

DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Program Update



World Bank, September 2009

This note provides a short overview of World Bank-managed activities in support of demobilization and reintegration (D&R) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 2004 to date. The purpose of the note is to highlight recent developments in D&R, particularly in light of events in the eastern part of the country, and outline necessary steps for the World Bank-financed national D&R program to come to a satisfactory conclusion.

A project to demobilize approximately 150,000 ex-combatants involved in the DRC conflict, the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP), has been underway since 2004, with combined funding of US\$200 million from a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) and World Bank-IDA grant under the umbrella of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). A first phase of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) ended in December 2006 with the demobilization of some 132,000 men, women and children.¹ A second phase, funded by a World Bank-IDA, African Development Bank (AfDB), and Government contribution of US\$75 million, was put in place to process a further 70,000 armed forces from the *Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) and 19,000 militia. Of these, 23,000 ex-combatants were expected to demobilize, 19,000 militia members were to receive reintegration support, 8,000 children were to get support for reunification and reintegration, and 40,000 ex-combatants demobilized in the first phase were to be reintegrated. This second phase was set to start in September 2008 and end in June 2010. However, to date, the on-going war in the east has severely disrupted the renewed demobilization process. Moreover, current trends suggest that only 20,000 combatants (new caseload) will be processed from which only some 5,000 will voluntarily demobilize by the program's end date (the

remainder will go into the FARDC).

Current events in eastern DRC also suggest that the Government is more concerned about mobilization into the armed forces than demobilization. Due to the accelerated integration of former CNDP and other armed groups into the FARDC and mobilization in Kinshasa and other provinces, the Government has indicated that its demobilization targets will indeed be much lower. This in turn will have significant implications for the Bank-financed EDRP in terms of budget savings and reallocations.

1. Historical context

The initial framework for the peace process and the DDR of combatants in the DRC was founded in the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement that supposedly ended the second Congolese war. This accord focused on the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular armed groups from the DRC. It stipulated that foreign armies were to return to their countries of origin and that foreign armed groups, including former Rwandan army elements and the *interahamwe* Hutu-militia, were to be disarmed by the UN mission (MONUC), repatriated, and processed through respective receiving country reintegration programs or justice systems.

Hostilities continued however and it was not until the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition, signed by all key Congolese stakeholders in December 2003, that a comprehensive national program for the restoration of peace and national sovereignty (during a transition period of two years) was endorsed. The parties agreed that the personnel of all the Congolese armed groups including

¹ The EDRP finances D&R only; disarmament is carried out by MONUC or the FARDC.

the existing 'loyalist army' (*Forces armées Congolaises*, the FAC), would be incorporated into a new national army, the FARDC. It was also agreed that this new army would immediately undergo a process of integration (*fusion and restructuring*) that would involve: (i) the reduction of numbers through an offer of voluntary demobilization, and (ii) the re-training and re-equipping of the remaining forces before re-deployment.

By 2004, given the ongoing conflicts in DRC and the multiple peace agreements, four separate but linked DDR processes were in place:

- i) **Foreign forces:** The Lusaka accord emphasized the withdrawal of all foreign armies from the DRC and the removal of non-Congolese armed groups with a focus on the FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda*). While the number of foreign armed groups in the DRC was unclear, the FDLR was estimated to number about 20,000 combatants and dependents.
- ii) **Congolese forces:** Under the Global Accord and a national DDR program (the PNDDR) that followed, the following groups were targeted for army integration and DDR: 100,000 FAC; 45,000 RCD-Goma; 10,000 RCD-National; 15,000 RCD-K/ML; 30,000 MLC and 30-50,000 mai mai.² These forces were the main beneficiaries of the PNDDR, which was financed by the MDRP and the World Bank.
- iii) **Pacification in Ituri:** Despite the relative success of the Global Accord, armed conflict continued in northeastern DRC in Ituri province between at least seven additional factions and some 50,000 combatants.³ With the intervention of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia and additional diplomatic pressure, the parties signed a separate peace agreement in Dar es Salaam in May 2003. Factions that were not signatories to the Global Accord were part of a more informal DDR process, which was led by UNDP and financed by MDRP and other donors.
- iv) **Child soldiers:** During the war, all parties used children as part of their armed forces either directly in military combat or in supporting roles. In accordance

with international law as well as the different peace agreements, the various armed groups committed to the release of children. Over the transitional period from Dec. 2002 to Oct. 2006, the Government, with support from the MDRP and other partners such as UNICEF and specialized NGOs, reintegrated some 30,000 children associated with armed forces.

International partners agreed to support these national processes as well as put their weight behind attempts to extricate all foreign armed groups from the DRC. In view of the regional nature of the war and the need to provide coherent and concurrent solutions across a number of countries in the sub-region, international partners proposed a novel regional approach to tackle DDR. Indeed at the time, Angola, the Republic of Congo (RoC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were in the process of resolving their respective conflicts in ways that also required support for DDR.

Seven countries of the sub-region and international partners thus agreed to establish the MDRP, which was funded by a MDTF and complimentary IDA, and a Secretariat to manage the program, which was located at the World Bank. Under the MDRP approach, national governments would establish and run their individual DDR programs (the exception was CAR). Thirteen donor partners and the Bank contributed US\$560 million (including US\$260 million from the MDTF, US\$64 million from bi-lateral financing and US\$240 million from IDA). The largest proportion of this funding was allocated to the DRC (US\$200 million) which also had the largest DDR caseload. The project designed to finance the PNDDR is called the EDRP. In 2008, after financing from the EDRP had been exhausted, the World Bank and the AfDB mobilized an additional US\$75 million to complete the DDR process (US\$50 million came from IDA and US\$25 million from the AfDB).

2. The DDR program in DRC

A National Commission for DDR (CONADER) was established by decree in December 2003 to implement the PNDDR. The PNDDR was drafted by March 2004 and adopted by decree in May 2004.

2 Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) ; RCD Kisangani – Mouvement pour la Libération (RCD- K/ML) ; Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC)

3 Ituri factions included the FIPI (Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri), UPC (Union of Congolese Patriots), FAPC (Peoples Armed Forces of Congo), FNI (Front for National Integration), PUSIC (Party for Unity Safeguarding the Integrity of Congo), FRPI (Patriotic Resistance in Ituri) and FPDC (Popular Force for Democracy in Congo).

The task set out for CONADER was daunting. First, there were no accurate figures for the number of combatants likely to enter into the PNDDR. Second, it had to establish an ex-combatant processing, payment and re-integration program in a vast country with very limited infrastructure and an almost nonexistent banking system. Third, it had to operate in a fragile post-war environment with a transitional Government made up of factions that were wary of seeing the process go forward. Fourth, conflict was still ongoing in parts of eastern DRC. Fifth, CONADER was dependent on other parts of the Ministry of Defense to deliver key elements of what in part was a joint program (i.e. the integration of the army). And finally, the program had a tight deadline: it had to be concluded before elections that were scheduled for June 2006.

The PNDDR was conceived within a common strategy for both army integration and DDR, taking into account the institutional role played by the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI) in managing the army integration process. The PNDDR would not be demobilizing separate former armed factions, but rather forces that were now integrated into the new army. As all factions were integrated into the FARDC they were automatically entitled to voluntarily enter the PNDDR without further verification as to their prior combatant status. The overarching plan was to put the whole FARDC through an initial joint PNDDR/SMI process (the so-called *tronc commun*) which would identify those who wanted to demobilize. In turn, the SMI would re-form (through the *brassage* process) the remnants into combined (*brassées*) units for re-training, re-equipping and re-deployment. This process was anticipated to produce an army of 18 re-equipped brigades (consisting of a very approximate total of 125,000 soldiers).

Individuals choosing demobilization would be supported by the PNDDR. They were to receive a first cash payment of \$110: \$50 to facilitate their transport home, \$50 as an initial allowance and \$10 as a food ration (this was subsequently modified). A monthly allowance of \$25 for the following year was to be paid through a cell-phone based system, and a network of NGOs/UN agencies would offer socioeconomic reintegration support. The total package was valued at US\$810 per capita. Special arrangements were made for children and women ex-combatants.

Whereas a cost per beneficiary could be estimated, the total number of beneficiaries was unknown. Lack of clarity on numbers and the concomitant impact on budget planning was a huge challenge. A 2006 report by the International

Crisis Group highlights the dilemma in reference to the global estimates of those under arms at the time: *“There is probably no better example of the challenges surrounding army reform than the question of the numbers of former combatants currently on the military payroll. At Sun City, the belligerents declared that their collective forces totaled some 220,000 fighters. However, when the time came for soldiers to be put on the payroll that number spiked to 340,000. The Superior Defense Council revised it down to 240,000 in February 2004, and this is the basis upon which the Treasury has allocated payments. However, most observers, as well as a South African-led counting process, estimate that the true number of combatants was likely about 130,000, or less.”*⁴

The joint PNDDR/SMI process started using a working figure of up to 300,000 ex-combatants and made provision for the reintegration of up to 150,000 ex-fighters, including 30,000 children. This figure was used as the basis for planning and budgeting.

3. Results of Phase I of the DDR process (2004 – 2006)

The PNDDR was beset by a number of critical challenges which had a serious impact on the timing and effectiveness of program delivery. Some of these challenges were internal, such as the weak capacity and management within CONADER, while others were external to CONADER, such as the political will of the parties to comply with demobilization and the massive logistical constraints. These problems are subject to analysis by project evaluations but suffice is to say that there were significant delays and overruns of the estimated PNDDR budget.

By the time presidential elections were complete and the transitional Government came to a close in December 2006, the program had processed 186,000 combatants, of which 132,000 were demobilized (including 30,000 children and 2,670 women). Some 50,000 combatants had chosen to remain in the new army. In view of the daunting challenges, many viewed this as a remarkable achievement. Nonetheless, original project objectives had yet to be met and the bulk of the initial budget had been consumed. Unforeseen cost overruns, under-budgeting and mismanagement resulted in insufficient funds being available to complete DDR, including the reintegration of about a third of those that had been demobilized by the program. Also, a series of complicated issues, primarily outside the control of CONADER, had prevented the demobiliza-

4 Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report N°104 – 13 February 2006- ICG

tion and specialized support being provided for the many handicapped and chronically ill ex-combatants. Furthermore, the new Government that came into power in 2007 claimed that some 70,000 FARDC and 19,000 sundry rebels (from the continuing conflict in the east) remained to be processed. The estimated cost to address this new caseload and to offer reintegration packages to the 40,000 ex-combatants from phase I now stood at an additional US\$ 75 million.

The World Bank and AfDB agreed to support a second phase of DDR on the condition that a new more effective management structure be established and US\$6 million arising from ineligible expenditures and misprocurement be reimbursed. The institutional reconfiguration and settlement of these conditions took some time, resulting in the inevitable interruption of DDR from early 2007 until the last quarter of 2008.

4. Progress of army reform

Army reform fared less well in the DRC than DDR. Donor support was poorly coordinated and the national Defense Council under the President never convened. Hence, reforms were never properly funded and relied on a series of ad-hoc interventions from external actors. Furthermore, fighting continued in the east with the outbreak of hostilities in Ituri. Before any significant reform and re-training could be undertaken, unprocessed units had to be deployed to the east of the country to address new threats to the political transition. In the absence of funding for a comprehensive plan, the Belgian Government established an 'emergency reform program' to provide three trained 'combined' brigades for eastern Congo. As the first phase of the DDR process was ending in December 2006 only 15 'combined brigades' (of the total 18) had been formed and these had received limited training and re-equipping and little to no vetting of the recruits. This inevitably resulted in the continuing weak performance of the FARDC and recurrent human rights abuses.

5. DDR and the Goma peace accords (2008)

The Goma 'peace accords' in early 2008, and the concomitant Amani process led by the Abbé Malu-Malu, provided hope to a resolution to the conflict in the east. In view of the delays incurred in setting up the second phase of DDR, a few donors established a separate 'emergency trust fund' (about US\$ 12 million) in February 2008, managed by the World Bank, to support reintegration activities for the old

caseload of demobilized, and in particular to prevent any re-recruitment of ex-combatants in the east given the renewed fighting. As it transpired, the Goma accords were a false hope with the CNDP pulling out. When the additional financing for the second phase became effective in September 2008, the resumption of hostilities in the east left the Government in no position to start processing the 70,000 FARDC they had initially anticipated. In turn, when the peace process eventually advanced, integration into the army, rather than demobilization, was the chosen mode for addressing the rebel demands.

There were initial claims that the various militias (primarily the *mai-mai*) fighting in the east numbered up to 60,000 combatants and that their 'neutralization' or disarmament would make a considerable contribution to the fragile peace process. However, not only was the PNDDR neither designed nor budgeted to deal with such an additional caseload, but experts questioned the veracity of this figure. Indeed a study financed by the MDRP suggested that the real figure was much lower (about 20,000 combatants) and that many of the signatory groups were likely the virtual creations of ambitious politicians rather than real armed groups. Until such proof was furnished, the PNDDR applied the strict one-man-one gun principle, which was written into its statutes as one of the key eligibility criteria. This was popular neither within the Amani peace process nor with certain international partners. However, this debate was overtaken by subsequent events.

6. Impact of the Rwanda-DRC rapprochement on DDR (2009)

In 2009, in an about turn, Rwanda and DRC brokered a deal that saw Rwandan forces enter DRC to carry out joint operations with the FARDC against the FDLR. As a corollary, the CNDP (whose leader, General Nkunda, had been arrested by Rwanda) also entered into an agreement (March 2009) with the Government that its armed forces would (re-)integrate into the FARDC and its political wing would become a legitimate political party.

The 'accelerated integration' process followed no previously agreed pattern. There was no passage through the joint PNDDR/SMI process. Thus there was no vetting, verification or offer of demobilization. The number of CNDP combatants integrated in this way is said to be around 6,000. Furthermore, in order to maintain a politico-ethnic balance, the Government integrated combatants from the *mai-mai* and other loyalist groups, numbering approximately 6,000. Finally, the Government also 'regularized' at least 7,000 FARDC that were still awaiting the regular joint PNDDR/SMI *brassage* process.

The Government now claims that there are no longer Congolese armed groups in eastern Congo. A few may have been overlooked by the army integration process but it now appears that the original claims of 60,000 armed militias were vastly exaggerated.⁵

The accelerated integration process, and the renewed operations against the FDLR, has been accompanied by a reorganization of the army. Whereas the army reform program called for 18 brigades, the FARDC now counts 35 brigades⁶ in the east alone. The motive for this proliferation is not clear. Some claim that a role had to be found for all the different integrated commanders; others see this as an attempt to limit the risks of having large formations of dubious government loyalty. Certainly the way in which the recent '*intégrés*' have been spread across these various brigades would give credence to the latter.

The EU security sector reform mission in the DRC (EUSEC), amongst other roles, assists the FARDC in registering and paying soldiers. After the first phase of DDR and prior to the resumption of the conflict in the east (and the subsequent 'accelerated integration' process), EUSEC estimated the FARDC to consist of 129,000 men of which approximately 50,000 had been through the joint PNDRR/SMI process and *brassage*. More significantly, EUSEC had managed to establish a system that was assuring that the bulk of the 50,000 men in the 'combined brigades' were receiving their salaries. Indeed this had been a pre-requisite for the very substantial pay rises that the FARDC was accorded (now some US\$50/month). With the more recent developments of September 2008, EUSEC and the SMI have been unable to keep track of the location of troops in the east and to pay their salaries. Nor has it been possible to register and pay the newly integrated forces. Additionally, there is a suspicion that since the last census, many men may have deserted while others have been recruited (including children). As a result, EUSEC and the SMI are currently attempting to carry out a new census.

7. Progress with the Second Phase of DDR (September 2008 – June 2010)

In light of these developments, particularly in the east where resumption of armed conflict was followed by an additional army integration process as part of the peace agreement of

March 2009, the PNDDR has had to contend with a number of changes in its initial design. Adaptation of key objectives has included the following:

- (i) **Demobilization:** in light of accelerated army integration in the east and the exclusion of the Presidential Guard (12-15,000 men), the number of combatants estimated to be processed has been reduced from 70,000 to about 10,000, of which some 5,000 are anticipated to be demobilized.
- (ii) **Re-integration:** the old caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants from the first phase remains, however the estimated new arrivals of 19,000 militia members no longer exist. Contracts to reintegration service providers were issued in 2008 and reintegration activities have started to support this population (old caseload). This number will only slightly increase by the number of additional combatants coming in as newly demobilized.
- (iii) **Children:** 8,000 children from the first and second phase of DDR remain to be supported through ongoing programs.
- (iv) **Handicapped and chronically ill:** although the project remains open to provide assistance to handicapped/sick combatants in the FARDC, numbers entering the process have been very low. The main issues are: (a) compensation for injury, (b) health care, and (c) housing. The project continues to provide an open door to this target group and ongoing sensitization efforts have started to bear fruit.

Given the present focus on socio-economic reintegration, it is worth noting that during the first phase of the EDRP, 54,000 demobilized ex-combatants received a reintegration package in different fields like agriculture, fishing, sewing, woodwork, bricklaying, driving, and metal work in all the provinces of DRC. For the second phase, the project was designed to focus reintegration activities that had demonstrated a better chance of success for beneficiaries, such as agriculture and fishing in rural areas, especially due to the general economic situation of the country. In the meantime, key implementing agencies from the first phase were selected for the second phase including CARITAS, FAO, INPP, ILO, and ADEKOR. Out of the 40,000 demobilized ex-combatants awaiting reintegration from the first phase, a total of 23,780 are currently receiving reintegration support in the different provinces. This results in a total of

5 The end in sight? - Opportunities for the Disarmament & Repatriation of the FDLR in the Democratic Republic of Congo, An Update, Hans Romkema, MDRP Paper Series, August 2009

6 The architecture of the FARDC is very difficult to define given the huge variation in force numbers by brigade.

77,780 demobilized ex-combatants who have received such support since the start of activities in 2004.

A small survey on reintegration provided some insights on current results such as: (i) more than 50 percent of the interviewed said they could provide for all basic necessities in their new life; (ii) only 25 percent of the interviewed thought it was harder for an ex-combatant to find a job; and (iii) social reintegration was progressing well with 95 percent saying they have been welcomed in their community after their return, 95 percent saying they have a good relationship with the local authorities and 79 percent participating in community social activities (such as sport, church, *fêtes* and funerals).

Alongside these internal programmatic adjustments, other key policy and operational issues have directly impacted the program as follows:

- (i) **Demobilization policy, army reform and the PNDDR.** The original objectives and target population of the PNDDR were founded on the Lusaka peace process and the dismantling of the various Congolese armed groups associated with the wars in the late 1990s. That process is more or less complete; hence the end date of the PNDDR in June 2010 is appropriate. The Government is now contending with a number of different challenges relating to armed threats in eastern Congo while at the same time facing the fiscal constraints of carrying such a large military force. It is foreseeable therefore, that the Government will need to go through a further round of demobilization in the future albeit in a very different context, i.e. one of military retrenchment and the move toward comprehensive security sector reform.
- (ii) **Formal DDR and 'community disarmament' activities.** With the resumption of armed conflict followed by a fragile peace in eastern Congo there has been a tendency to confuse two types of processes – formal DDR processes and those associated with the 'disarmament and livelihood support' given to armed groups active in the vicinity of their normal abode. One process, the PNDDR, has focused on individuals associated with politically recognized military groups who undergo a formal and legal process of renouncing force and returning to civilian life (demobilization). The PNDDR has followed strict criteria as set out by decree. The other disarmament process is focused on those who are not part of a mobilized rebellion but may have access to arms and either prey on ci-

vilian populations or repel those who do so (*groupes d'auto-défense*). These individuals may not be entitled to formal demobilization support but do represent a security risk. Hence, activities targeted at arms control and support to job creation and livelihood/ community support have been launched to address that risk. This is not DDR as strictly defined. After the Goma accords in 2008, these non mobilized forces were estimated at about 60,000.⁷ However, with the integration of some *mai mai* militia into the army, MONUC and UNDP now estimate the target group to be about 5,000 individuals associated with such armed groups. Regardless, the need to distinguish between the two processes – one a formal and legal process and the other associated with community recovery – is important. For example, allowing someone from the second category into the PNDDR would technically give the person the choice of joining the army, which would not be either appropriate or desirable.

- (iii) **AfDB and PNDDR.** When the Government requested further assistance in 2007 for the anticipated ongoing needs of DDR, the AfDB agreed to provide parallel financing of US\$ 25 million for the PNDDR. The AfDB project, *projet d'appui à la réinsertion socio-économique post conflit* (PARSEC), has a number of key components including: (i) a communication and outreach campaign for ex-combatants; (ii) a gender study and formulation of a strategy for women associated with armed groups; (iii) reinsertion activities for up to 28,500 ex-combatants (including cash payments, in-kind packages, training) with a focus on agricultural activities (including the formation of pilot agricultural associations), and (iv) support to the project implementation unit (funding for one communication and one agricultural specialist). Project activities are largely focused on the east: Orientale, Katanga, Maniema and the two Kivus.

Given PARSEC's slow disbursement rate (about US\$ 0.6 million to date), the AfDB project has been extended to end December 2010. In turn, due to the anticipated significant reduction in numbers of ex-combatants demobilized, and the under-spend of the World Bank financing, it is expected that the PARSEC will be re-oriented. At the moment, the planning figures of the PNDDR for the AfDB financing is for the reintegration of some 6,000 ex-combatants (in Katanga and Maniema provinces). An AfDB mission is expected to arrive soon in order to discuss future options including support to the community disarmament and integration activities noted above.

7 Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des conflit armées, Annexe I, GoDRC, June 2009

8. Future World Bank Support

Given the change in circumstances from when the second phase of DDR was first designed, in July 2009 the approach to DDR in the DRC was reoriented as follows:

- (i) **The PNDDR:** the most significant change has been the reduction in expected numbers of demobilized – from 23,000 down to possibly 3–5,000. This will result in considerable budget savings to the EDRP, which finances the PNDDR. Also, as per the position of the Minister of Defense, who accepts the reduction in expected numbers and wishes to see the current process come to an end, the EDRP will close at the end of June 2010 leaving very little time for disbursements and adoption of any new activities (particularly in view of the fact that the minimum time for an ex-combatant to go through the DDR process is, on average, nine months).

Currently IDA has disbursed US\$ 11.2 million of the US\$ 50 million additional financing to the EDRP. The Government is currently reviewing its current contracts with implementing agencies in particular to account for revised caseloads and the increase in prices of certain commodities. However, it is clear that there will be substantive savings (of around US\$ 10 million). The World Bank and the Government will be discussing the surplus, however, it is unlikely to be channeled through the EDRP.

- (ii) **Eastern Congo, community disarmament and the Emergency Multi-Donor Trust Fund:** As noted above, the Government and partners have a complex challenge in stabilizing the eastern part of Congo. There are a myriad of political and socio-economic reasons behind the ongoing conflict in the region.⁸ As recognized in efforts to stabilize the east, including the Stabilization Program for Eastern DRC (STAREC) and the UN Support Strategy for Security and Stabilization in Eastern DRC (UNSSS), long-term resolution of the armed conflict will require a multi-dimensional approach. One key component will be the provision of alternative livelihoods and disarmament of the various armed groups that continue to subsist and prey on civilian populations and humanitarian agencies. Further, as long as illicit mining continues to be a source of considerable revenue and well-organized armed forces such as the FLDR persist, preconditions

for comprehensive disarmament and pacification will not be in place.

Also noteworthy, is that the Bank is not permitted under its articles to finance disarmament. However, it is able to support livelihoods and has experience in the reintegration of ex-combatants. To prevent the re-recruitment of ex-combatants, the Bank established an Emergency MDTF for Congo to finance NGO support to the reintegration of ex-combatants. This trust fund has concentrated its activities on eastern Congo. Thus far, it has supported the following two reintegration projects:

- **CARITAS:** Socio-economic reintegration for 7,000 ex-combatants in South and North Kivu (US\$ 3.3 million). This project is due to close on 30 June 2010. To date, 4,085 ex-combatants have finished their training and received agricultural reintegration kits; a further 3,000 are in the process of being trained. Project performance is satisfactory, with problems related to insecurity in areas near Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga.

- **Save the Children-UK:** Support to the socio-economic reintegration of 1,500 demobilized children associated with armed forces (US\$ 1.5 million). This project will also close on 30 June 2010 and includes activities for vocational training and primary education in North and South Kivu.

The World Bank will carry out a review of the current needs in relation to the objectives and activities of the MDTF. Findings will be shared and discussed with MDTF donors for further action. In addition, the World Bank is examining how its current portfolio can further contribute to peace and security in the eastern DRC, in line with the Government's STAREC.

⁸ See variously Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, ICG May 2009, Faced with a gun, what can you do? : War and militarization of mining in eastern Congo, Global Witness, July 2009, and STAREC, *ibid*.