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(DRC)

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“Overview: DDR processes in Africa”²

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List of Acronyms and Definitions

AMF	Afghan Military Forces
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan later transformed to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
AU	African Union
Core Force	New integrated Army
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement also known as the <i>Naivasha Agreement</i> on – Sudan
CAR	Central African Republic
COFS	Combatants on Foreign Soil
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	West African Economic Community Military Group
EU	European Union
FAA	Angola Armed Forces
FARDC	Armed Forces of DR Congo
FANCI	Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire
Former Combatants	Individuals from former armed factions available for DDR
FN	Forces Nouvelles (New Forces – Cote d’Ivoire)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICU	Union of Islamic Courts
LRA	Lord’s Resistance Army – Northern Uganda
NCDDR	National Commission on DDR
MAF	
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization & Reintegration Programme
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilizing Mission in Haiti
MONUC	UN Mission in the DR Congo
RECS	Regional Economic and Security Communities
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
ROC	Republic of Congo
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA/M	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	Federal Transitional Government - Somalia
TJ	Transitional Justice
OAS	Organisation of American States
OSAA	Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOGBIS	UN Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNITA	Movement for the Total Independence of Angola
“War on Terror”	Post 9/11 influencing United States Global Security Policy
WB	World Bank

Definitions³

- **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)**
Aims at comprehensive reversal of war conditions to peace amongst belligerents and bring about peaceful conditions, enhance human security, stability and development through the transforming the role and posture of armed combatants.
- **Disarmament** refers to the collection of arms in or outside the conflict zone. Initially, this entails the gathering/assembly of combatants following cessation of conflict after which disarmament, weapons storage and accounting under national auspices then occurs. To this end, the identification and (assisted) disabling of mines and booby-traps may also occur (demining).¹
- **Demobilization** follows closely after the identification of a **core force** (formed by integrated forces) and the decision to demobilize the rest. This involves disbanding military structures and leads to the transformation of former combatants to civilian life.
- **Reintegration** the reinsertion into civilian life of former combatants, together with their families, in order that they resume economic, social and political life. This generally entails the provision of packages including cash, in-kind compensation, training on the job and encouragement to embark upon self-help, income-generating projects.

³ Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*, February 2005, citing United Nations Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 2000, p. 2.

1. Introduction

A fundamental precondition for peace, stability and human development in emerging post-conflict societies in Africa are comprehensive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes.⁴ For example, of those emerging states that have relapsed into armed conflict since the end of the cold war, the failure of DDR has contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the outbreak of approximately 60% of these armed conflicts.⁵

DDR is a complex and multi-faceted but highly political process that is typically initiated following the cessation of armed conflict. In practice, it is often linked to the broader process of Security Sector Reform (SSR), a phenomenon that motivates for the restructuring, re-orientation and professionalization of security related institutions to embrace, transparency and democratic norms. DDR is therefore shaped by the historical, socio-economic, geographic, cultural and ethnic factors; the nature of the armed conflict; and the manner in which the armed conflict was concluded and in some cases, the parallel introduction of Transitional Justice (TJ) notions. For instance, questions of amnesty before cessation of conflict as well as the criteria of selection of forces making up the integrated army form part of the key components of transitional justice tendencies. It is often subject to negotiated agreements between former adversaries. It is influenced by the interests of foreign actors, such as: the UN; the World Bank; and donor agencies. It is constrained by insufficient resources and the limitations of the national economy. Ultimately, the success and failure of DDR programmes are determined by the willingness of the rest of society to forgive ex-combatants for the violent acts they committed during the armed conflict, and support them in their transition from a life of war to a life of peace. Given the dynamics of DDR, it is important to note that:

There is no generic template of DDR practice that can be superimposed on post-conflict scenarios throughout the world. DDR processes must be carefully and sensitively custom designed for each scenario, by teams with intimate knowledge of the respective theatre, the players, the overall objective of the peace process and the tolls available.⁶

In the light of the above, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), United Nations (UN) has identified DDR as one of the major areas for intervention in order to bring about lasting peace, stability and development in emerging post-conflict situations. In this initiative, OSAA is leading “14 UN Departments and Agencies” in a process informed by lessons learnt over the last fifteen years to approach DDR in an ingenious

⁴ These notions as confirmed in the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) papers: See Concepts, Policy and Strategy of Integrated DDR, *The UN Approach to DDR*, Level 2 at <http://www.iddrs.un.org> accessed on 21 May 2007.

⁵ Monty G. Marshall, *Report-Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004: A Comparative Perspective*, prepared for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), Department for International Development (DFID), October 2005, pp. 7 and 8.

⁶ *DDR Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone – DDR Coordination Section, UNAMSIL*, August 2003, pp. 4 and 12 para. 51.

and more systematic manner.⁷ In practice, the OSAA intervention has been in the form of conferences and dialogue that bring together African practitioners while providing a forum to develop an empirically informed toolbox for DDR interveners.

The main objective of the toolbox is to: strengthen capacity; share the lessons learnt as well as best practices of recent DDR experiences in Africa; as well as create a platform for continental experiences to feed into the global DDR debate and vice-versa, facilitating the cross-fertilization of norms, practices and ideas. Furthermore, the strategy of deliberately locating the conferences in the midst of a DDR-related environment has resulted in the increased impact of the process.

In June 2005, OSSA facilitated the first *International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa* in Freetown, Sierra Leone, at the time, a country emerging from conflict, and host to one of the largest and complex peacekeeping missions and DDR initiatives in Africa. It also provided an environment in which the realities and complexities of DDR issues were graphically brought to the fore. During this conference, delegates urged OSSA to continue with the DDR consultative process on a bi-annual basis. The second *International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa* will take place in Kinshasa in June 2007.

This paper provides an analysis of current DDR trends, developments, and institutional arrangements in Africa. Various case studies from throughout the continent are considered. Analyses of the common challenges, successes and stumbling blocs are provided. In addition, key lessons from DDR processes are identified.⁸ It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive study of the state of DDR in Africa. This paper is merely an overview that seeks to inform the debate and discussions at the Kinshasa conference.

3. An African Overview: Has DDR brought stability to Africa?

Over the past three decades, DDR programmes in Africa have had mixed results. Since the early-1990s, the UN has become increasingly involved in DDR processes globally, from Afghanistan to Burundi and Haiti. In total, since 1992, the UN has engaged in over twenty-four DDR-related processes, twenty-two of which are currently ongoing. Of these, only six are outside the Africa, with those on continent accounting for 81% of the UN's involvement.⁹ On its African DDR initiative, the balance sheet is gradually reflecting major success. In each of the DDR processes engaged in, some have been innovative and remarkably successful, as was the case in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola and Uganda. Others however, have been glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have been unable to secure employment, and/or make the necessary social

⁷ Improving reintegration for former combatants: African experiences help UN 'refine' disarmament efforts, in *African Renewal*, Vol.21, No.1, April 2007, p. 5.

⁸ This paper is to be read in conjunction with *Aide-Memoir* of the conference that provides comprehensive elaboration of the Conference Objectives: 1, 2 a to d, 3 and 4; Outcomes expected from the deliberations and the Proposed Programme.

⁹ *Current Cases of DDR*, Spanish Agencie Catalane de Cooperacio el Devolupement at escolapau@pangea.org accessed on 18 May 2007, Map updated 15 February 2007.

and psychological adjustments to make the successful transition to civilian life. The most illustrative cases have been in Sudan, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) during late 2005 as well as the unending wars in Somalia.

The UN has not been alone in its involvement in DDR processes especially on the African continent. Complimentary bodies have included the African Union and in West, Southern and the Horn, regional economic and security groupings have also played an important part. Third, support has also come from international inter-governmental organisations such as the European Union (EU) and group of Scandinavian states as well as contributions made through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The MDRP was established in 2002 by over forty Western governments for purposes of creating a basket of resource support for DDR, focussing on the Great Lakes as well as West, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa, managed by the World Bank.¹⁰ More specifically, the following countries are part of the MDRP are: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo (ROC), Rwanda and Uganda.¹¹ From the traditional donor community, only Japan and the United States do not channel their support through MDRP.

a). *Progress in DDR since June 2005:*

The last two years has witnessed considerable progress with regards to the implementation of DDR processes in Africa. In Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Mano River Union area including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, marked stability characterises the security environment representing a departure to the picture of the 1990s. Even in Cote d'Ivoire, the May 2005 Treaty between the Chiefs of Staff of the Ivorian National Armed Forces (FANCI) and that of Forces Nouvelle has resulted in considerable movement on the DDR front. However, in contrast, countries bordering the Indian Ocean, especially located in the Horn, DDR has been subjected to considerable stress and even experiencing setbacks. Major set backs on DDR have also been witnessed in Somalia, the Sudan and Eritrea challenged by other factors such as regional dynamics, oil politics and the influence of the War on Terror. Against this cauldron, DDR processes have given way to rearmament and renewed fighting. On balance therefore, DDR has made a major impact in sustaining peace after the phases of ceasefire and elections in the previously troubled Mano River Union, stretching south as we saw to include Cote d'Ivoire. The same is also true of the prevailing situation in Angola and Central Africa although it must be admitted, pockets of resistance and fighting does continue to flare up at local levels without upsetting the strategic direction of the peace processes.

b) *DDR as part of a peace process*

In Africa, recent DDR processes have typically been established within the context of peace processes. The circumstances leading up to the peace process, the dynamics during

¹⁰ See *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Progress Report and Work Plan*, April at www.mdrp.org; See also MDRP Secretariat Quarterly Progress Report, October – December 2006 covering Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.

¹¹ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet* (March 2007) (<http://www.mdrp.org>).

the peace talks often determine the scope, range and sequencing of the DDR process, as well as the distribution of resources. Three different scenarios are outlined below.

- DDR as a result of peace secured by negotiated settlement between the conflicting parties, usually following pressure from an external party. This scenario normally sees the DDR decisions being postponed until after the election of a post-war government, with armed groups being left to reside in assembly points. Examples include Zimbabwe (1979), Namibia (1988) and South Africa (1990s).
- DDR as a result of peace settlements established by one party defeating others militarily. In this situation, DDR processes tend to be rapid and coercive in nature (particularly for the defeated party), and resources tend to be allocated in a biased fashion (usually in favour of the victor).¹² Examples include Angola (2003), Rwanda (1994), Uganda (1986) and Ethiopia (1990s).
- DDR as a result of peace agreements due to external intervention, usually in the context of a mutually hurting stalemate. The external intervening power (usually the UN) often takes a leadership role in the DDR process once a political agreement has been reached. Examples include Mozambique (1990s), Angola (1988), Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

It is important to note that the peace process may facilitate effective DDR programmes in some contexts, but in others, they may in fact undermine the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, as well as the national peacebuilding project. In general, the absence of the DDR programme from the peace process will usually result in compromises related to meeting the needs of ex-combatants, as post-war governments tend to face a competing array of developmental demands. In such instances, DDR and security is temporarily relegated in priority but as experience has shown, with serious adverse consequences within the first decade of independence. The solution therefore lies in the early recognition and addressing of these consequences before they mutate and become unmanageable.

An overview of 18 African DDR case studies is provided in the section below. The selection of the case studies attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between contemporary and historical cases, in order to ascertain whether or not lessons have been learnt, and/or mistakes repeated.

5. *Country-by country review of on-going (and completed) DDR processes*

I. Angola:

After years of failed attempts, the death of Jonas Savimbi at the small town of Luena in February 2002 triggered a peace process, signed only after 42 days, that reflects the almost root and branch DDR of the former rebel faction, The Movement for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In the rapid process that unfolded, of the available 80 000 UNITA forces, barely 5 000 were taken into the police for reintegration while the

¹² Paper and discussion with Brigadier General Frank K. Rusagara, Commandant Rwanda Military Academy, Nyakinama, Rwanda Defence Forces, May 2007 who cites three models.

rest, including some 30 000 family members, was summarily demobilized, physically dispersed and relocated throughout the country between April and June 2002.¹³ It is therefore true to say that, since 2002, Angola's DDR has been characterised by the mass demobilisation of former UNITA. Only in the last half-decade has attention turned considering the DDR of former official forces or the Forces Armadas de Angola (FAA).¹⁴ Meanwhile, the speed of the DDR of former UNITA forces was well in advance of the political de-regulation that was to later result in the reuniting of the two splinter groups of the movement and its transformation as the national opposition. Stated differently, there was a deliberate disconnect between the military disarmament and the recognition of UNITA as a political party. However, in spite of the tortuous developments in the politics of Angola, peace has reigned culminating in the recent moves to begin dismantling the formidable military might of the FAA. According to the October-December MDRP Progress Report, 97, 115 former combatants had been demobilized while a further 27, 000, amongst whom 15 000 are ready to begin enter the process have been identified. In total, the MDRP cites over 110, 906 former combatants, women associated with the fighting, children that will be addressed through its support as they are reintegrated into the wider society.

An added advantage for Angola is a “growing economy” from the windfall of the high oil revenues. This has witnessed senior commanders, electing to retire and join the emerging commercial sector in the country. This is an important safety net for DDR, an aspect that is normally lacking in many African economies/environments. A word of caution however, is to what extent has the government programme been “just and balanced”? If the answer is no, then clearly the process may in future constitute a source of conflict as the evidence has shown in other case studies elsewhere. It is also true to observe that there has been little or no attention paid towards dimensions of Transitional Justice in the Angolan case study. Whether this will come to pass after the elections is debateable although, given the protracted nature of the war and the atrocities committed, some attention towards influencing the current core force to respect human rights when engaged in war could have been useful. Finally, the question has also to be asked as to how adequate have been the DDR pay-outs towards making it possible for reinsertion of former combatants in an economy fast accused of being the most expensive on the continent? This point is important as, from the middle to the later stages of the protracted conflict in Angola, the economy had effectively become dollarised and remains so to this day, with serious implications on individuals who have been demobilized may not be able to sustain themselves?

II. Burundi

The Burundian DDR process, which included both individuals from the Burundian armed forces (including official militia groups), as well as opposition combatants, was initiated in 2005. As of November 2006, 28,328 ex-combatants had been demobilized. An additional 18,459 *Gardiens de la paix* and 9,509 ‘militants combatants’ participated in

¹³ Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas and Eneko Sanz, Escola de cultura de pau, *Angola*, p. 1 at; *MDRP Secretariat Quarterly Progress Report*, October – December 2006, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas and Eneko Sanz...

the demobilisation process. In terms of reintegration, reinsertion packages (predominantly cash payments) were provided. To date, the Executive Secretariat of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration has successfully placed 543 demobilized ex-combatants with employers. According to the UN, a further 5,412 ex-combatants have benefited from targeted economic support, 3,300 of whom are now engaged in income-generating activities.¹⁵ The conclusion on Burundi must be that, the political agreements still holds as does the core force that is in place, allowing the country to achieve relative peaceful conditions and begin to consider participation in the African Union peace mission in Somalia and by implication, as a full member of the international community. The challenge for Burundi however, remains in attempts now linking this successful phase of DDR with comprehensive SSR for sustainability and legitimacy of the newly established institutions?

III. Central Africa Republic (CAR)

The security situation in the CAR since the departure of President A. Pattasse and the inauguration of former insurgent leader, F. Bozize has deteriorated leading to the October 2005 deployment of forces by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). As part of the 2003 Bangui Agreement political agreement, the question of the reform of the armed forces, a reduction of vandalism from the activities of militia, internal insecurity and cross-border dimensions of the conflict that had drawn in and destabilized neighbouring Chad (estimated 45 000 CAR refugees in Chad) had been central to the peace treaty.¹⁶ An important component of the process was disarmament, designed to collect an estimated 100 000 small arms liberally distributed amongst the ordinary population based on perceived allegiance. Furthermore, there was also need to demobilize former combatants and their family members numbering some 42 000 given the social and ethnic construction of combatants drawn from the mutineers, liberators, Karako, Sarawi and Balawi groups amongst many. A related concern has been the challenge of reinsertion of these groups, including internally displaced peoples, numbering some 1.6 million people in a process in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank/MDRP are involved¹⁷. Significantly, the actual combatant numbers are small although the attendant impact on the 4 million plus population is greater and hence DDR can be achieved in a relatively short time if it enjoys sufficient political will.

The latest report by MDRP has indicated an end to the DDR and consideration of an exit strategy as well as future follow up in relation to SSR. There are obvious lessons to be learnt and drawn from the CAR experience on this important transition.¹⁸ At least two significant observations of the process were a) undertaking DDR that has a large armed population amidst a sizeable internally displaced people as well as refugees presents

¹⁵ See UN DDR Resource Centre – Burundi page (<http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php>)

¹⁶ Briefing by Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas and Eneko Sanz of ECP Escola de culture de pau, *Central African Republic* at

¹⁷ See MDRP: *Special Projects: Central African Republic. Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Support the Communities in the Central African Republic* at http://www.mdrp.org/countires/sp_car.htm accessed on 18 May 2007

¹⁸ MDRP *Quarterly Progress Report October-December 2006*, p. 5.

unique and multi-faceted challenges, including regional dynamics of porous borders and in/out flow of small arms and light weapons and, b) political will not exactly in place within actors divided by ethnicity, amongst other variables, can be a major impediment to progress.

IV. Congo - Brazzaville

The brief DDR process that occurred in the Republic of Congo during the end of 2003 to the present provides significant lessons. First, DDR in the Republic of Congo emerged from political differences between the incumbent, President Nguesso, and Pastor Ntoumi when the latter was denied an opportunity to participate in the May 2002 presidential elections. The differences soon degenerated into fighting in a development that soon witnessed the government inviting Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to augment their own security forces against Pastor Ntoumi who had in his support the Ninjas, a rebel movement that also includes child soldiers and mercenaries. A political agreement was later reached, in December 2003, leading to the departure of Foreign Combatants on the country's soil and a commitment by the Ninjas to disarm themselves, supported by UNDP and World Bank/MDRP, communities in eight districts coordinated by the National Programme for DDR (PNDDR). 30 000 former combatants were on hand to be demobilized in a process that clearly includes community participation.¹⁹ In practice, DDR has been slow, mainly due to government conditions imposed although the environment has continued to stabilise.²⁰

V. Democratic Republic of Congo

The DDR process in the DRC is arguably the most complex and multi-faceted programme ever implemented in Africa. It is comprised of, amongst other elements: a national programme; programmes that seek to disarm and repatriate foreign combatants and their dependents; and projects that aim to disarm members of militia groups and reintegrate them into civilian life. The UN and the World Bank are the main facilitators of the DDR process, along with the DRC government. The national programme seeks to demobilise approximately 150,000 ex-combatants, and by September 2006, close to 92,000 ex-combatants (including 27,346 children) had been demobilised. It is estimated that some 62,000 persons are yet to be included in the DDR programme. To date, some 13,000 foreign combatants and their dependents have been repatriated, while the UN estimates that approximately 10,000 foreign combatants still reside on DRC soil. Like other DDR programmes in Africa, the DRC process has experienced delays and

¹⁹ Relief Web, *Congo-Brazzaville: A sensitizing campaign brings together parliamentarians and local communities*, 22 August 2006, at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw>, accessed on 24 May 2007.

²⁰ *European Commission FSC.DEL/68/06 EC Action (EC + EDF) in the areas of SALW up to date – 13 March 2006 country reports* at <http://www.delvie.ec.europa.eu/.../> accessed on 24 May 2007

inefficiencies, which have been compounded by the size of the country, poor infrastructure and high levels of poverty.

VI. Eritrea

This is a country with the highest number of armed forces per capita, with a targeted 200 000 ex-combatants, including children for DDR.²¹ DDR in Eritrea post-2005 era appears to have become subject to the tense political and security situation facing the country and its strained relations with Ethiopia. While in 1993, and later in 2000, the country had embarked upon reducing the standing army, of late, these initiatives have since been suspended as, again the security situation with Ethiopia and generally in the Horn and Somalia, areas in which Eritrea appears to be somewhat involved, has deteriorated. In sum, the current security obtaining in Ethiopia is not conducive for DDR and efforts towards securing a comprehensive political agreement (s) is, yet again the re-starting point.

VIII. Cote d'Ivoire

The conflict that broke out in Cote d'Ivoire in September 2002 split the country into North and South with political movements and armed groups emerging in the two zones. Eventually, a significant faction coalesced around the Presidency, Laurent Gbagbo, in the South and his main opponent, Guillaume Soro leading the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles) in the North. Following several false starts on peace agreements, the significant Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 23 January 2003 contained a component of DDR. At the time, the rebel forces agreed to disarm themselves while government undertook to embark upon establishing a national integrated army, disarm and demobilize those who had been enlisted after 19 September 2002, most of whom were in the militia and reserves.²² While Soro in the North marshalled an estimated 18 000 forces under New Forces (Forces Nouvelles) the Government in the South had over 10 000 conventional forces supported by over 40 000 Paramilitary elements ranging from Presidential Guard units, gendarmerie, reserves and militia. This agreement was the result of considerable pressure from the regional organisation ECOWAS and the former colonial power, France. However, by late August 2003 it was clear that this was not holding.²³ More recently, a locally inspired initiative was signed between the two parties on 4 March, in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso. Again this

VII. Liberia

The Liberian DDR process was established in 2003 under the auspices of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration. A total

²¹ *European Commission FSC.DEL/68/06 EC...* p. 9.

²² Armin Langer, *Policy Levers in Cote d'Ivoire*, Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Context Paper 3, December 2003, University of Oxford, UK, p. 18; See also *United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI), Conflict Background*, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/index.html>.

²³ Armin Langer, *Policy Levers in Cote d'Ivoire*, p. 9.

of 101,495 ex-combatants and individuals associated with the fighting forces have been disarmed and demobilized. Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes were initiated in June 2004, which included computer and vocational skills training (such as carpentry, masonry, auto mechanics and farming). By November 2006, 22,000 participants had enrolled in formal education courses, with an additional 8,000 registered for courses starting before the end of the year. By the end of November 2006 the UN estimated that a total of 60,000 beneficiaries had completed the reintegration programme. In August/September 2006, the UN conducted a survey on ex-combatant reintegration. The survey found that only approximately 8% of ex-combatants had experienced an improvement in their socio-economic situation. Close to 28% reported that they are unemployed but on the whole, the DDR is holding, subject to the results of a review and evaluation that is now being undertaken. All things being equal, after the review we should expect consideration of an exit strategy and the transition of DDR to SSR for long-term and sustainable development.

A unique characteristic with the DDR process in Liberia is the phenomenon of “floating-combatants” being a group of unemployed youths, numbering approximately 60 000, found hawking their trade in violence in any of the countries of the Mano River Union.²⁴ After participating in the DDR exercises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, more recently, the youths have been found crossing over into Cote d’Ivoire “in order to triple the financial value of their weapons.”²⁵ Events in the Mano River Union conflict area manifest in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and now Cote d’Ivoire reflect the challenges of porous borders, small arms and light weapons proliferation and difficulty to control as well as the existence of neighbouring states capable of fuelling this trade that ultimately undermines national and regional security.

IX. Rwanda

In Rwanda, the DDR programme was established in 1997 under the auspices of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The work of the RDRC has been divided into two phases: 1997-2001, in which 18,692 former combatants were demobilised and provided with reintegration support. The second (and current) phase, which coincided with the establishment of the MDRP presence in Rwanda, is seeking to demobilise and reintegrate into civilian life some 36,000 former combatants. According to the MDRP, to date: close to 27,000 persons have been demobilised; 38,772 have been provided with reinsertion support; and 40,068 are in the process of receiving reintegration support. Reintegration support includes financial grants, vocational and apprenticeship training, education/scholarships, counselling and housing.²⁶

X. Somalia

²⁴ Jeffrey Isima, Cash Payments in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes in Africa in *Journal of Security Sector Management, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Vol.2, No.3*, September 2004, p. 3.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). 2006. *About the RDRC*. (<http://www.mdrp.org/rwanda.htm>).

DDR and the conflict situation in Somalia after 2005 have continued to be elusive. Worse, from December 2006, further intense fighting erupted following the entry of Ethiopian forces at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Reports have indicated Eritrean Government support for some of the groups battling the TFG and its supporters. Although the AU has called for a Mission to be deployed, only Uganda has sent 1 500 troops. Against this background, in the event that DDR eventually becomes a reality we note a number of significant factors that would have to be directly addressed in order to bring about a successful process. The first is of course the polarised political environment. Somalia continues to depict the collapsed state status that occurred in the 1990s. The country's conflict situation has since assumed dimensions of international War On Terror discourse, the religious factor drawing actors from the Middle East, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, a maritime security aspect that has seen pirates play havoc with the adjacent sea-lanes and the historical differences between clans, ethnic groups and neighbouring countries.

XI. Sudan

The civil war in Sudan that can be traced back to the 1950s which intensified in the 1980s has resulted in two major theatres of war: the conflict around the north and south between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its militia group, the Peoples Defence Force (PDF) versus the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army); and second, the post 2006 clashes in Western Darfur. The latter has pitted Sudanese Government Forces and pro-government militia groups- popularly known as the *Janjaweed* - versus the National Movement for Reform and Development and other sub-splinter groups. The first category of conflict, culminated in December 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that has established clear time lines for DDR, integrated Armies and related institutions before the referendum set for 2010. The second conflict theatre, despite strenuous efforts of the African Union in Abuja, has failed to produce a comprehensive agreement for all parties although the impact of the war on civilians and infrastructure in Darfur has been horrendous. The Abuja Agreement had a component for DDR in which the Sudanese Government had committed integrating 4 000 militia into the SAF and another 1 000 into the police force while providing assistance to another 3 000.²⁷ There has not been clear and firm commitments from the rebel groups although into this uncertain terrain, the AU deployed AMIS-the AU Mission in Sudan. Transformation of this into UNAMIS/UNMIS based on UN Security Council Resolutions 1547 and 1590 has proved difficult to realize.

Given the complexity of the conflict resolution process in Sudan, we can isolate several significant aspects that deserve further debate during the workshop. First, the lack of clarity around the DDR components of the peace agreements should be examined in relation to progress or the lack of it at the political level? Secondly, the conflict in the Sudan has now assumed serious external supporters and dimensions in relation to interests of Middle Eastern countries, the "War on Terror" and Islamic fundamentalism? Ethnicity and racism, including charges of slave trade are also factors explaining some of

²⁷ Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas and Eneko Sanz, *Sudan*, p. 2.

the dimensions of the conflict. Third, the country is awash with proliferation of weapons given its insecure coastline on the Indian Ocean and its geographic thrust into the Great Lakes area as well as overflow from the Ugandan conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The latter has, traditionally found common cause with the SPLA/M. Furthermore, on both sides; the conflict has child soldiers to be demobilized

XII. Uganda

Uganda has been affected by sustained periods of armed conflict since the mid-1980s, and has implemented a series of DDR initiatives since then. In 2000, the Amnesty Act was established, which permitted those Ugandans that had taken up arms against the government, and who subsequently wanted return to civilian life, to be granted amnesty without risk of prosecution or punishment. Those who have sought amnesty are referred to as "reporters", with the total number of potential reporters estimated to be in the tens of thousands. At the end of 2006, approximately 21,000 reporters had been granted amnesty, out of which 19,000 have received basic reinsertion/resettlement support. The Amnesty Commission, and in particular the Demobilization and Resettlement Team has facilitated the demobilisation and resettlement process, but it has encountered capacity constraints, which has undermined the effectiveness of the process.

XIII. Guinea Bissau

Following a series of coups and counter-coups that began in June 1998 led by the late General A. Mane, Guinea-Bissau finally welcomed the March 2005 recommendation by the UN Secretary-General that attention to DDR, reform of the justice system and revitalizing the economy constituted the preconditions for peace and stability. Since then, attention has turned towards the reduction of the standing army – by 10 544 – and in parallel with the demobilisation of militias and paramilitary groups – numbering 2, 051 - that both sides in the conflict had established.²⁸ Following a peace agreement signed in Abuja; the UN eventually established the UN Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) that has led represented international community presence in the country. Furthermore, Portugal re-entered the conflict scene, acting as a "lead-country" around which international support and commitments then coalesced and has been coordinated. Following advice and material support from the United Kingdom, in 2006, Guinea-Bissau has also embarked upon the reform of its security sector that includes drastically reducing its Armed Forces from 9 000 to 3 5000 as well as embarking upon the further retraining of ex-combatants.

Challenges continue to be noticed in the areas of a) the slow pace of implementation of the announced goals that had to be extended in 2005 and b) located in the Mano River Union, proliferation of small arms has continued, informed by the mobile youths across the very porous borders in the region.

²⁸ Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas and Eneko Sanz, *Guinea-Bissau*, p. 2: See also Mark Malan *Transitions with Minimal Assistance: Lessons from Guinea-Bissau?* Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2005 available at <http://64.78.30.169/kaiptc/Guinea>

XIV. Mozambique

The DDR programme in Mozambique was established as part of the General Peace Accord (1992) following two decades of civil war. The UN played a central role in this regard. By 1994, the disarmament and demobilisation component had been concluded, with approximately 110,000 ex-combatants being demobilised with a 30 000 core force, drawn equally from the government and the rebel group to be reintegrated. The National Commission for Reintegration was established to co-ordinate the reintegration process, which was rudimentary in nature, and focused predominantly on providing basic vocational training. It was clear from the onset that the Mozambican economy, which had been depressed by the civil war, would not be able to absorb the vast majority of ex-combatants. Hence, the reintegration programme encouraged ex-combatants to engage in subsistence agriculture.²⁹ Despite the obvious signs of DDR failure and the possibility of going back to war, this failed to happen as it occurred against the extreme exhaustion that had characterised the war actors during the late 1980s and the radically changed peaceful conditions in Southern Africa, especially in neighbouring South Africa, a country that had previously stoked the war fires in the region and in Mozambique.

XV. Namibia

The demobilisation process in Namibia took place in 1989, after three decades of armed conflict. Close to 57,000 former combatants were demobilised, but initially no reintegration assistance was provided.³⁰ It was assumed that ex-combatants would re-integrate into civilian life on their own accord. However, shortly after the completion of the demobilisation process, former combatants began to express their grievances through public demonstrations and protest action. The government responded by devising a cash payment scheme and introduced vocational training programmes in the form of development brigades.³¹ However, these efforts only had limited success in addressing these grievances, and by the late 1990s, significant numbers of ex-combatants remained unemployed. The problem was partially alleviated through the incorporation of several thousand ex-combatants into the Special Field Force (government paramilitary entity).

XVI. Sierra Leone

The DDR process in Sierra Leone was initiated in 2000, and was concluded by January 2004. Approximately 71,000 individuals underwent demobilisation, over 32,000 weapons were collected in the disarmament process, and some 56,700 former combatants registered for reintegration support. When the reintegration programme was terminated in January 2004, 51,122 had been provided with the reintegration support in the areas of

²⁹ João Paulo Borges Coelho and Alex Vines, 1994. *Pilot Study on Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique*, (Oxford: Refugees Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford).

³⁰ Gwinyai Dzinesa and Martin Rupiya, Promoting National Reconciliation and Regional Integration: The Namibian Defence Force, 1990 – 2005 in *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, (Ed) Martin Rupiya, (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005) pp. 208-09

³¹ Colletta, N. J. et al, 1996. *The Transition From War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank).

vocational training (such as carpentry, masonry, and tailoring), apprenticeship, formal education, agricultural and job placement. The majority of remaining ex-combatants were unable to make use of the reintegration support, and were subsequently given a once-off cash payment. However, the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, that of particularly male youth, has been stymied by low levels of economic growth, a lack of employment opportunities and poverty.³²

XVII. Zimbabwe

Following the end of the Zimbabwe civil war, at the considerable behest of external pressure from the Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Southern African Development Coordination Community (SADCC) approximately 36,000 combatants were demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life, a process facilitated by a National Demobilisation Directorate that was put into place. Because the DDR emerged only after elections, was not part of the Lancaster House peace treaty, in the run up to the elections, factions had seriously understated their strengths in a clear strategy to “keep-their-powder dry” in case fighting did break out again. Even as the core force was being considered, this development played havoc with any estimates of how the numbers available for DDR. Once the process began, those demobilized received a two-year, monthly reintegration stipend, and were encouraged to pursue business ventures. In retrospect, it now evident that the capitalist economy began to stagnate amidst expanding social and welfare programmes by the state. Increasingly, the size of the economy and institutions lacked the capacity and resources to provide suitable and sustainable relevant training designed for a long-term recovery and development. Not surprisingly, many of the business ventures embarked upon by ex-combatants failed to become viable and ultimately throwing more people into the unemployment sector. A 1993 it was estimated that some 25,000 ex-combatants were unemployed.³³ The failure of the reintegration process became a major factor behind the mobilisation (and exploitation) of ex-combatants as a political force that is characterising the current political crisis in Zimbabwe. In the current crisis, DDR appears to have been largely suspended with new units, including National Service and militia groups emerging. These will necessarily need to be demobilized once the political situation stabilizes.

XVIII. South Africa

The demobilisation of ex-combatants in South Africa was coupled with the downsizing of the national military, which took place between 1995 and 2001. Approximately 60,000 ex-combatants were demobilised as a result of these processes. There were a number of problems with the general process of demobilisation and reintegration, the result of inadequate planning, consultation, co-ordination and the implementation of the process. There was also an absence of feasibility studies to determine the social and economic needs of ex-combatants and their dependants. A study undertaken by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in 2002 and 2003 found that two-thirds of demobilised ex-

³² See UN DDR Resource Centre – Sierra Leone page (<http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php>).

³³ See: World Bank. 1993. Demobilisation and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies (World Bank: Washington D.C.).

combatants from the former insurgent forces were unemployed, with most either being dependent on family members to provide them with money, food and shelter. More than a third of the respondents indicated that they suffered from psychological problems.

6. DR Congo Conference Framework of Analysis/Discussion

a) Historical overview on the ending of the conflict

The war that broke out in the then Zaire in 1996, now DR Congo, and only ended through a series of agreements, including the 1999 Lusaka Accord followed by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue Global Agreement, had/and continues to depict characteristics in the majority of case studies above. Significantly, each of the peace treaties made reference to the need for establishing an integrated army. Meanwhile, fighting forces in the conflict were drawn from armed factions from within the country and outside, including elements from neighbouring states, fighting on different sides. Furthermore, the composition of the armed factions included child soldiers and women. During the last five years, DDR initiatives have paid special attention to these categories with mixed results.

Based on these peace agreements, facilitated by the regional economic bloc, SADC, the UN established MONUC, a body that today boasts 17 500 forces. However, one of the important challenges has continued to be, continued fighting and refusal to lay down arms by elements especially in the Eastern part of the country. By implication, this means that political will designed to bring about lasting peace and stability is lacking amongst some of the key players in the DR Congo.

Furthermore, The latter has since played a significant role in DDR, including undertaking the “enforced” dimension in the Eastern part of the country as well as providing security and policing for the recent elections to be completed. While the peace treaties created the entry point for both DDR and SSR, as we understand the concepts, because the fighting has not been completely eliminated, it now threatens the stability of the new state. However, the country is now entering that fragile phase of this process acting as the exit strategy of MONUC soon and the need to formulate and deploy other forms of support to consolidate democracy and avoid relapse. A major instrument that has emerged to fill this vacuum is the current comprehensive DDR initiative.

b) Combatants on Foreign Soil

Examination of the conflict in DR Congo shows that this has its roots in historical ethnic differences in the region, a factor that resulted in several armed factions working with governments in neighbouring states against the central government in Kinshasa. For its part, central government then requested military assistance from regional allies that participated in what has been described as Africa’s First World War until the peace agreements were signed. While the fighting that erupted in July 1998 was as a result of the expulsion of ‘foreign forces’ ongoing DDR is also challenged to address this dimension. Exactly who is involved and how should emerge in the workshop discussion. As the case study on the Congo-Brazzaville showed, for the DR Congo, there were even former soldiers that sought refugee across the river that have now to be considered for DDR? Furthermore, DDR of forces in Ituri and the Kivus also presents the challenge of hosting and receiving “combatants on foreign soil”?

c) Links between DDR and SSR

There are definite links between DDR, a phase that follows immediately after ceasefire, focussing on disarmament of both weapons and fighters, the establishment of a core force from a limited number of personnel and the reintegration of the rest and SSR, being concerned with the long-term policy, ethos, composition, role and function of security related organs and their oversight within a democracy. More specifically, while DDR is isolated once the integrated army is established, SSR modalities must take over in the formulation of security and defence policy, ethos, oversight mechanisms, training, conditions of service, internal and external civil military relations as well as links with other armies, role and function including serving as part of the regional/international community security bloc, doctrine and even resource allocation through parliament.

One of the basic standard measures reflecting the differences of DDR and SSR is that, notions of DDR are contained in peace treaties while those related to SSR can be integrated into the new Constitutions that are bequeathed to the emerging state.

The fact that these closely related phases are taking place in a fragile and emerging post-conflict state provides major challenges to appropriately formulate and conceptualize each phase, seek its consolidation before entering into the next. Because of the ever-present phenomenon of vulnerability, the need to continually evaluate each phase even as the next is being launched is crucial to the success of both DDR and later on SSR in DR Congo. Recent events have shown the progress of DDR and SSR at different levels in different parts of the DR Congo. Consequently, there is need to bring about the harmonization of these different processes at the national level.

d) Children & Women Associated with Armed Forces

Conflict in the Great Lakes region is prone use child soldiers, a phenomenon also common in the Mano River Union part of West Africa. However, this is not a global phenomenon and is particular to certain regions as the more developed countries have in place strict laws that conform to the UN conventions. In the 1996-7 War, the consequence of the “WaToto” or child soldiers was widespread. As a result, embarking upon DDR in the DR Congo faces the challenge of having in place a separate dimension that addresses child soldiers. While making this recommendation, there are however related factors that are not exactly clear and may be clarified in the discussions. For example, the extent of the problem is not clear nor is the level of ‘take-up’ – willingness to ‘retire’ by those considered child-soldiers? As evidence has shown in Liberia and Sierra Leone, sometimes the environment outside the ranks is not conducive leading to child soldiers lying about their ages so as to remain in the force? There is also the category of women associated with Armed Forces either as willing concubines, porters or trained soldiers³⁴ who have become part of the conflict baggage to be set down.

Finally, reports in the DR Congo and other parts of Central Africa have also pointed towards the use of rape and other sexual acts as a tool of war and dehumanising the

³⁴ Ernest Harsch, Pact to end use of children in war citing comments by UNICEF Director, Ann Veneman in *African Renewal*, Vol.21, No.1, April 2007, p. 4-5.

opponents. Where this has occurred, the question of transitional justice weighs heavy on both the consciences of the society, the new central government and the armed factions. Stated differently, where cases have been proven, measures designed to right the wrongs of this human rights violation must be considered – as long as they ultimately do not upset the march towards peace and stability.

e) DDR and Transitional Justice (TJ)

Methods of fighting by different factions have or have not violated human rights issues and since the 1980s, the concept of transitional justice, to be located during the transition from war to peace and before the consolidation of democracy, has become an important consideration.³⁵ Consideration of the TJ option must also take into account the robustness of the society to withstand any potential fall out as well as the ability/capacity of the state to deliver on the stated terms of reference. Because of this complexity and the ever-present danger of reversing gains received at the negotiated table, TJ has tended to be marginalized in many fragile post-conflict states. However, there is a balance to be considered in the post conflict era. One the one hand, does a state adopt TJ for purposes of eradicating a rewarding human rights violators or does it abandon this course for purposes of consolidating peace? Secondly, if this is done, does then by default, signal to others that they may continue with impunity and therefore risk the expansion of the atrocities? In each case, a balanced judgement has to be made and this challenge is very much alive in the DR Congo?

f) “Spill-Over” Effects

The war and end of conflict in the DR Congo has had enormous spill-over effects not only within the country but also across the Eastern, Central and Southern African states. The UN, EU, the United States, AU, MONUC and SADC have all been affected and responded in different ways to the dynamics of the war in the DR Congo. The factors not only include the proliferation of arms, human resources finding safe bases in neighbouring states for opportunities to rearm and fight another day as well as economic and social adverse effects on the DR Congo. On the DDR question, each of these bodies has reacted in a different manner, supporting the integrating army, assisting the demobilization and the reintegration process, including undertaking ‘enforced demobilization’ action against some reluctant groups in the Kivus and Eastern Congo. The important point to take away from the “spill-over” effects around DDR in the DR Congo is that, no amount of attention, targeted at the internal situation is likely to succeed unless the attendant “spill-over” effects in Central and Southern Africa are taken into account.

7. Cross-cutting Issues

There are number of cross-cutting issues to be considered and for purposes of brevity in such a short paper, the following are highlighted but are not exhaustive:

³⁵ *Transitional Justice*, accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_justice on 28 May 2007

a) Gender

Gender issues affecting DDR have to be mainstreamed as a way of comprehensively addressing the challenges in line with a constitutional democracy. The establishment of the National Commission on DDR that was for while headed by a woman was one way in which central government was sensitized of related gender dimensions to DDR. These included setting up separate camps and accommodation, supporting child supporting single mothers and consideration of equal packages in a society that culturally does not equate the worth of men against that of women. Initiatives targeting women and children in this process have also depicted important gender related dimensions but the workshop is expected to bring to our attention more issues that have so far escaped attention.

b) Human Rights

In the prosecution of the conflict in the DR Congo and Great Lakes generally, there have been serious atrocities and human rights violations committed. In Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo and even Northern Uganda, the loss of lives from the ongoing conflicts has been at a scale that borders on genocide or just below this international measurement. Hence, even as the countries enter into the post-conflict phase, the need to lock into place, within the constitution and the emerging institutions the norms and values of a human rights sensitive approach is important. Stated differently, what has happened must be documented for posterity while measures are put into place to avoid any repetitions in the future.

c) Governance

In considering DDR and Governance, an important point is to encourage the emergence of an elected political leadership to begin to manage the affairs of state and in the event, displacing the armed groups that have been in charge of particular regions of the country. The process of transition from peace treaties to the new state has provided a clear line of governance that should give leadership to the evolving process of DDR in line with the constitution. This should give rise to the SSR medium-to-long term phase of consolidating the gains of DDR and bring about lasting stability.

d) Community Based Issues and participation

Armed groups and their supporters have hitherto closed the space for community participation in the DR Congo. However, cases of opportunities opening up have now become common following the successful parliamentary and presidential elections. Local participants in the conference can benefit the process by further identifying other areas in which the community can develop a structured approach and participation designed to consolidate peace and stability in the country.

8. What are the common challenges, successes and stumbling blocks?

In general, the success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on three crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive *planning* that is based on sound research and analyses in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. If

we are correct in so asserting, then this calls for DDR related research capacity to be deliberately developed and resourced, focussing on issues on the African continent.

Second, it is critical that the requisite *political will* exists, at of all levels in the implementation strategy in order to positively influence the processes. To this end, others have argued that the DDR process itself maybe a problem but, if this enjoys committed political will, then the adverse effects of this challenge are minimized.

Third, is the question of cost or adequate resources available to undertake the initiative? Given the longitudinal effect of DDR that stretches into SSR and the fact that this emerges directly after the cessation of conflict, there is generally no country that is able to marshal the required resources to address DDR. These programmes are typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary resources, namely financial, material and technical expertise, need to be secured. As a result, contributions and support from outside is crucial to the success of the programmes. More specifically, DDR experiences in Africa suggest the following:

- If cash payments are not supplemented by other reintegration programmes, or at least accompanied by mechanisms to encourage spending on education and productive investments, a significant proportion of former combatants will experience difficulty using the payments to increase their long-term income. The reasons cited include: combatants' limited money management and investment experience (combined in many instances with a poorly developed financial sector), lack of practical skills, and family pressures.
- New governments following periods of long-term civil war typically experience difficulties with long term planning due to a variety of urgent and competing reconstruction demands, and they may lack the necessary administrative capacity and financial resources to implement them

There have been relative cases of success and it is important that we try and isolate what was at the bottom of such experiences. In Mozambique and more recently in Angola and Burundi, we can state that the despite obvious shortcomings such as the speed of DDR and the imbalance in integrating forces from the available factions, relative success has been achieved. Why? The one dimension is exhaustion, emanating from the protracted nature of the conflicts followed by concessionary political will at the central government level that has culminated in successful DDR programmes. Second, there have been successful cases emanating from robust intervention from outsiders succeeding to drag previously reluctant actors to Disarm, Demobilize and Reintegrate. An alternative of this is the context of enforced DDR in an environment that has lost its broader political agenda leaving minority groups isolated and susceptible to military action to disarm. Third, there have been cases of singular defeat of a faction on the battlefield leading to almost summary but successful DDR. The following points a summary of significant points for mounting successful DDR as well as secondary interventions in relapsed processes:

- *Planning*: at an early stage, integrate DDR with Peace Treaties
- Identify relevant DDR & SSR linkages for purposes of appropriate sequencing
- Establish clear political entity to lead DDR process
- Consider Regional Projects – as part of role/contribution of Regional Economic and Security Communities (RECS) projects to absorb DDR ex-combatants from a number of countries such as from the Great Lakes – guarding dams, energy installations and common infrastructure
- Factor in adequate resources for all phases

Stumbling blocks to DDR processes have generally been located in the lack of political will leading to intransigence amongst the belligerents. Second, initiatives have also foundered on the lack of adequate resources not only during phase one of arms collection but also in the next phases of severance and settlement packages. Furthermore, the nature of the economy has also made an impact with upwards of 60% of ex-combatants failing to secure employment and remaining on the fringes of the economy while impoverished. Finally, stumbling blocks have also been noticed in the form of a) foreign or external players influencing groups not to disarm and b) spoilers from amongst the groups or leaders themselves.

9. *What are the existing institutional arrangements to support DDR in Africa?*

Apart from the state structures in each of the countries grappling with DDR on the African continent, apart from South Africa and one or two other states, the rest have invited support from the regional economic and security structures – working with ‘lead-countries’ to assist with local initiatives. Within these processes however, what has not been widely acknowledged so far, is the critical role played by recipient communities at the local level. The community intervention maybe in the form of information dissemination, controlling personal vendettas and animosities as well as providing support such as dealing trauma and psycho-social impact of the darker side of engaging in the war. Almost as an automatic reaction in the cessation of conflict, communities as part of demobilization and reintegration offer this support to combatants. The types of support may also include provision of land, materials and labour power to help former combatants settle quickly. Second, former colonial powers have also come to the assistance of states as witnessed in the relationship established between Zimbabwe and Britain during the early 1980s, the French in Cote d’Ivoire as well as Britain in Sierra Leone. Bilateral support has also been made available to influence DDR with the example of the EU found assisting almost every DDR process on the continent. Finally, support has also come from other multilateral agencies amongst which, UNDP and MDRP have been the most prominent.

However, while support has appeared from a variety of sources at the national level of each of the participating country, this has remained uncoordinated neither with the conceptual phases of DDR and SSR nor with other donors that later come to the aid of evolving processes. The result has been uncoordinated and ad-hoc inputs whose impact has been patchy if not marginalized to result in incidence of impoverished former combatants existing in every country on the continent. What is missing and therefore

required is coordinated actions at both the international/regional level as well as at the national level with clear distinctions of progress between DDR and SSR.

10. What lessons can be learnt from complex DDR processes outside Africa?

There are interesting commonalities and lessons that we can learn from related to the experiences of other DDR processes outside the African continent. For instance, the example of the UN Stabilizing Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) appears to be worse than our situation in Somalia, of a relapsed initiative following the collapse of state authority. In Haiti, the evidence has shown that there is so far little political will. The point we made earlier in the discussion, of rebel groups having to adopt a sense national character in order to understand that continued conflict will leave no national inheritance is pertinent in Haiti and the capital, Port-au-Prince amongst the rebel groups – the Lavalas, previously allied to exiled President Aristede and the paramilitary death-squads. This is an important lesson to take away. As the UN Security Council Resolution 1702 pointed out after acknowledging the “limitations of DDR” whilst calling for a resumption of the failed initiative on MINUSTAH amidst the re-establishment of a National Commission for DDR (NCDDR). This was significant as even the policing units have become embroiled as factions and gangs in the increasingly lawless society of Haiti. As to the new mandate of MINUSTAH, which has always included a DDR component, the UNSC advised for the:

“reorientate of its DDR efforts, to further that goal towards a comprehensive community and violence reduction programme adapted to local conditions...”³⁶

The above was testimony of how DDR had failed to take hold in Haiti, leaving the factions at each other’s throat.

The same is also true of the situation in Colombia. According to the International Crisis Group a DDR process launched before 2004 has been taken advantage of and has since witnessed former gangs consolidate their grip of city neighbourhoods. Despite the intervention of the regional Organisation of American States (OAS), Columbia has been described as a country not ready to conduct serious DDR nor Transitional Justice amongst gangs and former military units, including FARC. This lack of political will while fighting and killings continue can partly be likened to our own situation in Darfur.

Finally, events in Afghanistan have also shown the dangers of seeking to conduct DDR through a victor’s initiative in an environment in which fighting still continues. Victors DDR witnessed in Afghanistan in which over 63 380 former Afghan Military Forces (AMF) organized around 259 units was demobilized since February 2003. While a small number joined the Afghan National Army, 53 415 demobilized and completed in time and within the US\$141 million dollar budget by July 2006.³⁷ This rapid demobilization is

³⁶ at <http://www.unddr.org/doc> accessed on 24 May 2007.

³⁷ *UNDP DDR Reintegration has been completed in time and within costs at* <http://www.undp.org> accessed 24 May 2007.

akin with what we saw in Angola in the case studies and evokes the same cautionary warnings. While this had some semblance to situations in Angola and Cote d'Ivoire, the security environment in the last two has clearly stabilized. Perhaps there are striking similarities of the events in Afghanistan with events in Sudan and Somalia. In the case of the latter, DDR has had to be suspended against the background of an absence of a political agreement.

The major lessons to take away from the international experience elsewhere is that DDR is unique to local and subjective conditions and is a process that does not lend itself to a common template. Second, that political agreement is vital for peace processes to evolve and for DDR to be located within such a framework. Without this precondition then it is bound to fail given its inherent limitations. Finally, the lessons elsewhere further confirm the centrality of DDR to peace and stability in post-conflict societies.

11. Conclusions: DDR, an opportunity for a peaceful future in Africa?

The international community and ordinary Africans have made huge investment in organising and participating in elections in Sierra Leone and the DR Congo and yet, the same peace processes remain fragile and threatened by possible failed DDR processes. The impact of failed peace processes through faltering DDR has been horrendous. Africa is host to the largest figure of some 9 million refugees, over 25 million internally displaced people and a difficult environment where trade, development and human security are absent. In such countries as Cote d'Ivoire, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda and the DR Congo, interest in consolidating DDR as part of peacebuilding and long-term stability is immense and any initiatives designed to strengthen existing processes is generally sought after.

Against this background, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, supported by a number of departments and agencies in the UN, is now at the forefront, on the African continent, seeking to create an intervention mechanism of DDR, complete with a tool-box, designed to support such post-conflict situations. After Freetown in 2005, the positive results of this intervention model suppressing tendencies of relapsing are already evident in spite of the intervening short two years. It is also partly true to say that if DDR holds in the Mano River Union, then the destructive tendency of the 'mobile youths' for hire, whose presence was already showing in the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, will be further minimized allowing for the consolidation of peace and stability in that region. Now, two years later, the challenge is on the DR Congo. As has been argued in the text, solving the complexity of DDR in this country requires a comprehensive and regional approach and by implication, failure will have adverse regional consequences. As the 17 500 MONUC forces prepares for the inevitable draw-down and eventual departure, the new DDR tool needs to kick-in in a comprehensive manner in order to shore up the gains made so far and further consolidate peace and stability in an environment that is still partly contested. The deliberations of the conference should identify the key areas of focus and targeting both attention and resources in order to bring about a successful DDR that has clear links to long-term and sustainable SSR. This overview has attempted to provide background material, including the brief examination of 18 case studies, in a bid to create an informed

discussion during the second Conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Stability in Africa.

12. Recommendations

ⁱ Adapted from UNIFEM's WomenWarPeace.org and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)