

# **Concepts and Experiences of Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants**

September 1996

Guidelines and Instruments for  
Future Programmes

***Concepts and Experiences of  
Demobilisation and Reintegration***

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Future Programmes***

Issued by the GTZ Programme Team  
Demobilisation and Reintegration  
of Ex-Combatants

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# SUMMARY

This document presents the GTZ experiences and policy concepts in the field of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The problems and potentials of the various stages of demobilisation and reintegration are described and discussed. Taking these as a framework for orientation, the tasks existing in this area for development-oriented emergency aid and for other fields of development co-operation are defined. On the basis of the lessons learned from previous and current projects the paper offers recommendations and guidelines for future demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

in brief

- Demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRP) for ex-combatants are an important instrument for **peace-keeping** and for **preventing armed conflicts**. In post-war societies there is a wide scope of tasks in the field of **development-oriented emergency aid**. These range from emergency aid in the first phase to infrastructure rehabilitation measures, organisational management consultancy, as well as promotion of training and employment.
- The **GTZ** is currently **supporting and implementing targeted DRPs** for ex-combatants in five African countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Uganda).
- **Two phases** can be distinguished in DRPs: the **demobilisation** comprises massing, registering, disarming and discharging the combatants, or disbanding the army. After discharge ex-combatants are supported in their efforts to **reintegrate** in all areas of civilian society. The combination of a variety of different instruments, policies, and projects are formulated as a reintegration programme.
- Different occasions exist for demobilising and reintegrating soldiers, armed groups and guerrilla fighters which differ from country to country. **After a civil war** the warring factions disband their armed units and only a few combatants can be taken over into the new army. After **a change of government** or after **political reforms** the army is disbanded or its numbers are reduced. In order to implement **savings in the defence budget** the personnel strength of the army must be cut considerably. The **pressure exerted by international donors** and requirements of **regional policies of détente** have led many governments to reduce their armed forces and to disband armed units.
- The **target group** are primarily demobilised soldiers and former members of armed groups; however, their partners, dependants and families as well as war invalids, dd veterans, and war widows must also be taken into consideration and are potential **beneficiaries** of reintegration measures. A further task of DRPs is to strengthen the resources of communities and families who take in the ex-combatants.
- Reintegration programmes should utilise the **self-help potential** of ex-combatants and improve **social, political and economic acceptance** for this group.

emergency aid to development

GTZ projects

demobilisation

reintegration

reasons to demobilise

target groups and beneficiaries

potentials

tasks for development co-operation

- In this field there is a considerable demand for consultancy services in connection with the organisation and planning of programmes and building-up both government-run and non-governmental agencies.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Assembly Area
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DRP	Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
EU	European Union
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Technical Co-operation)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRS	Information and Referral System
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
QIP	Quick Impact Programme
UN	United Nations

USA United States of America

UVAB Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme



## PREFACE

Armed conflict, civil wars and militarisation of society have had a disastrous effect on human development in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the first half of the 1990s global disarmament and regional peace initiatives lead to cease-fires and peace accords in countries that have suffered from war for decades. The transition from a war economy to sustainable peace posted new challenges for development co-operation. GTZ realised that emergency aid alone is not sufficient to support war-affected societies in their efforts to rebuild a civilian society and to utilise the potential of former combatants for productive purposes. Special programmes have been developed for the reintegration of former soldiers, guerrilla fighters and members of other armed groups; thus reducing the use of violence and helping ex-combatants to gain perspectives in a civilian society. Today reintegration programmes are an important measure in the continuum from disaster to development.

GTZ responded to these challenges with a number of special projects for ex-combatants in Africa and Central America. A *GTZ Programme Team Demobilisation and Reintegration* has been formed by the division 426 (Emergency and Refugee Programmes) and division 403 (Organisation, Communication, Management Consultancy) in order to support GTZ projects and to formulate **guidelines** and **specific instruments** for demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The Programme Team has been involved in the development of reintegration projects in a number of countries - mainly in Africa. This paper gives an overview over the experiences gathered over the last years and provides guidelines for future programmes.

This policy paper explains the tasks and approaches which from the point of view of the GTZ are relevant for development co-operation in the field of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. In a systematic overview of the individual stages and components of demobilisation and reintegration programmes terms are clarified and possible approaches for emergency aid measures and for provision of consultancy services to local executing agencies are set out. Both typical sequences of operations as well as experiences from current GTZ projects are presented.

The concepts presented in this paper have been formulated in close relationship with the policy documents of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) and of the European Union (EU). The comprehensive research which the World Bank and the United Nations Institute Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) have conducted on the demobilisation as well as on the rebuilding of war-torn societies also had an influence on the formulation of these guidelines. This concept paper on demobilisation and reintegration adds to the GTZ concept on refugees (GTZ Rahmenkonzept Flüchtlingshilfe) and is part of the GTZ approach to development oriented emergency aid.

This paper presents the **specific instruments and packages which GTZ has developed** for demobilisation and reintegration programmes. With this presentation we wish to address above all our partners and staff, who work in the field of planning and implementing such programmes. It can also serve as an introduction to the issues of demobilisation, reintegration and post-war reconstruction to all those individuals and organisations who are faced with development planning or working in related fields.

This text is divided into three parts. The breakdown essentially follows the organisational sequence of demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The two steps demobilisation (chapter 2) and reintegration (chapter 3) are dealt with in two separate chapters which can be read independently from each other.

<b>objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In chapter 1 (Introduction) <b>objectives</b> are formulated and the general conditions for demobilisation and reintegration programmes are explained. These preliminary considerations are guidelines which characterise the overall goals of development projects in this area and which at the same time are intended to determine the orientation of specific measures.</li> </ul>
<b>demobilisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Chapter 2 (Demobilisation) discusses the problems of the transitional phase in which combatants are prepared for discharge from the army or armed group. The typical <b>sequences of demobilisation processes</b> is described and the relevance of the single steps for the development-policy overall goals is dealt with. Demobilisation is by far not only a military operation. The tasks for development co-operation are described with respect to every step in the demobilisation process.</li> </ul>
<b>reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In Chapter 3 (Reintegration) the <b>process of social and economic integration</b> of demobilised combatants is presented. With consideration given to the different political and economic contexts prevailing, the relevant areas in which the reintegration process takes place are analysed. Measures for resettlement, employment creation and social integration are presented and discussed for these fields in which the focal area of GTZ's work lies.</li> </ul>
<b>glossary</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Special vocabulary</b> used in connection with demobilisation and reintegration are explained in a glossary (Annex 4.1). This presentation is supplemented by short project profiles from current <b>GTZ projects</b> in the field of demobilisation and reintegration (Annex 4.2).</li> </ul>
<b>GTZ projects</b>	

References to previous and ongoing projects concentrate on the experiences gained in **African countries**. This is due to the fact that this region has formed the focal area of GTZ projects in the field of demobilisation and reintegration in recent years. The experiences gained with troop reductions in Eastern Europe have been largely left out of consideration here, because the general conditions differ greatly. Within the scope of this paper it is not possible to go into the problems of armaments conversion, such as evolve particularly in locations where defence industry plants have to be converted for the production of non-military goods, or into the ecological problems resulting from the storage of arms. This in no way contests the relevance of this theme for Central and Eastern Europe particularly. However the focus of this presentation is oriented specifically to the demands made of demobilisation and reintegration programmes in developing countries.

An earlier version of this paper has been discussed at the GTZ workshop *Experiences with the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* which was held 17 - 19 April in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. The Programme Team would like to thank all workshop participants, the GTZ staff in the demobilisation projects as well as the partner organisations for their input and comments to this paper. Thanks are also due to the *Bonn International Center for Conversion* (BICC) for its close co-operation with the GTZ Programme team.



# 1 INTRODUCTION

The term *Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes (DRP) for Ex-Combatants* combines a whole series of political and development-policy measures with which the reduction in size and disbanding of armies or armed gangs is planned, implemented and backed up. DRPs become necessary when armed forces are disbanded or reformed after the end of international or civil wars. In peace times cuts in the armament budget often result in the implementation of DRPs. The need to back up the discharge of ex-combatants with development programmes arises above all when a society does not have sufficient resources at its disposal to offer the ex-combatants prospects of economic and social integration in a civilian society. Programmes and development-policy measures for demobilised combatants, returning refugees and internally displaced persons extend over periods of years and in some countries up to a decade.

definition

## Global Trends in Demobilisation

In recent years the demobilisation of soldiers and armed units and the reintegration of these ex-combatants into civilian society has become an urgent problem of post-conflict **peace building** and an important task for **development co-operation**. Both the number of demobilised persons and the programmes for their reintegration have increased substantially during the last few years. There are several reasons for this.

After the **end of the Cold War** cuts in armaments budgets and massive reductions in troops were implemented world-wide. Between 1990 and 1993 approx. 3 million soldiers were demobilised from the regular armed forces. The great majority of these troop cuts took place in Europe, the former Soviet Union and the USA.

end of the Cold War

The fact that politically motivated **arms supplies** and **military aid petered** out after the end of the bloc confrontations led to a clear decline in the armaments budgets in many states.

In some countries democracy movements have led to a replacement of **military dictatorships** often reducing the influence of the army on the state and the budget.

democratisation

In countries where liberation movements have come to power, guerrilla armies have been transformed into **smaller professional armies**. This has resulted in a large number of combatants not being taken over into the new army.

At the end of civil wars disbanding of the armies and armed units of all the warring factions is frequently an integral component of **peace agreements**. In many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America troops have been demobilised and supported in their transition into civilian life under the supervision of the UN. **Regional policies of détente** also favour demobilisation operations. In Southern Africa alone approx. 250,000 combatants have been affected by demobilisation since 1989.

UN peace keeping

conditionality of aid

Within the scope of stipulating conditions for development aid, bilateral and multilateral donors are urging ever more strongly that armaments budgets be cut in the developing countries. Since in developing countries the personnel costs are the largest cost factor for the army, this has frequently resulted in **soldiers being discharged**.

**peace dividend** In both the north and the south dwindling armaments budgets and the reduction of armies created great hopes of a **peace dividend** which would benefit sustainable development. While the demobilised soldiers from the regular armies in Western Europe and the USA could be received by a system of pensions, a social network and a functioning employment market, the situation in war-torn and impoverished countries is frequently considerably more problematic. It has become evident here that cuts in the armies can only contribute to a peace dividend in the long term, and only if considerable investments are made in demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRPs). In order to achieve a peace dividend economic alternatives to earning a living by the use of arms must be created.

**economic integration** Programmes for ex-combatants which improve the access of this group to employment and economic independence are aiming to transmit economic **impulses for reconstruction** of the country and **strengthening of civilian structures**, without which sustainable development is not possible. They involve ex-combatants in this development process as actors but should not create privileges for this group.

**security considerations** In many countries the need for reintegration programmes for ex-combatants arises out of security considerations. Without purposive demobilisation the peace process is endangered. Without purposive reintegration programmes peace times are endangered. No matter whether combatants associate themselves with the winners or the losers, there is always a danger that the disbanding of armed units can lead to the formation of **marauding gangs** and hence to an **increase in criminality**. Such a development can quickly turn into renewed destabilisation of the whole country.

**crisis prevention and reconciliation** DRPs are therefore an important component of development policies which **decrease the risk of violent outbreaks of conflicts** at an **early stage** and at the same time provide important economic impulses for **recovery and rebuilding** of war-torn societies. Ex-combatants have also become an important target group for development projects because their successful reintegration in family and community makes **processes of social reconciliation** concrete. This helps to overcome old enmities and social rifts and chances arise for new structures in a civilian society. Many bilateral and multilateral donors have recognised the significance of DRPs as an important field of development-oriented **emergency aid** and **crisis prevention**. DRPs have developed to become an independent sector whose potentials and sets of instruments are explained in detail in this paper.

## GTZ Experiences

The GTZ has gathered important experience in this field by designing and supporting DRPs. With projects for ex-combatants in Angola, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Somalia and Uganda GTZ is probably one of the most experienced development agency in this field. Within the scope of planning and implementing these projects specific instruments have been developed for DRPs. With development projects in more than 135 countries and over 9,100 staff members world wide GTZ can draw on a wide field of technical know how and regional experiences. This allows to design support packages for DRP which are tailor-made for the specific requirements of a country taking into account the political and cultural conditions.

Angola  
Eritrea  
Ethiopia  
Mozambique  
Somalia  
Uganda  
  
El Salvador  
Nicaragua

Taking a concern in the **recovery of war-torn countries** GTZ became aware how important it is to support peace creation and stabilisation of a country at an early stage. This is especially the case in the transitional phase after civil wars, when specific measures are required to strengthen the peaceful potential of ex-combatants from all warring factions. In countries in which the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants has either not been implemented at all or only inadequately, this has promoted renewed outbreaks of war with all its terrible consequences, such as was the case for example in **Angola** in 1992. GTZ considers demobilisation and reintegration programmes an important field of development co-operation and of **development oriented emergency aid**. This policy paper draws on the experiences of a number of differing countries and formulates guidelines and recommendations for ongoing and future programmes.

development orientated  
emergency aid

## 1.1 Overall Objectives of DRPs

The reasons and occasions for demobilising soldiers and disbanding or reducing the size of armed units can differ substantially. They generally involve a **military potential** which can no longer be maintained by the warring factions after the end of a confrontation, or which no longer has any political leadership and is thus cut off from further influx of resources.

starting points

The objective of DRPs is to facilitate and support the voluntary **return of ex-combatants** and their families to their home communities and embedding them in **civilian social and economic networks**. Ex-combatants should be enabled to utilise their own potentials peacefully. Access to land, education, training, capital, and employment represents the basic precondition for successful reintegration.

reintegration

The outcome of a war and the position of the ex-combatants as **victors** or **vanquished** determine the social perspectives of the demobilised individuals quite substantially. However, in poor countries particularly and in places where the army has formed no or only inadequate provisions for pensions, it has become apparent that the economic perspectives are poor for those demobilised from all parties in the war. Combatants generally have only **little formal education** and insofar as they possess trade and craft qualifications, they have frequently lost these skills during the war; only **few have technical skills** needed to operate modern weaponry. As a consequence of many years of internal conflicts the infrastructure is destroyed and the **indebted state** is not in a position to transmit impulses to the economy. In cases in which the government presence found its expression above all in military terms, confidence in government services is shattered. At the same time an

general conditions  
no pension schemes  
little formal education  
few civilian skills  
indebted governments  
lack of funds

economic reliance on the **war economy** has developed, which still determines the options for action of many ex-combatants even after the end of hostilities. In this situation government agencies, insofar as they still exist, generally **lack the funds** and experience to implement sufficient measures for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

**interdependent  
problems**

When supporting DRPs and implementing measures of development-oriented emergency aid it is necessary to relate to a series of complex and **interdependent problems**, especially in post-war situations. Areas which can be influenced directly by DRPs are outlined below. **Overall goals of DRPs** can be derived from this description of the problems.



### 1.1.1 Social and Economic Reconstruction in Post-War Societies

The outpoint for demobilisation operations is generally the end of a war. In many countries the **infrastructure is destroyed** as a consequence of the war and many branches of the economy have come to a standstill. The reintegration of **ex-combatants** - as well as of **refugees** returning at the same time - is rendered considerably more difficult by the fact that opportunities for employment and capital are lacking. **Mining** of wide stretches of land frequently hinders settlement in rural regions and in subsistence economies. At the same time in many countries the armed forces and armed groups represent the most important sources of income for the male population. In this situation reintegration projects can provide the first impulses for alternative opportunities of employment and thus make a contribution to voluntary disarming and demobilisation.

end of war

land mines

voluntary disarmament

Independently of the political situation surrounding demobilisation, it is important to utilise the ex-combatant's productive potential for the economic development of the country. The long-term objective of reintegration programmes is therefore to **create an economic and social climate** which allows both the groups which have hitherto been dependent on the war economy and those expelled from their home areas by the consequences of war a **perspective for survival**. Reintegration programmes not only create jobs for ex-combatants, but also transmit economic impulses at the same time from which the whole population profit and which can help to build up market structures, not reliant on the war economy.

utilise productive potentials

economic impulse for local market

An important objective of reintegration measures is therefore **promotion of employment**. By food-for-work programmes, incentives for employers and stimulation of small-scale and micro-enterprises jobs can be created for the target group. The setting up of new businesses, especially in the informal sector, can be facilitated by subsidies in order to strengthen the independent initiative of the ex-combatants in this way.

job creation

informal sector

### 1.1.2 Utilising the Potentials of Ex-Combatants

Reintegration programmes focus on ex-combatants, who have few or only inadequate chances of maintaining themselves after leaving an army or armed unit. During the demobilisation process various services hitherto provided by the army are provided by a DRP. These include, for instance, food, accommodation, health care. During reintegration, on the other hand, the aim is to **strengthen the potential for self-help** of the ex-combatants. The DRP should open up **access to resources** which facilitate economic independence and self-reliance. By allocating land, implements and subsidies it is possible to integrate the demobilised ex-combatants in economic as well as social systems. Targeted vocational training and upgrading programmes enable ex-combatants to **apply their skills** in order to earn their living. This constructive role improves their acceptance in society.

potential for self-help

training, land, subsidies

constructive role in society

<b>re-admittance to the community</b>	Social reintegration also means participation - not just in economic activities, but also in community activities. In Africa especially both are inseparably connected. Without <b>formal and ritual re-admittance in the community</b> the demobilised ex-combatants have no access to land and to the maintenance systems of the family and the community. Economic promotion of ex-combatants can therefore only keep pace with their social integration.
<b>social capital</b>	Assimilation of the war and coming to terms with its horrors are a long-term precondition for acceptance of ex-soldiers and ex-guerrilla fighters. Support for reconciliation and coping with war experiences promotes the creation of social capital.
<b>special needs</b>	In connection with strengthening the integration potential of ex-combatants in particular it is important to take into account the needs of specific target groups. For instance <b>war invalids</b> require special support to be able to work again. <b>Women</b> who fought in armies of liberation as soldiers with equal rights are generally confronted with traditional gender roles after cessation of hostilities and frequently suffer discrimination. A particular problem is posed by the reintegration of <b>child soldiers and young people</b> who have grown up with the war and never experienced non-violent tackling of conflicts within the family and community; the need special forms of <b>psycho-social care</b> which deals with their traumata in a way that does not exclude them from the social security of family and clan.
<b>war invalids</b>	
<b>female ex-combatants</b>	
<b>children</b>	
<b>young people</b>	

### 1.1.3 Promoting Civil Society

<b>strengthening local communities</b>	Involving all parties affected by the consequences of demobilisation is an important feature of effective DRPs. The <b>families and rural communities</b> to which ex-combatants return must be prepared for integration. The capacities of the receiving communities for care and maintenance represent an essential factor for smooth reintegration. In this situation the <b>assimilation of war-caused traumas</b> and overcoming of enemy concepts is crucial for the social integration of the ex-combatants and for the cohesion of the entire society. For this reason strengthening of the communities' potential for integration and measures for crisis prevention therefore also belong to the objectives of DRPs. Many <b>local NGOs</b> and initiatives that were not operational in war times developed through the funds of DRP and were able to implement projects on local level.
<b>overcoming enemy concepts</b>	
<b>supporting NGOs</b>	
<b>controlling the army</b>	Where demobilisation was conducted as a consequence of power sharing or democratisation it is also a measure to assert more <b>control over the army</b> . In a series of African states the military still remains an important factor in politics - even after the success of democracy movements. Building up a <b>democratic control over the armed forces</b> is an important part of the process of transition towards permanent peace. Controlled demobilisation and the creation of a new and leaner army can also be an important measure to make the armed forces <b>loyal</b> and more <b>disciplined</b> .
<b>loyal and disciplined forces</b>	
<b>civic education</b>	In a post-war situation and during the transition to democracy, information and civic education plays an important role. All citizens have to be aware of the new role of demobilised combatants and of new government structure. It is the task of DRP to make the population aware about disarmament as well as about new <b>possibilities of participation</b> in the state and community (voters education). Veterans associations, local NGOs founded by ex-combatants are just some examples of how ex-combatants can form civil interest groups.
<b>political parties and interest groups</b>	

The strengthening of interest groups, NGOs and political parties can contribute to a situation in which conflicts will no longer be solved by the use of armed force.

### 1.1.4 Preventing Violence - Creating a Peace Dividend

Controlled demobilisation and successful reintegration of ex-combatants can form a crucial element of efforts to **prevent violent outbreaks of conflicts**. Especially in unstable situations after a civil war when there is no central power established throughout the country, co-ordinated demobilisation of armed groups can help to prevent renewed fighting. Fear of acts of revenge by the victors can just as easily lead to streams of **refugees** as the sudden and **uncontrolled disbanding** of armies. It is by no means seldom for demobilised soldiers to return to regions in which others have taken their place during the war. This leads to conflicts with the groups who suffered under the war for a long time.

crisis prevention

fear of revenge

Early **information, consultation** and planning together with the affected parties can help to avoid violent conflicts. However, reintegration programmes alone are not necessarily a contribution to crisis prevention. If programmes for ex-combatants are not backed up by national policies of **reconciliation** or **power-sharing** they can easily increase tensions. Preferential treatment for certain groups or resettlement schemes for ex-combatants on lands claimed by other groups has in several cases created new conflict.

information

consultation

reconciliation

#### Peace Dividend

Disarmament and troop reductions are frequently attributed with a peace dividend. The idea is that those funds which have been saved from the defence budget can be used for development purposes. However, experience from a number of developing countries shows that achieving a peace dividend is more complicated than that. **Considerable investments** in demobilisation and reintegration programmes are necessary before public spending for the armed forces is reduced in real terms. These **costs are often underestimated** and are usually not attributed to the defence budget. Only when the **army's pension** fund is used to finance reintegration or if the army is conducting the demobilisation with their own resources these funds come from the defence budget. In most African countries DRP have not been financed by through the national defence budgets but **largely by foreign donors**. Even if the defence budgets are cut the remaining troops usually enjoy better pay and better equipment.

investing in peace

underestimated costs

pension schemes

foreign donors

Peace dividend is therefore not simply a cut in the defence budget but it is the overall benefit and development that a country enjoys as a consequence of successful demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. This **benefit is difficult to measure** as it entails a number of developments and changes at different levels of state and society. One such benefit is the **civilian use** of former army structures, the building-up of development agencies and related organisations.

difficult to measure

civilian use of military structures

rebuilding the state

capacity building for  
development projects


manpower  
development

After wars lasting many years public funds are exhausted and administrations have largely collapsed. Many state sectors are determined by military structures. In order to **establish democratic structures** and allow **civilian use of state resources** it is necessary to demilitarise and reform many areas of public life and state administration. This comprises not only control of weapons, but also the **building up of civilian administrations** in places where these have not existed beforehand. The national organisations which are responsible for demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants have to react very quickly and mobilise large personnel and financial resources for programmes with a limited time frame. The institutions that planned and implemented DRPs have **expertise** and manpower for **development planning**. After completion of a DRP many of these resources can be utilised in other development programmes, NGOs and line ministries. The provision of **consultancy services** for institutions and organisations implementing DRPs is a priority of bilateral support for these programmes because the investment is not only for demobilisation but benefits the country's **manpower resources** in the long term.

## 1.2 Model for Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes

The following model illustrates the sequence of demobilisation and reintegration programmes in diagram form on the basis of experience gained in many countries. This model shows an ideal-typical situation. DRPs have different focal areas in every country and elements which arise from the specific situation in the country. Special attention is drawn here to the **two essential phases demobilisation and reintegration**. Both phases overlap. The first phase - demobilisation - covers the measures up to discharge from the armed unit. This phase comprises disarming and in some countries massing of combatants in assembly areas (see section 2.2.2 Encampment). On discharge from the army or the demobilisation camps the reintegration phase commences. Reintegration is understood here as a process of social change with an open time frame which can be supported via various impulses and measures (see section 3.2 Components for Reintegration Programmes). The phase between demobilisation and the commencement of long-term reintegration measures is frequently termed the reinsertion or transitional phase. However no third phase has been defined in this paper since it is difficult to demarcate the transitional phase in relation to the other two. The conceptual division into two sections is only intended to serve as a model, with the aid of which the specific instruments and problems of DRPs can be illustrated. The dynamics of experiences with DRPs to date are best shown in the country examples (see annex 4.2 GTZ Project Profiles).

### Figure 1: Elements and Sequence of DRPs



## 2 DEMOBILISATION

### 2.1 Definition

Demobilisation means the formal and usually controlled discharge of active combatants from the army or from an armed group. The process of demobilisation comprises massing troops together in camps designated for this purpose (encampments) or barracks, subsequent registration and disarming of the combatants. The demobilisation phase serves to count and monitor the soldiers and to prepare them for their discharge. It covers maintenance supplies for the combatants and generally also return transport to their home regions. Demobilisation takes place on a contractual or statutory basis at stipulated places and is implemented in a limited time frame. The objective of demobilisation is to reduce or completely disband an army.

#### 2.1.1 Function

**tasks of the army**

The demobilisation of combatants is initially to be understood as the opposite of mobilising (recruiting) soldiers. Consequently it is generally carried out by the army. If there are several warring fractions to be demobilised troops of the United Nations (UN) often coordinate and supervise demobilisation. From the military point of view demobilisation takes place so that within short periods

- an army can be **disbanded**
- or the troop numbers can be **reduced**
- or an army can be **assembled anew**.

**cost reduction**

**restructuring**

**modernisation**

**loyalty**

The general advantages of demobilisation lie in a **reduction of costs** and in the chance to **restructure** the remaining units with a view to improving efficiency and political loyalty. The demobilisation of parts of the troops is a method frequently used to **modernise** or to **discipline** armed forces. It is by no means rare for the reduced army to enjoy more regular payments and improved equipment. These reformed armies often have **better qualified soldiers** and fewer invalids. One occasion for exchanging parts of an army could be doubts on the part of the political leaders concerning **loyalty** of their troops.

**end of war leads to power sharing**

**political imperative**

The different occasions for demobilisation also produce different motives and options. The most frequent occasion for demobilisation in Africa has been the **end of civil wars** and wars of liberation. In countries such as Angola, Mozambique and South Africa stable peace is only possible if the **groups which were formerly enemies share the power**. War opponents have to be integrated in a common political system and the armies or liberation

armies are assigned to new tasks. Consequently demobilisation is mostly enacted under a political imperative.

The complete **dissolution** of one or several armies generally takes place when a new government or a dominant regional regime can question the political legitimacy of these armed groups. The background to complete disbanding of an army is generally a military defeat or at least a military stalemate which has forced the warring factions to the negotiation table. This applies in particular in the case of wars within a state in which none of the warring factions leaves the country. In these cases in particular reintegration of ex-combatants from all warring factions is a prerequisite for a sustainable peace.

**dissolving armies**

**reducing troops**

The alternative to disbanding a defeated armed group is traditionally to **incorporate** it in part in the victorious army. Such strategic alliances occur above all in civil wars with a large number of actors. However, after the end of the war they call for a reform and reduction of the now excessively large army. This cannot be without political consequences if demobilised sections of the army also feel **politically excluded**.

**incorporating armed groups into one army**

Here it becomes evident that demobilisation is not a new phenomenon, but a process which, like mobilisation, belongs to the history of every army and to the consequences of every war. In this connection it must be emphasised that demobilisation is **primarily a military operation**, which cannot be planned and implemented on the basis of either **security-policy** or **party interests** without approval and steering by the military leaders.

**demobilisation as a military operation**

**security issues**

## 2.1.2 Relevance to Development Policies

Despite the above mentioned military aspects, demobilisation programmes have an important significance for the economic and social development of a country. The interfaces with emergency aid arise particularly in places where the **foundation for peaceful** development is to be laid by demobilisation after a civil war. The success of the demobilisation determines the chances of permanent peace and sustainable economic development quite essentially. In this phase there is generally not yet any basis for projects of long-term development co-operation. That is why it is all the more important to achieve swift demobilisation and consequently **stabilisation** of the peace situation by means of selected crash measures. Demobilisation can be an essential first step in the continuum from emergency aid to long term development.

**interface with emergency aid**

**building peace**

New tasks in the field of **disaster management** arise especially after civil wars in which the infrastructure has been destroyed and the population is bereft of its potential for self-help. The start of emergency aid after a cease-fire can help to support the path taken towards sustainable peace.

**disaster management**

<b>transition from war to peace</b>	Demobilisation is the focal point for formulating the conditions for the <b>transitional phase</b> from war to peace. Supply-specific problems in this phase can put the peace process in jeopardy. After a cease-fire armies and armed bands generally do not have sufficient resources of their own any more after a cease-fire to maintain their combatants. In some cases after a cease-fire the commanders no longer feel responsible for maintenance supplies for their combatants. In this situation tasks arise for national, as well as bi- and multilateral organisations to support demobilisation with <b>food supplies, health care, logistics</b> and transport. Crash measures implemented in the run-up period can improve the acceptance of demobilisation measures.
<b>armies disintegrate combatants need aid</b>	
<b>free resources for development</b>	Maintenance of an army and quartering it in barracks swallows a large part of the state budget. The faster demobilisation takes place, the sooner <b>funds</b> will be released for <b>recovery of the country</b> and long-term development. The <b>human resources</b> which are tied up in the armies can be used for the development process. By surveying and making effective use of this potential the transition to reintegration and reconstruction projects can be improved.
<b>organisational development</b>	The planning and implementation of demobilisation confronts the state with logistic and conceptual problems. Provision of <b>consultancy services in connection with the organisation and content-specific design</b> of the responsible institutions might be an important role of development co-operation.
<b>prevention of violence</b>	Since demobilisation programmes address combatants who have participated in violent conflicts, there is a considerable potential for <b>crisis prevention</b> measures in this area.
<b>UN involvement</b>	A <b>clear distribution of tasks</b> and a <b>clear definition of military aspects</b> such as e.g. disarming is necessary so that development oriented programmes can be implemented. At this important interface between military and development interests it might be particularly important to involve multilateral organisations (e.g. UN peace troops) since they can act as impartial moderators.
<b>diffusion of violence</b>	Despite a clear decline in the number of wars since 1992 there are still currently more than 40 armed conflicts in progress world-wide. The majority of these are <b>domestic conflicts</b> . Whereas wars between states can be terminated relatively quickly by diplomatic solutions under <b>withdrawal of troops</b> , the solution of domestic conflicts is a more complex and protracted operation. After years or decades of civil war a <b>diffusion of violence</b> can be observed in all layers of society. At the same time, the cessation of hostilities does not mean that the causes of the conflict have disappeared. On the contrary, the social inequality is frequently even aggravated by the war. Those who have fought to improve their life situation rarely possess more after the war than before, but they frequently now have a weapon. <b>Demobilisation by itself does not diffuse the actual potential for conflict.</b>



With the **political and economic consolidation after a civil war**, new transformation processes also commence. These changes such as e.g. structural adjustment programmes mean a deterioration in the living conditions and opportunities of those who have been demobilised. In this situation they are particularly dependent on government initiatives. They do not have resources of their own. Against this complex background demobilisation programmes are an important instrument in the consolidation phase and in the **preparation** of long-term reintegration programmes.

consolidation phase

laying the foundations  
for reintegration

### 2.1.3 Target Groups

Generally **all active members of an army or an armed group** can be considered the target group of demobilisation programmes. However, if an army is not completely disbanded, a **selection** is made and this is usually equivalent to a negative selection. The military authorities carry out this selection. It can be assumed that in the case of demobilisation, as with recruitment, there is only a **limited degree of volunteer spirit** and potential for exerting influence on the part of those affected. A catalogue of criteria is set up for demobilisation. For those who participate in a DRP it is above all a political and economic issue.

demobilisation is not  
always voluntary

Whether a combatant qualifies for the services of the demobilisation programme can not always be checked. In the case of guerrilla armies there is generally a total lack of personnel **documentation**, and in many armies a large number of “inactive” members are additionally listed on the payroll. The issue of **identity documents** accompanying registration is an important pull-factor for many combatants. For many people registration in the assembly areas (AAs) is the only way of **obtaining valid personnel documents**. In the case of discharge in times of peace the lower ranks are more strongly affected by demobilisation.

lack of personnel  
records

no IDs

A number of quite different groups are selected for or affected by demobilisation. Their backgrounds and motives differ greatly:

- ↳ Most demobilised persons have only a **low level of formal qualifications**.
- ↳ After years of war they have **high expectations**, but no material assets and property.
- ↳ Many of them have been **traumatised** by their war experience.
- ↳ Combatants with injuries or **permanent illnesses** (e.g. HIV) are discharged with preference.
- ↳ **Older** persons who have spent a large part of their life as combatants are discharged first.
- ↳ **Women**, who were represented strongly in some guerrilla armies, suffer discrimination in many ways when new armies are created and therefore nearly always belong to the demobilised group.
- ↳ **Children and young persons** who were recruited by armies during civil war are discharged at the end of the war without having a home. Frequently they are not even included in the demobilisation process if they are still under age.

people  
affected by  
demobilisation

- ⌋ **Mercenaries** and combatants with a foreign nationality are excluded from the army after wars and formally expelled from the country. This group also falls outside the DRP network in many countries, but generally has no prospects in the countries of origin.
- ⌋ Combatants who have fought in the ranks of an **army of occupation** or the **defeated army** are frequently rejected by the community afterwards. In some cases these units leave the country with the army of occupation (e.g. *Selous Scouts* in Zimbabwe, *Koevoet* in Namibia).
- ⌋ **Partners, dependants, and relatives** who have lived in the direct vicinity of the barracks and camps are also directly affected by the demobilisation.

**heterogeneous group**

Despite their common war experience, the target group of demobilised persons can be made up in a very **heterogeneous** fashion. This becomes particularly clear on transition into civilian life. The **different needs** of the individual groups must be taken into consideration already during the demobilisation process.

**self-demobilisation**

The phenomenon of **self-demobilisation** deserves special attention. We can speak of self-demobilisation when, for example as in Ethiopia, an army is disbanded in disorderly fashion after a defeat and the soldiers bereft of any command try to return to their home regions. Many flee to neighbouring countries in fear of pursuit. In the case of armed groups which survive on more or less organised attacks and road barricades after civil wars, the offer of **civilian alternatives** should lead to combatants leaving these groups individually. Self-demobilisation differs from desertion by the fact that it takes place in situations in which there is no longer any formal obligation for the combatants to belong to an army or an armed group. Their willingness to **slip back into the role of a civilian** depends essentially on the **pull-factors** which the reintegration programmes can create. This group is generally not covered by demobilisation programmes. There are usually no records about self-demobilisation. Such a situation conceals **risks** if there has been no disarmament. Self-demobilised combatants should be able to qualify for subsequent reintegration measures and documents recognising their duty in the army should be issued if possible.

**offer alternatives to armed robbery**

## 2.1.4 Security-Policy Prerequisites

**requirements for demobilisation**

Demobilisation as first segment of a DRP holds an important function for the success of the overall process. Before demobilisation or even just the planning of such a project can start, a series of military and political **preliminary conditions** must be fulfilled. The following conditions are to be understood as essential requirements. Their weighting must be checked from case to case.

**cease-fire**

- ⌋ The general **consent of the political representatives** of the state or the warring parties is absolutely vital. This presupposes a **cease-fire**. All parties to the war must agree to the demobilisation, even if not all parties are effected by demobilisation in the same way.

**involvement of troop commanders**

- ⌋ Support by the **army command**, troop commanders or war lords must exist in all regions. Both during demobilisation after war and demobilisation in times of peace,

<p>this presupposes that military or political leaders largely have control over the combatants.</p>	
<p>↳ The procedure and the benefits of demobilisation should be stipulated in a <b>peace contract</b> or a <b>law</b>.</p>	<p><b>contract or legal basis</b></p>
<p>↳ <b>Donors</b> should be included in the planning of the DRP already when the peace agreement is prepared. Demobilisation can be accelerated and facilitated by early provision of funds.</p>	<p><b>sufficient funding</b></p>
<p>↳ The <b>definition of the groups and contingents</b> to be demobilised should be a part of the peace agreement. A clear differentiation by comparison with other government organs (e.g. police) and other civilians (e.g. returning refugees) is necessary.</p>	<p><b>defined groups</b></p>
<p>↳ The <b>supervision</b> of the agreement by a <b>commission</b> with all fractions represented proves to be particularly constructive when delays occur or agreements are not adhered to. Such a commission should have free access to all regions of the country.</p>	<p><b>supervision</b></p>
<p>↳ The participation of <b>neutral, international observers</b> is a stabilising factor especially when demobilisation takes place as an integral component of a peace process.</p>	<p><b>neutral observers</b></p>
<p>↳ A definite <b>time frame</b> and <b>demarkation</b> of assembly areas facilitates demobilisation and provides clear perspectives for combatants. The assembly areas should be easily <b>accessible</b> for all armies and armed groups and be monitored by neutral security forces.</p>	<p><b>defined time-frame and locations</b></p>

When sporadic fighting breaks out again despite political agreements between the warring parties, it should be examined whether a demobilisation programme can promote an end to the fighting, or whether the DRP is endangered and has to be stopped.

## 2.2 Essential steps for Demobilisation

<p>The sequence of demobilisation can be divided into six elements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Planning</b>: from the peace plan to contingency planning</li> <li>2. <b>Encampment</b>: massing the combatants in assembly areas (in post-war situations)</li> <li>3. <b>Registration</b>: registering of the person related data and arms</li> <li>4. <b>Disarming</b>: collecting of and control over weapons</li> <li>5. <b>Pre-discharge orientation</b>: informing combatants about their rights</li> <li>6. <b>Discharge</b>: formal discharge and return transport to the home region</li> </ol>	<p><b>sequence of demobilisation</b></p>
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The chronological sequence of demobilisation (see Figure 2: Essential Steps of the Demobilisation Process, page 26) and the relevance of the individual elements result first of

all from the **political situation** preceding demobilisation. The available resources and the condition of the infrastructure are decisive criteria for the effectiveness and viability of demobilisation programmes. To achieve acceptance among the combatants and the commanding officers of the war parties it is important for the time schedule, locations and inputs of the demobilisation programme to be known in detail beforehand. Whereas demobilisation following a war takes place under considerable time pressure, demobilisation in times of peace can be better planned and even tested in a pilot phase. In some countries demobilisation only takes place once all combatants are united in one army.

## 2.2.1 Planning

<b>flexibility</b>	The planning and implementation of demobilisation programmes calls for a high degree of <b>co-ordination and flexibility</b> . It has proved expedient to charge a <b>single civilian institution</b> in the country with the co-ordination. Personnel with both civilian and military background should work in this institution. Demobilisation programmes have to be carried out under considerable time pressure and can generally only be realised in an institutional 'new start' phase. That is why line ministries are mostly not suitable as a co-ordinating or implementing instance. The planning of a demobilisation process often stretches from the negotiation of a peace plan to the contingency planning, a detailed appeal to donors and to the maintenance of assembly areas. These manifold tasks are often handled and <b>co-ordinated by the UN</b> which gained enormous experience in this field.
<b>one co-ordinating body</b>	
<b>UN involvement</b>	
<b>central planning</b>	A <b>central national organisation</b> should be charged with the central planning. <b>Support</b> by the UN and international organisations which have already accumulated experience in this field facilitates setting up this organisation.
<b>time pressure</b>	A problem of demobilisation programmes consists in the fact that within a very short space of time an <b>expensive system</b> has to be set up for tasks which are limited in time. However, that is why it is so very important for this organisation to be equipped not only with a <b>clear mandate</b> , but also with sufficient <b>financial resources</b> .
<b>mandate and resources</b>	
<b>involve donors</b>	The <b>co-ordination of the demobilisation plan with all groups involved</b> and the interested donors subsequently improves co-ordination of the work. The individual measures and inputs of the demobilisation programme can be implemented by international NGOs. These inputs should be equal as far as possible in all regions and for all groups.
<b>managing assembly areas</b>	There is a considerable need for <b>planning and management</b> also beneath the level of the national demobilisation organisation in the regions. It is in particular the difficulties at regional level and in the individual AAs which lead to <b>unrest</b> and not seldom to <b>insurrections</b> among the combatants. Problems arise above all when <b>co-ordination</b> between national and regional levels does not function. If food supplies are inadequate or combatants' pay does not reach the camps, this can endanger the demobilisation process.
<b>keep dwelling time short</b>	The <b>dwelling time</b> in the AAs should be as <b>short</b> as possible and lead to a direct transition into the reintegration programmes. The capacities of the reintegration programmes are

frequently not sufficient or the implementation of these measures is delayed. Until then the combatants remain in the camp. Some camps are only dissolved after years since they serve for permanent maintenance care of the ex-combatants. This creates additional dependencies.

If possible the demobilisation programme should be tested in a **pilot phase**. A test run with only a few hundred combatants allows the implementing bodies to identify weaknesses in planning and additional needs of the target groups. In countries in which the army is demobilised during peace times and when demobilisation only takes place after the merger of all armed forces to one national army, there is generally less time pressure than in immediate post-war situations.

plan a pilot phase

<p>➔ <b>Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↳ <b>Organisational consultancy</b> to the national and international organisations</li> <li>↳ Planning and <b>management</b> of the demobilisation process</li> <li>↳ <b>Logistics</b></li> <li>↳ Conduction of <b>needs assessments</b></li> <li>↳ Organisation of <b>workshops</b> with experts from other countries</li> <li>↳ Swift and <b>flexible</b> reaction of the donors necessary</li> </ul>	<p><b>organisational development</b></p> <p><b>needs assessment</b></p> <p><b>workshops</b></p> <p><b>quick reaction</b></p>
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### 2.2.2 Encampment

The **massing of combatants in assembly areas** (AAs) and camps for the purpose of subsequent demobilisation is practised above all when armed forces and armed groups are not accommodated in barracks. If a political solution is achieved at the negotiating table at the end of a civil war, then the **precise number** and **position** of all troops is generally not known exactly. As a result of ongoing recruitment, poor communications and the relative autonomy of regional commanders and local war lords, the army and armed groups frequently **do not any longer have control** over all their combatants. Massing these together in camps or barracks is therefore to be viewed under strategic aspects also, since in this way the **direct control over the troops** and their stocks of arms can be achieved. In addition, at least externally, the **same context** is achieved for all combatants for transition to civilian life - irrespective of the army they belong to and the duration of their service. The encampment is the first and also the most **critical phase** of the demobilisation procedure. If the encampment fails, not only is the demobilisation at risk but also the whole peace process.

assembly areas

control over troops

#### Location of the Assembly Areas

The location and **accessibility** of the assembly areas is stipulated in agreement with all parties to the war. Enemy armies are drawn together in **separate AAs** which should lie in an area which is **safe and accessible** for the combatants. Generally the assembly areas are located on the territory of the country in which the fights took place, so that combatants operating underground are also given the possibility of reaching the camps without having to cross a frontier. For guerrilla armies operating from neighbouring countries AAs can be set

accessibility

security issues

UN peace keeping troops

up there and disarming can also take place there. The establishment and fitting out of AAs is generally assumed by an UN peace troop and/or various UN agencies.

### Supervision

international observers

Supervision of the AAs by **international observers** or the UN has proved successful in many countries after civil wars. These monitors should also oversee adherence to the cease-fire and the conditions in the AAs. The longer combatants stay in the assembly areas, the more important becomes a link with the outside world and the family. The encampment period should be as **short** as possible. Despite this, in conflict situations care should be taken to ensure a strict separation of enemy groups. Other groups such as e.g. **returning** or **withdrawing** refugees and the **local** population should also be protected against attacks by combatants by means of supervision of the AAs.

separate enemies

### Emergency Aid Assembly Areas

food and water

Supply of the assembly areas with sufficient **food** and **drinking water** must be ensured. A lack of supplies endangers the discipline of the combatants. It is equally important to ensure sufficient basic **health care** in the AAs to look after sick combatants and to prevent epidemics. The camps should provide sufficient shelter and housing for the combatants and the staff running the AA. Logistical aspects and camp management are often underestimated but they are essential for a timely and effective demobilisation.

health care

supply assembly areas

#### ➔ Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ

- ⌋ Supply of the AAs with **food** and **medicaments** is a task of emergency aid.
- ⌋ The supply of combatant's **dependants** living in the direct vicinity of the AAs or the barracks is also important during this phase
- ⌋ Management of **regional offices** or assembly areas
- ⌋ Consultancy services to national **demobilisation institutions** in connection with planning and logistics of the encampment

Managing assembly camps

## 2.2.3 Registration

personal data

Independently of supervising the warring parties (number of soldiers and arms), the registration of important **person related data** is an element of the demobilisation programmes which can best be carried out in the AAs. This is a sensitive area since not only military data but also personal data are involved which in another context could be used against individuals or groups. Simply the suspicion that data surveyed during demobilisation could be used for prosecution or discrimination of the combatants can endanger registration.

legal aspects

In Namibia and in South Africa, therefore, **laws** were promulgated as a supplement to the repatriation and demobilisation agreements which granted certain groups **freedom from prosecution** under certain circumstances.

### Provision with Papers

issuing IDs

Soldiers and members of armed groups generally do not have any identity papers. In particular where the peace agreement also provides for new elections, papers are a vital prerequisite for participating in the elections.

The **discharge documents** which the combatants receive in the AAs also serve at the same time as entitlement to further services of the DRP. Since the discharge documents are frequently lost in the throes of post-war confusion they should be registered so that they can be replaced at any time. For many ex-combatants and particularly for former guerrillas a discharge document also has a high symbolic value since it additionally documents appreciation of their input for the war and the superior war objectives.

**issuing discharge documents**

### Planning for Reintegration Measures

An important aspect when registering data is the **planning need** for the ongoing supplies to the AAs and the following reintegration programmes. The lack of person-related data makes target group-oriented planning of reintegration measures difficult at the time of demobilisation. Frequently neither the exact number nor the age and region of origin of the combatants are known. A swift transfer of these figures can considerably facilitate **preparations by regional and local authority institutions** for reintegration of ex-combatants. This database is therefore an indispensable basis for the development co-operation institutions participating in the process.

**numbers and social profiles of combatants**

**collect planning data**

Groups whose special needs have not been taken into consideration in the demobilisation programmes can be recorded here. On this basis selective measures can be developed for the needs of **vulnerable groups**. The earlier these data are surveyed, the more efficiently the programmes for combatants can be planned. The survey of these data can also serve as an outpost for **monitoring and evaluation (M&E)** measures which are carried out in parallel with DRPs.

**monitoring & evaluation**

#### ➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

- ⌋ Setting-up of **logistics** for the registration of ex-combatants
- ⌋ Supply of special hard and software for computerised registration
- ⌋ In order to support the national organisations in the target group-specific **planning** of reintegration programmes data concerning the social profiles of the ex-combatants and their concepts should be surveyed already during demobilisation.
- ⌋ By building up an **M&E system** the need for reintegration measures can be surveyed already at an early stage.

**logistics**

**equipment**

**creating planning capacities**

**M&E**

## 2.2.4 Disarmament

### definition

Disarming is defined here as the **controlled collection** of light and heavy weapons. The separation of the users from their weapons can take place at several levels. Both whole armies and individual soldiers and civilians are disarmed. Disarming does not automatically mean destruction of the arms or reduction of arms stocks.

### monitor cease fire

Disarming of combatants is a central objective of demobilisation. The control over the weapons of the participating war parties is necessary in order to monitor an agreed cease-fire. Successful disarmament of civilians and armed groups can also help to re-establish the state's **monopoly of force**. The control over **heavy weapons** of the army and disarming of regular troops can generally be carried out more systematically than the **disarming of armed groups and civilians**.

### control of heavy weapons

### weapon proliferation

Most civil wars, especially in Africa, are defined by insurgency and are fought by irregular forces equipped with light weapons like machine guns. Machine guns are extremely cheap, easy to use and to transport. The **proliferation of light weapons** is an immense problem not only in countries emerging from civil war but also in bordering states and regions. The termination of a conflict might be agreed on by political leaders but the proliferation of weapons, often for commercial purposes, will prolong the fighting and create new violence.

### micro-disarmament

**Micro-disarmament** has therefore been identified as a priority by international peace-keepers and local politicians alike. This new concept involves a number of disarmament and arms control measures which range from normal weapons seizure tactics and gun-buy-back programmes to international embargoes and transparency mechanisms. Micro-disarmament covers not only **statutory forces** and **irregular armies** but also **civilians** which are not members of an armed group.

### disarming combatants

The **disarming of combatants** takes place when they arrive at the AAs and is a prerequisite for their discharge. In the case of discharge in times of peace, disarming takes place when they leave the barracks.

### disarming civilians

When weapons have been distributed by warring factions to the **civilian population** or local militia groups, it is almost impossible to collect these again. In fact hand-guns represent a much greater danger in and after civil wars than heavy weapons.

### 'cultural' weapons

Despite this, it is assumed in many regions that possession of weapons is of cultural significance and cannot be stopped. These so called "cultural weapons" are usually not registered and handed back.

### gun-buy-back programmes

By means of **gun-buy-back** programmes "surplus" weapons which were not given back during the official disarming can be collected. The exchange of weapons for food or cash can, however, increase the value of arms again after it has just dropped.



Weapons generally remain in the possession of the army or are destroyed by the United Nations. The **control over these weapon stocks** is important even after demobilisation since the sale or export of these stocks can reverse the action completely. Specific problems arise with the **demining**. Land mines pose a long term threat to civilians. Demining is extremely costly and requires special equipment and expertise. Demining programmes should involve both the local population as well as those ex-combatants who were involved in placing mines. After demobilisation demining programmes can also create short term employment for ex-combatants.

**control of weapons**  
**disposal of weapons**  
**demining**

Demobilisation without thorough disarming can result in the **long term in serious jeopardy for peace** in the country and the region.

**→ Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

For NGOs and bilateral donors **neutrality** is most important during this phase. Involvement in the disarmament process can only be support for other neutral organisations like the UN. Collection of arms should remain a task of the army or of UN peace keepers. This support could include:

- ↳ Support of **logistics**
- ↳ **Gun-buy-back** programmes for civilians outside the AAs
- ↳ **Technical advice** for conversion, disposal of weapons and military installations
- ↳ Technical advice, equipment, and training for **demining programmes**

**neutrality**  
**logistics**  
**gun-buy-back**  
**technical advice**  
**demining**

**2.2.5 Pre-Discharge Orientation**

The intensive **advisory services provided to combatants** concerning their **rights** and the benefits and potentials of the DRP should take place in the assembly areas before discharge. The better the combatants are informed about the existing qualification and promotion programmes, the more willing they will be to leave the camp and the better these offers will be used.

**advice on rights and benefits**

Many combatants were in the army for years and had **lost touch completely with civilian forms of life**. In some countries 're-education' formed part of the demobilisation. The preparation for behaviour patterns and problems encountered in everyday life should be part of the **advisory services offered in the camps**.

**counselling and guidance**

In the case of demobilisation which takes place in a transitional phase and before elections, the AAs can already be used for **voters education** and for **civic education**. In many situations, however, the work of political parties in the demobilisation camps can lead to considerable conflicts. Civic education programmes might also be run as part of a larger strategy for crisis prevention.

**civic education**  
**crisis prevention**

**skills training****literacy programmes**

The shorter the demobilisation phase, the better the chances for a smooth integration of the combatants into civilian life. There are, however, situations in which for political reasons combatants have to remain in AAs for several months or a year. This time can be used by conducting **skills training** and **literacy programmes** which prepare combatants for civilian life. These programmes should have a link to the reintegration measures following.

➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Possible Focal Areas of GTZ**

**civic education**

↳ **Civic education** programmes and conflict prevention courses

**skills training**

↳ **Skills training** and literacy programmes

**information systems**

↳ Integration of the AAs in the **information systems** of the reintegration programmes

**counselling and guidance**

↳ Funds and training for **counselling** and **guidance** programmes

## 2.2.6 Discharge

**transport****settling-in package****links to reintegration programme**

With discharge from the army combatants can be considered **officially demobilised**. The discharge generally comprises return **transport** to the home region and a package of material support which should assist the combatants' start into everyday life. In some countries the demobilisation programmes finished with these services. In fact, however, the process of reintegration just starts for the ex-combatants at this point. The chances of reintegration and the effectiveness of reintegration assistance offers also depend on the **transition** between demobilisation and reintegration (see section 3.2.1). The document which certifies discharge from the army (see section 2.2.6 Discharge) generally also entitles the ex-combatants to further services in the reintegration programmes.

### Discharge Packages

**food**  
**seeds**  
**cash**  
**civilian clothes**

On discharge from the army or the AAs the ex-combatants are frequently provided with **cash, seed, simple agricultural implements, feed rations, civilian clothing** and corrugated iron sheeting, so that in the first months after demobilisation their livelihood is secured. The ex-combatants are generally also eligible for further services which can be drawn at a community level. Support in long term reintegration is attributed here to the reintegration programmes (see section 3.2 Components).

### Transport

**return to home region**

The transport from the AAs, barracks, or from the war area to the regions of origin is generally part of the demobilisation and is therefore implemented by the organisations managing or supervising the demobilisation (UN). By analogy with refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), it is also assumed for the ex-combatants that they will **return to their regions of origin** and home villages in order to take up the structures there which they left before the war. However, in reality this planning basis generally proves to be unrealistic since many ex-combatants can no longer take up the life they led before the war again. Many of them are **drawn to the cities**. The data recorded during the surveys in the encampments (see section 2.2.3) are also an important basis for the logistics of the transport operations.

➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

- ↳ **Transport** of ex-combatants to their home regions
- ↳ Support in the **planning** and logistics
- ↳ Provision of **settling-in packages**
- ↳ Preparation of the **local communities**

**transport and logistics**

**settling-in packages**


**information of local  
communities**

## 2.3 Focal Areas of GTZ Activities

Requirements	Measures
<b>Planning of Demobilisation</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A programme for the demobilisation of combatants has to be developed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Support in planning and conceptualisation of the entire demobilisation programme and of single project components</li> <li>→ Conduction of planning workshops</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An efficient organisation is needed for the management of the demobilisation process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Organisational development for the implementing institution</li> <li>→ Monitoring and Evaluation</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Support for regional offices</li> <li>→ Close co-operation with other donors and NGOs</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation of Demobilisation Programmes</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assembly Areas (AAs) have to be set up.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Identification of sites for AAs</li> <li>→ Supply of AAs with water, food, medical services and shelter</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of AAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Consultancy services management and capacity building</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of combatants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Support for logistics; supply of special equipment</li> <li>→ Conducting needs-assessments</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparing ex-combatants for civilian life</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Setting-up information systems, Support for civic education and conflict prevention programmes</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparing ex-combatants for the labour market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Surveying the requirements of possible labour markets</li> <li>→ Skills training (crash courses) and literacy classes</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparing the communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Information of local communities</li> <li>→ Support dependants of ex-combatants</li> <li>→ Strengthen local communities with food supplies and social services</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discharge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Transport into home regions</li> <li>→ Settling-in packages</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demining</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Technical advice, equipment, and training for demining programmes</li> </ul>

→ Awareness campaigns

Figure 2: Essential Steps of the Demobilisation Process



## 3 REINTEGRATION

### 3.1 Definition

Reintegration is defined here as the process in which ex-combatants change to a civilian social status and regain access to civilian forms of work and income. *Reintegration* for ex-combatants as well as returnees and IDPs is particularly difficult in post-war situations. In fact it is only possible to speak of *reintegration* to a limited extent since war and violence have considerably changed both the concepts and capabilities of the ex-combatants as well as the living situation of the civilian population. A simple return to the conditions which prevailed before the war is generally not possible. Moreover the demands and expectations of the ex-combatants differ from those which existed before the war. Reintegration is a social and economic process with an open time frame which cannot be separated from the general development of the country.

#### 3.1.1 Objectives

The central objective of reintegration programmes is to **support ex-combatants** in their efforts to integrate themselves into **social and economic** networks of a civilian society. Whereas demobilisation serves primarily to disarm and register combatants, it is assumed in the services offered by reintegration programmes that the persons who make use of these programmes are already demobilised and are willing to lead a civilian life. By means of selective measures reintegration programmes for ex-combatants should

- ↳ strengthen the **potentials of the ex-combatants** to secure their livelihood by peaceful means and to participate in economic and social life. **ex-combatants**
- ↳ At the same time the measures are taken to strengthen the capacities of the absorbing **communities** to integrate the demobilised. The **general social conditions** and **macro-economic capacities** for the integration of this group should be improved and created respectively. **communities**

Most ex-combatants find their **own individual solutions** of how to deal with the challenges of their new situation and how to integrate into civilian life. The **majority** sees demobilisation as a chance to go back to a productive trade and to reunite with their families. These ex-combatants are usually not in need of long term support but they make use of discharge payments and settling-in packages. Reintegration programmes are therefore **targeted** at those ex-combatants who do have **difficulties** reintegrating. It is not the objective of reintegration programmes to reach each and every ex-combatant in a country no matter what his situation is. Reintegration programmes offer **targeted support projects** in disadvantaged regions or to those **groups who are in need** of special support. **individual solutions**

**targeted reintegration**  
**disadvantaged regions**  
**vulnerable groups**

On a national level these programmes aim to improve the general conditions for reintegration.

**programmes for returnees and IDPs**

**national policy**

Reintegration measures for ex-combatants should be well co-ordinated with other programmes for **returning refugees** or **internally displaced persons**. For any of these groups reintegration can only work if there is a national reintegration policy for all groups which are in need of support during their reintegration phase. This aspect is also important in emergency situations when donor agencies design programmes for repatriation. Returning refugees and demobilised ex-combatants should not be treated as one group when their political alliances differ and tensions are prevailing. Programmes should, however, be linked and benefits should be equal. Over time reintegration programmes open to other groups.

### 3.1.2 Conditions

There is a very broad spectrum of possible lines of approach for measures to promote reintegration which can take effect at different levels in social life and in the economy. Both the **depth of intervention** of such programmes and the **duration** can vary widely. Also the starting point and the target groups of such programmes depend to a large extent on the political situation in the country and on the influence that combatants and ex-combatants assert on politics. A differentiation is often made between members of the winning and the losing army.

Three possible scenarios describe the situation at the end of a war:

**winner**

⌋ Clear **winner** situation: Out of an armed conflict emerges a clear winner. The victorious party now has to reduce its forces and often feels an obligation to compensate their ex-combatants for the services rendered.

**loser**

⌋ Clear **loser** situation: One or several armed groups have been defeated militarily or had to dissolve their armed wing in order to reach their political goals. Ex-combatants have to reintegrate as civilians, often without much support but with a negative social image.

**no winner - no loser**

⌋ **No clear winner or loser**. Most civil wars do not end with a clear winner. A peace treaty is often brokered by a third party or the United Nations. In this case ex-combatants from all parties to the conflict have to be reintegrated into civilian life. Only few are admitted to the newly formed army.

**neutrality of programmes**

The **acceptance** that a reintegration programme enjoys and the **social prejudices** that the ex-combatants are facing, depend to a large extent on the political situation in the country and on the circumstances of the demobilisation. Reintegration programmes have to take these conditions into account and have to react to them **without discriminating against** groups of ex-combatants or other social groups especially those who suffered from the war.

**economic conditions differ**

In many countries civil war ended without a clear winner/loser situation. Every governmental or non-governmental institution responsible for the reintegration of ex-combatants has to work in a very sensitive and difficult political environment. In order to achieve integration into civilian networks, the role ex-combatants have played during the war should not shape the reintegration measures they receive. In many countries ex-combatants



from all warring parties experience **similar difficulties** integrating into civilian life. Some of their needs are similar to those of **returning refugees** or **internally displaced**. One important condition for reintegration programmes is therefore the economic condition of the society that has to integrate these groups.

Two different contexts are distinguished here with respect to possible reintegration scenarios: Reintegration in **war-affected societies** and Reintegration in **stable, largely civilian societies**.

### Reintegration in War-Affected Societies

Reintegration of ex-combatants frequently takes place in **post-war societies**. Directly after a war or civil war the social and economic structures have to be rebuilt and restructured. This situation is often characterised by a **shortage of food** and general supplies. In addition there is an elevated risk that existing conflicts turn into armed disputes again. In this situation demobilised persons are only one of several groups who rely on emergency aid. Other vulnerable groups include returning refugees, the internally displaced as well as those civilians who suffered from the consequences of war inside the country.

**post-war situation**

**food shortage,  
danger of renewed war**

**returnees,  
internally displaced**

The reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war societies is particularly necessary - but also particularly difficult. It is one of the **preconditions for stable peace**, but at the same time it can also carry **tensions** into the civilian population. Bridge-building between the two sets of requirements shapes the development-policy instrument in this situation. In countries like Liberia where loosely organised armed groups, often children teenager, are sustaining a civil war with no clear directions, the offer of reintegration projects can **initiate self-demobilisation**.

**incentives to end  
fighting**

The short and long-term reintegration of ex-combatants represents an important element within the scope of **development-oriented emergency aid** as is necessary in war-torn societies. This can reduce the application of force as both an 'income-creating measure' (criminality) and a means of resolving social conflicts. With the ex-combatants, measures address a target group which generally has only a particularly weak potential for self-help in the phase of general re-orientation. Reintegration programmes should therefore **strengthen the self-help potential** of the ex-combatants and be **poverty-oriented**. The involvement of ex-combatants in measures to rehabilitate infrastructure is expedient in post-conflict phases because it also enables the communities to experience a direct improvement in the post-war situation.

**emergency aid**

**conflict prevention**

**poverty orientation**

Post-war situations in some countries make regional and class differences even most apparent. If destruction and suffering from the war has affect a country only regionally or has been limited to certain social strata, . This contrast is particularly evident in the case of the return from exile of so-called **refugee-warrior-communities**. This term has been created to describe organised exile populations without a clear division between refugees and combatants. Most of the refugees also consider themselves to be combatants. When such a group is to be integrated in the dominant economic and social structures of a country after a peace agreement, **access to the employment market** as well as to **social positions** is often very difficult. While the returning refugees and ex-combatants are emerging from a war, the **dominant culture** and institutions in the country often deny

**refugee-warrior-  
communities**

recognition of these experiences. Among the demobilised persons this quickly leads to frustrations and demands which are not seldom emphasised by the use of force.

### Reintegration in Stable, Largely Civilian Societies

access to the formal  
sector

The reintegration of ex-combatants in relatively stable societies with **functioning markets and economic cycles** raises problems which differ from those in war-torn societies. This category includes demobilisation of armies which have participated in extra-territorial conflicts or have fought in wars whose consequences were not perceived with the same intensity throughout the whole of the country. This is the case, for example, in the South African society which has been very unevenly affected by violence and war against its neighbours. The general economy in the country and especially in the 'white' quarters of the major cities was never directly impaired by the war. In Zimbabwe and Namibia too the guerrillas returned in principle to countries whose **formal sector had not been destroyed** by the war and to which the ex-combatants never previously had full access.

training  
public awareness

The need for targeted reintegration measure is often underestimated in countries which have a relatively strong economy. However, it is especially in these countries that ex-combatants remain permanently excluded from the formal sector. Their lack of skills and formal qualifications denies them access to jobs and even in the informal sector competition is high. Without **qualified training** and without **social acceptance** they are likely to remain marginalised.

### Ex-Combatants and the State

The commitment that a government feels towards demobilised combatants influences the effectiveness and timeliness of reintegration measures. There is, however, also a danger that a too close linkage between the state and those surplus combatants who are not any longer needed in the armed forces can counteract integration.

pensions  
tax privileges  
public service posts

In a series of African countries in which liberation movements have taken over the state and the economy in an intact condition, ex-combatants have been looked after by government pensions and by **bloating the government system**. The way in which veterans and dependants were provided with maintenance in oil-rich Algeria was unique. After the country achieved independence many ex-combatants were provided with high-ranking posts in government enterprises and with import privileges from which they and their families still profit today. In Zimbabwe and Namibia too many returnees and ex-combatants were received in newly created positions in the public sector. These measures create employment and make a contribution to the social recognition of the ex-combatants. Reshuffling of the public service often runs parallel to the integration of several armies and is part of national reconciliation. In both the short and long term, however, this often represents a **burden on the national budget** without which the government administration would be more efficient. Tying ex-combatants to the state by means of **new clientele relations** is a political instrument which has its negative aspects in terms of development policy. Often those **groups** who do not have any lobby - female ex-combatants, elderly ex-combatants, members of ethnic groups and war-disabled - are **excluded**.

new tasks for the army

The **conversion of parts of the army into a government development agency** may be an attractive political decision in the short term since this can delay demobilisation. In this

way the army is provided with new tasks and a new image. In the long term, however, this new role of the army can also have **counter-productive effects**, since it does not promote reintegration into a civilian society. The already existing **dependence** of the combatants **on the army and the state** is reinforced.

The army as well as **state development associations** such as the *Development Brigades* in Namibia can provide valuable 'parking positions' for ex-combatants which allow them to get some work experience or training before they have to compete on the labour market. However, the **costs are high for training** measures outside the existing training institutions and in many cases the work experience does not relate to the market. There is a danger that such state owned employment companies are too **centrally** organised and do not have the capacity to take effect at community level.

development brigades

Providing maintenance care for parts of the victorious army is not unrestrictedly possible. In most countries peace processes after civil wars are based on a form of **power-sharing**. This makes it politically difficult to privilege a particular group of demobilised persons. Moreover the **pressure applied by international donors** aiming at implementing economically expedient and sustainable reintegration programmes is growing.

power-sharing

conditionality of aid

Parallel with demobilisation and reconstruction many governments also implement **structural adjustment programmes** of the World Bank. These programmes are frequently counter-productive for reintegration programmes because personnel and budget cuts in the public administrations result in additional unemployment. At the same time the range of social services available is restricted just at the time an increased demand develops due to returning refugees and ex-combatants.

structural adjustment

### 3.1.3 Reintegration on Three Levels: National - Regional - Local

No matter what the background and strategy of reintegration is, during implementation policy makers and development agencies have to define their tasks and responsibilities with respect to three different levels: national, regional and local. The distinction between national (**macro**-level), regional (**meso**-level) and local level (**micro**-level) is not only useful in order to recognise regional differences but it should also clarify the policy levels of possible reintegration measures. Reintegration is a process that mainly takes place in the communities at **local level**. This is where the quest for the potentials and needs of the target group starts and this is also where the programmes should have their **impact**. An efficient and effective national programme should, however, **link** and co-ordinate activities at all three levels.

macro  
meso  
micro

linking three levels

#### National Level

The policy at national level creates the conditions for reintegration and formulates the programmes. At this level there must be a clear **concept** for reintegration which takes regional needs, differences and capacities into account. Here, the general conditions and objectives are formulated and negotiated between the **parties** and **ministries** involved. The

macro level  
policy formulation  
planning  
finance

planning and **financing** of reintegration programmes generally exceeds the possibilities of the central government ministries. This results in tasks for bilateral and multilateral donors.

### → Tasks of Development Co-operation

At the macro-level development co-operation can act above all by providing consultancy services to institutions and legislators. Consultancy on organisational development of planning or implementing agencies, the planning of areas of responsibility and building up of monitoring systems is particularly necessary in cases in which new institutions are created with the mandate of promoting reintegration measures. In many countries, however, there is also a need for consultancy services to the legislator, since without a clear political mandate the competent institutions cannot act. This is especially the case in countries which reduce their forces in peace times.

consultancy services,  
capacity building

legal frameworks

planning

monitoring

meso level

### Regional Level

The implementation of national programmes in the regions can be carried out both by **government executing agencies** and by local NGOs. This is the level at which organisations of civil society get involved. The decentralisation of reintegration programmes is particularly expedient when the regions are affected by reintegration in very different ways. With **decentralised strategies of a national policy** it is possible to react to regional problems more flexibly. The national reintegration authority frequently maintains **local offices** which serve as **points of approach and advisory centres for ex-combatants**. Regional activities are co-ordinated and overseen from here. A lack of communication and co-ordination between central and regional institutions can, however, also delay implementation and render it more difficult.

decentralisation

executing agencies

advisory services

### → Tasks of Development Co-operation

Particularly in places where the reintegration of ex-combatants is a task of **development-oriented emergency aid** and where there is no strong executing agency available at national level, co-operation with local NGOs enjoys priority. At the meso-level support of regional and local executing agencies and NGOs is an important line of approach for reaching the target group directly and also for promoting structures in a civilian society. Work with regional organisations has proved particularly successful in the field of employment creation.

emergency aid

supporting local NGOs

employment creation

micro level

### Local Level

Social and economic reintegration of the individual takes place at local level. The **(re-) acceptance in the community** and family creates an important framework without which government or private reintegration aid cannot take foot. Here the **sparse resources** are **mobilised** which are, however, important to create a **civilian basis for the ex-combatants**. Access to land, to local markets and to work is generally regulated via the communities. At this level, however, the **infrastructure must be strengthened** in order to create better economic conditions in the long term. Reintegration at micro-level is also the basis for sustainable reconciliation.

community level

food security

infrastructure

reconciliation

**→ Tasks of Development Co-operation**

Direct intervention takes place at the micro-level. **Emergency aid** measures, **quick-impact programmes**, and **settling-in packages** are aimed at direct improvement of the situation at the local level - in the communities. However, in the long term **strengthening of the communities** which form the social network of the ex-combatants is an important task of sustainable development co-operation. The support of local NGOs, **local businesses** and other **private enterprises** (e.g. schools, training institutes) enjoys priority for development co-operation if such organisations exist. The **rehabilitation** of roads, bridges, schools and health care facilities by food-for-work or **personnel-intensive cash-for-work programmes** can stimulate local markets in the short term. Social services and reconciliation measures are further tasks at this level.

**quick-impact programmes**

**rehabilitation**

**food/cash-for-work programmes**

**social services**

**3.1.4 Timing and Planning**

Reintegration must be understood as a **development process with an open-end** time frame. This presupposes **long-term planning and flexibility**. This long-term perspective should also be reflected in the mandate of the institutions involved. At the same time, especially in the case of demobilisation after civil wars, it is necessary for perceptible success to be achieved **as quickly as possible** and for as many ex-combatants as possible to be reached by the measures. Quick-impact programmes (QIPs) are therefore generally placed at the start of demobilisation programmes or are already linked with the demobilisation packages which the combatants receive on discharge. In most countries, however, there are institutions and programmes which five to ten years after actual demobilisation address only ex-combatants. The term of reintegration programmes depends essentially on two factors: **Efficiency of the programmes** and the **political will**.

**flexibility in planning**

**quick response**

**Efficiency of the Programmes**

If the economic situation of the majority of the ex-combatants has improved on the basis of reintegration programmes or on the basis of an improved general economic situation, the objective of reintegration programmes has been achieved. Social indicators might differ according to the **political and social situation** in the country. Studying the long term effects of reintegration measures social scientist often take the frequency of **interaction** between the formerly separated groups as one indicator. Other indicators could include differences in **social status** and **representation** in communal decision making bodies. In many countries these indicators are not easy to measure. Efficient **monitoring systems** of a programme or single components can also provide policy planners with useful data to assess the efficiency of the programmes. Efficient programmes should be demand driven and should therefore monitor any change in the demand for individual measures and benefits very carefully. The **degree of provision of supplies** can also serve as an indicator.

**social indicators**

**monitoring systems**

**economic indicators**

It has been found, however, that in many countries a large proportion of the ex-combatants has not found any regular work even after five to ten years. After a short time it is possible to distinguish between **two groups**: On the one hand the ex-combatants with good prospects of reintegration and on the other hand those with relatively poor qualifications for the employment market or who lack integration into a community. The instruments for

**starters**

**vs.**

**non-starters**

promotion must be modified and improved in parallel with the economic and social development. The experiences gained by the GTZ in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia show that especially programmes in the upgrading and employment sector require **continuous promotion over years** in order to obtain sustainable success.

**long term  
marginalisation**

**link to development  
programmes**

Especially those ex-combatants with relatively low resources of their own form a large group in need for **long-term, poverty-oriented reintegration programmes**. It should be checked here via which social networks these groups are supplied and maintained and how these networks can be strengthened. In this connection it is expedient to expand the reintegration programme to **other target groups** with similar social profiles and to implement a **long-term transfer into general poverty-oriented development co-operation**.

**avoid dependency**

At the same time the measures of the reintegration programmes should be **limited in time** in order to **avoid** the development of **dependence** on promotion programmes.

**access to projects**

It should also be checked, however, whether the target group has full **access to the project lines offered**. Access to newly distributed land, government subsidies and upgrading courses is not seldom limited to urban centres and rendered more difficult by bureaucratic obstacles. In some countries the capacities of government programmes are so slight that a large proportion of the veterans cannot benefit from them even after years. This is frequently the case with planned land allocation projects, for instance in Zimbabwe.

**regular monitoring**

**diversified measures**

However even training measures and government credits are unattainable for many ex-combatants who do not fulfil the minimum requirements. Through **regular monitoring** from the start of a programme these gaps can be identified at an early stage. By means of **flexible diversification of the promotion instruments** it is possible to reach the target group.

The time frame of reintegration programmes is determined essentially by the **economic situation in the country** and by **links with other development co-operation programmes**.

### **Political Will**

Finally, the term of reintegration programmes depends on the **political will** of the legislator and of the **bilateral and multilateral donors**. Whereas there is a clear time schedule for demobilisation programmes which is generally also monitored by the international community, in the case of reintegration programmes there are frequently only **hesitant commitments by the legislator** and political decision makers. Such programmes are quickly considered to be too expensive. The relevant institutions are generally also lacking personnel resources and responsibilities.

**donor's commitment**

This is where an important task evolves for the donors, not just to finance programmes but also to **promote the development of institutions** which are in a position independently and in the long-term to **implement a mandate** for the reintegration of veterans. Otherwise the attention attributed to the situation of ex-combatants will all too often depend on the

ability of the veterans to draw attention to themselves by demonstrations and attacks using violence and force.

In many countries the **mandate of the implementing institutions is limited by law**. For example, in Uganda the demobilisation and reintegration authority *UVAB* was created initially for a term of six years. This makes **reintegration programmes a calculable burden in the national budget**. In some countries the areas of responsibility for demobilisation and reintegration are separated. In Mozambique demobilisation was carried out under the supervision of the UN. The mandate for steering reintegration programmes was only passed at a later date to the Ministry of Social Labour.

limited mandate

Old ex-combatants, war invalids and dependants of combatants killed in action must be secured by **social security systems**. In many countries the establishment of **pensions for veterans and war invalids** cannot be pushed through either fiscally or politically. Where pension claims for veterans and their families are stipulated by law, this was only done years after **completion of the reintegration programmes**. In Zimbabwe a law governing benefits for veterans was only passed in 1993, in other words 13 years after demobilisation. It must be reviewed in all cases whether or not it is possible to build up **long-term forms of social security** (i.e. pension funds) for certain target groups in parallel with the reintegration programmes. Target groups in this case are not only ex-combatants but also other war-affected groups. Such programmes should become effective above all after expiry of the reintegration programmes.

social security systems

### 3.1.5 Target Groups and Beneficiaries

**Ex-combatants without work and income** are considered to be the target group of reintegration programmes; however, their **families and the communities who take them in** must also be able to profit from reintegration measures. Hence, the group of beneficiaries of reintegration programmes is larger than the actual target group of ex-combatants.

ex-combatants and their families

communities

As already described above (see section 2.1.3 Target Groups) there are **considerable differences in the social and educational profiles** of ex-combatants. The different contexts become manifest particularly in connection with the difficulties in reintegration and must be accorded special consideration in reintegration programmes. The target group of ex-combatants can be differentiated on the basis of **age** (at the time of demobilisation), **sex**, **marital status** (and number of dependants to be maintained), **formal qualifications** (school-leaving certificates, vocational training) and **work experience**. This personal data is essential for the planning of targeted reintegration programmes and of support for individual solutions but only in few countries consolidated data on the social profile of the target group is available.

personal data

<b>social profiles</b>	A number of other indicators are useful to assess a clear picture of the social profile of the target group as a whole : <b>ethnic identity</b> , <b>duration of war experience</b> (in years and as a proportion of combatant's own age), political and social belonging to the group of ' <b>winner</b> ' or ' <b>losers</b> ', degree of <b>traumatisation</b> by the war, <b>health condition</b> (physical disabilities, permanent illnesses), <b>town - country</b> (settlement in urban or rural regions), <b>return</b> to home region or <b>resettlement</b> in other regions, <b>relations to community</b> (taken in by family, clan or community), the combatant's <b>own resources</b> . Drawing a social profile of the target group can also give a clearer picture of the beneficiaries of reintegration programmes. As <b>partners</b> and <b>dependants</b> of ex-combatants are as much affected by demobilisation than the former combatants themselves, there should be a clear idea of the size and the needs of the households that require support from a reintegration programme.
<b>partners, dependants and households</b>	
	These patterns already result in criteria for surveying the <b>target group</b> and for monitoring systems. In addition there is a series of social factors which characterise the situation and the problems of the target group.
<b>urban bias</b>	Many ex-combatants no longer wish to return to the conditions in which they lived in before the war or during their time as combatants. In their imagination <b>return to the country of their family has positive connotations</b> , but many ex-combatants go into the <b>cities</b> to seek work there.
<b>high expectations</b>	The privations of war have created <b>high expectations of life in times of peace</b> . In many cases the combatants were also promised access to education, work and land in the event of victory. These concepts then mould the plans and wishes of the demobilised persons. Disappointments are an inevitable consequence.
<b>dependency syndrome</b>	The <b>many years of dependence</b> from the army, the armed group or the liberation movement are also manifested after demobilisation in an attitude with often unrealistic expectations ( <b>dependency syndrome</b> ). The army or armed group has become a substitute family. Even after disbanding of the troops the networks remain active.
<b>class differences</b>	Within the scope of reintegration <b>differences in rank and class</b> also become apparent. High-ranking officers and technical specialists from the army generally have far fewer difficulties in finding a new task. It is by no means rare for them to be able to fall back on their contacts in the army from the private sector of the economy. However, as regards status and political influence, this is the group which has most to lose.
<b>under aged</b>	Reintegration programmes must also deal with the needs of groups which have not been officially demobilised. These are above all <b>child soldiers</b> and children and <b>young people</b> who have grown up in military camps. <b>Old people</b> and <b>war invalids</b> who left the army or armed groups before the end of the war can also be counted as a target group of reintegration programmes.
<b>old veterans</b>	
<b>wounded combatants</b>	
<b>individual solutions</b>	



The categorisation of the target group should not lead one to forget that most of the ex-combatants find **individual solutions to improve their life situation**. Reintegration programmes are intended to provide assistance in this connection.

## 3.2 Components for Reintegration Programmes

The GTZ is currently supporting the **building up and implementation of reintegration measures** in five African countries (see annex 4.2, GTZ Project Profiles). This means that it has been possible to gather valuable experiences in this field. Special instruments and programmes have been developed for the different fields and phases of reintegration. The most important phases of reintegration programmes and the Focal Areas of GTZ experiences are described below.

### 3.2.1 Transition from Demobilisation to Reintegration Programmes

The transition from demobilisation to reintegration is a critical point. Directly after demobilisation the subsistence level of the demobilised persons must be secured by support in connection with **transport and emergency aid** (food, seed, hoes, clothing, cash). Otherwise there is a risk that soldiers not yet demobilised will elude demobilisation and that those already demobilised will take up their weapons again. The first year after a civil war in particular is considered to be a critical period for reintegration of ex-combatants. During this phase of DRP a need for action evolves in the following fields:

**Transport** of the demobilised persons from the Assembly Areas (AAs) or from the barracks should be a part of DRP, so that the ex-combatants can come to the regions in which they themselves **see the best conditions for their reintegration**.

**transport**

The **supply** of the combatants with the necessities for survival must be ensured. The ex-combatants are prepared for the first phase of reintegration by the provision of **settling-in packages**. These packages should enable ex-combatants to take care of their own survival and possibly that of their direct family dependants. The services and the material value of the settling-in packages should be in relation to the standard of living of the rest of the population. The objective is to place as low a burden as possible on the scarce resources of the society taking in the ex-combatants.

**settling-in packages**

A similar objective to that of the settling-in packages is to be achieved by the quick-impact programmes in the fields of **employment and food security**. By labour-intensive road building and rehabilitation measures ex-combatants can already find employment during the transitional phase. The handing out of seed, simple agricultural implements and (temporary) allocation of land can also strengthen the self-help potential in the agricultural sector.

**food security**

**employment**

**health care** In areas in which the population has increased due to absorption of ex-combatants, there are frequently bottlenecks in **health care**. Strengthening existing health care facilities and security systems is particularly important in this phase.

**information and referral systems** At the same time with the return from war regions the ex-combatants should have access to **information** about possible promotion measures within the scope of the reintegration programme.

**food and drinking water**

**transport and logistics**

**settling-in packages**

**planning**

**surveying and monitoring**

**tools and seeds**

### ➔ Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ

↳ In the phase of transition from the assembly areas and barracks to a civilian life the classical **emergency measures** are frequently necessary. By analogy with the supplies for the AAs, in this phase it is also important to supply food, drinking water and seeds. The range of services also includes support in **logistics** and **transport, settling-in packages** and **building up orientation systems**.

↳ The planning of these measures requires considerable know-how and management capacities. In Uganda GTZ participated in **financing** the settling-in packages and at the same time assumed the provision of consultancy services to the implementing organisation UVAB in connection with **planning**. For logistics detailed data are necessary regarding the whereabouts of ex-combatants. Wherever the infrastructure in the country is sufficient it is expedient to put certain services such as transport or supply of agricultural equipment out to public tender. GTZ can also offer support in the preparation of tender documents for the various services and at the same time for building up monitoring measures.

## 3.2.2 Orientation Phase

**up-rooted by war**

**high mobility**

**individual solutions**

The first months after demobilisation are characterised by a very high **mobility** for many ex-combatants, as well as for returning refugees. In order to take up contact with family members and to see who has survived the war, and above all to seek employment, ex-combatants wander and travel between town and country and between the regions. This is also an expression of being up-rooted by the war. This **orientation phase is enormously important for individual solutions**. However, the high degree of mobility makes it more difficult for many ex-combatants to join the long-term projects that require continuous presence. It is generally also unclear where ex-combatants will find a possibility of settlement.

**information and referral systems**

**prospects and chances**

In order to facilitate the overview of reintegration assistance and employment opportunities for ex-combatants, **nation-wide information systems** are necessary. The concept of the *Information and Referral Service (IRS)* in Mozambique is an example of this. Ex-combatants receive advice in IRS-offices in all provinces: They are informed about the range of offers of the many NGOs and government organisations. Such a system serves communication purposes but it is also important in order to give ex-combatants a realistic idea of their prospects and chances on the labour market.

Usually news about planned or actual projects spread very rapid amongst ex-combatants as their old networks are still intact after demobilisation. With few actual **facts** at hand they develop high and often wrong expectations. An IRS has the task to **inform interested persons** about the conditions and requirements of benefits and projects. In particular the award of credits and subsidies for micro-businesses is not possible at all without previous detailed advisory inputs. For national programmes to reach regional and remote areas an IRS is essential in order to reach those target group not living in the capital. IRS offices can serve as branch offices of the institutions offering support for ex-combatants and of NGOs. IRS can also inform on vacancies in training programmes and on plots available under resettlement programmes.

**requirements of projects**  
**advise and information**

**→ Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

⌐ Provision of advisory services to the executing organisations in connection with building up a nation-wide information and employment exchange system. Such an information system can create programme-specific coherence especially in cases where many donors are operating in the field.

**information systems**  
**linking different programmes**

### 3.2.3 Resettlement and Access to Land

The provision of shelter and sustainable resettlement solutions for ex-combatants is an immediate task of a national reintegration programme. The issue of resettlement encompasses two main perspectives: immediate resettlement and long term solutions including a land reform.

#### Resettlement

The immediate resettlement solution is usually the return to home village or community. The adequate supply of **shelter** and **accommodation** for ex-combatants is an urgent task at this stage. In Uganda demobilised soldiers were given **construction materials** for simple huts as a part of their settling-in packages. Combatants who have been stationed in barracks are most likely to have maintained close links to their home and many have a family.

**providing shelter**  
**building materials**

For those who have been fighting in remote areas or outside the country it is more difficult to resettle in an environment where they have not lived for years or decades. Shelter for those ex-combatants and refugees who return after a long period of war can only provide a short term solution. Without a **sense of belonging** people will not resettle permanently and take things into their own hands. Arable land, employment, and social acceptance are factors that influence the long term perspectives and decisions of the target group.

**no place to stay**  
**sense of belonging**

**voluntary decisions**  
**push and pull factors**  
**urban vs. rural**

Settlement solutions have to be available to the ex-combatants but the decision of when, where and under what circumstances is so complex that it can not be decided by a resettlement programme. After all it remains very much a decision of the individual governed by many social and economic **push and pull factors**. It is also a matter of the local communities and their elders whether to accept ex-combatants with their dependants or not. Many of the ex-combatants are drawn to the towns. They can no longer imagine earning their living by working in the field or they do not have sufficient land to maintain themselves. Being a soldier has been for many a high social status associated with city life as soldiers do not earn their living from the hard work in agriculture.

**reconstruction projects**  
**housing industry**

**Long-term integration** of the target group in **reconstruction projects** is recommended as being particularly expedient and sustainable. As a result of the reconstruction and government rehabilitation measures there is a relative boom in the construction area after civil wars. Expectations are high that the government would now deliver houses to those who fought for them. One of the priorities of a resettlement policy should, however, be that the target group is directly involved and that they do not receive houses as a gift but that they are supported in their efforts to build their own houses. The sense of belonging is closely linked to a sense of ownership.

**employment creation training**  
**new housing schemes**  
**using appropriate technology**

A sound and well co-ordinated resettlement policy can therefore have a very positive employment and training effect; the beneficiaries being by far not only ex-combatants but also returnees and local craftsmen. Training programmes and employment measures in the private sector can be initiated by making funds available for housing projects. By promoting appropriate technologies that are not capital-intensive such as clay brick presses, it is possible to lay a good basis for micro-businesses to develop in this sector. Low-cost housing in peri-urban and rural areas is an appropriate measure to make these areas more attractive for returnees and ex-combatants both in terms of employment as well as housing.

**building materials**  
**vocational training technology transfer**  
**new settlements**

➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

- ↳ Provision of shelter and building materials.
- ↳ Promotion of building construction programmes; transfer of appropriate technologies and vocational training in the construction sector; promotion of measures to rehabilitate buildings and social facilities.
- ↳ Back-up of resettlement programmes by improving infrastructure and building up social facilities in new settlements.

**root causes of conflicts**  
**land rights**  
**access to water and mineral resources**  
**steps to prevent new conflicts**

**The Land Issue**

The problems of resettlement of returned refugees and ex-combatants are linked in nearly all countries with the question of land reform (see section 3.1.2 Conditions). The **solution of the land issue** is therefore the most important political demand of the groups who have fought with their weapons for **land rights** or **access to natural resources**. Expulsion from their own country is a direct experience for many ex-combatants in Africa as well as in Latin America. Conflicts over land and access to water or mineral resources form the root causes of many conflicts. In many cases these conflicts have escalated to war and have led to the expulsion of ethnic minorities and the formation of ethnic guerrilla movements.

Independently of the political compromises with which these wars are settled, reintegration programmes must consider these demands if they want to address the conflict.

However, it cannot be the task of reintegration programmes to push land reform ahead. Land reform is an issue of a national policy with consequences for all parts of a society. There is a broad target group for land reforms and further groups which are directly affected. **Ex-combatants are only but a small number of those who could profit from allocation of land.** Reintegration measures focus on quick impacts and short term implementation. A resettlement of ex-combatants to the detriment of other groups would necessarily lead to new conflicts.

consider returnees  
and  
ethnic minorities

### Access to Land

Access to land is generally a main **concern** of ex-combatants as well as returning **refugees** and other **landless** groups. These demands for land can not be addressed within a DRP only. Reintegration programmes, however, should **link with existing programmes of agricultural training** and of **land redistribution** in order to facilitate the access to land. This might entail a number of different measures and policies.

high demand for land

It is rare that ex-combatants have access to land immediately after demobilisation. The use of land is generally linked to **acceptance** and a **social position in the community**. When ex-combatants are reintegrated to their families and clans they are usually welcomed as additional **labour** on the fields and their are often given a small piece of land. This might be a solution in the short term but support from the family is not a long term solution. Reintegration programmes should survey the situation of ex-combatants **over time** to identify their specific needs. Existing **legislation of land** should be reviewed and opportunities for ex-combatants to obtain access to agricultural land should be explored.

traditional law

helping -hands

review legislation

The skills of ex-combatants in the agricultural are an other aspect to consider. Commercial farming requires experience and often specialised knowledge. **Agricultural training** should be a priority for those ex-combatants which are given land or land rights as part of DRP. This training programme might be linked to subsidies or **credits for smallholders**. In communal areas social integration acceptance are of major importance for ex-combatants who want to obtain land rights from **traditional authorities**. Many cleansing rituals which mark the *re*-integration are therefore linked to planting and harvesting.

agricultural training

credits and subsidies

traditional land  
distribution

#### → Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal areas of GTZ

- ⌋ Provision of support to ministries in evaluating possibilities of land allocation
- ⌋ Policy consultancy for land distribution policy
- ⌋ Agricultural training for ex-combatants
- ⌋ Subsidies for smallholders

land use studies

training

credits schemes

### Settlement Schemes

<p><b>co-operatives</b></p> <p><b>higher production</b></p>	<p>Many governments settle combatants and their families on <b>newly allocated land within the scope of government programmes</b>. Free land, cheap credits and improved infrastructure are some of the pull factors that shall attract especially the young and able-bodied ex-combatants to become productive farmers. Often organised in the form of <b>co-operatives</b> these settlement schemes are meant to be compensation to those who fought and at the same time increase the agricultural production. Government who feel unable to promote a land reform on a national scale are often eager to at least try a small solution with a small group.</p>
<p><b>controversial policies</b></p> <p><b>low out-put</b></p> <p><b>dependent on the state</b></p>	<p>From a development-policy point of view the settlement of ex-combatants in large agricultural agglomerations or on government farms is controversial. Experience gained in southern and eastern Africa has shown that such centres remain <b>permanently reliant</b> on governments aid if the infrastructure, management and individual initiative are insufficient. Transport for agricultural goods, access to local and national markets and adequate supplies of health care and social services are essential conditions for the <b>acceptance</b> and sustainability of such settlement programmes. Two factors make settlement schemes for ex-combatants a risky and often expensive experiment:</p>
<p><b>selection and qualification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌋ The settlers and farmers are selected from a group that has hardly any experience with farming or with <b>commercial agricultural production</b>. Settlers are often selected on the grounds of political or military merits rather than on the grounds of skills.</li> </ul>
<p><b>market orientation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌋ Many settlement schemes have <b>no sufficient links to local markets</b>. They remain a special field of the national rural development policy as they rely on direct subsidies from the state of foreign donors. The management is often a reflection of <b>military command structures</b> with little agricultural or managerial know-how. Many ex-combatants see these schemes as a source of income rather than a place to stay.</li> </ul>
<p><b>security issues</b></p>	<p>These schemes have to be open to other people also to avoid the impression that they are actually outposts of the army.</p>

#### ➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal areas of GTZ**

<p><b>extension services</b></p> <p><b>credit</b></p> <p><b>support of local NGOs</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌋ agricultural extension services</li> <li>⌋ credit schemes</li> <li>⌋ consultancy on land use and sustainable agriculture</li> <li>⌋ support for NGOs and community organisers</li> </ul>
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### 3.2.4 Access to Training and Employment

<p><b>improve chances on the labour market</b></p> <p><b>small business</b></p>	<p>Improving the access to work and employment forms a central element of reintegration programmes. The <b>acquisition of skills</b> should improve the chances of ex-combatants on the employment market. Business training and small credits should support those who want to set up their own businesses. However, the context situations differ in each country (see section 3.1.2 Conditions). Ex-combatants generally only have <b>low-level or no formal vocational qualifications</b>. Crash courses in skills training are offered within the scope of</p>
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DRPs in order to improve the opportunities of ex-combatants on the labour market. Training programmes for ex-combatants are therefore frequently connected directly with employment promotion measures.

### Training

Training measures for ex-combatants range from **on the job training** to **vocational training**. Many countries lack the capacities to offer training to a large number of ex-combatants at the same time. Vocational training for adults who have hardly any relevant working experience and who have only little or no formal education is **difficult** and extremely **costly**. Furthermore the employment market in post-conflict societies has generally **limited capacities** to absorb large numbers of ex-combatants and returning refugees. Therefore, special courses for ex-combatants have been set up in many countries as part of DRPs.

different forms of training

<p>Designing <b>special course modules</b> for ex-combatants has several advantages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↳ Courses focus on the <b>level</b> and <b>background</b> of the target groups.</li> <li>↳ Training courses develop <b>existing skills</b> and qualifications of the ex-combatants.</li> <li>↳ Training courses should be market orientated in order to enable ex-combatants to <b>find employment</b> or to <b>start their own small business</b>.</li> <li>↳ In short-term programmes for skills training ex-combatants familiarise themselves with the <b>demands of work outside the army</b>.</li> <li>↳ Courses can be <b>organised as part of DRPs</b>. This should also involve private training institutions. Capacities of the vocational training system are not necessarily affected.</li> <li>↳ <b>Short courses</b> outside the formal qualification system can be organised at <b>regional</b> level.</li> <li>↳ Training courses linked to <b>grants</b> or <b>small credits</b> can help to bridge the gap to self-employment.</li> <li>↳ Training courses are important for <b>future employment chances</b> as most ex-combatants have no employment record outside the army.</li> </ul>	
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appropriate level

use potentials

work experience

additional capacities

decentralised training

links to grants

employment record

Courses for ex-combatants should address the requirements of the **informal sector**. Most ex-combatants have no chance to find employment in the small formal sector (see section 3.1.2 Conditions). There is, however, a danger that ex-combatants are marginalised. Skills alone are not sufficient to start a small business. In addition to skills a basic knowledge of the **market structures** and of **accounting** is needed. This is even more the case as ex-combatants have generally lived outside a 'money economy' for years. Training courses are needed to qualify ex-combatants for grants and credit programmes.

informal sector

skills

market orientation

To ensure that **training** is in fact **in line with market requirements** it is vital to **estimate needs** in advance - for both the formal and the informal sector. If ex-combatants are trained in skills for which there is no demand, long term unemployment and growing **frustration** are the results. Before the start of any training programme a detailed needs

market oriented needs assessment

assessment should be undertaken. If training courses react to the demands of public and private employers ex-combatants have a better chance to find employment.

**create 'parking positions'**

It often remains uncertain whether ex-combatants find work after completion of a training course. However, experiences from reintegration programmes in Ethiopia and Mozambique, however, show that training courses as such can have a positive effect. They create **'parking positions'** for ex-combatants. Training courses can be seen as just one form of support and employment for ex-combatants at times when they need money, a civilian job, and a perspective for the future. These measures buy time for a **consolidation of peace** and for the reconstruction of war torn countries.

**social effects of training**

Training is not only a matter of professional qualification. The **social effects of training** courses are often **underestimated** and they are hard measure. For many ex-combatants the training courses offered as part of a reintegration programme are their **first chance** to receive some sort of professional training. The experience to learn and to apply this new skill can be a **positive effect** in itself. The completion of the training course adds to the **social status**. By the time the training courses have finished the individual ex-combatant might have established more contacts and have a clearer perspective of what he or she can do for a living.

surveys

screening

curricula

training centre

co-ordination

administration

➔ **Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

- ↳ Surveying the demand for training
- ↳ conduction of labour market surveys
- ↳ Develop selection process
- ↳ Developing training modules for crash courses
- ↳ Rehabilitation of existing training institutions and skill development centres
- ↳ Identification of private businesses which are suitable for on the job training
- ↳ Administration of training systems

### Promotion of Employment

Employment creation and the promotion of employment is a vital component of GTZ reintegration projects. Employment creation takes place on two levels:

- ↳ Financial promotion of **new jobs created for ex-combatants**
- ↳ Financial promotion of **businesses set up by ex-combatants**.

**broad range of institutions**

Employment promotion programmes for ex-combatants can be administered through different organisations. These can be **NGOs, commercial banks, private businesses** or extension offices of **government institutions**. In many countries there are no banks to administer small credits to ex-combatants. In these cases structures for employment programmes have to be set up. Employment promotion measures should not only focus on urban areas but must also be implemented in **the regions and in rural areas** where many of the ex-combatants live with their families.



**Wage payments** or wage **subsidies to employers** who employ ex-combatants are a measure frequently used to open the employment market for the target group. This is particularly expedient after training courses. For many of the younger ex-combatants this is the first step into the employment market and the first reference for future employers. This employment relationship can lead to the creation of further jobs. Financial promotion for companies **offering on the job training**: This measure can provide realistic training and good chance for further employment.

**subsidies for employers**

**on the job training**

**Grants and credits for ex-combatants**: Most DRPs offer special grants to ex-combatants who are starting their own business. Grants and credits from special funds are usually the only source of funding for ex-combatants' businesses as ex-combatants have no entitlements for commercial credits. Many DRPs experienced **difficulties with credit schemes**. A large number of small businesses were unable to service their debts. **Grants** in connection with **accountancy training** and **management advise** have been more successful instruments.

**creating access to credits**

**grants for new micro-businesses**

**financing training**

Before starting small businesses a **detailed market analysis** should be undertaken. Advise on market strategies should be linked to the grants.

**conduct market analysis**

**→ Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ**

- ↳ Market research
- ↳ Funding for new micro and small-scale businesses set up by means of an open reintegration fund. Examples: Mozambique, Ethiopia
- ↳ Funding on-the-job training
- ↳ Close co-operation with private businesses
- ↳ Accountancy training and management advise

**market analysis**

**administration of funds**

**training**

### 3.2.5 Promoting Social Reintegration

Social reintegration means above all that there is a **broad acceptance of ex-combatants** in the population. In post-conflictive societies the **political and legal equality of all ex-combatants** is a basic precondition for their social reintegration. At the same time it must not be forgotten that every war leaves a wake of **severe traumas** and **embitterment** which can only be tackled very slowly. When designing support for the social reintegration of ex-combatants it cannot simply be assumed that the psychological consequences of the war will disappear among civilians and ex-combatants. On the contrary, social reconciliation processes which are also perceptible for each individual at the micro level must be supported.

**creating acceptance**

**at micro level**

#### Reconciliation

Suppressing and forgetting the horrors of war can turn out to be counter-productive in the long term. The individual and **collective assimilation of the war** is one of the preconditions for social reintegration. The forms of reconciliation and coping with collective

**coping with collective traumas**

traumas differ widely between cultures and on a gender-specific basis too. References to the run-up period to the war are generally involved.

**create awareness** **Public education and awareness about the war** and its consequences play an essential role in the reconciliation process. The promotion of such education in schools, the media and in communities can also be considered as a kind of crisis prevention.

### Creating Social Capital

**regaining social status** In addition to the social process of understanding and reconciliation it is necessary to create 'social capital' at the individual level. This process can assume widely varying forms for the groups distinguished above (see section 3.1.5 Target Groups and Beneficiaries). In traditional societies especially the **expectations** made of the individual differ according to **age and gender**. It is therefore important for the ex-combatants to be socially recognised by the community and at the same time to have the possibility of making a contribution to the community themselves. For many male ex-combatants the **ritual re-admittance into the community** is connected with **cleansing rituals** by the elders. If this formal acceptance is refused these men remain permanently excluded, as e.g. in the north of Uganda. However, once the ritual re-admittance has been carried out the ex-combatants are still faced with the task of feeding themselves and their families and **assuming a 'respected' social role**. Promotion of employment and training is therefore to be considered a direct contribution to the social reintegration of the ex-combatants.

### Social Reintegration of Female Ex-Combatants

**coping with traditional expectations** The return to traditional roles is more difficult for **female ex-combatants**. Especially for women who have fought in liberation movements, who have completed training courses and also shouldered responsibility in a guerrilla army, the return to civilian life is frequently bound-up with **limitations**. **Social expectations** restrict them to traditional concepts which have nothing more to do with the reality of their lives. These contradictions lead to prejudice, slander and **discrediting** even from their own families. For instance, women who have fought together with men in war are often considered to be prostitutes. Individual conflicts arise within the **family** and at **work**. Reintegration programmes can give consideration to this target group by offering specific training and employment programmes for women extending beyond the traditional roles.

### Social Reintegration of Youth and Child Soldiers

**war trauma** For **children and young persons** who have grown up in the war situation or who participated directly in the brutalities of war as so-called child soldiers it is particularly important to treat these **trauma** by therapy. In these cases it is often hardly possible to speak of *Reintegration*. In many countries torn by civil war the war situation has become the normal condition for more than a generation. Not only those still under-age today, but also the generation of 20 - 25-year-olds have **grown up with the war**. The end of the war brings relief, but it also means new uncertainties. Access to **education**, the **security of maintenance supplies** and the **protection of the family and clans** represent inestimable social capital for these children. Many learn **peaceful forms of tackling everyday routine and conflicts** for the first time. Support for psycho-social care and social reintegration is therefore to be seen as a long-term investment in the stability of society.

### Promoting Psycho-Social Care

Psycho-social care for ex-combatants appears to be a particularly urgent problem especially after civil wars lasting for decades, such as took place in Angola and Mozambique. Among many ex-combatants traumatising finds its expression in the form of recurrent **states of fear and delusions, depressions and alcoholism**, as well as **psychosomatic illnesses**. The consequences are occupational disablement and social ostracism - and a vicious circle soon evolves.

lasting traumata and mental illnesses

This results in a need for therapy, not necessarily only in the textbook sense. Many different forms of **'Counselling'** are required here. Listening, understanding and advising, the social assimilation of the trauma and the ritual cleansing from a stigma - these are inputs which cannot be provided by service facilities of the health care system. These processes take place in the family, in religious communities, within age groups and initiation groups. **Collective and individual assimilation of the war** are mutually necessary and productive. The **division between public and private roles** is different in each culture. These boundaries must be respected in psycho-social care measures. However, public discussion of this theme can create a greater capacity in the private sector to articulate war experiences and traumas. The above institutions and groups can then tackle this theme more openly and permit assimilation of the trauma. Only then is the support for institutions in the field of psycho-social care expedient.

counselling in the community

cultural differences

permit assimilation

The question of **which institutions can provide psycho-social care** is answered differently from country to country. Building up a separate psycho-social care system for ex-combatants cannot be financed and nor is it expedient, since this could isolate the target group. Instead measures in this field should **address multipliers who assume counselling functions**. Teachers, pastors, local dignitaries and traditional healers are allotted an important role in this process. Enhancing their **awareness for traumas** and **'internal injuries'** of ex-combatants and returning refugees is a major task of reintegration programmes. The transfer of coping strategies to and by these multipliers is a further objective in this field.

don't isolate the target group

training for counselling

#### → Tasks of Development Co-operation and Focal Areas of GTZ

- ⌋ Strengthening the capacities of those communities who take in ex-combatants
- ⌋ Support for reconciliation processes by promoting independent media and NGOs
- ⌋ Promotion of training and employment measures for women
- ⌋ Promotion of organisations which offer counselling at a local level
- ⌋ Information and training for multipliers in the communities
- ⌋ Support of therapy programmes for traumatised children.

focus on communities

support reconciliation

counselling at local level

programmes for children

### 3.3 Possible Measures and Focal Areas of GTZ

Requirements	Measures
<b>Planning of Reintegration Programmes</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forming an organisation for the reintegration of ex-combatants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Consultancy on the planning of reintegration programmes</li> <li>→ Capacity building for implementing institutions</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning reintegration programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Estimation of demand</li> <li>→ Organisation of workshops and exchanges of experience with partners from other countries</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation of Reintegration Programmes</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Securing subsistence of ex-combatants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Provision of settling-in packages</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training of ex-combatants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Conducting precise market studies in advance to ensure that training is in fact in line with market requirements</li> <li>→ Setting-up training programmes for ex-combatants</li> <li>→ Designing of course modules for skills training</li> <li>→ Monitoring &amp; Evaluation of ongoing training measures</li> <li>→ Assistance programmes following training</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Funding and administration of 'open funds'</li> <li>→ Grants for small and medium businesses which employ ex-combatants</li> <li>→ Setting-up of small credit schemes for ex-combatants</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration of ex-combatants in rural areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Agricultural training for ex-combatants</li> <li>→ Training personnel for extension services</li> <li>→ Supporting local NGOs and co-operatives</li> </ul>

### 3.4 Conclusions

Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants provides a **challenge** to governments, peace-keepers, development agencies and NGOs alike. One of the challenges is to **develop tools** which are oriented at the special needs of the target group. This paper has shown that a whole variety of **specific instruments** and targeted approaches exist for this relatively new field of DRPs.

GTZ has gained considerable experiences in a number of different countries. The **close co-operation** with our **partners** and with other development agencies resulted in a number of successful projects. New ideas, initiatives, and instruments have been developed which are presented in this paper.

The special nature of DRPs should not lead to an isolation from other emergency aid programmes. DRPs are closely linked to **repatriation and reintegration programmes** for refugees and internally displaced persons. These programmes also contribute to rehabilitation efforts and to capacity building in post-war societies. A **co-ordination** with other programmes might also initial that programmes open up to wider target groups as reintegration proves successful.

There are new challenges ahead as prolonged civil wars confront peace-keepers and development organisations with **increasingly complex situations**. In those countries where all state structures have collapsed, new tasks for emergency aid arise in connection with demobilisation programmes.

The instruments and planning guidelines present a **catalogue of possible measures**. Conditions for implementation differ greatly. Programmes for demobilised combatants are part of **development oriented emergency aid** and at the same time they are an important link in the continuum from disasters to development. Planning in this transition requires a high degree of **flexibility** and **sensitivity** for political change. Most of the programmes start under enormous **time pressure** and under difficult **security conditions**. However, in many countries only an early intervention can keep the fragile peace process alive. Successful demobilisation and reintegration programmes create the basis for long term development programmes and sustainable reconstruction measures.

## **4 ANNEX**

## 4.1 Glossary

### Armed Groups

Armed groups are defined here as organised or paramilitary units who are not a part of the regular state army or the police. This term is used to describe both relatively large armed gangs as well as paramilitary sections of opposition groups. A distinction between armed groups, rebels and → *Guerrilla* is politically motivated and consequently cannot always be made clearly.

### Assembly Areas

Assembly Areas (AAs), Quarters Areas or Assembly Points are the names given to zones and camps which are designated especially for massing and → *Demobilisation* of an armed group or army. By the → *Encampment* in these zones, which in many cases are stipulated by a joint commission of all warring factions and are monitored by the United Nations, → *Combatants* are to be disarmed, registered and maintained up to the time they are discharged (see section 2.2.2 Encampment).

### Cease-fire

A cease-fire simply means the cessation of hostilities for a limited period or an unlimited period between several warring factions. Only a peace agreement represents the formal end of a → *War*. Without political agreement a cease-fire alone does not represent a basis for demobilisation projects (see section 2.1.4 Security-Policy Prerequisites).

### Combatants

Combatants is the term used to describe men and women who are organised and active as → *Soldiers*, → *Guerrilla Fighters* and members of → *Armed Groups*.

### Demilitarisation

Demilitarisation describes the process of breaking down military structures in a defined area. This can mean both the physical withdrawal of an army from a region as well as reduced importance of the military sector in public life and administration. However demilitarisation does not necessarily mean cuts in the numbers of armed forces. See also → *Self-Demobilisation*.

### Demobilisation

Demobilisation is defined here as the formal and controlled discharge of active → *Soldiers* from the army or of combatants from an → *Armed Group* (see section 2.1 Definition). See also → *Self-Demobilisation*.

### Disarming

Disarming is defined here as the controlled collection of light and heavy weapons. The separation of weapons from their users can take place at many levels. Both whole armies and individual → *Combatants* and civilians are

disarmed. Disarming does not automatically mean destruction of weapons or reduction of the weapon stocks (see section 2.2.4 Disarmament).

### **Encampment**

describes the massing of → *Combatants* in camps for the purpose of supervision or → *Demobilisation*. The Encampment or Quartersing comprises the registration, → *Disarming*, maintenance and medical care for the combatants (see section 2.2.2 Encampment). The objective is their discharge or their → *Remobilisation* in a newly established army.

### **Ex-Combatants**

Ex-combatants are defined as demobilised men and women who were active as → *Soldiers*, → *Guerrilla Fighters* and members of → *Armed Groups*.

### **Guerrilla**

Non-regular armed unit with a social-revolutionary programme. The term originates from the context of the Latin-American anti-regime wars and relates to a type of warfare which draws on the rural population as a resource and seeks to weaken the regular army by selective attacks. In Africa this term was used for anti-colonial liberation movements which enjoyed the political recognition of the OAU.

### **Guerrilla Fighters**

Guerrilla fighters is the term used to describe men and women who are active members of a guerrilla army. In some cases each member of a liberation movement is also considered to be a member of the guerrilla army. There is generally no central registration of all the members of a guerrilla army.

### **Peace**

There are many definitions of peace. Within the scope of this paper peace is understood as a condition in which there are no hostilities and no declared → *Wars* in a country. This condition does not exclude a more or less high degree of force by government organs or → *Armed Groups*. The escalation of force to a civil war is a fluid transition. The differentiation of → *War* by → *Cease-fire* and peace agreement is generally clearer.

### **Reinsertion**

The return of demobilised combatants to their home region. Transport and reintegration assistance. Although reinsertion is frequently still a part of demobilisation programmes, it is understood here as the first part of → *Reintegration* (see sections 2.2.6 Discharge and 3.2.1 Transition from Demobilisation to Reintegration Programmes).



## Reintegration

Reintegration is defined here as the process in which → *Ex-Combatants* regain access to civilian forms of work and social status. Reintegration is a process with an open time frame which takes place at different social and subjective levels. In the case of many → *Ex-Combatants* it is only possible to speak of reintegration to a limited extent since they have never known a society without → *War* (see sections 3.1 Definition and 3.1.1 Objectives).

## Remobilisation

This is understood to mean renewed mobilisation of already demobilised → *Combatants*. This happens when a new army is established which recruits its members chiefly from *Ex-Combatants* or if a → *War* breaks out again after unsuccessful → *Demobilisation* and the warring factions form up again.

## Self-Demobilisation

One speaks of self-demobilisation when an army or armed group disbands itself without any orderly organisation and the → *Combatants*, without any commanders, try to return to their home regions as civilians. Self-demobilisation differs from desertion in that it takes place in situations in which there are no longer any formal constraints for the combatants to belong to an army or armed group.

## Soldiers

Soldiers are defined here as men and women who are voluntarily or involuntarily members of a regular government army and are active in it.

## Veterans

Veterans are former → *Soldiers* or → *Guerrilla Fighters*. This term is used to mean the same as → *Ex-Combatants* or ex-soldiers.

## War

The term war is used to define both inter-state and domestic armed conflicts. In the case of domestic conflicts especially it is difficult to draw definitive boundaries in the continuum from local escalation of violence to a nation-wide civil war. The decisive criterion here is that wars are armed conflicts which in the affected areas lead to a wide-ranging collapse of civilian life, tie up considerable resources for conduct of the war and lead to human, material and ecological damage.

## 4.2 GTZ Project Profiles

↳ **Eritrea**

↳ **Ethiopia**

↳ **Mozambique**

↳ **Somalia**

↳ **Uganda**

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Eritrea</b>
<b>Demobilised Combatants:</b>	48.000
<b>GTZ Project:</b>	Programme for Reintegration and Reconstruction - MITIAS
<b>German Contribution:</b>	DM 4.9 million
<b>Duration:</b>	9/1994 - 9/1996 (1st phase)

## PROFILE

### Military Background:

After 30 years of war, Eritrea reached its independence from Ethiopia. The fighters of the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) were politically highly motivated. The aim of the DRP is not to demobilise an official army but to integrate liberation fighters who have achieved their political goals.

### Demobilisation:

- During the first two years after independence all combatants worked voluntarily for the reconstruction of Eritrea for pocket money only.
- Due to economic constraints the government decided in 1993 to reduce the number of combatants serving in the new national army.
- The demobilisation process has been completed in 1995.

### Economic and Social Background:

- The long war lead to the complete breakdown of the economy and the infrastructure.
- Eritrea is one of the poorest countries in the world. The real GDP contracted by 7% between 1985 and 1990. The country suffers from regular droughts:

### Executing Agency:

MITIAS has been founded as a department of the Eritrean Relief & Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA) and is responsible for the development and implementation of reintegration programmes for ex-combatants. It also co-ordinates the activities of implementing agencies. Mitias is now a unit of the newly founded Commission ERREC.

## RESPONSE OF GTZ

### Programme Objectives:

MITIAS is in the position to develop and effectively and efficiently steer reintegration and development programmes which lead to employment and development of EPLF female and male combatants into the Eritrean society.

**Target Groups:** Ex-combatants

### Main Activities:

- Support of organisational development, training, and professionalization of the Mitias.
- Long and short term experts for organisational development and subject matter specialists.
- Office equipment for MITIAS.
- Equipment for settlements and pilot projects.
- Partly financing of training and upgrading of staff members of MITIAS.
- Financing of reintegration programmes through an open fund/ credit systems for ex-combatants.

### Lessons Learned

- Demobilisation is an essential part of the social rebuilding of the war-torn Eritrean society. The overall aim is to transform a heterogeneous society (refugees, ex-combatants and those who lived under Ethiopian occupation) into a unified society. For this process the expression „integration“ fits probably better than „re-integration“.
- The percentage of women in the former liberation army was very high compared to all other armies on the continent. Integrating these women into traditional and still patriarchal community structures causes problems.
- Special support given to ex-combatants is generally accepted by the population.

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Ethiopia</b>
<b>Demobilised Combatants:</b>	over 600,000
<b>GTZ Project:</b>	Integration of Ex-Combatants and Displaced Persons
<b>German Contribution:</b>	DM 6.0 million + DM 2.0 million for Displaced Persons
<b>Duration</b>	2/1992 - 12/1994 (extended until 1996)

## PROFILE

### Military Background:

Following several wars of different type (anti-regime-wars), between different parties and of different durations (up to 30 years), the government army has been defeated in 1991.

### Demobilisation:

After the take-over of power of opposition troops, the former Ethiopian army was disbanded, a large part of the defeated combatants ran away because of fear of pursuit. The following organised demobilisation was based on an enactment of the interim-government. The country has experienced one of the largest demobilisations in Africa.

### Economic and Social Background:

Ethiopia still suffers from the destruction of war. The infrastructure and the economy are still weak. Political instability still prevails in certain areas of the country which had been fighting for autonomy. Parallel to the demobilisation large numbers of Ethiopian refugees are returning home from neighbouring countries.

### Executing Agency:

GTZ co-operates with the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (CREDWV). The commission is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The mandate includes demobilisation and reintegration as well as re-mobilisation for the new army.

## RESPONSE OF GTZ

### Programme Objectives:

The main aim of the project is the reintegration of the ex-combatants, of refugees and of displaced persons into the civil structures of their former home communities. The local economic structures are to be strengthened.

### Target Groups:

Ex-combatants, refugees and displaced persons.

### Main Activities:

The main instrument is an open fund which can be used flexibly for the implementation of several projects to be implemented by qualified agencies. Further activities are:

- The financing of income-generating projects and employment creation measures.
- Extension services
- Financial and material assistance for the implementation of productive micro-projects (food-for-work programmes, training, etc.).
- Co-ordination of all micro-projects
- Vocational and specialised training
- Grants

### Lessons Learned

- Due to time constraints the planning and the start of the project were unusual. After the war, support programmes for the target groups had to be implemented without any delays. The GTZ project is administratively autonomous. In the first phase of the project refugees and women were not sufficiently considered as target groups.
- The main target group are the demobilised combatants. The incorporation of other vulnerable groups succeeded only in a few projects. The project's priority is the promotion of small-scale enterprises.

- p GTZ has administered many projects autonomously but in line with the Commissions policy. The Commission will dissolve itself in 1996.

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Mozambique</b>
<b>Demobilised Combatants:</b>	90,000
<b>GTZ Project:</b>	Open Reintegration Programme
<b>German Contribution:</b>	DM 4.5 million for 2 years
<b>Duration:</b>	9/1994 - 6/1996

## PROFILE

### Military background:

Mozambique is characterised by more than 15 years of war of independence and 15 years of civil war. The two fighting parties (resistance movements vs. government troops) symbolise a political-ideological conflict. They have been fighting for the control of government and power.

### Demobilisation:

- A military deadlock situation was the starting point for the peace negotiations and the following peace treaty, in which the sequence of the demobilisation process has been formulated.
- A new smaller army was to be built which incorporates members of both armies.
- Therefore about 100,000 combatants have been demobilised within one year.
- The whole process took place under the authority of the UN.
- There is only little motivation to join the new army.

### Economic and Social Situation:

- Free and fair elections have taken place.
- As a consequence of the long war, economy and infrastructure are very poor.
- There are large numbers of returning refugees.

### Executing Agency:

There was no Mozambican implementation agency and the government has no particular reintegration policy yet. In co-operation with the UN and international donors, a commission dealing with demobilisation and reintegration has been created but has been dissolved in 1994.

## RESPONSE OF GTZ

### Programme Objectives:

The programme objectives are the creation of a secure livelihood and therefore, the integration of demobilised ex-combatants and other marginalised groups -like refugees- into the social and economic local community of specific provinces.

### Target Groups:

Besides the 100,000 demobilised ex-combatants the target group encloses their dependants, the intaking communities as well as returning refugees.

### Main Activities:

The GTZ-Project is part of 4 programmes created by the international donor community. The main instrument is an Open Fund, which provides local topping-up payments and grants for a multitude of income generating and job creating activities, implemented by small-scale enterprises, NGOs and others. The German input consists of:

- Secondment of experts
- Provision of materials and equipment
- Assumption of the operating and administration costs
- Financing and administration of the open fund
- Extension services
- Upgrading measures

### ▫ Lessons Learned

- As the demobilisation process has been administered by the UN the Mozambican authorities only resumed responsibility three years after the start of the programme. GTZ is an executing agency in four provinces.

- p The sole target group are ex-combatants. The incorporation of other vulnerable groups succeeded in only a few projects. The project priority is the promotion of small-scale enterprises. The long term sustainability of these measures has to be evaluated.

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Somalia (Somaliland)</b>
<b>Demobilised Combatants:</b>	50,000
<b>GTZ Project:</b>	Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Clan-Militia in North-West-Somalia
<b>German Contribution:</b>	DM 5.4 million; Total budget: DM 15.0 million
<b>Duration</b>	8/1994 - 7/1996 (1st phase)

### PROFILE

#### Military Background:

- ⌋ After the collapse of the political system a civil war started between different clans in 1988. The principal aim was the control of power and resources.
- ⌋ In 1991 the North-Western part of Somalia separated and declared itself independent under the name of Somaliland.
- ⌋ The UN-Intervention in Somalia (started in 1992) did not lead to a stable and peaceful situation.
- ⌋ The political and military situation in Somaliland is supposedly more stable than in Somalia, but there are frequent outbreaks of renewed fighting.

#### Demobilisation:

- ⌋ An informal agreement of the clan elders, the result of a conference from May 1993, provided the political framework for the demobilisation process which started in Somaliland in 1993.
- ⌋ The combatants are not an organised military formation. There are professional soldiers, experienced fighters as well as youth and child soldiers.
- ⌋ Disarmament remains incomplete as small fire arms are not generally accepted on the basis of socio-cultural traditions.
- ⌋ Demobilisation is conducted without involving ex-combatants into reintegration programmes.

#### Economic and social situation:

- ⌋ The political and economic structures in Somalia have broken down. Somaliland is economically disadvantaged - in terms of agriculture and resources. The only source of state revenue is the port.
- ⌋ Somaliland is not recognised as a sovereign state by the international community.
- ⌋ There are hardly any structures which could be used for the implementation of projects.
- ⌋ Huge parts of Somaliland can not be used for settlements and agriculture because of mines.

#### Implementing agency

The National Demobilization Commission (NDC) with five subordinated regional commissions was constituted by the government. This commission has an unclear legal form and is in an uncertain financial situation. 11 of 13 staff members are ex-combatants.

### RESPONSE OF GTZ

#### Programme Objectives:

The main objective of the GTZ Project is to create employment opportunities for ex-combatants. Social and economic reintegration measures should target about 10,000 ex-combatants and their families as well as war widows and their dependants.

#### Main Activities:

- ⌋ The main instruments are advisory services and organisational planning and management consultancy. The GTZ project employs two long-term-experts.
- ⌋ Another local expert deals with management and co-ordination of gender issues. Furtheron there are:
  - ⌋ Planing and management training.
  - ⌋ Provision of materials and equipment.
  - ⌋ Grants and topping-up payments.
  - ⌋ Institution building; Capacity building training programmes.

#### Lessons Learned



- ⌋ The project's efforts to create civilian perspectives for ex-combatants are severely undermined by frequent outbreaks of fighting between clan militia.
- ⌋ The realisation of financing contracts takes a long time (about 6 month).

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
<b>Demobilised Combatants:</b>	50,000
<b>GTZ Project:</b>	Support of the Veterans Assistance Programme
<b>German Contribution:</b>	DM 4.8 million (technical), DM 5.0 million (financial)
<b>Time of Operation:</b>	12/1992 - 12/1997

## PROFILE

### Military Background:

After several years of civil war Uganda has experienced peace and relative stability since 1986. During and after these wars several armed groups have been incorporated into the National Resistance Army (NRA).

### Demobilisation:

- Demobilisation started seven years after the take-over of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Budgetary considerations and pressure from the donor community led to the governmental decision to reduce the number of army staff.
- The NRA was reduced from 80,000 combatants to 30,000.
- The demobilisation included settling-in kits and a reintegration plan.

### Economic and Social Background:

- The political situation is stable and the economy is, after years of civil war, characterised by growth and increasing confidence of foreign investors.
- Elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held in 1994. Residential elections were held in 1996.
- After the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes some 155,000 posts in the public service have been cut.
- Armed groups are still active in the northern regions of Uganda.

### Executing Agency:

The demobilisation programme is implemented by the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB). UVAB has been set up as a non-military parastatal for six years. The programme is funded mainly by the international donor community.

## RESPONSE OF GTZ

### Programme Objectives:

The programme's main objective is to promote the sustainable economic and social integration of ex-combatants into society. In the second phase the project emphasises the support of families and local communities.

### Target Groups:

Ex-combatants and their families (total: around 150,000 persons)

### Main Activities:

- The main activities are extension services, organisational and financial assistance for planning and managing the demobilisation and reintegration measures. GTZ activities concentrate on consultancies for UVAB and the setting-up of M&E measures.
- The priority in the second phase of the project is the administration of a fund and the promotion of income-generating activities within the reintegration programme.

### Lessons Learned:

- The initial project plan neglected the concerns of women. Spouses and dependants were only incorporated into the target group in a second phase.
- UVAB is characterised as efficient and the demobilisation has been completed successfully.
- The entire process has been well documented by UVAB.