Eritrea: Comparatively many women soldiers; generally high level of education Angola: Desire of the majority of combatants to return home and work in farming

⁹⁴ cf. UN-DPKO (1999), p.5

3.4. Profiles of the responsible actors ("Subjects")

i) Actors and their interests

The DDR process in Colombia is the responsibility of the government of Alfonso Uribe and was implemented in the framework of an agreement with the paramilitary units that are to be demobilised. International involvement and support is limited to an observing mission of the OAS. Who has what interests is widely debated. While the government calls the demobilisation process a step in the direction of "democratic security", sceptical observers consider the process to be merely a cover for a further institutionalisation of paramilitary influence⁹⁵. On the other hand, multinational PSOs are present in many post-conflict settings, and many international organisations and agencies, (UN sub-organisations, the World Bank, ILO, etc.), development agencies (GTZ, USAID), national actors (transitional government, parties involved in the conflict, civil society) and private 'sub-contractors' (IOM) are involved. The scope of 'own', national control of a DDR process is mainly determined by other contextual factors, such as the way the conflict ended, local capacities, etc.

The UN put their demobilisation programmes in the context of humanitarian interventions that are to solve the problems of violence in the Third World. The fact that PSOs and DDR programmes also serve the interests of the intervening actors – be it humanitarian interests determined by domestic policy and due to public pressure or strategic interests⁹⁶ – has already been discussed in Chapter 2.4. Against this background, one can see that the strong commitment in Afghanistan is connected with the strategic importance of the country in the War on Terror. The fact that the PSO only followed a military invasion by the US and strategic alliances between US troops and certain fractions in Afghanistan has also prejudiced the status of impartiality of DDR programmes⁹⁷.

ii) Means, capacities and financing

It is obvious that the number of military personnel in a PSO as well as the financial, personal and logistical resources have an important influence on opportunities and prospects for the success of a DDR programme⁹⁸. The promised resources are on the one hand determined by local capacities and the interests of the intervening parties. On the

⁹⁵ cf. Human Rights Watch (2005)

⁹⁶ cf. in this regard Crocker et al. (2004), p.27ff. The different interests have also implications with respect to procedure and targets of the intervening parties. The humanitarian interest, determined by national politics and consequently geared to publicity 'at home', to immediately - and with short-term effect - end massacres and save human lives does not always lead to measures geared to sustained peace-making.

⁹⁷ cf. ICG Asia Briefing No.35 (2005): "The US-led coalition has relied on militia commanders in its military operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban" (p.i)

⁹⁸ cf.. Doyle/Sambanis (2005), who identify "three key factors that characterise the environment of the post-war civil peace". Apart from conflict characteristics and the remaining 'local capacities' after the war, it is "the amount of international assistance" such as mandate, military personnel and financial aid (p.4). A very detailed overview of the financial means provided to most post-war DDR programmes, the donors and financing mechanisms (loans, trust funds, etc.) can be found in Ball/Hendrickson (2005/1), Appendix 2, p.31ff., in the framework of the Working Group 2 of the SIDDR.

other hand the International Community's willingness to support and to pay is greatly determined by the transparency of the DDR process, its progress and the perspectives of the entire peace process, and, last but not least, the responsibility of the actors involved.

iii) Institutional and contractual embeddedness

Finally, the contractual and/or legal framework on which DDR is based is of utmost importance. In how far have the parties involved agreed on a comprehensive peace accord? Is this guaranteed under international law, such as by UN resolutions? Are there DDR specific agreements and regulations on a timeframe, the number of combatants to be demobilised, a sufficiently precise framework for the implementation and the monitoring? In how far is DDR part of national law? A good institutional embeddedness and guarantee reduces uncertainties and imponderabilities of a DDR process by a large degree, which, in turn, can raise the chances of success by far⁹⁹. The UN Security Council therefore has taken DDR into consideration for a number of years now, and this systematically in the framework of its resolutions on PSO. Meanwhile, DDR has also become part of nearly all peace agreements that came into being due to international mediation¹⁰⁰.

Table 4: Context factors on the profile of implementing actors

Context responsible actors	Important factors	Concrete examples
Institutional embeddedness and mandate	"Legal framework" and peace agreements (unilateral, bilateral, multilateral) Embeddedness of DDR in peace agreements, DDR specific rules and accords Guarantee by international law (UNSC)	El Salvador: Precise guidelines on scope and timeframe for the demobilisation of the guerrillas and the reduction by half of the military personnel of the government army in the peace agreement PSO: Mandate secured by UNSC resolutions, weapons embargo.
Profile of the actors involved	Personal, logistic and military capacities and resources, commitment of the International Community, presence of a PSO Budget(s), donors, financial framework, mode of financing: Multidonor Trust Fund" or financing in the framework of a (limited) PSO? Interests and motives (humanitarian, strategic or regional security/governance motives?)	Angola: Existing state capacities and resources. DRC: No state authority Afghanistan: Actual military conquest by US troops. Broad military and civil commitment of the International Community, PSOs with a robust mandate Bosnia: Originally up to 32,000 soldiers with SFOR soldiers. MONUC: In 2000 merely 5,537 Peacekeepers Liberia: No secure financing for reintegration. Open UNDP Trust Fund Bosnia/Kosovo: Stability interests of the EU. Afghanistan: "War on Terror" and its implications Colombia: Interest of the US in the fight against the illegal economy based on the drug trade; no support for the national DDR process because of respective amnesties..

⁹⁹ cf. Gleichmann et al. (2004), p.19.

¹⁰⁰ cf. on this matter corresponding compilations in connection with the SIDDR, Working Group 1; www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890/a/43966;jsessionid=ahjv9e0nlbUf (03 September 2005)

3.5. Overview: Context groups

"The nature of the war determines the nature of the peace" – and this is not all. Conflict lines and causes co-determine the profiles of the warring parties; the way a conflict was terminated determines the balance of power in the post-conflict situation; strategic interests influence the scope and decisiveness of international intervention. These are only a few examples for the numerous links between a diverse number of context factors. The constellations taken here, therefore, must not tempt observers to view the different context factors as independent of one another. Quite the contrary, a – simplified and summarised – overview of DDR processes of the past years and decades shows four main categories of often connected context factors (context groups)¹⁰¹:

i) Military victory of one party to the conflict (Angola, Rwanda, Uganda)

If a conflict is ended by a final military victory by one party to the conflict, there is generally no great risk of fighting resuming in the short or medium-term; the security situation seems settled. The balance of power is clear (and on one side), and at least the victorious party has working command structures. The preconditions for the involvement of a PSO are not given.

ii) End of a political conflict by entering into a peace agreement (Mozambique, Burundi, Aceh, Sudan)

As the conflict was not decided by military means, there is a certain balance of power between the parties involved upon entering into the peace agreement. Depending upon the degree of polarisation, the status of confidence-building and political will, one can either assume that the peace process is secured or one has to concede that the security situation is fragile. In general, international commitment is not geared to a robust mandate but to diplomatic means, to reconstruction and the long-term consolidation of peace.

iii) Ceasefire/Peace in the context of a 'failed state' (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan)

A ceasefire and a fragile peace can be assured by the political will of the major parties to the conflict and/or a PSO with a sufficiently robust mandate, depending on the polarisation or commercialisation of the conflict as well as the scope of the collapse.

¹⁰¹ This following and complementing the three "sets of circumstances" drawn up by Berdal (1996), p.7f., (Peace agreement between the parties - DDR after final victory of one party - fragmentation, collapse of state and public order).

iv) "Failed State", no working agreements on peace or ceasefire
(DR Congo, Haiti)

There is no sufficient political will to keep to a ceasefire and, due to the strong fragmentation of the parties to the conflict, there are no representatives that one could negotiate with to achieve a workable peace accord. The International Community cannot or does not want to intervene in a way that would guarantee security all over the country and that would enforce any kind of peace.

The case of Colombia – a singular case of a totally different approach the results of which remain to be seen – cannot be allocated to any of these context groups.

The following chapter will mostly deal with the implications of the described settings to the design of concepts for DDR programmes and their components.

4. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

Some of the principles and practices of the Integrated Approach (see Chapter 2.3), such as central criteria for the DDR process in the peace agreement, which should be determined in as detailed a way as possible, or the establishment of reliable monitoring commissions – including the participation of the parties to the conflict – are undisputed in their intention, but difficult to implement. Numerous DDR programmes in a peacekeeping environment have mostly followed the Integrated Approach in their basic structure. A rapid disarmament and demobilisation by a PSO with a robust mandate at the outset of the peace process together with the appointment of a transitional government with the participation of the parties to the conflict and the build-up of a new national army ought to create the necessary preconditions both for general elections and reintegration efforts by civilian actors, thus contributing to longer-term peace consolidation and sustainable development. Taking Mozambique, Sierra Leone or Liberia as an example, one can speak in a certain sense of typical DDR processes within the framework of typical modern PSOs. In the concrete implementation within the specific setting, however, major deviations often occurred in these DDR programmes, some wanted (to take account of certain specific circumstances), some unwanted (when certain approaches failed or preconditions in the fields of logistics, finances and personnel were lacking to carry out the concepts on a wide scale).

Other DDR programmes already differed in their basic conceptual direction. For instance, the basis for a military peace enforcement mission with an attempted coercive disarmament of militias in Somalia is of a totally different nature to, for instance, the peace and demobilisation process in Burundi, where diplomatic efforts lay at the heart of the process. The attempt to demobilise Colombian paramilitaries that operate from a position of military strength differs fundamentally from the disarmament and demobilisation process of the defeated Angolan UNITA.

The following will throw light on the conceptual possibilities and their scope and juxtapose different approaches. At the same time, I will try to find cross-references to situation-specific settings, mainly with the help of practical experiences from the case studies. The empirical-analytical evaluation is again carried out by way of a systematic framework which is divided up in the areas of sequencing, connection with other peacebuilding instruments, ownership, area-specific approaches as well as exit strategies. Table 5 will give an overview of the scope of conceptual DDR approaches.

4.1. Positioning of DDR in the peace process ("Sequencing")

As mentioned before, the sequence of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the integrated approach is clearly defined, with disarmament and demobilisation occurring immediately after the ceasefire and peace agreement, thus very early in the peace process. The main purpose of 'DD' is thus to act as a confidence-building measure in view of the continuation of the peace process. In the context of a fragile ceasefire and peace agreement, it is also 'DD's task to make use of the right moment to prevent a reignition of the conflict by starting and completing disarmament and demobilisation activities as early

as possible¹⁰². Precondition for the success of this approach is, however, the sufficiently robust equipment of the PSO in view of the establishment of a secure and stable environment.

Table 5: Overview of possible conceptual approaches

Concept areas	Possible approaches
"Sequencing": Positioning of DDR in the peacebuilding process	Demobilisation as impulse for the peace process (Colombia) Quick demobilisation at the outset of a peacebuilding process (Liberia, Sierra Leone and others) Step-by-step demobilisation during the entire peacebuilding process (Burundi)
Conceptual combination with other peacebuilding processes P	
DDR - SSR	DDR mostly without SSR (Nicaragua, Angola) DDR mostly in the service of SSR (Eastern Europe/CIS) SSR mostly in the service of DDR (Kosovo Protection Corps) Same importance of SSR as DDR (Afghanistan, Liberia, Burundi)
DDR - SALW - Control	DDR and measures against the proliferation of SALW (Embargoes, Monitoring, legislative measures)
DDR - Democratisation	DDR as precondition for the holding of elections (Liberia, Afghanistan, etc.) Political collaboration in the transitional government and political parties as incentive for DDR (Afghanistan, etc.)
DDR - Justice/ascertainment of the truth/reconciliation	(Part-)amnesty as incentive for demobilisation (Mozambique, Sierra Leone) Participation in ascertaining the truth as precondition for participation in DDR programmes (MDRP)
DDR - Development cooperation and reconstruction	Reintegration programmes as part of a national development strategy (reconstruction of infrastructure, community development, etc.)
DDR - Public relations	DDR as part of a comprehensive information strategy
Ownership, control, responsibility	DDR mostly as a national responsibility (Colombia, Angola) DDR as a shared responsibility (Burundi, Afghanistan) DDR mostly as an international responsibility, namely one PSO (Liberia, Sierra Leone) civil vs. military ownership Relation of 'DD' and 'R' financing concepts
Area-specific approaches	Individual vs. collective demobilisation/disarmament Consent-based or coercive demobilisation/disarmament (Burundi vs. Somalia) "Who is a combatant?": open vs. strict admission criteria (Liberia vs. Burundi) Reintegration: offer-oriented, needs-oriented, community-oriented
Exit strategies	Exit options and strategies Strategies for the transition to following processes of peacebuilding and reconstruction

¹⁰² Heinemann-Grüder (2005), p.180: "In most cases, only immediately after the end of a war can major results be achieved".

In the peace-bringing concept of the Colombian government, the intended and already started demobilisation of the paramilitaries stands right at the beginning of the process. With the conflict still going on, what is lacking in Colombia is a broad ceasefire or even peace agreement supported by all parties to the conflict. All demobilisation efforts to date are based on, on the one hand, an amnesty offer to the combatants as individuals and, on the other hand, on agreements between the government and the paramilitary units. The Colombian government considers (or 'sells') DDR to be a spark that 'ignites' the peace process by breaking the spiral of violence¹⁰³. This approach takes place in a conflict setting in which the paramilitary units to be demobilised find themselves in a position of military power on the one hand, and a position of major economic and political influence on the other, which they attained by the use of violence and the wide control of the drugs trade.

While the disarmament and demobilisation process in Sierra Leone or Liberia was carried out within weeks and months and completed before the general elections, DDR programmes in Burundi only started a number of years after the beginning of the peace process and the appointment of a transitional government¹⁰⁴. It was impossible to implement DDR programmes in Burundi unless the parties to the conflict had at least some confidence in the peace process and the disputes were transformed onto a political level. The implementation of DDR in Burundi is therefore not primarily a confidence-building measure for the later peace process but rather seems to premise the confidence built by the peace process. In Burundi, DDR was carried out step by step, during long-term planning and in parallel to the entire peace process that was designed to last a number of years which, in turn, did not primarily build upon the deterrence potential of a robust PSO but mostly on diplomatic means and persistent international negotiations. The process has proven to be successful against the background of the difficult and polarised initial situation of a communal conflict. The setting in Burundi is/was characterised by hard, ethnically formed conflict lines and a fragmentation into numerous more moderate and more radical parties and their armed militias that, however, can rely on intact command structures. As a matter of fact, this as well as the mostly political contents of the dispute, only made a solution through negotiation possible. Due to the strong ethnic polarisation as a consequence of numerous massacres and under the influence of the Rwandan genocide, a deep seated distrust was and still is felt between the parties to the conflict that were facing each other in a kind of military stalemate. In such a setting, the keeping of the balance of power is of utmost importance. As long as the combatants and commanders – as they perceive it! – do not see a way of guaranteeing

¹⁰³ Concept of the "*Seguridad Democrática*" of the Uribe government in which DDR is presented as an effort to eliminate one factor of violence from the conflict (ICG Latin America Report No.8 (2004), p.1). As already mentioned before, the honourableness of this approach and thus the seriousness of the DDR process is quite controversial. HRW in particular considers the demobilisations to date as a farce which merely serves the interests of the paramilitaries (protection of their assets, prevention from being extradited to the US, certain transformation of the movements). Despite all the understanding of the criticism voiced, one has to say that HRW in the present situation of an intractable conflict cannot make any other suggestions for a concrete implementation and enforcement of the peace and demobilisation process. Measured against the popularity of Uribe among the population, the 'price is right' (broad amnesties and no punishment). Cf. *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 21 October 2005.

¹⁰⁴ However, one has to stress that in the first years of the peace process DDR was certainly an issue. In the peace accords, the disarmament and demobilisation of the units was equally included as was the build-up of a new army with the participation of the formerly excluded Hutus; one merely has or had to await the implementation of the demobilisation process.

their personal security and their (political) influence by civilian and political means, they will hardly consent to being disarmed and demobilised¹⁰⁵. In the context of a polarised political conflict on the one hand and a balance of power between hierarchically structured units of combatants on the other, it will hardly be possible to initiate disarmament and demobilisation at the beginning of a peace process as the degree of security and trust necessary for the implementation of DDR will only be restored in the course of the peace process. An excellent example for this is the peace process in Northern Ireland. Only at the time of (nearly) the end of the peace process when Sinn Fein was increasingly integrated into the political arena was the IRA prepared to hand in their weapons and have them destroyed¹⁰⁶.

In principle, DDR can also be considered in the situation of a continuing conflict, and a lack of a peace agreement can also be considered as a 'prelude' to a process that brings peace to the region, as can efforts to induce de-escalation. Successful implementation of such an approach of DDR 'right in the middle' of conflict situations, however, are lacking; what remains is to await the results and the course of the Colombian 'experiment'.

When there is a ceasefire or peace agreement, therefore actually a state of a post-conflict situation, the positioning of DDR in the peace process is very much determined by the context (see above).

Finally, it needs to be pointed out that DDR processes in PSOs have not taken the key role ascribed to them by the UN DPKO. The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia hardly referred to DDR, and NATO did not have an explicit mandate in this respect. There were no such DDR programmes, instead, extensive and spontaneous demobilisation of "ad hoc wartime formations" or a "chaotic disintegration of the armed forces" took place¹⁰⁷. While DDR in Bosnia was not a priority, PSOs in the DR Congo and in Haiti did indeed provide for DDR programmes. However, due to inadequate preconditions (a difficult environment, the insufficient scope of international commitment), they have not yet been implemented.

4.2. Interplay with other instruments of the peace process

The term Integrated Approach already implies that DDR is to be one of many instruments in the peacebuilding process. When I presented this approach in Chapter 2.3, I also pointed to other peacebuilding instruments which are applied in the starting period of the peace process in parallel to disarmament and demobilisation or during a later phase in parallel to reintegration (see also Figure A1 in Appendix 3). In this Chapter, other possible conceptual links will be looked at; the link is often already made within the

¹⁰⁵ see: SIDDR Working Group 1: "While addressing DDR may be important, maintaining the power symmetry of the parties is necessary for the talks not to break down".... "Sequencing will therefore have to move in tandem in a peace process" (www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/66/53234f9f.pdf (03 September 2005).

¹⁰⁶ see: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 September 2005 "Abrüstung der IRA vollzogen".

¹⁰⁷ Pietz (2004), p.23 and 25. Baare (2005), p.27, comments on this that NATO in Bosnia mainly succeeded in taking full military control and guaranteeing security because of its huge presence. "This was one of NATO's strengths, identified in the otherwise less than coherent DDR process".

framework of a peace agreement in which the parties involved agreed on a DDR process. Chapter 5 will deal with target conflicts and dilemmas.

i) DDR and SSR

- The reform or reconstruction of the security sector (SSR), and particularly the reconstruction or re-building of the army and, often, the police sector is very close to DDR¹⁰⁸: Most DDR programmes were and still are connected with such measures. The scope and method of such a conceptual link, however, differ very much:
- Latin America: DDR programmes in Nicaragua and El Salvador were not accompanied by any interventions in command structures and the composition of the government armies; the guerrilla movements were the only 'armies' that were demobilised. Demobilisations therefore mostly represented a transformation of these armed units into unarmed political movements. In Colombia, there was even a marked increase in military personnel in the government army while at the same time efforts were made to demobilise paramilitary groups.
- Eastern Europe/CIS: DDR programmes here were not set in a post-conflict context and are therefore not the focus of this paper. However, to grasp the entire scope of possible interaction between DDR and SSR programmes it is worth taking a quick look at the situation in the East. Demobilisation took place with the target of creating slimmer, less expensive and more effective security forces; therefore, DDR was an integral part of SSR and mainly in its service.
- Angola: It is true that combatants of the dissolved UNITA were integrated into the victorious government army (FAA). However, the actual power structures in the FAA remained mostly unaffected by this. Therefore the incorporation of UNITA combatants merely presented a reintegration measure rather than serving as a deep-seated reform of the Angolan armed forces.
- Liberia, Afghanistan, Burundi, etc: Simultaneously to the disarmament and demobilisation of combatant units, the build-up of a new, uniform, national army and police force took place with the intention of, on the one hand, having them composed of a representative share of ethnicities and of efficiently and impartially observing the security needs of the population. On the other hand, combatants of former parties to the conflict were/are to be integrated into these security forces – in the context of a depressed (war) economy often the only realistic option for a large number of combatants to be

¹⁰⁸ see Gleichmann (2004): SSR "is fundamental to the DDR process..." (p.21) "It is obvious that disarmament measures need to be accompanied by other programmes that provide increased security" (p.43) with the goals of SSR being "the creation of effective accountable forces and supporting structures to bring security to people"; see Brzoska (2005), p.96.

introduced to a long-term paid occupation. In these cases, goals are pursued, both in terms of a reform of the security sector and in terms of reintegration, which can complement but also contradict each other. These dilemmas and target conflicts resulting from the complex relationship between DDR and SSR will be dealt with in Chapter 5 in more detail.

- Kosovo, DR Congo: The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a) transformed into the unarmed Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in the framework of respective agreements, b) it was granted a 50 percent share in the staffing of a new Kosovo police force. In terms of security policy, the necessity and scope of the KPC has not been proven, and it is the KLA's understanding that it does not represent a protection corps but the precursor of a future Kosovar army¹⁰⁹. The formation of the KPC must therefore be considered as a reintegrative measure and political price for the (incomplete) disarmament and demobilisation of the KLA. In Ituri, DR Congo, MONUC and the national DDR commission (CONADER) also attempted to 'buy' the commanders of the militias by offering them military posts in Kinshasa – another (failed) approach that did not go along with the goals of SSR.

ii) DDR and measures against the proliferation of SALW ("SALW-control")

In the framework of its efforts to achieve stability and peace, the UN Security Council makes great efforts to control the possession and the cross-border proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)¹¹⁰. SALW control contains measures such as weapons embargoes which are agreed upon routinely in the context of the mandate of many PSOs, the fostering of stronger controls and an effective monitoring of weapons im- and exports, or collection or destruction activities. In his "Report on Small Arms"¹¹¹ addressed to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan points to the central role that DDR plays in this context, where DDR can be considered as part of an expanded strategy to limit the uncontrolled possession and trade of SALW and where measures to control the proliferation of SALW can complement DDR programmes. When DDR is considered an attempt to reduce the number of weapons in a certain conflict setting, and SALW control an effort to stop the cross-border or 'cross-setting' flow of weapons, both concepts appear to have parallel features. From the point of view of an economist, SALW control would be allocated to the supply side whereas DDR programmes intend to curb the demand for weapons, in particular. Be it as it may, it is decisive that DDR depend on (other) measures dealing with the containment and control of the proliferation of SALW and vice versa. This is shown most urgently in the regional conflict settings such as in West Africa, where easy access to SALW on the one hand makes/made DDR processes more difficult and incomplete disarmament on the other hand stimulate(ed) the weapons market in neighbouring countries. This again emphasised

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Marc Remillard, DCAF

¹¹⁰ Definition of SALW according to the "Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector Reform" (GFN-SSR): "All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability" (www.gfn-ssr.org/good_practice.cfm?id=91&p=21, 10 October 2005). The majority of conflicts to date have been fought mostly with SALW; cf. Münkler (2003), for ex.

¹¹¹ UNSC (2005)

the importance of regional (DDR) approaches. An evaluation of the case studies, however, seems to indicate that SALW are still available in nearly all post-conflict settings¹¹²; which suggests that DDR as a needs-oriented approach is more effective than prohibitive control measures.

iii) DDR and democratisation

The establishment of a democratic system is the main political target of the Peacebuilding Consensus. Main instruments for this are the appointment of a transitional government of 'national unity', the support of a multi-party system, and democratic elections.

In its makeup, DDR as a means for conflict transformation, can be directly linked to the transformation of fighting units into civilian political parties and movements. This, for example, has been explicitly formulated in the new Afghan legislation, where it is laid down that official political parties were/are no longer allowed to support armed units and were/are not allowed to maintain associations with combatant militias. The concept of a complete demobilisation therefore is the precondition for the registration of former parties to the conflict as political parties, and vice versa, the chance of being able to 'officially' exert political influence is also meant to be an incentive for the parties involved to turn in their weapons.

It is true that the concept of DDR is not that explicit when it comes to holding free, democratic elections – often considered the most important milestone on the way to democratic peace. However, DDR and free elections both depend upon and complement each other: The successful completion of disarmament and demobilisation ('DD') is generally an indispensable precondition for the holding of free elections. On the other hand, the perspective of gaining/winning an adequate/appropriate political participation via the elections and thus being able to defend one's power position gained by military victory or secured by military means could serve as an incentive and central precondition for the units' will to be demobilised. 'DD' and free and fair elections together are considered proof of a successful transformation of the conflict to a civilian, political level where DD generally takes place at an earlier stage than the holding of general elections¹¹³.

A similar situation can already be found in the transition phase where, in most cases of a military stalemate (Liberia, Burundi, for instance), the formation of a government of national unity is agreed upon, in parallel to the initiation of the DDR process. Demobilised commanders of the former parties to the conflict generally hold key positions in these transitional governments. The leader of the Liberian rebel movement MODEL, for instance, is Foreign Minister of the Liberian transitional government, and the leader of the most important Afghan militia has been appointed Minister of Defence in the Karzai government. The appointment of a transitional government appears to be an instrument to maintain the balance of power in the transitional period and also during

¹¹² To express it in more casual terms: wherever there is demand there is supply - especially in such a profitable 'business' as the trade in weapons

¹¹³ Even in Burundi, where DDR had been designed to run in parallel to the entire peace process, substantial demobilisations were a precondition for the holding of general national elections.

the DDR process. The 'appropriate representation' in the transitional government is thus to be interpreted as the political price for conceded disarmament.

These posts in the transitional government are also a reintegration measure for the highest cadres, a transformation that corresponds to their own understanding of their social prestige.

iv) DDR and justice, compensation and the search for truth

The Colombian 'Law on Justice and Peace' foresees major restrictions in the criminal prosecution of paramilitaries who consent to being demobilised¹¹⁴. During the demobilisation process itself, and with the support of a survey conducted by the attorney general's office, it is decided whether charges are brought against them or not. In Colombia, the question of a penalty for (war) crimes is thus the central connecting factor for demobilisation. This central factor corresponds to the paramilitaries' evident interest in preventing charges being brought against them and, in particular, in preventing extradition to the United States. No demobilisation without (extensive) amnesties – it is true that this link is particularly striking in the Colombian setting but it is not unique: "The political negotiations that end civil wars often require an amnesty as a necessary compromise for a peaceful end to the violence and a peace agreement that makes DDR possible"¹¹⁵. Examples of a (partial) amnesty can be found in numerous peace agreements, such as in Mozambique (1990) or in Sierra Leone (2002), where there is a general amnesty with the exception of major crimes against humanity. It is true that the (partial) amnesty here is not that explicitly linked to demobilisation but it is meant to be an incentive to participate in DDR programmes.

The strategic approach of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of the World Bank, on the contrary, foresees a detailed interviewing of combatants in the demobilisation process with respect to human rights violations and their own personal role. One precondition for access to reinsertion and reintegration benefits can depend on both a reasonably clean, personal record and the willingness of combatants to participate in finding the truth. Therefore, to a certain degree, the concept of DDR serves to assist in the search for justice and truth¹¹⁶.

v) Reintegration and development cooperation /reconstruction

While disarmament and demobilisation are geared to short-term security goals, reintegration, depending upon its conceptual approach, can be connected to the national reconstruction of infrastructure and the economy. This is particularly the case when reintegration programmes are not only geared to demobilised combatants but, in a

¹¹⁴ These limitations and alleviations are mainly an amnesty of so-called 'political' offences, the prohibition of extradition, massive deductions in the punishment in cases where the charge is accepted, extremely short delays for the referral of charges and court investigations as well as release from the duty to reveal any offences, command structures and military aliases.

¹¹⁵ Duthie (2005), p.8.

¹¹⁶ On such 'Conditionality' and 'Screening' of combatants, see Duthie (2005), p.19 and 22.

comprehensive approach, to the (family, village ...) communities into which the combatants are returning. In such approaches, the reintegration of ex-combatants can be viewed as a part of a general reconstruction and development strategy.

There is also a particularly close relationship between DDR and reconstruction when demobilised combatants are used in projects involved in the (re)construction of the infrastructure. With this, DDR contributes just as much to reconstruction as infrastructural projects contribute to reintegration¹¹⁷.

vi) Information policy

Under the influence of the devastating effects of propagandistic radio programmes and hate campaigns in the media (in Rwanda, for instance), UNDPKO has recognised in the past years that peace efforts and PSOs need to be accompanied by an information and media strategy. This is valid in particular for DDR programmes which are based on voluntary, individual demobilisation: "For example, if the mission priority is DDR... the public information programme can assist by widely publicising the agreement to disarm and demobilise combatants, encouraging fighters to come out of hiding to surrender their weapons, extolling the advantages and incentives of a return to civilian life and providing accurate information on assembly sites and demobilisation camp locations"¹¹⁸. Therefore, the planning and design of DDR has to be closely synchronised and coordinated with the entire information and media policy of a PSO.

4.3. Actors, ownership, control and responsibility

"Local NGOs and civil society should participate to the maximum extent possible in DDR exercises, particularly in the reconciliation and peace-building process"....."Local and national capacities should be enhanced through active consultation, engagement and participation in the planning and implementation of the DDR process"¹¹⁹.

National and local governments, local NGOs and civil society ought to be involved if possible. As far as the question of task-sharing is concerned, the UNDPKO leaves a lot of leeway – for good reason, and the question about ownership is not completely answered. Generally, one has to assume that local participation in the demobilisation phase is more difficult and that a PSO often plays the key role.

In settings without a PSO, that is when a party to the conflict has gained a military victory to the extent that it no longer feels threatened in its superior power position, DDR programmes are generally under the control of the national government, led by the

¹¹⁷ see also the Bosnian "Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project" (EDRP) of the World Bank, for instance, which deals exclusively with the work of ex-combatants in infrastructure projects.

¹¹⁸ BBPU (2003), p.47. The central meaning of a coordination of DDR programmes and the information and media strategy is also stressed by M. Remillard (DCAF); Interview of 14 October 2005.

¹¹⁹ UN-DPKO (1999), p.5 and 6

victorious party to the conflict¹²⁰. External actors are involved to varying degrees; their involvement is generally limited to mediation activities, logistical and conceptual support, the financing of DDR programmes and monitoring¹²¹. The fact that a position of power does not invite the party to cede control of the DDR process to external actors is also shown in the 'special case' of Colombia, where the paramilitaries can dictate the conditions of their partial disarmament to a large degree. External involvement has hitherto been limited to an observer mission of the OAS.

The sharing of tasks and responsibilities between national governments and external actors, however, also varies in the diverse settings of a PSO, as the following comparisons will show:

- Afghanistan: The responsibility for DDR lies officially with the Afghan transitional government which in turn depends upon the support of the American intervention troops and ISAF. The implementation lies with the UNDP. In practice, however, the powerful factions and units of the former 'Northern Alliance' which control(ed) the 'new' Afghan Ministry of Defence exerted a great amount of influence both on demobilisation programmes and on the process of SSR.
- Burundi: When disarmament and demobilisation started off 'properly' in the first half of 2005 as late sub-processes of a peace process brought about mainly by diplomatic negotiations, the transitional government in Burundi had been in office for a number of years and had built specific institutions and commissions with a broad participation of the parties to the conflict in which international actors were also involved as observers and consultants¹²². While the responsibility for the disarmament and demobilisation processes that are important for the balance of power and security of the combatants lies with the parties to the conflict and the transitional government, more 'civil' reintegration programmes are carried out by UNDP and development agencies, such as USAID.
- Liberia: Disarmament and demobilisation was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a peacekeeping force with a troop strength of up to 15,000. A superordinated commission was made up of the guarantors of the peace agreement and representatives of the parties to the conflict. UNDP was in charge of the financing and the allocation of

¹²⁰ see Berdal (1996), who describes as one of the three major settings the one in which the "responsibility for demobilisation has been assumed by governments victorious in civil war or otherwise not under direct military threat" (p.27). Examples are Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Angola.

¹²¹ see for instance Angola: the demobilisation of UNITA was carried out under the leadership of the Angolan army; the UN, Portugal, Russia and the United States were asked to be observers. The World Bank and other donors financed a reintegration programme which is under the umbrella of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP).

¹²² Like this, the parties to the conflict themselves guarantee security in the camps where the disarmament of combatants took place.

reintegration programmes. DDR processes in Sierra Leone or Mozambique were also characterised by a similar distribution of responsibilities.

The responsibilities for the implementation of DDR programmes in a peacebuilding setting are often mixed – with highly varying gradations. With this, differing responsibilities not only concern the national–international dimension but also exist between military actors such as national ministries of defence and peacekeeping troops, mixed civil–military commissions and purely civilian actors (UNDP, IOM, NGOs). Military actors play a key role in disarmament and demobilisation, both sensitive issues with regard to the balance of power and security, while reintegration programmes are often organised by civilian sub-organisations of the United Nations (UNDP, UNICEF for children-specific programmes). Therefore, there is often a divided responsibility between disarmament and demobilisation on the one hand and reintegration on the other. This has led to difficulties in coordination and harmonisation as well as to substantial gaps in the financing of reintegration measures in particular (see below, Section 4).

An external ownership can generally be agreed upon on a bilateral or multilateral basis and can be taken over by international (UN), regional (EU, NATO, OAS, AU), sub-regional (ECOWAS) or national (national ministries, development agencies and aid organisations)¹²³. PSOs and DDR-programmes mostly contain a combination of stakes on different international levels.

Even in a peacekeeping setting, effective, intact conflict parties are not prepared to endanger their power positions by disarmament and demobilisation programmes. The influence of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the control of the demobilisation programmes by the conflicting parties in Burundi show that DDR cannot/should not fundamentally change the existing balance of power even if there was the presence of a PSO. The keeping of the balance of power is rather a precondition for the implementation of DDR programmes. Exceptions are imaginable in settings in which there is no question about the fact that a PSO has full military control due to its very 'robust' mandate and equipment and that it is capable of carrying out a compulsory coercive disarmament of fighters¹²⁴.

4.4. Area-specific approaches and exit strategies

i) Financial models

Most DDR programmes excel by a complex combination of different national, bilateral and multilateral financial instruments¹²⁵. The instrumental separation of 'DD' and 'R' is characteristic – and problematic – because of this. Contrary to disarmament and demobilisation programmes, reintegration projects are often not covered by the budget of a PSO. To finance these programmes, funds will mostly have to be raised on a bilateral or

¹²³ Woodhouse/Ramsbotham (2005), p.143

¹²⁴ According to Marc Remillard (DCAF) this was in part the case in the Bosnian setting; interview of 14 October 2005

¹²⁵ see overview in Ball/Hendrickson (2005/1), Appendix 2, p.31ff.

multilateral level, to replenish trust funds in particular. This has often led to delays in the programme implementation and major gaps in financing in the area of reintegration¹²⁶.

One chance for an integral financing of the entire DDR process would be to include the reintegration part in the financing umbrella of a PSO, something postulated by the chair of the panel of the UN Security Council for PSOs and the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan¹²⁷.

In the framework of the SIDDR, a frequently made suggestion is to establish 'preventive' funds with flexible purposes, such as the Post-conflict fund of the World Bank¹²⁸: In fragile post-conflict settings, in particular, DDR programmes often ought to be implemented quickly and show a flexibility in reaction with respect to changes in the situation.

ii) Targeting

*"Who is a combatant?"*¹²⁹, or: Who is meant to be a combatant and thus have access to reinsertion services and reintegration programs? In the setting in Burundi of a political conflict between well-organised units, only persons will gain access to the DDR programmes who hand over a weapon, who are allocated to a military fraction and who can prove that they have military knowledge. Here, one can say that conditions for admittance are very strict with the aim of actually disarming and demobilising 'real' party militias.

In Liberia, where UNMIL carried out an ad hoc DDR programme in the setting of a fragile peace and 'failed state', the turning in of a weapon or of 150 pieces of ammunition sufficed. The primary goal was to set a clear example for peace under the pressure of the circumstances and to get the demobilisation process going as quickly as possible. The price for this was – like in parts of Afghanistan – a wide-reaching abuse of reintegration payments by 'combatants' especially hired for the demobilisation process, and civilians alike.

In connection with longer-term reintegration programmes, one has to ask oneself the conceptual question of the right 'targeting' in an even broader framework: should reintegration programmes be geared to acknowledged combatants or their civilian communities, and thus an open person subgroup¹³⁰?

¹²⁶ for instance in Liberia, where the UNDP Trust Fund was only able to raise part of the envisioned funds for reintegration. It is true that there was criticism that not enough workable projects had been available. See Paes (2005).

¹²⁷ see Brahimi-Report (2000), p. 8, and UN Security Council (2005), p.12

¹²⁸ see "Integrated DDR Financing" in Ball/Hendrickson (2005/2), p.43ff.

¹²⁹ Pouligny (2004), p.6

¹³⁰ see Specht (2003), p.1f.

iii) Coercive vs. consent-based disarmament and demobilisation

The mandate of the UN intervention in Somalia in 1993 mentions explicitly the use of coercive methods when disarming the units of combatants and militias¹³¹. The DDR approach tallied with the total concept of this UN intervention as Peace Enforcement Operation (PEO). The utter failure of UNOSOM II went down in the history of UN peacekeeping as a traumatic experience. Following this experience, PSOs and DDR approaches dominated (again) based on the consensus of the rival parties, that is a peace agreement previous to any UN action. However, there are no straight borders between coercion and consent in the sense that the deployment of a 'robust' PSO as well as diplomatic measures can build up pressure and deterrence potentials that could virtually enforce formal consent with demobilisation activities. Again, a collective disarmament and demobilisation in collection points and camps (see following section) would hardly be considered 'consent-based' by combatants of 'special' units with a strong social cohesion and feeling of pride, but as a capitulation¹³². In settings such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan finally, where military interventions by NATO preceded DDR programmes, it is nigh on impossible to speak of consent-based demobilisation, even if the basics of DDR programmes had been agreed upon in the end.

The peace operations after the Cold War have shown the limits of both consent-based and coercive demobilisations; on the one hand, limits for the enforcement of coercive disarmament and demobilisations lie, as the experience with the hitherto unique totally coercive intervention in Somalia has shown, in the difficulty of controlling a larger territory against the consent of armed units. On the other hand, 'humanitarian interventions' often already limit the willingness for risk and sacrifice by the intervening forces per se¹³³.

In the failed states of the DR Congo and Haiti, efforts to achieve an 'amicable' and consent-based disarmament have also not been successful. The ICG called on MONUC to support the new Congolese army in its coercive disarmament of the 'core of the problem', the exiled-Rwandan FDLR, to thus give new impulse to the intractable peace and DDR process¹³⁴. Even if a country-wide coercive disarmament of all Congolese parties to the conflict is impossible and unrealistic, certain selective but determined disarmament activities could be instrumental in making other parties involved decide in favour of a consent-based disarmament, signalling that a continuation of the armed conflict will no longer be profitable. From this perspective, coercive and 'consent-based' disarmament no longer appear to be conceptual opposites but concepts that could complement each other, particularly in sub-settings of failed states and fragmented militias that are averse to peace. An approach, practiced in Sierra Leone particularly by

¹³¹ Berdal (1996), p.24.

¹³² see Faltas (2005), p.6: "It is hard to imagine the combatants of ETA, the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades and Abu Sayyaf filing into camps to be disarmed and demobilised". Here, too, the kind of units proves to be the decisive context factor.

¹³³ see Berdal (1996), p.31, on "the evident lack of will of outside powers to engage in coercive disarmament (...) where the appeal of national interest is unlikely to convince a sceptical public accustomed to peacetime standards for 'acceptable' levels of casualties in operations short of war".

¹³⁴ see ICG Africa Report No.91 (2005), p.26. "*How to force people to peace who want war*". In Haiti MINUSTAH has already carried out the coercive disarmament of armed gangs in the capital Port-au-Prince; cf. ICG Latin-America/Caribbean Report No.13 (2005)

Britain goes in that direction: "The strategy for success may be a dual track approach combining dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and credible military deterrence to close off the option of war on the other. The international community must be unanimous in its condemnation of spoilers"¹³⁵.

iv) Individual vs. collective demobilisation

In effect, two parallel DDR processes are taking place in Colombia: Based on a government decree from 1994 each combatant who gives up armed fighting, who surrenders and who hands over his weapon is offered amnesty and access to a reintegration programme¹³⁶. This offer of demobilisation and reintegration is geared to individual combatants and is not based on any agreement – verbal or written – with the commanders of the units.

In the framework of negotiations conducted since 2003 between the Colombian government and paramilitaries, both individual and collective DDR programmes are carried out in parallel. Entire units gather at their commanders' command in special areas where they turn in their weapons and are allocated to reintegration centres¹³⁷.

In practice, individual and collective demobilisation often overlap and complement each other: even if there is some kind of agreement with the parties involved and their commanders, when units are fragmented or disorganised, individual combatants will still have to be addressed and convinced that it is worth entering the DDR process¹³⁸. If, on the other hand, there is a largely consolidated hierarchy in the units to be demobilised, as for example in Angola or Burundi, demobilisation mostly takes place collectively. One dominant, technical concept is "encampment", the collection of combatants in special zones or camps, so-called 'cantonment sites'¹³⁹. Decentralised alternatives without special collection zones and camps are reinsertion offers for which individual combatants can qualify directly by registering with the responsible authorities and handing over their weapons there and then¹⁴⁰. A mostly individual and decentralised approach was adopted at times by UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, where mobile units 'on wheels' disarmed combatants prepared to be demobilised and allocated them to reintegration programmes. Collective, central encampment approaches often used to be complemented by weapons-

¹³⁵ PBPU (2003), p.9.

¹³⁶ Koth (2005), p.39ff. Originally, this approach was intended to be a war tactic of the government with the intention of weakening and dissolving the guerrilla movements. As this approach of individual demobilisation was also offered to paramilitaries in 2002, one can indeed consider it an extension to the collective DDR process that had started in the meantime.

¹³⁷ Koth (2005), p.26ff. Prime example for this approach was the (alleged?) demobilisation of the infamous paramilitary "Bloque Cacique Nutibara" in Medellin, which had been negotiated with their leader, Don Berna. See also ICG Latin America Report No.8 (2004), p.11ff.

¹³⁸ An example of this is again Liberia where the parties involved were incapable of delivering lists of their combatants who were to be demobilised. This is why UNMIL was out of its depth at the beginning due to a surprisingly high number of real and unreal combatants; see Paes (2005), p.253ff.

¹³⁹ see UN-DPKO (1999), p.15. An interesting combined approach of voluntary encampment was followed during the demobilisation of the RUF in Sierra Leone; see PBPU (2003), p.26.

¹⁴⁰ Examples of such approaches in the Rep. Congo and Sudan can be found in Faltas (2005); p.11f.

buy-back programmes which again presented an incentive not only for individual combatants who had not been disarmed but also for civilians.

v) Reintegration concepts

Technical aspects and thus the question of whether certain reintegration instruments are appropriate in general or in certain settings is not the focus of this paper. "Modalities for the 'R' of DDR seem pretty standard if one looks what is done: facilitating access to land, labour-intensive public works, vocational training (..), formal education (..), micro-credit schemes, micro-enterprises support, programmes for people with disabilities and national service-type training (..)"¹⁴¹. What remains to be added are special programmes for female combatants and for child soldiers.

Most of these 'standardised' approaches are supply-side oriented: the UNDP and other actors in charge of reintegration offer a whole range of different reintegration assistance schemes, depending on the means available and realisable, and concrete projects from which combatants who are to be demobilised can choose. The short-term success of a reintegration programme is measured against the programme participation rate of combatants; longer-term success is measured against their labour force participation rate¹⁴².

The Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project (PELRP) implemented by the World Bank in Bosnia, on the other hand, was based on a demand-side oriented approach and was to cover concrete needs, interests and requests by ex-combatants in a flexible manner. In the process, it turned out that interest was mainly concentrated on start-up aid in the area of farming¹⁴³.

As to the long-term (re)integration of former combatants into a civilian profession, a demand-side oriented approach might prove to be more efficient. However, very often it is security interests that are the (short-term) focus of DDR programmes. Offered reintegration measures are often of a transitional character and are to ensure that as many combatants – who have only recently been disarmed – as possible are occupied with (civilian) activities and thus do not see any reason to take up arms again. In this context, special attention must be paid to former commanders, and reintegration measures should be offered to them corresponding to their social prestige¹⁴⁴.

An additional question that is important for the basic conceptual direction of reintegration programmes is whether reintegration measures should be offered to combatants or to (civil) communities to which they return or into which they enter: Should support be only or mainly geared to former combatants or mainly to the

¹⁴¹ Baare (2005), p.15. Baare gives a good overview of the 'performance' of the different approaches.

¹⁴² While in Afghanistan, for instance, the reintegration programmes found vivid interest, in Liberia only a small percentage of the previously demobilised combatants did participate. The sustained economic integration proved to be difficult in both settings.

¹⁴³ see Pietz (2004), p.45ff.

¹⁴⁴ see for instance PBPU (2003), p.29. A (not very successful) example of an approach specifically geared to commanders is the Afghan Commander Incentive Programme.

communities which include victims of war, traumatised people and IDPs? The approaches mentioned earlier are geared to combatants, as they offer return assistance and/or job opportunities. From a development policy perspective, approaches are increasingly favoured that seek the sustainable reconstruction of the civil communities that have to receive the combatants. One advantage of community-oriented approaches lies in the fact that the perception of demobilised combatants will change earlier; they will no more be approached and perceived as combatants but as members of civil communities. Key experiences with community-oriented approaches were gained from programmes on the economic transition and support of former military garrison cities in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Further examples are successful community-oriented approaches in the Democratic Republic of the Congo¹⁴⁵ and military-civilian 'stop-gap' programmes in Sierra Leone (see Appendix 2).

vi) Exit and transitional strategies

DDR programmes are generally limited to a duration of a few years, and most reintegration measures are transitional solutions. However, the peacebuilding and reconstruction process continues. The aim of a transitional or exit strategy would now be to integrate the needs of former combatants after the end of DDR into wider programmes of reconstruction and the national fight against poverty¹⁴⁶. These transitional strategies ought to guarantee a certain amount of continuity and prevent abrupt breaks that could present a danger to the peace process.

The question of an 'orderly' exit needs also be asked in the case of a failure of the peace and demobilisation process; the aim of such an exit strategy would then be the 'cutting of one's losses'.

The selection of suitable conceptual approaches greatly depends upon the specific setting. If, in the setting of a failed state, fragile ceasefires and peace agreements are mainly guaranteed by a robust presence of a PSO, DDR will mainly be based on intervention and deterrence. As a rule, this will be followed by strong signs in favour of an end of the war and thus a rapid demobilisation of the parties involved at the beginning of the peace process and by the peacekeeping troops. Examples for such a setting are Liberia, Sierra Leone or Afghanistan.

However, if peace seems to be secure to at least some extent, be it by the military victory of one party to the conflict or a workable political compromise, the DDR process is greatly based on the political will of the national actors. In this setting, DDR can rely more on national ownership and be designed and planned on a longer-term basis.

The selection of conceptual approaches not only depends on the 'external' context but also on the aims, means and decisions of the intervening actors. The question of 'final' reintegration aims in particular touches on two dimensions:

¹⁴⁵ Faltas (2005), p. 10f.

¹⁴⁶ see Baare (2005), p. 9

- "*What?*": What are the goals in terms of quantity? Is the support of combatants only supposed to last for a transitional period until peace seems to be consolidated? Is the commitment of the International Community of a long-term nature with the aim of improving the economic and social situation of the communities to which the combatants return in a sustainable manner?
- "*Who?*" or *what programme?*: If longer-term development goals are to be pursued, one has to ask the question: where does DDR end and where should subsequent programmes start? The reintegration component of DDR can comprise both reintegration assistance focused on combatants and – at a later date – projects aiding the development of communities to which combatants have returned. However, it is also conceivable that reintegration alone is carried out under the umbrella of a DDR programme. Longer-term perspectives would then be subject to other, subsequent development projects¹⁴⁷.

The dilemmas, as well as conflicts with respect to decisions and aims that actors responsible are facing when planning and implementing DDR programmes, will be discussed in the concluding final Chapter 5.

¹⁴⁷ see Faltas (2005), p.11f.

5. DISCUSSION: DILEMMAS, TARGET CONFLICTS AND CLASHES OF INTERESTS

DDR ought to be part of a coordinated strategy with a view to the economic and social development as well as of the future design of the security system¹⁴⁸. DDR programmes require a contractual or legal framework which lays down contents, responsibilities, timeframes and coordination mechanisms as precisely as possible. Key factors are a secure environment and the political will of the parties to the conflict. Up to here, on an extremely abstract level, all actors agree on DDR. In the concrete orientation, concept and implementation of DDR programmes, however, numerous dilemmas and target conflicts arise. These also affect the higher levels of a PSO when DDR programmes are part of a multi-functional peace operation. Key questions are:

- Dilemmas: How much pragmatism is appropriate and 'allowed' in dealing with warlords? How high is the price for achieving immediate security allowed to be for sustainability, justice and the adherence to basic principles? How far may/should/must commanders and combatants of parties to the conflict play a leading role in the transitional government, in the building up of a new army and the implementation of the DDR process?
- Chances and limits of DDR: Can DDR, can reintegration programmes directly contribute to easing poverty and social injustice? Or are they 'merely' transitional strategies that open a window of opportunity for development programmes against poverty, economic plight and social injustice?
- Actors and interests: Who – international actors, national (transitional) governments, representatives of the parties to the conflict – is supposed to bear how much responsibility for designing the concepts and in implementing DDR programmes? Whose perspectives count? Those of the 'perpetrator', the combatants or those of the victims, the war invalids and IDPs? Those of national security politicians or those of international development agencies?
- Superordinated aims: Which aims are to be realised with a PSO? Can and should Afghanistan or the DR Congo, for instance, be transformed and rebuilt into democratic states founded on the rule of law with a multi-party system and social market economy?
- And anyway: When are the minimum requirements for the deployment of a PSO and the implementation of a DDR programme met? Ought 5,537 peacekeepers to intervene at all in an area the size of the Congolese Eastern Provinces and in the setting of a failed state, and attempt to implement a DDR programme?

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Marc Remillard, DCAF

There are no patent remedies and generally valid answers to these questions. "Putting these questions on the table does, however, build awareness of the dilemmas and challenges that eventually have to be met and resolved"¹⁴⁹.

5.1. The basic dilemma and its facets: Stabilisation vs. sustainable development

"It is nearly as in old times – the powerful in the country determine what the people have to do. This is a disservice to the democratisation of a country and the trust of the population in the rule of law. However, hardly anyone speaks of this anyway. Security and the end of violence are more important."
(NZZ of 13 October 2005 on the constitutional process in the Iraq)

The rule of law and democratisation, or security and an end of violence? The answer of the Integrated Approach by the UNDPKO is an 'as well as': first security by disarmament and demobilisation, then development and democratisation by long-term reintegration programmes with a wide scope which in the end should contribute to a lasting 'liberal' peace (cf. Chapter 2.3).

It is true that security and development goals cannot generally be achieved without conflict. In post-conflict settings, often peace and security in the sense of stability and the absence of fighting can only be realised by measures that compromise long-term development and democratisation goals – and this in a variety of respects.

i) Security vs. security

As mentioned in Chapter 4, in parallel to the DDR process, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was established consisting exclusively of demobilised KLA combatants as well as a Kosovan police which was also made up (at least) 50 percent of former KLA fighters. The KPC as a 'protection force' makes little sense in terms of security policy¹⁵⁰; a balanced composition is out of the question. With this, from the perspective of SSR or the build-up of effective and trustworthy security forces, too many and possibly the 'wrong' people, too, have been recruited in the DDR process¹⁵¹. However, with a view to the political stabilisation of the post-conflict situation, one has to make another judgement: the formation of the KPC appears as a concession to the KLA for its demobilisation, and a reintegration measure for the demobilised KLA combatants. The KPC, the disproportionate influence of the fractions from the Panjshir valley in the new Afghan army or the, for the most part, absence of a rebuilt Angolan army can be

¹⁴⁹ SIDDR, Mid-Term Review; www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/60/56/ecaa5216.pdf (2 October 2005)

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Marc Remillard, DCAF

¹⁵¹ see Brzoska (2005), p.101: "The logical result of this interest [of the conflict party in influence and posts] is that a larger number of people are kept in the armed forces than would be necessary for the maintenance of post-war-security". Additionally, ex-combatants are often discredited in the eyes of the population which does not make them ideal representatives of the new security organs.

considered to be 'trade-offs' in favour of immediate stabilisation, trade-offs that are considered to be unavoidable in post-conflict settings in general¹⁵².

On the other hand the representation of post-conflict stabilisation and public security as opposites belies the fact that without previous stabilisation and appeasement, without the demobilisation of the parties to the conflict and the political concessions necessary for this, starting up any SSR process is impossible. Additionally, one cannot build a new army from 'nothing' but mostly depends upon ex-combatants to join in. Against this background, the question cannot be an 'either or' but rather, based upon the concessions necessary in peace policy, a 'how to' in the long term build up security forces that are as effective and responsible as possible. With this in mind, Brzoska postulates the inclusion of representatives of an SSR perspective in peace negotiations and DDR processes¹⁵³.

ii) Warlords: Partners or pariahs?

Charles Taylor stepped down as Liberian president, went into exile to Nigeria with an international arrest warrant being issued. 'Marshal' Fahim, the commander of the most powerful Afghan militia, was given the post of Minister of Defence in the Afghan transitional government. Ramush Haradinaj, a former commander of the KLA, had to face the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague despite being elected Kosovan "Prime Minister"; he was recently released from prison, because "the man can handle his fellow countrymen" and "was supposed to keep the hotheads in check with his authority as former rebel commander"¹⁵⁴. Representatives of the Liberian rebel movements LURD and MODEL became part of the Liberian transitional government, while in Sierra Leone the RUF was dissolved totally in the course of the peace and demobilisation process. All the above-mentioned persons and groups are accused of human rights violations.

But where are the borderlines between 'spoilers' who, if possible, ought no longer to play a political role and 'partners' in the peace and demobilisation process who can take over posts in the transitional government and be candidates in the following elections? The transformation of military power to political influence (of equal value) and thus the incorporation of important players in the parties to the conflict are a precondition for a DDR process that is based on a peace agreement. This holds true not only for Africa but also for the European Union; the IRA was only prepared to disarm when some of their leading supporters were permitted to take up important offices, and the political influence of Sinn Fein was considered to be secured.

It is true that warlords are not really the ideal representatives for a political new beginning where good governance, democracy and the rule of law are fundamental values; their

¹⁵² see Baare (2005), p.9 and Brzoska (2005). These trade-offs become critical when, as in El Salvador, [the] "individual physical security declined after the end of the war" (p.99), that is when the end of the war leads to a worse security situation for the population due to the failure to reintegrate ex-combatants, inadequate security structures and rampant criminality. The criminal activity of former combatants is a huge problem in various settings. The case of El Salvador, however, may still be considered an exception to the rule.

¹⁵³ cf. Brzoska (2005), p.104

¹⁵⁴ *"Diktat der Realpolitik im Kosovo"* (*"Imperative of practical politics in Kosovo"*); NZZ of 20 October 2005.

political participation can also be attributed to a trade-off in the interest of security and stabilisation. Answers to this dilemma are just as difficult as the exact determination of the borderline between 'good' and 'evil', between victims and perpetrators (which often is not possible). Answers also depend upon the context factors concerning the balance of power, the political will as well as the perception and standing of warlords in the respective society¹⁵⁵.

iii) Security vs. justice and the establishment of the truth

Just as legitimate, national security forces that can guarantee the security of the entire population after the withdrawal of a PSO and political institutions that are more than mere phantoms in a 'shadow state', justice, the establishment of the truth, and reparations are considered to be essential parts of a basic process of dealing with the root causes of a conflict and thus a longer-term conflict prevention. On the other hand, "(f)ear of punishment can hinder DDR programmes"¹⁵⁶.

The rule of law and 'justice' are important components of an established democratic peace. In the peace process, however, there is a lot of antagonism between 'peace' and 'justice'¹⁵⁷. It is significant that nearly all peace agreements contain far-reaching amnesty provisions. A (certain) relinquishing of punishment and 'justice' as well as possibly of a detailed reappraisal of human rights violations committed during the conflict are part of the price that needs to be paid for security and stability.

A certain consensus has been reached in the past years in dealing with the dilemmas between justice and peace/security, namely that there is an amnesty. However, those that are mainly responsible for major war crimes are prosecuted. The task of special truth commissions like in South Africa or Sierra Leone is to guarantee an as comprehensive investigation as possible into the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses during the war. However, if the notorious Liberian warlord Prince Johnson or his Afghan counterpart Abdul Sayyaf can carry on with their political activities unchecked and even stand as candidates for the new parliaments, this shows drastically the political difficulties in dealing with the ever-present dilemma between security and justice in a consistent manner. In my opinion, the relative nature of 'justice' in particular, as well as the establishment of the truth, are strongly affected by the cultural and societal sense of what is right and wrong and thus little suited for (too) interventionist approaches from the international community. A reappraisal of history must in the end always be made from within. One will also have to accept that there is no 'sole' right solution in the existing antagonism between 'justice' and reconciliation¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁵ In the context of the difficulties that peacekeepers encounter when handling 'barbaric actions' and when being confronted with the perception of acts of violence, Pouligny (2004), p.22, speaks of "(c)ontradictory memories and accounts". While the RUF had lost all support of the population in Sierra Leone, this cannot be said to the same degree of LURD and MODEL; to that extent the strategies adopted by the UN would be consistent in this respect.

¹⁵⁶ Duthie (2005), p.19.

¹⁵⁷ Betts (1994): "Do not confuse peace with justice" (p.31).

¹⁵⁸ compare *Le Monde diplomatique*, October 2005: "Reconciliation before justice in Sierra Leone." A comparison between Chile and Serbia is interesting. Despite the fact that Milosevic is imprisoned in The Hague, no comprehensive reappraisal of history in Serbia has taken place despite great international pressure. In Chile, on the contrary, Pinochet will probably not

iv) Focus of reintegration

In terms of security deliberations, reintegration programmes would have to be geared to former combatants with the aim of opening up civil perspectives to them which they consider to be more lucrative than to continue to 'earn their living with violence'. In terms of justice deliberations, it appears to be objectionable to grant reintegration assistance to combatants, the perpetrators, which again puts them in a privileged position compared to the civil population, women and children, war invalids and IDPs.

The fact that stabilisation and security goals in post-conflict settings (have to) have priority, even in this dilemma, is shown best by the way that values and goals, such as the equality of both sexes, children's rights and the particular consideration of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups of persons, etc are detailed in a nearly stereotypical manner in most publications and guidelines on DDR¹⁵⁹ while in the concrete implementation of DDR programmes mostly potential security risks and thus the (male) combatants are ultimately given priority. The focus of reintegration assistance, in particular in settings of a fragile peace, nearly inevitably lies on (potential) threats rather than absolute needs¹⁶⁰.

This dilemma is eased de-fuse in the sense of making less dangerous to a certain degree in the approach of community-oriented reintegration which does not start off from categories of persons (combatants vs. injured and vulnerable persons) but from the communities to which they all return. Precondition for this approach, however, is that there are (still or again) communities that are able to receive them¹⁶¹.

The ridge, however, remains narrow: "A narrow focus solely on the belligerents risks creating tension because of the perception by non-combatants that this particular group is unjustly rewarded. On the other hand, including too many objectives in the process itself, will lead to unrealistic expectations of what might be achieved, which threatens to undermine DDR"¹⁶².

v) Many questions and some answers

Extremely far-reaching political concessions in a peace and DDR process can cement certain deeper causes of a conflict – clientelist networks, shadow-state usurpation of institutions and the thus resulting exclusion of the rest of the population – and prevent the reappraisal of the conflict. As a result, peacebuilding and DDR are reduced to the fight against the symptoms and, in the worst case, can even lead to future conflicts. On the other hand, it is only the end of fighting that opens a window of opportunity for development and 'justice'. This is why political concessions in favour of immediate security interests lie virtually in the nature of DDR programmes in post-conflict settings.

be punished. A comprehensive but controversial reappraisal of the dictatorship did, however, take place despite the fact that it lasted a long time and was fraught with stumbling blocks.

¹⁵⁹ see, for example IPA (2002), p.7, UN-DPKO (1999), p.10 or Gleichmann et.al (2004).

¹⁶⁰ Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.20: "The motivations for granting special assistance to former soldiers and resistance fighters are often better explained by potential threats than by the special needs of this group".

¹⁶¹ Baare (2005), p.14.

¹⁶² SIDDR, Mid-Term Review; www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/60/56/ecaa5216.pdf (02 October 2005).

From this viewpoint, a "(p)ease before justice pragmatism"¹⁶³ is practically 'inherent' in DDR programmes. The decisive challenge for DDR programmes lies in consolidating the main aim of 'peace and security' without harming the prospects of a sustained and 'just' development too much. The price of the "peace before justice pragmatism" must not be so high that longer-term development goals are seriously compromised right from the beginning. Concrete questions that need to be asked in this context are, for instance: What security 'trade-offs' still appear to be justified and where are the limits? How clean must be the record, how bloody may the hands of an ex-combatant or commander be not to prevent him being incorporated into the new army or becoming a member of a transitional government? How can it be prevented that the security 'trade-offs' of DDR do not exclude the build-up of trustworthy security forces and political institutions, at least in the long run, and that the long-term development and SSR goals do not disappear from sight?

One answer to these questions is always of a political nature and sometimes, at least in part, determined by the context. With comparatively little risk of a flare-up of armed fighting, after a final military victory of one party to the conflict (Angola) or after a largely secure political solution to the conflict (El Salvador), a DDR programme can/could 'afford' to go beyond immediate security deliberations and to orient itself towards longer-term perspectives. However, especially after conflicts in the setting of a fragile peace in a failed state, there often remains only one choice, namely between "the plague and cholera"¹⁶⁴, between the renewed flare-up of war-like acts and far-reaching concessions, even to commanders and combatants whose record could hardly be called 'clean'. Former combatants in particular, however, comment on this dilemma and argue that like this even former warlords and their fighters are given the chance to become 'proper' soldiers or civilians when they are embedded in structures that grant personal security, a regular income and certain rights to them¹⁶⁵. In terms of concept, these dilemmas can be slightly defused by open, flexible approaches which do not prejudice the medium- and long-term development when, for instance, the build-up of a new army is designed from the start as a long-term measure which gives the opportunity to approach the SSR goals by small but continuous steps.

5.2. "Specific transitional reintegration" or "Post-conflict reconstruction"¹⁶⁶?

The purpose of DDR should be to integrate former combatants in a productive civil life, to give them access to land and employment. It should not neglect victims of war, make reconciliation and social healing possible and thus contribute to "overall economic development for the country as a whole". All this should be done while taking into

¹⁶³ Baare (2005), p.2

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Marc Remillard, DCAF

¹⁶⁵ Interview with T.S. Davies, whose statements concerning this matter may also be led by his own interests and thus have to be taken with caution. See also Duthie (2005), p.10, who quotes an ex-combatant from Sierra Leone: "We did pretty bad things which we are sorry for and want to say so. All we want now is peace and reconciliation which will bring development for all".

¹⁶⁶ Baare (2005), p.5f.

account principles such as "non-discrimination, gender-equity, non-institutionalisation and non-stigmatisation of the children"¹⁶⁷.

Even in 'peaceful' contexts, international financing institutions, development agencies and NGOs in their entire reconstruction work have only succeeded in very few exceptional cases to build up functioning political institutions, to solve difficult political core questions, such as land reform, and to thus initiate prosperous economic and social development. Now, expectations have developed so far that DDR programmes are to close the gap between the "political promises of a peace deal and the harsh economic reality of a post-war-country"¹⁶⁸. Measured against these aims and expectations, any DDR programme is bound to fail.

What can, what should DDR do at best? Baare and Gleichmann/Hoffmann rightly demand the acknowledgement of certain limits to what DDR programmes can achieve, and this in particular in unstable post-conflict settings where short-term security and stability gains are the priority¹⁶⁹. One would therefore have to accept that DDR programmes themselves do not overcome the root causes of the conflict, or improve the social standing of certain groups in society, and cannot modify the general economic situation. If this is accepted, reintegration components of DDR no longer appear to be development programmes for economic reconstruction and the advancement of social justice but rather transitional strategies geared specifically to combatants and their integration into civilian life in view of a transitional reintegration. DDR would then 'merely' contribute to the consolidation of a somewhat secure and peaceful environment which is the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction. "It may be that when ex-combatants are 'as poor as the rest' and women associated with fighting groups are 'as oppressed as the rest' a DDR programme has achieved what it can"¹⁷⁰. Post-conflict reconstruction, development policy, economic reconstruction, programmes fostering social justice would then be based on the 'normal' poverty of all, a poverty which also combatants are faced with at the end of a DDR process, or a poverty from which they have been released as a tribute to security. A kind of poverty, too, that additionally disadvantages certain groups of persons.

DDR needs clear perspectives for a future development, the future structure of political institutions as well as the security sector. However, rather than providing these perspectives, DDR itself can open a window of opportunity and create chances, windows of opportunity to overcome causes of conflict, and chances for projects of economic and social development. Still speaking of settings in a fragile security situation, it would no longer be a question of expanding the focus of DDR itself to an ever-increasing development and justice perspective but to secure coordination with subsequent development projects. In the framework of such programmes, disadvantaged groups of

¹⁶⁷ Quotes from: Nübler (1997), Gleichmann et al (2004) and UN-DPKO (1999).

¹⁶⁸ Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.30.

¹⁶⁹ Hoffmann/Gleichmann (2000), p.30ff. and Baare (2005).

¹⁷⁰ Baare (2005), p.8; For security deliberations, one has to ask the question when combatants would have to be considered "dangerously poor" (p.4). The "peace before justice pragmatism" therefore often leads to a privileged treatment of the combatants. Since the prospects of a reintegration into "normal poverty" do not really present a shining incentive for disarmament and demobilisation, there is the tendency to entice combatants with promises of reintegration that can often not be kept. See Faltas (2005), p.8.

persons, such as IDPs, war victims, women and children can also be compensated for the security 'trade-offs' of DDR and the privileged treatment of combatants¹⁷¹.

Incidentally, UNDPKO in its guidelines also speaks of "opportunities for development"¹⁷² (and not of development!); the strong verbal stress on values such as gender equity, justice and reconciliation, etc in UN publications can to a certain degree be interpreted as concessions to the Western public, potential donors and their values.

5.3. 'Ownership' and clashes of interest

In a perspective geared to sustained development and conflict prevention, a peace and DDR process ought to be based on the political will of the parties involved, be of local responsibility, and incorporate conflict parties and civil society alike. Otherwise there is the danger that there is only peace because of the presence of a PSO. Realistically, a mostly national ownership of the DDR process is only possible in settings of a final military victory or a workable political solution, when there are sufficient institutional capacities (or when these will have been created) by the time of the implementation of a DDR programme. In settings of a fragile ceasefire or peace agreement, in particular in the context of a failed state, however, these preconditions are missing. After 20 years of war, Liberia, for instance, was faced with the "(d)aunting challenge of rebuilding from ground zero"¹⁷³. Often in such settings, there is also the imminent time pressure as "mostly ... only immediately after a war can substantial results be achieved"¹⁷⁴. This is why at times there is only very little time for DDR to begin, namely after the conclusion of a fragile ceasefire or peace agreement. International intervention and, at least for the beginning, extensive external or international leadership of the DDR process is often indispensable, even if the peace and demobilisation process may appear to be imposed and 'not authentic'. National DDR commissions with a broad participation of local actors and/or the gradual transfer of responsibility to a (more) local level are widely used approaches to find a compromise between 'own' and 'foreign' rule over the DDR process.

Each participation and each intervention mirrors some party's interests. Whose perspective, whose interests count when diverse local and external actors are involved in a DDR programme? Representatives of the parties to the conflict try to secure their political and economic influence and regard DDR programmes to be a possible means for this. The EU (and Switzerland, too) notably want(ed) to defuse the migration problem in the Balkans. The US is committed to the War on Terror in Afghanistan and is looking for local allies. Public and private donors as well as humanitarian organisations are interested in rapid, visible results for reasons of publicity and popularity¹⁷⁵, and finally, DDR agencies and commissions tend to an ever wider interpretation and expansion of their

¹⁷¹ see also Baare (2005), p.7 and 9, where he also speaks of "exit strategies" for DDR and "entry strategies" for development programmes.

¹⁷² UNDPKO (1999), p.7.

¹⁷³ Transitional Government of Liberia et al. (2005), p.9

¹⁷⁴ Heinemann-Grüder (2005), p.180

¹⁷⁵ see Mason (2000), p.41f. and Crocker et al. (2004), who in this context uses the term "humanitarian motives" and sees the inherent danger of too much action for the sake of publicity.

mission¹⁷⁶. All clashes of interests resulting from this which interfere with the previously discussed target should at least not totally remain in the subconscious when designing DDR programmes.

5.4. 'Democratic peace' in post-conflict societies

In the Peacebuilding Consensus as presented in Chapter 2.4, the peace that DDR and other instruments are attempting to implement, is intended to be of a liberal and democratic nature. This also implies that the values underlying this peace are universal. 'Democratic peace' as the superior aim of most DDR programmes, however, is quite controversial; the discussion about this, however, can only be dealt with in passing in the scope of this paper. The following points are under debate:

- the aim of democratic peace in itself and with this the (by no means per se symbiotic) relationship between peace and democracy,
- the implications of significant components (democratic elections and market economy reforms) of the peacebuilding consensus for post-conflict societies,
- the capacities and possibilities of the international community to implement their ambitious approach,
- and other possible alternatives.

i) On the evidence of 'democratic peace'

Bellamy points out that, for instance, Bosnia's political system before the war was just as little a democracy as the ones in Afghanistan, Burundi or Liberia. According to him, the establishment of democratic structures is therefore not a mandatory precondition for peace in the sense of an absence of armed violence¹⁷⁷. Representatives of the theorem of 'democratic peace', however, object that democracies tend to abstain from waging war against other democracies and therefore favour a forced democratisation¹⁷⁸. The evidence is undisputed for inter-state wars and established and secured democracies. The effects of a democratisation, however, are controversial. According to a number of sources, only incompletely or superficially democratised states, so-called anocracies, as well as states which are in the process of being democratised, are subject to a higher risk of intra-state conflicts than pure autocracies¹⁷⁹. Some authors again have put this finding into

¹⁷⁶ In this context, Baare (2005) speaks of a "DDR best practice and lessons learned industry", which shows an "inherent tendency" to expand focus and timeframe of its activities (p.9f.). This would correspond to the expansive behaviour of each bureaucratic institution, as sketched by Niskanen. See also Blankart (2003), p.506.

¹⁷⁷ Bellamy (2004), p.28.

¹⁷⁸ Hasenclever (2003), p.200ff.

¹⁷⁹ See, for instance Human Security Center (2005), p.151, and Snyder (2000), p.15ff.

perspective for the period after the Cold War¹⁸⁰. What remains despite all uncertainty is a certain paradox: established democracies – the aim – would be more peaceful but democratisation – the road – is at least stony and fraught with security risks.

ii) Free elections and free markets

The establishment of democratic standards and, particularly, early holding of free elections are of major importance in the peacebuilding consensus. The attitude of competing parties who – while misjudging the chances of a strong opposition in established democracies – perceive elections as a "Winner-takes-all formula"¹⁸¹ is one danger inherent to country-wide elections. On the other hand, parties in numerous 'democratised' post-conflict settings do not necessarily define themselves via their programme. Election results often follow the traditional (ethnic, tribal, clan-related) loyalties and thus mirror existing, non-democratic, power structures, which does not really point to a fundamental democratisation in the Western sense. However, if, in the peacebuilding consensus, democratic values that are considered to be universal are not embodied in undemocratic, 'illiberal' societies, the 'democratic peace' aspired to remains virtual and ultimately limited to the absence of armed violence¹⁸².

For a long time the economic component of the peacebuilding consensus largely consisted of measures for a quick opening-up of the market and economic liberalisation. More recently, the World Bank and others have pointed to the problematic effects an adjustment to a conventional economic structure in post-conflict societies brings about: "There is growing evidence that ... conventional economic reform packages are inappropriate and counterproductive in post-conflict settings"¹⁸³, as a quick opening of the market appears confrontational and competitive, and thus can lead to social tension and possibly the political and social exclusion of a large part of society. Instead of a focus on macro-economic stability, as characteristic for 'classical' structural adjustment programmes of the international finance institutions, they should focus on counterbalancing politics and measures with immediate results in the employment and income situation

iii) "The Maximalist Model under stress"¹⁸⁴

Despite enormous military, logistical and financial effort, it has not been possible to instil (more) democratic standards in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo. Even public security

¹⁸⁰ see Gurr et al. (2005), who - referring to the commitment of the UN - stressed the better performance of anocracies since the end of the Cold War; p.17. A clear empirical statement may be generally problematic due to the difficult differentiation of the terms (for instance democracy-anocracy) and the short period of time.

¹⁸¹ Hare (2004), p.219

¹⁸² According to Richmond (2004), p.95, this becomes most apparent in the international protectorates - Bosnia, Kosovo - where the imported democratic structures were only maintained by external control and governance. According to Richmond, the peace gained finally corresponds to a kind of "ending conflict through governance".

¹⁸³ see Tschirgi (2004), p.14f., with reference to Collier, Paul: Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank, Washington D.C., 2003, and Paris (2004).

¹⁸⁴ Ottaway (2003), p.317ff.

was/is only guaranteed with difficulty (and only to some degree) despite the fact that the scope of the international commitment in these regions must indeed be called "highly exceptional"¹⁸⁵ – "the maximalist model (is) under stress". In other regions of conflict, such as the DR Congo or Haiti, the allocation of resources looks comparatively modest. In this context, Bellamy and Williams speak of 'second class' PSOs for countries without strategic importance, which are mainly borne by regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, or by UN troops from developing- and threshold countries¹⁸⁶.

Even if PSOs that have been carried out since the end of the Cold War represent the most extensive and ambitious approach for the reconstruction of countries ravaged by war since World War II¹⁸⁷, the preparedness of the International Community to sacrifice resources and invest money, thus their capacities and resources, is limited and will remain so. As a result, one has to question the relationship between the realisation of a 'democratic peace' and the means of its implementation.

iv) Alternative approaches

The substantial risks inherent in 'democratisation' become apparent in particular when they remain incomplete and when the transitional phase is not sufficiently secured. 'Free elections' held (too) early can fan/stir up ethnic and political tensions, radical economic liberalisation can aggravate social opposites. In addition to this, the international community lacks resources in many conflict settings to implement its ambitious aims.

Despite all justified criticism, what are the alternatives? Hardly anyone postulates a return to the practices of the Cold War where autocracies were overthrown for the sake of stability; and rightly so. What would follow the end of the war would be political oppression and torture.

The formula "Institutionalisation before Liberalisation"¹⁸⁸, however, postulates a different procedure. Paris suggests preventing the destabilising effects of a transformation of post-conflict societies to liberal market democracies carried out as quickly as possible, by putting the emphasis first on the build-up of working institutions that could implement democratic and market economy reforms at a later date and in the course of a gradual process. At least part of the peace process in Burundi follows this approach. Before free elections are held, a transitional government has been in force for a number of years with the participation of rival ethnicities and parties. Under the aegis of this transitional government, institutional structures for the implementation of the DDR process were created, and a constitution was established and enacted. This constitution also contained clear rules and regulations on the division of power between the two ethnicities. This way a polarisation, as would have taken place in free elections, was at least in part prevented. The principle of 'trusteeships', where an international transitional governance body is

¹⁸⁵ Ottaway, p.320

¹⁸⁶ Bellamy/Williams (2004/2), p. 196. Examples for this are, as mentioned earlier, the DR Congo or Haiti, but also Liberia and Sierra Leone, where interventions by the "West" only increased after the failure of ECOWAS/ECOMOG.

¹⁸⁷ Paris (2004), p.4

¹⁸⁸ On liberalism: Shklar (1998) and Geuss (2001). On the 'realistic' model: Ottaway (2003). On the institutionalisation: Paris (2004)

responsible for institution-building, points to a similar direction, just like the approach followed in Liberia at present. While the holding of free elections is still high on the agenda, monetary assistance for the reconstruction is subject to an abandoning of sovereignty in part by the condition that decisions on important government spending are made by experts from abroad¹⁸⁹.

While Paris changes the way, the speed and the instruments but not the (final) aim, Ottaway fundamentally questions the aim of a democratic state founded on the rule of law after Western examples and takes the resources as a starting point which 'the West' is prepared to and capable of employing in a certain country. "What kind of minimally acceptable political system can be developed in this country, based on the present power distribution, countervailing forces that may arise with some encouragement and help, and the level of external political and financial support that can be mobilised for this particular country?"¹⁹⁰. However, suggestions of what such a 'more realistic' (cheaper) political system could look like in settings such as Afghanistan or the DR Congo are lacking.

As deliberated upon in Chapter 2.4, the peacebuilding consensus is based on a certain and very extensive understanding of liberalism, which, according to Geuss, would require a "natural affinity between democracy, liberalism and human rights thinking" and which, a little provokingly, is called by him "NATO ideology"¹⁹¹. Sceptical about the universality of such liberal values, Geuss calls for a morally "abstinent" limitation of liberalism to "a concrete political programme to eliminate specific evils". Shklar, too, merely considers the "fear of systematic cruelty"¹⁹² to be universal. A universal liberalism would therefore have to limit itself to preventing the violation of basic human rights committed by the abuse of power (by in particular guaranteeing physical integrity, protection against torture and inhumane treatment, equal rights and legal protection). To achieve this, mechanisms for the separation of powers, a representative political system and an independent judiciary are indispensable. Such mechanisms, however, are not that far away from the concrete postulates of the peacebuilding consensus.

Finally, from the perspective of the critical-reflective peace theory, it is true that a "reduction, transformation and conversion of the military power" is "essential for civilisation" in the sense of a "peaceful transformation of conditions, worlds and kinds of living by the reduction of violence, conflict settlement and peace modelling"¹⁹³. Still, critical theorists are sceptical towards the peace consensus dominating today. In their view, the emancipation of disadvantaged regions and people, a global evening out of the causes of inequality – inherent in the current (neo)liberal world order – and a fundamental

¹⁸⁹ On the "Principle of Trusteeship" see Bain (2003), abstract, www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/0199260265/toc.html (10 October 2005): "Situations in which some form of international supervision is required in a particular territory in order both to maintain order and to foster the norms and practices of fair self-government". The prototype is UNMIK in Kosovo. On Liberia, cf. NZZ of 10 October 2005.

¹⁹⁰ Ottaway (2003), S.321

¹⁹¹ Geuss (2001), p.505ff.. Bonacker/Imbusch(2005) speak of a "OECD peace" (p.132)

¹⁹² Shklar (1998), p.11 and p.19

¹⁹³ Vogt (1997), p.34

analysis of the institutions of the nation state and the military ought to be in the foreground¹⁹⁴.

In a critical peacebuilding approach, the limitation to purely "conflict-solving humanitarian interventions" would not suffice but, within the framework of a global transformation of world society, one would make every effort to reduce military and arms potentials and to include forms of structural violence¹⁹⁵. These critical-reflexive approaches are faced with a dilemma not unknown to them. It is true that they are in a position to show deeper correlations and to unmask hidden activities and interests that have been taken for granted. However, in their global, emancipatory approach, they prove to be of little manageability in the immediate 'here and now' of acute crises. In practice, their influence with respect to the drafting of peacebuilding missions and DDR programmes is therefore limited to including additional aspects (in particular the role and self-perception of the intervening agent) into the immediate, manageable 'problem-solving' approaches.

All in all, there does not seem to be any approach that would fundamentally move away from the peacebuilding consensus. Concrete alternatives to the model of a democratic state based on the rule of law are hardly apparent. The challenge, however, remains. Outside interventions have up to now failed to implement successfully working democratic states based on the rule of law in the setting of failed states. However, the experiment of the peacebuilding consensus has only been going on for 15 years, so the learning and adjustment process is in full swing.

5.5. To intervene or to look on, to implement or wait?

Rwanda 1994, Srebrenica 1995, the failure of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone; based on these and other negative experiences, the UN recommended in "Thinking Anew" and "The Need of Change"¹⁹⁶, amongst other things, that PSOs were only to be deployed if their equipment and their mandate was robust enough. Still, 200 Uruguayan UN soldiers were stranded helplessly in the jungle of Bunia (DR Congo) in May 2003, and the mission of the African Union in Darfur (Sudan) is largely without effect. The danger of second-rate PSOs in countries that only play a subordinate strategic role in the War on Terror has become manifest in particular since 9/11¹⁹⁷. It is therefore quite illusionary to think that the UN is prepared and able to intervene quickly and with sufficient equipment in each conflict setting – despite the "Responsibility to Protect", which the ICISS ascribes to the 'West' and the international organisations dominated by it.

¹⁹⁴ Jabri (1996), for instance, calls war a "constitutive aspect of state formation" and an "act of reproduction of social structures which render it possible", the "scope and intensity (of which) are reinforced through a global military order" (p. 172f. and 182). Against this background and from a critical perspective, current DDR programmes appear to be a mere fight against the symptoms.

¹⁹⁵ See Pugh (2004), p.40f., who refers, amongst other things, to the work of Galtung. Galtung, for his part, decisively disapproves of the theorem of "democratic peace" (see Galtung (1998), p.97ff.)

¹⁹⁶ Kofi Annan speaking to the UN General Assembly 1999; see Bellamy/Williams (2004/1), p.1, and Brahimi Report (2000), p.1

¹⁹⁷ "Other peacebuilding needs are therefore relegated to 'second tier' international concerns". Tschirgi (2004), p.17

In the age of globalisation of the media, the option of 'doing nothing' has also become more difficult. 'Doing nothing' today means to look on, wait for exhaustion and war-weariness when pictures of emaciated refugees and burned down villages from Darfur or of children mutilated by cutlasses in Sierra Leone or Rwanda are served up on TV. But the pressure from the public, the humanitarian interest to do something increases.

There may have been instances when 'doing nothing' would have been more honest than doing 'something', when a totally insufficiently equipped mission, merely assigned to function as an 'alibi', undermined the credibility and the 'drive' of the UN for future operations¹⁹⁸. It may also be that MINUSTAH in Haiti was able neither to implement a consequent DDR programme nor to establish a democratic state order based on the rule of law. However, there is no doubt that it has saved innumerable lives, as does (today's) MONUC in the DR Congo.

Again, there are no magic formulas. Chestermann calls for "clarity" and consistency, the consistency of aims and available means, of rhetoric and action. Empty promises only lead to frustration and undermine trust and credibility if the international community postulates the right of local self-determination but takes key decisions itself, as is the case in Kosovo¹⁹⁹. In this sense, one has to call for PSOs that concentrate on realistic, sometimes more moderate, targets and limit themselves to the consequent application of the available instruments. In Burundi, for instance, the AU abstained from deploying a 'first class PSO' (deliberately or out of necessity), and thus the demonstration of military strength. Instead, the focus lay right from the beginning, and consequently, on extremely persevering diplomacy. The establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law and the implementation of an extensive programme of collective demobilisations seems hardly realistic in the DR Congo – measured against such aims, MONUC is bound to fail. As experience has shown in Itui, it does seem possible, however, to guarantee a certain degree of protection to the population against the excessive assaults or maybe to admit combatants willing to demobilise to needs-oriented reintegration programmes.

Back to DDR; the question whether a DDR programme ought at all to be considered for a certain setting is somewhat easier to answer. "As a rule disarmament planners should not attempt to disarm factions until they have organised effective state-wide security or at least the guarantee of achieving it. In the uncertain period after the reduction of hostilities, a failed or half successful disarmament can encourage a proliferation of smaller groups at local level"²⁰⁰. A precondition for extensive demobilisation programmes is confidence-building between the parties to the conflict and/or the presence of a PSO which can guarantee security across the entire country and thus an environment in which the parties involved also consider security and the symmetry of power to be guaranteed without the force of weapons. If these conditions are not given, DDR efforts will have

¹⁹⁸ The initial equipping of MONUC as a "blow to its credibility"; Garrett Evans in the International Herald Tribune of 26 July 2004; www.crisisgroup.org (21 October 2005). Rwanda must also be allocated to this category.

¹⁹⁹ Chesterman (2003): "If genuine local control were possible then a transitional administration would not be necessary"; p.3

²⁰⁰ Berdal (1996), p.29. This opinion is widely undisputed; however, one needs to point out the work of SIDDR, Working group 1, "DDR aspects in Peace Processes and Peace Agreements" where it is urgently pointed out that strategic 'hard issues', such as a complete demobilisation ought not to be carried out too early. (www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890; 10 August 2005)

negative results and hold high risks of causing an additional or renewed escalation of the conflict²⁰¹.

Questions arise in the context where there is reason to believe that one or more parties to a conflict only demobilise incompletely or pretend to demobilise (Angola 1994), and/or the DDR programme is abused by 'wrong' combatants (Liberia). Are violations and shortcomings to be denounced publicly? Is it better to interrupt or even discontinue or is the continuation of the process per se more important? In Angola, the fact that the parties involved only pretended to participate in the DDR process and where their military capacities remained the same, was one of the contributing factors for the conflict flaring up again²⁰². In Liberia, in contrast, the ICG did not interpret the abuse of the DDR process by 'combatants' only recruited for this purpose, and by civilians as the 'kiss of death' for the peace process – the dynamic of the continuation of a (possibly imperfect) peace process was considered to be more important²⁰³.

The decisive factor at the end will be whether the peace and demobilisation process – by whatever means – leads to a wide dissolution of the military capacities that can immediately be mobilised and thus to a loss in the ability to lead a coordinated military offensive. In the case of units that are highly organised (Burundi, Angola), a 'clean' demobilisation is absolutely necessary, whereas in settings of a failed state some kind of disintegration of the already fragmented militias will take place anyway (Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan in part). In this context, the perception of the commanders and combatants on whether the war is over or whether they consider DDR programmes to be a mere breathing space for future armed activities is very important; spontaneous demobilisations are therefore generally an encouraging sign.

These target conflicts and dilemmas – of differing scope – are all inherent to individual cases that must be considered to be conflicts and post-conflict situations. Instead of clear answers there are merely vague tendencies. It is true that to be aware of all this does not create generally applicable 'best practices'. However, it increases the chances of a good, adjusted, 'realistic' approach for each individual case.

5.6. Final conclusion

"Conclusion: Since the end of the cold war the UN has led an upsurge of international activism that has played a critical role in reducing the number of violent conflicts".
Human Security Report (2005), p.146

The Human Security Report with its generally positive recognition of the post-conflict peacebuilding of the UN does not stand alone. Gurr/Marshall, also attribute "advances on the way to a more peaceful world" to the commitment of the UN, and Doyle/Sambanis consider the UN to be a good peacemaker as long as it does not try to

²⁰¹ see exemplary Ottaway (2003), p.316 with reference to Angola 1996 or ICG Asia Report No.65 (2003). One could also point to the effects of the failed first DDR programmes in Liberia and Sierra which fuelled the conflict.

²⁰² Hare (2004), p.219

²⁰³ International Crisis Group (2004) Africa Report No.75

enforce peace with brute force²⁰⁴. However, the current measure of success is the end of hostilities and not the consolidated democratic peace based on the rule of law which the peacebuilding consensus is actually trying to establish. "The end of the political violence has not led to peacebuilding" in the sense that peace could be characterised as secured, self-supporting and sustainable²⁰⁵. Are targets, strategies and approaches therefore too ambitious? Maybe. But maybe PSOs have to reach for the dove, to at least catch the sparrow. Maybe attempts at democratisation, a certain political participation, are a precondition for a conflict transformation onto a civil level and thus for the end of armed conflict²⁰⁶.

At present, there is hope for Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Aceh with respect to "bridg(ing) the transition for humanitarian relief to a country's return to a conventional development trajectory"²⁰⁷. We do not know yet where these countries will be in five or 10 years time, but what we certainly do know, is that a successful DDR process, a successful transformation of units of combatants to civilian movements, is the precondition for a return to development policy normality. This holds true for the past and is the prospect for the future. Failed demobilisation efforts have repeatedly led to a flaring-up of the war: in Angola (1994 and 1997), in Liberia (1996) and in Sierra Leone (latest 1999). For Haiti, Colombia and the DR Congo, the disarmament of certain groups (paramilitaries in Colombia, Rwandan "génocidaires" in the Congo, armed gangs in Port-au-Prince) is seen as the key to bringing movement to the bogged-down peace processes²⁰⁸.

If peacebuilding so far has not been able to establish the desired democratic peace but is 'only' capable of building a bridge in the (difficult) normality of Third World countries, it may well be presumptuous to expect DDR to join in the fight against poverty and discrimination, to bring about justice, and to eliminate the causes of conflict. So far, the emphasis on a very broad development perspective in the integrated approach of UNDPKO is of a more rhetorical than realistic nature. If DDR programmes succeed in turning combatants into civilians, turning armed units into political movements, thus re-establishing the monopoly of power and consolidating peace and security, this will be ambitious enough in a post-conflict setting.

When DDR programmes focus on combatants and the stability of post-conflict situations with their operational targets, they create the environment in which long-term post-conflict peacebuilding can commence. Therefore, one can argue that DDR is a window of

²⁰⁴ Gurr/Marshall (2005), p. 75. Doyle/Sambanis (2005) consider the UN to be suited for consensus-based strategies up to "discrete enforcement" (robust PSOs, such as in Liberia) but unsuited for "war making" (peace enforcement as in Somalia). One needs to note, however, that the findings are quite controversial, and that the time period since the end of the Cold War is still (too) short for a reliable analysis.

²⁰⁵ Tschirgi (2004), p.10. In an analysis carried out over longer periods of time, (Collier, Paul (2003): *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington D.C.) the probability of a post-conflict country falling back into armed conflict within five years was 44 percent.

²⁰⁶ see for instance the concept of "Participatory Peace" by Doyle/Sambanis (2005), p.16ff.

²⁰⁷ Tschirgi (2004), p.10

²⁰⁸ Colombia: "To eliminate one factor of violence", see again ICG Latin America Report No.8 (2004), .1. DR Congo: ICG Africa Report No.91 (2005), p.26. Haiti: ICG America/Caribbean Report No.13 (2005)

opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding as well as for development cooperation in the 'normal' poverty in the Third World.

The main dilemma lies in the fact that the 'first window' can only be opened by political concessions to the parties to the conflict. These concessions in turn can compromise the peacebuilding targets and thus close the 'second window'. This becomes particularly obvious in the dilemma between short-term post-conflict stability and longer-term public security, when DDR consolidates peace, ie makes war-like acts end, but has to allow for trade-offs that impair the reputation of trustworthy security systems, the rule of law, the bringing about of justice, etc, thus making the already difficult guarantee of public security even more difficult. This is precisely why the coordination and harmonisation of DDR programmes with measures for the build-up of an efficient and responsible security system, with compensation projects for disadvantaged and vulnerable persons, with programmes for reconstruction and development, is so important. It is the task of DDR to contribute to minimising the effects of the compromises and trade-offs, and to not losing track of the longer-term aims.

(Nearly) every case is a special one. Specific settings require adjusted conceptual answers for their dilemmas and clashing interests. Sensitivity to settings and conflicting interests does not only represent a precondition for 'good' DDR practices in the individual case but also for the formulation of consistent, realistic goals and an estimate of the capacities needed for this. It also means to recognise and name the price that needs to be paid for the establishment of post-conflict stability to combatants and units for their demobilisation. Blatant inconsistencies between rhetorical claims and actually fulfilled promises, between targets and means, have an impact far beyond the individual case Rwanda was just as much a consequence of Somalia as Darfur or Bunia. Such "failures soon claim[ed] victims elsewhere"²⁰⁹, by undermining the credibility of the international community as a whole and by belittling both the local population's and potential donors' willingness to support. Both credibility and willingness to support are the foundation on which future DDR programmes are based – in Aceh and in the Sudan, maybe and hopefully soon in the DR Congo or in Sri Lanka.

²⁰⁹ Doyle (2001), p.536

APPENDIX

A.1 Overview of DDR processes since 1990 and their evaluation

Africa	When?	PSO?	Cause / context	Source for this paper
Namibia	1990-92	Monitoring - Mission (UNTAG)	End of Apartheid	Secondary literature
Mozambique	1992-97	PKO (ONUMOZ)	End conflict Frelimo-Renamo	Secondary literature
Uganda	1992-95	-	Victory Museveni	Secondary literature
Djibouti	1993-02	-	Peace agreement	-
Eritrea	1993-97	-	Independence	Secondary literature
Somalia	1993	Peace enforcement	Violence, anarchy	Secondary literature
Somaliland	1993-?	-	De-facto independence after conflicts	-
Angola	1995-97	„Verification mission“ (UNAVEM III)	Peace agreement government-UNITA	Secondary literature
Mali	1995	-	Conflict government-Tuareg	-
Liberia	1996-97	"Observation Mission" (UNOMIL), ECOMOG troops	Peace agreement, Transitional government	Secondary literature (Case study)
Sierra Leone	1996-04	First Observer Mission by UN and ECOWAS, as of 1999 PSO (UNAMSIL)	Peace agreement	Overview study
Rwanda	1997-05	-	Victory NPF after genocide	Secondary literature
DR Congo	1999-?	PSO (MONUC)	Diverse agreements	Case study
Guinea-Bissau	2000-?	-	Peace agreement	-
Eritrea	2001-06	(Only monitoring of ceasefire)	Ceasefire and peace agreement with Ethiopia	Secondary literature
Ethiopia	2000-2005	(Only monitoring of ceasefire)	Ceasefire and peace agreement with Eritrea	Secondary literature
Rep. Congo	2000-	-	Victory Sassou-Nguesso	Secondary literature
Chad	2000-?	-	Victory Idriss Deby	-
Angola	2002-2006	-	Death of Savimbi, End of the fighting by UNITA	Case study
Burundi	2004-?	PSO (ONUB))	Peace agreement, Transitional government	Case study

Liberia	2002-?	PSO (UNMIL)	Sending of Taylor into exile, Peace agreement, Transitional government	Case study
Central African Republic	2004-06	"Political mission" (BONUCA)	Consolidation of power by Pres. Bozizé	-
? Sudan	2005-?	PKO (UNMIS)	Peace agreement, SPLA government	Future prospects
Cambodia	1991-93	UN transitional administration	Withdrawal Vietnam	Secondary literature
Tajikistan	1997-	Observer mission	Peace agreement	-
Cambodia	1999-2005	-	Dissolution Khmer Rouge	Secondary literature
Solomon Islands	2002-03	Regional PKO (mostly Australia)		-
Afghanistan	2002-06	UN Assistance Mission and NATO troops	Overthrow of Taliban by US-led military interventions	Case study
Papua New Guinea	2003	-	Autonomy agreement for Bougainville	-
? Aceh (Indonesia)	2005-?	Monitoring Mission EU /ASEAN	Peace agreement GAM-government	Future prospects
Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine	Ca. 1992-	-	Collapse Socialism and Soviet Union	Overview studies BICC
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995-03	UN-Mission (UNMIBH), SFOR/IFOR	Peace agreement Dayton	Overview study BICC
Kosovo	1999-	UN transitional administration (UNMIK), NATO troops (KFOR)	Withdrawal/capitulation of Serbian army	Overview study BICC
Northern Ireland		-	Peace Process	Daily press
Nicaragua	1989-92	Observer mission UN and OAS	Election victory Chamorro, End of fighting by the Contras	Overview study BICC
El Salvador	1992-96	Observer missions UN and OAS	End of guerrilla fighting by FMLN	Overview study BICC
Haiti	1994-95	PKO (UNMIH)	Reinstatement of Aristide by USA	-
Guatemala	1997-?	UN-Verification Mission	End of guerrilla fighting	Overview study
Haiti	2004-?	PSO (MINUSTAH)	Removal from office of Aristide	Case study
Colombia	2004-?	OAS Observer mission	Agreement paramilitaries-government	Case study

Sources: SIDDR (www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890), BICC Paper No.8, BICC Briefs No. 25, 26 and GTZ (2001)

A. 2 Evaluation of the case studies and short case analyses

1. Case studies

Conflict analysis

	Conflict profile, history of conflict	Actors	Causes of conflict
Afghanistan	<p>Two decades of war: Soviet invasion, Mujahideen, Taliban.</p> <p>International components (Cold War International terrorism) Regional component (Pakistan).</p> <p>Localisation and individualisation (Warlords in changing coalitions)</p>	<p>Primary actors: Fractions of the former Northern Alliance, Taliban, troops of the American coalition "Al Quaeda"? Secondary actors: Local militias and warlords, 'private armies'</p> <p>Interests and positions: power, opium production, control of transportation routes, international destabilisation / terror vs. War on Terror</p>	<p>Primary causes: originally Islamic-religious fight against Soviets. Taliban: Religious Puritanism, ethnic and regional opposites. Influence of Pakistan, tribalism</p> <p>Prolonging factors: Failed state, opium production, international terrorism</p>
Angola	<p>Colonial War of Independence since 1961; then, during the Cold War, proxy conflict between MPLA and UNITA. Up to 2002 numerous failed peace agreements.</p> <p>After Cold War, transformation of the conflict to national fight for power and resource war. With this, mostly national dimension but strong Angolan influence on wars in neighbouring countries.</p> <p>Strong personality (Jonas Savimbi)</p>	<p>Primary actors: Government party and Angolan army (control of central administration and the capital Luanda) on the one hand and UNITA rebels (temporary control of large parts of the country) on the other hand.</p> <p>Secondary actors: Interested parties in oil and diamond deposits.</p> <p>Interests and positions: government power and resources</p>	<p>Primary causes: Fight for power in post-colonial setting with personal component (Dos Santos vs. Savimbi)</p> <p>Prolonging factors: Exploitation of natural resources and rents from respective war economies, due to the extremely long duration of conflict war is considered to be the intrinsic social order that all have grown accustomed to.</p>
Burundi	<p>Assassination of President 1993, bloody escalation with 300,000 dead. Since then conflicts between army (Tutsi-dominated) and armed units of the opposition (Hutu population majority).</p> <p>Involvement of civil society (massacres, fortified villages)</p> <p>Regional dimension: Escalation in Burundi by events in Rwanda</p>	<p>Primary actors: Tutsi army, armed units of the political groups representing the two rival ethnicities that in part are fragmented in a number of fractions.</p> <p>Secondary actors: local militias ("Gardiens de la Paix") and other party militias.</p> <p>Interests and positions: Ethnically determined conflict of power</p>	<p>Primary causes: Monopolisation of the authority of the state by the Tutsi minority along the rival ethnic groups.</p> <p>Prolonging factors: Enormous distrust between the parties to the conflict and ethnic groups; this against the background of numerous massacres of civilians and the genocide in Rwanda.</p>

<p>Haiti</p>	<p>Militarisation of policy-making since Duvalier, instability and violence after his removal from office. US-intervention in favour of Aristide 1994. Overthrow of Aristide 2004, Strong polarisation of society around Aristide. Armed agitation by various fractions.</p> <p>Early 2004 UN intervention (US-led Multi-national Interim Force, after three months transfer to Stabilisation Mission MINUSTAH under Brazilian command)</p> <p>Widespread violence and assaults of irregular, armed groups; failed state.</p>	<p>Armed groups and paramilitaries with various backgrounds: Remains of former armies, Duvalier's death squad, armed brigades of political parties (in favour of/against Aristide), private armies of local warlords, (youth) gangs, former convicts, national police of the transitional government, MINUSTAH</p> <p>Interests and positions: Maintaining/ gaining power on national and local level, commercial interests, interest in stability of US.</p>	<p>Primary causes: Fight for maintaining/gaining power on national and local level as well as for commercial monopoly gains achieved by owning guns (corruption, illegal business ...)</p> <p>Prolonging factors: general militarisation of policy-making and conflict settlement, political polarisation, lack of state authority, enormous corruption, disastrous economic situation, climate of impunity, general availability of SALW, missing trust in policy-making.</p>
<p>Colombia</p>	<p>Root lies in conflict of landless farmers with big landowners. Formation of guerrilla movements (FARC, ELN) and paramilitary 'self-defence committees'. Military oppression of guerrillas.</p> <p>Superposition by Cold War: support of the military by US, influence of the revolution in Cuba.</p> <p>Violence against civil society and social/political movements ("guerra sucia"). Connections army - paramilitaries.</p> <p>De-ideologisation and commercialisation of the conflict after the end of the Cold War. Entry of FARC into the kidnapping and drugs business as well as increasing dominance of drug lords in the AUC.</p>	<p>Primary actors: Paramilitaries of AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia); guerrillas of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), government.</p> <p>Secondary actors: US ("Plan Colombia").</p> <p>Interests and positions: All in all opaque. AUC: consolidation of power, no punishment and prevention of commanders' extradition to the US, securing of valuables gained by illegal activities. FARC / ELN: 'wait and see' attitude, correction of existing power structure, 'business' interests, security guarantees. Government: Reestablishment of state control and order across the entire country Consolidation of the existing power structures. US: Fight against production of drugs ("Plan Colombia").</p>	<p>Primary causes: Power and ownership relations, in particular ownership of land. Originally strong ideological colour. Increasing weight of interests from illegal business activities, in particular about the control of drugs production and trade.</p> <p>Secondary cause by conflicting interests in the question of punishment of human rights violations and illegal businesses.</p> <p>Prolonging factor: Decade-long adaptation to violence as pattern for conflict settlement.</p>

<p>Congo (DR)</p>	<p>Conflicts as result of Rwandan genocide 1994: Rwandan interventions against escaped "génocidaires". As of 1998 rebellion pro-Rwandan/-Ugandan militias against Kabila government. 2002/2003 Peace agreement, transitional government and UN peacekeeping force. Still no end to the fighting in Kivu and Ituri. In total 3.8 million deaths.</p> <p>Over-exploitation by parties to the conflict and foreign troops of the mineral resources of the DRC. Break-up between Rwanda and Uganda and the militias supported by them.</p> <p>Regional component and setting of failed state</p>	<p>Primary actors: Congolese army, Rwanda, Uganda, FDLR (former Rwandan army and Interahamwe), RCD-G (pro-Rwandan), pro-Ugandan factions</p> <p>Secondary actors: Splinter groups and militias supported by the main actors of diverse ethnic groups, private armies in connection with the exploitation of mineral resources.</p> <p>Interests and positions: Rwanda: Extinction of FDLR, exploitation of mineral resources.. FDLR: Prevention of extradition to Rwanda. Other actors mostly power policy and economic interests.</p>	<p>Primary causes: Effects of the genocide in Rwanda and continuation of the conflict on Congolese soil. At the same time setting of failed state where Rwandan parties to the conflict took advantage of the power vacuum in the East of the Congo and lack of state power/control.</p> <p>Prolonging factors: Exploitation of natural resources, breakout and fanning of ethnic opposites.</p>
<p>Liberia</p>	<p>End of dictatorship Doe and 1989-97 bloody conflicts with more than 200,000 deaths; victory of warlord Charles Taylor. As of 2000 again armed conflicts between Taylor's 'army' and the rebel movements LURD and MODEL. Intervention of ECOWAS in Summer 2003 in Monrovia, Conclusion of peace agreement and departure of Taylor into exile.</p> <p>Increasingly regional aspect of the conflict through the exertion of influence by Taylor in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. Trans-border connections between parties to the conflict. Liberia's role: "Eye of a regional storm".</p> <p>Central role of Charles Taylor</p>	<p>Primary actors: Former army/fighters of Charles Taylor, rebel groups LURD and MODEL</p> <p>Secondary actors: more militias and, in particular, 'private armies' of smaller warlords and economic interests (timber industry, etc.).</p> <p>Interests and positions: Access to power and resources/termination of clan-, patronage- and ethnically-determined exclusion.</p>	<p>Primary causes: Failed or shadow state setting with monopolisation of state and resources for the interests of the power-holders and with the exclusion of all other groups of society. Conflict lines along ethnic criteria (in particular Madingo and Krahn against other ethnic groups).</p> <p>Prolonging factors: Exploitation of natural resources (in particular timber) and gains from respective criminal war economies. At the same time, exploitation of resources in the regional context (in particular diamonds from Sierra Leone). Due to the long duration of conflict war is considered to be the intrinsic social order that all have grown accustomed to. Involvement of Liberian combatants in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire und Guinea.</p>

Analysis of post-conflict situation

	Security situation	Peace process	State, economy and society
Afghanistan	<p>Presence of US troops, the International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF) as well as a UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA).</p> <p>Still precarious security situation with control of Karzai government limited to Kabul. Continuing significant influence by the warlords. 'War on Terror'</p> <p>Continuing ethnic tension, in particular due to the dominance of the Panjshiri (Tajiks) in the ministry of defence in the transitional government</p>	<p>Bonn Conference: Agreement on "Loya Jirga" and formation of a transitional government, adoption of a constitution, elections. No real comprehensive peace agreement.</p> <p>Process of adoption of a constitution, elections for president and parliament have been carried out.</p>	<p>Failed state. Great differences and heterogeneities in the regional context..</p> <p>Personal/tribal/local loyalties, tradition of weapons possession</p> <p>Disastrous economic situation, upswing in Kabul due to international presence. Opium production.</p> <p>Heritage of year-long war activities and gross human rights violations</p>
Angola	<p>Through final military victory of the MPLA comparatively little risks of a flaring up of the fighting. Political will of the parties to the conflict is there, no deployment of international peacekeeping forces.</p> <p>Three-four million weapons in circulation. As a result great risks of banditry.</p> <p>Continuing conflict over the Cabinda enclave and interference of Angola, particularly in the conflict in the DR Congo.</p>	<p>Consent of UNITA to peace agreement after death of Savimbi and hopeless military position</p> <p>Bilateral peace agreement by Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of 4 April 2002 as 'revival' and addition to the Lusaka Accord of 1994. Covered by international law by UN Security Council Resolution 1994 und 1997 (UN missions UNAVEM III und MONUA)</p>	<p>Certain state capacities through proceeds from oil, control of oil industry and economy by military-political networks of the government. Enormous disparities between population and elite, centre and periphery.</p> <p>Difficult heritage of the year-long war: 1/3 of population as IDPs, 1 million war deaths, traumata. No programmes for the prosecution of war criminals and reparations or compensation</p>
Burundi	<p>General adherence to ceasefire, however, still generally fragile security situation.</p> <p>Stationing of peacekeeping forces of the AU, later UN.</p> <p>Enormous proliferation of SALW in the entire country</p>	<p>Since 2000 gradual approval of peace agreement by parties to conflict (Arusha; ethnic balance of power in government and army) under international mediation (South Africa) as of 2000. However, no comprehensive peace agreement as of yet with consent of all parties involved; one militant group stands aside.</p> <p>Transitional government 2000-2005 and transitional constitution. Local, presidential and parliamentary elections 2005</p>	<p>Operative government</p> <p>Difficult economic environment (coffee prices, agriculture damaged by war).</p> <p>Central challenge lies in overcoming the deep mistrust between parties to conflict and ethnic groups, confidence-building and coming to terms with war crimes (partial amnesty in the agreement of Arusha).</p> <p>Many IDPs and refugees, in particular in Tanzania</p>

<p>Haiti</p>	<p>Lack of authority of the 7,500 UN soldiers and interim government.</p> <p>Control of large parts of the country by diverse paramilitary groups (slums, rural regions)</p> <p>Precarious security situation, in particular in Port-au-Prince</p> <p>About 300,000 SALW, 170,000 of which 'owned' by civilians</p> <p>Still unsolved question of power, continuing destabilisation efforts on the part of Aristide, etc.</p>	<p>Interim government but no peace agreement</p>	<p>Lacking state authority, no functioning administration (Haiti as failed state)</p> <p>Widespread poverty, unemployment above 60%, most corrupt country on earth, monopoly gains by use of weapons.</p> <p>Unsettled and polarised society.</p>
<p>Colombia</p>	<p>Situation of general violence prevails, abductions, political murders, etc.</p> <p>Control by FARC of so-called demilitarised zone, control by paramilitaries of wide parts of the country.</p> <p>Armament of the Colombian army; civilians are being armed to support the government army in rural regions (Soldados campesinos). Military aid from US in the framework of "Plan Colombia"</p>	<p>No peace agreement, no negotiations between FARC and government, first signals of readiness to negotiate by ELN. No negotiations between AUC and FARC.</p> <p>Talks between government and paramilitaries on disarmament, "Law on Peace and Justice".</p>	<p>Functioning administration with limited control.</p> <p>Paramilitary mafia-like networks. Drugs production under control of paramilitaries and guerrillas is of great importance. Enormous social differences.</p> <p>War heritage: 3 million IDPs, traumata and human rights violations.</p> <p>Popularity of President Uribe's "Policy of the firm hand" in the framework of Seguridad Democrática.</p>
<p>Congo (DR)</p>	<p>Situation of general violence in Kivu and Ituri. Questionable will for peace by exploitation of resources in governing vacuum of power.</p> <p>After disastrous beginning, MONUC has been enforced but still not able to protect civilians in a comprehensive manner.</p> <p>Basic conflict between Rwanda and FDLR remains unsolved, FDLR loses strength.</p> <p>Regional context: Authoritarian Kagame regime in Rwanda, fragile pacification in Burundi. Presence of foreign powers in East Congo. Uncontrolled outside borders.</p>	<p>Diverse peace agreements (Lusaka Accord in particular), stationing of a UN peacekeeping force</p>	<p>Still lack of state control, lack of infrastructure. Failed state. Hardly functioning transitional government, undisciplined army, power struggles in Kinshasa</p> <p>Disastrous economic and social situation, numerous IDPs, massacres, continuing ethnic tensions on various levels.</p>

Liberia	<p>Stationing of a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) under a Chapter VII-mandate of the UN Security Council. Extensive control of the security situation.</p> <p>Unclear role and intentions of the warlords (agitation by 'spoiler' Taylor from Nigeria, tensions in LURD and MODEL).</p> <p>Remaining unsolved conflict in Côte d'Ivoire and unstable situation in Guinea. Presence and participation of Liberian combatants and weapons. Stabilisation in Sierra Leone.</p>	<p>Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003 between Taylor, LURD and MODEL by mediation and pressure exerted by ECOWAS and international contact group.</p> <p>Departure of Taylor into Nigerian exile and formation of transitional government with the participation of warlords representing parties to the conflict.</p> <p>Presidential elections in November 2005</p>	<p>"Daunting challenge of rebuilding from 'Ground Zero' ": Still hardly functioning state institutions and infrastructures.</p> <p>Economic and social disastrous situation, about 350,000 IDPs, mostly in camps in and around Monrovia.</p> <p>Traditional patriarchal land and marriage rights, therefore very difficult standing for young men.</p> <p>Reconciliation: Up to now no implementation of programmes for prosecution and reparation. Truth commission planned.</p>

"Objects": Analysis of combatants and units

	Structure and organisation of units	Social profile of combatants
Afghanistan	<p>No precise information on number of combatants; only estimates on number of existing weapons</p> <p>Hierarchies and authorities: Heterogeneous structure of combat units, many local warlords and militias. Local and personal loyalties are of great importance</p>	<p>Origin mostly from villages of the respective commanders. About. 10 percent child soldiers.</p>
Angola	<p>Hierarchies and authorities: Strict command structures in UNITA</p>	<p>Average age: 26, average 'service': eight years, low educational background, origin from rural provinces, wish to return to home regions, 40 percent wish to work in farming</p> <p>About 10 percent child soldiers, military participation of women in the UNITA not clear</p>
Burundi	<p>Large number of armed units, partially strong splitting up in different factions. Within factions mostly quite strict hierarchies and command structures.</p>	<p>No secure information, assumption that majority of combatants originate from rural environment. Some parties involved indicate number of combatants. Numerous militias from civilians.</p>
Haiti	<p>No central authorities and command structures. Many heterogeneous units on a local level.</p>	<p>Numerous youth gangs, former death squads and convicts as paramilitaries.</p>
Colombia	<p>Split-up of AUC into diverse regional blocks, which, however, have a strict hierarchical structure - mostly led by feared drug lords</p>	<p>Mostly men between 18 and 35 years without higher education, recruited by comparatively high salaries paid by the paramilitaries. Average 'service': eight years, most urgent wishes: return to family and work as micro-business owners.</p>

Kongo (DR)	Heterogeneous structure of the combat units, central influence of Rwanda on the RCD-G, weakening of and tensions within FDLR; only estimates on the number of existing weapons	No reliable information
Liberia	Heterogeneous structure of the combat units, many local warlords and militias, internal tensions within the former rebel movements LURD and MODEL	11 percent child soldiers, 20 percent women (data questionable due to abuse of DDR programmes). Origin: 27 percent farmers, 35 percent students (!). Hard core of long-term fighters, sometimes problems with drugs.

"Subjects": Framework, embeddedness, actors DDR

	Institutional embeddedness	"Ownership", profiles and interests of actors responsible
Afghanistan	<p>Formal acknowledgement of the former Mujahideen units as "Afghan Armed Forces" in the Bonn Agreement of 2001. DDR not explicitly part of agreement, only goal of the build-up of a new army with the participation of the various factions.</p> <p>Afghanistan New Beginning Programme (ANBP) by the Afghan transitional government.</p>	<p>In practice, responsibility lies with Ministry of Defence (ie the Panjshiri factions). Interested in power consolidation.</p> <p>Execution UNDP, participation of ISAF and coalition forces in disarmament. Strategic interests (War on Terror).</p> <p>Financing of ANBP by Japan and other national governments (planned \$167 million for three years, up to now only 50 percent paid out). DDR under Japanese leadership, UNICEF: special programme for minors.</p>
Angola	<p>Comprehensive regulation of central framework conditions and directives of DDR in Memorandum of Understanding; sometimes resort to the pertinent regulations of the Lusaka Accord</p>	<p>Control and implementation of DDR programmes by Angolan government (commissions with participation of UNITA).</p> <p>Invitation to UN and state troika</p> <p>Participation of World Bank in framework of a 'parallel' demobilisation and reintegration programme</p>
Burundi	<p>Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) of the diverse parties to the conflict in the framework of the Arusha Agreement. Monitoring by Implementation Monitoring Committee with broad participation of Burundian and international actors.</p> <p>Embedded in MDRP. Integration of peace missions by AU and later by UN. Covered by international law by AU and UN Security Council Resolution.</p>	<p>Responsibility lies mostly with transitional government and DDR institutions created by it. Like this, comprehensive participation of the parties to the conflict in planning.</p> <p>Distribution of diverse tasks to sub-contractors, for instance with respect to the demobilisation of child soldiers (UNICEF, Norwegian Refugee Council and others).</p> <p>Responsibility for reintegration lies with UNDP and formation of a Trust Fund. Implementation of own programmes, for instance by USAID.</p>

Haiti	<p>Up to now merely appointment of a National Commission for DDR (NCDDR), but no work on a comprehensive conceptual approach with a respective framework of laws.</p> <p>Legitimation of a (too?) broad MINUSTAH mandate with explicit reference to NCDDR by UN Security Council Resolutions</p>	<p>Up to now merely un-coordinated efforts of disarmament and pilot programmes by various national and international actors</p>
Colombia	<p>Embeddedness of DDR in national legislation (Law on Justice and Peace, law on individual disarmament and amnesty) and in the concept of Seguridad Democratica</p> <p>Collective demobilisation as essential part of the agreements between government and paramilitaries (Agreement of Santa Fe de Ralito).</p>	<p>Implementation of DDR programmes by Colombian central government (disarmament and demobilisation: High Commissioner for Peace; reintegration: Ministry of the Interior)</p> <p>OAS Monitoring Mission, limited participation of IOM. No official support by US, EU and the UN.</p>
Congo (DR)	<p>Diverse peace and ceasefire agreements. Provisions for the withdrawal of foreign troops (mostly Rwanda and Uganda) and disarmament of non-Congolese units (in particular former Rwandan army and Interahamwe) already agreed upon in the Lusaka Accord of 1999</p> <p>Covered by international law by respective UN Security Council resolutions, weapons embargo by UN Security Council.</p>	<p>MONUC is responsible for demobilisation and repatriation of non-Congolese combatants (mostly former Rwandan Hutu army and Interahamwe). In 2003 expansion of MONUC's mandate to the disarming of Congolese combatants, that lay formerly with the Congolese government alone. Formation of a national commission for DDR (CONADER). Like this shared responsibility. Participation of World Bank in framework of MDRP.</p>
Liberia	<p>Central framework conditions and aims for DDR laid down in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; international recognition and support by UN Security Council Resolutions.</p>	<p>Responsibility for disarmament and demobilisation lies mostly with UNMIL Joint Implementation Unit. Formation of a commission for DDR made up of representatives of the parties to the conflict and guarantors of the peace agreement.</p> <p>Distribution of diverse tasks to sub-contractors, particularly with respect to the demobilisation of child soldiers (UNICEF, Norwegian Refugee Council and others).</p> <p>Responsibility for reintegration lies with UNDP and formation of a Trust Fund. Implementation of own programmes, for instance by USAID.</p>

DDR: Concepts and implementation

	Conceptual approaches	Implementation and evaluation
Afghanistan	<p>Previous history: numerous militias disarmed by rule of the Taliban; partial rearmament after 9/11 by US</p> <p>Aim of the demobilisation: 50,000 - 100,000 combatants of the 'official' militias. Naming of combatants to be demobilised by Ministry of Defence, verification by Verification Committee.</p>	<p>End of 'DD' July 2005: More than 60,000 persons disarmed and participating in reintegration. Delivery of 36,000 SALW and 11,000 heavy weapons. Giving of too high numbers of combatants by militias. No total demobilisation of the strongest units (Panjshiri), partially with approval of the US in the War on Terror.</p>

	<p>Handing over of one's weapon to the Mobile Disarmament Unit. Reception of food and \$200. Storage of weapons in Kabul. Cantonment of heavy weapons by ISAF</p> <p>DDR as part of SSR: Build-up of a new (ethnically more balanced) army and police force.</p> <p>Incentives: Command posts in the new army. Law on political parties: Incentives for demobilisation as admitted political parties are not allowed to have armed units and maintain connections to militias.</p> <p>Reintegration: nine-months-long reintegration programmes. Special programme for local commanders ("Commander Incentive Programme")</p> <p>Special programme for minors (UNICEF)</p>	<p>Signs that DDR accompanied 'only' the traditional volatility of the structure of the Afghan militia and a structural change.</p> <p>Granting of posts in the new army often by patronage system of the dominating militias. Due to this perception of missing impartiality in SSR and DDR.</p> <p>Reintegration: Strong demand for programmes but hardly any jobs afterwards. Little success of the commander programme. Destabilisation by poppy cultivation.</p> <p>Up to now only disarmament of 'recognised' militias but not the many 'irregular' militias of local commanders, influential persons, political groups, particularly in rural areas. Law punishing the upkeep of private militias and the refusal to disarm has not yet been enforced.</p>
Angola	<p>Failed peaceand DDR processes 1994/97</p> <p>Demobilisation of 33,000 soldiers of the Angolan army (FAA). Disarmament and demobilisation of 50,000 UNITA combatants and 250,000 relatives in 35 quartering areas and family reception areas, led by the FAA and administered by UNITA. Formal inclusion of demobilised UNITA fighters into FAA and thus end of UNITA's existence. Incorporation of 5,000 combatants each in the Angolan armed forces and the national police. Discharge and short-term reinsertion of the other demobilised combatants.</p> <p>Long-term reintegration: two-year programme of the Angolan government financed by the government and international donors. Embedded in national plan for development and fight against poverty. Classical reintegration packages: ID cards, cash payments, clothes, agriculture kits, etc. Parallel programme in framework of the MDRP. Later link to the reintegration of combatants and IDPs.</p>	<p>Demobilisation of 85,000 UNITA combatants and 280,000 relatives. With this planned target exceeded and huge logistical problems; delays, long waiting times and difficult humanitarian situation in camps leading to more crime.</p> <p>Handing-over of about 30,000 SALW as well as heavy weapons. With this, presumably 90 percent of the UNITA armoury demobilised.</p> <p>No special programmes for women, neglect of war victims.</p> <p>No systematic disarmament of civil society, problems with a further increase in general armed crime and banditry.</p> <p>Difficulties in coordination between two reintegration programmes (government and World Bank) and with the transition from demobilisation to reintegration (change in responsibilities).</p>
Burundi	<p>Integration of combatants of all parties to the conflict in new army, police, DDR part of SSR.</p> <p>Planned target of disarmament: 55,000 combatants in two phases; with Phase 2 taking place successively together with the build-up of new security forces. With this, concept of a 'slow', gradual implementation of DDR elements in parallel with the progression of the entire peace process.</p> <p>DD: Collection in camps (with weapons, control by respective conflict party!). Clear criteria for reception (hand-over of weapons, allocation to military faction, proof of military knowledge). Reinsertion with the help of staggered cash payments.</p>	<p>Delayed beginning of Phase 1, successes since early 2005. Bad experiences with Pilot Cantonment 2003 (just about 200 combatants): Difficulties with security mistrust, lacking perspectives due to long waiting time in the camps without reintegration programmes.</p> <p>Up to now, all in all successful course of the entire, long-term peace process; successful conflict transformation onto the political level so far.</p> <p>Difficulties with reintegration have in part been defused by embedding the DDR process into SSR. Otherwise no results yet, as DDR process has only just started.</p>

	<p>Reintegration: Financial framework of four years with the aim of integration in families of origin, special programmes for children.</p>	
Haiti	<p>Up to now no comprehensive conceptual approach for country-wide DDR programmes.</p> <p>Military disarmament activities of a limited scope, community-based pilot projects by UNDP (local development and reintegration projects, propagation of peaceful conflict settlement mechanisms, etc.)</p> <p>Little thought-out approach of the transitional government on a SALW buy-back programme, not implemented.</p>	<p>Up to now no substantial disarmament, demobilisation or even reintegration, no substantial reduction of the armoury.</p> <p>Lack of comprehensive and coherent national DDR strategy.</p> <p>Rapid loss of confidence of the transitional government: No sustainable improvement of the security situation and /or restoration of state authority.</p>
Colombia	<p>DDR, together with the establishment of demilitarised zones, amnesty and ceasefire, is part of the negotiations between the government and paramilitaries. Start of collective demobilisations during the negotiations. Demobilisation of entire units in assembly areas (hand-over of weapons, interrogation, passing on to reintegration).</p> <p>DDR not part of a comprehensive peace agreement but attempt to initiate positive dynamics ("to eliminate one factor of violence from the conflict")</p> <p>Outline legislation (Law on justice and peace) of 21 July 2005: Prosecution highly unlikely when participation in the demobilisation process, no duty to reveal all their offences, assets, aliases and command structures.</p> <p>In parallel: offer of individual demobilisation and reintegration against partial amnesty.</p>	<p>Until summer 2005 collective demobilisation of more than 5,000 paramilitaries, and about 6,000 individual demobilisations of combatants of all armed groups. At the same time difficulties with the coordination of demobilisation and reintegration.</p> <p>Ceasefire is not kept to. No spill-over of demobilisation to guerrillas, no disarmament of civil society.</p> <p>Suspicion of pro-forma demobilisation by recruitment of combatants solely for the purpose of DDR programmes, reports of new recruitment. Paramilitary structures and networks remain unchanged. Doubt about the good will of the paramilitaries and suspicions arise that the transformation of the paramilitaries is only a farce and that much effort is put into preventing public prosecution and extradition. Allegations against OAS for ineffective monitoring.</p> <p>Up to now hardly any punishment and reparations.</p> <p>Suspension of the DDR process by paramilitaries in October 2005</p>
Congo (DR)	<p>Emergency Programme in the framework of MDRP: Aim of demobilisation: 150,000 combatants (!) and the promotion of resource reallocation to other sectors.</p> <p>MONUC in Kivu, aim: voluntary disarmament and repatriation of about 15,000 FDLR combatants.</p> <p>Ituri (2005): Ituri Disarmament and Community Reintegration Programme after ceasefire agreement between most militias involved in the conflicts there: Joint programme of CONADER, new Congolese army, MONUC, UNDP, UNICEF; concept of voluntary demobilisation for the time being by providing incentives to commanders (posts in new Congolese army in Kinshasa on the one hand and community-based reinsertion assistance on the other).</p>	<p>Up to now no success both of MONUC in Kivu and the national programme. Hardly any repatriation of FDLR combatants. The official number of demobilised combatants is 15,000 but hardly any useable weapons have been handed in. Failed approach of incentives to commanders (posts with Congolese army). Bad acceptance of reinsertion assistance. All in all no sustainable stabilisation of the situation.</p> <p>Build-up of the new Congolese army/integration of former rebels: Little success in the implementation, 'ghost' soldiers receiving pay, 'real' soldiers not receiving anything, desertions, banditry.</p> <p>Insufficient capacities of MONUC and new Congolese army to guarantee the security of civilians and disarmed combatants. At the same time only unassertive action and, above</p>

	<p>Most recently, individual attempts at coercive demobilisation in Kivu by MONUC and the Congolese army.</p>	<p>all, totally insufficient remuneration.</p> <p>Limits of voluntary demobilisation when the underlying regional and political conflict is not solved, and in the setting of a failed state.</p>
Liberia	<p>Previous history: 1996: failed peace- and disarmament efforts. Successful disarmament and demobilisation in the neighbouring country Sierra Leone</p> <p>Aim is the disarmament of 50,000 combatants and the collection and destruction of 70,000 SALW by UNMIL. Official dissolution of the fighting parties. With this, approach of rapid demobilisation as a precondition for the continuation of the peace process.</p> <p>Disarmament and demobilisation (DD) in 3 phases and with a cantonment concept: (Separation of the combatants in the camps, at the same time registration, medical examination and supplies, guidance and payment of \$150. Admission when handing over at least 1 SALW or 150 pieces of ammunition. Transport of combatant to desired region and again payment of \$150.</p> <p>Reintegration: NGOs are being invited by UNDP to suggest reintegration projects which would be funded by the Trust Fund. Separate programmes of USAID in combination with infrastructure programmes. Special programmes for child soldiers (UNICEF and others)..</p>	<p>Enormous demand in the pilot phase. Due to very short-term planning, UNMIL is overtaxed. Clashes and unrest in Monrovia and suspension of DD programmes for a few months.</p> <p>Until the end of the DD programme in November 2004, a total of 102,000 took part who, however, only handed in 27,000 SALW (and a lot of ammunition). Unusual ratio of 'demobilised combatants' and weapons that have been handed in. Suspicion of extensive abuse of DDR programmes. Suspicion that the 'hard core' of the combatants was not demobilised and disarmed but took weapons with them and escaped to Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.</p> <p>Only little participation in reintegration programmes: "Dangerous mismatch between DD and RR phases of the programme". On the one hand, considerable gaps in financing in the UNDP Trust Fund, on the other hand lack of suitable reintegration projects. Therefore no effective reintegration of the combatants.</p> <p>Criticism voiced concerning the institutional separation of DD and R and the lack of a uniform coordination.</p> <p>No systematic disarmament of civilians, armed crime and banditry. Problems with IDPs in Monrovia were worsened by the fact that 45 percent of those 'demobilised' also settled in the region of Monrovia.</p>

2. Evaluation and short analysis of further, important DDR programmes

Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua)

Settings:

Nicaragua: Peace agreement between Chamorro government, Sandinistas and Contra rebels 1990. Mutual consent about disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the Contras (about 23,000 combatants). No reform/reduction of the army controlled by the Sandinistas in this agreement.

El Salvador: Peace agreement between government/army and the FMLN guerrillas 1992. Mutual consent on demobilisation of FMLN combatants (about 8,000), cutting of troop strength by half (demobilisation of 30,000 soldiers) and transformation of the FMLN into a political party.

Some years later similar developments in Guatemala and Honduras with a small number of demobilised combatants.

Conceptual approaches:

Demilitarisation in the framework of democratic transition. Close connection between DDR and peace processes. Only in the case of El Salvador are there clear rules and regulations in the peace agreement with respect to DDR.

Handing-over of weapons to UN/OAS missions in security zones without the presence of the government army; with this separation of the parties to the conflict as integral part of the concept. Only in the case of El Salvador: Connection of demobilisation with a reduction in government army troop strength. Still no formation of a new army with the participation of FMLN combatants.

Experiences:

Successful demobilisation of combatants. Failed reintegration into civil life and easy availability of SALW led to widespread armed, sometimes also politically-motivated, crime.

Incomplete disarmament by lack of transparency (no weapons inventories) and the keeping of numerous functioning weapons by the combatants. Disappointed expectations in reintegration by difficult economic, social and political situation as well as insufficient financial means for the programmes. This led to the Contras taking up arms again ("Recontras").

Role of the army: No neutral role of national armies which continued to be dominated by one party to the conflict. Result: Continued insufficient political control of the armies.

Encampment and/or allocation of the combatants to special collection zones: good planning and quick handling is essential to avoid unrest amongst the combatants and thus possible security risks.

Reintegration: Difficulty of sustained economic reintegration in weak, unstable national economies with a generally high unemployment rate. Tensions between combatants and civilians by programmes which are exclusively geared to combatants. Nicaragua: Tensions about access to land and real estate between ex-Contras and Sandinista officers.

Eastern Europe/CIS

Settings:

Reform of the Central- and Eastern European armies (mass armies) after the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as well as rapprochement of resp. integration of the affected countries into NATO and EU. Democratisation, modernisation and reduction of the military.

Demobilisation and reintegration of professional soldiers, officers and the conversion of garrisons. Challenge of reintegrating persons of (then) high social standing and reputation.

Settings: Setting of transformation of authoritarian systems and not post-conflict setting.

Conceptual approaches:

Disarmament/demobilisation by the Ministries of Defence or the army itself. International participation particularly in the area of training and reintegration of demobilised officers.

EU-TACIS Programme (Ukraine, Russia): Build-up of institutional capacities for the implementation of national reintegration programmes, job market analyses, design of training programmes, offer of standardised courses.

Implementation by regional centres (regional approach).

On the one hand individual approach (support, retraining of demobilised officers and soldiers), on the other hand attempt at economic conversion of garrison cities (community-based approach).

Bilateral programmes: Reintegration programmes for soldiers stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany financed by Germany. Financing and leadership of six local retraining centres for demobilised officers in Russia by Britain.

Experiences

Ukraine/Russia: Reintegration programmes nearly exclusively financed by international donors. High importance of EU-TACIS Programme.

European interests in stability and economic development in bordering countries (that in part are willing to join) certainly one decisive factor for the broad commitment of the EU.

Access to the job market in difficult economic environment (Ukraine, Russia) mainly in the security domain. Otherwise often experience that training is not geared to the necessities of the job market. Training alone without being embedded in the regions affected by economic growth and job creation has been proven to be insufficient.

Commitment of national/regional/local government and agencies involved is essential; insufficient legal bases on the national level.

Russia: Little commitment and late reaction of the government and particularly the Ministry of Defence. No clarity about the number of soldiers to be demobilised. Success of the British

programme by direct implementation and good contacts to commanders' headquarters of the affected regions.

Poland: Defused reintegration problems by generous pension scheme for former members of the army. Appointment of a special department for 'conversion' in the Ministry of Defence in close cooperation with other ministries. Approach: employment of former soldiers in the penal system and conversion of former garrisons to prisons.

Hungary: Little identity bequeathed by the role of the military in Hungarian Socialism. At first little national commitment; formation of an interministerial committee in 2000.

Recommendations: Clear framework conditions and rules concerning size and structure of the future army. Involvement of key ministries (particularly Ministry of Defence) and a superior coordination office highly important. Reintegration/retraining on a regional and local level, decentralised and flexible approaches with regular evaluation, space for self-responsibility of those affected, sufficient legal base and financing.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Settings:

Post-conflict setting against the background of an enforced 'peace' by the International Community (Dayton); incomparable comprehensive deployment of international troops with a UN mandate (IFOR/SFOR of NATO). Due to geographic closeness, immediate stability interests of Western Europe.

Extensive, 'spontaneous' demobilisations of ad hoc wartime formations after the end of the war; "chaotic disintegration of the armed forces".

No specification with respect to future armed forces and DDR in the Dayton Agreement.

DDR no central part of the peace agreement, no priority, no mandate of control for IFOR. Therefore DDR too late without clear leadership, coordination and mandate.

Complicated semi-state structures after the Dayton Agreement (three entities).

Conceptual approaches:

Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (EDRP) of the World Bank (1996-99): Implementation by three different agencies in the three entities. Focus not on the support of SMEs and self-employment but on the employment of ex-combatants in reconstruction financed by international donors (building, infrastructure). Numerous sub-contracts and assignments to NGOs.

2. Phase: Demobilisation after agreement on a further reduction of military personnel of the three entities: Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project (PELRP) of the World Bank (as of 2001): Demand-oriented approach with the target of self-reliance of ex-combatants (training, advice, business creation, farming).

International Organisation for Migration (IOM): Support for ex-combatants in the areas of SMEs, application, vocational training, etc.

Experiences:

Dayton Agreement: Target reached: End of war. Mistakes made with DDR: No agreement and no stipulations, no participation of NATO in the disarmament of the Bosnian parties to the conflict.

Ordered demobilisation and reintegration made more difficult due to complex state structures in Post-Dayton Bosnia, by lacking priorities and stipulations in the Dayton Agreement. Demobilisation mostly chaotic due to disintegrating (para)military structures.

Due to this, continued fragile security situation in particular in rural areas, wide distribution of SALW, armed crime and enforcement of particular interests of political extremists, too, with the force of weapons.

Generally insufficient willingness of the Ministries of Defence to cooperate, this in particular because of the continuing tensions between the three entities. Insufficient data on social profiles of ex-combatants and military personnel.

EDRP: Major gaps in financing. All in all a high total of 'reintegrated' ex-combatants, however, no sustainable reintegration as employment was based on temporary infrastructure projects financed by international donors.

PELRP: Major delays in the implementation by the fact that Ministries of Defence did not provide necessary information on ex-combatants. Demand was mostly limited to the area of agriculture. Difficult economic environment (termination of most labour-intensive reconstruction projects

financed by international donors).

IOM: Receipt of only 20 percent of the financing necessary for a full implementation.

Generally no taking account of special needs of female ex-combatants in the programmes mentioned.

Enormous effects of war traumas.

Kosovo

Settings:

Structure: Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA): No uniform disciplined army with clear command structures/political leadership. 'Hard core' of a "pre-1998 KLA" and short-term joining-in of many civilians during the war of 1999. High level of education (often in exile) of many KLA commanders.

Comprehensive military action of NATO against the Serbian military. End of conflict by Serbian capitulation. KLA in the role of the ally and victor, even 'war hero'. Consecutive stationing of a strong peacekeeping force (KFOR) under the mandate of the UN.

No final provision for the status of the Kosovo under international law. Administration is taken over by the UN (UNMIK). Unstable political environment in Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia. Close connections with the Albanian population beyond the borders.

Due to geographical closeness, stability interests of Western Europe. Interest of US in the construction of military bases.

Possession of a personal weapon as cultural normality. Loyalties in society lie with the extended family, mistrust towards state institutions ("secretive nature of the current Kosovo society").

Major tensions between KLA and other Albanian political parties. Intimidation by KLA and parties affiliated with it.

Conceptual approaches

Agreement between KFOR and KLA on abandonment of positions, turning in weapons and transformation of KLA into the unarmed so-called "Kosovo Protection Corps" (KPC). Handover of the weapons to KFOR. KPC in reality an organisation succeeding the KLA.

Prohibition of illegal possession of arms by UNMIK.

Reintegration on two tracks: Training and transition into KPC, Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) for those who were not transferred into the KPC (courses in various professions). Implementation is taken over by IOM.

Build-up of a new police (KPA) with the involvement of minorities. Negotiation of a 50 percent quota for former members of the KLA.

Formation of two well-known political parties of former KLA commanders.

Comprehensive amnesty for KLA combatants. War crimes prosecuted by an international tribunal.

Experiences:

Disarmament: Only incomplete turning in of weapons. Assumption that numerous SALW have been kept for the 'worst case' or been transferred to Albania, South Serbia, Macedonia or gotten into the hands of organised crime.

Diverging ideas about the role of the KPC (humanitarian organisation for the International Community, core of a future Kosovar army instead of KLA). Problem: KLA mostly prevented the integration of other Albanian units into the KPC.

Little demand for vocational training given in the ICRS programme. Therefore increased focus on self-employment. Big share of former KLA members in the security domain (KPC, KPA, private). A considerable part of former combatants have been reintegrated successfully with this.

Organised crime is an enormous problem (smuggling, drugs trade) with former KLA combatants participating/taking the leadership.

Persistency of extremist-nationalist armed Albanian groups in the South of Serbia and Macedonia who are supposed to have close ties to the KLA. Problem: Trans-border weapons trade and widespread availability of SALW

Importance of the setting of war-end and the self- perception of the KLA as victor.

Sierra Leone

Settings:

Shadow state; nepotism and erosion of state institutions. Escalation to armed rebellion by RUF in 1991 with Liberian influence. Increasing dominance of illegal war economies ("blood diamonds") in the regional context.

Firstly only little successful international interventions (ECOWAS) and sanctions regimes.

Shocking cruelties committed mostly by RUF. Little disciplined units (RUF, government army and traditionally-oriented 'self-defence militias').

1999/2000: Transfer of mandate from EMOCOG to UNAMSIL; massive increase in military personnel and Chapter VII mandate. With this sufficient deterrent potential to take action against RUF. Lead nation is Britain.

Comprehensive agreement on DDR in the Lomé Convention, 2001. Resumption of the DDR process by UNAMSIL formerly started by ECOMOG.

Concepts:

Fast track demobilisation of all parties to the conflict, at the same time dissolution of RUF. Partially 'disarmaments on wheels' by UNAMSIL, thus voluntary encampment. Reintegration aid not until combatants are 'at home', admittance to programme according to the principle 'one man, one gun'.

Comprehensive participations: Formation of a National Commission for DDR (NCDDR), extensive participation of the World Bank, etc. Embeddedness of DDR in a comprehensive PSO approach with the build-up of a new army, police, justice system, etc; amnesty but formation of a Truth Commission as well as a special tribunal for crimes against humanity.

Reintegration focused on vocational training. Stop-gap programme (community development projects and military intervention should tensions arise). UNICEF programme for child soldiers.

Emphasis on a comprehensive information policy.

Experiences:

Demobilisation of more than 70,000 combatants. Difficult reintegration due to desolate state of the economy. Tensions between combatants and communities. Successful stop-gap programme.

Basis for successful demobilisation by deterrence potential of a PSO with a robust mandate and robust equipment under British leadership.

Outlook

Sudan:

9 January 2005: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between SPLM/SPLA and the Sudanese government, but with the exclusion of other parties. Division of power and entering of the SPLA into the Sudanese government (Vice-Presidency). Formation of joint army units and elimination of all military groups apart from SPLA and government troops. With this, particularly demobilisation of the militias loyal to the government, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF).

CPA provides for the formation of a common commission of SPLM and government for the demobilisation and integration of combatants from other militias (particularly SSDF) into SPLA or the Sudanese army.

Uncertain prospects of success by the exclusion of other opposition groups from the CPA ('exclusive' division of power between government and SPLA/SPLM), questionable political will and other armed conflicts in Sudan, for instance Darfur).

Aceh/Indonesia:

Peace agreement comprising extensive autonomy of the Province of Aceh within Indonesia between GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and Indonesian government.

DDR of GAM combatants and, at the same time, explicitly part of the agreement as well as partial drawback of Indonesian troops: number of GAM combatants to be demobilised has not been determined; estimates of about 2,000-4,000 guerrillas and about 800 weapons.

Regulations in the agreement: clear timetable of 15 September to 31 December 2005. Transfer of estates from a shut-down plantation (20 ha to commanders, 5 ha for armed combatants, 3 ha for

normal GAM members). Government makes \$6 million available for damages to the needy (to be determined by GAM). Formation of a monitoring commission from representatives from ASEAN and EU.
Estimates of the prospects for success: Favourable.

A3. Glossary

1. Terminology of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) on DDR

Disarmament "is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should comprise the development of arms management programs, including their safe storage and final disposition which may entail their destruction".

Demobilisation "refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants, some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs, discharge and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new unified military force".

Reintegration "refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families of adapt, economically and socially, of productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind-compensation, training and job and income-generating projects. These measures frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons, economic development at the community and national level, infrastructure rehabilitation, truth and reconciliation efforts and institutional reform. Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term success of reintegration".

Source: UNDPKO (1999), p.15

2. Term "Security Sector Reform" resp. "Security Sector Reconstruction" (SSR)


SSR "Measures taken to assist in making the security sector more accountable to civilian democratic authorities and ensuring greater transparency of security sector expenditure. Assistance also includes training of security forces for their proper role in democratic society including respecting human rights and humanitarian law".

Source: (British) Department for International Development (DFID);

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf> (22 October 2005)

3. Terms and definitions in the framework of Peace Operations

Overview:



Source: *Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*;

www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Other/PeaceSupportManualMMM/Ch2.html (22 October 2005)

Peace Support Operation (PSO): "PSOs are multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace. PSOs may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations. Outside of military circles, the term peacekeeping is often used erroneously to embrace all PSOs, including peace enforcement".

Source: *Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*;

www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Other/PeaceSupportManualMMM/Ch2.html (22 October 2005)

Peace enforcement "is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces to assist diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerent or hostile parties who may not consent to that intervention".

Source: *Australian Government*; www.dva.gov.au/commem/commac/studies/anzacsk/res3.htm (22 October 2005)

Peacekeeping: "Hybrid politico-military activity aimed at conflict control, which involves a United Nations presence in the field (usually involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief".

Peacemaking: "Diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; military activities contributing to peacemaking include military-to-military contacts, security assistance, shows of force and preventive deployments".

Chapter VI "provides for the settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures, including negotiation; enquiry; mediation; conciliation; arbitration; and judicial settlement (Article 33). The Security Council is authorised to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means or to make recommendations (Article 37). Thus, the decisions or recommendations of the council for the appropriate terms of settlement of an international dispute should be carried out by the parties themselves".

Chapter VII "is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Under the direction of Chapter VII, the United Nations Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39)".

Peacebuilding: "In the aftermath of conflict; it means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict; often involves elections organised, supervised or conducted by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infrastructures and institutions such as schools and hospitals, and economic reconstruction".

Source: *UNDPKO*; www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary (22 October 2005)

4. Positioning of DDR in PSOs according to the Integrated Approach of the UNDPKO




Fig. A1: DDR in the continuum of the peace process. Source: DPKO (1999), p.17

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