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Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and Challenges

Thematic Working Paper 5

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Contribution to the Project:

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and the Interests of the Poor**



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MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

Contents

1. Introduction.....	1
1.1 Findings of the paper	2
1.2 Methodological Challenges	3
1.3 Structure of the paper.....	3
2. Best Practice in Reintegration.....	4
2.1 The Importance of Reintegration.....	5
2.2 Programme design	6
2.3 Community-based approaches	8
2.4 Tools and Methods.....	11
3. Post Conflict Development: Connecting Reintegration and Long Term Development	13
3.1 Improving Financial Assistance to Conflict Afflicted States	13
3.1.1 Needs Assessments	15
3.1.2 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.....	18
3.2 New Best Practice Approaches.....	19
3.2.1 Dialogue and participation.....	19
3.2.2 The Private Sector.....	20
3.2.3 Financial Sector	21
4. Operationalising Best Practice in Reintegration: Challenges and Constraints	22
4.1 Community Approaches and Local Ownership.....	22
4.2 Resources	24
4.3 Security	26
4.4 Programme Design.....	27
4.5 Training.....	29
5. Reintegration and Long Term Development: Contradictory Agendas	31
5.1 Technical Challenges	32
5.1.1 Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity	32
5.1.2 Needs Assessments	34
5.1.3 Aid Harmonisation.....	35
5.1.4 Aid Dispersal	36
5.1.5 Aid Levels.....	37
5.1.6 Financial Support to Conflict-Affected Countries.....	37
5.2 Development Policy.....	38
Conclusion	40

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1. Introduction

This working paper explores reinsertion and reintegration processes and how these connect (or are expected to connect) with donor-led strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development. DDR has long been recognised as essential for post-conflict stability, but in the 2000s, there has been emphasis on enhancing the linkages between short-term, time-bound DDR process and long-term reconstruction and development programmes and processes in post-conflict states.¹ The importance of situating reintegration into the wider context of long-term development has been stressed by the UN, whose best practice guidelines emphasise that reintegration should: ‘support a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.’² This does not suggest a restructuring of DDR activities, which aim to establish an environment *conducive* to long-term economic development rather than *fostering* long-term development,³ but a bridging of short- and long-term agendas.

Strategies for promoting long-term development in post-conflict states have, like DDR best practice, evolved over the last decade. Donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have sought to improve strategies for promoting economic development in post-conflict and fragile state contexts, a move toward anticipating and organizing post-conflict development and state building programmes that was first outlined by the World Bank in 1995.⁴ This has increased awareness of mechanisms and opportunities for linkage between short- and long-term processes, and the need for holistic approaches. The utility of enhancing connections has been further underscored by the concentration of DDR activities in poor countries and understanding of the ‘conflict trap’, wherein poverty and exclusion are identified as drivers of conflict.⁵ At the institutional level, the synergy between DDR and development agencies, and

¹ UNDP (2005) *Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants*. http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/_DDR_Practice_Note_English_PDF.pdf.

² Report by the UN Secretary-General (February 2000) *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*.

³ L. Specker (2007) *Reintegration Phase of DDR Processes*. Expert meeting report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Conflict Research Unit. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080128_cru_conf_ddr-r-phase.pdf

⁴ N. Colletta (1995) “From Warriors to Workers: The World Bank’s Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” *Leaders*, No. 204; The World Bank (1997) *Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. World Bank: Washington, D.C.

⁵ D. Collier et al, (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, World Bank Policy Research Report No. 26121. World Bank: Washington, D.C.; D. Collier (2004), ‘Development and Conflict’, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. Mimeograph; D.

the capacity for connected programming, has been promoted through new specialised units such as the UN's Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR⁶ and the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit.

1.1 Findings of the paper

This paper argues that despite the intentions of the international and donor community, there is a long way to go before DDR activities and long-term development strategies can merge seamlessly in the manner envisaged. Even though there has been convergence between DDR and development programmes and processes in best practice guidelines, practical experience of connectivity is limited and research and thinking around linkages is at a rudimentary stage. There has been very little follow-through in terms of serious planning and application of connected programming strategies. Much work needs to be done to identify and elaborate linkages between DDR and long-term development if such linkages are shown to be appropriate, while tools that could be of value in connecting these programming areas, such as needs assessments, require technical refinement before they can be of practical and operational utility. More fundamentally, as 'stand alone' programme areas, DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes face significant operational, logistical and financial constraints. Unless these policy and process challenges are addressed, advances in building linkages between DDR and long-term development will be of limited and questionable value. It is also evident that linkages between DDR and long-term development will be problematic to forge owing to practical institutional constraints. There is little cross-over by practitioners and specialists from DDR and development programming and this is reflected in a broader conceptual, policy and specialist division: DDR continues to be written, approached and appraised through a military and security lens, while development theory, policy and strategy continues to be written by economists and informed by political economy / economics disciplinary approaches.

Beyond the 'micro' challenges faced by linked programming strategies, this paper points to two macro-level questions that need to be addressed. Current reconstruction and development strategies have been shown to provide an inadequate stake in peace for a broad sector of the population, while undermining prospects for successful and sustainable reintegration. Might current market-led donor approaches to economic stabilisation and post conflict reconstruction contradict reintegration activities by generating new patterns of political and economic exclusion that can in turn catalyse new conflicts? Rather than embedding reintegration into current strategic approaches to development, should the development paradigm itself be re-assessed? Secondly, what is the instrumental value of reintegration? Here it is important to stress that there is no consensus on the scope of DDR within the policy,

Collier and A. Hoeffler (2005), 'Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no.4.

⁶ In line with UN General Assembly Resolution 59/296 that stressed the importance of: 'strengthened cooperation and coordination between the various actors within and outside the United Nations system to ensure both the effective use of resources and coherence on the ground in implementing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.' For background discussion, see Expert Seminar (July 2006) *EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development*, Brussels, http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/eu_and_ddr_seminar_report.pdf.

practitioner and academic community. In order that the debate on linkages can progress, there needs to be detailed exploration of the benefits of *separating* reintegration out from disarmament and demobilisation and simply limiting DDR programming to the more ‘hard’ security oriented D and D. Should then the policy and practitioner community return to first principles and focus on separating out, improving and effectively resourcing short- and long-term processes rather than seeking to bridge them?⁷

1.2 Methodological Challenges

This paper draws upon a desk study of the key primary source documentation in the fields of DDR and development. It incorporates evidence from the field work and papers conducted for this project, primary source policy and programme documents and secondary source academic material. Exploring the relationship between DDR and long-term development is problematic on a number of counts. Firstly, the donor community has only recently moved to integrate DDR and connect programmes to long-term development strategies. Thinking around linkages is underdeveloped, abstract and largely restricted to ‘specialised’ post-conflict reconstruction units. The material available for review and analysis is therefore limited. Secondly, the majority of the 34 global DDR experiences have been conducted relatively recently and as a result, the timeframe for assessing longer-term impacts and linkages is too narrow to provide substantive empirical insights.⁸ Thirdly, there has been little to no tracking of those targeted for reinsertion and reintegration activities. Consequently there is limited empirical material from which substantive conclusions as to the connectivity (or otherwise) of DDR and long-term development can be drawn out. Underscoring a generalised paucity of empirical data, there is also a lack of research into programme initiatives intended to enhance connectivity such as ‘Community Driven Development’. Where insights and ‘lessons learned’ have been gathered, this has been at an early stage of the conflict to peace transition and from small-scale surveys. Moreover judging ‘success’ in reintegration is problematic. Unlike the D and D elements, which can be assessed from quantitative information, there is no standard methodology for evaluating the R component. And while reintegration may be evaluated as successful from a ‘macro perspective’ if there is no recurrence of conflict (i.e. a process-oriented assessment), ‘micro-level’ performance oriented assessments, based on indicators such as community security, ex-combatant employment and civic engagement (of which there are very few) can provide different indicators of reintegration. Finally, this paper is being written during a period of changing paradigms and perceptions of best practice. As such, DDR and long-term development strategies constitute something of a ‘moving target’ in terms of analysis.

1.3 Structure of the paper

This paper is divided into 2 main sections: the first section looking at best practice in (short-term) reintegration and (long term) development strategy in conflict-prone country contexts,

⁷ N. Ball and L. van der Goor (2006) *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles*, Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit.

⁸ The International Labour Organization (ILO) has determined that 10 years is necessary in order to conduct a valid study of reintegration impact.

the second looking at existing limitations to effective linkage between these two processes. In order to address the opportunities and constraints for linking DDR and long term development, the paper seeks to unpack the key issues by firstly discussing best practice in reintegration strategies (section 2). The aim here is to consider current best practice guidelines for reinsertion and reintegration, situating these processes within current thinking on integrated and connected post-conflict development programming. The focus specifically on the issue of reintegration is not intended to sideline the significance of demobilisation, disarmament and related security issues for long-term development processes but to enable specific consideration of the reintegration phase, as this is upheld as the nodal point for linkage between short- and long-term processes.

Section 3 turns away from DDR debates and focuses on the long-term development angle. It explores current international and donor agency best practice in development strategy for conflict prone and post-conflict countries. The section discusses recent initiatives that are intended to break the ‘conflict trap’ and generate pro-poor economic growth, stability and long-term development. The section identifies those tools and mechanisms (such as Needs Assessment Frameworks and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) that can be used as vehicles to connect short- and long-term processes. In order to substantiate the claim that there are ongoing and significant constraints to reintegration programming that have to be overcome before progress can be made in enhancing linkages to long-term processes, Section 4 returns to the issue of reintegration and overviews the problems experienced in recent DDR experiences. The aim here is to highlight areas of weakness in programming and to outline the limitations that these impose on efforts to forge connectivity with long-term development programmes and processes. The fifth, final section looks at technical and programming constraints in long-term development planning and considers the contradictions implicit in peace-building projects that seek to connect reintegration to market led development and economic stabilisation strategies.

2. Best Practice in Reintegration

The ‘R’ component (rehabilitation, reinsertion, reintegration and resettlement) has become a key aspect of the UN’s broader post-conflict development agenda, where it is defined as: ‘essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe [. . .] part of the general development of a country.’⁹ Reintegration programmes are conceptualised as the connecting point between DDR and national development plans. Effective reintegration programmes can enable ex-combatants to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction; enhance productive capacity and restore livelihoods; contribute to development and economic growth through the provision of training and labour; and contribute to security and prospects for peace by deconstructing military modes of behaviour and building civic awareness, citizenship and the promotion of non-violent forms of dispute resolution.¹⁰ For these reasons, best practice

⁹ UN (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 1.2 Introduction to Integrated DDR Standards. <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/01/>

¹⁰ IDDRS, 2.20 *Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks*. <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/02/20.php>

guidelines stress that reintegration processes should be embedded in a comprehensive framework for peace consolidation and economic recovery.

2.1 The Importance of Reintegration

While reinsertion is a short-term, transitional exercise¹¹ that focuses on the immediate provision of assistance such as clothes, medical assistance, tools, shelter, money or food to demobilised ex-combatants,¹² reintegration is a multidimensional: ‘complex, long-term process through which ex-combatants and their dependents are assisted to (re)settle in post war communities (the social element), become part of the decision-making process (the political element), engage in sustainable civilian employment and livelihoods (the economic aspect), as well as adjust to attitudes and expectations and/or deal with their war-related mental trauma.’¹³

Reintegration activities are valued as a good in their own right, (benefiting the ex-combatant and his or her dependents) and the wider community by facilitating prospects for peace and development.¹⁴ This can be seen on four levels.¹⁵ Firstly, reintegration serves as a form of humanitarian assistance in which all war-affected actors and constituencies - including ex-combatants – are recognised as victims; it is also a form of ‘compensatory justice’¹⁶ where: ‘ex-soldiers believe they have done their duty, either as defenders of the state or members of liberation forces and they expect their contribution to be officially recognised.’ Thirdly, reintegration allows ex-combatants to bring essential skills, ‘manpower’ and social capital to the recovery and reconstruction process.¹⁷ Finally – and linking with the benefits to the wider community, reintegration can prevent a return to conflict by addressing potential security threats. Employment and job training for reintegration for example reduce dependence on factional networks that link ex-combatants and the potential for ‘spoiler’ activity, by providing material incentives to ‘buy in’ to peace processes. This reduces the risk that ex-combatants will seek to secure unmet material need (and those of dependents) through criminal activity and violence– or engage in new forms of violence, such as domestic violence generated by feelings of frustration and perceptions of powerlessness. Countering the security risk posed by ‘idle’ ex-combatants is a pre-requisite for economic development,

¹¹ N. Ball and L. van de Goor (2006) *ibid*.

¹² S. Willibald (2006) ‘Does money work? Cash transfers to ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes’, *Disasters*, vol. 30, issue 3.
<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2005.00323.x>

¹³ G. Dzinesa (2007) ‘Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa’, *International Studies Perspective*, vol. 8; K. Kingma (2002) ‘Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 99-132.

¹⁴ N. Hitchcock (2004) ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Case of Angola’, *Conflict Trends*, vol. 1, pp. 36-40.

¹⁵ A. Heinemann-Gruder and T. Pietz (2003) *Turning Soldiers into a Workforce: Demobilisation and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Bonn: BICC; K. Kingma (2000) (ed.) *Demobilization in sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts*. Houndmills: Macmillan.

¹⁶ J. Schafer (1998) ‘A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled’: AMODEG and the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 1.

¹⁷ S. Klingebiel et al (1995) (eds) *Promoting the Reintegration of Former Female and Male Combatants in Eritrea: Possible Contributions of Development Co-operation to the Reintegration Programme*. Bonn: DIE.

with the implications of ‘post-conflict’ violence outlined in the UNDP review of ex-combatant reintegration in the Central Africa Republic:

These multiple forms of insecurity translate into muggings, armed robbery, rapes, widespread looting, and hostage taking with ransom demands [...] The most palpable consequence of this high level of insecurity is the inability of CAR authorities to effectively launch and implement their emergency socio-economic recovery programs, especially in the rural areas.¹⁸

Linked to the economic and material aspects of reintegration is the need for effective social and political reintegration. Ex-combatant participation in civic and community life is viewed as essential for peace and stability in the post-conflict period.¹⁹ The political reintegration process recasts ex-combatants as citizens allowing for the substitution of old ‘identities and emblems’ premised on and shaped by violence and conflict, with new social and cultural identities and interests. Effective political reintegration provides mechanisms through which ex-combatants can participate in defining the new post-conflict social contract and articulate their grievances and demands through pacific channels. This in turn assists in re-legitimising institutions and government and the construction of a political culture based on non-violent resolution of conflict and difference. The failure to adequately reintegrate ex-combatants both in economic and political terms has had deleterious consequences for stability in a number of country cases that include El Salvador, Nicaragua, East Timor, Namibia and Zimbabwe.²⁰ The lesson learned from these experiences is that political marginalisation, alienation, unmet need and uncompensated reward can be channelled through destabilising protest actions and the emergence of disaffected veteran’s movements which can play: ‘an important role in destabilizing the social order and polarising the political debate, becoming easy targets of populist, reactionary, and extremist movements.’²¹

2.2 Programme design

Best practice in reintegration programme design, as outlined in the SIDDR²² and IDDRS stresses that programmes should be responsive to, and informed by a detailed understanding

¹⁸ See for example UNDP (Feb 2004) *Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS) Central African Republic*. LAC reviewed document: Oxfam 2005

¹⁹ J. Gomes Porto, I. Parsons and C. Alden (2007) *From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of Unita Ex-Combatants*. Ashgate: Basingstoke. Also available at http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/MONO130FULL.PDF?link_id=25&link_id=4339&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3

²⁰ S. Gear (2002) ‘Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing ex-Combatants in the ‘New’ South Africa’, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, *Violence and Transition Series*, Vol. 8.

²¹ M. Fusato (2003) ‘Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’, in G. Burgess and H. Burgess (eds.) *Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium*, University of Colorado, Boulder. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/>. For a detailed case study of this danger using the example of Zimbabwe, see M. Musemwa (1995) ‘The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilization of the Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and the Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993’ in J. Cilliers (ed.), *Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa* (Institute for Defence Policy, South Africa), 47.

²² Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890>

of the causes of conflict, with emphasis on engaging with the diversity of country contexts and abandonment of a ‘one size fits all’ approach.²³ Political will is seen as a precondition of programme success, and to ensure this, the objectives and expected results of the reintegration programme should be clearly defined from the outset. As discussed in 2.3 of this report *Community Approaches*, participatory and ‘people centred’ approaches that incorporate ex-combatants (through veterans associations), communities and other stakeholders into the planning process is advocated at the design stage.²⁴

Integral features of reinsertion and reintegration programme design (see also 2.4 *Tools and Methods*) for the SIDDR, ILO and IDDRS include accountability and transparency; mainstreaming of gender and rights based approaches²⁵ and realistic costing and flexibility in funding structures - allowing for adaptation in volatile post-conflict contexts.²⁶ Eligibility criteria for ex-combatant entry into programmes should be established and should avoid allowing entry on the basis of weapons surrender; be based on principles of equity and; allow for equal access to reintegration opportunities for all groups facing reintegration problems – including I.D.U.s and refugees. According to the ILO: ‘the social return to including vulnerable groups in broader programmes is likely to be higher than having programmes that segregate people into different schemes.’²⁷ Where ex-combatants receive individual reintegration support, this should be limited and delivered through programmes that benefit the broader community. Effective programming ensures that: ‘receiving communities are adequately consulted and understand and accept that specifically tailored support given to ex-combatants will enhance their own security’ through comprehensive sensitisation programmes (feeding into reconciliation processes) and programmes that are designed to move quickly from being ex-combatant specific to community-based and national development oriented.²⁸ The structure of reintegration packages will typically comprise one or all of the following elements (focused by sector) outlined in Box 1 below.

Box 1: Reintegration Assistance

Stop gap programmes (developed through the transitional subsistence support strategy) that are short-term in nature, focused on projects that can facilitate ex-combatant reintegration into the community (such as road building and infrastructure repair), ease the transition from demobilisation to reintegration and occupy the ex-combatant while more comprehensive and targeted reintegration opportunities are being developed. Links between infrastructure works and long-term sustainable employment can be forged.

Education, training and skills development programmes through educational provision and

²³ IDDRS. See also ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*.

2.2 General Framework for Design and Implementation of Reintegration Programmes
<http://www2.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/training/publ/pub21.htm>

²⁴ See for example K.Kingma (ed.) (2000) *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, *ibid*.

²⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).

²⁶ IDDRS Section 3.20 *DDR Programme Design*.

²⁷ ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*, *ibid*.

²⁸ IDDRS 3.20 *DDR Programme Design*

scholarship programmes, practically oriented vocational training, apprenticeships, on-the-job training and life skill development.²⁹ This in turn means that sustainable reintegration develops the capacity (and technical resources) of national, regional and local training and educational institutions.

Employment creation programmes through linkage with the private sector and programming in the informal economy. This should be “linked to patterns of demand for goods and services, and in particular should be co-ordinated with infrastructure availability and rehabilitation.”³⁰

Livelihood and income generation through the promotion of private sector and business development services (the latter addressing constraints faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, technical skills, market access and information), employment in existing enterprises, micro-and small business start-ups and the provision of micro-grants.³¹

Source: ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*.

2.3 Community-based approaches

A strong relationship with the community is designated by the SIDDR and IDDRS as a vital entry point for reintegration activity. Receiving communities are: ‘a principal partner in DDR programmes, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome.’ The community becomes the stakeholder and ‘owner’ of reintegration: ‘While national and international support is essential to create the basis for reintegration, it ultimately comes about as a result of sustainable, community-driven efforts.’³² Current community based approaches build on earlier UN initiatives such as the UNDP PRODERE³³ programme in Central America and the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme in Tajikistan.

Box 2: Community-Based Approaches (USAID and Office of Transition Initiatives)

Description	<u>Support is provided to build the foundations for participatory decision-making at the community level on the immediate priorities for rehabilitation, recovery, and/or survival needs.</u> Representatives from local government, NGOs, and civil society decide on priority activities and implement them together. Activities might include improvements to schools, water, health, and sanitation facilities.
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To re-establish informal local governance in situations of a chaotic or failed state and in the absence of a functioning national government. ▪ To demonstrate the benefits of participatory decision-making through tangible projects that have immediate benefits.

²⁹ Civilian social behaviour, non-violent conflict resolution and career planning. See for example ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*. *Ibid.* <http://www2.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/training/publ/pub21.htm>

³⁰ ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*. *Ibid.*

³¹ Disbursed in instalments and on the basis of a clear start up plan. Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs) in Cambodia and Central America are cited as a successful model for micro-entrepreneurial development in post-conflict contexts. The LEDAs delivered business training, credit and counselling to micro and small enterprises and facilitated dialogue to identify business opportunities.

³² IDDRS *ibid.*

³³ Development Programme for Displaced, Repatriated and Refugee Populations, funded by the Italian Government.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To bring former enemies together to decide common priorities. ▪ To build trust among participants (including trust between the community and donors). ▪ To identify and facilitate the growth of new leadership within the community.
Prerequisites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There must be access to the vulnerable populations who will form community groups. ▪ Communities must be willing to provide labour or other in-kind contributions to ensure local ownership.
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Create informal local rehabilitation/development councils with wide community participation. ▪ Support activities identified by local associations such as shelter, livestock, and income generation. ▪ Fund grants to communities to repair and re-open community centers, markets, and schools that benefit everyone. ▪ Find relevant international NGOs and donors to meet community needs in delivery of health and education services. ▪ Establish links between public officials and ordinary citizens through organization and implementation of community improvement projects.
Examples	<p>In Kosovo (1999-2001), OTI helped establish <u>Community Improvement Councils</u> (CICs) composed of 12-15 people reflecting the diversity of their local population. They identified their community's priority reconstruction needs and OTI provided the material resources. Together, OTI and the CICs implemented 375+ community improvement projects. The CICs emerged as representatives of their communities, providing other donors and international organizations with information on real needs and priorities as defined by Kosovars themselves. To facilitate positive, community-based interaction among diverse groups of people in Macedonia (2001-2003) and to encourage citizen participation in community decision-making, OTI supported 210 multi-ethnic initiatives through small grants in its first year. In 2002, approximately 5,000 people were directly involved in identifying, designing, and implementing these local projects, while tens of thousands participated in and benefited from them. Projects included small-scale infrastructure reconstruction, such as repair of schools and clinics; removal of hate graffiti; rehabilitation of parks, cultural centres, and recreation facilities to promote positive social interaction between groups; and multi-cultural events such as volunteer clean-up days, concerts, sports competitions, dance performances, summer camps, and art exhibitions. OTI-funded projects brought together different ethnic groups, members of opposing political parties, and different age groups, some for the first time since the conflict. By providing immediate, tangible signs of peace and progress at the community level, OTI worked to make hope a reality.</p>

Source: OTI and UNDP/ERD, *Community-Based Approaches in Reintegration and Rehabilitation*, October 2000.

The use of community organizations, veterans' associations³⁴ and informal localised networks and discussion groups in reintegration processes delivers multiple dividends according to the best practice guidelines of international and donor agencies.³⁵ They allow communities to identify their own development needs; prevent 'inconsistency between the perception of needs at the central level and actual needs of communities'³⁶ and enhance monitoring and transparency: 'if, on publicly accessible criteria, some communities gain disproportionately to their needs, it will be clear for all to see.'³⁷ Community and informal and veteran's networks also have value as vehicles for political reconciliation and political reintegration, providing a locus for sensitisation and reconciliation activities, with well designed, community based reintegration programmes allowing space for complex processes of peace building and dispute settlement capacity to be addressed. Ireland, Nicaragua, East Timor, Rwanda and South Africa count among a number of countries that have facilitated community healing and reconciliation through localised victim / ex-combatant dialogue processes.³⁸ Localisation / informalisation also creates a framework for broad political discussion: 'which is concerned with collective responses to conflict-created needs', facilitating the articulation of collective rather than subjective interests,³⁹ promoting civic awareness.

Box 3: Institutionalising Veterans Associations

The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB)

- The UVAB was created by the Government of Uganda to facilitate the demobilisation and reintegration of 36,400 National Resistance Army soldiers. The Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme (UVAP), co-ordinated by the World Bank and implemented between 1992 and 1996 - additionally addressed the needs of 125,000 dependents. The UVAP provided a transitional safety net designed to meet basic needs for a six-month period and counselling and training. While economic reintegration proceeded relatively successfully, social reintegration was initially hindered by community mistrust despite high-level sensitisation campaigns.
- Over the longer term- the return of veterans was seen to improve security. Key lessons identified by the World Bank stressed: the importance of political will and institutional implementation capacity – with the benefits of central coordination through a temporary agency, balanced by decentralizing implementation authority to the communities particularly emphasised; needs-based preparatory planning; provision of non-transferable discharge certificate; identification of opportunities for veterans in product and factor markets; continuous information to beneficiaries about opportunities and constraints and; effective donor co-ordination.
- The ease and success of reintegration was found to be determined by 'the interplay of a

³⁴ The AMODEG (Associacao Mocambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra) in Mozambique is frequently cited as an example of the importance of veterans' associations as a form of social capital in support of economic and social reintegration

³⁵ See Ball, Nicole (1997) 'Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa', pp. 85–105 in K. Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; M. Berdal (1996) *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Institute for Strategic Studies.

³⁶ ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*. *Ibid.*

³⁷ ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*. *Ibid.*

³⁸ See for example B. Greenbaum (2005) *Evaluation of the 2005 Ex-Combatants' Dialogues*, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation <http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papgreen.htm>

³⁹ ILO (1997) *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*. *Ibid.*

community's physical and social capital and a veteran's financial and human capital'.

Source: <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/infobeng/infob12e.htm>

In particular, the engagement of local and national media in the dissemination of information about reintegration activities is emphasised. This enhances popular knowledge and understanding of reintegration beneficiaries, activities and programme objectives, reducing potential perceptions of injustice and grievance.⁴⁰ To summarise, three general approaches to reintegration can be identified, with applicability determined by the nature, length and type of conflict, the manner of the conflict's resolution and the post-conflict recovery priorities.

Box 4: Tailoring Reintegration Approaches

Approach	Purpose	Objective	Characteristics	Activities
Short-term stabilization (reinsertion)	Draw ex-combatants away from fighting / criminality until a peace mission is deployed, or security sector or political reform is completed.	Provide rapid transitional support for resettlement and short-term income-generation opportunities to potentially disruptive ex-combatants.	Low cost per ex-combatant. Short-term. Only viable when ex-combatants do not represent a long-term security threat.	Information, counselling and referral services. Transitional support schemes (food, clothing, transportation, other). Short-term labour-intensive projects.
Ex-combatant-focused reintegration	Provide ex-combatants with tailored, individually focused sustainable solutions for long-term reintegration.	Engage ex-combatants in sustainable micro-projects to reduce the long-term security risks they present.	Higher cost per ex-combatant. Can create feelings of unfairness within community. To be used when ex-combatants represent a long-term threat to security.	Information, counselling and referral services. Micro project development through grants. Training, technical advisory and related support services.
Community-based reintegration	Provide communities with tools and capacities to support reintegration of ex-combatants, together with IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups.	Supports ex-combatant reintegration as a component of wider, community-focused reconciliation and recovery programmes.	Highest cost per ex-combatant. May not address ex-combatants' concerns directly. Addresses needs of community as a whole.	Community projects with greater inclusion of all social actors. Peace-building and reconciliation activities. Local security enhancement activities.

Source: USAID / OTI

2.4 Tools and Methods

Data collection tools for programme design are a mechanism for linking reintegration to long-term development programmes. Economic reintegration opportunities – through training, wage- or self-employment need to be identified through early, detailed, comprehensive, disaggregated, gender sensitive and regularly updated data collection, mapping and assessment of socio-economic conditions, the labour market and the political and security

⁴⁰ Job referral services, public information about the duration, beneficiaries and success of reintegration projects.

situation. These data collection processes that frame reintegration programme design, such as the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) provide an opportunity for reintegration to:⁴¹ ‘link seamlessly with long-term poverty reduction and development activities’⁴² through wider national recovery programmes and strategies such as Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA),⁴³ transitional results matrices or frameworks (TRMs/TRFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Box 5: Data Collation for Reintegration Design

Labour and Markets

- What is the local demand for goods, services and labour (skilled, unskilled)?
- What are potential areas for new market growth and economic reintegration opportunities?
- Are there cultural or social labour norms relating to sex divisions or sex specific restrictions in the labour market?
- Can youth and older children enter the labour market safely? Is legislation in place to protect children from exposure to the worst forms of child labour?
- Have labour norms changed during the conflict?
- Which services (social- and business-related; public and private) are available? Can services be made available easily? Who supplies services, or can supply them? What support is required to upgrade services that are essential for reintegration?
- What other war-affected groups are present in the area (or will return), and what type of assistance will they receive? What are their needs? Can the reintegration programme indirectly supply their needs?

Economic

- What is the overall economic situation of the country?
- Which are the most dynamic, or potentially dynamic, economic sectors? Do these sectors present reintegration opportunities for both male and female ex-combatants and for adults, youth and older children?
- What other opportunities are, or can be, available to former combatants, given their existing skill sets? How can their skills be improved in a way that increases their employability?
- Have opportunities for public–private partnerships been explored?

Infrastructure

- What infrastructure exists to allow economic activity to take place (e.g., roads, communications, electricity supplies, etc.)? Where are the worst bottlenecks?

Services

- What business development services are available, and where? What services could be developed with minimal support?

Training providers

- What education and training providers and institutions exist? What subjects/skills and age groups do they specialize in?
- What capacity do they have to support the DDR programme?

⁴¹ The UNDAF links programmes to national priorities, including the Millennium Development Goals.

⁴² IDDRS. Ibid.

⁴³ Generally prepared by the World Bank and the UN, the PCNA defines short- (12–24 months) and medium-term (24–60 months) recovery priorities and financial requirements on the basis of an overall long-term recovery goal. International donors’ conferences are built around the PCNA document.

Having assessed best practice in reintegration, the following section addresses current strategies for long-term development in post-conflict country contexts in order to highlight points of linkage, institutional coordination and programmatic convergence.

3. Post Conflict Development: Connecting Reintegration and Long Term Development

The 2000s saw an enhanced appreciation among donors and the IFIs of the challenge of operating in post-conflict environments.⁴⁴ Specifically there was awareness of the need to address the economic determinants of the conflict ‘trap’⁴⁵ (with the evidence that post-conflict countries have a 44 per cent chance of reverting to conflict during the first five years after the onset of peace) and boost economic development in order to reduce the opportunity costs of armed rebellion. In revised strategies for development (and conflict reduction), conflict sensitivity is stressed under the ‘do no harm’ principle and poverty is addressed as a multidimensional phenomenon that has multiple and interlinked causes.⁴⁶ This refinement of approaches has been underpinned by the emergence of new perspectives on security, specifically the growing prominence of the human security perspective⁴⁷ and the integration of a rights based approach to development.⁴⁸ This is based on a: ‘growing recognition of the crucial links between human rights violations, poverty, exclusion, vulnerability and conflict.’⁴⁹

3.1 Improving Financial Assistance to Conflict Afflicted States

In recognition of the complex proliferation and resulting shortcomings in donor aid provision, donors and national governments issued the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, with the aim of reducing transaction costs and optimising the anti-poverty and growth

⁴⁴ P. Uvin (2002) ‘The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms’, *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1;

⁴⁵ Collier et al, (2003), ‘*Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*’, *ibid*; Collier and Hoeffler (2005), ‘*Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict*’, *ibid*. Collier (2004), ‘Development and Conflict’, Centre for the Study of African Economies. *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ The DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (2001); <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/14/2672735.pdf>

⁴⁷ R. Paris (2001) ‘Human Security, Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 2; L. Axworthy (1997) ‘Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership’, *International Journal*, vol. 52, no. 2, Spring.; UNDP (1994) *United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; UN Commission on Human Security (2003) *Human Security Now*; S. Alkire (2003) ‘A Conceptual Framework for Human Security’ Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

⁴⁸ World Bank (2005), *Equity and Development. World Development Report 2006*, Washington, DC; UNDP (2005), *Human Development Report (2005). International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World*, New York. D. Kaufmann (2005) ‘Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge’ in P. Alston and M. Robinson (eds.), *Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 352-402.

⁴⁹ OECD (2007) Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development; OECD (2006) *The Development Dimension: Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and Challenges*, OECD Development Dimension Series, http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,fr_2649_34565_37045656_1_1_1_1,00.html. O. Thoms and J. Ron (2007) ‘Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?’ *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp.674–705, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

inducing impacts of increased levels of aid. The Paris Declaration stressed five partnership principles: developing country leadership on development policies and plans (ownership); that donors base support on the recipient countries development strategies and systems (alignment); that donors coordinate aid (harmonisation); that donors and recipient countries orient their activities toward desired results (managing for results) and are accountable to each other (mutual accountability).

In relation to conflict afflicted states, financial assistance flows had traditionally been volatile and dependent on a limited number of donors.⁵⁰ In order to address this, the donor community devised a model of best practice for international engagement (see Box 6 below), supported by an annual reporting system *Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States*.⁵¹ This aimed to improve transparency and coordination among donors and, building on the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, counter the negative impact of volatile and weak aid flows, while drawing donor's attention to the importance of sequencing development, diplomatic and security efforts in conflict afflicted countries.

Box 6: Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

- Avoid unintentional exclusionary effects of uncoordinated donor behaviour and address the problem of 'aid orphans'
- Act fast when windows of opportunity arise;
- Stay engaged long enough, especially in post-conflict situations, and
- Reduce the destabilising effects of volatile patterns of international engagement.

Recognising the limited capacity of conflict affected countries to implement public finance and related reforms necessary for debt relief and lending that was integral for post conflict reconstruction, the IMF and World Bank devised new lending modalities that included Post Conflict Fund grants and pre-arrears clearance grants to post-conflict countries with large and protracted arrears (2001). This freed up resources, creating an enabling environment for reconstruction and long-term development. A third mechanism for mobilising flexible financing for essential or urgent activities in conflict affected countries was the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) initiative.

Box 7: Lending Initiatives to Post Conflict Countries

The Post-Conflict Fund

- Established in 1997 as part of the World Bank's Development Grant Facility (DGF)
- The aim of the PCF is to position the Bank for constructive engagement in countries where normal instruments cannot be used or may not be appropriate.
- PCF grants (which range from \$25,000 to \$1 million) place a premium on: (i) innovative

⁵⁰ Central African Republic, Togo, Liberia, Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe rely mainly on three donors, which account for more than 50% of their total net ODA respectively. OECD (2005) *Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States* Unclassified DCD (2006) http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,fr_2649_33693550_33964254_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD (2006) Development Cooperation Directorate *Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2005 Report*, Fragile States Group (FSG).

⁵¹ OECD Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, *ibid*.

approaches to conflict and development; (ii) partnerships with donors, the UN system and NGOs; (iii) appropriate exit strategies, especially in terms of potential for replicability and scaling up; and (iv) scope for using grants to leverage additional funding and thus enhance impact.

- Grant proposals are approved by the PCF Committee that includes representatives from the Social Development Department and CPR Unit
- In 1999, range of grants broadened to include conflict analysis, capacity building, community development, youth-at-risk, psychosocial and mental health in post-conflict populations, and focused research on the causes of conflict.
- 126 projects in 37 countries have been approved since 1997, financed with grants worth \$63.5m. Examples include grants to support delivery of health services through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Somalia; an action plan on HIV/AIDS in Somalia; a project to empower women through socioeconomic development in Tajikistan; capacity building and development in Timor-Leste and reintegration of street children in urban areas of DRC.

Pre-Arrears Clearance Grants

- Measures performance by a set of 12 Post-Conflict Progress Indicators (PCPI) designed specifically for post-conflict countries
- Allows for exceptional levels of international development assistance for up to 4 years (an increase from the initial 3 years, but with lower levels of initial assistance in line with low levels of ‘absorptive capacity’). This is followed by a 3 year ‘phase down’ to performance-based norms
- PCPI ratings are clustered around security and reconciliation; economic recovery; and social inclusion and social development
- Post-conflict countries eligible for exceptional IDA allocations based on PCPI ratings, may receive up to 40% of their IDA allocation as grants for a limited period once their arrears have been cleared.

Multidonor Trust Funds

- West Bank Gaza: 27 donors \$269 million Holst Fund + coupled with a \$380 million trust fund from Bank net income;
- Bosnia: \$150 million trust fund for emergency projects (\$25 million in grants, \$125 million in concessional loans);
- Timor-Leste: \$80 million multi-donor trust fund started with \$10 million of Bank net income
- Sierra Leone: administration of a \$12 million multi-donor trust fund for DDR, in tandem with a \$25million IDA credit for the reintegration of war-affected populations; and
- Greater Great Lakes Region: \$350 million trust fund for demobilization and reintegration.

Regional financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank assumed an increasingly influential lending, collaboration and co-ordination role.

3.1.1 Needs Assessments

Heightened sensitivity to conflict contexts catalysed methodological and typological refinement of programming environments (represented by the weak, fragile and failing states agenda) and the introduction of new conflict sensitive tools (such as Conflict Analysis Frameworks, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments) and needs assessment strategies,⁵² such as the humanitarian needs assessment (dealing with the immediate conflict / post conflict environment); the UNs Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and World Bank's Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS).⁵³ These address short- to medium-term reconstruction and rehabilitation priorities, feeding into long-term development planning exercises, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Needs assessments have the potential to become the principle mechanism for embedding reintegration into development strategies.⁵⁴ The assessments determine short- and medium-term recovery and rehabilitation priorities, serving as a mechanism for raising and structuring lending and financial support. As outlined in Box 7 needs assessments have multiple objectives: serving as a vehicle for a mutually agreed transition strategy among stakeholders; overcoming the consequences of conflict; preventing renewed conflict; shaping recovery priorities; establishing the financial implications of addressing immediate needs and; linking short and medium-term priorities to long term goals.⁵⁵ The value of the Needs Assessment is that it can connect the CCA and UNDAF to longer-term strategies such as the PRSPs, enabling coordination of planning. The Assessment process also emphasises stakeholder participation including through workshops and validation meetings, enabling DDR planners and practitioners to feed into assessment and analysis of the post-conflict phase. Stakeholder engagement and consultation also provides a forum for representatives of ex-combatants (and at the local level, the ex-combatants themselves) to articulate their needs and interests into the overall development process, while providing an arena for the training and employment offered through reintegration packages to inform or be informed by national and local development strategies. Here, the community is a vital actor representing an agglomeration of stakeholders through the Community Based Approaches, (discussed in Section 2), which can provide a natural bridge from reintegration to long-term focused programme and project development.

At the institutional level, moves to harness linkages are represented by the creation of integrated post conflict reconstruction units such as the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR) in the World Bank. In 2002, UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank began collaboration on the '4Rs' initiative, posited as an innovative tool for: 'bridging repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction processes to promote durable

⁵² Such as the World Banks Conflict Analysis Framework. See FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004) *Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches*, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld. http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html

⁵³ World Bank (1997) *A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See for example, GTZ - T. Schaef (2004) *Working Paper 9. Case Study Liberia: Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNAs): Case Study Liberia*. In Country Study. Eschborn and GTZ - C. Schenk (2004) *Working Paper 7. Case Study East Timor: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Needs Assessment in Timor Leste: Lessons Learnt and Good Practices*. In-Country Study. Eschborn.

⁵⁵ See GTZ *Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*. Working Paper No. 11. Eschborn.

solutions for refugees and displaced populations, and thus contribute to poverty reduction.’ Three pilot countries, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, were chosen to trial the approach, which seeks to promote inter-agency co-ordination and maximum flexibility for field staff.

Box 7: Post-Conflict Framework Assessments

Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) ⁵⁶

- A key entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and financing post-conflict recovery strategies.
- A complex analytical process led by the national authorities, supported by the international community and carried out by multilateral agencies (UN and World Bank) on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil society.
- Aims to overcome consequences of conflict or war, prevent renewed outbreak and shape the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulate their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal.
- Provides donors, national authorities, (NGOs) and other stakeholders, with a comprehensive and fairly objective estimate of needs and recovery priorities
- Provides a conceptual basis for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and World Bank and UN country strategies (Country Assistance Strategy—CAS; and UN Development Framework—UNDAF, respectively).

Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)

- Prepared by the World Bank for active borrowers from the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to determine IFI financial, technical or advisory support levels;
- The starting point of the CAS is the country’s own development vision, as defined in a PRSP or other country-owned process.
- Developed in consultation with country authorities, civil society organizations, development partners and stakeholders.
- Sets out a selective program of IFI support and designed to promote collaboration and coordination among development partners in a country.
- Includes a comprehensive diagnosis of the development challenges facing the country, including the incidence, trends, and causes of poverty.
- Identifies key areas where IFI assistance can have the biggest impact on poverty reduction.
- Takes into account the country’s creditworthiness, state of institutional development, implementation capacity, governance, and other sectoral and cross-cutting issues.
- Implementation and progress in achieving stated outcomes is tracked through a framework of targets and indicators to monitor Bank Group.

⁵⁶ August 2004 UNDG Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations

3.1.2 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

The PRSP process is intended to place poverty reduction at the heart of development objectives by establishing a framework for ensuring government and donor coherence in identifying and designing policy interventions that deliver pro-poor economic growth.⁵⁷ The PRSP structures relations between the donor community and recipient country, with approval of the PSRP by the IMF and World Bank providing a basis for concessional lending and debt relief under the HIPC Initiative.

Box 8: Design Principles of PRSPs

- Country specificity, ownership and leadership, with broad input from civil society, elected institutions, key donors and relevant IFIs;
- Development from an understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty and the links between public actions and poverty outcomes, recognizing that sustained poverty reduction will not be possible without rapid economic growth and:
- Orientation toward achieving outcome-related goals for poverty reduction

There is a strong emphasis on instituting participatory approaches in the PSRP, with best practice for the second generation of PRSPs emphasising: ‘regular public-private dialogue (PPD) by sub-sector or at the appropriate policy level, combined with bottom-up communication processes to ensure that local-level issues are fed into higher level policy processes’. This creates a vehicle for linking reintegration to longer-term strategies, by engaging development planners with local level needs and interests at an early stage. It also creates a ‘voice’ and stake in the peace process, undercutting the potential for the exclusion and marginalisation of ex-combatants and their communities. There are also political benefits to be gained, with dialogue and consultation assisting in the re-legitimisation of government and formal political processes, reducing perceptions of alienation and exclusion that could be manifest through recourse to violence. The new best practice PRSP approach also stresses the need to broaden-out private sector representation to representatives and participants from the informal sector and small and medium enterprises. This creates another channel for designing models of sustainable reintegration by linking training and employment strategy to long term development planning.⁵⁸

Of the 30 countries that completed the first PRSP process and 22 that finalised the interim PRSP, 25 were conflict affected. Experience from this first round drew attention to the immense institutional, economic and social challenges post-conflict countries face in devising their PRSPs.⁵⁹ This has resulted in recognition of the need for greater flexibility in developing the PRSP framework in conflict affected countries and understanding that: ‘PRSPs in conflict-affected countries [...] should look and feel very different from other countries’ – specifically though a more detailed focus on factors that affect the risk of

⁵⁷ On pro-poor growth see World Bank (2005) ‘Pro-poor Growth in the 1990s. Lessons and Insights from 14 countries’. Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth Research Program, The World Bank, Washington DC.

⁵⁸ OECD DAC (1999) *Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation*, http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34541_1887516_1_1_1_1,00.html

⁵⁹ *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda*, *ibid*.

conflict.⁶⁰ Leading from this, and indicative of the new flexible and conflict sensitive approach, there is greater acknowledgement of the potentially destabilising effects of over-emphasising macroeconomic stability and state re-structuring in conflict affected countries, specifically when restoring macroeconomic balance is seen as a trade off with popular demands for social welfare. According to the World Bank: ‘Social policy is relatively more important and macro-policy relatively less important in post-conflict countries’ and that: ‘relative to the normal post-conflict strategies adopted, social policy should be assigned somewhat higher priority.’⁶¹ This recognition of the importance of flexibility in the PRSP process allows reintegration needs (such as employment creation) to be factored into long-term development strategy.

3.2 New Best Practice Approaches

In addition to the opportunities presented by Needs Assessment and PSRP processes for linking reintegration and long-term development, new best practice in development approaches (the Post-Washington Consensus or Pro-Poor Agenda) also provides a structural framework for designing policies that can improve linkages and create an environment conducive to successful reintegration.

3.2.1 Dialogue and participation

Integral to the revised pro-poor approach is an emphasis on broad-based formal and informal mechanisms for dialogue, consultation and participation because; ‘Without equitable dialogue, governments follow the loudest, most powerful voices, which rarely speak in the best interest of broad-based private sector growth, let alone poverty reduction.’⁶² In order to ensure pro-poor outcomes, the policy process: ‘must build on structures and process that are deliberately set up to elicit citizen participation in policy formulation and implementation, and promote accountability of policy makers.’⁶³ Expanding mechanisms for dialogue and participation - horizontally and vertically – from the national level down to local communities is now prioritised for the construction of legitimate, broad based and responsive development policies.⁶⁴ Communities are at the core of aid and development thinking, on the basis that they are better positioned to identify recovery priorities.

The community driven development approach (CDD) is particularly stressed in post-conflict country contexts. A key operating principle of the World Bank, the CDD approach: ‘typically tries to improve a low level, stable equilibrium of service provision and community infrastructure’.⁶⁵ CDD has evolved into community-driven reconstruction (CDR) that:

⁶⁰ *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, ibid.*

⁶¹ *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda. I bid.*

⁶² OECD DAC (2006) *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development*, Section 6, ‘Constructing Inclusive Public-Private Dialogue’. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/40/36563837.pdf>

⁶³ OECD DAC (2006) *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. Ibid.*

⁶⁴ OECD DAC (1997) *Final Report of the DAC Ad hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance*. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/12/1894642.pdf>

⁶⁵ The World Bank has supported CDD projects in Rwanda, Colombia (the Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio) and Timor Leste (Community Empowerment Project). In Rwanda, this focused on support for the reintegration of returning refugees, social rehabilitation and decentralization. In Colombia, the project supported community based participatory approach to development and peace and the Timor Leste initiative

‘generally aims to support reconstruction following large devastation caused by conflict, and in situations of great economic, institutional and communal flux.’ The demand-led approach of the CDR process is seen by the World Bank as an innovative way of bridging the relief to development gap, by allowing communities to: ‘drive the reconstruction process without the need to label activities emergency or developmental.’ The CDD and CDR approach presents a valuable opportunity for connecting reintegration to short-, medium- and long-term development, specifically were Community Based Approaches to reintegration allow for an established and identifiable community of stakeholders to be engaged in CDD. Here, the best practice framework for reintegration naturally parlays into a community of stakeholders in reconstruction and development strategy, programmes and processes.

3.2.2 *The Private Sector*

New best practice approaches from international and donor agencies operating in conflict prone countries continues to emphasise the role of the private sector – in line with the original Washington Consensus model. Improvements in the investment climate (enforcing property and contract rights, reducing corruption, reforming tax and regulatory regimes) are seen as a driver of economic growth and poverty reduction, with the private sector a principal actor in breaking the conflict trap.⁶⁶ However, best practice has moved away from an emphasis on supply-side interventions (focused on ‘large’ private economic interests) toward market-side support that promotes an enabling environment for sustainable and ‘inclusive’ patterns of private sector and pro-poor growth.⁶⁷ As outlined by OECD DAC: ‘The emerging pro-poor agenda for private sector development is both different and broader than the previous agenda.’⁶⁸ Consequently interventions to boost the private sector can be designed to strengthen the connections between reintegration and long-term development.

The focus now is on designing incentives to private sector activity that can allow for: ‘more and better jobs, higher incomes, better returns on goods sold and greater affordability of essential goods and services.’⁶⁹ Where implemented, this can enhance links between reintegration, reconstruction and development by promoting private sector participation in the design of reintegration strategies and by forging a macro-economic environment conducive to better identification and targeting of ex-combatant educational and training needs, and the creation of micro-credit frameworks that can stimulate small and medium business development and linkages into the broader economy. This undercuts the tendency for template approaches, such as schemes that train ex-combatants for non-existent jobs or which provide skills that are not appropriately matched to economic and development objectives.⁷⁰ Early consultation with an incentivised private sector can reap significant economic and

funded the creation of democratically elected village development councils and provided funds so they could undertake local reconstruction projects

⁶⁶ World Development Report (2005) *A Better Business Climate for Everyone*. Washington, D.C.; World Bank (2005) Pro-Poor growth in the 1990s Lessons and Insights from 14 Countries. *Ibid*.

⁶⁷ OECD (2004) ‘Accelerating Pro-Poor Growth through Support for Private Sector Development. An Analytical Framework’, Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris

⁶⁸ OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. *Ibid*.

⁶⁹ OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. *Ibid*.

⁷⁰ Becker (2003), *Private Sector Development in (Post)-Conflict Situations - Experience by Inter-national Organizations*, Draft Report 15.04.2003, GTZ, Eschborn

political dividends, enhancing development synergies across the violence to peace continuum while providing a stake for both the private sector and ex-combatants in peace and the national development 'vision'. Context specific interventions can: 'be used as a vehicle to create short-term employment opportunities during the fragile transition to peace. Small-scale infrastructure programmes can be designed to promote local businesses', while 'large-scale economic infrastructure programmes can, if properly timed and coordinated, make significant contributions to the long-term productivity of businesses.'⁷¹

A further significant revision in best practice relates to understanding of the *informal sector*. Previously policies to encourage formalisation were stressed but these have been challenged by the 'decent work' approach that emphasises the importance of: 'recognising and maximising the contribution of [...] informal enterprises, family-run farms and self-employed people.'⁷² This is particularly beneficial for poverty reduction for poor and marginalised groups, such as women and arguably ex-combatants, by allowing their contribution to, and benefits from economic growth to be captured, expanded and facilitated.⁷³ More broadly, with its emphasis on disaggregated value chain analysis, the new market-side approach to private sector development allows obstacles to the potential economic contribution of poor groups, to be identified and minimised, serving as a valuable tool in the design of reintegration strategies and allowing for a connection between reintegration packages and broader national development plans.⁷⁴

3.2.3 Financial Sector

The emphasis on pro-poor growth has catalysed a significant re-evaluation of donor approaches to the financial sector. Best practice now places less emphasis on the privatization of provision (which led to the consolidation, centralisation and reduced availability of banking and credit in the 1980s and 1990s) and stresses donor support for the start up and financing of geographically spread microfinance institutions; linkages between microfinance and the banking sector and; encouragement of a solid institutional and legal environment in order to promote broader and deeper financial sector activity and access. As with other elements of the new best practice guidelines, implementation of this approach by national authorities, donors and the private sector can be integrated with community based reintegration and reconstruction processes, providing structural mechanisms for sustainable community development and successful reintegration through support to livelihoods and employment opportunities.

The previous two section points to the evolution and institutionalisation of approaches in reintegration and long-term development practice that can maximise success in reintegration

⁷¹ GTZ (2006) *Private Sector Development in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes*: Eschborn.

⁷² From this perspective, the informal economy is recognised as a long-term, structural feature of economic development. Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development, OECD 2006

⁷³ Cartmill, 1999; Tzannatos, 1999; The Gender, Institutions and Development Database, <http://www.oecd.org/dev/institutions/GIDdatabase>

⁷⁴ Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development, OECD 2006 p 54; Beck (2004). 'Finance, inequality and poverty: Cross country Evidence', World Bank Policy, Research Paper WPS33338, 2004; DFID 'The Importance of Financial Sector Development for Growth and Poverty Reduction; DFID, August 2004

by bridging this to post-conflict reconstruction strategies and priorities. The following two sections address the limitations of these policies and assumptions, demonstrating that there is still a long way to go before effective connections from short- to long-term process and programmes can be made.

4. Operationalising Best Practice in Reintegration: Challenges and Constraints

There are grandiose expectations relating to the synergies between reintegration and long-term development and peacebuilding. But as this section outlines, reintegration activities, and DDR processes more broadly, demonstrate significant limitations. Best practice in documentation and declaratory statements has yet to translate into effective reintegration experiences on the ground. Until these problems within DDR as a ‘standalone’ programming area are addressed, it is highly unlikely that the expectations of connectivity and linkage can be realised, and the process of effectively embedding DDR into national development strategies accomplished.

4.1 Community Approaches and Local Ownership

The emphasis on local ownership and community engagement in DDR design and programming fails to engage with serious impediments to the roll-out of this type of approach. While there have been successful examples of community-based and delivered DDR,⁷⁵ the limitations are inadequately addressed in the documentation. Firstly, community approaches are not necessarily appropriate, or easily embedded in certain country contexts. The most successful experiences have been in those countries where ex-combatants had already begun to rebuild their communities before the DDR process began (Uganda, Somaliland and Eritrea⁷⁶) or never left the community setting (for example URNG in Guatemala⁷⁷). These factors do not pertain to all post-conflict settings, many of which have few community-based NGOs or history of community-oriented development and reconciliation processes. The scale of the conflict (which can vary from region to region and community to community) also impacts on the capacity to implement community based approaches. In Sierra Leone, the former head of the DDR commission emphasised the lack of viable communities into which former combatants could reintegrate: ‘Many refugees and displaced people were still returning home and much basic infrastructure from schools to health clinics had to be rebuilt. Helping such communities revive was an enormous task.’⁷⁸

A second problem lies in defining ‘the community’, particularly in the dislocation of the post-conflict context. There is a tendency in the best practice guidelines to simplify the

⁷⁵ Exceptions being successful community based programmes in Uganda, Somaliland and Eritrea

⁷⁶ M. Berdal (1996) *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Institute for Strategic Studies; E. M. Bruchhaus and M. Amanuel (2000) “‘Leaving the Warm House’: The Impact of Demobilization in Eritrea”, pp. 95–131 in K. Kingma (ed.) *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts*. *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ R. Arroyo (1999) *Fase de la Incorporación inicial de los Miembros de la UNRG a la Vida Civil*. Guatemala: Fundación Guillermo Toriello.

⁷⁸ E. Harsch, (2005) ‘When war ends: transforming Africa’s fighters into builders’ *Africa Renewal*, vol.19.

complexities and intra-group dynamics of individual communities. In an exploration of the reintegration of forcibly abducted people (FAPs) in Uganda, Muwonge⁷⁹ found that:

Community based reintegration suffers from a lack of shared vision between the community and the FAPs. While the community provides the basic necessities for survival, the FAPs generally feel that this is insufficient given what they have been forced to endure. This failure to anticipate the expectations of the FAPs is at the heart of the dysfunction within the IDP community.

Thirdly, ex-combatant preference for urban reintegration can pose operational challenges for community based approaches, which are typically more sustainable and effective when focused on rural areas and in cases where ex-combatants return to their former communities. The case studies from Liberia, the Balkans and Central America reflect the difficulty of locating and monitoring urban-based ex-combatants and of rolling out community-based approaches where the ex-combatant has no history of living in the community of return. Moreover the momentum of top-down approaches is underestimated. According to Muggah: 'DDR is usually mandated by UN Security Council resolutions, terms and timelines are determined by outside donors and the process is usually part of on-going peace operations. Thus by definition it is top-down.'⁸⁰ The danger that existing structures and processes at the community level may be undermined by 'externally imposed' DDR programmes has been flagged and reintegration programmes criticised as donor driven exercises that fail to connect with community needs. In Sierra Leone: 'DDR had community-oriented dimensions, but it did not draw upon a community participatory approach or for communities to be the prime beneficiaries [...] the lack of community-informed perspectives and participation in some of its programming as they were rolled out had significant negative impacts.'⁸¹ In East Timor, Peake found that the community-based RESPECT programme was overly complicated, flawed in design, had no clear audience, lacked monitoring and suffered from an absence of local ownership and government buy-in.⁸²

Where community-based initiatives have been launched in a favourable environment, they have repeatedly suffered from a lack of donor and national level financing. Community-level activities are not accorded the level of importance as national reconstruction and peacebuilding initiatives, in either financial or legislative terms. Linked with this, community connections to long-term development and peacebuilding is weak, and mechanisms for articulating local aims and ambitions to national policy strategy development are negligible.

⁷⁹ M. Muwonge (2007) 'Community Based Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: A Case Study of the LRA in Northern Uganda' paper submitted to the Fourth International Institute for Peace Through Tourism African Conference. <http://www.iipt.org/africa2007/PDFs/Muwonge.pdf>

⁸⁰ R. Muggah (2006) 'Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan', Small Arms Survey, Geneva, and Oxford <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2795>

⁸¹ Solomon and Ginifer CICS Working Paper.

⁸² Gordon Peake CICS Working Paper

4.2 Resources

The financing of DD and specifically reintegration activities has been a problem, raising serious questions as to the sustainability and viability of these programmes and the commitment of donors to reintegration and the forging of effective links with long term development processes.⁸³ The Secretary General of the UN has noted that: ‘securing reliable funding in support of the ‘Rs’ is of the utmost importance to ensure adequate implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes’.⁸⁴ This is despite the low cost of reintegration programmes, the Escola de Cultura for example estimating disarmament and reintegration of over a million ex-combatants costing the equivalent of only 2% of the world’s military expenditure.⁸⁵

A significant problem is that donor funding is largely absorbed by the technical, more visible (and time sensitive) elements of disarmament and demobilization, to the neglect of more complex reintegration activities that require a long-term commitment. According to Muggah: ‘Donors and DDR planners repeatedly privilege more visible activities such as the gathering of hardware, at the expense of the more complex process of regenerating the capacities and capabilities of beneficiaries and communities.’⁸⁶ The EU Expert Seminar on DDR noted that: ‘While the majority of funds for specific and narrow “DDR programmes” get sucked into the demobilisation process, too little attention is given to livelihood support activities.’⁸⁷ The *Final Communique of the Dakar Seminar on the Challenge of Re-integrating Ex-Combatants in DDR Programmes in West Africa* highlighted: ‘inadequate or delays in funding, complexity of funding mechanisms, lack of coordination among donors, multiplicity of funding mechanisms’⁸⁸ and a fragmented reintegration financing architecture as the central problems facing reintegration activities in the region.

In Sierra Leone, Solomon and Ginifer found that: ‘Reintegration financing shortfalls were a major barrier [...] to putting into place sustainable programming. The UN Secretary-General warned in May 2002 that a lack of funds was delaying the resettlement of thousands of former combatants [...]. A major problem was that most of the donor funds were invested in disarmament and demobilisation, leaving little for the reintegration phase.’ Further to this: ‘The NCDDR tried targeting ex-combatants with short-term reintegration programmes, but because of limited funds reintegration was held back, while local NCDDR partners also had difficulties in delivering medium- and longer-term reintegration, due to a lack of resources.’ In Bosnia Herzegovina (underscoring the generalised nature of the problem), the IOM Transitional Assistance to Former Soldiers programme, (2002-2004) received only 20% of

⁸³ Progress Report on Ways to Combat Subregional and Cross-Border Problems in West Africa, UN 11/02.2005 (S/2005/86)

⁸⁴ EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development. Expert seminar, Brussels, July 2006. http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/eu_and_ddr_seminar_report.pdf

⁸⁵ Escola de Cultura, DDR web page. <http://www.pangea.org/unescopau/english/programas/ddr.htm>

⁸⁶ R. Muggah ‘Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan’, *ibid.*

⁸⁷ EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development. Expert seminar, Brussels, July 2006.

http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/eu_and_ddr_seminar_report.pdf

⁸⁸ Final Communique. *Ibid.*

the \$7.4m funding required.⁸⁹ In Central American experience, there was a \$600m financing shortfall in the El Salvador re-integration programme, with donors slow in following through on initial commitments,⁹⁰ while in Nicaragua, donor failure to disburse financial commitments led to the collapse of the 'development poles' programme intended to reintegrate former Contra fighters in rural areas. In Liberia, funding for reintegration was seen as so inadequate that the International Crisis Group was compelled to call on the international community to: 'Provide as a matter of urgency funds to finance the reintegration of Liberia's ex-combatants.'⁹¹

The absence of full financial support for reintegration activities has resulted in long and destabilising delays in progressing from demobilisation to reintegration phases, generating ex-combatant frustration that has in turn undercut the assumed security-building benefits of DDR. In Liberia, a full two years after the D and D stages had been completed, 40,000 registered ex-combatants had not been given access to reintegration programmes,⁹² while in Sierra Leone: 'Many ex-combatants envisaged their allowances being paid instantly, but it was not uncommon for them to experience delays in payments of between three to seven months, causing widespread discontent and on occasion riots and violence.'⁹³ In Central America, Spencer noted that: 'The increased violence, banditry and use of arms in these countries is often a sign of former ex-combatants frustrated at their inability to reintegrate and angered at their governments for not providing adequate assistance. This frustration, coupled with high poverty, has led to increased violence on the streets, at times, *worse than during the wars*.'⁹⁴ In Namibia, the failure of the newly independent government to devise an effective reintegration programme led ex-combatants to resort to public disruption and rioting,⁹⁵ similarly in South Africa, where protests by ex-combatants were: 'motivated by the needs of the individuals concerned to highlight their grievance.'⁹⁶ In Bosnia Herzegovina: 'Ex-combatants felt abandoned by government institutions, as exemplified in frequency of peaceful protests and roadblocks in 1997 and 1998. Demobilized soldiers continue to confront government over pension delays, exclusion from the privatization process and grievances over housing.'⁹⁷ This calls into question the assumed link between reintegration and security. It would appear to be the case that inappropriate training for non-existing employment opportunities, artificially inflated expectations of material advancement and

⁸⁹ J. Alexander (2004) 'From Barracks to Business: An Evaluation of IOM's Transitional Assistance Program to Former Soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina', School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

⁹⁰ D. Spencer (1997) *Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America*, Paper 8, BICC.

⁹¹ International Crisis Group (2004) 'Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils', *Africa Report*, no. 75, 30.

⁹² <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52>

⁹³ Solomon and Giniifer, CICS Paper, Sierra Leone.

⁹⁴ D. Spencer, BICC, *ibid.* p. 14

⁹⁵ G. Dzinesa (2007) 'Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa', *International Studies Perspective*, vol. 8, p. 80.

⁹⁶ M. George (2004) Opening Address of The Deputy Minister of Defence at the Occasion of A Symposium on Military Veterans, University of South Africa, cited in G. Dzinesa 'Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa', *ibid.*

⁹⁷ Bosnia Herzegovina, mini desk study. CICS DDR project.

frustration with political and economic marginalisation that is responsible for fermenting discontent, rather than a proclivity toward violence on the part of ex-combatants.⁹⁸

Although DDR is entering a ‘new phase’, there is little indication that donors have the capacity or willingness to step up reintegration funding to the substantial levels required to make these programmes effective or sustainable. More problematically, and as discussed in section 5, the trend of centralising post-conflict recovery and financing through multilateral basket funds is leading to a tying of reintegration assistance with economic conditionalities. In addition there has been little progress in reforming and restructuring funding mechanisms and financing streams. The issue of balancing distribution of funding between different elements of the DDR process has not been addressed by donors and a wider debate, relating to the reform of official development assistance (ODA) that would allow for donor funding of the military components of DDR has not gained traction.⁹⁹

4.3 Security

A final limitation to effective and sustainable reintegration is the finding from the country case studies that disarmament programmes have serious limitations, that there is a lack of integration between the DD and the R stages, and a failure to adequately connect reintegration to broader security-related programming activities such as SSR and SALW (See Working papers 2 and 3 in this series). For example, in relation to disarmament, an estimated one weapon is turned in per two combatants in DDR programmes.¹⁰⁰ The El Salvador weapons collection programme left an estimated 200-300,000 weapons in civilian hands,¹⁰¹ in Kosovo there were an estimated 317,000 illegally held SALW five years after formal disarmament,¹⁰² in Mozambique only a ‘modest’ amount of the estimated six million weapons in the country were turned in,¹⁰³ while in South Africa disarmament is widely acknowledged to have been incomplete.¹⁰⁴

Sustained insecurity is a reported problem in all of the case studies (in some contexts worsening) with violence acquiring new forms (violence against women, drug- and gun-related violence). In Bosnia, where crime levels rose by 30 per cent between 2004 and 2005:

⁹⁸ UNESCO (1996) International Congress of demobilized Soldiers: Their Social Reintegration and Role as Peace Promoters; Cramer, Christopher 2006, ‘Labour markets, employment, and the transformation of war economies’, *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 389-410.

⁹⁹ For an overview of this debate, see M. Brzoska, *Analysis of and recommendations for covering security relevant expenditures within and outside of official development assistance (ODA)*. Paper 53, Bonn International Center for Conversion: Germany.

¹⁰⁰ IANSA review. Press release. <http://www.iansa.org/regions/europe/documents/DDR-survey-escola-de-cultura-de-pau-2006.pdf>

¹⁰¹ D. Spencer, *Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America*, *ibid.*

¹⁰² FCI and Saferworld (2007) ‘Small Arms and Human Security in Kosovo: an Agenda for Action’, www.safeplaceproject.org. See also J. Perry (2004) ‘SALW Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility and Lessons Learned’, US State Dept.

¹⁰³ G. Dzinesa ‘Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa’, *ibid.* I. Lundin, M. Chachiua, A. Gaspar, H. Guebuza (2000) ‘Reducing Costs through an ‘Expensive Exercise’: The Impact of Demobilization in Mozambique in K. Kingma (ed) *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ G. Dzinesa . *Ibid.*

‘Surveys indicate that gender-based violence – including rape, domestic violence and trafficking – is a huge problem.’¹⁰⁵ In South Africa, SALW: ‘feature prominently in violent crime and contribute directly to the distinctively high murder rate.’¹⁰⁶ The EU Experts seminar noted that: ‘A massive rise in rape and violence mainly against women and young girls, but also involving men and boys, is often a particularly striking part of this trend.’ This was seen to be: ‘a direct consequence of years of war and violence and the consequent decline in moral and social values’, pointing to serious limitations in DDR as a ‘standalone’ process. In the majority of cases, the security gap and delays between DD and R stages allowed criminal groups to consolidate; led to the re-arming of frustrated ex-combatants and / or catalysed the formation of paramilitary groups defending minority ethnic or political interests. This has repeatedly undermined the intended security building benefits of D and D, and the capacity of DDR programmes to create a foundation for long-term development and stability.

Communities are particularly ill-positioned to articulate their security needs in the early phase of the conflict to peace transition and this is inadequately recognised in best practice guidelines which reify stakeholder participation without adequately engaging with the dire vulnerability and trauma of affected populations and the lack of infrastructure (police stations, communications equipment) and security in the immediate post-conflict phase.

4.4 Programme Design

Comprehensive best practice recommendations for reintegration programme design have repeatedly fallen down at the first hurdle – anticipating and calculating ex-combatant numbers. In Liberia, the number of ex-combatants registering for reinsertion and reintegration was triple original assessments. In Ivory Coast, ex-combatant numbers increased from 30,000 to more than 45,000 in a matter of months and in Kosovo 25,723 Kosovo Liberation Army Fighters registered for DDR programmes, beyond the official estimate of 20,000.¹⁰⁷ Even in the most current DDR planning experience – Southern Sudan¹⁰⁸ – under-estimating ex-combatant numbers has been a problem, raising serious questions as to the capacity of programmers and agencies to absorb ‘lessons learned’ from previous experiences, anticipate over-subscription and address the drivers of exaggerated ex-combatant numbers (such as access to reinsertion benefits.)

The needs of women and vulnerable groups – such as disabled ex-combatants and child soldiers may be emphasised in best-practice guidelines, but in terms of practical experience, they are inadequately catered for in reintegration processes. In Sierra Leone for example, Solomon and Ginifer found that:

¹⁰⁵ Mini Desk Study CICS DDR Project.

¹⁰⁶ R. Chetty (2000) Firearm Use and Distribution in South Africa. Praetoria: National Crime Prevention Centre Firearm Programme. Cited in G. Dzinesa, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁷ Naumann, F. “Wag the Dog: the Mobilisation and Demobilisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army”, 2001, BICC: Bonn.

¹⁰⁸ R. Muggha ‘Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan’ *ibid*.

Women were among the worst affected by fault-lines in the design and implementation of DDR in terms of both their safety and security and economic/social recovery. The number of women associated with the fighting forces was estimated to be around 12 per cent. However, gender programming aimed at women was largely absent in DDR and there was little recognition of the formidable challenges faced by women ex-combatants.”¹⁰⁹

They conclude that: ‘By not making special provision for these women, DDR programmes missed an opportunity to intervene to reduce negative social and economic impacts on their well-being’ in turn having consequences for long-term development and poverty reduction strategies.

Parallel problems were reported in the East Timor, Liberia, Central American, Nepal and regional West African programmes.¹¹⁰ Where targeted interventions for these constituencies were built into reintegration programmes, they were small scale, vulnerable to funding shortfalls and ultimately unsustainable. Existing programmes have failed to adequately respond to best practice guidelines, with substantive problems in relation to donor and NGO co-ordination, funding and sensitisation reported particularly in relation to the delivery of educational support and reintegration for child ex-combatants. More problematically, and again pointing to the empiricism of the assumptions underpinning reintegration programme design, the extent to which the reintegration needs and experience of female ex-combatants should be differentiated has been questioned in some country contexts. For example surveys in Sierra Leone and Eritrea finding limited distinction between male and female ex-combatant needs.¹¹¹

The cultural, economic and political challenges implicit in mainstreaming gender equality appears to be chronically underestimated in reintegration guidelines. For example, the reality of the post-conflict economic environment is inadequately factored into recommendations for the reintegration of women. While it is acknowledged that the provision of child-care facilities and home-based delivery of reintegration programmes is a means of addressing women’s needs,¹¹² the capacity of the state or donors to deliver this type of assistance on a national, long-term and sustainable basis is limited and faces severe macro-economic constraints.

Further to this, the desk and literature reviews demonstrate that programming inadequately addresses the recurrent marginalisation of women in the conflict to peace transition and there is little evidence of engagement with UNSCR 1325¹¹³ in best practice guidelines or

¹⁰⁹ UNAMSIL, ‘The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned’, UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section: Freetown, August 2003, p. 25.

¹¹⁰ See the mini case studies and desk studies in the CICS DDR project.

¹¹¹ E. Bruchhaus and A. Mehreteab, ‘Leaving the warm house: the impact of demobilisation in Eritrea’ in K Kingma, (Ed.). *ibid.*

¹¹² See for example OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. *Ibid.*

¹¹³ SCR 1325 builds on earlier conflict and gender related resolutions that include the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), the ECOSOC Agreement on Gender Mainstreaming (1997) and resolutions relating to the rights and protection of refugees, children and civilians in conflict, and the Geneva Conventions. On the

programming tools (CCA, UNDAF, PSRP, Needs Assessments etc). In its review of gender equality and aid delivery, but with relevance for the problems identified in reintegration, the OECD found that: ‘the gap between policy and implementation continues to be an uphill climb’, with shortfalls in funding for gender mainstreaming, gender policy specialists and training facilities particularly acute.¹¹⁴

Following from this, it should also be noted that the social and political dimensions of reintegration are inadequately addressed in the best practice literature beyond issues of community sensitization and social reintegration opportunities presented by community based approaches. The focus of programme design and best practice guidelines is specifically on the economic aspects of reintegration, with little consideration of political elements. This is despite the acknowledged importance of effective political reintegration for peacebuilding and prospects for long term stability. As Peake outlines in relation to East Timor:

Timor is far from alone as a case of a state in which veterans form the first political elite in a new state or in radically altered constitutional arrangements. In the last decade, former combatants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Northern Ireland, have adapted to new roles as politicians and administrators [...] This dynamic is too often skirted over altogether in the DDR literature and programme advice.¹¹⁵

The documentation does not engage with the political aspirations of ex-combatants or how other areas of programming – particularly democracy and governance related activities that form part of the long-term development / state building agenda can connect to reintegration.

4.5 Training

While best practice models emphasise well-designed training and reintegration programmes based on detailed evaluations of ex-combatant and community needs, this has only weakly translated into practice on the ground. In Liberia, ex-combatants in Monrovia claimed they were only offered agricultural training, even though they intended to stay in an urban area. In Sierra Leone, Ginifer and Solomon found that: ‘DDR failed to develop effective transitional livelihood options for ex-combatants and has contributed to their current poor economic prospects’ according to Ginifer and Solomon. They noted a lack of qualified and motivated teachers and trainers, particularly in the worst conflict affected regions of the country:

This was compounded by the short-term six month training period which gave little prospect of providing credible skills and professional development [...] interviews

impacts of war and violence in the conflict to peace continuum, see D. Pankhurst (ed.) (2007) *Gendered War and Peace: Women's Struggles for Justice and Post-War Reconciliation*, Routledge: London and M. Vlachovund and L. Biason (eds), (2005) *Women in an Insecure World: Violence Against Women - Facts, Figures and Analysis*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

¹¹⁴ OECD (2005) *Gender Equality and Aid Delivery: What Has Changed in Development Co-operation Agencies Since 1999*. Paris.

¹¹⁵ Mini Case Study, CICS DDR Project.

show that training undertaken under DDR has not usually significantly contributed to ex-combatants' well being.¹¹⁶

Parallel problems were reported in all of the field and country-desk studies. In particular: training programmes were inadequately rolled out to the most intensely conflict affected regions or communities; there was a dearth of adequately trained trainers and teachers; funding shortfalls in training programmes were systemic and, once again, a common finding was that women in particular were inadequately catered for.

The utility of the menu of training programmes set out in best practice recommendations is questionable, underscoring a serious disconnect across the CAS, UNDAF, Needs Assessment and PRSP process and there is an ongoing failure to engage with the socio-economic dislocation and economic realities of the post-conflict economies into which ex-combatants are expected to be reintegrated into. In the country case studies reviewed here (based on the desk studies and field studies), unemployment was on average over 60 per cent in the formal economy; credit and loans facilities were weak; private sector-based employment opportunities low and markets for ex-combatant skills and products were negligible. Across a range of country and regional contexts, from the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa to South West and South East Asia, reintegration based training schemes led to limited formal employment opportunities and small and medium businesses supported by donors as part of the reintegration framework demonstrated limited sustainability.¹¹⁷ While reinsertion and reintegration support aims to improve income earning / livelihoods opportunities, this has not been the experience in the majority of cases. While land distribution programmes and the support of family members did emerge as an important factor in the subsequent development of sustainable livelihoods, overall, economic reintegration programmes have not led to the enhancement of the economic position of ex-combatants, or in broader programming – their dependents.¹¹⁸ In his survey of Liberian ex-combatants, Pugel did find a distinction in economic reintegration between those who had gone through reintegration training programmes and those that had not. However, the livelihoods and wage differentials were relatively narrow.¹¹⁹

A serious criticism is that reintegration training is inadequately connected to national development plans and that programmes are informed only by the short-term need to 'securitize' the post conflict environment by providing immediate opportunities for otherwise idle ex-combatants. Here there is a disjuncture between needs assessment exercises such as the CCA, UNDAF and PCNA. Related to this, data collection processes that underpin and

¹¹⁶ Ginifer and Solomon, Sierra Leone Country Case Study, CICS DDR Project.

¹¹⁷ N. Ball (1997) 'Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa in Kumar, K. (ed.) *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein (2007) 'Demobilization and Reintegration', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 4: G. Lamb (2006) 'South Africa: Reintegration into Civilian Life of Ex-Combatants', Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

<http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/033lamb/>

¹¹⁹ J. Pugel (2006) 'Key Findings from the Nation Wide Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia: Reintegration and Reconciliation'

http://mirror.undp.org/liberia_new/Ex-combatants%20Nationwide%20Survey%20-%20Key%20Findings.pdf

inform reintegration programmes, for example which ask ex-combatants to identify their preferred training / employment option, creates exaggerated expectations of long-term benefits. A further criticism is that these assessments are conducted during a time (the immediate post-conflict period) of economic transition and restructuring, which is to say a period when it is difficult to clearly discern what the future labour market will look like. Finally, a problem repeatedly identified in the literature and field reports is the challenge of absorbing the ‘flood’ of ex-combatants, many of whom have shared the same package of reintegration training and consequently find themselves in competition with each other (mechanics, carpenters and barbers). The macroeconomic policies prescribed by donors to post-conflict countries (increasingly ‘imposed’ through conditionalities and debt relief packages) do not present the optimal environment for sustainable reintegration and the generation of productive livelihoods. In this respect, the economic constraints implicit in post-conflict environment are a serious limitation to the operationalisation of best-practice reintegration strategies and the capacity of institutions and programmers to forge connections between reintegration and long-term development strategies.

This in turn explains why reintegration programmes have been relatively unsuccessful in promoting the dissolution of factional networks. Case studies from South Africa, Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Balkans, Central America, Mozambique, Eritrea, Angola and Liberia show that factional networks persisted long after termination of the formal DD and reintegration process. The percentage of ex-combatants maintaining these ties varied from country to country, up to 53% in South Africa,¹²⁰ but in none of the case studies fell below 10% of the sample interviewed. These ties were seen by ex-combatants to provide opportunities for employment, information sharing, joint business initiatives, socialisation and personal security – the latter important when receiving communities and / or family members had rejected the ex-combatant. As such, the persistence of these networks emerged in this research as rationale, functional and vital to the welfare of the ex-combatant – a manifestly different impression than that provided in the DDR best-practice guidelines.

5. Reintegration and Long Term Development: Contradictory Agendas

In the previous section, a dichotomy between policy and practice in reintegration programme was shown. It was argued that weaknesses in DDR as a standalone area impede the forging of connections to long-term development planning. Similarly there are serious technical and policy impediments to linkage presented from the long-term development angle. Although development agencies and donors have made substantial progress in orienting their work to the specific challenges presented by post-conflict country contexts, serious technical, programming and institutional limitations exist, raising serious questions as to the capacity of development and lending institutions to link programmes and policies to reintegration activities. A broader critique, which is addressed in the second part of this section, relates to the impact of market oriented economic stabilization agendas that are pursued in post-conflict countries. These create a highly unfavourable macroeconomic and social environment for effective and sustainable reintegration activities.

¹²⁰ G. Lamb (2006) ‘South Africa: Reintegration into Civilian Life of Ex-Combatants’, *ibid.*

5.1 Technical Challenges

5.1.1 Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity

Although the documentation produced by multilateral institutions and individual country donors elaborates on the need for a more nuanced approach to poverty reduction and conflict contexts, the documentation relating to pro-poor growth produced by the main international and donor agencies (including OECD DAC and the World Bank) make limited reference to conflict contexts. This is despite the dominance of the conflict / poverty paradigm and the fact that 22 of the 34 countries least likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals are countries in, or emerging from, conflict. Here, the criticism is that the new development agenda lacks conflict sensitivity in the main best practice and generic poverty reduction (and pro-poor growth) documentation. The use of, and reference to conflict assessments and PCIA is negligible. There is limited acknowledgement of the potentially negative and harmful effects of best practice recommendations (for example, in relation to trade promotion, privatisation, FDI capture) in post-conflict and conflict prone country contexts, so while the literature is replete with emphasis on shifting away from 'pure growth' models to addressing patterns of growth and their distributionary impacts,¹²¹ there is no consideration of the potential conflict inducing impacts of these policies. There is limited integration of post-conflict reconstruction issues or assessment of the relationship between frameworks for recovery (such as the PCNA and CAS) and best practice development guidelines. The DAC and its Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET), which aims to develop and share good practice, do not make any connection between conflict, transitional assistance and long term development and there is no acknowledgement of sequencing issues. The political and economic dynamics of conflict prone countries are bypassed and treated as neutral variables that have no impact on best practice and optimal development strategy. In this anti-poverty framework, absolutely no reference is made to DDR processes. Moreover tools for enhancing conflict sensitivity and for conducting conflict impact assessments are underused and understressed in the documentation, wherein a primacy is placed on poverty and its determinants, while insignificant attention is paid to the conflict elements.

This absence of conflict sensitivity and the lack of progress in institutionalising the use of conflict assessment tools and frameworks underscores the limited progress that has been made in mainstreaming conflict dynamics across the spectrum of development organisations. This reflects the limited influence of 'relief to development' thinking across development agencies and signposts the scale of the challenge ahead if more effective connections are to be made between DDR and long term development strategies.

¹²¹ OECD DAC (2001) *DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction*, *ibid.* OECD DAC (2006) *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Key Policy Messages*, *ibid.*

Box 9: Documentary Weaknesses (1)

Conflict in Development: The Missing Link

OECD 2006, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Key Policy messages (and also OECD, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and Challenges, OECD The Development Dimension Series, Paris 2006).

- While detailing the importance of infrastructure improvements, access to land and agriculture, market opportunities, investment in early childhood development and the importance of gains in social development for sustainable and pro-poor growth, this important and influential document makes no reference to conflict-affected countries or conflict settings.
- There is no acknowledgement of the post-conflict context that pertains to many poor countries.
- Failed and fragile states are barely touched upon.
- The importance of improving security for pro-poor growth is stressed, with Sierra Leone and Rwanda cited as case studies – but despite the use of these post-conflict examples, there is no discussion of justice and security issues during the DDR phase. The entire DDR process is sidelined in this document, which provides no pointers for linkages between DDR and long-term development strategy. This document is highly conflict insensitive, with no integration of conflict risk or assessment for the policy recommendations presented

OECD/ DAC 2007 Action Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development

- Detailed in its elaboration of opportunities for integrating human rights principles, promoting human rights more effectively in development, and mainstreaming human rights as a cross-cutting issue in development assistance, this document makes no reference to conflict contexts – even in its assessment of fragile states.
- No linkage is discussed or foreseen between transitional justice and longer term access to justice initiatives and / or potentially negative and discriminatory impacts from programming in the DDR phase.

Indicative of the neglect of the conflict dimension in current development strategy, the best practice documentation on poverty reduction bypasses the dilemmas implicit in transiting war economies, and neglects the political economy of post-conflict economies (economic / power alignments, resource distribution, employment structures, infrastructure deficits).¹²² Transiting conflict-affected economies is addressed as a technical matter, an issue of putting the right institutions and policies into place and encouraging formalisation of economic sub-sectors. The failure to develop assessments of war economies and their characteristics and impacts on the post-conflict setting is a significant omission. Development throughout the ‘relief to development’ continuum is affected by economic structures, opportunities and interests forged and institutionalised during the conflict. The size and depth of the war economy inevitably differs in individual country settings, but invariably in all cases it:

¹²² See for example International Alert (2004), *From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus*, London.

- a) Structures economic and political incentives in the immediate post-conflict period – i.e. whether to persist on the outside of formal structures and sustain illegal economic activities or to forego illicit opportunity for formality and legitimacy;
- b) Shapes the employment opportunities and cost assessments of actors (specifically ex-combatants);
- c) Determines the economic ‘space’ open to government and the private sector and the potential costs (conflict related) of confronting illicit activities;
- d) Crafts shadow networks of influence that usually permeate local administration if not national government;
- e) Distorts transition economies and transition agendas. For example, a noted feature of the privatisation process in a number of conflict-affected countries has been the purchase of liberalised sectors by ‘criminal’ elements with wealth derived from illicit activities (Kosovo);
- f) Undermines effective macroeconomic management.

War economies remain a significantly under-researched area, despite recent evidence that they become progressively more embedded with the application of market led stabilisation processes that restrict opportunities for employment in the formal sector, access to welfare and related publicly funded benefits and which negatively impact on small scale livelihoods. Further reflecting the detachment of best practice development guidelines from the realities on the ground in conflict afflicted countries, the politically demobilising and socially polarising effects of conflict are not factored into guidelines on stakeholder participation and community dialogue, which inform both the DDR literature and the pro-poor literature of the development agencies.

5.1.2 Needs Assessments

While the needs assessment processes present a mechanism for linking reintegration and long term development, there are serious technical deficiencies that must be addressed before these can become effective and useful tools. As GTZ, among other critics have highlighted: ‘their process and methodology have not yet been systematically assessed and further developed, causing concern at the main agencies responsible for their main implementation’. Moreover: ‘understanding of the underlying principles and methodologies is quite often widely divergent’ and in all of the PCNAs analysed by GTZ none had established a clear conceptual link between peace-building and the issues addressed in the needs assessment. Running against the emphasis on coordination and cohesion between agencies, interaction and planning has been criticised as deficient, and low standards of quality in assessment preparations, monitoring and evaluation have been highlighted.¹²³ A particular deficiency, and one which highlights the opportunities lost for bridging reintegration and long-term development relates to issues of national ownership and stakeholder participation. Both the Needs Assessment and PRSP exercises have been criticised for failing to build effective national ownership, with tensions between national development priorities and conditionality

¹²³ UNDG / UNDP / World Bank / GTZ (2004) *Review and Analysis: Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*. Eschborn.

terms (resulting in limited country manoeuvrability in defining the anti-poverty agenda) highlighted. Inter-related with this, rather than engaging widely and broadly with community, regional and national domestic stakeholders, both exercises are criticised as donor driven, offering little opportunity for effective local input.¹²⁴

Box 10: Documentary Weaknesses (2)

UNDG *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations* (2004)

- This document discusses ‘the context in which post-conflict needs assessments take place, its links with the post-conflict recovery phase, and a broad typology of post-conflict settings that influence the approach to the needs assessment’ and ‘reviews some key conceptual issues, including the need to embed the process within a longer-term vision on reconstruction, linkages to other processes, the selection of priority sectors, approaches to costing needs, integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment, and the need to focus on institutional capacity building. The guide includes recommendations on managing the needs assessment process, from the preparatory phase to the lessons-learned phase.’
- While expansive in its elaboration of the above areas, there is no discussion of DDR processes and their relationship to longer term development. No programmatic or conceptual linkages between DDR and LTDS are identified or elaborated. This is despite the document’s aim of bridging the relief to development gap.

World Bank *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda and Development Cooperation and Conflict* (2001)

- As with the UNDG document, these two World Bank documents outline the need to link transformative and long term development in post conflict reconstruction and they set out frameworks and tools for conflict assessment and sensitivity in procedural operations.
- Detail is provided of the emerging importance of DDR activities to the World Bank and for unified post-conflict reconstruction agencies. However, no linkage is made between DDR processes and programming and long-term development.

The stress on stakeholder participation and routinised dialogue is not followed through by donor and government practice on the ground. The majority of the population are excluded from major policy decisions that shape national economic policy. The stakeholder rhetoric does not address the structural limitations on participation by poor people – a heterogeneous sector with distinct needs and engagement capacities. In particular, there has been little progress in institutionalising the role of community organisations, linking community based reintegration and community led development processes or strengthening the legal position of communities within the policy and legal framework.

5.1.3 Aid Harmonisation

A 2006 monitoring of the 2005 Paris Declaration found that: ‘half of the developing countries signing onto the Paris Declaration, partners and donors have a long road ahead to meet the

¹²⁴ World Development Movement (2000) ‘Still SAPPing the Poor: A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies’; Economic Development in Africa (UNCTAD, 2002), UNCTAD (2006) Economic Development in Africa, *ibid*.

commitments they have undertaken.’¹²⁵ Aid flows remained volatile and unpredictable, undermining improvements to, and accuracy in budgeting procedures. Only 17% of the countries reviewed had a robust development framework with the necessary capacity and resources for implementation. Inter-related with this, revised PSRPs were found to be: a) ineffective in terms of prioritisation and sequencing; b) lacking in mechanisms to ensure prioritised actions had resources and; c) vulnerable to problems of operationalisation at different tiers of government.¹²⁶

The cost of uncoordinated aid continued to be high and slow progress was reported in untying aid, prompting the monitoring report to emphasise an urgent need for donors to: ‘work more aggressively to ensure reduced costs and harmonisation.’ Despite a commitment to joint missions and assessments, the report noted a continued proliferation of parallel implementation units (PIUs) and limited progress by donors in meeting the target of 611 PIUs by 2010 (down from the 1832 recorded in 2006).

Good headquarter policies were not being translated on the ground in country, and country ownership – a core principle of the Declaration- was found to be weak and in need of strengthening. The report also found that more work needed to be done on managing results and developing systems for mutual accountability and performance assessment. Joint exercises, such as the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment were being conducted, but progress here was undermined by delays in the dispersal of aid that in turn exacerbated problems of under- and over-accounting in budgets.

5.1.4 Aid Dispersal

Aid continued to be concentrated among a small group of recipients. UNCTAD found that the share of the ten largest African aid recipients increased from 35% between 1985-94 to 40% between 1995-2004. Overlapping with this was a concentration of FDI receipts, with the top ten African destinations receiving 75 per cent of FDI.¹²⁷ In line with the Paris Aid review, UNCTAD found that ODA continued to be volatile, heavily concentrated and driven by priorities distinct from the development agenda (specifically the geopolitical, strategic and security considerations of donors). Aid delivery has also become increasingly focused on social services (education, health and welfare concerns), in line with the objectives set out in the Millennium Development Goals. Critics, which include Finance Ministers from Africa and the UNCTAD, claim this is at the cost of broader economic and development objectives and neglect of the underlying structural causes of poverty (infrastructure, agricultural development and energy supply). A specific concern is that this expenditure cannot be sustained in the absence of growth-oriented, productive investment. An estimated 65% of resources released under the HIPC initiative focused on social services, while only 7% were

¹²⁵ OECD DAC (2007) *Aid Effectiveness 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration*; see also M. Foresti, D. Booth and T. O.Neil (2006) ‘Aid effectiveness and human rights . strengthening the implementation of the Paris Declaration’. Paper commissioned by the GOVNET. Overseas Development Institute, London .

¹²⁶ See also World Bank *Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach—Main Findings*

¹²⁷ UNCTAD (2006) *Economic Development in Africa, ibid.*

dedicated to infrastructure (4% on governance and 1% on structural reforms).¹²⁸ The trend of donors supporting specific projects through the Sector Wide Approaches was found to be poorly co-ordinated in relation to each individual project and also national development goals.¹²⁹ Finally, sectoral distribution of aid continued to be heavily determined by the priorities and preferences of donors, not recipient countries¹³⁰ and this in turn lead to the neglect of new, emerging development challenges such as the rapid expansion of urban populations;

5.1.5 Aid Levels

Central to the development agenda of the 2000s has been the concept of the ‘Big Push’ to drive the poorest countries of the world forward. This has informed debt relief initiatives and donor commitments to increase aid levels. It is estimated that \$50 billion to \$76 billion pa is required for all developing countries to reach the MDGs, while in Africa, the necessary additional resources are estimated to total 10-20% of GDP.¹³¹ However, donors are not on course to meet commitments to a scaling up of ODA to 0.7% of GDP and grants available to poor countries. Linked with this, the WTO has made limited progress in expanding the trade and market opportunities to developing countries or in eliminating developed world subsidies to domestic producers and exporters.

5.1.6 Financial Support to Conflict-Affected Countries

Beyond the generic problems relating to revised donor engagement strategies and principles in developing countries, there are also ongoing dilemmas related to best practice in fragile and conflict prone states. This is despite efforts to refine strategic approaches and enhance the conflict sensitivity and operational sophistication of actors and agencies that are engaged in post-conflict settings.

Fragile states remain highly dependent on a limited number of donors, and aid flows remain volatile.¹³² In its 2005 assessment, the Development Assistance Committee Monitoring Resources Flows to Fragile States found that Cote D’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi, Niger, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Chad, Tajikistan, Guinea-Bissau and Togo either received low levels of aid in relation to need and governance indicators or they experienced high volatility of aid flows and international engagement. These countries: ‘appear to attract relatively little international attention and, to that extent, could be regarded as marginalised.’ The 2006 report¹³³ pointed to ongoing problems in countries that were ‘marginalised’ and receiving already low levels of aid in relation to their relatively higher needs and policy and institutional quality (Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Nigeria, Uzbekistan,

¹²⁸ UNCTAD (2006) *Economic Development in Africa*, *ibid*.

¹²⁹ R. Liebenthal and S. Wangwe (2006) *The Emerging Aid Architecture: PRSs and the MDGs*, UN Economic Commission for Africa

¹³⁰ UNCTAD 92006) *Economic Development in Africa*, *ibid*.

¹³¹ UNECA, 2005a; UNECA, 2006; see UNCTAD, 2006a).

¹³² OECD (2005) Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States Unclassified DCD(2006)1; OECD (2006) Development Cooperation Directorate Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2005 report.

¹³³ OECD (2006) Development Cooperation Directorate Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2005 report.

Yemen, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe). The Fragile States Group found that country-level frameworks for sharing information among donors were insufficient to coordinate the allocation of aid in fragile states and that improvement was needed in the communicating and sharing of information on aid allocation intentions.

Despite best practice guidelines and engagement principles stressing the need to maintain support to post-conflict countries, there is an ongoing problem of donor's rescinding financial assistance once the immediate conflict period has passed.¹³⁴ The 2005 *Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States* found that post conflict Sierra Leone: 'might be an example of where donors may be withdrawing too early in the post conflict phase', while the Central Africa Republic 'might be an example of where donors have turned their back on a country'. The IMF and World Bank found that there has been continuity in the pattern of aid being abundant and extraordinarily high when a country is at the centre of international attention, declining thereafter as attention fades.¹³⁵

On a political level, regional organisations, IFIs and donors have institutionalised the principle of maintaining engagement. This is intended to counter the marginalisation and isolation of pariah regimes and citizens within its borders. It marks an important shift from the practice of sanctioning and embargoing that frequently exacerbated social crisis and entrenched pariah governments. However, there is a long way to go before all external actors operate and practice this principle with the requisite unity for it to be translated into a coherent policy. *Realpolitik* and strategic interests continue to prevent declaratory statements effecting actual practice on the ground. Further to this, there is an ongoing problem with judging the standards of fragile, pariah and conflict prone states and the applicability of conditionality as a basis for financial support in these contexts. There is a real danger that continuity with the system of 'rewarding' good performers, as represented by the operating principles of the US Millennium Challenge Account, will perpetuate volatility of aid flows and contradict the thrust of the engagement strategy.

5.2 Development Policy

There is a substantial critique as to the appropriateness of current growth and development paradigms and the assumptions relating to peacebuilding, civil society, the capacity of the private sector and the role of development aid that underpin them. Here, donor led economic and political reconstruction strategies that form the 'state building agenda' amount to a: 'level of intrusion and social engineering that would not have been countenanced by earlier generations of aid donors'.¹³⁶ For some critics, the package of pro-poor development, good governance and democratic assistance constitutes a: 'highly invasive forms of external regulation'¹³⁷ that is 'neo-colonial' in its core characteristics of perpetuating external

¹³⁴ UNDG (2004) Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations, *ibid.*

¹³⁵ The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, *ibid.*

¹³⁶ J. Goodhand (2006) *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*. Lynne Rienner.

¹³⁷ D. Chandler, (2006) *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State Building* (London, Pluto)

dependence, inhibiting local ownership and responding to the interests of outside actors. Rather than building effective states, these forms of liberal peacebuilding and intervention structure weak and illegitimate states and perpetuate conflict and drivers of conflict such as inequality and unrepresentative government.¹³⁸

A core criticism of the standard package of stabilization and structural adjustment packages that were imposed in the 1980s and 1990s was that they fundamentally failed to produce the ‘right kind of growth path’.¹³⁹ The ‘post-Washington Consensus’ approaches mark little more than a tinkering at the edges of existing practice. Standardised packages based on reducing public expenditures, privatising state industries and reducing tariffs seriously erode the capacity of post-conflict states to generate employment, and they forge an environment that counters the success of reintegration packages that are premised on developing productive livelihoods, small scale co-operatives and ‘decent work’.

Policies promoting market liberalisation, free trade based regional integration and ‘global insertion’ have not generated the national growth benefits intended or assumed due to a number of factors that include: changing patterns of consumer demand away from ‘traditional’ commodities¹⁴⁰ to new ‘dynamic’ products; an expansion of the trade in higher-value-added agricultural commodities; growing commercial domination by large, vertically integrated firms and a strengthening of the technological component of production, distribution, information and marketing chains. This changing dynamics of the global economy poses tremendous challenges for post-conflict countries,¹⁴¹ which are ill-positioned to capitalise on ‘new’ dynamic export sectors and markets – at least during the critical short- to medium term owing to factors that include climatic, infrastructure, social capital, investment and geographic deficits. Where post-conflict countries have been able to respond flexibly and identify the right mix of markets, skills and output (for example, cut flowers and agricultural products from Central American countries), the new export sector has generated poorly remunerated employment opportunities. This in turn has deepened problems of poverty and inequality, while increasing reliance on the informal economy for livelihoods and security. In the Central American case (although with parallels in other post-conflict contexts such as the Balkans) this structural conditions have allowed the illicit, war economy to become embedded in the post-conflict system as a function of its importance and economic vitality.

In this respect, development strategies continue to give limited acknowledgement to the actual operating reality – and structural constraints - on the ground in conflict affected countries. Units such as the PCRU do nod to the difficult social, economic and political post-

¹³⁸ See P. Englebort and D. Tull (2008) ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States’, *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4; also M. Duffield (2005) ‘Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present’, *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 5: no. 2; M. Pugh (2006) ‘Post War Economies and the New York Dissensus’ in *Conflict Security and Development*, vol. 6, no.3. and O. Richmond (2005) *The Transformation of Peace*, Palgrave, London.

¹³⁹ UNCTAD (2006) *Economic Development in Africa*, *ibid*.

¹⁴⁰ Such as such as coffee and cereals

¹⁴¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Economic Development (2004) *Economic Development in Africa Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence*. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsafrica20031_en.pdf

conflict environment, but their policy recommendations continue to be informed by idealised notions of the private sector, civil society and government capacity. In the countries reviewed for this paper, the private sector was weak, fragmented on ethnic, religious or regional lines and fundamentally incapable of serving as the ‘motor of development’ posited in contemporary growth paradigms. In a number of cases – the Balkans being paradigmatic – the war economy elite was the only group positioned to participate in privatisation and private sector development processes. This led to money laundering and corruption on a grand scale, severely undermining prospects for long-term development and good governance. Civil society – as outlined in the previous section on DDR, tended to be traumatised, displaced and ill positioned to feed into ‘participatory’ processes’.

The persistence of market oriented approaches in post-conflict countries delimits the potential for creating an economic peace dividend, it generates new forms of conflict and exclusion and constrains opportunities for sustainable reintegration. However, national governments in conflict affected countries are highly constrained in their ability to respond flexibly to their own, self defined development agendas and demands of national constituencies owing to the conditionality terms that flow from the post-conflict debt relief packages of donors and IFIs. Donors allow little room for the emergence of a ‘developmental state’ that is responsive to the interests of domestic citizens and capable of formulating indigenous development strategies and responses. Agendas and priorities continue to be set by external actors. The persistence of conditionality in lending modalities erodes the autonomy of national governments and the evolution of interest articulation and reconciliation capacities in the recipient country. Income generation (specifically the needs of particular communities) and labour market issues are neglected in the new development discourse, undermining human security and development gains while jeopardising transitions from organised political violence in conflict to criminal violence in peacetime.¹⁴²

In this context, meaningful reform and progress in reducing poverty and building legitimate, representative government can only come from far-reaching change to the structure and ideological orientation of multilateral organisations and international financial institutions, with an emphasis on building ‘developmental states’. The provision of more autonomy for developing countries in enacting their policy vision is seen as a fundamental, as is improved representation of poor countries in multilateral fora. More broadly, radical reform of the international trading systems and a scaling up of development assistance to poor countries (or at a minimum, a commitment on the part of developed countries to deliver on pre-existing ODA commitments) is posited as an appropriate macro-level response.

Conclusion

While opportunities and mechanisms exist for linking reintegration to long-term development, these are inadequately elucidated and show limited institutionalisation and uptake by donors and practitioners. Tools such as the Needs Assessment and PRSP and development strategy

¹⁴² K. Beasley (2006) ‘Job Creation in Post Conflict Societies’ USAID, issue paper 9; E. Date-Bah (2003) ‘Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle’ ILO, Geneva.

based on engaging the private sector in reconstruction, can bridge the reintegration to development continuum, but they have not been effectively utilised or deployed in order to achieve this objective. There is a substantial disconnect between policy and practice, with reintegration and long-term development processes and programs demonstrating ongoing limitations as ‘stand-alone’ areas. Before complementarities and linkages can be developed, substantial effort must be dedicated to refining existing programmes, policies and approaches. Failure to follow and realise commitments in issue areas such as funding for reintegration, stakeholder participation, country ownership, aid harmonisation, conflict sensitive and realistically pro-poor development processes, will not only constrain the possibility of evolving linkages, it also runs the risk of ‘doing harm’ and institutionalising existing bad practice and policy and programming weaknesses. More fundamentally, there needs to be serious exploration of current programme strategies and empirical grounding for the assumptions that underpin them. For example, in relation to reintegration, Muggah has suggested that: ‘Despite growing enthusiasm for DDR within defence and development circles, there is a surprising lack of evidence as to whether or not it works. With the exception of a smattering of assessments, post-mortems and superficial indicators relating to the number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants demobilised, there is virtually no proof that such interventions strengthen ‘human security.’¹⁴³ Moreover, there is evidence to suggest from Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa that independent (non-programmed) community and local processes as the driver of social reintegration, with the church, family and local political organisations *in particular* accounting for the success of otherwise of reintegration. These questions around the value of DDR need to be addressed before it is appropriate to develop linkages to long-term development processes that in themselves may contradict and undermine the goals of reintegration. Ultimately, limiting the scope of reintegration programmes to spoilers and a narrowly defined range of ex-combatants can divert attention away from structural impediments to broad-based and equitable national recovery and development.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ R. Muggah ‘Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan’ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ K. Jennings (2007) ‘The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 204-218; M. Pugh (2006) ‘Post-war economies and the New York Dissensus’, *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 269-89.