

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL  
DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT  
Pilot Reintegration Project

# Project Management Documentation



## **Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation Series**

DDR Programme 2013-2014 Pilot

Republic of South Sudan

### **Book 1: Project Management Documentation**

- Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report
- External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project
- Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey
- Pilot Reintegration Project Document as Implemented (October 2014)

### **Book 2: Implementing Partner Documentation**

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- SECTION II - Livelihood Start-Up Kits Summary & Reflection

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- Information Counseling and Referral System User's Manual
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# Foreword

**D**isarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme has been found to be a critical component of consolidating peace, establishing stability, and allowing recovery and development to take root. Since 2011 the Government of the Republic of South Sudan has been developing a new nationally led and owned DDR Programme aimed at enhancing the country's stability and prosperity by facilitating the return to productive civilian life of former members of the National Organized Forces (NOFs). The current events in South Sudan only further emphasize the importance to the country of DDR and its connection to the nation's overall development. As such, it is critical that the country continue and invigorate its work in developing a nationally-led well-designed and well-implemented DDR Programme.

To ensure the full DDR programme was well designed to fit the context and needs of South Sudan, the Programme was started in 2013 with a pilot, during which lessons could be learned and incorporated before scaling up to the full caseload. The Republic of South Sudan's National DDR Programme (NDDRP) Pilot conducted in 2013-2014 was a vital first step in the country's efforts to institute the full National DDR Programme.

As reintegration is the ultimate measure of success of a DDR process, the Republic of South Sudan places great importance on the reintegration process. In February 2013, the Republic of South Sudan's DDR Commission officially requested the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the World Bank to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in South Sudan through a generous contribution by KfW of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pilot Reintegration Project began in April 2013, serving 290 ex-combatants by providing reintegration

programming including entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings, livelihoods start-up kits, Information Counselling, Referral Services (ICRS), and community empowerment through community support projects.

The primary objective of the NDDRC's Pilot Reintegration Project was to test reintegration approaches and modalities and develop actionable lessons to inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan's future DDR programming. An important piece of this work is the compilation of documentation on the process, activities and lessons learned to be used by the NDDRC in future tranches. In addition, all manuals, curriculum and training materials developed throughout the pilot were also developed to be available for use in the NDDRP.

I would like to thank TDRP for their guidance, commitment and hard work both on the Pilot Project and in the production of this documentation. In addition, I would like to thank African Union and Bonn International Center for Conversion for being our partners in this process and our Implementing Partners, UNICON, IOM South Sudan and Adam Smith International and consultants for their dedication and commitment to this project. The Pilot Reintegration Project has increased the capacity of the NDDRC management and staff working on DDR and produced a wealth of knowledge and lessons which will provide a great benefit to the people of South Sudan when used in the full DDR programme.

**William Deng Deng**

Chairperson  
National DDR Commission  
Juba, South Sudan

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# Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report

October 2014





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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CAAFG	Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
HQ	Headquarters
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission of the Republic of South Sudan
NDDRP	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
NOF	National Organized Forces
PMU	Project Management Unit
SPLA/M	Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement
SPLA-IO	Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the World Bank
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups

# Executive Summary

The Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of South Sudan's National DDR Programme (NDDRP) was conducted with the overall aim to test reintegration approaches and modalities, and to develop actionable lessons that can inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan's future DDR programming. Reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life is a major challenge and in fact the key measure of a DDR programme's success. Managed by the World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) in close coordination with the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) and through financial support from Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the reintegration pilot was conducted in three phases from April 2013-October 2014.

This first pilot DDR Programme focused on 300 members of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/South Sudan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF) in their transition out of the armed forces into civilian life. The pilot reintegration project began with 290 participants carried over from the reinsertion phase of the full programme at Mapel Transitional Facility. The 290 individuals were from the Wounded Heroes division of SPLA/SSAF. This classification, however, is not related to injury and all participants in the pilot were able-bodied individuals. The pilot was conducted in the four states of the country's northwest region, Greater bahr el Ghazal.

The project was implemented through four components:

- **Livelihoods Support** was the largest component of the work. This focused on assisting individuals in establishing sustainable alternative livelihoods in their communities of return. Incorporated in this component were (i) entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings conducted over a series of interactions, (ii) livelihoods start-up kits, (iii) technical skills extension, and (iv) leveraging available government services. The technical skills extension included agricultural extension visits as well as targeted vocational training and expert visits. (Implementing Partner: UNICON)
- **DDR Community Support Projects** were placed at communities with high levels of ex-combatant return. These projects included the construction or rehabilitation of water boreholes or specifically requested common good projects. This process pri-

oritized community engagement in the implementation of this peace dividend. (Implementing Partner: IOM)

- **Institutional Capacity Building** included two tracks with the first focused on project management training, mentoring, staff support, and systems development. (Implementing Partner: Adam Smith International). The second track of capacity building was the completion of an information counselling and referral system. The NDDRC now has a customized system that will allow for collection and reporting on ex-combatant data as well as facilitate counselling and referral to the ex-combatants. (ICRS completed directly by TDRP in close coordination with NDDRC)
- **Monitoring and Evaluation** included both comprehensive data collection and additional capacity building focused specifically on M&E. The pilot collected ex-combatant registration and baseline data, a community baseline survey, and an ex-combatant satisfaction survey. These tools and data are all available to NDDRC for future use. (Phase 1 Implementing Partner: Adam Smith with Integrity Research, Phase 2: TDRP)

Each of the components produced documentation of lessons learned as well as tools including training curriculum and manuals, the ICRS system, etc. to be utilized and/or built upon in future programming.

Finally TDRP took stock of the programmatic and operational learnings of the piloting process alongside the shifting dynamics of DDR since December 2013. The following key learnings emerged:

## LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT LESSONS LEARNED

### Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings

- Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings are the most crucial component of reintegration programming.
- Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings should be delivered via a combined curriculum.

- The joint entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy training should begin early in the DDR cycle and continue throughout to encourage livelihood and market-based decision-making throughout the DDR process.
- The baseline (Transition Facility or Vocational Centre) and follow-up reintegration trainings (in-field or community) should be formulated as one holistic training course with various modules.
- Information on trainings and services to be provided to XCs throughout the DDR process must be shared not only with ex-combatants but also with all staff including trainers.
- All XCs and community trainings should emphasize hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best practices for low-literacy adult learners.
- DDR Community Support Projects should be implemented through the appropriate line ministry linked to the DDR Commission through a State-managed, coordinated mechanism.
- A clear criterion for community selection and project choice is necessary, with all decisions agreed to pre-budget formulation.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION LESSONS LEARNED

- Monitoring and Evaluation (and Management Information Systems) require specific staff skills that need to be agreed to by all stakeholders from the outset.
- Funding agents will have to commit additional resources both for capacity building and potentially embedding resources within the Commission.
- Both Internal and External M&E systems are required for an effective DDR program
- Use of ICRS caseworkers as data collectors in tandem with external enumerators is both effective and enhances ongoing M&E.

## Livelihoods start-up kits

- Livelihoods start-up kits are an essential component of reintegration programming requiring significant staff, resources and attention to logistical detail to ensure full and timely distribution.
- Start-up kit contents must be accredited and agreed upon through a consultative process.
- Alignment of start-up kits with vocational training is critical and should include contents used during training and distribution upon completion of the vocational training.

## INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING LESSONS LEARNED

- Development of tailor-made systems (e.g., ICRS) is time and training intensive, and to be effective need to be initiated well in advance of a DDR program.
- Conducting an organizational assessment followed by the identified organizational adjustments are necessary prerequisites to effective staff capacity building.
- Task specific, on-the-job trainings were the most effective capacity building approach.

## Technical skills extension

- Partnering with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide agricultural extension trainings to XCs through Agricultural Extension Workers is an effective and sustainable approach.
- Vocational Expert Visits or Apprenticeships require too much individual attention and resources therefore are not a viable approach at this time.
- Providing vocational skill courses through state level institutions shows potential as an approach and should be explored further.
- Trainers must team up with ICRS caseworkers across all trainings to ensure continuity and to enhance service delivery across the entire process.

## STRUCTURAL LESSONS LEARNED

- DDR must be more closely linked with Security Sector Reform (SSR) than in former iterations of DDR in South Sudan.
- Coordination between the SPLA/NOF and the NDDRC in the preparation of the combatants while still within the military is essential in ensuring a cost effective and sustainable programme.
- Reinsertion and Reintegration are intrinsically interwoven and should be planned as such.
- Communications including sensitization and public information with external audiences and internal communications require significant attention and coordination.

## DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS LESSONS LEARNED

- DDR Community Support Projects have high social capital returns and should be part of a greater reconciliation process but not a core component of DDR.

- Psychosocial issues and substance abuse are factors restricting sustainable livelihoods.
- Gender and child sensitive programming needs additional attention and coordination.
- Systemic approaches to ensure ex-combatant voice in programming are required.
- The full DDR programme as piloted is too costly to be brought to scale thus the alternative approach incorporated in the NDDRC's new Harmonized Reinsertion and Reintegration Strategy should be explored.
- Increased clarity on categorization of DDR beneficiary groups and numbers of beneficiaries;
- Reduced cost;
- Increased harmonization of programming in reinsertion and reintegration;
- Full national government implementation; and
- Continued momentum.

Matching the findings above with the realities of the recent events, this analysis finds that the priority areas requiring attention for a renewed strategy include:

- Increased linkage between SSR & DDR;

The current events in South Sudan underscore the importance of DDR to the country and its connection to the nation's overall development. As such, it is critical that the country continue and invigorate its work in developing a nationally-led well-designed and well-implemented DDR programme. The learnings from this pilot as well as the tools developed are relevant and timely as these contribute to the development of an effective and realistic full National DDR Programme.

# 1 Background

**D**isarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) has been highlighted as a Government of South Sudan's (GoSS) priority as an integral component of the country's progress toward establishing sustainable peace and socio-economic development. The importance of this process was further highlighted by the events beginning 15 December 2013.

At last count, the SPLA's standing parade was approximately 194,000. Many of these soldiers have received little to no military training, are illiterate, and some are over pensionable age. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), some SPLA members were redeployed to other institutions including the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Brigades), and the Correctional Services (Prisons). These services are often jointly referred to as the National Organized Forces (NOF).

The Government recognizes that the armed forces need to transition to a more proportionately-sized and resourced national army (SPLA) which respects human rights and operates under effective civilian oversight. A reduction in force size is needed to modernize SPLA as well as to reduce the national defence budget. Currently, approximately 40 percent of the national budget is consumed by defence expenditures, a significant proportion of which is used to meet salary and welfare costs. Streamlining the military is, therefore, in the Government's overarching interest. As the soldiers are demobilised, the number of citizens with formal access to weapons should reduce. As those carrying arms pose a potential future source of insecurity if not managed appropriately, DDR is seen as one component of a broader security sector reform process.

## 1.1 South Sudan DDR Programme Objective

The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments to foster recovery and development. This is conducted by disarming, demobilizing, and sustainably reintegrating DDR target groups in their chosen communities of return while supporting longer-term development and

mitigating potential negative impacts through community based activities. DDR has been found to be a critical component of consolidating peace, establishing stability, and allowing development to take root.

The overall GoSS objective of the South Sudan DDR Programme is "To support the transformation of SPLA / SSAF into a more professional, efficient, and cost-effective armed force." The overall programme further aims to enhance the country's stability and prosperity by facilitating the return of the National Organized Forces' former members to productive civilian life.

The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants can contribute significantly to the overall process of peace consolidation and prosperity in South Sudan. Experience in other post conflict countries demonstrates stabilization and the assumption of a normal life for these target groups is likely to prevent new tensions and can contribute to burgeoning economic life in small communities. The strategy's main objective is to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and the creation of an enabling environment for sustainable development through socio-economic reintegration of people affected by the conflict. In recent years, bilateral and multinational partners have supported a large number of projects in the fields of community development and the fight against poverty. The strategy will, therefore, tend to create synergies between these projects where possible to avoid duplication in the response and coordination of actors involved.

In South Sudan, the current DDR design encompasses one year of programming. This includes a three month reinsertion phase at a transition facility followed by six months of reintegration services and finally three months of follow-up, counselling, and referral by the National DDR Commission's (NDDRC) state staff.

The overall programme aims to enhance the country's stability and prosperity by facilitating the return of National Organized Forces' (NOF) former members to productive civilian life. Initially, the government suggested processing 150,000 ex-combatants through the new programme. More recent estimates (pre-December 2013 / January 2014), however, suggest that the actual numbers are in the range of 60,000-80,000.

# 2 Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project

The government of South Sudan initiated the DDR programme with a pilot to ensure that a full programme fits the context and needs of South Sudan and that lessons learned during the pilot could be incorporated before scaling up to the full caseload. The Pilot Reintegration Project includes the reintegration services and reintegration related capacity building components of the pilot DDR programme.

## 2.1 Goal & Objectives

***The primary goal of NDDRC's Pilot Reintegration Project is to test reintegration approaches and modalities and develop actionable lessons which can inform and improve the GoSS' future DDR programming.***

These modalities include direct services to beneficiaries and project management. This is achieved through the following objectives:

*Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

*Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

## 2.2 Reintegration Approach

Reintegration is a core component of the overall DDR process and is highlighted in the South Sudan DDR policy as the key measure of the DDR policy's success. Reintegration programming aims to contribute to the consolidation of lasting stability and development through the improvement of social and material conditions of ex-combatants and other beneficiaries. Reintegration is a process of continuous social and economic development, initiated during the DDR phase, and ideally continuing through a stabilisation period into the medium and possibly long-term. Ex-combatants return to civilian life either in their community of origin or in new communities through reintegration and seek sustainable livelihoods. DDR programmes can catalyse long-term development and peace consolidation. Best practice reintegration models incorporate a more holistic development pathway that builds linkages between the initial phases of DDR's medium-term recovery and stabilization initiatives with consideration for longer-term sustainable development.

Economic reintegration needs are highlighted as the Pilot DDR Programme's priority. Social activities have been minimized for this initial tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Social reintegration activities are not prioritized given ex-combatants were members of SPLA who are largely lauded and well regarded by local populations for their role in the country's liberation. The pilot also recognized successful reintegration of ex-combatants is not the result of the reintegration work alone but the culmination of the full suite of services provided from the time of demobilization through disarmament, reinsertion, and reintegration programming and services.

# 3 Process of the Pilot Reintegration Project

## 3.1 Project Caseload

The first pilot DDR Programme served just under 300 members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/South Sudan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF) in their transition out of the armed forces into civilian life. The pilot is established and delivered in the four states of Greater bahr el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern bahr el Ghazal, and Western bahr el Ghazal). The Mapel Transition Facility located in Western bahr el Ghazal is the transition facility serving the Greater bahr el Ghazal region.


The pilot reintegration project began with 290 participants carried over from the Mapel Transition Facility programming. All 290 individuals are from the Wounded Heroes’ division of SPLA/SSAF. This classification, however, is not related to injury and all pilot participants were able bodied individuals.

All participants underwent a dual verification process that confirmed i) their involvement with NOF, and ii) that the identity of the individual presenting themselves was in fact the individual listed. Prior to registration, each individual provided their Demobilization Certificate and their names were checked against the demobilization list provided by SPLA. In addition, each individual showed photo identification – the national ID, the military ID or an identification form created and signed by the commanding officer and the UNMISS DDR officer. As the Pilot Reintegration Project caseload was dictated by the caseload in Mapel, the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) was engaged in conversations with NDDRC, UNMISS, BICC and SPLA regarding the pre-Mapel verification process. Several individuals were turned away as they did not meet the verification criteria. The Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) was used during Registration and individual information was securely captured.

Over the course of the pilot project, five participants passed away, leaving the caseload at the end of the pilot standing at 285 ex-combatants.

The pilot was initially envisioned to serve NOF’s 500 members including SPLA/SSAF. The reasons for the

Pilot Caseload by Chosen State of Return	
Lakes	93
Western bahr el Ghazal	92
Warrap	75
Northern bahr el Ghazal	30
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>290</b>



lesser caseload may be attributed to NOF’s lack of confidence in the project following the CPA DDR which made a negative impression, as well as other factors such as ongoing questions regarding pensions. This initial caseload reflects insufficient buy-in from SPLA and NOF in the DDR Programme overall. The pilot caseload included 272 men and 18 women and the average age was 43 years based on self-reporting at registration (by age group, 95 participants were under 40 years of age, 175 between 40 - 54, and 20 over the age of 55).

## 3.2 Project Timeline

The South Sudan National DDR Programme was designed to last for one year beginning with a three-month reinsertion phase at a transition facility followed by six months of reintegration services and finally three months of follow-up, counselling, and referral by NDDRC state staff. In April 2013, the first caseload of ex-combatants started at the Mapel Transition Facility where they received vocational, literacy and numeracy, and life skills

training. The initial design called for the project to begin in April 2013 and run through April 2014. However, the transition facility officially began their three-month training in June 2013 thus shifting the reintegration timeline.

During the last weeks in the camp, the pilot project provided ex-combatants in the Mapel facility with classes on entrepreneurship, cooperatives, and financial literacy focused on applicable skills supporting them in their segue to reintegration. In September 2013, the first pilot tranche of 290 former soldiers graduated from the Mapel Transition Facility and the ex-combatants (XCs) returned to their communities. The pilot project provided livelihoods support in their communities of reintegration through which the XCs received follow-up entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings and start-up toolkits to assist ex-combatants engage in sustainable livelihoods in the area of vocational training they received. In concert with this work, the communities received DDR community support projects and cooperatives training alongside the returning ex-combatants.

The project will run through October 2014. The pilot design included a mid-point break to come into effect on December 15, 2013 and activities were to be resumed on January 6th 2014. The conflict that sparked on December 15, 2013, however, delayed activities until April 2014 due to security, thus extending the project with implementing partner (IP) service delivery to be completed by July 2014 and all evaluation and knowledge transfer by October 31, 2014.

### 3.3 Project Preparation

TDRP worked closely with NDDRC in preparation for the new programme by providing technical assistance with a focus on reintegration since late 2011. Additionally, TDRP provided technical assistance to NDDRC to hone the new DDR programme's overarching vision of reintegration into an operational reintegration approach. The NDDRC and TDRP teams built the reintegration design from the national policy and strategy documents, developing and finalizing the reintegration approach in the winter of 2012/2013. In designing this approach, TDRP applied knowledge gained through earlier TDRP research specifically on livelihoods, vocational training, and cooperatives. Stakeholder meetings and focus groups were also conducted to inform design.

In late 2012, KfW on behalf of the German government in coordination with NDDRC requested TDRP to assist in piloting the reintegration programme of the first tranche of up to 500 ex-combatants to be demobilized

in the pilot phase. TDRP agreed to this expanded role which includes: 1) testing the DDR reintegration modalities for the country's new national programme, 2) capacity building of NDDRC systems and staff, 3) financial management of the reintegration services for this initial pilot tranche, and 4) the establishment of an Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). The funds and project are managed by TDRP and the project is implemented in partnership with NDDRC through IPs. As part of TDRP's technical assistance, a team of TDRP staff and consultants conducted a series of missions between 2012 and 2014 with the primary objective to provide oversight and management of the NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project.

TDRP conducted missions on 8-26 October and 27 November-13 December 2012 focused on identifying reintegration opportunities and, together with NDDRC, developed a Pilot Reintegration Design. The team explored livelihood activities in line with the experience and interests of the ex-combatants while keeping in mind relevant market realities through meeting with stakeholders and utilizing research and profile data. The second mission worked in collaboration with NDDRC to test the programming design for a pilot reintegration project and to test XC interest in various components. This testing was done with two methods: (i) meeting with NDDRC leadership and DDR stakeholders, and (ii) conducting in person focus groups with current military members who will be included in the DDR pilot and community members from communities of intended return in Lakes and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. Based on the input collected, the mission adjusted the previously suggested reintegration activities to account for the mission findings and formulated a draft pilot reintegration project design for further input by NDDRC. The draft reintegration pilot design was presented at an interactive session with stakeholders on 11 December 2012 in Juba.

In January 2013, the team solicited additional input and edits to the pilot reintegration design. The TDRP team incorporated the feedback and completed a final draft pilot reintegration programme document for the first reintegration pilot. The team then conducted a mission in March to agree upon final implementation modalities including identification and contracting requirements for partner organizations. These included agreeing of the final specifics of the programme including: reintegration livelihood activities such as in the area of cooperatives, small farming and micro-enterprise development; DDR community support projects; and the eventual Monitoring and Evaluation system that was to be implemented. Following these discussions, the commission issued their final Pilot Reintegration Project Programme Document in March 2013.



### 3.4 Implementing Partners

Implementation of the project components entailed the contracting of three IPs. In March 2013, TDRP began the IP solicitation process for the pilot. This process included an initial request for Expressions of Interest (EOIs), their review, and a correlated Request for Proposals to those with valid EOIs. Proposals were received and reviewed in April 2013.

The following implementing partners were selected for the pilot:

- 1) Livelihoods Support – the firm UNICON International Ltd. was contracted for the period from May 15th, 2013 to October 31st, 2014.

- 2) DDR Community Support Projects – the agency International Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in South Sudan was contracted for the period from August 19th, 2013 to June 30th, 2014.
- 3) Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation – the firm Adam Smith International with M&E sub-contractor Integrity Research were contracted for the period from May 14th, 2013 through November 30th, 2013.

### 3.5 Components of the Pilot Reintegration Project


In order to achieve the overarching reintegration objectives, the pilot reintegration project includes the following four components:

<b>Livelihoods Support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings</li> <li>• Livelihood start-up kits</li> <li>• Technical skills extension:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Agricultural extension visits</li> <li>(ii) Vocational expert visits</li> <li>(iii) Targeted supplementary vocational training</li> </ol> </li> <li>• Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up</li> </ul>
<b>DDR Community Support Projects</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Site selection &amp; community mobilization</li> <li>• Installation of boreholes, water pump rehabilitation or community requested common good projects</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Capacity Building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support and Systems Development</li> <li>• Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS)</li> </ul>
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Registration data collection</li> <li>(ii) Baseline Surveys – Ex-combatants &amp; Communities of Return</li> <li>(iii) Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey</li> </ol> </li> <li>• M&amp;E capacity building:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) M&amp;E training</li> <li>(ii) Creating procedures and tools</li> </ol> </li> </ul>

### 3.6 Project Phases

The project was implemented in three phases. As seen in the following diagram, the service delivery components were broken into two to allow for additional flexibility to assess mid-way through the project and incorporate those lessons into the remaining programming. Although entirely unintended, this break between phases was scheduled for December 15, 2013 and thus the devastating civil unrest did not impact delivery in Phase 1. Phase 2 was postponed due to security and services resumed starting April 2014. Implementing Partner Service delivery was finalized by the end of July 2014.

Phase 3 of the pilot was established to ensure that the pilot achieved the learning objectives by imbedding an external evaluation and a period of knowledge consolidation and transfer.



### 3.7 Project Finances

The ultimate objective of conducting the pilot reintegration project is to test methods and modalities during this phase in such a manner that they could be replicated in the future. This has particular bearing on costs. As a pilot it can be expected that certain economies of scale are missing, and thus costs will be higher than scaled-up implementation of the same modalities. However, emphasis was placed on minimizing costs where possible throughout the process. NDDRC was called upon to make several tough choices in prioritizing among the various programming options allowed by the DDR policy. The areas chosen in this pilot were based on lessons learned in the CPA DDR, DDR research, and best practices.

The pilot reintegration project was funded through a

grant from KfW of Germany in the amount of 2 million euro. NDDRC was included in discussions of project fund usage to ensure full awareness of project management. These funds were spent as follows.

The direct ex-combatant services are found in the livelihoods support total of \$1,087,482. With 290 participants in the pilot programme, the cost per ex-combatant comes to \$3,750 per participant. This cost is above the anticipated costs to replicate such a model with larger caseloads due to a combination of 1) economies of scale impacting purchasing and training, and 2) reduced training of trainers and preparation time necessary once a full project is implemented. Community members also participated in cooperative trainings within this component (284 community members in Phase 1 and 129 community members continuing in Phase 2).

NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs			
	Phase 1 TOTAL COMMITTED	Phase 2 TOTAL COMMITTED	TOTAL
<b>Livelihoods Support</b>	\$800,200	\$287,282	\$1,087,482
Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings	\$164,500	\$0	\$164,500
Livelihoods Start-Up Kits	\$323,100	\$0	\$323,100
State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings	\$312,600	\$146,433	\$459,033
Technical Skills Extension- Agricultural extension visits		\$48,417	\$48,417
Technical Skills Extension- Vocational expert visits		\$14,247	\$14,247
Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings		\$63,547	\$63,547
Assistance in accessing available government services		\$14,638	\$14,638
<b>Community Support Projects</b>	\$155,750	\$294,250	\$450,000
<b>Capacity Building and Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</b>	\$519,506	\$247,525	\$767,031
Mentoring/Capacity Building	\$442,836	\$84,519	\$527,355
Government employee Training of Trainers		\$117,855	\$117,855
M&E Surveys	\$76,670	\$45,151	\$121,821
<b>NDDRC Participation Funds</b>	\$120,000	\$120,000	\$240,000
<b>Evaluations</b>	\$28,269	\$0	\$28,269
<b>Contingency</b>		\$78,929	\$78,929
Juba Ex-combatant and Crime Survey		\$76,540	
Final transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC		\$2,389	
<b>TOTAL ALL</b>	<b>\$1,623,725</b>	<b>\$1,027,986</b>	<b>\$2,651,711</b>

# 4 Pilot Reintegration Project Activities

## 4.1 Livelihoods Support

All ex-combatants participating in the NDDRC pilot programme were eligible to receive a suite of reintegration livelihoods support services. This included (i) livelihoods support trainings on entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy to operationalize the vocational training received at the transition facility, (ii) livelihood start-up kits correlated to the vocational trainings received in Mapel, (iii) targeted technical skills extension through either expert visits by agricultural extension workers or vocational experts, or targeted supplementary vocational skills training, and (iv) assistance in accessing available government services through referral and follow up by ICRS caseworkers. These services are designed to support ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths including cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members, small farm and/or rural agricultural enterprises, and individual micro-enterprise businesses.

Highlights of this work include:

- All ex-combatants at the Transition Facility participated in Mapel based intensive entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings
- 93% of ex-combatants participated in state-based follow-up trainings (270 of 290)
- 92% of agricultural track ex-combatants participated in agricultural extension trainings (119 of 129)
- 99% of livelihood start-up kits distributed (288 of 290 with 2 XCs unreachable)

While it is too early in the process to determine the impact of this programming, early indicators suggest that the XCs are utilizing the training and techniques. For example, per the XC Satisfaction Survey, 61% self-report making a living by operating their own business and 23% self-report currently participating in a cooperative or association (up from 5.1% self-reporting that they participated in a cooperative at some point in their life before joining the DDR programme). The ex-combatant satisfaction survey report provides full detail on the findings.

### 4.1.1 Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings

This sub-component was the primary emphasis of the reintegration training due to a combination of factors. Firstly, due to the informal nature of the market in South Sudan and the limited job market it is very likely that for an ex-combatant to utilize the vocational training they received in Mapel they will need to start up their own venture - be it a business, partnership or cooperative. This is in keeping with the best practice successful programmes seen that focused on the entrepreneurship and financial literacy aspects of training, rather than continued vocational training (e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC).

The same experience also shows us that in the absence of entrepreneurship training, no matter how well skilled an XC is, they do not succeed. Research also shows that, with the exception of agriculture, the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants will not continue in the vocation they have been taught but will use this training to first earn sufficient capital to migrate to their own chosen opportunity or use capital inputs to start in the area that they want to work in. As an example, 25% of ex-combatants responding to the satisfaction survey reported not working in the vocation in which they were trained at Mapel with the survey having been conducted less than 1 year after the training. Of those 52 XCs who said they were not working in the vocations on which they were trained, 38 of them chose to make a living by being self-employed in farming. Literature shows that entrepreneurs who are pulled rather than pushed into a sector or opportunity have an infinitely greater chance of success. Additional DDR studies show that XCs who join or initiate economic associations or cooperatives will have a greater chance of success fully reintegrating socially and economically. The caveat being that this is contingent on the size of the cooperative (small cooperatives are most successful) and the composition of the cooperative including community members.

The main thrust of this training was on empowering XCs to adopt a sustainable livelihood approach. This train-

ing included 1) a 10-day intensive training conducted at the Mapel Transition Facility during the last two weeks of camp, and 2) state-based follow-up trainings in both phase 1 and phase 2. The training was an important complement to the vocational skills training provided by UNESCO at Mapel as it urged the XCs to think about those skills from a business/entrepreneurship potential perspective. Further, the trainings drew on the literacy and numeracy trainings received, providing tangible uses of the information and including financial literacy training modules. Additionally, the training in the camp facilitated XCs to initialize thinking on cooperative or partnership work, into which they were encouraged to incorporate community members upon return to their communities.

The training at Mapel was very well received. According to the ex-combatant satisfaction survey, 98% of the respondents were satisfied with the training they received in Mapel, 97% stated that they learned new knowledge during the entrepreneurship trainings, and 86% of participants stated that they have made use of the skills they learned. Additionally, the Mid-Term Review, final ex-combatant satisfaction survey, and implementing partner reporting found a demand and applicability of the entrepreneurship, cooperatives, and financial literacy trainings.

To conduct the training for 290 ex-combatants, 10 South Sudanese individuals were recruited based on their background in business or related fields and language skills and trained during a two-week programme in Mapel. This allowed the trainers to meet many of their future students and receive basic information on them, including literacy level, approximate location, possible grouping preferences, and incorporate these ground realities into the training material. An international training expert conducted this training. The expert first developed the Training of Trainers (TOT) curriculum as draft as well as the field training manual and training materials to be used by the trainers during the business/cooperative training for XCs. These materials were then adjusted over the course of the TOT to respond to additional information on local context and trainees' demographics, and then utilized in the Mapel and state-based follow-up trainings. These curriculum and training materials are now available to NDDRC for future use. The TOT's success is reflected in the XC satisfaction survey in terms of the satisfaction overall with the training, and in particular none of the five participants expressing low satisfaction sited concern with the trainers but rather referenced training content and wanting additional training on the topic.

Once the ex-combatants graduated from Mapel and returned to their chosen communities, the trainers with the support of NDDRC state level staff circulated within the states to provide follow-up trainings to the XCs and community members joining the XCs in cooperatives or associations. The follow-up training was designed to build on the intensive foundational training provided at Mapel. During phase 1, according to implementing partner reporting a total of 253 ex-combatants received the business/cooperative training in addition to 284 community members. In phase 2, 170 ex-combatants and 129 community members attended trainings. This was confirmed by the findings of the ex-combatant survey in which 94% of respondents reported participating in various State-based business and association/cooperatives trainings with each of them attending on average two training sessions of this kind. These trainings included 15 modules covering a variety of entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy topics on an as-needed basis depending of the needs of individual XCs and their situation. The XCs' needs were determined by a needs evaluation conducted by the training team.

The field training used several well-known learning methods that proved to be successful in the region, such as (i) simulations and role-play, (ii) learning by doing, (iii) visuals and illustration, (iv) hands-on experience via interaction with existing businessmen, (v) individual counselling, and (vi) practice sessions. The State-based livelihood trainings were received very positively, as an overwhelming majority (94%) of respondents who attended the trainings said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State trainings with a further 71% of them stating that they had used these new additional skills in their life. New skills that XCs mentioned included how to better work with others, how to form associations/cooperatives, how to keep financial records, and how to manage business, among others.

The pilot also saw a significant increase in ex-combatants choosing to participate in associations or cooperatives after completing the pilot training. Only 14 ex-combatants (4.8%) reported having participated in associations/cooperatives at the start of Mapel. In comparison, 23.5% of respondents (48 of the 204 ex-combatants responding to the satisfaction survey) reported participating in associations/cooperatives in July 2014. Only one cooperative had completed the official registration process by July 2014 however, many groups were in various phases of formation after receiving the entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings. The NDDRC's ICRS caseworkers reported working with 17 such groups which were formed by a total of 68 ex-combatants joined by 442 community members as of July 2014. Meanwhile

more than half of the respondents of the satisfaction survey (61.3%) were making a living by operating their own business.

In the project's phase 2, a second 10-day ToT was provided to NDDRC's 16 ICRS caseworkers in order to provide quality training services to XCs and to increase the capacity of the NDDRC state teams in service delivery. The training matched to that provided to the external trainers in Phase 1 with further adjustments made to localize the context and for use by the ICRS caseworkers. The decision to use national staff as trainers had both positives and negatives. The positives included that the ICRS caseworkers have knowledge and experience in working with the XCs and were well able to reflect the needs and challenges they may face in the field as well areas of knowledge that would be particularly in demand by the XCs. Additionally, in terms of implementation, the ICRS caseworkers have strong knowledge of the areas and are able to locate the trainees in challenging environments. The primary negative aspect of the ICRS caseworkers acting as trainers is that these staff do not have any background in entrepreneurship or business, as opposed to externally hired trainers. Despite this drawback, the trainings in phase 2 were well received. It is also of note that when combining the knowledge transferred to the locally hired UNICON trainers, state managers, and NDDRC ICRS caseworkers, the TOT has become a capacity-building tool that ultimately contributes to the development of South Sudan in ways beyond the Project's direct goals.

Utilizing NDDRC staff as trainers in Phase II of this work piloted a new approach. This added to the effectiveness of the trainings. However, as to be expected, most of the ICRS caseworkers do not have a business background, which is beneficial in a trainer on these topics. Additionally, it is important to balance the workload of the caseworkers so they are available to counsel and refer. As the programme builds to scale pairing skilled trainers with ICRS caseworkers appears to have the highest potential for success.

Regarding structure of the training, the pilot's initial design called for the implementation of separate business and cooperative trainings. However, based on the recommendation of the training expert these were combined into a single joint curriculum including modules on each topic. This allows ex-combatants to learn a broad range of approaches and then determine their ideal business structure based on market realities once they returned to their communities. This flexibility greatly expanded the value of these trainings.

Additionally, the inclusion of the training at Mapel by the reintegration implementing partner constituted a new approach to that seen previously. This design forms a natural continuity between the trainings received in the camp and the trainings in the communities of return, allowing for improved learning outcomes. This approach also provided the XCs increased information on services available during reintegration with the intention of reducing misinformation and reinforcing their return home as part of a continuous DDR process of support. Overall this allows for the XCs to be introduced to the reintegration trainers, develop a rapport, and better understand the services which will be available in the programme once they return to their communities. The approach directly responded to a lesson learned in previous DDR programming where the programming at the center and in the states were completely disconnected. This approach shifted the paradigm of viewing each DDR component in isolation to viewing it as one process experienced by the XC. Prioritizing an overlap period during which reintegration trainers stay at the Transition Facility may become more challenging as scale increases; however, it is strongly encouraged. The importance of accurate and consistent information sharing with the ex-combatants, which is only achieved through accurate and consistent information sharing with all staff and trainers, cannot be overemphasized.

#### 4.1.2 Livelihood start-up kits

Livelihood start-up kits which matched to the training that each received in Mapel were distributed in Phase I of the pilot. This process involved the initial design of the contents of each kit, contracting suppliers, logistics of warehousing and delivery, and distribution at each of the four state offices. Lessons learned from the CPA DDR were revisited in the development and implementation of this sub-component and particular emphasis was placed on 1) timely delivery of goods, 2) quality of goods, 3) relevant materials to trainings delivered, and 4) oversight of the delivery process of complete toolkits.

Regarding the initial design of the kit contents, the toolkit composition for all eight vocational tracks was designed through discussions with the Ministry of Labor's Multi-service Training Center (MTC) in Juba to ensure that the tools included in the kits would be appropriate for local conditions and match national best-practices on vocational training. The UNESCO Mapel vocational trainers were also consulted to ensure the tools were in line with those used in the trainings. The final list of tools was then agreed upon by UNICON, TDRP, and NDDRC. This process was completed responsibly and 70% of the ex-combatants stated that they were satisfied

with their toolkits, one fifth of whom were very satisfied. Sixty-nine ex-combatants chose the driver/auto-mechanic track. This group did not receive sufficient vocational training in the previous reinsertion phase and supplementary vocational training was added during reintegration as they were uninformed on their intended profession or the use of their tools. Not surprisingly, most of those who were dissatisfied were auto-mechanic trainees. However, many lessons were learned in the process and in future projects, ex-combatants themselves should be involved in the approval of the lists and regional differences should be incorporated in aspects such as seed choice.

A thorough bidding process was conducted with 66 organizations approached and 16 submitting bids. NDDRC was closely involved in the entire procurement process to ensure knowledge transference on the process and steps required for responsible procurement. As a result of this process, NDDRC now has a solid database of potential suppliers from the region that can be used in future similar assignments for supply of goods. High standards for procurement are crucial and these must be maintained moving forward. This pilot was notable in that all contents of the toolkits were delivered to the Juba warehouse within three weeks of contracting. This was a major achievement.

Kits were compiled and grouped by state in Juba with active oversight by TDRP and NDDRC. The kits were then transported by road to the four state capitals. Orientation meetings were conducted at NDDRC state offices with NDDRC and Implementing Partner state teams to ensure they were prepared for the distribution including use of the ICRS system to track the entire process.

The official distribution of the toolkits was conducted from November 1st-5th, 2013. This process was implemented in close cooperation between all parties – NDDRC state office, representatives of NDDRC HQ, the Implementing Partner and World Bank/TDRP. In each state, distribution teams were present and active to ensure that start-up kits arrived in good order and were distributed to the beneficiaries in a timely fashion. The ICRS system was used to generate documentation for the distribution process including state specific distribution lists and individual forms for each XC to sign upon receipt of their kit. In addition, XCs were required to demonstrate their DDR photo ID credentials in order to receive their kit. Through clear documentation the staff was able to easily confirm receipt and respond from a position of information to ex-combatant questions. Ex-combatants with bulky kits (agriculture, masonry, etc.) or coming from large distances were assisted with trans-

port to their communities. A large amount of detail and logistics is required in this process. To ease some of the transport challenges, when numbers of beneficiaries are scaled, up, alternate approaches such as regional distribution centers may be worth exploring.

By the end of the pilot, 288 of 290 ex-combatants have collected their toolkits according to NDDRC reporting. The final 2 ex-combatants are not able to be located. 239 out of 290 ex-combatants collected their toolkits by the end of phase 1 and the remaining ex-combatants informed they could collect their toolkits at any time in their respective NDDRC state office.

Overall the process of design, procurement, and distribution of toolkits to ex-combatants was highly successful. Despite the short delivery timeline, the toolkits were comprised of quality goods, and were distributed in full. According to the results from the XC satisfaction survey, 77% of the non-auto trainees said that they were still using the tools provided in the toolkits. 83% of those in the agricultural track were still using their tools. Some challenges faced in the process included the short timeframe did not allow for as much consultation on the toolkit contents as would have been ideal. In particular, XCs should be consulted.

### 4.1.3 Technical skills extension

In addition to the general entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings, additional agricultural focused business training was added during phase 2 of the pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants that chose the agricultural livelihood path (44%) received targeted advice to support their reintegration. In addition, feedback from phase 1 suggested that some XCs were in need of additional technical skills training in particular vocations beyond what was learned at Mapel. Therefore, in Phase 2 a sub-component of technical skills extension was added to provide these additional services.

#### 4.1.3.1 Agricultural extension visits

Of the current caseload, the largest group of individuals (129 or 290) are interested in farming post military service. This is well aligned with the current market potential particularly in areas outside the capital cities. The agriculture development potential of South Sudan is enormous. According to the African Development Bank reports, the absolute majority of the households in South Sudan are primarily dependent on agriculture and livestock and 75% of the country's land area is suitable for agriculture. At the same time, only 4% of the arable land is cultivated and farming is predominantly of a subsistence nature. This creates almost unlimited opportunities

for those willing and able to develop themselves within the field of agriculture, albeit with significant transport and logistical challenges. However, the constraining factors limiting the agriculture development are mainly (i) lack of knowledge, and (ii) lack of resources. South Sudan's agricultural indicators are far below the regional standard, while the natural conditions are in many cases much better than those of their neighbours.

To further support this group, Phase 2 livelihoods work included agricultural extension training. This training was made available to build upon and upgrade the technical skills developed at the Mapel Transition Facility. The agricultural sub-component was designed to be introduced in Phase 2 to align with the growing season. The training included improved methods, best practices, and small farm business skills. The Ministry of Agriculture assigned seven agricultural extension workers to the DDR project to implement this work. Among the day-to-day responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture extension workers are to (i) train the population in the field of agriculture, (ii) promote the development and adaptation of appropriate agricultural technology, and (iii) promote the efficient production and marketing of agricultural products. It is clear that these goals align perfectly with the goals of the South Sudan DDR programme.

The Ministry's agricultural extension workers attended a 7-day TOT to supplement their knowledge. In this manner, the programme was well aligned with the National DDR policy which calls for the DDR programme to conduct reintegration through line ministries where possible, and in so doing increase the capacity of the partner Ministry. By further training the agricultural extension workers, the programme contributes a positive benefit to the communities at large where the extension workers are assigned in the course of their day to day work.

Operationally, the agricultural extension workers were joined by ICRS caseworkers and Implementing Partner state managers to comprise agricultural training teams when conducting trainings for the XCs who chose agriculture as their field of reintegration. This allowed additional flexibility in the training mechanism as many ex-combatants are found to work at both a trade and farming. Through this approach 119 XCs of 129 who chose the agricultural track received follow-up trainings. Just as with the entrepreneurship and cooperatives training, the implementing partner developed a curriculum and training materials for a TOT and the field extension trainings. All these materials are now available within NDDRC for future use. Overall, the addition of agricultural specific trainings was well received and the use of Ministry of Agriculture Extension Workers was a good and sustain-

able use of resources. Strong relations between NDDRC and the Ministry of Agriculture should be fostered as the latter will be a critical partner in any effective DDR in South Sudan

#### 4.1.3.2 Targeted supplemental vocational training

Preceding the reintegration phase, ex-combatants received training in 1 of 8 vocational areas as conducted by UNESCO at the Mapel Transition Facility. As discussed above, those ex-combatants who were to receive auto-mechanic/drivers trainings were found to require supplemental training during the reintegration phase due to challenges in implementation at Mapel. To address this concern in phase 2 the project facilitated the 52 ex-combatants to attend driving training through them receiving driving licenses and 2 ex-combatants to attend auto-mechanic courses. In addition, the project covered the mandatory medical examinations as well as official license issuance fees for all XCs who attended the driving schools.

While this was not initially included in the pilot design as all vocational trainings were to be provided in Mapel, the effort provided a relevant case study on the process and costs of vocational training provision in local centers rather than in cantonment camps. Through the provision of state-based driving and auto-mechanic courses it was found that there is potential to provide trainings through existing training programmes at the state level. This could avoid one of the most criticized pitfalls of DDR programming, i.e. the flooding of certain markets and limited success rates when large numbers of trainees are given a small menu of options for vocational trainings. However, it is of note that the absorptive capacity of the training centers will require careful assessment. Additional benefits of this approach include the increased capacity of training local institutions over time and the potential for more region specific training to respond to market demand.

#### 4.1.3.3 Vocational expert visits

In Phase 2, vocational expert visits were added to test the modality for future programming. This allowed the ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration fields to receive a visit by an experienced professional with proven skills in their respective field. The drivers/auto-mechanics were not eligible for this additional attention as they were attending the additional training in Phase 2. The expert visits were not mandatory and the XCs were free to decide if they wanted to participate in this sub-component or not. The reach of this activity was also



limited by experts' availability in locations close to those of the corresponding XCs, other options chosen by the ex-combatants (see section 4.1.4 below) as well as the majority of the population being busy cultivating at the time it was on offer. The expert visits were limited to one welding expert who visited the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes and mentored the XCs in the welding reintegration field.

While vocational expert visits or apprenticeships can be very effective on an individual basis, this pilot found that such an approach needs high levels of attention by NDDRC to implement as well as careful state-level pre-planning. With additional logistical support and coordination, NDDRC in cooperation with small business representatives and training facilities may be able to provide the XCs in all the states with adequate level expert visits that will benefit their reintegration. However each apprenticeship must be individually negotiated and vetted for appropriateness and training must be conducted for the hosts to clearly set expectations and structure to the process. This takes not only time, but also significant staff and resources.

#### **4.1.4 Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up**

In keeping with the national DDR policy, the NDDRC is tasked with understanding the available services of government institutions and linking XCs with those services. It was learned through this pilot that while there are many services available, transaction costs limit the use of many of these services, leaving them often underutilized in an environment of massive need. As an example, through various ministries the Government of South Sudan provides opportunities to registered cooperatives (e.g. tractor lease, subsidized seeds etc.), however very often financial illiteracy prevents people (including XCs) from successfully registering a cooperative and/or the registration fee becomes the final obstacle that they, even collectively, cannot overcome.

In response to this, phase 2 built in a sub-component of assistance in accessing and leveraging available government resources. These opportunities were identified by the state teams and particularly the ICRS caseworkers and included assistance with land registration, cooperative registration, tractor usage, and timber. This sub-component found a high return and saw the ability to leverage valuable assets and services by eliminating the transaction costs to XCs. This is a good indication; however as the project scales up the larger numbers could ab-

sorb all capacity of these programmes thus leaving them unavailable for other citizens. The DDR policy should explore how to expand these services to ensure use by ex-combatants does not offset their use by others.

#### **4.1.5 Tools developed and available for future use**

In addition to the collection of actionable lessons learned, the pilot has also developed tangible tools that NDDRC can utilize in future work. This includes:

##### Training Materials

- Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy curriculum and modules
- Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy TOT Training manual
- Agriculture Business TOT curriculum and modules
- Agriculture Business TOT training manual
- Agriculture supplemental training materials

##### Livelihood Start-Up Kits

- Start-Up Kit Process and Lessons Learned Report
- Start-Up kit Contents, Lists, and Costs
- Contracting Process Documentation

### **4.2 DDR Community Support Projects**

The pilot reintegration project also provided communities with a peace dividend through targeted community projects in communities receiving high concentrations of XCs in the pilot caseload. In addition to the community projects, community members participated in cooperative trainings as outlined above in the livelihoods support section.

Highlights of this work include:

- Communities were consulted and engaged in the siting or repair of water boreholes.
- IOM supported the reintegration process through the implementation of 17 community projects in the target states (an additional 7 to the initial 10 agreed).
- Based on the number of XCs from each state, Western Bahr el Ghazal received nine community support projects, Lakes five projects, Warrap two projects, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal one project.

### 4.2.1 Site selection and community mobilization

DDR Community Support Projects were requested by NDDRC to consist of water projects in 10 communities. First the Implementing Partner, IOM, used the information from NDDRC's ICRS to identify the areas within these states where the highest number of XCs planned to settle in order to identify project implementation sites. Communities were then selected by NDDRC using an agreed upon selection criteria including ensuring that projects were placed in communities different than those of the UNMISS Reinsertion Community Projects.

Delivery of these projects was then discussed and agreed upon by members of the community in question. In this process 39 community meetings were conducted with up to 1,285 attending across all the sites. These discussions ensured representation of a range of community stakeholders and were conducted in coordination with NDDRC state offices and rural water departments. In one case, a borehole project was not needed as they had sufficient water supply but the local community suggested an alternative common good project. In that case a payam office was completed at the community's request.

The project made efforts in mainstreaming gender with the community-wide meetings typically attended by women group representatives along with youth and elders. Fourteen water management committees were trained, with the female membership ratio averaged 56%.

### 4.2.2 Installation/rehabilitation of boreholes or community requested common good projects

For the 16 water projects, IOM engineers developed the tender documents for the borehole drilling which were reviewed by the NDDRC PMU and firms were contracted to complete the work. As with the toolkits, NDDRC was consistently involved and informed of the procurement details and process as IOM followed their procurement procedures. Exposure to this process further contributes to NDDRC's capacity building. Fair and cost based bidding processes are critical in this process and must continue to be used if such programming is continued.

The tenders for Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States were launched and the bids were opened at a PMU meeting in December 2013. Community mobilization and training of community management committees was completed in early spring and all six boreholes were

completed in March 2014. The original tenders for the three boreholes in Lakes State were launched in March 2014 and despite some challenges due to well depth, all projects were completed by May 2014. Due to the competitive bidding process and fewer solar pump installations than originally envisioned, a surplus of operational funds remained in the budget in the programme's closing months. Authorization was received to drill an additional five boreholes with these funds in Western Bahr el Ghazal due to impassable roads in other areas. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, the community requested a project that was outside the preferred project categories of water and marketplace improvements. The community of Malual Bai Payam identified completion of a payam administration office as a project to be supported by the programme. Construction began on the payam office through a community initiative prior to the programme and had not been finished due to lack of resources. Completion of the payam office was listed as a high priority for the community and thus its completion was approved as that community's project.

In each community, a series of community meetings were held to explain the community's role in managing the investment after project completion. At each of the water project sites, community water management committees were established and training on the management and maintenance of water points as well as the promotion of good hygiene practices was undertaken. Pump repair toolboxes were distributed to all borehole sites for use by pump repair technicians to service and repair the pumps.

According to the implementing partner, both the XCs and community members expressed gratitude to NDDRC and the World Bank for this initiative which brought much-needed basic infrastructure to the selected communities. Through this initiative, the communities have witnessed that NDDRC's promise to provide community infrastructure was fulfilled promptly and in good quality. Both communities and XCs stated that they would look forward to continued support from the government towards improvement of basic services such as water, healthcare, education as well as jobs/livelihood opportunities.

Overall, this component was successful in delivery, completing 17 community projects rather than the projected and contracted 10.

While this pilot focused on timely completion of a water projects, it was found by the implementing partner that communities would generally accept a water project, however that may not meet the priority needs of the community. In fact, community priorities include a

broader range of improvement projects. It was suggested that in future programming communities with high level of XC reintegration select from a broader range of improvement projects when it is clear that the intervention is a priority of the majority of community members. In keeping with the national DDR policy, it is likely that the whole of government approach of the DDR policy while calls for coordination with other line ministries with existing community project processes would be the most effective path to providing these broader options. In this way, community projects could be provided from a wider group of options by the best aligned ministry. This broader approach however requires resources and time to implement properly and inclusively.

### 4.2.3 Tools developed and available for future use

- Community Selection Criteria
- Contracting Process and Documentation

## 4.3 Institutional Capacity Building

In addition to the service delivery aspect of the pilot reintegration project, work on capacity building to NDDRC systems and staff is a crucial component of the pilot reintegration project in keeping with the systems and staff development objective. A team of consultants from Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research worked with NDDRC between May and November 2013 to assist in strengthening the operational capacity of the commission. Additionally, TDRP has been providing technical assistance and support for the ICRS system since 2012.

Highlights of this work include:

- Multi-day HQ & state based PMU trainings in management, reintegration, and best-practices conducted
- One-on-one staff mentoring at the HQ level
- Inputs on organizational structure and impact on reintegration
- Development of an Informational, Counselling and Referral System including the software interface and database, and establishment of an ICRS caseworker team by NDDRC
- Capacity building training of ICRS caseworkers and IT staff

### 4.3.1 Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support, and Systems Development

The Institutional Capacity Building Component was conducted primarily through training and mentoring of NDDRC staff. For management of the pilot reintegration project a PMU was formed at the HQ level which interfaced with the state level teams in the four states participating in the pilot. The PMU reported up to an NDDRC Steering Committee that provided policy guidance and oversight. The establishment of the PMU was intended to achieve two purposes: 1) management and operationalization of the pilot and 2) full exposure of a cross-functional team of NDDRC staff to the processes and management required to implement reintegration, increase operational understanding, and capacitate NDDRC to manage programming of potential future programmes.

The formation of the NDDRC's PMU increased NDDRC's exposure and awareness of processes and progress, and helped to expedite some operational processes. However, it has not created a sustainable management structure to oversee future work. In the light of the GoSS' intention to expand and accelerate demobilization and reintegration support and the foreseen increased number of implementing partners (and possible funding streams), time and effort needs to be invested in improving the regular structure and functions of the organization including cross-functional work and communications.

Capacity building training and mentorship was particularly targeted at the PMU and state level teams. The team leader also held regular sessions with NDDRC's senior management to take stock of project progress and to discuss relevant capacity issues within NDDRC. A mentoring model was utilized in this work. While it was seen that an on-the-job approach is best for capacity building at this juncture rather than sending individuals to trainings elsewhere, the mentoring approach used was flexible and at times the lack of concrete structure brought into question the effectiveness of training.

In addition, group trainings were conducted for the headquarters' PMU staff as well as the NDDRC State staff in the four states of Greater bahr el Ghazal. Two four-day training workshops were conducted: one for the HQ PMU in Juba (19-22 August) and one for the staff of the four State Offices of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, in Wau (27-30 August). The trainings focused on project management including planning, assessment, lessons learned, M&E, and management skills while also covering key issues, systems, and processes that were to be

put in place. The training in Juba focused primarily on the needs to HQ staff while the training in Wau focused on the needs, challenges, and processes for the State staff. The training sessions were facilitated by ASI mentors along with NDDRC staff themselves who played a central role by providing presentations and leading some discussions. Both workshops produced a list of urgent and important action points related to the implementation of the pilot project that were then left to be followed up by the PMU.

These trainings were well received and much information was shared with NDDRC staff whose role impacts on reintegration. It was noted that the staff were particularly engaged on topics related to the pilot project's components which is information that should have been conveyed to all staff by NDDRC through standard reporting structures. This was critical information and aligning NDDRC staff before the start of the reintegration service delivery proved crucial.

In addition, the capacity building component targeted systems development in project management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). In addition to HQ and combined State level training sessions, smaller sessions were held at the State level in which the existing systems and procedures were discussed with the responsible staff, as well as relevant institutional partners. Particular focus was given to critical approaches to provide reintegration assistance and conduct M&E, as well as on administrative and financial management systems. Discussions included the way in which NDDRC would need to involve key stakeholders in the DDR process. Implementing partner staff was extended at the state offices through support from BICC and through this cooperation developed a state level work plan, a budgeting template, and state specific work plans. The NDDRC state teams were engaged at differing levels in this work in the different states and the long term impact is not clear. It is clear that the State staff in the State offices are more aware of the importance of systems and procedures than at the start of the process. Some of these systems have been revived in discussions at the state level. The ASI team found that some of the systems/formats of the CPA DDR should not be discarded offhand but reviewed and assessed for further relevance. For example, the Financial Management and Operational Guidelines Manual are useful but needs to be reviewed. Also Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) need to be reviewed. However, it is clear that the use of these systems and procedures need to be guided and communicated more clearly and systematically from the center (HQ).

The capacity building work had limited impact but showed potential for progress within NDDRC. Insti-

tutional capacity building requires more than the establishment/ improvement of systems and staff training. Institutional capacity depends to a large extent on: a) the organizational structure; b) planning and management; c) communication and learning capacity and practices; d) available resources; and e) staffing, including organizational culture, motivation, and qualifications. Indeed, during their engagement the mentors observed that the capacity of NDDRC is at least as much constrained by the way it is organized and managed as by the qualifications of its staff. It is also clear that further support, particularly in bringing greater ownership at state level is a key priority, whilst ongoing support within the HQ is also recommended.

A comprehensive briefing of ASI's findings was provided to the senior management NDDRC and the PMU on 30 September to ensure transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC.

The strategic capacity building conducted saw limited uptake. In reflection, the mentoring and staff training model utilized had good content, but did not address core challenges facing the organization and staff. These appear to include organizational structure issues, lack of clear job responsibilities and individual reporting structure, lack of internal communications, scarcity of resources, lack of clarity with budgets and available resources, low staff morale, and others. Capacity building continues to be needed by the NDDRC, however, the approach used should build from an institutional capacity assessment. If the findings of the assessment are then implemented, then capacity building can have lasting impact. It is also of note that many tasks of programme management such as M&E and MIS require highly technical skills. In these cases an imbedded consultant providing on-the-job mentoring is likely required.

### **4.3.2 Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS)**

In tandem with capacity building work, the pilot included the design, development, and implementation of the Information, Counselling, and Referral System (ICRS) under development by TDRP and NDDRC since early 2012. The work included development of the software and database as well as a significant focus on training and capacity building of the NDDRC ICRS, M&E, and IT staff. To date the ICRS includes sections on: profiling, registration, XC baseline survey data, Transition Facility training data, start-up kit tracking, counselling and referral services, and opportunity mapping. The information is accessible to NDDRC staff through reporting as well as interface access. This information is then able to be utilized by ICRS caseworkers to facilitate liveli-

hood counselling and referral to ex-combatants, and is also available to NDDRC for use in programme management and M&E.

The TDRP consultants, in coordination with NDDRC and BICC, conducted several trainings for NDDRC staff and specifically for 17 ICRS caseworkers under the guidance of the ICRS manager. The ICRS caseworkers were drawn from all 10 states to ensure capacity was built in state offices throughout the country although the pilot itself was targeted at the 4 states of Greater bahr el Ghazal.

In early April, TDRP consultants presented the software and conducted training at a three-day workshop of NDDRC ICRS caseworkers in preparation for registration to begin on 15 April 2013. The TDRP team further worked alongside the ICRS manager and caseworkers as well as UNMISS staff to set up the registration process and system at the Mapel Transition Facility. TDRP conducted a similar training for the initial pilot of the XC baseline survey. The M&E implementing partner also provided trainings to the ICRS caseworkers on the survey methods for the XC baseline survey and the community baseline survey. The TDRP also provided video tutorials and online mentoring for the opportunities mapping sections. Video tutorials have been found to be highly utilized by the ICRS caseworkers and TDRP is in the process of creating them for all sections of the system. Additionally, TDRP conducted training on the counselling and referral sections as well as video tutorials on additional capabilities of the system.

This very tangible, hands-on training has received significant traction and the ICRS caseworkers are evidence of NDDRC staff's ability to noticeably benefit from capacity building training. These staff have accomplished a great deal over the course of the pilot project. While there are structural questions about the coherence of the ICRS caseworker position with the overall commission structure which have been raised with NDDRC leadership, the capacity of this group has been raised regardless of where they are positioned.

The development of such a system requires significant efforts on the technical front. The TDRP technical consultant conducted an assessment and validation of equipment, the network, servers, network connectivity and bandwidth as well as an assessment of data tracking needs, systems, and readiness. Further work was conducted to ensure profile data verification, software updating as required, and together with BICC and NDDRC initiated the construction of a registration data capture architecture including both biographic and biometric information of ex-combatants for future use.

The development of the system for future use is a milestone for NDDRC and truly in DDR programming overall. This is the first full development and use of an ICRS in DDR. The system was used through the full DDR cycle in this pilot. The consultant was available to make adjustments as needed and the result is a fully operational ICRS system.

The ICRS is complete and represents the full DDR cycle, however the system will require additional attention as adjustments are made to the programme from the learnings of the pilot. Additionally, areas such as the counselling and referral and reporting have been programmed and initiated but can be more fully utilized in future tranches.

### 4.3.3 Tools developed and available for future use

- Organizational Management and Process:
  - Business management & PMU staff training materials
  - State work plan & budget template
- Information Counselling and Referral System
  - ICRS software & database including source code
  - ICRS User's Manual
  - ICRS Administrator's Manual

## 4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

The M&E component was included in the pilot reintegration project to improve NDDRC's capacity to track achievements and project progress, provide updated information to guide decision-making, detect problems as they arise, and ultimately assess the overall project impact and identify lessons learned to inform NDDRC at project closure.

Highlights of this work include:

- Pilot M&E data collection included: Registration data, Ex-combatant baseline survey, Community baseline survey & Ex-combatant satisfaction survey
- Basic M&E training included with the HQ and state PMU trainings in keeping with the initial M&E assessment
- M&E South-South exchange with the Rwanda DDR commission including an all staff M&E plenary training and drafting of a foundational M&E manual for future use

#### 4.4.1 Beneficiary data collection

The M&E component included collection of registration information on all DDR participants which was complimented by a baseline study of all available DDR participants while they were in the transition facility. A community baseline survey conducted immediately following the XC baseline survey further informed the pilot. The pilot also included a final assessment of beneficiary satisfaction conducted amongst a sample of over two-thirds of the XCs.

The registration data collection was conducted by NDDRC staff – the ICRS caseworkers at Mapel. An ex-combatant could receive their DDR ID only through the registration process which is mandatory to receive services. Registration data was collected for 100% of the participants. This work was completed in collaboration with UNMISS who contributed the hardware and training facilities as well as DDR staff to assist in preparations. There are several technical lessons learned from this work which were captured by NDDRC’s Joint Operations Committee. Overall the process went well and provided a good base on which to build in the future. This was the first time ICRS caseworkers collected survey data on a computer, thus some challenges in survey time and data entry were to be expected; the delays reduced over the process. A profiling process was conducted in advance of the pilot. However, due to a combination of reasons including weak communications and a lack of clear directives from the military, the group profiled matched to the individuals that actually met the verification standards only in some cases. In future programming, an accurate profiling process could shorten the registration data process.

After all participants had arrived at Mapel, an ex-combatant baseline survey was conducted. The baseline survey of XCs was designed with assistance of World Bank consultants. It was developed by drawing on experience of similar surveys in Uganda, Rwanda, and elsewhere. The survey was first piloted at the Transition Facility in Mapel (27-28 May), then adjusted and subsequently handed over to the ASI/Integrity team which trained the enumerators and conducted the actual survey. The training of the enumerators (12 NDDRC ICRS caseworkers) took place in Wau 2-4 July, led by the M&E Capacity Building Expert. The training focused on familiarizing the enumerators with administering the tool itself, good interview practice, and research ethics required for conducting surveys. The baseline survey sample encompassed 274 ex-combatants which included all ex-combatants at the center over the period of the survey.

A community baseline survey was also conducted in

urban and rural communities across the four states and looked at the impact of DDR on those local communities affected. The instrument for the baseline survey of communities built on lessons learned in the earlier XC survey. It was reviewed and fine-tuned together with NDDRC and TDRP. The baseline provides a snapshot of community attitudes towards returnees and XCs. Perceptions, expectations, fears, attitudes, and socio-economic circumstances of the communities into which the XCs are reintegrating were captured. The enumerator training was conducted in Wau from 19-21 September in collaboration with UNMISS who generously contributed use of their training facilities. The community survey produced information about the XCs and how community members perceived their return. The survey also included data on livelihoods, economics, cooperatives, social capital, empowerment, and security in the communities. Overall 805 households across the four states were surveyed. The survey was completed on 11 October 2013.

The XC satisfaction survey was conducted at the end of phase 2 with a sample of over two-thirds of participating XCs (204 ex-combatants). This survey was conducted to gain the XC perspective in assessing the modalities used in the pilot reintegration project and the level of XCs’ satisfaction with the various aspects of each modality. The survey explored both the expectations and satisfaction level of ex-combatants with the services of the pilot DDR programme. Further, the survey looked at the economic, and to a limited extent social, reintegration of the participating ex-combatants. The survey further provides triangulated information on ex-combatants participation in reintegration trainings and services as delivered by implementing partners and the degree to which the beneficiaries are utilizing those trainings. The survey also collected XCs’ suggestions for improvement on the training and services. This survey was very beneficial in the assessment and learning of the pilot. Additionally, findings were very encouraging in terms of implementing partner service delivery and accuracy of reporting.

#### 4.4.2 M&E capacity building

Assisting NDDRC in building its M&E capacity was the other key area of the component. The enhanced M&E system was to be based as much as possible on the existing systems within NDDRC and would include effective and efficient linkages with NDDRC’s ICRS.

Early on in the process, from 23 June till 19 July, two implementing partner consultants worked with the Commission to assess the situation and propose an initial M&E system appropriate for the anticipated tasks ahead. In the PMU meeting on 10 July, the consultant team presented a draft results framework, an overview of how

the M&E system could operate, as well as a draft capacity development plan for M&E. Subsequently, on 25 July the consultant team delivered an update on the work done thus far on the M&E system and capacity, including the main components already developed.

However, the effectiveness of the project in assisting NDDRC in establishing an appropriate and functioning M&E system was hampered by the absence of M&E staff/Unit within NDDRC. Staff turnover has continued to be an issue and the lack of an M&E team remains a challenge for NDDRC. As such there was no significant opportunity to train or mentor M&E staff.

Thus the training approach was shifted to a broad staff training approach. In phase 1 the ASI/Integrity team included broader training on M&E for NDDRC staff, particularly through multiple sessions devoted to M&E during the PMU workshops in Juba and Wau in August, and as part of the ongoing mentoring at the State level. Additionally, due to the absence of M&E staff, an increased emphasis was placed on the development of an M&E manual to act as a starting point in future work. The consultants in phase 1 contributed towards such a manual. In phase 2, through a south-south exchange to bring in the experience of the Rwanda DDR commission in M&E implementation, further staff training and mentoring was provided and an M&E draft manual was completed. The manual includes the proposed roles and responsibilities as well as a detailed draft logical framework and reporting schedule for NDDRC. Its purpose is to provide detailed guidance and practical tools for the M&E staff and other staff involved in M&E such that they are effectively able to track the project's progress and inform decision making for effective and efficient management of NDDRC operations. The manual will allow all staff (not only staff involved in M&E) to see how data and information about the programme is intended to feed back into management to continuously adapt and adjust implementation in order to improve. Buy-in at all levels will help the process of data collection and sharing of lessons from the analysis.

Once a unit is in place, significant briefing and training will need to take place in addition to some organizational

clarifications to enable the Unit to start systematic M&E of the pilot project. The Commission should further clarify the precise intended role of the M&E Unit and its interaction with the ICRS, which currently manages most of the Management Information System (MIS).

#### **4.4.3 Collection of lessons learned and reflection**

Phase 3 of the pilot reintegration project is focused on the assessment and capture of actionable lessons learned which can be incorporated into future programming. This is conducted in the pilot through a multi-pronged approach. First, Implementing Partners were instructed throughout the pilot to collect, reflect, and report upon lessons learned. Each final IP report includes detailed lessons learned. Additionally, TDRP through this final report is collecting and aggregating the systemic and overall lessons learned. Finally, the MTR and final external project evaluation are also expected to provide insight on lessons learned. These final learnings will be discussed with the NDDRC leadership and staff through a workshop at the end of the pilot reintegration project, which is set to close on October 31, 2014.

In addition, TDRP worked together with NDDRC to incorporate lessons learned from this pilot into an updated national approach of a harmonized reinsertion and reintegration strategy. This approach looks to respond to the programming and cost findings from this experience.

#### **4.4.4 Tools developed and available for future use**

- ICRS software & database usable for M&E including ex-combatant profiling, registration, baseline data, services delivered, casework, and referrals
- Ex-combatant baseline survey: questionnaire, ICRS section & report
- Community baseline survey: questionnaire & report
- Ex-combatant satisfaction survey: questionnaire & report
- Foundational M&E manual

# 5 Lessons Learned

As outlined above, the primary objective of NDDRC's Pilot Reintegration Project is to test reintegration approaches and modalities and develop actionable lessons which can inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan's future DDR programming. To this end, a mid-term review (MTR) was conducted in November 2013 to assess progress, make recommendations, and consolidate learnings. A final review is also being conducted at the close of project and these learnings will additionally be conveyed to NDDRC upon completion.

The MTR assessed all components of the Pilot Reintegration Project including Livelihoods Support, Community Support Projects, Capacity Building, and Monitoring and Evaluation. Some of the lessons from the MTR, particularly around livelihoods support, provide important insights in recommendations for future planning. Secondly, an ex-combatant satisfaction survey was fielded by NDDRC enumerators in August 2014 to capture the expectations, level of satisfaction, and current livelihood progress of the participants. In addition, IPs' reporting and TDRP analysis of the entire reintegration process has contributed to the following findings. Beyond the MTR, NDDRC conducted an internal review of the work in Mapel through a joint team of NDDRC, IPs, advisors, and stakeholders. These lessons learned also have implications for reintegration programming.

## 5.1 Livelihoods Support Lessons Learned

### 5.1.1 Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings

*Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings are the most crucial component of reintegration programming.* These vital trainings are an indivisible component of any reintegration training. The trainings' entrepreneurial focus, whether through formation of a cooperative, association, partnership, or small business, opens an alternative path to formal employment to sustain a viable livelihood. This

is particularly applicable in South Sudan where the job market is too weak to be expected to absorb significant labor supply.

*Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings should be delivered via a combined curriculum.* These modules are to be presented from the common viewpoint of the entrepreneurial thinking necessary to succeed be it through an individual business, a partnership, associative work or a formal cooperative. This allows ex-combatants to learn a broad range of approaches to call on over the coming years and to determine their ideal business structure based on market realities once they returned to their communities. This also allows the flexibility for an individual to receive detailed training on a specific topic such as single non-association training as determined by the trainers' discussions with the individual.

*The joint entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy training should begin early in the DDR cycle and continue throughout to encourage livelihood and market based decision making throughout the DDR process.* Specifically these trainings should be introduced before the vocational training as it can guide the individuals' vocational training choices from a market and business perspective. This training should then continue as a strand throughout the DDR trainings to keep the ex-combatants' mindset focused on empowerment and economic sustainability upon reintegration. Vocational trainers should be trained to imbed market based thinking into their respective trainings.

*The baseline (Transition Facility or Vocational Center) and follow-up reintegration trainings (in-field or community) should be formulated as one holistic training course with various modules.* In this model the Transition Facility courses constitute the introduction and basic theory with the state-based trainings comprising the practicum/field training modules with additional theory as needed. The ex-combatant should complete the full course inclusive of all modules at the camp and in the states before receiving a certificate of completion of the DDR course.



Information on trainings and services to be provided to XCs throughout the DDR process must be shared not only with ex-combatants but also with all staff including trainers. To minimize misinformation and confusion an internal communication system must be employed through which all staff including trainers are fully informed, can accurately respond to basic XC questions on services to be provided over the course of the DDR process regardless of the staff or trainer's role in the process, and be clear who to refer them to for more specific questions.

***All XC and community trainings should emphasize hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best practices for low-literacy adult learners.*** These hand-on, visual approaches were found to be the most effective training method in the context of XCs' training likely due to the low levels of formal educational experience and literacy. Traditional classroom training with written materials is not effective.

### 5.1.2 Livelihood start-up kits

***Livelihood start-up kits are an essential component of reintegration programming requiring significant staff, resources and attention to logistical detail to ensure full and timely distribution.*** Vocational Training should be accompanied by the necessary tools to utilize their newly learned skills once ex-combatants return to their communities. However, the toolkit distribution is a significant effort requiring continual attention through to complete distribution. Additionally, a clear and systematic distribution and documentation process is necessary.

***Start-up kit contents must be accredited and agreed upon through a consultative process*** including input from the federal and state agencies (such as the Ministry of Labor's Vocational Training directorate and the regional Multi-service Training Center (MTC), the Ministry of Agriculture's extension workers, the NDDRC state staff and ICRS caseworkers), ex-combatant representatives, the implementing partner(s) and private sector practitioners. This consultative process must also link with the tools utilized in the vocational trainings.

***Alignment of start-up kits with vocational training is critical and should include contents used during training and distribution upon completion of the vocational training.*** Vocational trainings should utilize the same tools during trainings which the XCs will be given following the trainings. The vocational trainers must all be well acquainted with these tools and able to train on them. To achieve this, the planning of the start-up kits

needs to be aligned with the transition facility service delivery and respective implementing partners should be in close contact. Start-up kits should be made available upon completion of the vocational trainings. Location of distribution should prioritize ease of transport for the XC to their community of reintegration with the kits intact.

***Sensitization must be conducted on the toolkit contents and timing.*** Due to the high level of anticipation and expectation regarding the toolkits, there is potential for significant confusion. Therefore a clear and consistent message should be conveyed to all XCs regarding the toolkit contents and process. Internal communications must also ensure all staff and trainers are informed on the topic to ensure consistency. It is crucial to have a clear process that is understood by all staff and partners assisting in the distribution.

*Note: Additional technical detail on lessons learned in this process is available in UNICON's Livelihood Start-Up Kit Summary and Reflections Report and UNICON's final report.*

### 5.1.3 Technical skills extension

***Partnering with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide agricultural extension trainings to XCs through Agricultural Extension Workers is an effective and sustainable approach.*** Strong relations between NDDRC and Ministry of Agriculture should be fostered as the latter will be a critical partner in any effective DDR in South Sudan.

***Vocational Expert Visits or Apprenticeships require too much individual attention and resources therefore are not a viable approach at this time.*** Individual business apprenticeships or expert visits need high levels of attention by NDDRC as each placement must be individually vetted, hosts must be trained and the experience must be consistently tracked.

***Providing vocational skill courses through state level institutions shows potential as an approach and should be explored further.*** This approach offers a lower cost option as compared to providing the trainings at a transition facility and allows additional flexibility in terms of what training topics can be made available to ex-combatants.

***Trainers must team up with ICRS caseworkers across all trainings to ensure continuity and to enhance service delivery across the entire process.*** In larger caseloads ICRS caseworkers will not have the bandwidth to operate as trainers, however ICRS caseworkers should

be paired with trainers with business experience in field training teams.

*For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the livelihoods component of the pilot reintegration project, refer to the UNICON final report.*

## 5.2 DDR Community Support Projects Lessons Learned

***DDR Community Support Projects have high social capital returns and should be part of a greater reconciliation process but are not a core component of DDR. DDR Community Support Projects should be implemented through the appropriate line ministry linked to the DDR Commission through a State managed coordinated mechanism.*** The South Sudan DDR policy calls for a whole of government approach that is extremely relevant for Community Support Projects. In keeping with the DDR Policy of South Sudan these should be implemented through the appropriate line ministry as a special project of DDR to supplement the direct XC services provided through the DDR commission. This will allow for the inclusion of a broader range of DDR community improvement projects for which it is clear that the intervention is a priority of the majority of community members. Looking at the community projects in this way allows for greater responsiveness to community needs and builds longer term trust in the system as a whole.

***A clear criterion for community selection and project choice is necessary,*** with all choices agreed to pre-budget formulation. Communities receiving high concentrations of returning ex-combatants are given priority. In addition, community choice must take into account any other DDR community efforts previously conducted there or through Reinsertion projects.

*For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the community project component of the pilot reintegration project, refer to the IOM final report.*

## 5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Lessons Learned

***Monitoring and Evaluation (and Management Information Systems) require specific staff skills that need to be agreed to by all stakeholders from the outset.*** Skills levels within the DDR Commission are limited and regardless of training, mentoring and capacity building, it is unlikely that a cadre of skilled staff can be generated to properly administer this crucial organizational task.

The recruitment of relevant personnel will have to be revisited by the NDDRC. In addition, funding agents will have to commit additional resources both for capacity building and potentially embedding resources within the Commission.

***Both Internal and External M&E systems are required for an effective DDR programme.*** The DDR programme must incorporate two distinctly separate M&E lenses; one that addresses management and operational needs of the DDR Commission and Programme and the other targeting the needs of GoSS, external stakeholders, funders and general community. As such, the M&E system will need to account for both: (i) internal M&E and (ii) external M&E.

***Use of ICRS caseworkers as data collectors in tandem with external enumerators is both effective and enhances ongoing M&E.*** ICRS caseworker involvement in this area allows for structured interactions over the course of the process which has additional M&E benefits in terms of qualitative observations on the progress and needs of the ex-combatants.

## 5.4 Institutional Capacity Building Lessons Learned

***Development of tailor-made systems (e.g., ICRS, vulnerable groups, communications, M&E, etc.) are time and training intensive, and to be effective need to be initiated well in advance of a DDR programme.*** The development of a context specific ICRS required 2 years of work and multiple rounds of staff training. This provided access to information that was used to implement, manage and oversee various aspects of the work.

***An organizational assessment followed by the identified organizational adjustments are necessary prerequisites to effective staff capacity building.*** Attention to the NDDRC institutional structure, job responsibilities, individual reporting, institutional reporting, internal communication, budgets and available resources, staff morale, and relationship between the HQ and state offices should be prioritized and non-negotiable.

***Task specific, on-the-job trainings were the most effective capacity building approach.*** Trainings on specific tasks such as survey data collection were found to improve technical capacities within the commission. When given clear job responsibilities and tasks the staff of the NDDRC has significant potential in oversight and implementation.

## 5.5 Structural Lessons Learned

***DDR must be more closely linked with Security Sector Reform (SSR) than in former iterations of DDR in South Sudan.*** An effective DDR programme in South Sudan will only be one that effectively contributes to the reduction of military forces and military expenditure. As such an active role of SPLA and the National Organized Forces in DDR is essential as the two processes are intertwined. In addition the SPLA's role in strategic decision making of DDR needs to be increased to ensure mutual agreement. Linkages between the NDDRC programme and SPLA work must be strengthened. More efforts are required to understand the SPLA process (including the Wounded Heroes) and to bring both processes together.

***Reinsertion and Reintegration are intrinsically interwoven and should be planned as such.*** The terminology of the various partners and stakeholders has created a discrete line separating the two. However, successful reintegration of ex-combatants is not the result of the reintegration work alone but is the culmination of the full suite of services provided from the time of demobilization through disarmament, reinsertion, and reintegration programming and services. Only when viewed holistically does one see the full process as experienced by the ex-combatant or DDR participant.

***Psychosocial issues and substance abuse are factors restricting the development of sustainable livelihoods and as such a successful reintegration.*** XCs with unaddressed psychosocial issues have significant difficulty reintegrating. In addition, whether for psychosocial or other, communities and individuals with high levels of alcohol consumption are also hampered in their development.

***Gender and child sensitive reinsertion and reintegration programming need additional attention and coordination.*** Additional attention, through targeted sub-programmes, is required to sufficiently integrate women's needs and livelihood interests in the preparation and implementation of reintegration support. Structural approaches need to be developed to deal with issues observed in the communities.

***Communications including sensitization and public information need additional attention and coordination.***

Measures need to be taken towards more actively communicating as well as increased transparency throughout the programme. Operational processes need to be developed to share information with XCs and their communities through radio, mobile phone, follow-up visits, etc. The existing communication strategy needs to include both an internal and external strategy, updated, and systematically implemented. The communications strategies need to be synergized across stakeholders while incorporating lessons learned.

***Systemic approaches to ensure ex-combatant voice in programming need to be designed and implemented.***

Another area for improvement is in the involvement of XCs in the process of design and implementation. Life skills programming speaks to the importance of voice and self-determination and these principles should be further incorporated into the overall programming including XC representatives on committees and XC representatives in the communities of return.

***The full DDR programme as piloted is too costly to be brought to scale thus the alternative approach incorporated in the NDDRC's new Harmonized Reinsertion and Reintegration Strategy should be explored.***

Even with strict fiscal discipline, the overall costs of the full pilot programme as designed with three months in a transition facility, followed by six months of reintegration services, and completed by three months of ICRS and follow-up services, is prohibitive to the NDDRC achieving the projected scale. It was necessary at all times during the pilot to monitor overall cost of delivery of the full programme. Within this atmosphere of strict fiscal discipline, over-runs will at times be necessary but must be clearly articulated and understood by all stakeholders. It is essential that alternative lower cost options be constantly considered and tested.

*For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the capacity building component & structural lessons of the pilot reintegration project, refer to the ASI final report.*

## 6 Changing Dynamics in South Sudan DDR

In addition to the learnings found from the pilot itself, it is important to note the changed situation in South Sudan as of December 2013, and the implications on DDR in South Sudan. As of the start of the pilot programme in April 2013, South Sudan DDR was a programme with beneficiaries coming from the military and the NOF. The need for this programme was outlined clearly in DDR policy to professionalize, right-size, and streamline the NOF. This would both 1) reduce the potential for idle or underutilized members reigniting conflict by assisting them in establishing sustainable alternative livelihoods, and 2) reduce the weight of these salaries on the national fiscus which could in turn be used for developmental priorities as outlined in the South Sudan National Development Plan.

The current events in South Sudan underscore the importance of DDR to the country and its connection to the nation's overall development. At the same time, the conflict also changes the dynamics of DDR in South Sudan by introducing additional groups to the potential pool of DDR participants.

Looking forward, South Sudan DDR programming must now reflect:

- The programmatic and operational learnings of the piloting process;
- Realities of financial costs of the initial strategy design; and
- Recent events in South Sudan which require that the current approach to DDR in South Sudan be assessed.

# 7 Strategic Recommendations for Future Programming

Matching the findings above with the realities of the recent events, the priority areas requiring attention for a renewed strategy include:

- Increased clarity on categorization of DDR beneficiary groups and numbers of beneficiaries;
- Reduced cost;
- Increased harmonization of programming in reinsertion and reintegration;
- Full national government implementation; and
- Continued momentum

***Increased clarity on categorization of DDR beneficiary groups and numbers of beneficiaries is necessary given the recent events in South Sudan.*** The individuals that may now qualify for DDR programming fall into the following categories:

- Current SPLA & other national organized forces
- Former SPLA & other national organized forces (SPLA-IO)
- Rebel groups (non-SPLA origin)
- Civilians that joined recent fighting (ie. White Army of largely youth, dinka youth who are recruited, etc)
- Wounded Heroes / Veterans (loyalties irrelevant)
- Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (WAAF)
- Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (CAAF)
- South Sudanese Combatants in Foreign Armed Groups

This represents a broad spectrum of experiences and needs and the service delivery modalities for the various groups may differ to best respond to those needs. For example those with a long military history that are being demobilized from the SPLA will be in need of an SSR approach while children would be in need of a separate special programme and the mobilized civilian youth may benefit most from a community based approach. In light of the new actors it would behoove the people of South Sudan to structure the South Sudan DDR programme to provide appropriate DDR programming for the varying groups. What had been a programme limited to only former members of SPLA and national organized forces must now look at attending to a greater variety of groups.

Additionally, recent events will require a reassessment of the numbers of beneficiaries to undergo the DDR process. Initial estimates for the National DDR Programme suggested the need to process 150,000 ex-combatants. As the Government of South Sudan has improved internal systems to give more accurate numbers, updated estimates from late 2013 suggested a significant decrease of the overall initial caseload. Following the events of December 2013 the numbers will need to be updated.

This situation may require the implementation of DDR at a faster pace or in greater numbers than formerly anticipated and thus now is the appropriate time to use the knowledge learned to date to assess the reintegration approach through a highly realistic lens.

***The need to reduce costs from the initial design*** is a second area for attention. While costs of the pilot would be

expected to reduce with scale, one of the main findings of the pilot was that the approach as implemented was cost prohibitive and required further tailoring to be realistic. The programme will achieve the scale and impact desired by the Republic of South Sudan only by addressing the financial realities and therein encourages stability and reallocates resources as needed.

***The need to more effectively align the reinsertion and reintegration work of the DDR programme*** is a third area of focus which correlates closely with cost. Looking more holistically at the programme allows the government to find additional efficiencies in the programme while also providing a stronger programme to beneficiaries.

***The continued development and establishment of full national government implementation of the DDR programme*** is the fourth priority area to be addressed. The initial DDR policy and strategy documents call for national ownership which can have programmatic benefits including full national ownership and contextual understanding in programme planning, service continuity, and cost efficiencies.

***Finally, it is clear that momentum and motivation are key factors in success.*** At this time, there is a positive momentum on this programme which is an even greater testament to NDDRC and the implementing partners given the tense environment they are facing. It is recommended that a transitional pilot project be implemented to harness the current momentum and immediately incorporate the lessons learned in this pilot. The Transitional Pilot would segue in a paced manner up to the full scale programme.

In summary, the current events in South Sudan underscore the importance to the country of DDR and its connection to the nation's overall development. As such, it is critical that the country continue and invigorate its work in developing a nationally-led well-designed and well-implemented DDR programme. The learnings from this pilot as well as the tools developed are relevant and timely as these can significantly contribute to the development of an effective and realistic full National DDR Programme.

# External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project

Anthony Finn Ph.D.  
Claudia Breitung

October 2014







FINAL EVALUATION  
OF THE PILOT  
REINTEGRATION PROJECT  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
NEW NDDR PROGRAMME

Anthony Finn Ph.D.

Claudia Breitung

October 1, 2014

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CBR	Community Based Reintegration
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EA	Environmental Assessment
ERM	Environmental Risk Management
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FMFA	Financial Management Framework Agreement
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HQ	Head Quarters
IA	Implementing Agency
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MDTF-SS	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTC	Multipurpose Training Centres
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NBGS	Northern Bahr el Ghazal State
NDDRC	National DDR Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OP/BP	Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration
RFQ	Request for Quotations
SC	Steering Committee
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPMU	State Project Management Unit
SSAF	South Sudanese Armed Forces
SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
TT	Task Team
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
WB	World Bank
WBGS	Western Bahr el Ghazal State

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# I Executive Summary

## Project Background

1. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) DDR Pilot Reintegration Project (Phases 1 and 2) was implemented between April 2013<sup>1</sup> and August 2014. On December 19<sup>th</sup> 2013 the Project was suspended in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Livelihood Project activities restarted on 15<sup>th</sup> May 2014 (with works on the Community Support Projects already having recommenced during late February 2014). A follow-up learning session to this evaluation is planned for November 2014 in Juba, South Sudan.

2. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), a very unstable security situation, the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and NDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project need to align with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility.

3. Due to the ongoing conflict between the SPLA and opposition forces, increased rebel militia activity as well as inter-communal clashes in various regions of South Sudan the Project was implemented in a very unstable security context (though the Greater Bahr el Ghazal States were less conflict affected than others). The Project environment deteriorated drastically during Phase 2 with the country facing massive IDP and refugee movements, closure or destruction of essential basic services such as medical facilities and schools, increased mobilization of civilians, a shift from development assistance towards emergency relief and disruption of agricultural activities due to the fighting which has led to a major food crisis with at least one third of the population in need of urgent food aid.

4. The original Development Objectives of the Project are as follows: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

5. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are:

- (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

6. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows:

- (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

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<sup>1</sup> IPs were hired in June 2013 and ICRS activities on registration and the baseline started in April 2013.

7. The first tranche of the pilot DDR programme was anticipated to include 500 individuals from the SPLA and other national organised forces. However, the final caseload of DDR participants selected by GoSS to go through the DDR process included only 292 individuals from SPLA's Wounded Heroes, which is currently a designation not necessarily based on injury, but rather on assignment to the DDR programme. Out of this group 290 ex-combatants graduated from the vocational, life skills & literacy/numeracy training in Mapel Transition Facility (TF) (the wider NDDR Pilot Programme with which the Project aligned) and received reintegration support through the Project. Besides the ex-combatants the main Project beneficiaries were community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and community members in sites where seventeen (originally planned as ten<sup>2</sup>) DDR Community Support Projects (borehole installations & rehabilitation and one Payam building rehabilitation) were implemented. According to estimates by the IA (IOM) the Community Support Projects benefited approximately 7,500 people. As five ex-combatants died during the reintegration period the caseload at Project closure is 285 individual ex-combatants.

8. The Project was implemented over two phases between June 2013 and September 2014. Phase 1 of the Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub-components (Start-Up Kits, and Training); (ii) Institutional Capacity Building, (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. Phase 2 of the Project had three sub-components: It continued and innovated the Livelihood Support subcomponent, it implemented and further developed the M&E component including through South-South exchange and it implemented the DDR Community Support Projects. In both Phase 1 and Phase 2 while not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US\$ 120,000 in Phase 1 and US\$ 120,000 in Phase 2) which finances the reintegration participation costs to the NDDRC<sup>3</sup> and included the Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP (World Bank) to the NDDRC which was not a direct cost to the Project. All administrative costs were absorbed by the TDRP.

9. The final evaluation of the Project was conducted in August and September 2014. The evaluation included a comprehensive review of Project documentation, datasets and IA outputs, consultations with 75 individuals, and a field mission to Juba and Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal State (WBGs) where qualitative key informant interviews and qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants were conducted. The first community consultation in Nykiejo, Achot Boma, Rochdog Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 14 men and 12 women as well as separate key informant interviews (KIIs) with the village leader. The second community consultation in Nyinalel, Kuom Boma, Marial Bal Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 13 men and 1 woman including the village leader.

### **Summary of Findings**

10. The final evaluation finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as short to medium term changes resulting from Project activities and outputs) have resulted from the Project. These fall into three broad categories: (i) knowledge transfer and behaviour change (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities); (ii) short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries (ex-

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<sup>2</sup>See Project Implementation Plan (PIP). South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. DDR Community Support. September 2013.

<sup>3</sup>Costs directly associated with reintegration activities

combatants and their communities); (iii) any shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

11. In the Livelihoods Component the main outcomes are as follows: (i) learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits; (ii) learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; (iii) inclusion of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component (iv); an increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants; (v) continuous utilisation of toolkits for livelihood activities by a majority of ex-combatants; (vi) increased vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge of the Project participants (that is used by many ex-combatants to initiate livelihood opportunities), and (vii) increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives).

12. The results of the Participant Satisfaction Survey<sup>4</sup> carried out in July/August 2014 show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The majority of respondents (61.4 percent) are frequently or sometimes using their tool kits, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks. Regarding the vocational skills training the XCs received in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those XCs though that received an auto mechanic training). Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes).

13. The comparison of the livelihood activities of XCs before and after the DDR programme shows an increased engagement in cooperative work (while only a minority of the programme participants indicated to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the satisfaction survey respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR). This increase in group livelihood activity most likely results from the trainings around cooperative business.

14. However, despite these positive trends these findings should not be overestimated. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success and shape of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and sustainability. Other indicators also convey a rather mixed picture of the socio-economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries at the end of the DDR pilot; for example, more than 37.9 percent report that they usually have to borrow in order to meet their household expenses at the end of the month. On the other hand 42.6 percent indicate that their income has increased because of the vocational trainings, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning. Due to these mixed results and the extremely short-time lag between the implementation of reintegration assistance and the final evaluation, definitive and detailed comments on the sustainability of the livelihood activities cannot be made.

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<sup>4</sup> In July/August 2014, in order to gain knowledge of the ex-combatants livelihood situation TDRP conducted a ex-combatant satisfaction survey of the those who were enrolled in the Pilot programme.

15. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behaviour. The *main* outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the reality of leading Reintegration programming in DDR; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) important breakthroughs in the States particularly in working with line ministries in order to support the IGAs of ex-combatants.

16. The evaluation reviewed the conclusion of the MTR that at the time of the MTR it was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The final evaluation makes specific recommendations regarding these issues.

17. The Community Component has mixed outcomes. While significant learning took place regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with a concentration of ex-combatants and the water interventions have improved access to clean water for target communities, the effectiveness of the Community Projects with regard to (i) promoting peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate and (ii) promoting community engagement and ownership and reducing tensions between communities and XCs, remains ambiguous.

18. The Project's objectives and design are **relevant** to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS<sup>5</sup> and current Interim Strategy Note (2013-2014).

19. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11<sup>th</sup> March, 2012).

20. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2.

21. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

22. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects.

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<sup>5</sup>The MDTF-SS was operationally closed on December 31, 2012, and financially closed at the end of June 2013.

MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

23. The Project **efficiency** in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory (MTR) to **satisfactory** because: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant.

24. In Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is looked into. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US\$2,759.<sup>6</sup> In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were targeted with Project activities (5 had died over the course of the Project). Of the 285 targeted, 269 received services. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex-combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant remain high at US\$ 3,750.

25. **Effectiveness** is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation.

26. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2.

27. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs.

28. The Community Support component was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.<sup>7</sup>

29. The Pilot Reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design's effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be **replicated** and **scaled** in future programming:

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<sup>6</sup> Costs discussed in this section are direct costs (including IP management and staffing costs) and do not include WB or NDDRC related management or administration costs.

<sup>7</sup> The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US\$ 25,000 when compared to US\$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps.



- (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system at HQ and inter-organizationally with the State level;
- (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff;
- (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff;
- (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities;
- (e) Community support projects (but with provisos about design, size and whether or not they should be managed through the NDDRC or DDR).

30. The final evaluation made the following specific findings and recommendations (that are related to (i) achievement of objectives; (ii) the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (iii) the Project design and outcomes of each Component.

#### **Project Context and Strategic Environment**

31. The evaluation finds that the Project has **satisfactorily** provided ex-combatants with skills thus enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio-economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio-economic objective).

32. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed **highly satisfactorily** generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed **moderately satisfactorily** to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective).

#### **Project Context and Strategic Environment**

33. **Conclusion 1.** The success of the Project as a pilot, testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment.

34. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear.

35. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme).

36. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical. It observed that the suspension of the Project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum is being lost; however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan.

37. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment, and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation.

38. Timing will be essential for any future DDR programming. The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attend to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme.

39. **Recommendation 1a.** The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed.

40. **Recommendation 1b.** The NDDRC be supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (which could include stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, representatives of civil society), to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled.

41. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions.

42. Despite the progress being made through the Project, DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR through dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development, institution building or infrastructure projects. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency.

43. **Recommendation 1c.** In the short to medium term specifically, the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat which has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes.

44. **Recommendation 1d.** In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics.

45. **Conclusion 2.** The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR.

46. **Recommendation 2.** While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.<sup>8</sup>

47. **Conclusion 3.** UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013<sup>9</sup> but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was cancelled.

48. **Recommendation 3.** The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned<sup>10</sup> which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.

49. **Conclusion 4.** The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources.

50. **Recommendation 4.** The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the

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<sup>8</sup> The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past.

<sup>9</sup> See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013.

<sup>10</sup> An limited in scope internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis.

NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project.

### **Project Design and Outcomes**

51. **Conclusion 5.** The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission.

52. **Recommendation 5.** The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project.

53. **Conclusion 6.** Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF.

54. **Recommendation 6.** In reality reinsertion and reintegration are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations.

55. **Conclusion 7.** The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

56. **Recommendation 7.** The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming.

57. **Conclusion 8.** The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

58. **Recommendation 8.** The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation.

59. **Conclusion 9.** The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion.

60. **Recommendation 9.** The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future.

61. **Conclusion 10.** The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.
62. **Recommendation 10.** When estimating the impact on future programming, economies of scale should be considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities
63. **Conclusion 11.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.
64. **Recommendation 11.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any 'inclusive enough coalition' strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design.
65. **Conclusion 12.** The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC.
66. **Recommendation 12.** In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed.
67. **Conclusion 13.** The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.
68. **Recommendation 13.** The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2).
69. **Conclusion 14.** The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.
70. **Recommendation 14.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

71. **Conclusion 15.** The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

72. **Recommendation 15.** The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

73. **Conclusion 16.** As a result of the flexible design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission's cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised.

74. **Recommendation 16.** In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex-combatants).

75. **Conclusion 17.** The training of trainers (TOT) that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) have increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC.

76. **Recommendation 17.** Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment.

77. **Conclusion 18.** A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel.

78. **Recommendation 18.** In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. Ex-combatant representatives should be involved in identifying the content of toolkits. The same toolkits that will be provided to ex-combatants should also be utilised in the vocational trainings.

79. **Conclusion 19.** A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation.

**Recommendation 19.** In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan.

**Conclusion 20.** A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the wider pilot Project) thus influencing sustainability and impact of some Project activities.

**Recommendation 20.** Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme.

**Conclusion 21.** Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative)

80. **Recommendation 21.** For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work must be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative, and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC.

81. **Conclusion 22.** Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC.

82. **Recommendation 22.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend. However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component.

**Conclusion 23.** The Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types.

**Recommendation 23.** Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation.

# 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

## 1.1 Project Context

83. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project<sup>11</sup> has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the programme context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC<sup>12</sup>; (iii) the policy context (*South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020*); (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility; (v) since 27<sup>th</sup> May 2014 a revised UN mandate removing DDR from the purview of the agency<sup>13</sup>; (vi) limited operational budget in the NDDRC, and (vi) the highly unstable security environment in the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS).

84. RoSS became an independent country on the 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

85. During December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of 15<sup>th</sup> December fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict rapidly escalated, spreading throughout the capital Juba, to Jonglei and several other States in South Sudan resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties.

86. Peace negotiations led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started in January 2014 in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa but have been adjourned numerous times with no significant progress made up to date. They re-started on September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014. A succession of cessation of hostilities agreements signed by GoSS and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) have been repeatedly violated or ignored on the ground in some parts of South Sudan.

87. According to the UNHCR assessment of the situation in South Sudan as of August 2014, the continuous breach of ceasefire agreements and the unstable security situation has severely affected the humanitarian situation in the country creating anything between 500,000 and 1.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and more 447,000 refugees.

88. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. The institutions of the State that began to emerge in the previous years include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. However, this process of creating effective and legitimate state structures and practices has been severely impaired by the current conflict. Since most of the country's public funds continue to be channelled towards the military and the country has been in a state of emergency for more than ten months, most government institutions face severe difficulties in fulfilling their core functions.

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<sup>11</sup> Henceforth referred to as 'the Project'

<sup>12</sup> Henceforth referred to as 'CPA DDR'

<sup>13</sup> See UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014)



89. Additionally, most donors have reviewed their development support in response to the ongoing crisis shifting funds towards the mitigation of humanitarian consequences of the conflict while suspending or redesigning a number of long term development programmes.<sup>14</sup>

90. South Sudan's economy is relatively undeveloped, largely undiversified and highly oil dependent. The greatest part of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival. RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of temporary oil flow stoppages, high inflation following independence, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities as well as the economic consequences of the current conflict.

91. Despite slight achievements in the past years South Sudan's development indicators are very poor. The country has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas, high infant and maternal mortality rates and low life expectancy.<sup>15</sup> Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. The situation has led to a breakdown of agricultural production and resulting severe food insecurity.

92. Consequently, the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges, conflict stressors and famine all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project.

93. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme.<sup>16</sup> The NDDR Pilot Programme consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: registration, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training delivered to ex-combatants. In Phase 2 the Project sought to compensate for poor quality training in auto-mechanic and driving provided to ex-combatants in the Mapel TF.

In Project documentation it is identified that the Project is intended to work towards the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme.<sup>17</sup> It is, however, also stressed that the Project does not address CAAF/G and WAAF/G, since these groups were intended to be addressed by separate special programmes. While capacity building of the DDR system and NDDRC staff was stated as

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<sup>14</sup> See Donor Statement July 11, 2014.

<sup>15</sup> 27percent of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40percent of males compared to 16percent of females are literate and 53percent of urban compared to 22percent of rural population is literate. National Baseline Household Survey (2009).

<sup>16</sup> The Mapel TF Pilot is not part of this evaluation.

<sup>17</sup> Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6.

a direct objective, the Project did not aim at directly building capacity of the line ministries, civil society or private sector. The Project aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank task team (TT), consultants hired by the Project and IAs sought to work in varying degrees in conjunction with implementers of the reinsertion component of the NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. However, the collaboration was hampered by an insufficient flow of information between the involved stakeholders especially in the planning stages. The at times weak information exchange seemed to be a stumbling block for closely linking reinsertion and reintegration activities. In future programme iterations it will hence be all the more crucial to have the necessary coordination structures in place to coordinate between various DDR partners.

94. As a result of the outbreak of hostilities in RoSS in December 2013 the Security Council adopted resolution 2155 (2014) in March 2014 that temporarily shifted the UN mission's main focus from peacebuilding activities to the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With this reprioritization DDR was removed from the UNMISS mandate. Most UNMISS DDR staff has consequently been transferred to other mission sections. At the time of the final evaluation there appears to be a renewed determination in the NDDRC to build relationships with the UN and lobby GoSS to press for the UN to reincorporate DDR in the next UNMISS mandate.

95. This final evaluation examines the pilot reintegration activities and does not look into the pilot reinsertion component that was funded by UNMISS. The final assessment of the wider pilot at Mapel TF pilot was planned by the UN and NDDRC to be conducted separately and in addition to an evaluation of the training sub-component (impact assessment) that was carried out by UNESCO (consultants for the final evaluation of the reinsertion phase had been identified in December 2013). Due to the outbreak of the crisis and the reprioritization of the UNMISS mandate the final evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold. All involved stakeholders as crucial regard an independent evaluation for capturing lessons learned which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.<sup>18</sup>

96. At the time of the final evaluation discussions were ongoing within UNMISS to at least maintain a small core DDR unit for planning purposes. The NDDRC appeared to be determined to seek technical assistance from such a group which could be part of a broader consortium of international stakeholders to reach out to all conflict parties and to support and monitor strategy processes evolving around DDR in the course of the Addis Ababa negotiations.

97. It should be noted that the MTR concluded that the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the involved UN agencies and that this was likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of Phase 2. The evaluation reaffirms this conclusion and recognises in terms of principles of cooperation the NDDRC has shown in Phase 2 a progressive shift in how it wishes to engage with the UN family in the future and this is informing their lobbying of the GoSS and UN regarding re-including DDR in the mandate.

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<sup>18</sup> Although the JOC started to collect lessons learned in an internal process, the final document produced by the JOC in December 2013 lacks completeness (e.g. it contains very little details about costing).

The Project is conceptualised first and foremost as a *pilot* in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, and institutional capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme. Consequently the performance of the Project can be measured against: (i) the achievements of the Project Development Objectives; (ii) the degree to which learning is being acquired, has been or is likely to be utilised including evidence that Project design and implementation in Phase 2 was adjusted to account for learning in Phase 1 including as documented in the MTR; and; (iii) emerging evidence of outcomes for targeted beneficiary populations.

## 1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

98. In the Project documentation the original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

99. The **socio-economic** objectives of the Project are:

- (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

100. The **reintegration programme, systems and learning** objectives are as follows:

- (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

101. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

## 1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries

102. Originally the intended direct ex-combatant beneficiaries of the Project were a pre-selected group of 500. The NDDR Pilot Programme failed to secure the target caseload of 500 ex-combatants or to secure the target caseload as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme: the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned. At the time of final evaluation the direct beneficiaries are as follows. The Project benefited the 290 ex-combatants who were targeted by a variety of Reintegration supports during Phase 1. Of the 290 ex-combatants who were benefited during Phase 1, 270 directly benefited from Reintegration supports during Phase 2. According to data provided by the IA a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants in Phase 1 and in Phase 2, 129 community members benefited from activities in the Livelihood Supports component. Additionally, an IA-estimated 7,500 people directly benefited from activities in Project Component: Community Support Projects.<sup>19</sup>

103. In addition to ex-combatants and community members the Project targeted the NDDRC staff during activities in Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (Phase 1) and

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<sup>19</sup>June 2014, IOM Final Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project - Consultancy to implement DDR community support projects.

through M&E capacity building in the form of a south-south exchange with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) during Phase 2. Also in Phase 2 16 ICRS Case-workers at the Commission benefited from activities in Project Component: Livelihood Supports through Training the Trainers (TOT) training in Business and Cooperatives and partially through attending two days of a seven day training module for Agricultural Extension Workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It was intended that 11 Agricultural Extension Workers would directly benefit from TOT training in Agriculture and Business/Cooperatives but due to logistical challenges 7 received the TOT input.

#### **1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs**

104. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project *outputs* are discussed below.

##### **Project Component: Livelihood Support (US\$ 1,087,482 Implemented by UNICON)<sup>20</sup>**

105. In Phase 1 the Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1), the design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to increase financial literacy and entrepreneurial knowledge and support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. This follow-up training continued in Phase 2. At that stage the livelihood assistance moreover entailed agricultural extension work and training in improved agricultural methods, best practices and small farm business skills for the ex-combatants choosing agriculture. As alterations to the original project components<sup>21</sup> the Project additionally implemented targeted vocational trainings that were provided to ex-combatants via vocational training centres and facilitated a vocational expert visit to deliver support to interested ex-combatants in vocational skills not covered through the targeted vocational trainings or agriculture.

106. For overall management of the component and the start-up kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, a Project Manager, a Livelihoods Training Specialist, a Start-Up Kit Manager, a Procurement Specialist, two Agricultural Training Specialists as well as one State Manager in each of the four pilot States. To deliver the training sub-component in Phase 1 UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and the 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return. In Phase 2 business/cooperative training teams were deployed in each State to conduct follow-up visits to interested ex-combatants. The agricultural trainings were implemented by 7 extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture (3 in WBGs, 1 in Warrap State, 1 in Lakes State, 2 in NBGS). Supplementary vocational trainings were conducted in close collaboration with the Wau Vocational Training Centre and the Aweil driving school.

##### **Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US\$ 323,100) (costs only occurred in Phase 1)**

107. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry's Multipurpose Training Centre in Juba (MTC) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF

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<sup>20</sup>Total costs for livelihoods support component. Due to the lesser number of participants than initially expected (290 vs. 500) it was agreed to spend less than the initial livelihood support budget (US\$ 1,200,000).

<sup>21</sup>See chapter 1.5 for a detailed description of alterations to original project components

UNESCO Vocational Trainers.<sup>22</sup> UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30<sup>th</sup> 2013.<sup>23</sup> The NDDRC was present at the opening of bids. Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2013 and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At the time of the final evaluation distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:<sup>24</sup>

**Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution (Source: NDDRC)**

State	Target	Actual	Rationale
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	30	All distributed
Western Bahr el Ghazal	92	91	1 remaining
Warrap	75	74	1 remaining
Lakes	93	93	All distributed
<b>Total</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>288</b>	

Source: UNICON and NDDRC

**Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US\$ 764,382<sup>25</sup>)**

108. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four themes:

- (a) Cooperatives/associations;
- (b) Small farm or rural enterprise training;
- (c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and
- (d) Adult or formal education.<sup>26</sup>

109. **Training in Mapel TF (Phase 1) (US\$ 164,500):** The curriculum as developed by the IA largely home based and adjusted while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return (delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in IGAs or in preparation to work as a cooperative).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup>UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

<sup>23</sup>See September 2013, UNICON Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component.

<sup>24</sup>Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices.

<sup>25</sup>Costs incurred for the following components: i) Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; ii) State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; iii) Technical Skills Extension-Agricultural extension visits; iv) Technical Skills Extension- Vocational expert visits; v) Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings; vi) Assistance in accessing available government services.

<sup>26</sup> All ex-combatants were asked whether they would be interested to receive assistance with education or livelihood toolkits but none chose the education path.

<sup>27</sup>Modules 1 to15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives.

110. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Training Curriculum;
- (b) Training Manual;
- (c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers).

111. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2013 and ending 11<sup>th</sup> September 2013.

112. **Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 1) (US\$ 312,600).** Dynamics of training in the States after graduation in Mapel TF is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation (in Phase 1) was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the final evaluation.

**Table 2. Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 1)**

State	ex-combatants	CMs	Total
Warrap State	70	34	104
Lakes State	93	29	122
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	30	108	138
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	60	113	173
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>537</b>

Source: UNICON

113. **Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 2) (US\$ 146,433):** In Phase 2 the supplementary follow-up trainings aimed to build on the foundation of trainings received by ex-combatants in Phase 1. The trainings were intended to provide successful ex-combatants with the knowledge to enhance their business performance while those ex-combatants that face difficulties receive additional input and assistance in problem solving. The follow up during phase 1 indicated that ex-combatants were at different levels of progress regarding start-up and management of their enterprises.

114. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Training Curriculum;
- (b) Training Plan & Schedule;
- (c) Training of Trainers and resulting cohort of trainers;
- (d) State-based follow-up trainings.

115. A TOT was conducted for ten days from 16<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> May 2014 producing a cohort of 20 trainers (16 trainers plus 4 IA hired State managers). The curriculum entailed 13 training modules

that link up with the training content delivered in Phase 1.<sup>28</sup> A participant satisfaction survey conducted by the TDRP shows that the level of participants' understanding of the materials is very high (even though somewhat lower than that of Phase 1) but it was not possible to independently verify these findings for the final evaluation.<sup>29</sup>

116. Following the TOT the trainers delivered the modules to the ex-combatants on State level. Similar to previous State based trainings it is difficult to verify whether the trainings were implemented in a satisfactory manner and to what degree the training objectives were met. According to data provided by the IA 269 ex-combatants (94 percent of the current caseload<sup>30</sup>) received supplementary training (see table 3).

**Table 3. Supplementary Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 2)**

State	Current caseload	Trained ex-combatants	ex-combatants untrained/not found
Warrap State	75	74	1
Lakes State	90	81	9
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	29	29	0
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	91	85	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>16</b>

Source: UNICON

According to data from the satisfaction survey 61.8% of the respondents were very satisfied with the State based training, the majority being most satisfied with the way in which trainers taught them (91.8%) and the contents of the training (90.7%).<sup>31</sup>

117. **Agricultural extension visits (Phase 2) (US\$ 48,417):** According to the Project Document ex-combatants are to receive assistance in farming and further appropriate agricultural extension training, which is supplemented with small business training. In line with these objectives the agricultural sub-component was introduced in Phase 2. The agricultural extension work targeted those ex-combatants that opted to pursue a career in agriculture and who had received the agriculture toolkit in phase 1 (129 ex-combatants in total).

118. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Curriculum design;
- (b) Training plan & schedule;
- (c) Training of Trainers for Agriculture Extension workers;
- (d) Agricultural Extension field trainings.

<sup>28</sup>Modules 1 to 13 were: (i) Introduction and Micro lab: Expectation and Commitment; (ii) Learning Process and Curriculum Design: Illiterate and less educated people; (iii) Financial literacy/numeracy; (iv) Entrepreneurship and Business Development in Cooperatives; (v) Steps in starting a business and Cooperatives; (vi) Business and Behavioural Skills Development in Cooperative Entrepreneurship; (vii) Training in Business Plan and Financial Transactions in Business; (viii) Enterprise Management; (ix) Advance Management Skills and Systems; (x) Training and advisory in Legal Aspects: Registration and Taxation; (xi) Planning and Managing Field Level Operations; (xii) Documentation and Reporting; (xiii) Action Plan & Concluding.

<sup>29</sup>IA Interim Report 3 (IR 1 of Phase 2)

<sup>30</sup>The Project's current caseload is 285 ex-combatants as 5 beneficiaries of the initial caseload (290) passed away.

<sup>31</sup> See : Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (2014) (Draft - in Progress).

119. A 7-day agricultural TOT focusing on small farm business skills and improved agricultural methods<sup>32</sup> was conducted from 28<sup>th</sup> May to 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2014. An international agriculture specialist facilitated the training with the assistance of a local agriculture trainer contracted by the IA. The main participants of the TOT were seven extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture of Greater Bahr el Ghazal who already had a foundation in training agriculture. A self-assessment of the TOT participants conducted by the IA revealed that the level of understanding and confidence in delivering the modules was moderate/high. The agronomy knowledge amongst the participant group was inconsistent which seemed to challenge the knowledge transfer.<sup>33</sup>

120. Based on their previous expertise and the knowledge acquired in the TOT the extension workers, in close collaboration with staff from the NDDRC State offices who had joined the TOT training, delivered the subsequent agriculture trainings to the targeted ex-combatants in the pilot States. The objectives of this State based follow-up training in agriculture were, amongst others<sup>34</sup>:

- (a) To further support the ex-combatants to utilise the Agricultural trainings gained at Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return;
- (b) To train the ex-combatants on agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills;
- (c) To train the ex-combatants on small farm business skills with an emphasis on livelihood success.

121. The agricultural extension training was delivered to 119 ex-combatants out of the original 129 people who chose agriculture as their field of reintegration. In addition, because the extension workers were travelling together with the Phase 2 training teams, the agricultural extension training was available for the ex-combatants of other reintegration fields to attend, provided that it did not interfere with their core training following a non-objection of the UNICON state manager. The number of additionally trained ex-combatants was not recorded as no separate attendance sheet policy was introduced for them.<sup>35</sup>

122. To what degree these trainings helped to support the beneficiaries to improve their agriculture livelihoods in their communities of return is difficult to assess. Due to challenging logistics and limited financial means of the Project the ex-combatants were not visited by the extension workers in their communities of origin but were trained in central locations. Given the lack of field visits to the ex-combatants' homes and the relatively limited training time it can be assumed that more extension work on a one-on-one basis would be needed to have a lasting impact on the individual XC. However, the evaluation does not have the adequate data to gauge the training impact and to substantiate this argument.

123. A total of 399 people benefited directly from training in Phase 2 (follow-up training in business skills/financial literacy/business motivation and training in agricultural business/agronomy practices). This includes 270 ex-combatants (out of which one ex-combatant

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<sup>32</sup> The modules covered during the training were: i) Introduction; ii) Numeracy and Literacy; iii) Why establish a seed business? iv) Business Planning; v) Agricultural Topics; vi) Agricultural Cooperatives.

<sup>33</sup> See UNICON Interim Report 3

<sup>34</sup> See TOR for Livelihood Support Phase 2

<sup>35</sup> UNICON Draft Final Report



died) and 129 community members. During phase 1 a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants. Thus the percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent.

**Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (US\$ 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR)<sup>36</sup> (Phase 1 only) and South-South Capacity Building and M&E (US\$ 247,525 Implemented by UNICON) (Phase 2 only)**

124. During Phase 1 only Institutional Capacity Building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been:

- (a) Inception Report;
- (b) PIP;
- (c) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs (see 2.4 below);
- (d) Draft Final Report;
- (e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC;
- (f) SWOT analysis for State Offices;
- (g) Draft M&E manual;
- (h) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC),<sup>37</sup>
- (i) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal;
- (j) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys and Reports;
- (k) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS).

125. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators).

126. During Phase 2 direct Institutional Capacity Building took the form of a South-South exchange with the RDRC. This activity was planned in response to the poor quality M&E manual produced by the IA in Phase 1 and in recognition that the staffing configuration in the NDDRC during Phase 1 was not such that a stable M&E unit existed. However, the staffing issue persisted during Phase 2. The outputs of the exchange have been as follows:

- (a) An M&E manual (in draft form as of the time of final Project evaluation);
- (b) A MSPPT presentation to NDDRC HQ.

127. The chief non-Project financed activity increasing capacity in the NDDRC was the completion of the ICRS, itself an important information management system for the Commission. The ICRS, financed directly by the World Bank is the central IT system to facilitate the

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<sup>36</sup>Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research

<sup>37</sup>August 19<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal).

registration of ex-combatants as well as their counselling and referral to socio-economic opportunities by ICRS Caseworkers.

128. At the time of evaluation the following are the outputs of activities associated with the ICRS:

- (a) Final version (3.0) of the ICRS installed on the HQ ICRS server;
- (b) Source code and draft user manuals (ICRS User Manual V2.0 and ICRS Administrator Manual V1.0) at the time of evaluation all of which is with the TDRP for final sign-off before transfer to NDDRC;
- (c) Completed Administrator Training of the NDDRC IT Unit on installation, configuration and troubleshooting;
- (d) Completed ICRS User Training of ICRS Caseworkers.

**Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 450,000 Implemented by IOM) (Phase 1 and Phase 2)**

129. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance.”<sup>38</sup> It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches.<sup>39</sup> In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives:

- (a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties;
- (b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties

130. At time of final evaluation the outputs of this Component have been:

- (a) PIP;
- (b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC);
- (c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process;
- (d) Engagement of State PMUs and local government;
- (e) Community orientation to the CDD/R; facilitation of community meetings;
- (f) Training of management committees;
- (g) Project implementation;
- (h) Final report.

131. Prior to the Project start NDDRC opted to prioritise water interventions and improvements of local market places. Interventions targeted counties in the four-state target area with the highest number of ex-combatants registered in the programme. Based on location selection criteria<sup>40</sup> drafted by the IA (taking into account the number of ex-combatants registered in the ICRS database and a needs analysis) a matrix was drafted outlining potential target Payams. Based on the matrix the sites were selected by the local authorities in close collaboration with NDDRC and IOM. NDDRC State Coordinators and IOM field staff then liaised with community

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<sup>38</sup>NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36

<sup>39</sup>ibid

<sup>40</sup>See Site Selection Criteria for Water Projects, updated September 2013

members and ex-combatants to identify the priority improvement projects that were of highest priority in their communities within the available budget.<sup>41</sup>

132. According to the IA's final report it was originally proposed to implement up to 10 community projects but in the end IOM finalised 17 projects (15 boreholes with hand pumps, one Payam building rehabilitation, and one borehole with solar pumping system<sup>42</sup>). All 16 water projects were coordinated with the Rural Water Departments in each State. The community projects were implemented in the following locations:

- (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (9 Projects);
- (b) Lakes States (5 Projects);
- (c) Warrap State (2 Projects);
- (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project – Payam Building rehabilitation).

133. Initially it was planned for WBGS to only drill four boreholes but due to the competitive bidding process and cheaper pump installations than originally envisioned (more hand pumps than solar pumps), a surplus of operational funds remained in the budget which was utilized to drill five additional boreholes in the State.

134. A series of community meetings (39 in total) were held with the target communities in each project site. In these meetings IOM staff explained the role of the community in managing the investment after project completion. 1285 participants (895 males and 390 females) attended the meetings. Ex-combatant engagement in these meetings was reported only in three communities. The breakdown according to States is as follows

- (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (16 meetings);
- (b) Lakes States (13 meetings);
- (c) Warrap State (4 meetings);
- (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (6 meetings).

135. Due to the outbreak of the conflict in mid-December 2013, activities were temporarily suspended and a no cost time extension was issued by the World Bank until 30<sup>th</sup> May 2014. Works on the community support projects recommenced in late February 2014 when the World Bank lifted the temporary suspension of the programme. The final Project report was submitted on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2014. This final Project evaluation did not include a technical assessment of infrastructure outputs.

#### **Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US\$ 240,000)**

136. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project.

137. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the HQ PMU which comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. While the PMU met regularly in Phase 1, meetings were less frequent in Phase 2. According to the Project Document

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<sup>41</sup>See IOM Final Report

<sup>42</sup>The original plan was to upgrade and convert an existing borehole into a water yard. However due to the low yield from the existing borehole, a new borehole was drilled and solar pumping system installed.

the PMU is responsible for overarching management and coordination of reintegration pilot activities. While the PMU has turned out to be an important body to align the activities of various NDDRC departments and to share information amongst the national management level, it did not entirely fulfil its role as the ‘backbone’ of the reintegration process. Although all departments were requested to continuously engage and input through their participation in the PMU, the active involvement of some NDDRC units in the PMU remained marginal. At time of final evaluation the SPMUs were not operative first and foremost due to lack of staffing in the State offices. The SC met several times during the course of the Pilot Project and the TCC in the form of the Joint Operations Committee (JOC) while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC has brought together the major stakeholders including the UN family (in Phase 1).

### **1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification**

138. The Project was designed to be implemented in three Phases with the design and implementation of Phase 2 Project Components being flexible enough to allow the Project to react to learning from Phase 1 and to the changing situation on the ground. Phase 3 was to consist largely of evaluation and learning.

139. As per the Project documentation the original Project Phase 1 was designed as a start-up phase running for three months (15<sup>th</sup> April to 31<sup>st</sup> November 2013) with the aim to “establish a HQ PMU institutional framework, mechanisms, systems and procedures and to contract Implementing Partners who will provide technical assistance and execute programme activities including setting up of economic activities falling under Component 2 [Livelihoods Support].”<sup>43</sup> Phase 1 largely ran to schedule until the suspension of the Project on 19<sup>th</sup> December 2013.

140. In the original Project documentation Phase 2 was designed as a follow-up and consolidation phase running for four months (1<sup>st</sup> December 2013 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2014) with the aim of reinforcing outcomes from Phase 1 through follow-up reintegration services “either in the form of cooperatives, entrepreneurship around small farm activities or small enterprise training, or continued education and opportunities to ex-combatants and community members at their place of reintegration.”<sup>44</sup> As a result of the suspension of the Project Phase 2 ran from 15<sup>th</sup> May 2014 until 31<sup>st</sup> July 2014.

141. The project documentation identifies a third phase which was designed as the evaluation and knowledge transfer phase set to run between 1<sup>st</sup> April and 15<sup>th</sup> June 2014. This phase was intended to complete “M&E activities with a beneficiary assessment and community dynamics study, as well as an overall evaluation of the processes, systems and outcomes of the Pilot. The knowledge transfer process will be completed during this phase.”<sup>45</sup> In reality Phase 3 has not been a distinct phase and of those planned-for activities that have been implemented they have come towards the close of the Project: XC satisfaction survey conducted in July/August 2013, end evaluation in August and September 2014 with a follow-up learning session planned for October 2014.

142. Aside from minor scheduling changes Phase 1 was implemented as planned however as noted above the Project was suspended on 19<sup>th</sup> December, 2014 due to the deteriorating security

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<sup>43</sup> September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 42.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid: 43.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid: 43.

situation. The major implementation challenge arising from the suspension was that no progress had been made on activities in Component: DDR Community Support Projects. Activities were rescheduled to Phase 2 when the IA exceeded planned Project outcomes. The IA exceeded the planned-for number of outputs due to cost savings on construction that were subsequently put to use in an additional 5 sites.

143. Phase 2 was very lightly designed in order to allow the Project to adjust to learnings from Phase 1 and from the MTR. At design Phase 2 had the following aims:

- (a) Visit all livelihood projects, that is where ex-combatants have formed working groups (partnerships, associations or cooperatives) once;
- (b) Ensure at least three follow-up counselling sessions with ex-combatants during their month-end visits to the NDDRC offices when they collect their monthly salaries; and
- (c) If necessary visit enterprises that are reported to be failing and as feasible, provide additional mentoring assistance to address challenges.<sup>46</sup>

144. Phase 2 encountered a rapidly deteriorating security situation and so implementation was postponed until 15<sup>th</sup> May, 2013. In the interim period partners in the Project design engaged around potential activities for Phase 2. Based on learning from Phase 1 and the MTR the originally planned-for activities were largely overhauled. Regarding the intended aims of Phase 2 the original quantitative indicators (numbers of visits to ex-combatants, number of counselling sessions) were discarded and replaced with the following activities and justifications. More detailed exploration of outputs and outcomes from Phase two is included in Section 2 and 3 below.

145. Component: Livelihoods Support:

- (a) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives to training NDDRC ICERS workers. The justification for this shift is to retain expertise in the NDDRC and increase the capacity of ICERS workers to deliver technical counselling to ex-combatants. This design element was initiated by the NDDRC SC and implemented by UNICON.
- (b) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Agriculture (which included modules on numeracy and literacy, establishing a seed business, business planning and cooperatives) to including Agricultural Extension Workers from the State Ministry of Agriculture. The justification for this shift is: (i) to foster better cooperation with line ministries in the States, and (ii) to maximise delivery to ex-combatants and civilians as Agricultural Extension Workers work with both groups to dispense guidance of agricultural practices.
- (c) Inclusion of Technical Skills Extension: additional training mainly in auto mechanic and driving but also in carpentry, masonry and plumbing to ex-combatants. The justification for including these activities was the ex-combatant identified poor quality of training in Mapel TF in auto mechanic and driving as well as challenges faced by some ex-combatants obtaining their driving license and making use of the toolkit

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid: 26.

received as part of this component in Phase 1. These activities were led by the NDDRC in cooperation with local training institutions in the State. A total of 52 individual participated in the driving classes whereas two ex-combatants received supplementary auto mechanics training.<sup>47</sup>

- (d) Inclusion of planned expert mentoring visits by skilled trades people. This was intended to supplement vocational training received in Mapel TF however in reality this was a minor activity. The expert visits were limited to one welding expert, who visited the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes and mentored some ex-combatants who were trained in welding and now resided in those states.<sup>48</sup>

146. Component: Institutional Capacity Building:

- (a) Inclusion of South-South exchange in M&E. Phase 1 saw the completion of the Institutional Capacity Building component however activities focusing on M&E capacity building were not completed to the required standard and staffing challenges in the NDDRC compromised the effectiveness of those same activities. The Project included a South-South exchange with the RDRC in order to deliver M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and to draft the M&E manual for the Commission.

147. The Project documentation identifies that activities in Phase 3 were to contain a Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) and Community Dynamics (CD) survey. As a result of the changed circumstance on the ground a decision was made by the NDDRC and TDRP to cancel the surveys and replace them with a Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey (BSS). This survey was implemented by ICRS caseworkers between June and August 2014 with a final report due to be completed in September 2014, authored by the Bank TT.

148. In summary these changes to the Project largely have been driven by the deteriorated security situation and by the in-built Project flexibility to react to learning.

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<sup>47</sup> UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2.

<sup>48</sup> UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2.

## 2. Project Outcomes

149. Following is an examination of Project *outcome* sat the time of the final evaluation of the Project. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories:

- (a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities);
- (b) The short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex-combatants and their communities as per the Project aims;
- (c) The shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

150. The Project logic model is such that at the time of final evaluation the Project should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in capacity in the NDDRC and acquisition by the Commission of systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge and skills acquired during the Project, thus positively changing its institutional performance both incrementally during the Project and in any future DDR programming.

151. The final evaluation finds that there have been behavioural shifts and knowledge shifts in the NDDRC in line with the aims of activities carried out in the Institutional Capacity Building component and also generally as a result successfully implementing reintegration programming in the Pilot.

152. Behavioural shifts and knowledge have resulted from activities in the Capacity Building Component in Phase 1 and in Phase 2. They have also resulted from the sum total of activities in the Pilot for example, where in some State offices staff have shown initiative and determination to maximise outcomes for ex-combatants and to proactively involve line ministries in supporting the Pilot programme (Section 2.1 below).

153. While without a Tracer and community survey it is difficult to measure the outcomes for beneficiaries of the project, certainly there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the Livelihoods Support component. Also there are reported positive outcomes for community members through the Community Supports Project as a result of having localised access to clean water. In all cases for ex-combatants and for community members the sustainability of outcomes is unclear and as discussed below (Section 2.1 and 2.3) there are mitigating factors negatively affecting some outcomes.

154. The MTR concluded that at the time of the review was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN in South Sudan.

155. As is discussed below (Section 2.2 and Section 3) the hiatus in DDR programming will have a major negative effect on the outcomes of the Project unless managed effectively by the

NDDRC with the support of the GoSS and the external partners to the Commission including not just BICC and TDRP but also UMMISS and donors. This is particularly the case regarding outcomes from the Institutional Capacity Building component and from the creation of an ICRS.

156. The loss of DDR from the UNMISS mandate is a major challenge to the NDDRC and the GoSS. For the NDDRC it constitutes the loss of a logistical support however it also represents an opportunity to re-engage the UN in a changed external and programmatic environment. The Commission are being proactive in seeking the re-incorporation of DDR in the UN mandate if renewed in November 2014 and it is imperative that this re-engagement is highly strategic and done with a view to maximising the input from the UN both as a thought-partner in the ‘good-enough coalitions’ that design and implement DDR programming and also as a logistical partner.

## **2.1. Livelihood Supports**

157. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the Livelihood Supports component are:

- (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits;
- (b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field;
- (c) Nascent involvement of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component;
- (d) Increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants;
- (e) A majority of Project participants has started utilising the toolkits for livelihood activities;
- (f) Project participants have acquired additional vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge which many of them utilise to initiate livelihood opportunities;
- (g) Increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives).

158. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub-component. Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components.

159. Regarding learning how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition, transfer and quality control reporting from the field, in Phase 1 UNICON worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO. Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON’s operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organisation and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organisation, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard



expected by UNICON. In Phase 2 recommendations regarding this issue were considered by the IA leading to improved reporting and less complicated implementation structures to deliver the training sub-component.

160. As mentioned above in Phase 1 all livelihood activities (training and start-up kit subcomponent) were implemented by the IA and sub-contracted service providers with no direct involvement of the Line Ministries on State level. In line with the National DDR Strategic Plan (2012-2020), the collaboration with the line ministries was significantly strengthened in Phase 2. In WBGs, for instance, the NDDRC State Office closely coordinated pilot reintegration activities with various Ministries on State level to maximize gains for ex-combatants. As a result of this collaboration selected groups of ex-combatants received additional reintegration benefits such as plots of land, timber and seeds.

161. Although these developments are still early stage, these are signs of a growing albeit loose relationship between the NDDRC and the State Ministries. Even though the above mentioned activities may have been more a result of a strong initiative of the respective NDDRC State office rather than a structured approach towards engaging State Ministries and it is uncertain to what extent this proactive involvement of the Ministries has been replicated in other States, the given example indicates that the DDR Programme can succeed in harmonizing its activities with other national stakeholders. The cooperation with the Ministries leads to greater alignment of the Pilot Project with the National DDR Strategic Plan that stipulates national institutions and local service providers to play a role in implementing the reintegration component.

162. As of now the collaboration between the NDDRC and the State Ministries on reintegration related issues appears to be loose and is at times characterized by ad hoc engagement and individual initiative. Consequentially, the related operational procedures and processes are – in parts - still unstructured and lack a holistic approach. It is, for instance, still unclear on what grounds groups of ex-combatants have received additional livelihood benefits (most importantly the level of formalisation of an association/cooperative) or what will be the impact on acquired land titles should a cooperative cease to persist. In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise such implementation arrangements. There is a risk that due to the imminent halt in the DDR Programme the emerging ties between NDDRC and other national stakeholders will stagnate thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the achieved Project outcomes.

163. Whereas in Phase 1 external trainers hired by the IA delivered training, in Phase 2 technical skills training was implemented in close collaboration with a variety of public and private and well-established local service providers. For instance, the IA coordinated its agricultural extension work with the State Ministry of Agriculture. In the agriculture context the IA trained extension workers in best practices and appropriate farming techniques. In addition targeted vocational trainings were provided to ex-combatants via existing vocational training institutions (e.g. ex-combatants enrolled in driving and mechanic courses with the Wau Vocational Training Centre; in Aweil and Rumbek ex-combatants joined classes at a driving/auto-mechanic school). This localised approach towards training not only helps to build the capacity of South Sudanese institutions and organisations but also is likely to be more cost-efficient than implementation arrangements involving external or international training institutions. With regard to future programming it remains to be seen whether the same approach can be applied. Especially when the programme is massively up scaled it is uncertain whether the existing local service providers have enough technical and human resources to handle large numbers of ex-combatants. As much it is feasible to utilise them in DDR operations, it will be

necessary to carefully assess their capacities prior to the Project start and scope the programmatic options for aligning with institution building work in the States.

164. The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. It is, however, not clear in how far the trainers were able to utilise the skills and knowledge they acquired in the TOT in the delivery of trainings to the ex-combatants. In light of the reported varying skills levels of extension workers and ICRS staff (in terms of technical but also literacy/numeracy skills) it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning short to medium term outcomes of the extension trainings.

165. According to Project documentation on the entrepreneurship TOT in Phase 2 the trainers were empowered to influence the ex-combatants and instil in them a positive attitude toward their resettlement with their communities through setting up cooperative based business enterprises. At time of the final evaluation it is clear that trainers can articulate the concepts of entrepreneurship and cooperatives and apply the training process. The trainers can also assist ex-combatants in taking key decisions concerning business start-ups.<sup>49</sup>

166. Despite these positive gains a general critique about the TOT is that the training was relatively short given the amount of knowledge (on the training process and methods) that had to be imparted to the ICRS staff. The trained were granted limited time to develop certain key competencies and to absorb the training materials. Since the group of trainers changed from Phase 1 to Phase 2 the Project could also not build on the previous training and fieldwork, but had to start afresh thereby not being able to utilize the capabilities that had been built earlier in the Project.

167. The MTR identified that the Project assumed that reintegration programming, if implemented well, would increase confidence in the effectiveness of the DDR programme, and as a consequence, confidence in the NDDRC. The MTR noted that at the time of writing there was no evidence for this outcome. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these findings. Given the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013, the fragile security situation and ongoing mobilisation in the country there is generally little to no confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex-combatants and community members, relevant questions were not included in the Baseline surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with of SSR.

168. The expert visits that were introduced as a supplementary sub-component in Phase 2 had limited outcomes. While it was planned that a majority of ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration tracks receive a visit by an experienced professional with proven skills in their respective field, the expert visits were only offered by one welding expert. The limited reach of this activity was, according to the IA, due to lack of availability of experts in locations close to those of the corresponding ex-combatants, and the involvement of ex-combatants in agricultural work. The scaling-up of this sub-component in future programme iterations will be challenging as it is questionable whether there will be enough local experts available to carry out training on the job. Moreover, the amount of individual attention needed for each ex-combatant is very high and potentially not scalable.

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<sup>49</sup>Report by Lead Consultant to UNICON on TOT in phase 2

169. As mentioned above, the final evaluation faces challenges in measuring the outcomes for individual beneficiaries because of the missing tracer survey and constraining environmental factors. However, based on data of a Satisfaction Survey that was conducted in July/August 2014 by TDRP in close collaboration with NDDRC, it is nevertheless possible to at least identify broad trends.

170. The Satisfaction Survey aimed to find out: (i) the extent to which DDR participants are satisfied with the Pilot Programme; (ii) how well ex-combatants were reintegrated into the society; (iii) how they were faring in the host communities since being demobilized, and (iv) what were their subsequent embankments on the reintegrating process.<sup>50</sup> In total the survey had a sample size of 204 ex-combatants (70.3 percent of the current caseload) including 192 males and 12 females.<sup>51</sup>

171. The results of the Satisfaction Survey show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The available data though, especially around the establishment of cooperatives and associations has to be analysed with some degree of caution because there appears to be some conflict around the concept of cooperatives in the South Sudanese context (especially the clear distinction between cooperatives, associations and working groups). For future DDR programming clear-cut guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved including line ministries.

172. According to the Satisfaction Survey results the overwhelming majority of respondents (70 percent) indicate to be very or somewhat satisfied with the toolkit they received and most (89.1 percent) remarked that they know how to utilise the tools. Those respondents that had attended the animal husbandry, masonry and auto mechanic/driving classes in Mapel reported lowest levels of satisfaction with the toolkit. The respondents that express dissatisfaction with the toolkit mostly criticise that the tools were of low quality and easy to break and that parts of the tools were missing upon delivery. Another point of concern was raised regarding the types of toolkits. The study finds that 46.5 percent of the respondents mention that the toolkits they had received did not match to what was used at the vocational trainings at Mapel which obviously is a crucial point to consider in future DDR programming. Concerning the short to medium term livelihood impact of the toolkits the survey results show that the majority of respondents still make use of the materials they have received. The study finds that 61.4 percent indicate to frequently or sometimes use the kit, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks.

173. Regarding the vocational skills training in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those ex-combatants that received an auto mechanic training). The study finds that 71.3 percent of those respondents that indicate to utilise the vocational training skills mention they taught other family or community members the skills they acquired in Mapel, 57.3 percent state to make use of what they were taught to solve things in the household whereas more than half (51.3 percent) indicate to use the acquired skills to improve their own business. The respondents who report not to have used the vocational skills give as reasons that access to capital

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<sup>50</sup>See Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (Draft in Progress)

<sup>51</sup>Due to logistical and security constraints not all programme participants took part in the survey.

was lacking (69.8 percent), that they did not have the right tools (51.2 percent) and that the training was not sufficient/they did not learn enough (39.5 percent).

174. Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants (74.5 percent of the sample) report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes). Amongst the respondents that attended the carpentry course the overwhelming majority (93.3 percent) is still working in the same vocation, followed by the group of respondents that attended agriculture lessons (91.8 percent are still active in agriculture). For the other vocational tracks these figures are slightly or much lower. The study finds that 69.2 percent of respondents that attended the electrician course still work in that vocation, for auto mechanics this figure is 62.3 percent (which is an somewhat surprising result given the low level of satisfaction with the training course), welding 57.1 percent and animal husbandry 46.7 percent. The interviewees that attended the masonry and plumbing course are least successful in this respect.

175. These results show that some of the vocational trainings have not been thoroughly linked to marketable skills and knowledge was not always imparted in line with the market realities. Some vocations were simply not beneficial for starting relevant business in the communities of return. This is in part resulting from the lack of counselling on what technical skills would be useful in relation to the market opportunities in the ex-combatants' respective locations.<sup>52</sup> The lack of thorough market analysis has already been a point of criticism in the CPA DDR programme - these lessons learned have obviously not been adequately mirrored in the National DDR pilot Project.

176. Out of the sample of 204 ex-combatants only 3 respondents did not take part in the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperative training in Mapel. The overwhelming majority of the respondents who participated in the course affirmed that they acquired new knowledge, with 59.9 percent indicating to have learned a lot and 31.2 percent to have gathered some new knowledge. The greater majority of participants (73.5 percent) claimed to have used some or a lot of that knowledge and skills in their daily lives whereas 6.4 percent only used very little of what was learned. Only 13.7 percent of respondents mentioned not to utilise the entrepreneurship skills. Amongst this group most respondents (79.2 percent) gave as a reason that there is no opportunity to apply the knowledge. This hints at the lack of economic opportunities and limited absorption capacity of the market in South Sudan which is a major stumbling block for many ex-combatants.

177. Those survey participants that reported using the entrepreneurship skills utilise them when working with other people (83.4 percent). Another 67.5 percent within that group also notes that they had formed a cooperative or that they were in the process of forming one (31.1 percent). This correlates with data received by the NDDRC on the formation of cooperatives in the Pilot Project. In total 17 livelihood groups<sup>53</sup> were set up across Greater Bahr el Gahazal of which most are not registered cooperatives as such but in the process of registering. These findings confirm that the training was effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. This, however, does not mean that ex-combatants solely focus on such livelihood forms. When asked how the entrepreneurship skills were utilized more than half (57.0 percent) of the respondents claim that they managed to

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<sup>52</sup>See also UNICON. *Consultancy to Implement the Livelihoods Support Component– Phase 2. Comments and Recommendation based on Interaction with Trainers after Phase II Follow-up* (unofficial document).

<sup>53</sup>7 in Warrap State, 5 in WBGs and 5 in NBGS

establish a business. More than a third (34.4 percent) says they utilized the skills to improve on an existing business while a slight less number of the respondents (29.1 percent) mention to have found an employment opportunity because of the entrepreneurship training they received.

178. Out of the 204 respondents that took part in the survey 203 participated in a follow-up business or cooperative training after leaving Mapel, with most of them (80.5 percent) receiving training for two full days or more. Similar to the results of the Mapel training, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicate that the supplementary training on entrepreneurship and financial literacy taught them a lot or some additional knowledge (93.6 percent) and more than three quarters (80.5 percent) still make use of the training to a large or some degree. These results clearly indicate a positive impact of the State level training.

179. Other indicators convey a rather mixed picture of the economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries. In order to meet their household expenses at the end of each month, more than one third of the respondents (37.9 percent) report that they usually have to borrow from someone else, another 25.6 percent on the other hand mentions that they usually break-even and another 23.6 percent states that they usually have money left over. Equally mixed findings came out of the survey when respondents were asked whether their income changed because of the vocational training they received. 42.6 percent report that their income increased, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning.

180. When comparing the livelihood activities of the respondents before and after going through the DDR programme, there are some slight changes visible. The most striking change is the increased participation in registered cooperatives (of more than 21 people). While only 0.7 percent of the sample indicates to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR. This figure of 18.0 percent is high and must be interpreted with caution. There is a high likelihood that this increase in-group livelihood activities results from the trainings and counselling around cooperative business.

181. The final evaluation finds that this result is a positive outcome of the livelihood support component that should, however, not be over-interpreted. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and value in terms of creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants. As helpful as cooperatives are in creating a supportive environment for ex-combatants and the communities involved, cooperatives need to be understood in the broader market context and its absorption capacity. Not every vocation is equally suited for cooperative business and not every cooperative has a potential to succeed which is a point that needs to be taken into consideration more thoroughly in future DDR programming.

182. Socially, most interviewed ex-combatants (79.8 percent) mention not to face any challenges back in their home communities. The overwhelming majority report that their communities were accepting them after their return from Mapel and that they did not face any hostile or jealous reactions from other community members because of the reintegration assistance they received or their salaries. When asked about their expectations with regard to their military status upon completion of the DDR programme, 85.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they regard themselves as civilian whereas only 14.8 percent expected that they would continue to be a Wounded Hero. Although not every DDR participant hence seems to have understood or accepted that they cease to be part of the military, the overwhelming majority of

participants do acknowledge the transition process from soldier to civilian. In this respect the programme's outcomes have been moderately positive.

## **2.2. Institutional Capacity Building**

183. The main Institutional Capacity Building component was implemented in Phase 1 of the Project and assessed at the time of the MTR (at the close of Phase 1). At the time of the MTR the outcomes of the activities in this component had focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the seeding of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. The component was intended to produce difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. The MTR identified that at the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component had been:

- (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank;
- (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same;
- (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project;
- (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation;
- (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation;
- (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC.

184. The MTR noted that at the close of Phase 1 the main outcomes from the Project components had been: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, and (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO).

185. As seen above (Section 1.5) Phase 2 supplementary activities under this Component were the M&E capacity building delivered as a South-South exchange with the RDRC. Supplementary capacity building activities implemented outside the component were: (i) the technical capacity building of the IT unit and ICRS workers around the ICRS; (ii) the programming and installation of the ICRS itself; (iii) training of ICRS case workers in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (iv) training of ICRS in delivering a PDA-based survey (the satisfaction survey). Both the ICRS and the satisfaction survey are not financed under the Project but are complementary activities implemented by the World Bank TT.

186. At the time of the final evaluation the medium term outcomes of these supplementary trainings are hard to predict. Certainly in the short term and depending on the individual concerned some of the ICRS workers will have increased understanding and skills in the basics of the financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives, as well as increased skills in delivering a PDA-based survey.

187. The NDDRC IT has experienced an increase in technical skills around working with the ICRS as a result of the training and technology transfer however as flagged by the Bank TT itself and by the IT unit there is a need for additional support and some technical functions cannot be actioned by the unit without the direct support of the Bank TT's IT consultant.

188. Similarly ICRS case-workers may have received a variety of training inputs but how these inputs can or will influence performance in the field is not clear. This Project evaluation does not constitute an institutional assessment and did not take a scientific approach to examine how the NDDRC works in the field however, though observation it is clear that the innovation and achievements evident in those State offices visited by the evaluation arise largely from the initiative and capability of the staff there. In such situations then the training may have a more-than-short-term impact.

189. Performance is influenced by many factors and at the State level where the group of NDDRC staff (ICRS workers) who have been most highly targeted by capacity building during the Project work, performance is severely negatively influenced by the critical lack of infrastructure and resources. Negative impacts of poor resource allocations resulting from the austerity budget (from delays in payment of salaries to basic budgeting items) have been exacerbated by the loss of critical infrastructure as a result of UNMISS withdrawing support (generators, power, transport) and the effects of the ongoing deterioration in security. These factors affect HQ but are far more striking at State level. The factors influencing performance are augmented by the pause in activity by some parts of the NDDRC as it waits to see where DDR will be situated and the wider SSR environment that emerges from the Addis negotiations and the current instability (Section 4).

190. In summary, all these factors contribute to a continuous erosion of 'institutional capacity'. Apart from the shape of the ICRS unit, much of the nascent systems and positive ways of working that emerged during Phase 1 have all but disappeared. Arguably the ICRS unit itself while functioning is indicative of what the IA identified as the problematic institutional arrangements and organisational structure in the NDDRC<sup>54</sup>: it is evidence of an organisation imbalance both in terms of activity and in terms of information flow which will need to be addressed in any future programming and through the proactive leadership of the NDDRC itself.

191. The MTR identified that M&E capacity building in Phase 1 was impeded by a lack of staffing in the NDDRC. Despite the implementation of M&E capacity building activities in Phase 2 a similar situation exists now in the Commission and so M&E capabilities appear at best, rudimentary.

192. The Project did not engage in capacity building activities around public information partly because this field was covered by other partner institutions to the NDDRC such as UNMISS and BICC. Therefore the public information and communications agenda was technically outside the scope of the reintegration pilot. The NDDRC and UNMISS PI departments though faced crucial funding challenges that significantly aggravated sensitisation efforts and outreach. Although the NDDRC in collaboration with its partners carried out sensitisation events in the assembly areas prior to the start of the DDR programme, not all potential DDR candidates could be reached (partly because of lack of cooperation on the side of

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<sup>54</sup>October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC.

the SPLA commanders, difficult access to the XCs' home communities and wounded heroes communication channels being by word of mouth, discrepancy between profiled caseload and actual programme beneficiaries). Due to this gap in sensitisation ex-combatants had different and sometimes overly high expectations for their reinsertion training. Although the DDR trainers were providing orientation to the XCs upon their arrival and additional sensitisation sessions in Mapel were carried out during the reinsertion period to counter lack of sensitisation, the information provided to XCs was incomplete and lacked coherence. General information about the DDR programme during reintegration was provided by the ICRS caseworkers but not in a structured manner (i.e. following the PI strategy). For future programme iterations it will therefore be crucial to better integrate sensitisation activities throughout reinsertion and reintegration programming (e.g. information dissemination about the DDR process should be closely linked to the vocational and life skills modules). Moreover, sufficient funding needs to be availed to cover the sensitisation campaigns for the targeted recipient needs.<sup>55</sup>

### **2.3 DDR Community Support Projects**

193. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the DDR Community Support component are:

- (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with high concentration of ex-combatants;
- (b) Improved access to clean water for target communities where water projects were implemented;
- (c) Learning regarding the effectiveness of Community Driven Development/Reconstruction (CDD/R) Projects in the DDR context.

194. At the time of the MTR no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects were reported due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19th, 2013. The timing for the community projects turned out to be a major factor influencing Project implementation. Due to the rainy season most selected sites were completely inaccessible for several months that not only negatively affected the pace of construction works but also hindered the IA from travelling to the communities to carry out community mobilizations. Seasonal changes in South Sudan thus have to be taken into account more thoroughly in planning future DDR phases.

195. Despite the mentioned implementation challenges the IA none the less managed to deliver the required outputs after a no cost extension was issued by the WB until end of May 2014. The Project highly benefited from the IA's experience with similar types of community based Projects.

196. The evaluation finds that there seems to be an increased understanding within NDDRC of what is necessary to facilitate implementation of CDD/R projects. Through collaboration with IOM on the community sub-component the NDDRC State offices engaged in varying degrees with the communities of return although the individual livelihood support was more in the centre of NDDRC's attention. Confusion only arose with regard to the bidding process as the NDDRC seemed not be aware that the Project had to follow IOM's procurement procedures and therefore suggested utilising the GoSS procurement policy. Through a very transparent bid analysis involving the relevant NDDRC departments this issue could be solved. However, future projects

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<sup>55</sup> See also NDDRC's internal lessons learned paper (December 2013).



should ensure that all actors are aware of the partners' respective policies and that knowledge about procurement procedures is widely spread within the organisations.

197. The community projects have brought a positive change for target communities. Although the final evaluation did not have a chance to appraise all 17 projects and only 2 sites were visited in WBS (water interventions/boreholes)<sup>56</sup>, the evaluation find that the interventions that were assessed are providing direct and clear benefits to the communities and appear to meet local needs and priorities. For example, one water Project in WBS provided more than 1050 people with clean water which exemplifies the strong impact the Project has on local health and development.

198. The objectives of the community support projects, in particularly the overall aim to promote peacebuilding in the pilot States and the goal to demonstrate NDDRC's commitment to the larger community, are overly ambitious given the relatively small size of the sub-component. Concluding from the field visits completed in the frame of the final evaluation it appears that the communities concerned were only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC. The lack of understanding in the community of the link between DDR and local development might be partly due to the small caseload with only some few ex-combatants resettling in certain areas, it puts into question the Project's aspiration to demonstrate NDDRC's commitment to the larger community. In future one possible way to go would be to increase the scale of the community interventions to ensure visibility and to distinguish the DDR Community Support Projects from other Projects implemented by different organizations in the same community. Instead of linking the community projects to the work of DDR Commission the Project would rather emphasise its peace dividend aspect and the fact that through the assimilation of ex-combatants the community receives additional benefits. Alternatively a coherent sister CDD programme separate from DDR could replace activities.

199. The final evaluation finds that the Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types. The focus on water interventions and market rehabilitation, which originated from the belief that these interventions are simple to implement, restricted the options that were presented to the communities hence minimizing their level of engagement. An exception was the completion of the Payam building in NBS that followed a purely community driven approach (the community requested the completion of the unfinished Payam office which was of high priority but outside the preferred project categories of water and marketplace improvements). The building was completed using local skilled and unskilled labourers from the community, an approach that reinforced the community's ownership of the project.

200. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees. However, as the MTR found, both the experience of IOM in previous projects in South Sudan (outside DDR which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these risks.

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<sup>56</sup>Sites that were visited in the frame of final evaluation: 1.) Nyikejo Village (Jur River County, Rochdog Payam, WBS); 2.) Nyinalel (Jur River County, Marial Bai Payam, WBS)

201. Although the evaluation did not use an impact evaluation to assess the impact of the DDR community projects on the target population, there is anecdotal evidence that the communities have little capacity to manage newly constructed infrastructural resources in the medium and long term. Although the IA delivered trainings to members of the water management committees and consequentially knowledge on infrastructure maintenance was imparted to the community, it remains questionable whether these skills will be utilised in future. Ideally, follow-up training or refresher courses in repair and maintenance would be needed to ensure sustainability of the training impact, as would access to spare parts.

202. The community members interviewed for this study all expressed concern that in case the water borehole breaks down the community will lack the necessary financial resources to purchase the needed spare parts. Instead of seeking sustainable and self-reliant solutions to this problem (such as structured savings for the pump installation), most interviewees stressed that they would rather look for assistance from the NDDRC or other government institutions. This exemplifies a strong aid dependency that puts the CDD/R projects at risk and also aggravates the implementation of any future community project of that kind.

#### **2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition**

203. As a pilot the Project must be orientated towards trialling systems and institutional capability, documenting learning and auctioning relevant learning.

204. The MTR found that by design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing and disseminating learning. The MTR identified that throughout design and implementation that the Bank TT had worked progressively with the NDDRC, the IAs and with key external stakeholders to emphasis the learning-orientation of the Project. The final evaluation finds that the Bank TT and IAs were consistent in their orientation towards learning as evidenced by the volume of learning content in IA reporting to the Bank identifying pertinent issues and tracking challenges and recommendations for future programming including in areas outside the purview of particular IAs but within their scope of operation.

205. Also the MTR identified that the NDDRC was eager to learn by doing but that logistical challenges and human capacity were limiting factors on the ability of the Commission to fully engage and implement learning. The MTR found that the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design. Critically, the NDDRC and the Project architects should reflect fully on the recommendations and reporting of all IAs including those further down the delivery chain particularly the Training Professional Dr. Guatam Raj Jain and the Trainers who worked during Phase 1 of the Livelihoods Support Component. In place of the now-cancelled evaluation of the Mapel TF and the programme implemented there the NDDRC should engage UN thought partners in a full review of the both the programmatic learning and strategic learning from the Project interrogating all assumptions of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility including that the appropriate way to design DDR in South Sudan is using the Transition Facility Approach. Any Phase 3 learning sessions should incorporate stakeholders from the wider South Sudan DDR programming environment.

206. Observing *programmatic learning pertaining to activities*, the final evaluation finds that the learning orientation of the Project persisted into Phase 2. IAs successfully improved field M&E to accurately track outputs and short-term outcomes and the NDDRC worked to collate and manage data from the field. It should be noted that data collection in such complex, fragile and insecure areas as those presented by the Project is highly challenging and often problematic. That

said at a programme level the data-collection by IAs and that of the NDDRC has some limitations. For both the IAs and the NDDRC data pertaining to outcomes particularly numbers of functional cooperatives/associations is not reliable. For the NDDRC data sharing and learning sharing within the NDDRC is limited. This appears partly to be a result of institutional imbalance and partly a result of disconnection between human systems in the Commission (which is perpetuated by resource challenges and lack of connectivity between HQ and State offices).

207. As identified in the MTR for learning to be useful it must be actioned. The Project has demonstrated how the NDDRC can implement a pilot reintegration project and it has tracked consistently the opportunities and challenges of the implementation. The question is how the NDDRC and the Project Architects will systematically reflect on programmatic learning; on strategic learning and on how the two interrelate. Critically the learning from the Project while largely programmatic also has relevance to the wider strategic context including the design of any future DDR programming, the necessity of aligning DDR and SSR, and critically ensuring transparent GoSS buy-in to that same DDR and SSR.

### 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

208. The evaluation finds that the Project has **satisfactorily** provided ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio-economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio-economic objective).

209. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed **highly satisfactorily** generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed **moderately satisfactorily** to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective).

210. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

211. At the time of final evaluation (end of Phase 2 of 3) the Project has made good progress towards meeting of its Project objectives and appears on course to meet its remaining objectives. The MTR documented how the project despite early implementation challenges had recovered to successfully implement the majority of activities in Phase 1 except those negatively affected by factors outside the control of the Project: activities in the Component Community Support Projects were affected by environmental issues and activities in the Component Institutional Capacity Building were affected by human capacity in the NDDRC.

212. The factors affecting the implementation and outcomes of the Pilot can be classified as: (i) those directly related to the Project design; (ii) those related to institutional capacity and arrangements, and (iii) those related to the external environment including the security, policy and donor environment

213. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows.

214. The factors **negatively** affecting the Project outcomes since the beginning of the pilot, some of which (as outlined below) have been addressed by the Project implementers are:

- (a) Limited institutional capacity of the NDDRC;
- (b) The external environment;
- (c) The external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants;
- (d) Data management regarding outcomes of Components Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains (addressed since the MTR);
- (e) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation (addressed since the MTR);
- (f) Quality of some outputs (addressed since the MTR).

215. The factors **positively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme (as per MTR);
- (b) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies (as per MTR);

- (c) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP (as per MTR) in cooperation with BICC;
- (d) Responsiveness and ability of IAs to become operational for Phase 2 in a short notice period;
- (e) Flexibility of IAs in reacting to a somewhat iterative project design (see point a previous paragraph);
- (f) Cooperation with line Ministries in the States.

**216. Design limitations such as internal coherence, timing and the use of delivery chains.**

The MTR found that in Phase 1 the implementation of the Project during the season when ex-combatants would normally tend their land negatively impacted on the achievement of outcomes relating to sustainable livelihoods by ex-combatants. However the timeframe for the Project implementation was largely outside the control of the key stakeholders other than the NDDRC as the Project was required to align with the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project that itself was poorly timed.

217. The external security environment heavily influenced the timing of Phase 2. The MTR found that the Project appeared to lack some internal coherence with a wide spread of activities matched in the Project documentation with a too-ambitious set of objectives. Similarly the MTR found that the use of delivery chains, particularly in the Component: Livelihood Supports compromised quality control and contributed to unnecessary challenges implementing training activities.

218. Some Phase 2 activities such as training under Component Livelihood Supports do not present a coherent ‘flow’ or logic from the Phase 1 activities. The decision to capacity build ICRC caseworkers through TOT went against the advice of the lead trainer and designer of the training curriculum and missed the opportunity to capitalise on progress made with independent consultants in the States in Phase 1. The decision to use Phase 2 to compensate for shortcomings in the training given by UNESCO in the Mapel TF (training that is programmatically unconnected to the Project) appears out of sync with the intention of a Pilot and rather appears to be compensating for the performance of other agencies in Phase 1. However that the supplementary training was delivered through local vocational institutions rather than through trainers in a Transition Facility is an important point proving that the capacity to train ex-combatants exists in the vocational training sector.

219. In Phase 2 the IA (UNICON) successfully addressed issues relating to the use of delivery chains to deliver training to ex-combatants experienced during Phase 1. In Phase 2 the IA showed a much better understood the environment and the challenges to implementation and expertly dealt with challenges encountered during implementation.

**220. Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation.** The IAs addressed all effectiveness and implementation delays experienced in Phase 1 and documented in the MTR (effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there). UNICON did not experience any of the effectiveness and implementation challenges it encountered in Phase 1. The IOM exceeded its delivery targets and completed all activities on time.

221. The **external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants.** The Project documentation identifies that along with testing delivery systems the Livelihood Support component will

“provide livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success.”<sup>57</sup> This outcome of ‘long-term livelihood success’ is greatly influenced by the external environment but also by the reality of the local markets into which ex-combatants are integrated.

222. The training given to ex-combatants by the Project is closely tied to the skills imparted during the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel. While the Project can train ex-combatants in cooperatives and entrepreneurship any outcome from that training is limited by the vocation in which the ex-combatant was trained, the quality of that training and the demand for those newly acquired vocational skills in the market place. With some vocational training it is clear that there is little obvious demand for cooperatives: for example, welding. In the case of welding the Wau ex-combatant welders’ cooperative that was formed during Phase 1 (and had land granted to it from the Ministry of Land and Physical Infrastructure via the NDDRC State office and was given a generator and plasma torch); at the time of the final evaluation this cooperative of six ex-combatants had dissolved. One ex-combatant remained in an unpaid apprenticeship with a local civilian welder. The fate of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative illustrates a clear underlying weakness in the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project which negatively impacts on the outcomes of the Project: the vocational training given to ex-combatants is based on a very general and macro-level UN-led assessment of market opportunities.

223. Unfortunately the UN has not conducted a final evaluation of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project so the effectiveness of the vocational training programme has not been measured however; from the observable evidence the main form of cooperative or associative working that is yielding returns for ex-combatants appears to be for those trained in agriculture, not the other vocational skills. This reflects a critical challenge that is universal in vocational training programmes in DDR: how the vocational training aligns with the absorptive capacity of the market.

224. Activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component encouraging the formation of cooperatives have faced other challenges. One such challenge has been the lack of clarity around the officially acceptable definition of a cooperative. In South Sudan the required number of members to register as a cooperative is 21 people: which even within the agriculture sector is a limiting factor. In reality the line ministry at the State accepts a lower number of members when recognising a cooperative but there is no set definition. Consequently the line ministry in Western Bahr al Ghazal accepted six members to register the Wau ex-combatant welding cooperative but such decisions appear to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Consequently a lack of clarity exists around how to advise ex-combatants and community members to form cooperatives.

225. The **lack of standardisation and systems** at ministerial level and in the NDDRC presents a risk factor to the NDDRC. In the case of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperatives the NDDRC state office managed to secure a grant of a parcel of land from the line ministry to enable the cooperative develop a premises or site for trading. However as with the granting of timber to the Wau carpentry cooperative (a cooperative which at the time of the final evaluation was one person as the others were reported by the remaining members as absent tending their lands) the granting of land has been on a case-by-case basis and highly reliant on the industry of the NDDRC staff thus leading to the possibility of the NDDRC being accused of bias when one cooperative gets a grant of an asset and another does not.

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<sup>57</sup> September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25.

226. With the dissolution of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative the NDDRC is faced with the unusual situation of a land title granted to a non-existent cooperative without any clear systematic way of managing that land or the grant of land itself. In such a situation the NDDRC is faced with a reputation risk where state offices can be perceived as acquiring land for itself. Regardless of such reputational risk, purely for the harmonization of systems and to accurately gauge how to scale such important support from the line ministries it is imperative that the NDDRC formalises all the relevant definitions and procedures around cooperatives and granting of assets or resources by line ministries.

227. **Quality of outputs.** As documented in the MTR, at the end of Phase 1 in the Component Institutional Capacity Building the Project encountered poor quality baseline reporting and M&E manual from ASI/IR. The MTR noted how the M&E manual produced by ASI/IR was not completed to the highest standard so during Phase 2 and the Project employed South-South exchanges to address short fallings in the M&E activities of the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component. The outputs of the Phase 2 activities have included a good quality draft M&E manual however the NDDRC still does not have an M&E unit or the capacity to manage high quality M&E so there is no evidence of outcomes from the M&E activities.

228. The **institutional limitations** encountered by the M&E activities reflect a larger challenge encountered by the Project and which faces any future DDR programming. As documented during Phase 1 by the IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component the NDDRC is hamstrung by an unbalanced organisational structure and staffing challenges. Despite the creation of the PMU by the Project as an attempt to balance information sharing and engender engagement of staff in the NDDRC by the close of Phase 2, a limited number of staff have been involved in the implementation. The IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component warned that the creation of the PMU is a useful mechanism to ensure project implementation but it avoids the greater need to reform the organisational structure of the NDDRC and ensure that staff of all levels is engaged. The final evaluation finds that this finding remains salient. Furthermore the tendency to concentrate capacity building in the ICRS unit is likely to have further imbalanced the organisational structure of the NDDRC.

229. The negative impacts of the lopsided organizational structure are exacerbated by staff churn and the difficulties faced by the NDDRC to meet basic operational costs and salaries under austerity budgets and in the current security environment. A further exacerbating factor is the loss of logistical support as a result of the UN removing DDR from the current mandate of the organisation: in the States UN-supplied generators are locked and the NDDRC can no longer work through the UN to travel from Juba to the State offices.

230. The factors in the **external environment** negatively influencing the outcomes of the Project were as follows:

- (a) Breakdown in security and postponement of the beginning of Phase 2 until May 2014;
- (b) Loss of DDR in the UN mandate;
- (c) Refocusing of donor strategy on humanitarian response;
- (d) Continued lack of active support of the GoSS for DDR.

231. All of these factors are highly relevant to the design of any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

232. The breakdown in the security environment in December 2013 and the resulting postponement of Phase 2 had the potential to derail the remaining Phases of the Project. Arguably the most observable negative impact of the postponement has been on internal systems and capacity in the NDDRC as built during the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component and as created by the Project implementation structures (PMU, SPMU, SC).

233. In Phase 2 much of the nascent systems and ways of working that emerged from activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component have disappeared. This is both at HQ and at State level where mentors worked with the NDDRC to build capacity. Structures such as the PMU and SPMUs have not been functional during Phase 2 and so as outlined above, work to implement the Project has become concentrated in a small number of staff in the NDDRC.

234. Despite this it is clear that some cumulative outcomes of the experience of the Project remain. There is an increased sense of empowerment that, if offered the opportunity, the NDDRC can lead DDR programming. Some state-level staff show a clear increase in capacity, drive and innovation but the evaluation cannot conclude that this is pervasive as only one State was visited by the team.

235. The MTR found that prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA. The final evaluation finds that as the Project draws to a close the external environment is highly challenging to securing many of the outcomes from the Project.

236. Clearly the ongoing conflict in the country is dynamic however it is unclear how or where DDR fits in any future scenario. It can be argued that the failure of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel to secure the appropriate caseload of ex-combatants for DDR reflected a lack of buy-in by the GoSS and the SPLA. While progress was made to secure the outward support of the GoSS such as through ministerial visits to Mapel during graduation it remains the case that South Sudan is in conflict with widespread recruitment into all factions of the SPLA and in that context the real outcome of the Project: to show national leadership by the NDDRC and to visibly build the capacity of the NDDRC to lead future DDR programming is threatened. Without highest-level buy-in to both DDR and SSR any capacity built in the NDDRC will gradually dissipate as it 'waits' for direction to come from GoSS on DDR or SSR. Consequently it is critical that the NDDRC appropriately strategize about future DDR and that other stakeholders in particularly the donor community engage the parties in the Addis talks on DDR and SSR.

237. This last point is critical: engagement on future DDR and SSR programming must come at all levels in order to create any possibility on future DDR programming. Furthermore, the NDDRC must not sit idle, waiting for any decision but rather should be supported by donors and the GoSS at the least to prepare a properly designed, considered and strategized DDR/SSR programme that takes full cognisance of the heterogeneity of groups that may undergo DDR. The NDDRC and its critical thought partners (including the UN, ideally with a renewed DDR mandate even if only in limited fashion) should consider all aspects not just of the Project but also of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel and fully interrogate the assumptions, modalities and efficiencies of what has been implemented.

238. Urgently the NDDRC, its donors and the GoSS must strategize around the wholesale refocusing of the donor community on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and find space for the preparatory strategic and programmatic work for further DDR-SSR programming. Critically



there must be highest level buy-in in all parties to the Addis talks to the relevance and potential of DDR-SSR in South Sudan.

239. While there were challenges arising from the kind of vocational training given to ex-combatants in Mapel overall the implementation and outcomes of the Project were positively influenced by **the fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Reintegration programme**. As noted in the MTR in Phase 1 the design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project.

240. The **strong relationship** between the Bank TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO helped the Bank TT approach the Project in a holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. In Phase 2 this is less relevant as the Project was attempting to build on its own outputs from Phase 1.

241. Throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 a critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the **intensive support of the Bank TT and BICC** and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank's presence on the ground in Phase 1 and 2, and BICC's presence on the ground in Phase 1 has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC.

242. The **ability of IAs in Phase 2: UNICON and IOM, to become effective in the field at short notice** have proven crucial to the implementation of the Project. For UNICON overcoming and learning from implementation delays in Phase 1 greatly improved their performance and the IA had significant work to manage to redesign training curriculum for Phase 2. For IOM, familiarity with the activities and with the environment proved instrumental in the timely implementation of activities.

243. As noted above **cooperation with line ministries** has yielded results at State level including granting land and materials (teak and seeds for example) to some cooperatives. The project targeted line ministries by including agricultural extension workers in training implemented as part of the Livelihood Support component. In the case of the involvement of line ministries granting land and materials it is important that the NDDRC in cooperation with the various ministries develop guidelines and criteria for such assistance. At the time of the final evaluation it is not clear how including agricultural extension workers in livelihoods training affects how they in turn work with ex-combatants and the communities particularly given the extreme resource challenges for workers in the line ministry. However it is clear that this inclusion is an important step to building positive working relationships with the ministries that could yield good outcomes in the future.

### **3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

244. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. It is noted that at the time of the final evaluation project documentation is being redrafted to align with the learning from Phase 1 and the MTR. The available project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively

affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, for both Phase 1 and 2 the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of good quality and intensive.

### **3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation**

245. Overall, the identification of risks has been **satisfactory** however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner.

246. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Project has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project. Phase 3 of the Project should clearly orientate itself to actioning two distinct categories of learning: (i) learning pertaining to project design and implementation and (ii) learning pertaining to strategic engagement in SSR and DDR for the future.

### **3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank**

247. As per the MTR the final evaluation finds that the Project M&E framework is a high-level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs:

- (a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured.
- (b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned.
- (c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction.

248. The MTR findings around the efficacy of the Scorecard indicators, the over-ambitious nature of project objectives and the lack of indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a pilot project: that is, one orientated towards trialling, learning and innovation were not acted upon. Rather Bank M&E consisted of BTOR/AM, improved IA reporting and close monitoring of activities on the ground. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on –the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered.

249. The evaluation re-affirms the finding of the MTR that the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies.

### **3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance**

250. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme:

- (a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning.

251. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Project has been compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011.

252. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the Bank TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary.

253. The principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity should be front and centre in any strategizing by the NDDRC regarding future programming. They should guide thinking that explicitly addressed the heterogeneity of the ex-combatants that may be targeted in any future DDR programme. Specifically, the logic that there is one army (SPLM) and that that army is an army of returned victorious heroes must be deconstructed as plainly that is not the current reality. The risks of the GoSS strategy of incorporating rebel groups into the national army as a modality of SSR-DDR must be fully interrogated.

## 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR

### 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design

254. The Project's objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS (now closed) and ISN FY 13-14.

255. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11<sup>th</sup> March, 2012).

256. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2.

257. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

258. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

259. The Project was interlinked with the MDTF-SS in three ways:

- (a) The Project's focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects.
- (b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS's funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programmes for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US\$ 36.4 million.
- (c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component.

### 4.2 Efficiency

260. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory to *satisfactory* because of: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant.

261. Disbursement to IPs has been as scheduled. In Phase 1 ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US\$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US\$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US\$920,200. The World Bank disbursed the fifth payment on 24th March 2014 on acceptance of final Phase 1 report. In total at the time of final evaluation eight of nine payments have been disbursed on time (US\$ 1,482,057 of scheduled US\$1,531,564). The final payment of US\$49,507 is due on approval of final report that was submitted in draft form during the week ending 5<sup>th</sup> September 2014. In Phase 1 IOM had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US\$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US\$450,000). All payments were disbursed on time in Phase 2. At the time of the final evaluation the total disbursements to IAs has been US\$2,501,070 of US\$2,451,563.

262. The MTR noted that while recognizing that if the Project leads to future programming there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, in Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US\$2,759.<sup>58</sup> In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were target with Project activities (5 had died in the interim period between Phase 1 and Phase 2). Of the 285 targeted 269 received services from the Project. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex-combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant is US\$ 3,750.

263. The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US\$1,817<sup>59</sup>; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US\$2,065<sup>60</sup> and Burundi \$2,775<sup>61</sup>. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made?

### 4.3 Effectiveness

264. Effectiveness is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above.

265. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2.

266. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood

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58 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs.

<sup>59</sup>ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp. 28-29.

<sup>60</sup>ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp. 19-22, 31-43.

<sup>61</sup>ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28.

Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs.

267. The Community Support Programme was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.<sup>62</sup>

#### **4.4 Potential to Grow to Scale and Sustainability**

268. The Pilot reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design's effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be replicated and scaled in future programming:

- (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system on HQ and State level;
- (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff;
- (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff;
- (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities
- (e) Community support projects.

269. The final evaluation concludes that all components have the potential to be replicated and scaled up (at least in part) in future DDR programming. However, in order to be sustainable and effective some will require some additional inputs (like the M&E system) and/or more substantial revision.

270. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevant reintegration programme) of placing the NDDRC front and centre and emphasising national ownership. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective, efficient and relevant national DDR programme. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its role in Reintegration programming in DDR.

271. The NDDRC has significantly strengthened its leadership position in the course of the Pilot Programme and has assumed a critical role in coordination and project management. Since the beginning of the NDDRP the Commission has been actively involved in the strategic development of the Programme and its sub-components. Together with the UN, the SPLA, line ministries and other DDR stakeholders the Commission has drafted and finalized a National DDR Policy, Strategic Plan and National Programme Document that gave critical guidance for the implementation of the reinsertion and reintegration sub-component. A Joint Operations Coordination Committee that has been chaired by the Commission was set up to control, coordinate and monitor reinsertion activities in the transition facility in Mapel which indicates the

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<sup>62</sup> The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US\$ 25,000 when compared to US\$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps.

high level of national ownership. Although the UN took a lead in the implementation of reinsertion activities, the Commission clearly benefited from its active involvement, was able to build its capacity and played a key role in oversight. The final evaluation finds similar trends for the reintegration sub-component. The Project Management Unit (PMU) put the Commission in the centre of the project and through the ICRS department the NDDRC gained significant experience on state level in managing livelihood assistance. Important lessons have been learned that will allow modification of the DDR programme prior to replication country-wide.

272. Despite these positive trends and a visible and growing involvement of many NDDRC departments in implementation and oversight there were a range of factors that negatively influenced the extent to which the NDDRC was capacitated to assume its leadership role thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the Project. Due to financial constraints of NDDRC some of the key positions on national and state level were not filled and as a consequence certain systems and departments that the Project had planned to leave at its closure (like the State PMUs and the M&E department). Due to the imbalance in NDDRC's organisational structure (already outlined in chapter 2.2) some departments were side-lined resulting in difficulties for the IA to leave an independently functional management team that is able to run reintegration programming in future DDR tranches. Not least the lack of support from the GoSS (e.g. the delay in the establishment of the National DDR Council, lack of interest in DDR on the side of the line ministries) has exacerbated the Commission's efforts to guide and implement the Project in a fast and efficient manner.

273. Furthermore, a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was assumed that any successes thus far would hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of Reintegration programming, however, with the outbreak of hostilities mid-December 2013 and the changes in the internal security environment any progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming was damaged.

274. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. The design of the Training sub-component in the Livelihoods Support window emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The unplanned strategy of utilizing TOT methodology had the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The TOT of the agricultural extension workers in Phase 2 is a positive example that illustrates how the DDR Programme can build on domestic human resources and utilize them for training ex-combatants.

275. The principle of including community members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and approaches to cooperative working practices. Due to lack of a Community Tracer Survey the final evaluation cannot assess whether the inclusion of community members into the trainings supported social inclusion and mitigation of conflicts but what can be noted is that there is a strong community involvement in livelihood activities involving ex-combatants (for instance, the 17 working groups that have been listed so far involve 68 ex-combatants and 442 community members).

276. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual, collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission. Through the chosen approach the Pilot Project has triggered some learning on the side of the Commission especially in the field of project management and oversight. Partly stemming from external factors such as the outbreak of the conflict the capacity building stopped at a time when the Commission was just about to utilise the acquired skills in actual programming. Due to the imminent halt in DDR activities after closure of the Project the nascent capacities can most likely not be sustained over time.

277. The ICRS System that is one element of the Capacity Building component is currently inactive. Since the system is only as useful as the data it contains, the ICRS will require continuous updates otherwise its sustainability will be highly questionable. In terms of replicability the ICRS system would be ready to be utilised in future programming but would require some data adjustments.

278. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability of the infrastructure to be provided through working with communities to create community water committees and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing of boreholes and pumps. However, the final evaluation finds that the infrastructural installations are unlikely to be as sustainable due to quality of outputs. Experience not only from South Sudan but also other countries shows that success rates of maintaining hand pumps are generally low. Solar powered higher volume water pumps, for instance, would have a longer lifespan than the infrastructure that were installed in the Pilot thus mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare parts.

279. Although the Project attempted to enable some community members to independently manage and maintain the water installations, it is uncertain to what extent the communities indeed follow the suggested approach (this might vary from community to community). According to the IA this is not only a particular problem for Projects in South Sudan but also in other countries. As a way out and in order to ensure sustainability of water installations, future water community projects should ensure that the community agrees to generate income e.g. through water charges prior to the Project start. To ensure that this conditionality does not compromise on ownership the Project has to grant enough time for community sensitisations.

280. In view of the lack of a community tracer study it is also not clear whether the Community Projects have helped to foster trust between the ex-combatants and the rest of their communities (as stated in the Project objectives). Given the small number of returning ex-combatants, their limited engagement in the IA's community mobilizations and the relatively small scale of the Projects the impact will most likely be much lower than expected.

281. Further complicating factors negatively impacting on the sustainability of the DDR community projects are the manifold social problems within the communities concerned. Particularly alcohol abuse appears to be a challenge in the rural areas as it erodes the social fabric and significantly hinders the development of coping strategies of the community. For any CDD/R project such negative social influences are a significant risk that can jeopardise project success and should hence be thoroughly considered in project design and implementation.



#### **4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

282. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19<sup>th</sup> 2013. Peace negotiations are scheduled to recommence in Addis, Ethiopia on September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014 but the security situation remains highly unstable and a humanitarian crisis is unfolding.

283. During the MTR it was identified that in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. Given the ongoing mobilization of civilians and violent conflict in the country it seems inappropriate to initiate any planning for subsequent DDR phases without radically revising the current DDR approach (and here especially a closer alignment with other SSR activities). Since most donors, as a reaction to the crisis, have channelled their funding and efforts to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, there appears to be very little openness to consider any short to medium term funding for DDR/SSR activities. For the Project this is a severe backlash as the momentum is likely to be lost. There will be a gap in programming which puts at risk the progress that has been made so far. Especially with regard to the capacity building that has been done a lot of investment will most likely vanish.

## 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance

### 5.1 Bank Performance

The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how it performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank's role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.<sup>63</sup>

#### (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

##### Rating: Satisfactory

284. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SSR-DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership.

285. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex.

286. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI and IOM) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISS. The TDRP's own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC's interaction with those same agencies.

287. The TDRP's role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP's knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC's self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR

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<sup>63</sup>The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project.

The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP. **Bank-executed Activities** consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross-border and cross-cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender. **Trust Fund Management and Administration:** establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects.

and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme.

288. The Bank was appropriately reactive to the deteriorating security situation that forced the postponement of Phase 2 of the Project. However, the re-start of the Project in May 2014 was at very short notice affecting the preparation by IAs to implement altered project activities such as changing the livelihoods training from building on the capacity built with independent trainers in Phase 1 to focusing on the ICRS team in the NDDRC. Similarly the Bank-led ex-combatant satisfaction survey (in place of Tracer and Community Dynamics surveys originally planned) was designed with limited preparatory time.

289. While the IA and the Bank implemented these activities effectively there should be more time to reflect on changed design of activities and the reasons for this. Also, the Bank should afford itself more time to plan such M&E activities as the ex-combatant satisfaction survey. Often in programming in FCS it is generally accepted that in emergency contexts (such as that in South Sudan) and because of the context, responsive projects (such as this Project) cannot be afforded adequate preparation time or space for reflection. This does not have to be the case. Given that Phase 2 was re-started in a hurried fashion it is important for the Bank with the NDDRC to give adequate space to Phase 3 (learning) and laying the foundation for effective and efficient strategizing about potential future SSR-DDR programming in South Sudan.

#### **(b) Quality of Supervision**

##### **Rating: Satisfactory**

290. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance.

291. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank's own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues.

292. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs.

293. The final evaluation notes that recommendations around Bank project M&E have not been implemented and recommends that in future pilot interventions the recommendations of the MTR on project M&E are given due consideration.

#### **5.2 NDDRC Performance**

294. The NDDRC's role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP

and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made.

295. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself it identified as being unable to alter. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level. This situation has been further aggravated by the change in the UNMISS mandate and the consequent withdrawal of the mission from any DDR related activities. The NDDRC State offices that were formerly provided with fuel and communication systems through UNMISS are now largely inactive due to lack of electricity and internet services.

296. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commissions alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU. This approach of finding practical workaround significantly helped NDDRC to coordinate between its respective departments and to take the lead in implementation of reintegration activities in close collaboration with the IAs. The PMU, however, also created a parallel structure to the existing institutional arrangements thereby unintentionally marginalizing some NDDRC staff during the Project. The marginalization occurred both at strategic and at operational levels. In order to avoid such imbalances in future iterations it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations.

297. The ICRS department has strongly benefited from the Capacity Development activities throughout the Pilot Project and has played an outstanding role in the implementation of the reintegration sub-component. Taking into account that the ICRS department has been built from scratch the achievements are substantial. The ICRS caseworkers have gained significant experience in the support of ex-combatants which enables them to attend to programme beneficiaries throughout the whole DDR process (registration, data capture, follow-up and referral). Because of the involvement of the ICRS unit in extension work and training in Phase 2 the caseworkers are now also better capacitated to advice ex-combatants on socio-economic opportunities than at the Project start. As the database itself is not operative due to lack of connectivity on State level, and the financial restrictions and withdrawal of material support through UNMISS took effect before the system could be fully rolled out, ICRS has not been tested in its final version in day-to-day operations.

298. Over the course of the pilot NDDRC closely engaged with various donors to attract interest and to ensure funding for subsequent pilot phases. It was assumed that through the gains made for ex-combatants in Mapel one would also be able to start DDR operations in two more locations (Torit and Bor). From the beginning donor dialogue turned out to be very challenging due to the negative perceptions of DDR in South Sudan resulting from the CPA-DDR programme. Moreover donors were unclear about how the DDR pilot in Mapel would be replicated in other locations given that NDDRC envisioned different institutional setups for the implementation of pilot activities in Greater Equatoria and Greater Upper Nile.

299. NDDRC had a productive collaboration with the involved UN agencies. Particularly around operations in Mapel NDDRC closely liaised with UNMISS and UNESCO on national and State level. Through the interaction with the UN the Commission sought to learn and build its own capacities while ensuring that the programme followed a national strategic vision. As a result of NDDRC's challenging financial situation the focus of the interaction with UNMISS often shifted towards logistical support which was provided by the mission to NDDRC. Against this background the Commission did not always fully capitalize on the mission's DDR planning capacity. At the time of the final evaluation, however, the NDDRC positively acknowledges the strong technical, logistical and financial support that was provided by the UN in the pilot process and appears to be determined to continue the collaboration despite the fact that DDR has been removed from the UNMISS mandate.

300. Over the course of the Pilot Programme the NDDRC has assumed a strong leadership role which allowed the Commission to give strategic guidance and to coordinate the various stakeholders involved. However, the Commission would have been even more effective in taking the lead on DDR if it had received more political backing from GoSS. For instance, the delay in government contribution to the programme retarded activities and procurement of items needed to run operations Mapel. The DDR Council, which was supposed to provide political guidance was established late and did not meet as often as required. It hence did not give sufficient strategic guidance and also did not succeed in harmonizing between different national stakeholders in DDR issues. Because of this lack of harmonization on DDR Council level the NDDRC faced severe challenges in aligning its Project activities with other national programmes as envisioned in the National DDR Strategic Plan. Although the line ministries were requested by the DDR Council to provide a comprehensive and casted programme indicating how each Ministry would support implementation of the wider DDR Programme, the alignment process turned out to be very slow and cumbersome.

301. NDDRC's cooperation with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), particularly the Directorate of Veterans Affairs, and the SPLA intensified throughout the pilot process leading to close interactions between the institutions. However, due to inadequate political guidance through the DDR Council and the seemingly limited confidence and buy-in of the MOD and the SPLA into the programme, NDDRC's efforts to implement the DDR pilot were significantly undermined, as evidenced by the limited number of DDR candidates that were assigned to go through the DDR pilot process (only 290 candidates were selected instead of the targeted number of 500 people).

### **5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners**

302. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM.

#### **5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research**

303. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics

surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project's overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI's reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process.

304. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality.

305. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity.

### **5.3.2. UNICON**

306. Initially in Phase 1 UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation.

307. In Phase 1 UNICON's reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub-components.

308. In Phase 2 UNICON actioned its own institutional learning from Phase 1 from all aspects of Component design and implementation as well as learning on general operational issues in South Sudan. The IA improved on already strong M&E emphasising actionable learning for both the current Project and future DDR programming in South Sudan.

309. Throughout the Project communications from UNICON have been succinct and comprehensive.

### 5.3.3. IOM

310. Generally, IOM engaged well with the Project and exceed delivery.

311. In Phase 1 IOM faced significant implementation challenges mostly because of access restrictions to the selected Project sites because of the rainy season and the challenging road network in South Sudan. Despite these delays in construction and the Project suspension due to the outbreak of hostilities IOM in the end delivered the component in an effective manner and was able to successfully deliver (and even exceed) the project outputs within the agreed timeframe.

312. Monitoring and reporting on activities and outputs were concise, intelligible and on time. The collaboration with the NDDRC on national and State level was described by the involved stakeholders as constructive but was at times hampered by NDDRC's challenging recourse situation which aggravated joint supervision of the community projects.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Although the Project provided funds in the IOM budget for allocation to the DDR Commission for supervision of community support projects and other project related expenses, these funds were only transferred to the NDDRC at a very late stage of the Project. In the beginning IOM was not provided with sufficient information on how to administer the funds to the Commission (see 2014. IOM *Final Project Report*).

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

313. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component. Where relevant mention is made of whether or to what extent recommendations from the MTR have been acted upon.

### 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment

314. **Conclusion 1.** The success of the Project as a pilot testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment.

315. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear.

316. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme).

317. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical to the success of the Project. It observed that the suspension of the project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum has been lost however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan.

318. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation.

319. Timing will be essential for future DDR programming: The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attending to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme.

320. **Recommendation 1a.** The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around



the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed.

321. **Recommendation 1b.** The NDDRC is supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (including stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, and civil society representatives) to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled.

322. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions.

323. Despite the progress being made through the Project DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR through dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development or infrastructure projects in communities. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency.

324. **Recommendation 1c.** In the short to medium term specifically the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat that has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes.

325. **Recommendation 1d.** In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics.

326. **Conclusion 2.** The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR.

327. **Recommendation 2.** While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.<sup>65</sup>

328. **Conclusion 3.** UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013<sup>66</sup> but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold.

329. **Recommendation 3.** The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned<sup>67</sup> which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.

330. **Conclusion 4.** The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources.

331. **Recommendation 4.** The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR (above, conclusion 4) and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project.

## 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes

332. **Conclusion 5.** The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission.

333. **Recommendation 5.** The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project.

334. **Conclusion 6.** Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF.

335. **Recommendation 6.** In reality reinsertion and reintegration programming are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations.

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<sup>65</sup> The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past.

<sup>66</sup> See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013.

<sup>67</sup> An internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis.

336. **Conclusion 7.** The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

337. **Recommendation 7.** The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming.

338. **Conclusion 8.** The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

339. **Recommendation 8.** The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation.

340. **Conclusion 9.** The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion.

341. **Recommendation 9.** The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future.

342. **Conclusion 10.** The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.

343. **Recommendation 10.** When estimating the impact on future programming economies of scale should be considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities

344. **Conclusion 11.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.

345. **Recommendation 11.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any 'inclusive enough coalition' strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design.

346. **Conclusion 12.** The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC.

347. **Recommendation 12.** In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed.

348. **Conclusion 13.** The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.

349. **Recommendation 13.** The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2).

350. **Conclusion 14.** The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

351. **Recommendation 14.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

352. **Conclusion 15.** The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

353. **Recommendation 15.** The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

354. **Conclusion 16.** As a result of the fairly loose design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission's cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised.

355. **Recommendation 16.** In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State

Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex-combatants).

356. **Conclusion 17.** The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC.

357. **Recommendation 17.** Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment.

358. **Conclusion 18.** A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel.

359. **Recommendation 18.** In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. The same toolkits that will be provided to XCs should also be utilised in the vocational trainings.

360. **Conclusion 19.** A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation.

361. **Recommendation 19.** In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan.

362. **Conclusion 20.** A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the pilot) including e.g. the lack of proper market analysis for the vocational skills training.

363. **Recommendation 20.** Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme.

364. **Conclusion 21.** Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative)

365. **Recommendation 21.** For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to

receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC.

366. **Conclusion 22.** Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC.

367. **Recommendation 22.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend. However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component.

368. **Conclusion 23.** The Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types.

369. **Recommendation 23.** Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation.

## Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

**Table 3. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs (Final as of September 9<sup>th</sup> 2014)**

NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs					
	<b>INITIAL BUDGET</b>	<b>Phase 1 TOTAL COMMITTED</b>	<b>Phase 2 TOTAL COMMITTED</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Difference</b>
Livelihoods Support	\$1,200,000	\$800,200	\$287,282	\$1,087,482	\$112,518
<i>Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings</i>		\$164,500	\$0	\$164,500	
<i>Livelihoods Start-Up Kits</i>		\$323,100	\$0	\$323,100	
<i>State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings</i>		\$312,600	\$146,433	\$459,033	
<i>Technical Skills Extension-Agricultural extension visits</i>			\$48,417	\$48,417	
<i>Technical Skills Extension-Vocational expert visits</i>			\$14,247	\$14,247	
<i>Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings</i>			\$63,547	\$63,547	
<i>Assistance in accessing available government services</i>			\$14,638	\$14,638	
Community Support Projects	\$400,000	\$155,750	\$294,250	\$450,000	-\$50,000
Capacity Building and Monitoring & Evaluation	\$660,000	\$519,506	\$247,525	\$767,031	-\$107,031
<i>Mentoring/Capacity Building</i>		\$442,836	\$84,519	\$527,355	
<i>Government employee Training of Trainers</i>			\$117,855	\$117,855	
<i>M&amp;E Surveys</i>		\$76,670	\$45,151	\$121,821	
NDDRC Participation Funds	\$240,000	\$120,000	\$120,000	\$240,000	\$0
Evaluations	\$70,000	\$28,269	\$0	\$28,269	\$41,731
Contingency	\$81,711		\$78,929	\$78,929	\$2,782
<i>Juba Ex-combatant and Crime Survey</i>			\$76,540		
<i>Final transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC</i>			\$2,389		
<b>TOTAL ALL</b>	<b>\$2,651,711</b>	<b>\$1,623,725</b>	<b>\$1,027,986</b>	<b>\$2,651,711</b>	<b>\$0</b>

## Annex 2. Documents Reviewed

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## **Annex 3. Consultations**

### **NDDRC**

William Deng Deng (Chairperson)  
Majur Mayor Machar (Deputy Chairperson)  
Obwaha Claude Akasha (Ag Director General for Operations)  
Rev. Saturnino Ladu (Director of Reintegration)  
Samuel Juma Yerimia (Director of Programmes)  
Rosa Weet (Gender Advisor)  
Peter Garang Ngor (Procurement and Logistics Coordinator)  
Kuot Kuot Deng (Senior IT Officer)  
Chan Moses Awuol (ICRS Manager)  
William Tong Uruan (State Coordinator)  
John Alier (ICRS Caseworker, WBGS)  
Francis Nyibang John (M&E Officer, WBGS)  
ICRS Caseworkers (x4 as Focus Group)  
Isaac Mabor (M&E Officer)  
Nathaniel Majok Deng (AG Finance Coordinator)  
Angelo Wani (Assistant Finance Coordinator)

### **Other National Actors**

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Agricultural Extension Workers WBGS (x2 as Focus Group)  
Wau Vocational Training Centre (Director)

### **UN Partners**

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Salah Khaled (Head of Office and UNESCO Representative to South Sudan)

### **World Bank and KfW**

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Alexandra Burrall Jung (TDRP)  
Kathrin Kästle (KfW)



## **BICC**

Ada Hakobyan (BICC)

Wolf Christian Paes (BICC)

## **Implementing Partners and Consultants**

Sergey Burnaev (UNICON)

Matt Huber (IOM)

Adeel Zafar (IT Consultant)

GuatamRaj Gain (Training Consultant)

## **Donor representatives**

Johannes Sperrfechter (German Embassy, Deputy Head of Mission/Head of Development Cooperation)

## **Community Consultations**

## Annex 4: Methodological Note

The external final evaluation used a standard methodology of: (i) comprehensive document review; (ii) qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs); (iii) qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants (FGDs) as well as with some staff of the NDDRC, (iv) ongoing data triangulation with emerging reporting from the NDDRC, the TDRP and the IAs involved in implementation.

Fieldwork for the evaluation took place between 11<sup>th</sup> August and 29<sup>th</sup> August 2014 with site visits to Juba (Central Equatoria State) and Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal State) South Sudan. In Jur River County two community projects were visited in Roch Rochdog Payam and Marial Bai Payam where FGDs were held with community members and KIIs with community leaders. Installation of hand pumps and drilled boreholes were visually confirmed in both locations but an expert technical assessment of the infrastructure was not undertaken.

The evaluation is built upon the MTR (November 2013 to February 2014). The MTR provides one pillar of the analytical framework informing consultations and analysis with project documentation (original and revised and including the ex-combatant satisfaction survey) and IA reporting constituting the other pillar. Triangulation of the analytical framework with data compiled during the field phase and in subsequent KIIs was completed by 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2014. The format of the MTR report provides the format for the final evaluation. The final evaluation should be read in conjunction with the MTR.

Limitations encountered during the inception phase of the evaluation were as follows:

- (a) Logistical: the lack of availability of UN flights due to how the UN mandate no longer includes DDR and consequently that the Commission is no longer able to access flights through the UN;
- (b) Availability of some key informants, mainly the IOM where the two informants are currently on leave;
- (c) Unclear security situation in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes State: although the situation in and around Wau town (risk level 3) appears to be stable the GIZ risk management office (RMO) advised the consultants to minimize road movements and to restrict the planned consultations to Wau town. Regarding the security situation in Rumbek and its surrounding Payams the consultants received contradictory information from various sources. Due to the higher risk level in the State (level 4) the GIZ RMO likewise advised to limit activities to Rumbek centre. Since the situation in Lakes State remains unstable, further and sudden outbreaks of violence are possible which might endanger the planned mission to Rumbek. The consultants will continue to monitor the situation by closely liaising with the UNMISS field security coordination office and GIZ RMO. During field work the security situation in Rumbek deteriorated and in consultation with the relevant parties the team decided not to travel there.


**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL  
DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT  
Pilot Reintegration Project**

**ANNEX A**

Mid-Term Review of the  
Pilot Reintegration Project  
Republic of South Sudan  
New NDDR Programme

Anthony Finn Ph.D.

**FEBRUARY 2014**



## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EA	Environmental Assessment
ERM	Environmental Risk Management
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FMFA	Financial Management Framework Agreement
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HQ	Head Quarters
IP	Implementing Partner
ICRS	Information, Counseling and Referral System
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MA	Monitoring Agent
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MDTF-SS	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTC	Multipurpose Training Centres
NDDRC	National DDR Commission
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OP/BP	Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration
PSC	Project Steering Committee
QCBS	Quality and Cost-Based Selection
RFQ	Request for Quotations
SC	Steering Committee
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
SPLA-O	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPMU	State Project Management Unit
SSAF	South Sudanese Armed Forces
SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
TT	Task Team
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
WB	World Bank

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## Executive Summary

### Project Background

1. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project was implemented between June 2013 and December 19<sup>th</sup> 2013 the latter date marking the Project suspension in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Originally the Project was intended to run for 1 year until June 2014. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and SSDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project fit with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility.
2. The original Development Objectives of the Project include (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.
3. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are:
  - (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
  - (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.
4. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows:
  - (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
  - (b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.
5. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project as well as community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and where ten Community Based Reintegration activities (bore-hole installation and one Payam rehabilitation) were planned to take place.
6. The Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub-components: (a) 1: Start-Up Kits, and (b) Training; (ii) Institutional Capacity Building; (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. While not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (*US\$ 130,000*) which finances the operational costs to the NDDRC and included the (no-cost to the Project) Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP.
7. The MTR was conducted in November and December 2013 in RoSS with additional consultations in the United Kingdom. The MTR included a verification mission from Juba to Wau and Kuajok, 42 unique consultations, many of which were then followed up with repeat consultations. The MTR also included an extensive review of project documentation and the

outputs of all Implementing Partners. The preliminary analysis of the MTR was presented at KfW in Berlin, Germany on December 2<sup>nd</sup> 2013.

### Summary of Findings

8. In summary, the MTR finds that with regards to the expected achievements of the core three Project components the following outputs were identified. At the time of MTR the start-up kits had been procured and distributed to State offices in a prompt and efficient manner. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State all kits had been distributed, in Western Bahr el Ghazal State 3 of 92 kits remained to be collected, in Warrap State 4 of 75 kits remained to be collected and in Lakes 10 of 91 remained to be collected, after a delay in distribution largely as a result of difficult moving in the rainy season.

9. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum (which was drafted in advance and then finalized in Mapel Transition Facility) took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2013 and ending 11<sup>th</sup> September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members. This quantitative data has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR.

10. Seven team members from the IA including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor, implemented institutional capacity building. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. The Component produced a variety of outputs that are documented in the MTR as well as strong shifts in institutional confidence and understanding in the NDDRC.

11. Community Support Projects were contracted in two phases and while progress implementing community-based reintegration activities was limited at the time of the MTR in part because of difficulty working in the rainy season the IA had completed most activities in Phase 1. As part of the Project suspension the Component was suspended having produced the following outputs: (i) PIP; (ii) selection of communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC), and (iii) selection of contractors through the tendering process.

12. Project Management and Project Support has enabled the implementation of the Project and created additional project management structures in the NDDRC. Specifically the following have been created: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs). The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly. At the time of the MTR SPMUs were not functional.

13. The MTR finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as the shifts in institutional behavior and knowledge because of the Project) have resulted from the Project. The outcomes of Livelihood Supports component include: (i) documented learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution; (ii) documented learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field, and (iii)

evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants. Pending confirmation through a Tracer study, it appears that for now there is an interest and receptiveness by ex-combatants to receive training on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and business skills.

14. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behavior. The *main* outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) a reconstituted M&E department.

15. The MTR finds that the Project has produced certain outcomes **coherent** with it being a *pilot*; that is, a learning process. By design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning and it is clear that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels.

16. The MTR finds that the Project's objectives and design are **relevant** to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, and (iv) German donor strategy and the MDTF-SS. The Project aligns with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11<sup>th</sup> March, 2012). The design of the Project supports engendering **national ownership** in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR.

17. The MTR finds that the project's **efficiency** is moderately satisfactory because: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale that reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably in costs with other DDR processes in neighbouring countries. The MTR finds that the Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in the report body below. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Pilot objectives.

18. In summary, the MTR makes the following specific findings that in Section 6 of the MTR report are complemented by at least one recommendation per finding.

19. **Conclusion 1.** Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost.

20. **Conclusion 2.** Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of



the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices.

21. **Conclusion 2a.** While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transitional Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan.
22. **Conclusion 3.** Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected Project documentation or M&E frameworks.
23. **Conclusion 4.** In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices. It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR.
24. **Conclusion 5.** Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the delivering the curriculum due to the low literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. While the curriculum was adjusted to take account of this the effectiveness of training may have been compromised at least as held to account to the original expected outcomes of the Component.
25. **Conclusion 6.** Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building. M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission during the Project.
26. **Conclusion 7.** The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC.
27. **Conclusion 8.** One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and ex-combatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC, but there were no activities or metrics to measure this.
28. **Conclusion 9.** As a *pilot* the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture.
29. **Conclusion 10.** Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague.

30. **Conclusion 10a.** Regarding M&E of the Project, the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation.
31. **Conclusion 11.** The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan's National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011.
32. **Conclusion 12.** By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs).
33. **Conclusion 13.** The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks.
34. **Conclusion 14.** The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.
35. **Conclusion 15.** Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IPs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS.
36. **Conclusion 16.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.
37. **Conclusion 17.** Throughout the Project the TDRP's role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance.

# 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

## 1.1 Project Context

38. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project<sup>1</sup> has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the program context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC<sup>2</sup>; (iii) policy context (*South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020*), and (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility.

39. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) became an independent country on the 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> of January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

40. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. Economically, RoSS is largely undeveloped and characterised as county with largely undiversified, highly oil dependent and subsistence economy.<sup>3</sup> The institutions of the State that currently are being built include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. They also include the national institution for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programming, the National DDR Commission (NDDRC). Economically the RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of oil flow stoppages, high inflation, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities.

41. Leaving aside the deterioration of the security situation in RoSS since mid-December 2013 the development challenges for RoSS are substantial. Compounded by recent violence and instability RoSS has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas and for females, low life expectancy and high infant mortality.<sup>4</sup> Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. Consequently the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges and conflict stressors all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project.

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<sup>1</sup> Henceforth referred to as 'the Project'

<sup>2</sup> Henceforth referred to as 'CPA DDR'

<sup>3</sup> In 2010 RoSS was the most oil-dependent country in the world with oil exports accounting for 80% of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2012 Gross National Income (GNI) was US\$650 largely because of the significant income outflows to oil companies (WDR 2013). Outside of oil livelihoods are largely concentrated in subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. At the time of the MTR in the national media the President of RoSS has indicated that the country's two-year-old austerity budget of restricted government spending will be lifted by mid 2014 as a result of increased oil productivity and export.

<sup>4</sup> 27% of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40% of males compared to 16% of females are literate and 53% of urban compared to 22% of rural population is literate. *National Baseline Household Survey (2009)*.

42. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15<sup>th</sup> fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particular) to an end.

43. The CPA DDR dominates the historical program context. As a consequence the Project is tasked with overcoming a negative hangover from the recognised under-performance of the CPA DDR process. Specifically, the challenges that have resulted from this CPA DDR hangover have included ensuring buy-in from the SPLA. However, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building and implementation arrangements (including institutional arrangements) means that primarily systems, capacities and institutional arrangements are the areas in which the performance of the Project can be gauged, rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programme. The MTR notes that this distinction is not adequately reflected in the Project objectives.

44. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme.<sup>5</sup> The NDDR Pilot Programme pilot consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: profiling, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training and psychosocial supports delivered to ex-combatants. The MTR notes that in its official project documentation the Project does not adequately explore how it is intended to fit with the NDDR Pilot Programme other than stating that the Project is intended to align with the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme.<sup>6</sup> However in reality, the Project was deliberately aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank TT, consultants and IAs all sought to work in varying degrees in collaboration with the implementers of NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. The MTR finds that at the time of the MTR the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the UN agencies above, something that is likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of the NDDR Pilot Programme or building on future programming or a Phase 2.

45. The Project is conceptualized first and foremost as a *pilot* in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, national capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme.

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<sup>5</sup> The Mapel TF Pilot is being evaluated for the NDDRC separate from this MTR.

<sup>6</sup> Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6.

Consequently while the performance of the Project can be measured against the achievements of the Project Development Objectives it can also be measured against the degree to which learning is being acquired and is likely to be utilised.

## **1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators**

46. The original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

47. The **socio-economic** objectives of the Project are:

- (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

48. The **reintegration programme, systems and learning** objectives are as follows:

- (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- (b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

49. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

## **1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries**

50. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project. Originally, the intended beneficiaries were 500 ex-combatants who were anticipated to be entered into the NDDR Pilot Programme. As a result of the failure of the NDDR Pilot Programme to secure the target case-load of 500 ex-combatants or to secure the target case-load as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned.

51. The Project also targets members of communities of return both through community inclusive reintegration activities (Component 3) and through inclusion in extended reintegration supports around forming economic cooperatives (Component 2).

## **1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs**

52. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project *outputs* are discussed below.

### **Project Component: Livelihood Support (US\$ 800,200 Implemented by UNICON)<sup>7</sup>**

53. The Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1) and design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. For overall management of the Component and the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, Project Manager, Livelihoods Training Specialist, Start-Up Kit Manager and a

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<sup>7</sup>Component costs from initial contract plus extensions for Phase 1.

Procurement Specialist. To deliver the Training sub-component UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return.

**Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US\$ 323,100)**

54. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry’s Multipurpose Training Centres (MTCs) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF UNESCO Vocational Trainers.<sup>8</sup> UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30<sup>th</sup> 2013.<sup>9</sup> Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on October 1<sup>st</sup> and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At time of writing distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:<sup>10</sup>

**Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution**

State	Target	Actual	Rationale
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	30	All distributed
Western Bahr el Ghazal	92	89	3 remaining to be collected
Warrap	75	71	4 remaining to be collected
Lakes	91	81	10 remaining to be collected. Difficult moving due to rainy season.

**Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US\$ 477,100)**

55. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four areas:

- (a) Cooperatives/associations;
- (b) Small farm or rural enterprise training;
- (c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and
- (d) Adult or formal education.

56. The curriculum as developed by the IA while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in associations or in preparation to work as a cooperative.<sup>11</sup>

57. The outputs for this sub-component are:

<sup>8</sup>UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

<sup>9</sup>See September 2013, UNICON Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component.

<sup>10</sup>Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices.

<sup>11</sup>Modules 1 to 15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives.

- (a) Training Curriculum
- (b) Training Manual
- (c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers)

58. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure so the degree to which the Sub-Component has achieved or was on course to achieve its outcomes is unclear.<sup>12</sup> Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2013 and ending 11<sup>th</sup> September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected for the MTR and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR.

**Table 2. Trainings Delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Source: UNICON)**

State	XCs	CMs	Total
Warrap State	70	34	104
Lakes State	93	29	122
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	30	108	138
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	60	113	173
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>537</b>

59. The percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent however there is little gender balance with women comprising 1 percent of the overall ex-combatant trainee complement but which reflects the proportion of women ex-combatants who underwent DDR at the Mapel Transition Facility (12). The actual impact of this training is not possible to gauge at present but indications of possible future impact would have been available following the Tracer and Community Dynamics follow-up studies in April 2014.

**Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (USD 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR)<sup>13</sup>**

60. Institutional Capacity building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been:

- (a) Inception Report
- (b) PIP
- (c) Drafted (with NDDRC) draft PIM (see 2.4 below)

<sup>12</sup>NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25

<sup>13</sup>Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research

- (d) Draft Final Report
- (e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC
- (f) SWOT analysis for State Offices
- (g) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs
- (h) Draft M&E manual
- (i) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC)<sup>14</sup>
- (j) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal
- (k) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys
- (l) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS)

61. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators).

62. Regarding the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys ASI worked with IR to produce the studies. For the Baseline study of all 290 combatants ASI/IR followed the following timetable:

- (a) Trained enumerators/ICRS case workers (July 2<sup>nd</sup> to July 4<sup>th</sup>, 2013)
- (b) Conducted baseline survey (July 6<sup>th</sup> to July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013)
- (c) Data capture and processing
- (d) Reporting

**Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 155,750 Implemented by IOM)**

63. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance.”<sup>15</sup> It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches.<sup>16</sup> In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives:

- (a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties;
- (b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties

64. At time of MTR the outputs of this Component have been:

- (a) PIP;
- (b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC);
- (c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process.

65. To date the implementation of the Component has been limited to the Site Selection Phase and some Community Mobilization and the Tendering Process. Construction was delayed due to the rainy season. At the time of the MTR and prior to the suspension of the Project it was

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<sup>14</sup> August 19<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal).

<sup>15</sup>NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36

<sup>16</sup>ibid



planned to implement 10 projects (9 boreholes and one Payam building rehabilitation) in the following locations:

- (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (4 Projects)
- (b) Lakes States (3 Projects)
- (c) Warrap State (2 Projects)
- (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project)

66. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees however both the experience of IOM during the CPA DDR (which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion.

**Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US\$ 130,000)**

67. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly.

## 2. Project Outcomes

68. Following is an examination of Project *outcomes* to date. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories:

- (a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation);
- (b) The difference made as a result of the NDDRC (hopefully) acquiring greater knowledge about project design, management and implementation, and
- (c) The difference made in the lives of beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex-combatants and their communities.

69. It can be argued that if successful, eventually the overall outcome of the Project should have been greater than the sum of its parts. In other words if the Project was successful then the longer term outcome flowing from knowledge transferred (not just through capacity building activities by the IP but also through other dynamics of project design and implementation such as the experience of implementation, TA by the Bank and the knowledge acquired by non-capacity building IPs) will result in concrete changes in the institutional behaviour and performance of the NDDRC, which in turn will influence the design, implementation and success of a future national DDR programme as well as the buy-in and confidence of the GoSS and SSAF.

70. This points to the basic and generic (but in the case of the Project, unwritten) logic model that can be applied to the Project design: by design, the Project when complete should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in knowledge in the NDDRC and providing the Commission with systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge acquired and positively change its institutional performance in the next Reintegration Project. At the time of the MTR the early stage of knowledge acquisition and the links between knowledge and changes in institutional behaviour and performance are not clear. The scale of the institutional development that is required to enable the Commission to implement a national DDR programme is substantial. Despite this the sum short term-outcome of the Project is a diverse body of knowledge and changed institutional arrangements, mainly the PMU.

71. A major challenge to the success of the Project has been finding a functioning recipient for the knowledge acquired during implementation, whether the appropriate institutional body (a PMU, for example), the appropriate individual (a technical or managerial staff member) or the appropriate institutional system (comprehensive M&E or Reintegration programming).

72. While some newly constituted layers in the Commission are performing (PMU, see above) the Project needs to remain objective about these structures and interrogate their effectiveness and suitability in principle to a larger national DDR programme in order to clearly identify what systems or changes have the greatest chance of surviving post-Project

73. There are examples of the challenge of finding a home in the NDDRC for knowledge acquired during implementation of the Project. For example, the Project has managed to procure, transport and distribute high quality reintegration kits to ex-combatants in a timely manner and with clear and transparent procurement systems. The challenge is to enable the NDDRC in the future to manage an IA to complete required tasks to a similar or better level of performance. At

present it is not clear where the repository lies for actionable knowledge around managing such a process.

74. Similarly the Project has managed to run Baseline Ex-combatant and Community Dynamics studies but it is not evident where the capacity to manage such a process lies in the NDDRC. And it is not clear how the principles of impact measurement as realized in Baseline, Community Dynamics or Tracer surveys can be translated by the NDDRC into Reintegration programming, monitoring and evaluation or sensitization and outreach.

75. Put simply, at the time of the MTR it was unclear how everything achieved to date (and that was likely to be achieved by the end of the Project) would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. This is particularly the case when many of the key pieces (such as particular staff members) have been missing or replaced during the Project. While the NDDRC has lead the Project and has constituted new management structures to implement the Project the progress in Project implementation has relied upon intense and embedded *operational* support of the TDRP. Prior to the suspension of the Project it was clearly too early to withdraw that support without jeopardizing what is arguably the unwritten priority objective of the Project: the creation of systems and institutional capacity that will persist into the medium to long term. However if future programming occurs or a Phase 2 there is a clear need for the TDRP to have a clear exit strategy at Project start-up that best supports the achievement of the development objectives in a sustainable manner.

## 2.1. Livelihood Supports

76. At the time of MTR the outcomes of Livelihood Supports component are:

- (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution;
- (b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field;
- (c) Evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants.

77. Regarding learning documenting how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution, despite implementation challenges the IA has been strongly learning-focused. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub-component.<sup>17</sup> Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components.

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<sup>17</sup> See UNICON, 2013 (d)

78. Regarding learning targeting how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field, UNICON has worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO.<sup>18</sup> Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON's operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organization and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organization, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard expected by UNICON. The IA has indicated that recommendations regarding this issue are being considered as it finalizes its own end reporting to the NDDRC and the TRDP.

79. Regarding providing evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increasing confidence in the NDDRC; at present there is no evidence for this outcome. Presently there are no surveys of perceptions in key stakeholders in the GoSS or SPLA or of ex-combatants regarding emerging shifts in perceptions of competency of the NDDRC and confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex-combatants and community members questions were not included in the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with of SSR.

## **2.2. Institutional Capacity Building**

80. The Institutional Capacity Building component has focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the nascent emergence of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. By design it should have produced difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. At the time of MTR the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component are:

- (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank;
- (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same;
- (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project;
- (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation;
- (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation;
- (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC.

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<sup>18</sup> See Section 3 below.

81. The IA produced a body of knowledge products which together cover key areas of institutional development. When understood alongside the outcomes of the one-to-one mentoring (mainly points b, c and e above) there is the beginnings of a shift in institutional culture and practice which if capitalized upon is likely to return dividends in the medium to long term. However, capitalizing upon this emerging cultural shift is a long and complicated process. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC acquired a greater understanding of the full extent of the journey ahead both in terms of required institutional development and required programme design/implementation. Critically, the NDDRC is aware of the need to action historical learning including that from the CPA and that from this project.

82. Despite these challenges the main outcomes from the Project components are: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO), (VI) fast track the development of ICRS, (VII) core team has been trained on the successful delivery of reintegration components and ICRS.

83. The MTR finds that the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff including the Chairperson, the Director for Reintegration and the State staff was context specific, that is, it was situated within a strong understanding of the operational context of the NDDRC and was delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI/IR also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project's overall rationale as a pilot. ASI/IR have documented a wide selection of areas to be addressed in any future iteration of the Component.<sup>19</sup>

### **2.3 DDR Community Support Projects**

84. At the time of the MTR there are no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

### **2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition**

85. As a pilot there are certain outcomes that should be expected including actionable learning regarding implementation, political economy/implementation environment; performance of stakeholders and future or follow-on project design. In design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning in all these areas and the Bank TT has worked with IAs to ensure they are also orientated in that direction. It is clear from the significant amount of practical learning acquired that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels. The challenge to the Project has been to ensure that as it progresses all relevant learning is communicated clearly within the NDDRC and that staff are engaged. Shared learning must be

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<sup>19</sup>October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC.

understood by the NDDRC as an opportunity to re-engage implementing partners, particularly in the UN family, in this knowledge-orientated project. Critically, the methodologies used in the Pilot, particularly by the IAs should be replicated in future programming by the NDDRC. Ultimately the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design.

### 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

86. At the time of MTR the Project was on course to meet its project objectives. It was on course to achieve these project objectives despite early implementation challenges in what is now identified as Phase 1 of the pilot. However, progress that has been made towards outcomes faces clear institutional and external environmental challenges and the ability of the Project to deliver reintegration opportunities and to provide a meaningful kick-start to what is hoped will become a national DDR process is seriously challenged by the external environment, particularly the security and political environment.

87. The challenges met by the Pilot can be classified as either: (i) directly related to the Project design and implementation or as (ii) emanating from or being part of the external strategic, operational and physical environment.

88. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows. The factors **negatively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains;
- (b) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation;
- (c) Quality of some outputs, and
- (d) Capacity (human, skills and resource) within the NDDRC.

89. The factors **positively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme;
- (b) Strong relationship between the TDRP and BICC;
- (c) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies;
- (d) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP;
- (e) Underestimation of the level of involvement required and knock-on effects on TDRP's ability to respond to IAs in a timely manner.

90. While generally well designed the Project has design limitations negatively affecting the achievement of outcomes. At the time of MTR the project timeline has limited the achievement of outputs and outcomes and has complicated the Pilot design. The Pilot was initiated in line with the intake of the first tranche of ex-combatants to the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme, which occurred during the time of year when normally ex-combatants would tend their agricultural land. The planned time for ex-combatants to be in Mapel Transition Facility was three months however some were on site for up to five months. When ex-combatants graduated from Mapel Transition Facility they did so during rainy season when transport is difficult and in the case of Lakes State unfeasible in many locations. From the perspective of maximising the ability of ex-combatants to put into practice their entrepreneurship and cooperatives training the Pilot is likely to have benefited from better timing so as not to clash with when gardens are tended. With graduation happening during the rainy season many ex-combatants from Lakes State (see above) were been unable to collect their start-up kits and there have been logistical issues getting trainers to communities of return to complete their training of ex-combatants and community members in cooperative working.

91. In general the Project has strong external relevance to the strategic context and the needs of the NDDRC but it does have internal coherence challenges that appear to stem from trying to implement too diverse a range of activities with very limited funds. Internal coherence challenges appear to be around the delivery of limited Community Supports Projects (CSPs). While the capacity of the IA appears strong the budget line for CSPs is limited, the Project document overstates the likely achievements of the component and the documentation is somewhat over aspirational about the usefulness of such a limited intervention.

92. Delivery chains in DDR relate to the layers of implementers employed to deliver services to ex-combatants or the communities of return. In the case of the Pilot and as a result of lack of familiarity with the operating context one IA (UNICON) implemented the Training sub-component with an overly complicated structure and with an implementer who proved problematic in how it has treated the Trainers it hired. Had UNICON better understood the environment including service providers and trainers or had it been more embedded in South Sudan before the Pilot start-up then delivery could have been simplified and the barriers encountered could have been avoided.

93. At the beginning of the Pilot UNICON encountered other barriers to implementation. The main barriers to the IP becoming effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. The poor content quality of the initial project documentation produced by the IA reflected a lack of preparedness. Because of these barriers initial implementation of the Livelihood Supports Component was delayed and there was an urgent and immediate high risk that the achievement of outputs of both sub-components would be negatively affected. However the IP benefitted from extra time allowed for implementation by the Trust Fund (TF) extension to September 2013.

94. Despite this difficult start the IP addressed the barriers to implementation by locating increased human and capital resources in South Sudan and being present on the ground during procurement, transportation and distribution. UNICON deployed additional staff to implement the training curriculum in Mapel and engaged additional 10 trainers to deliver the follow-up training on site in communities of return.

95. During distribution the IA was physically assisted by TDRP staff and consultants to distribute kits at State level and as is discussed below the Bank TT actively facilitated introductions of UNICON to other relevant organizations including the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme partners in order to ensure the effectiveness of this component.

96. The turn-around in UNICON's performance was critical to the success of this sub-component. The distribution of kits and the involvement of stakeholders (which can be improved upon) hugely improved on the provision of start-up kits carried out during the CPA DDR process in terms of timeliness (ex-combatants were provided with start-up kits within one month of formally graduating from the Mapel TF as compared to nine months in the CPA DDR) as well as bringing State ministries on board with kit design as outlined above.

97. The outcome of the Project Component Institutional Capacity Building is difficult to quantify primarily because: (i) the weak institutional capacity in the NDDRC with which the IP was met resulted in the mentors engaging at a low level and in some cases with units in the NDDRC which were not fully functional or which do not have adequate staffing, and (ii) timing, logistics and staffing challenges that were not unique to ASI/IR which limited the degree to which ASI/IR M&E consultants could coordinate activities with other IAs and the NDDRC. In



particular the planned mentoring of the M&E unit failed because of spoilers in the then staff of the unit in the NDDRC. An alternative strategy was developed by ASI/IR, which is to produce an M&E manual to be used in HQ and State Offices.<sup>20</sup>

98. The one aspect of ASI delivery that was clearly weak was reporting on the Baseline ex-combatant survey. The Baseline survey report appeared hastily put together and had limited analytical content. TDRP and NDDRC comments to the IA resulted in revised versions but from the trajectory of IR engagement on the Pilot it appears that internal staffing and roles were not appropriately aligned in the inception phase. This was partially rectified later during survey administration and the production of the Community Survey report. The M&E manual produced by IR was not optimal and required additional input before being acceptable as a potentially useful tool for the NDDRC. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC does not have the capacity to manage or quality assure future impact orientated studies such as the planned Tracer in 2014.

99. The Project was explicitly designed to begin addressing the capacity challenges within the NDDRC: one Component explicitly addresses this issue as does the methodology applied by the Bank TT in closely working with the NDDRC on Project design and implementation. This cooperation was intended to ensure the implementation of the Project and create structures within the Commission that would simultaneously ensure the implementation of the Pilot while contributing to the creation of effective project management systems. While there are questions raised by ASI in its remit as capacity builder to the NDDRC around the role of the PMU post-Pilot and while the MTR finds that the SC and PMU could better share information in the NDDRC and better involve other key staff, clearly the constructive, partnership approach employed by the TDRP and the focus on capacity building has greatly enhanced the ability of the Project to deliver outputs and secure outcomes.

100. The Project encountered challenges around human capacity and resource capacity in the NDDRC. In summary, the M&E activities of the Capacity Building component were totally undermined due to spoilers in the staffing and then the need to replace the evaluation staff in the Commission. Similarly, the lack of personnel in the States greatly undermined the ability to secure sustainable outcomes from the Capacity Building component. Material resources ranging from financing to fuel and transport including the state of repair of Commission vehicles were limiters on the Commission's ability to fully engage with the Project. However, when it experienced barriers the Capacity Building IA adjusted its approach to delivering their outputs and to try and have a greater chance at positively influencing systems and institutional behaviour. The input was clearly valued by the NDDRC particularly in the States but the fact remains that the outcome of the Capacity Building component was limited by the often very low starting point of engagement.

101. The design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project. The strong relationship between the TDRP TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO has contributed to the TT approaching the Pilot in an holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. During implementation these same relationships enabled the TT

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<sup>20</sup>At time of writing this manual is still in preparation and has not been reviewed by the consultant.

to facilitate the IAs to relate to the UN family and overcome the implementation delays being encountered.

102. A critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the intensive support of the TDRP TT and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank's presence on the ground has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC.

103. In summary, the challenges that emanate from or are part of the external strategic, operational and physical environments and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows:

- (a) Security and political environment;
- (b) Legacy of the CPA DDR;
- (c) Limits on the buy-in of local SPLA and of the GoSS including the effects of limited SSR;
- (d) Little and uneven economic development and market opportunities.

104. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15<sup>th</sup> fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million IDPs. During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particularly) to an end.

105. Thus at the time of the MTR it is clearly not possible to continue the Project putting all achievements to date under severe stress and significantly damaging sustainability and the possibility of outcomes. The project was suspended on December 19<sup>th</sup> 2013.

106. Prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA possibly as a result of that CPA legacy. While other factors may have been in play clearly the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme encountered major barriers even to the recruitment of the appropriate number of SSAF for the Pilot DDR programme (290 soldiers instead of the target 500) and those who did enter Mapel Transition Facility did not match those profiled in the initial start-up of the pilot. While arguably this did not affect the overall progress towards the achievements of objectives by the Pilot these issues (which were characterized as barriers or problems with local SPLA senior staff) were still a significant blow to confidence in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme and so to the Project.

107. If the Project is to be restarted the achievement of the **Social and Economic objective** is likely to be negatively affected by the lack of economic opportunity in communities of return, poor local market conditions and the lack of sufficient policy to address economic development. The Project risk management strategy identified this as a risk to be managed. To manage the risk the Project design focused on activities to reduce the reliance of ex-combatants on job creation policies in the context of (i) limited market opportunities, (ii) the lack of micro-finance to establish cooperatives and (iii) the lack of State-level procedures to facilitate establishing cooperatives. However this same context is still likely to negatively impact on the social and

economic benefits to ex-combatant of participating in the Pilot (and arguably, the broader NDDRC Pilot DDR programme).

### **3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

108. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. The project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of high quality and intensive.

### **3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation**

109. Overall, the identification of risks has been **satisfactory** however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner. An example of this approach is the in-depth support of IAs when IAs encountered implementation delays due their own unsatisfactory preparation for the Pilot. Once fully engaged, IAs utilized the same approach to navigating difficulties in implementation.

110. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Pilot has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project.

### **3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank**

111. The Project M&E framework is a high-level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs:

- (a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured.
- (b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned.
- (c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction.

112. Scorecard indicators for output (a) above are overambitious and vague and probably reflect the view of the TT prior to the engagement of the IA that only then identified the full extent of human and material capacity challenges in the NDDRC. As such the indicators should be revised to more accurately reflect the assessment by the IA and understand the realistically achievable progress given the limitations of NDDRC capacity at present.

113. Score-card indicators for outputs (b) and (c) are a combination of easily measurable indicators (for example, 100 percent of ex-combatants receive a livelihood start-up kit within 2 months of graduation) and those which implicitly defer measurement to future Tracer studies (for example, up to 80 percent of ex-combatants who participated in the non-agricultural training at the Transition Facility initiate decent and sustainable livelihood opportunities, through entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, market, product management).

114. The M&E framework would benefit from revision based on the learning from implementing Phase 1 of the Pilot: specifically, it would be useful to scale back the ambition of some of the indicators to more realistically match what IAs have encountered on the ground. For example, it is unlikely that 60 percent of those trained will be assisted to establish economic associations and regardless in this instance ‘assisted’ should be qualified and defined to more accurately reflect the level of support given to ex-combatants and community members thus far in the Pilot. In other words, what does ‘assisted’ mean?

115. The M&E framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a **pilot** project; that is, one orientated towards trialing, learning and innovation. Despite this as seen above the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies.

116. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on –the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered.

### **3.5 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance**

117. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme:

- (a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning.

118. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Pilot is compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011.

119. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary.

## 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR

### 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design

120. The Project's objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS.

121. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23<sup>rd</sup> September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11<sup>th</sup> March, 2012).

122. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

123. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

124. The Project is interlinked with the MDTF-SS in several ways:

- (a) The Project's focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects.
- (b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS's funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programs for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US\$ 36.4 million.
- (c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component.

### 4.2 Efficiency

125. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is rated *moderately satisfactory* because of: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant.

126. Disbursement to IPs has been on target. ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US\$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US\$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US\$920,200. IOM have had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US\$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US\$450,000).

127. The Project has low budget costs for each component; put simply, the Project has managed to deliver a high volume of work and outputs from IAs for limited cost (Annex 1). Among some of the IAs the consensus is that the design and implementation of the Pilot received high value for money.

128. At the time of MTR the financial management of the Project by the Bank TT was satisfactory and showed flexibility in line with the overall flexibility of the project management in order to enable IAs meet the unforeseen costs in barriers they experienced during implementation. All IAs were highly appreciative of the consultative and flexible manner in which the TT engaged around project budgets.

129. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support is US\$2,759.<sup>21</sup> The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US\$1,817<sup>22</sup>; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US\$2,065<sup>23</sup> and Burundi \$2,775<sup>24</sup>. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made?

130. As stated in the Pilot the costs are minimized, with very little opportunity for reducing costs further on any one component. By component the basic cost of start-up kits averages US\$671.65 per ex-combatant before transportation and warehousing costs are added which increase the unit cost to US\$923.61. Transportation and warehousing costs constitute 28 percent of the overall costs but by far the highest cost incurred was transportation (US\$14,000 total cost of importing and transport to the States and US\$ 20,000 total cost of local transport within the States) reflecting the logistical difficulties of moving assets into and around South Sudan during Phase 1. Overall, in Phase 1, the main cost to the Project is the provision of start-up kits totaling US\$ 323,100 compared to US\$ 477,100 for Training supports (US\$ 312,600 Livelihood Supports Training plus US\$164,500 Mapel Entrepreneurship Training).

### 4.3 Effectiveness

131. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Project objectives. Regarding Objective 1: *To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in their communities of return* the Project had successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. The Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. Training was delivered to community members to augment the community-inclusive methodology and to increase the likely sustainability of economic cooperatives. In addition the main IA (UNICON) employed a Training of Trainers (TOT) modality to overcome the lack of available trainers that has had the subsidiary effect of skilling

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21 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs.

<sup>22</sup>ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp28-29.

<sup>23</sup> ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp.19-22, 31-43.

<sup>24</sup> ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28.

new trainers and stimulating them to take the first steps towards forming their own economic cooperative.

132. The objectives of the Training sub-component are very ambitious and in reality given the time spent delivering training in Mapel TF and in the communities, and given the literacy and numeracy challenges and that the curriculum was developed and then refined while at Mapel (but to a good standard) some are unlikely to have been fully met at the end of Phase 1 or fully met to achieve the level of outcomes one would expect from the way the objective is framed.<sup>25</sup> This vagueness in objectives is exacerbated by the kind of reporting from the field which overstates the potential impact and complexity of the training which in all reality is training in fundamentals, not training in advanced business as is suggested from an overview of the curriculum. Also, given limits on time it is unlikely that all aspects of the curriculum were implemented in the communities of return.<sup>26</sup> Similarly given the limits on the knowledge of the Trainers it is unlikely that all modules as per the curriculum were implemented.

133. For example, the IA reports that in Warrap community-based training began on 23<sup>rd</sup> September and continued until 13<sup>th</sup> November 2013 during which time 70 of 75 participating ex-combatants were trained along with 34 community members in nine modules.<sup>27</sup> However during the MTR verification visit to Wau and Kuajok trainers identified that they had not spent much time in communities delivering training. In Kuajok it was identified that by the date of the visit

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1. <sup>25</sup>Focusing on the objectives of the State-based training, the IA identifies the objectives as follows: (1) To support the ex-combatants utilize the Vocational, Literacy and Life Skills trainings gained at the Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return; (2) To reinforce and facilitate the operationalization of the decision made by ex-combatants during their training in Mapel to establish themselves in individual businesses or in partnerships and cooperatives; (3) To assist in cooperative formation and offer subsequent training to ex-combatants along with community members who wish to join in the formation of cooperatives and management of cooperatives in different technical sectors; (4) To assist the establishment of individual entrepreneurs or partnerships in business activities by offering further training to ex-combatants in business start-up and management including (i) micro-enterprise skills training as correlated to the vocational trainings received in the Mapel Transition Facility; and (ii) small farm business skills training; (5) To assist ex-combatants in handling the start-up and management process such as board formation, marketing and book-keeping initially; (6) To offer advice in initial troubleshooting such as lack of support of family or community members or selection of location appropriate to the opportunities.

<sup>26</sup> Training at State level is outlined as including: (1) Business Start-up Training which has the following modules: (a) Business Development; (b) Cooperative formation; (c) Start-up of Individual and Partnership; (d) Business plan Preparation; (e) Business Skills Development, and (2) Management of Individual Cooperative Enterprises which has the following modules: (a) Legal Process and requirements; (b) Marketing and Sales; (c) Purchase Management; (d) Production and Work Place Management; (e) Book-keeping Practices.

<sup>27</sup>(1) Business plan for setting up cooperatives – how to identify resources required to run business, how to name cooperative, how these businesses would be useful to the customers; (2) Financial literacy – how to identify resources required to run business, how to manage resources and how to allocate them, selection of business name, how to make business useful to its customers, how to identify the different type of skills by individuals within cooperative, etc.; (3) Book-keeping management – how to deal with day-to-day operations and how to record transactions, utilization, allocation of profits and how to control others expenses incurred in business; (4) Marketing research – how to inform potential customers, how to advertise the services/goods that are available through this business; assessment, advertisement and promotion of goods and services in the market; (5) Communication skills – how to communicate to the customers in the market and others suppliers - both external and internal suppliers - and how to communicate internally within organization; (6) Planning and controlling – how to plan their businesses, how it will be implemented, when activities shall be taken, and how to control operations to minimize expenses and maximize profits; (7) Time management skills – how to manage time and avoid inconveniences, how to do scheduling; (8) Leadership management skills – how to lead others and how to motivate them, giving them right to participate in decision making process and learn different leadership styles, especially those related to cooperatives; (9) Marketing orientation – how to sell goods and services to customers, how to organize supply of goods and how to check if the goods are still usable, how to select potential suppliers.



(November 14<sup>th</sup>) trainers had trained ex-combatants and community members for just three hours. From this brief visit there is evidence enough that there are deficiencies in reporting from the field, quality assurance of training outputs and an overall lack of realism in the indicators used to plan deliverables in the Training sub-component.

134. Trainers were unsure how to register or if one could register cooperatives at State level so logically, it is not likely that they trained ex-combatants and community members in legal processes and requirements. What this reflects is the need to revisit the alignment of the curriculum with the capacity of ex-combatants and the available time for trainers to work in the communities to create a set of indicators that more accurately reflect what can be achieved. These indicators should align with verification of the exact outputs in each State during Phase 1, however in the case of this pilot verification is unlikely to be possible given the outbreak of conflict. However, in future designs this recommendation should be implemented.

135. Similar to the limitations on verifying the training it is not possible to verify the numbers of cooperatives formed by ex-combatants and community members or to identify whether ex-combatants and community members formed cooperatives where they had expressed and intention to do so. However, the IA reports that the information from Trainers in the field (which is incomplete) indicates that 11 groups of varying sizes were indicating that they would form some type of associative work practice<sup>28</sup> or cooperative.<sup>29</sup>

136. The Institutional Capacity Building component has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. The component has produced a starting point for what should ideally be a long-term process of highly strategic and highly empowering TA and knowledge transfer including through the methodology of mentoring. The effectiveness of the Component is its assessment of institutional capacity at HQ and State level as well as the linkages between the two and critically, the lack of implementation of lessons learned from previous DDR programmes and their evaluations. The core reporting of the IA was consistent and regular and the final report contains practical and accurate learning and recommendations.

137. The Community Support Programmes has not yet been effective at producing outcomes primarily because the Component was designed to be implemented across Phase 1 and Phase 2. While the IOM experienced challenges to implementation as a result of the effect of the rainy season on road transportation planned activities were completed before suspension of the contract between the Bank and the IOM due to the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan.

#### **4.4 Sustainability**

138. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevance reintegration programme) to place the NDDRC front and centre in the new Project thus

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<sup>28</sup> The term 'associative work practice' fits the type of collaborative work being initiated by most groups of ex-combatants because the unit they were forming or intended to form would not meet the legal requirements to be a full cooperative, particularly the need for 21 individuals to be members. Also, difficulties and lack of understanding around registering cooperatives were likely to result in ex-combatants with or without community members, joining together as informal associations to benefit from collaborative work practices.

<sup>29</sup> Annex 2 for table of cooperatives and associative work practices

exemplifying for any future DDR programme to succeed it must be nationally owned and led by the Commission. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective, efficient and relevant national DDR programme, which would contribute to the long term reform of SSAF. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its role in Reintegration programming in DDR.

139. However a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was clear that any successes thus far would hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of Reintegration programming however, with the changes in the internal security environment any progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming is likely to be seriously negatively affected.

140. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. In the Livelihoods Component the unplanned strategy of utilizing Training Of Trainers (TOT) methodology has the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The design of the Training sub-component emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The principle of including community members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and approaches to cooperative working practices.

141. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual, collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission and which should have the greatest chance of creating genuine and sustainable shifts in institutional culture and performance.

142. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability of the infrastructure to be provide through working with communities to create community water committee and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing of boreholes and pumps. However, the outputs of the component had it gone ahead were unlikely to be as sustainable due to the low-cost and limited design. For example, solar powered higher volume water pumps also have a longer lifespan then the kind being installed in the Pilot thus mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare parts and skilled maintenance people.

#### **4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

143. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19<sup>th</sup> 2013. The result is that all Phase 2 planned activities are suspended, as are the delayed Component DDR Community Support Projects. At present there is no way of verifying what has happened to ex-combatants who

participated in the Project but it is highly unlikely any can progress on livelihood issues in the current situation in South Sudan. During the MTR it was identified that in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. With the current security situation in the country this momentum is likely to be lost or seriously negatively influenced.

## 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance

### 5.1 Bank Performance

The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how the TDRP performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank's role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.<sup>30</sup>

#### (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

##### Rating: Satisfactory

144. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SS DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership.

145. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex.

146. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISS. The TDRP's own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC's interaction with those same agencies.

147. The TDRP's role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP's

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<sup>30</sup>The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project. The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP.

- (a) **Bank-executed Activities** consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross-border and cross-cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender.
- (b) **Trust Fund Management and Administration:** Establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects.

knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC's self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme.

148. Throughout the Project the TDRP's role shifted from technical assistance to operational assistance with Bank staff and consultants becoming embedded in the implementation of the Project rather than remaining in technical or project management roles. In the field during the implementation of any pilot project the Technical Adviser is often under stress to become more involved in day-to-day implementation of the project than is expected from the role of advisor. Metaphorically there is a thin line between providing TA and then being hands-on during implementation. The TDRP clearly crossed over from TA to operational assistance during the first phase of the Project. While this is somewhat of a grey area and a judgment call by the TDRP staff as to what it will take to ensure the successful implementation of the Project, the TDRP should be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge and should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and plan for same.

### **(b) Quality of Supervision**

#### **Rating: Satisfactory**

149. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance.

150. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank's own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues.

151. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs. At one point in the implementation of the Project the Bank TT fell behind when providing feedback to ASI on the deliverables by IR and this suggests that the Bank found the volume of work managing the Project challenging. Similarly the IA argues that the Bank's approach to the project was too hands on and that the form and content expected by the Bank of the IA's deliverables was too rigid. Specifically, the IA argues that the Bank's feedback on the Baseline and Community Dynamics reports was too prescriptive and rigid and did not afford IR the freedom to produce the kind of report they planned to produce.

152. The Bank's role was to advise the NDDRC on the quality of the surveys and the survey reporting and facilitated the NDDRC to develop its understanding of the principle and usefulness of this kind of M&E. Due to the lack of expertise in the NDDRC the Bank lead on reviewing the deliverables of IR and was detailed on its feedback to the IA on the quality and content of their deliverables, which to begin with was poor. It is notable that IR did recover somewhat to produce

a better quality report for the Community Dynamics study. The MTR finds that in the future the Bank should along with the NDDRC be more prescriptive at the beginning of the Project outlining the form of the deliverable in any contract with future IAs.

## **5.2 NDDRC Performance**

153. The NDDRC's role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made.

154. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself it identified as being unable to alter.

155. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level.

156. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commissions alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU, an approach that was beginning to prove effective.

157. The risk of finding practical workarounds to institutional challenges is that occasionally some staff may become unintentionally marginalized so it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations. Arguably some staff members were being unintentionally marginalized during the Project and this should be avoided in future iterations. The marginalization occurred both at strategic levels and at operational levels.

## **5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners**

158. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM. With the suspension of the project IOM had achieved little in the implementation of the DDR Community Support Projects and so the performance of the IA is not rated below.

### **5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research**

159. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics

surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project's overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI's reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process.

160. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality.

161. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity.

### **5.3.2 UNICON**

162. Initially UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation.

163. UNICON's reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub-components.

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

164. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment; (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component and (iii) as they relate to the role of the stakeholders.

### 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment

165. **Conclusion 1.** Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost.

166. **Recommendation 1.** In any future programming or Phase 2 the negative effect of this stop in momentum which can result from a number of factors not just the extreme situation of the deterioration of the security situation should be considered and planned for including that any future activities in capacity building may be starting from a low level. Momentum is critical and where delays can better anticipated and managed they should be. Events such as an outbreak of armed conflict are outside the control of the Project.

167. **Conclusion 2.** Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices. While the spoiler issue was addressed the other issues remained outstanding at the time of the MTR and until addressed will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.

168. **Recommendation 2.** Future programming or Phase 2 should be designed in such a way so that the Government of RoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources

169. **Conclusion 2a.** While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transit Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan.

170. **Recommendation 2a.** This critical macro-issue means that while the NDDRC may benefit both programmatically and institutionally if the Project is re-started, it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency in the broader SSR environment.



## 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes

171. **Conclusion 3.** Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected Project documentation or M&E frameworks.

172. **Recommendation 3.** The focus on being a Pilot should be more coherently incorporated in future Project documentation or in Phase 2 of the Project and in all relevant M&E frameworks.

173. **Conclusion 4.** In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR.

174. **Recommendation 4.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits.

175. **Conclusion 5.** Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the design of the curriculum particularly in relation to the literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. It is not possible to verify the input for State-based follow-up trainings which included the community.

176. **Recommendation 5.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the curriculum should be further refined to suit the needs and capacities of ex-combatants, a process which should involve the main stakeholders in vocational training such as UNESCO. All curricula should be systematically quality controlled and reviewed for effectiveness as part of ongoing project M&E.

177. **Conclusion 6.** Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission.

178. **Recommendation 6.** A key output from the activities of Component 2 has been a capacity audit of the NDDRC. The NDDRC should ensure that the staffing complement is filled in advance of any future programming addressing the capacity and skilling of the Commission.

179. **Conclusion 7.** The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC.

180. **Recommendation 7.** Any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilize a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme.

181. **Conclusion 8.** One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and ex-combatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC but there were no activities or metrics to measure same.

182. **Recommendation 8.** In Tracer studies attitudinal change regarding the perception by ex-combatants and civilians of the value and usefulness of the NDDRC and DDR programming in general should be included.

183. **Conclusion 9.** As a *pilot* the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture.

184. **Recommendation 9.** This orientation should be maximized on in future pilot programming or in Phase 2. Learning and knowledge capture should be integrated into Project M&E and feedback loops to monitor how learning is actioned by the stakeholders should be designed.

185. **Conclusion 10.** Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague.

186. **Recommendation 10.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the M&E Framework utilized by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing Phase 1. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided.

187. **Conclusion 10a.** Regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation.

188. **Recommendation 10a.** In future programming or in Phase 2 this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning.

189. **Conclusion 11.** The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011.

190. **Recommendation 11.** This good practice should be replicated in all future programming or in Phase 2.

191. **Conclusion 12.** By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs).

192. **Recommendation 12.** In future programming or in Phase 2 sustainability should continue to be emphasized and where challenges exist they should be addressed appropriately. The main design feature that should be addressed is the design of Component 3, particularly the type of infrastructure being put in place and the realistic options to make that infrastructure as sustainable as possible.

193. **Conclusion 13.** The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks.

194. **Recommendation 13.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration, in Phase 2 or in a re-start of Component 3 serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community based reintegration. Furthermore expanding the scope of activities should also be considered and additional buy-in from local Ministries garnered in order to make activities as likely to produce impact as possible.

195. **Conclusion 14.** The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.

196. **Recommendation 14.** When estimating the impact on future programming or Phase 2 economies of scale should be considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced.

197. **Conclusion 15.** Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IAs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS.

198. **Recommendation 15.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the use of delivery chains should be explicitly addressed in the design process and the risks associated with it should be appropriately managed. The planned implementation modalities of IAs should be fully interrogated in light of this recommendation.

### 6.3 Stakeholders

199. **Conclusion 16.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.

200. **Recommendation 16.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS.

201. **Conclusion 17.** Throughout the Project the TDRP's role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance.

202. **Recommendation 17.** In future the TDRP should more critically assess the risks of such a shift in its role and be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge. The TDRP should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and consider how to develop an appropriate exit strategy given the difficulties inherent with becoming more embedded in operationalization.

## Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing at time of MTR

### NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs

Updated 15 December 2013

	INITIAL BUDGET	Phase 1 TOTAL COMMITTED
Capacity Building and Monitoring & Evaluation	\$660,000	\$519,506
<i>Mentoring/Capacity Building</i>		\$442,836
<i>Tracer Surveys</i>		\$76,670
<i>Phase 2 NDDRC Staff TOT</i>		
Livelihoods Support	\$1,200,000*	\$800,200
<i>Mapel Entrepreneurship &amp; Cooperatives</i>		\$164,500
<i>Start-Up Toolkits</i>		\$323,100
<i>In-State Entrepreneurship &amp; Cooperatives</i>		\$312,600
<i>Agricultural Extension</i>		
<i>Supplementary Vocational Trainings</i>		
<i>Apprenticeships</i>		
Community Support Projects	\$400,000	\$155,750
NDDRC Participation Funds	\$240,000	\$130,000
Evaluations	\$70,000	\$30,000
Contingency	\$81,711	
<b>TOTAL ALL</b>	<b>\$2,651,711</b>	<b>\$1,919,706</b>

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## **Annex 3. Consultations**

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# Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey

Implemented by: TDRP & NDDRC  
Report by: Kate Jinghua Zhou

October 2014





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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ICRS	Information Counseling and Referral System
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
NDDRP	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
NOF	National Organized Forces
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
XC	Ex-Combatant



# Executive Summary

The South Sudan Pilot DDR Project attempted to test the modalities of the reintegration system and develop lessons learned for future DDR programming. To this end, 2014 South Sudan ex-combatants' satisfaction survey recorded the reinsertion and reintegration experience of 204 ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program. Based on the self-reported opinions of 204 ex-combatant respondents, the overwhelming majority of them are adapting well to civilian life, and notable advancements in reintegration have been made within just one year.

**Livelihood trainings achieved the goals of providing ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths and basic skills to secure a livelihood in the communities.** All ex-combatants participating in the Pilot Program were eligible to receive the livelihood trainings at the Mapel Transitional Facility which included vocational skills training, literacy and numeracy training, life skills training, and entrepreneurship skills training. A little over 95% of ex-combatants interviewed were positive that they were satisfied with all the trainings they received and most ex-combatant participants suggested that more vocational options could be provided in future programs.

Ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program received their livelihood start-up toolkits after the series of livelihood trainings. **Overall the process of design, procurement, and distribution of livelihood start-up toolkits to ex-combatants was highly successful.** 203 out of 204 ex-combatant respondents reported that they received their toolkits and that the types of toolkits they received were consistent with the vocational skills they were trained on. For future programming, more thoughts could be put on the practical aspects of the tools included in the toolkits and the logistical aspects of the toolkit distribution process.

In addition to the entrepreneurship skills training pro-

vided at Mapel, additional agricultural focused business training was added during the reintegration phase of the Pilot Program. According to the satisfaction survey, **the State-Based livelihood training met ex-combatants' need for additional technical skills and addressed the issues that demobilized combatants encountered in their reintegration process.** An overwhelming majority of the 192 respondents who attended the trainings said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State trainings with a further 71% of them stating that they had used these new additional skills.

With regards to ex-combatants' livelihoods after returning to the communities, **agriculture and animal husbandry were the two main livelihood options chosen, and it is a positive finding that approximately three quarters of ex-combatants were working on the exact vocations that they were trained on at Mapel.**

**The DDR Pilot Program contributed to the economic empowerment of ex-combatants.** The number of business associations/cooperatives has tripled in the communities after the Pilot Program, and most ex-combatants interviewed were positive that the Pilot Program, especially the vocational trainings, contributed to their increased income.

**The acceptance of ex-combatants by communities and their inclusion in community activities were proved to be very high.** An absolute majority of ex-combatants interviewed claimed that they were very well received in the communities, and more than eight in 10 of them consider themselves as civilians in society.

Taking into consideration the responses to the ex-combatants' satisfaction survey, ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot DDR Program in South Sudan are adapting well to their post-SPLA life and substantial advancements have been made during their reintegration phase within such a short period of time.

# 1 Introduction and Methodology

## 1.1 BACKGROUND

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), many soldiers from various external forces were integrated into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) while some SPLA members were redeployed to other National Organized Forces (NOF) including the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Brigades), and the Correctional Services (Prisons). The Government recognized—with the intention of reducing the size of military forces as well as the national defence budget—that the armed forces needed to transition to a more proportionately-sized and resourced national army (SPLA) that respects human rights and operates under effective civilian oversight. For these reasons, the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program has been highlighted as a priority of the Republic of South Sudan and as an integral component of the country's development strategy to establish sustainable peace, enhance stability, and promote socio-economic development. Since 2011, the Government of South Sudan has focused on developing a new nationally led and owned DDR program, incorporating lessons learned from the CPA DDR process. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments such that recovery and development can begin. This objective is achieved by disarming, demobilizing, and sustainably reintegrating DDR target groups in their chosen communities of return while supporting longer-term development and mitigating potential negative impacts through community based activities.

In 2012, the South Sudan National DDR Commission was officially established and was charged with the responsibility to plan and implement the national DDR program to support transformation of SPLA/SSAF into a more professional, efficient and cost-effective civilian life. The DDR program started off in 2013 with a pilot during which lessons could be learned and incorporated to ensure a well-designed scale up to a full caseload DDR program to fit the context and needs of South Sudan. Beginning in April 2013, 290 ex-combatants were enrolled in the Pilot Reintegration Project and to date they have received reintegration support including Information Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) counseling, fi-

nancial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives training, livelihoods start-up kits, and community engagement in preparation for community support projects.

The primary goal of the NDDRC's Pilot Reintegration Project is to test reintegration approaches and modalities and develop actionable lessons which can inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan's future DDR programming. These modalities include direct services to beneficiaries and project management.

Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:

- To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

## 1.2 XC SATISFACTION SURVEY

In 2014, TDRP conducted an ex-combatants (XCs) satisfaction survey of the 290 demobilized ex-combatants who were enrolled in the Pilot Program in order to gain knowledge of how well ex-combatants are reintegrating into their communities and the main challenges they are experiencing.

The XC satisfaction survey's purpose included:

- Assessing reintegration approaches and modalities of the pilot reintegration project;
- Determining the current reintegration status of all ex-combatants;
- Assessing ex-combatants' participation in reintegration

tion trainings and services;

- Understanding issues related to access to and ex-combatants' participation in reintegration trainings and income generating activities;
- Assessing the degree to which ex-combatants benefited from the program (especially from the livelihood aspect), and are actively engaged in business associations/cooperatives;
- Assessing the responses of ex-combatants to their new socio-economic status within the host communities following demobilization and reintegration;
- Assessing the satisfaction level of ex-combatants with the reintegration trainings and services provided, and obtaining ex-combatants' suggestions for improvement on the training and services; and
- Developing lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming.

### 1.3 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

By presenting findings of the demobilization and reintegration processes, the report's main purpose is to assess the relevance as well as the modalities of the Pilot Program activities designed to facilitate ex-combatants' reintegration. The report's findings seek to provide facts and reflections to pinpoint the key challenges that ex-combatants face when reintegrating in host communities and to highlight best practices during the reintegration process. It is hoped that the results from the satisfaction survey lead to a better design for the overall DDR programming and future project implementation.

It is important to note that the XC satisfaction study is not a tracer study that tracks changes amongst ex-combatants who were traced from the baseline survey conducted in 2013. Data and findings of the XC registration

survey are, however, referred to for comparisons to track patterns and measure changes in XCs' livelihood, community dynamics, and XCs' perceptions in order to better achieve the main purpose of assessing the programmatic operation of the Pilot Program.

## 1.4 METHODOLOGY

A mixed methodology including research on the previous and current situation as a scoping exercise to develop, test and adapt the questionnaire, comparative study of similar post-conflict countries, and qualitative field survey in the four States of reintegration were undertaken. In order to ensure that questions in the XC satisfaction survey could be properly articulated and were relevant to the Pilot Program, a model interview session was conducted among ICRS caseworkers before they were deployed to conduct the field survey. On the model interview session, ICRS caseworkers in turn shared their insights and suggestions for improvement of the questionnaire.

### 1.4.1 TARGET SURVEY POPULATION

As the satisfaction survey was designed to follow up with ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot Program, the target population for this study was the 290 ex-combatants (272 males and 18 females) enrolled in the Pilot Program. The target sample size for the satisfaction survey was set at 70% of the target population size (290) and therefore, it was hoped that 203 ex-combatants could be interviewed. The study eventually located 204 ex-combatants. While more than 90% of the ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal participated in the satisfaction survey, it must be noted that the sample size of Western Bahr el Ghazal covered barely more than half (53.3%) of the total number of ex-combatants in the State. The reason for this comparatively small percentage was due to the impassable roads during the rainy season which made it impossible for NDDRC staff to reach out to all the counties in

**Table 1: Target Population and Sample of Satisfaction Study**

State of Reintegration	# of XCs in the Pilot Program			# of XCs in the Satisfaction Survey			% of XCs in Satisfaction Survey
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Warrap	72	3	75	54	2	56	74.7%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	28	2	30	28	0	28	93.3%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	79	13	92	39	10	49	53.3%
Lakes	93	0	93	71	0	71	76.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>70.3%</b>

Western Bahr el Ghazal. With the sample size of 204 respondents, analyses could be made on a 95% confidence level with a confidence interval of  $\pm 3.7\%$ .

## 1.4.2 TIMING

The preliminary work on the study including desk research, questionnaire design, and programming was initiated in July 2014. Field research and surveys were undertaken in July and August, and data analysis was conducted in August and September.

## 1.4.3 DATA COLLECTION

As the XC satisfaction survey was programmed in tablets and the surveys were undertaken using tablets, collected qualitative survey data were saved directly on the tablets with the completed survey forms uploaded to the World Bank Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) central server on a daily basis. Upon completion of field surveys and data collection, all the survey data were coded and programmed in SPSS for comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis.

## 1.4.4 RESEARCH TEAM

The research team was led by TDRP alongside the NDDRC staff. The ICRS manager provided technical support and monitored the completion of questionnaires throughout the entire field survey process.

11 NDDRC ICRS caseworkers worked as enumerators and travelled to the States of reintegration in order to conduct the interviews. Before going into the field, ICRS caseworkers participated in a half-day intensive training on how to engage survey respondents and conduct tablet-based surveys. In turn, ICRS caseworkers shared their suggestions for the questionnaire's improvement. As part of the training, ICRS caseworkers practiced conducting surveys amongst each other which further helped them familiarize with the questionnaire and prepared them for the field survey.

## 1.4.5 LIMITATIONS

While efforts were made to reduce the limitations of the study, various limitations were inevitable due to the survey sample as well as restrictions related to resources and time frame. A number of limitations can be identified, some of which are common to other studies of the same kind.

First, in terms of survey data, it should be noted that some of the data are missing or invalid which may lead to biases in the findings. Further, while the questionnaire

provided multiple options for every question, it is possible that there were still not sufficient options to capture all the answers that ex-combatants had in mind. This study, as with any research project that relies heavily on quantitative data analysis, cannot be tested against any set of qualitative criteria in that it cannot fully reflect the experience of respondents. Therefore, it is likely that some data might have been misinterpreted and it is simply hoped that the interpretation of the data is representative of what is intended.

Secondly, considering the size and type of research sample as well as the fact that the survey was conducted by NDDRC staff, it is impossible to eradicate the misleading responses provided by interviewees. It is highly likely that among the 204 interviewed ex-combatants, some were reserved in both the manner they responded and the content of their responses. Additionally, some ex-combatants may also have deliberately misinformed enumerators on some issues due to the fear of authorities or in the hope that they might receive further benefits in the future. On the other hand, it is necessary to note that the viewpoints and background of researchers may also shape the research and analysis process, thus resulting in inevitable biases in the final findings.

Thirdly, as is demonstrated in the table of target population and sample of satisfaction study, among the total 204 ex-combatants interviewed, only 12 were women. As gender-disaggregate data is crucial to plan a targeting mechanism that benefits both genders equally and to determine how gender objectives are faring in regard to the Pilot DDR Program, the small sample of women ex-combatants interviewed left a few questions unanswered:

- How are the South Sudanese female ex-combatants faring after demobilization in comparison with their male peers and with women in the communities in general?
- How accessible and appropriate are the Pilot Program benefits to female ex-combatants, and what are the suggestions on program improvement from the female perspective?
- What is the role or participation of female ex-combatants in income generating activities, especially in business associations/cooperatives?

It is worth noting, however, that as there are only a total of 18 female ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot Program, the answers from the female ex-combatants interviewed in the satisfaction survey (67% of the entire female ex-combatant population) are to a large extent

representative of the female ex-combatant perspective in general.

Finally, it should be noted that as the original XC satisfaction survey was in English and did not have an official translation in local languages, it was up to the enumerators to verbally translate each question for respondents. Despite the training for enumerators and the efforts made to harmonize questions, it is still possible that there were nuances in meanings of certain questions during each survey and among different ICRS caseworkers. Further, it is likely that there was a misconception of certain issues or terminologies between ex-combatants and enumerators.

## 1.5 SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF EX-COMBATANTS

In order to properly understand the challenges of demobilization and reintegration in South Sudan as well as the effectiveness of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Program, it is necessary to take a closer look at the demographic profile of the ex-combatants. This section contains basic socio-demographic information on the ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program. In addition, it should be noted that the demographic data is presented and analyzed by breaking down into the four States of reintegration – Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes – in order to facilitate a better understanding of the geographic differences in the demographic profile of the ex-combatants interviewed.

### 1.5.1 AGE

As is indicated in the following table, the average age for the 204 ex-combatants interviewed is about 43.0 years old. The mean age is older for males than that for females, 43.3 compared to 37.8. Notably, the youngest ex-combatant who participates in the Pilot Program is currently 20 years old while the oldest is 70 years old, which suggests that the Pilot Program covered a group of ex-combatants from a wide range of ages.


In terms of average ages in four different States, Lakes States has the youngest group of ex-combatants on average compared to the other States, as the mean age for ex-combatants in Lakes States stands at 39.4 and median age at 40.0. The mean age for ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot Program in Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal is between 43 and 47 years old (46.2, 45.0, and 43.2 respectively); further, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal have ex-combatants that are currently 70 years old.

Interestingly, when further considering the age groups that ex-combatants fall in, approximately 8 out of 10 respondents are under the age of 50 (81.4%), with 70.6% between the ages of 31 and 50. Similar pattern of age distribution occurs in all four States of reintegration. The age distribution of ex-combatants implies that most of them should still be economically active, capable of receiving formal education, vocational training, literacy and numeracy training, life skills training and entrepreneurship training to ensure a sustainable livelihood, and

**Table 2: Age of respondents**

AGE (years)						
Gender	Number	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Range
Male	192	43.27	44	20	70	50
Female	12	37.75	39	22	50	28
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>42.95</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>
State of Reintegration	Number	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Range
Warrap State	56	46.18	45	26	70	44
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	28	44.93	43.5	32	70	38
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	49	43.24	44	22	64	42
Lakes State	71	39.41	40	20	62	42
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>42.95</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>

**Figure 1: Age Distribution of Ex-Combatants**



21.6% and 10.3% of respondents were sergeant and sergeant major respectively, ex-combatants of senior level ranks is rare amongst survey respondents. There was one second lieutenant and one major interviewed in Western Bahr el Ghazal.

The general distribution of former military rank breakdown differs only to a limited extent in the four reintegration States. In Warrap, half of the ex-combatants interviewed are former corporals (28 ex-combatants),

which accounts for 40.6% of total corporals within the 204 ex-combatants. There are also 10 former privates, 15 former sergeants, and three former sergeant majors in Warrap. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, there are also more former corporals than former privates, 10 (35.7% of ex-combatants interviewed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal) compared to 6 (21.4% of ex-combatants interviewed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal). Different from the other three States, a comparatively large percentage (42.9%) of ex-combatants surveyed were of higher junior ranks in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, as a quarter of respondents (7 ex-combatants) were former sergeants, 3 respondents were former sergeant majors. Further, the only two former regimental sergeant majors of the 204 ex-combatants are both from Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes States have similar distribu-

hereby, qualify to enter the job market and more generally to re-enter civil society.

### 1.5.2 MILITARY HISTORY

The former military affiliation inevitably affects ex-combatants' economic status and livelihood, roles and social status in the communities as well as individual perspective on different issues. Former military profiles of ex-combatants, therefore, provide an alternative angle to understand the data collected in the satisfaction survey.

As is shown in table 3, the majority of ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program are soldiers of junior military ranks as approximately two thirds of the total respondents identified themselves as either privates<sup>1</sup> or corporals<sup>2</sup> (66 and 69 respondents respectively). While

**Table 3: Former Military Rank**

State of Reintegration	Former Military Rank						
	Private	Corporal	Sergeant	Sergeant Major	Regimental Sergeant Major	Second Lieutenant	Major
Warrap (56 XCs)	17.9%	50.0%	26.8%	5.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal (28 XCs)	21.4%	35.7%	25.5%	10.7%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Western Bahr el Ghazal (49 XCs)	40.8%	24.5%	14.3%	16.3%	0.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Lakes (71 XCs)	42.3%	26.8%	21.1%	9.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
<b>TOTAL (204 XCs)</b>	<b>32.4%</b>	<b>33.8%</b>	<b>21.6%</b>	<b>10.3%</b>	<b>1.0%</b>	<b>0.5%</b>	<b>0.5%</b>

1 A private is a soldier of the lowest military rank.

2 A corporal is also a junior rank, indicating a more experienced soldier than a private, but having no particular command appointment corresponding to the rank.

tion of ex-combatants in terms of former military ranks. The ex-combatant population in both States primarily composes of former privates, i.e. 40.8% (20 ex-combatants) and 42.3% (30 ex-combatants) in the two States respectively. Former corporals account for 24.5% and 26.8% of the respondents in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes respectively. There was no significant representation of ex-combatants of more senior military level in Western Bahr el Ghazal or Lakes, except for one former second lieutenant and one former major in Western Bahr el Ghazal.

The military background of ex-combatants can both be

an advantage and a disadvantage in their reintegration experience. For example, higher military rank can be an advantage for the ex-combatants who seek employment in the private security sector. However, such an advantage may turn into a disadvantage or obstacle when ex-combatants try to re-position themselves in civil society as civilians. Few ex-combatants interviewed mentioned, however, that they felt there was any discrimination or stigma in the job market or in the host communities. This finding suggests that the integration of ex-combatants in communities in South Sudan is comparatively high and the discrimination of the job market towards ex-combatants is not particularly evident.

# 2 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey and Project Delivery

In July 2014, TDRP conducted an ex-combatants' satisfaction survey of the 290 demobilized ex-combatants who were enrolled in the Pilot Program in order to gain knowledge of how well ex-combatants are reintegrating into their communities, the main challenges they are facing, and the extent to which program participants are satisfied with the Pilot Program.

This section primarily analyzes the satisfaction level of ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program in terms of reinsertion services at Mapel, reintegration and entrepreneurship trainings at Mapel, livelihoods toolkits received after the training, as well as State-based reintegration services and follow-up livelihood trainings. Respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with different types of trainings and services, what they were most satisfied with or what they were not satisfied with, and what their suggestions were for improvement on the trainings and services.

## 2.1 PRE-DDR EXPECTATIONS

### 2.1.1 EX-COMBATANTS' KNOWLEDGE ON DDR PROGRAM

Respondents were asked what they were told about the DDR program before they participated in the Pilot Program. Data shows that prior to enrolling in the DDR Pi-

lot Program, the vast majority of the 204 ex-combatants (80.3%) were told that they would be trained on vocational skills. More than half of them were also told that they would be trained on agricultural skills (66.8%), they would receive toolkits after the training (65.8%), they would get business and literacy trainings (61.7% and 56.5% respectively), and they would get help to start their own business (53.4%). For most of respondents, therefore, the purpose of the DDR program which was to prepare and enable them to get ready for a sustainable livelihood after being demobilized and reintegrated in the society was correctly conveyed.


The trends of ex-combatants' knowledge on the DDR program are similar in the four different reintegration States for the most part. However, compared to other States, noticeably more ex-combatants in Warrap (71.7%) believed that they would be offered a job after the DDR program.

### 2.1.2 EX-COMBATANTS' EXPECTATIONS FROM THE PILOT PROGRAM

Expectations of ex-combatants from the Mapel Training Facility were built upon what they were told and their own understanding of the DDR program. As such, it is not surprising that when asked what they expected to be


offered at Mapel, most of the respondents expected to be trained on vocational (75.5%) and business skills (68.1%) amongst other trainings. Other top expectations of ex-combatants included receiving toolkits (63.7%) and receiving their SPLA salary (51.0%), which are consistent with their general knowledge about the DDR program. It is quite concerning, however, that 7.8% of the total respondents expected to receive additional trainings to get more respect or promotion in the SPLA as it should be well understood by every participant who

Figure 2: Information Received on DDR Program before participating





**Figure 3: Expectations from Mapel Transitional Facility**




goes through the demobilization and reintegration process that they would not return to SPLA ranks.

Same as the consistency of ex-combatants' knowledge about the DDR program in different States, State-disaggregated data on what ex-combatants expected to be offered at Mapel further supported the general trend of ex-combatants' expectations.

### 2.1.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ON TRAINING FACILITIES AND SERVICES

When asked about their suggestions for improvement on facilities and services provided at Mapel, most re-

**Figure 4: Suggestions for Improvement on Facilities and Services at Mapel**



spondents (70.7%) mentioned that improvement could be made to the medical care sector at the training facility. Further, it is encouraging that 64.6% of respondents thought that ex-combatants should be more involved in the decision-making and operations of the camp which suggests that most Program participants were willing to be actively engaged. Other frequently mentioned suggestions include provision of better food, better sanitation, and more drinking water.

It should be noted that within the sample of 192 males and 12 females, 45.5% of respondents provided suggestions on female service and 27.3% of respondents gave advice on childcare service. More respondents could

have recommended these two kinds of services if more female ex-combatants had participated in the Pilot Program and it can be predicted that provision of female services and childcare will be a prerequisite component to facilitate female ex-combatants' participation in the future program.

## 2.2 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS


### 2.2.1 VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Preceding the reintegration phase, ex-combatants received training in 1 of 8 vocational areas at the Mapel Transition Facility. According to the survey, all respondents received vocational training. Among the seven vocational training options offered, vocational training on agriculture/farming was the most popular as 85 ex-combatants (41.7% of total participants) chose to be trained on agriculture/farming followed by auto mechanic/driving training which was the choice of 61 respondents (29.9%). Both animal husbandry training and carpentry training had 15 participants, representing 7.4% of total ex-combatants in the Pilot Program; 13 ex-combatants (6.4%) were trained on electrical, seven were trained on welding, and both masonry and plumbing had four (2.0%) trainees each.

#### 2.2.1.1 USE OF VOCATIONAL SKILLS

With the exception of ex-combatants who received auto mechanic/driving trainings, most respondents trained on other voca-

**Figure 5: Ways of Using Vocational Skills**




tions claimed that the vocational trainings they received taught them new knowledge and that they have used what they learned in real life. 71.3% of those who said they used the vocational skills claimed that they taught the skills they learned to others in the family and community, with a further 57.3% using the skills to deal with household activities and 51.3% to improve their own business. Interestingly, those who taught the vocational skills to others were more likely to have also used the skills to improve their business and establish new businesses. This tendency is especially true for those who were trained on agricultural skills.

While most respondents were positive that they learned something new at the training and they made use of the vocational skills that they learned, there are a total of 49 ex-combatants who have not had the chance to apply the vocational skills. Most of them said it was because they had no access to capital (69.8%) or they did not have the right tools (51.2%). The majority of all respondents lived in rural areas before they joined the military, and most of them chose to return to the rural communities where they were from after demobilization. In the rural settings where farming and livestock breeding are the predominant forms of livelihood, there are few opportunities, either formal or informal, for ex-combatants to apply technical skills such as electrical and

welding. This area of matching vocational skills offered at the transitional facility to rural livelihood options requires further attention in the full scale up.

As is illustrated above, attention should also be put on respondents who received trainings on auto mechanic/driving. Of the 61 ex-combatants who received auto mechanic/driving trainings, more than half of them claimed they have little (14.8%) or no chance (41.0%) to use the skills. When asked why they have not used the auto mechanic/driving skills, most of them explained that the training was insufficient and thus they did not

**Figure 6: Reasons for Not Using Vocational Skills**



**Table 4: Usefulness of Vocational Skills Training**

Type of Vocational Training	Did the vocational training at Mapel teach you anything new?				Have you used what you learned in the class?			
	a lot	some	a little	nothing	a lot	some	a little	nothing
Agriculture (85 XCs)	64	16	5	0	51	26	1	7
	75.3%	18.8%	5.9%	0.0%	60.0%	30.6%	1.2%	8.2%
Animal Husbandry (15 XCs)	8	6	0	1	4	3	3	5
	53.3%	40.0%	0.0%	6.7%	26.7%	20.0%	20.0%	33.3%
Auto Mechanic (61 XCs)	20	29	7	5	15	12	9	25
	32.8%	47.5%	11.5%	8.2%	24.6%	19.7%	14.8%	41.0%
Carpentry (15 XCs)	11	4	0	0	9	5	1	0
	73.3%	26.7%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	33.3%	6.7%	0.0%
Electrician (13 XCs)	10	0	2	1	7	1	1	4
	76.9%	0.0%	15.4%	7.7%	53.8%	7.7%	7.7%	30.8%
Masonry (4 XCs)	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
Plumbing (4 XCs)	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
	75.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%
Welding (7 XCs)	7	0	0	0	4	0	0	3
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%
<b>TOTAL (204 CXs)</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>49</b>
	<b>62.3%</b>	<b>27.0%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>3.4%</b>	<b>45.6%</b>	<b>23.0%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>24.0%</b>

learn enough. The other main reason was the lack of access to capital. It must be noted that ex-combatants who received auto-mechanic/drivers trainings were mostly trained during the reintegration phase due to challenges in implementation at Mapel. As a result, rather than providing additional auto mechanic/driving training at the Mapel Transitional Facility, the project facilitated 52 ex-combatants' attendance at a driving training program as well as securing licenses and two ex-combatants' attendance at an auto-mechanic course during the project's reintegration phase.


### 2.2.1.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Respondents were then asked about their satisfaction level with the vocational trainings they received. The vast majority of the 204 ex-combatants were satisfied with the vocational trainings with 53.4% of them (109 ex-combatants) being very satisfied, 26.5% (54 ex-combatants) satisfied, and 15.2% (31 ex-combatants) moderately satisfied.

Not surprisingly, most of those who expressed their dissatisfaction with the vocational trainings were those

who did not get any chance to use the vocational skills. Particularly, 8 out of 10 of the ex-combatants who were not satisfied with the vocational trainings were trained in auto mechanic/driving, and all of them further explained that they were unsatisfied because the training content was not appropriate and the training duration was too short.

**Figure 7: Satisfaction Level with Vocational Training – Aggregate (204 XCs in total)**



**Table 5: Satisfaction Level with Vocational Training**

Type of Vocational Training	Were you satisfied with the vocational training you received?			
	very	some	a little	no
Agriculture (85 XCs)	64.7%	25.9%	9.4%	0.0%
Animal husbandry (15 XCs)	46.7%	33.3%	20.0%	0.0%
Auto mechanic (61 XCs)	34.4%	27.9%	24.6%	13.1%
Carpentry (15 XCs)	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Electrician (13 XCs)	53.8%	23.1%	15.4%	7.7%
Masonry (4 XCs)	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%
Plumbing (4 XCs)	75.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%
Welding (7 XCs)	42.9%	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%
<b>TOTAL (204 XCs)</b>	<b>53.4%</b>	<b>26.5%</b>	<b>15.2%</b>	<b>4.9%</b>

## 2.2.2 LITERACY AND NUMERACY TRAINING

203 out of 204 respondents participated in the literacy and numeracy trainings in Mapel. As most ex-combatants in the Pilot Program were illiterate and had limited numerical skills before coming to Mapel, 98% of the literacy and numeracy trainings' participants were positive that trainings provided them new knowledge with 86% of them claiming that they were able to apply the newly learned literacy and numeracy skills in their daily lives.

### 2.2.2.1 USE OF LITERACY AND NUMERACY SKILLS

Upon demobilization, ex-combatants who were generally illiterate lacked both professional skills and education. As the basis of any form of education and training,

literacy and numeracy skills play an essential role in the reintegration process, and this is especially true for those who seek employment outside the agriculture sector.


With the new knowledge garnered in literacy and numeracy trainings, most respondents who used the skills said that they feel more capable at handling cash (78.2%) and using mobile phone (77.6%) implying that literacy and numeracy skills exert very positive impacts on ex-combatants' daily lives.

Further, 73.9% of them claimed that they were able to help their children with homework due to the literacy numeracy skills. The fact that about 130 could help their children with homework not only suggests that ex-combatants have a good relationship with their children, but also conveys the encouraging message that the DDR program's positive effects are influencing a larger population or even generation. It should also be noted that the literacy and numeracy trainings were especially beneficial in terms of its positive impact on business activities. More than half of those who have used the skills claimed that they were not only more capable of running a business (67.3%), but also better able to understand receipts (58.2%) and sign documents (53.3%).


For the 27 respondents who have not used the literacy and numeracy skills, it was the lack of opportunity to

apply the knowledge (73.9% of 27 respondents) rather than the lack of ability to understand the knowledge itself (26.15% of 27 respondents). Not surprisingly, approximately 1 in 2 of those who said they did not have the opportunity to apply the skills are self-employed in either agriculture or animal husbandry, i.e. livelihood options that require less literacy and numeracy capacity compared to small business. In addition, it may be the case that considerable assistance and time are needed for ex-combatants to feel confident enough to apply the new skills.

**Figure 8: Usefulness of Literacy and Numeracy Training (203 XCs in total)**




**Figure 9: Ways of Using Literacy and Numeracy Skills**



### 2.2.2.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH LITERACY AND NUMERACY TRAINING

In terms of satisfaction level with the literacy and numeracy trainings they received, the vast majority of respondents were satisfied with the trainings (97%), in particular, approximately two thirds of them stated that they were very satisfied with the trainings. As all project participants received the training at Mapel at the same time, there is very marginal difference in satisfaction level across four different States.

**Figure 10: Satisfaction Level with Literacy and Numeracy Training (203 XCs in total)**



### 2.2.3 LIFE SKILLS TRAINING

Reintegration of ex-combatants is a difficult and challenging process. Having spent a long time in the armed forces, ex-combatants may often find it hard to adjust to the demands of civilian life and new social environment after demobilization. To varying degrees, most ex-combatants suffer from psychological problems that to some extent inhibit their ability to properly integrate into communities, resulting in unexpected conflicts within communities and even with family members. Evidently, it is

not only psychological problems that may result in difficulties for ex-combatants during their reintegration process. A range of other social and livelihood challenges facing ex-combatants in the reintegration phase may lead to conflicts, self-doubt, identity crisis, nervousness, and so on. For these reasons, life skills trainings were provided in the Mapel Transitional Facility. Speaking especially to the importance of voice and self-determination, the life skills training was aimed to reduce socio-economic obstacles for ex-combatants, provide effective social guidance, and, therefore, facilitate the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants.


#### 2.2.3.1 USE OF LIFE SKILLS

With two missing cases of the survey sample, 201 out of 202 ex-combatants received the life skills training at Mapel. The trainings appeared to have served its purposes as data collected indicate that an overwhelming majority of respondents (94.5%) felt that they learned something new at the life skills trainings. 88.2 % of them have actually used the life skills they learned with more than a half (51.8%) claiming that they have used the skills a lot.

For those who have used the skills they learned at the life skills trainings, when asked about how they made use of the skills, most of them said that they used the skills to solve conflicts in the family (96.4% of cases) and in the community (84.3% of cases). Same as with the pattern with literacy and numeracy trainings, a small minority of ex-combatants (11.8%) have not used the life skills with the primary reason being no opportunity for them to apply the knowledge.

Interestingly, there are obvious differences in the use of life skills across the different age groups. It appears that middle-aged ex-combatants benefited the most from the life skills training. Ex-combatants who are between the ages of 30 and 50 appear to apply life skills much more frequently than those in other age groups and most of them use life skills they learned to solve conflicts in the community and in the family. For demobilized combatants, unfulfilled expectations, competition over resources, pressures and difficulties in finding employment and securing livelihood can all easily trigger conflicts with people that constitute the reintegration setting. It is a positive observation that middle-aged ex-combatants could take advantage of the life skills they learned to solve communal and domestic conflicts either for themselves or for others. While it is still too early to determine the impact of life skills at the community level, it


**Figure 8: Usefulness of Life Skills Training**



every participant was satisfied with the life skills trainings they received (99.0% of respondents). In fact, among all the training modules provided at Mapel, life skills training is the one that enjoys the highest satisfaction level. The only two participants who were dissatisfied with the training (in their twenties and sixties) believed that they learned nothing new from the training and thus, were unable to apply the skills in their daily life.

When further asked what they were most satisfied with regarding life skills training, most respondents mentioned the contents of the training and the way trainers delivered the knowledge, accounting for 87.3% and 86.3% of responses respectively.

**Figure 12: Ways of Using Life Skills**




is reasonable to assume that the frequency of conflicts between ex-combatants and non-ex-combatants are on the decrease as the reintegration process progresses.

### 2.2.3.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL OF LIFE SKILLS TRAINING

As most respondents found life skills trainings to be useful and practical, it is not surprising that approximately

**Figure 13: Satisfaction Level with Life Skills Training**



87.3% and 86.3% of responses respectively.


## 2.2.4 FINANCIAL SKILLS, BUSINESS, ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES TRAINING

Besides the training modules discussed above, the implementing partner of the Pilot Program conducted a two-week intensive training on entrepreneurship skills, including financial and business skills as well as basic knowledge relevant to associations/cooperatives, in order to better prepare ex-combatants for the reintegration process in the host communities and better assist ex-combatants in securing a livelihood in civil society. The main thrust of this training was on empowering ex-combatants to build a sustainable livelihood approach for themselves. The training was an important complement to the vocational skills training, as it urged the ex-combatants to think about those skills from a business/entrepreneurship potential perspective. Further, the trainings drew on the literacy and numeracy trainings received, providing very tangible uses of the information previously learned. Additionally, the training in the camp facilitated ex-combatants to initiate thinking on cooperative or partnership work into which they were encouraged and to incorporate community members upon their return to their communities.


### 2.2.4.1 USE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP SKILLS

According to the ex-combatants' satisfaction survey, 202 out of 204 ex-combatants participated in the training, and the majority of respondents (97.0%) were positive that they learned new knowledge during the entrepreneurship trainings. Further 8 in 10 (80.4%) of those who participated in this training module claimed that they have made use of the entrepreneurship skills they learned.

**Figure 14: Usefulness of Entrepreneurship Skills (202 XCs in total)**



**Figure 15: Ways of Using Entrepreneurship Skills**



In terms of the use of entrepreneurship skills, most of the respondents who actually used the skills said that they managed to apply the new skills when working with other people. It should also be noted that more than half of them said that by using the new skills they acquired through the entrepreneurship skills training, they formed a cooperative (68.0%) and slightly more than 3 out of 10 (32.0%) were in the process of forming a cooperative. This finding is very encouraging not only because the data suggests the effectiveness of the training but also because forming or participating in cooperatives is one of the most effective means to sustain a viable livelihood in South Sudan where the job market is too weak to absorb all the labor supply.

Given that the majority of respondents stated that they have used entrepreneurship skills by working together with others or by forming or being in the process of forming a cooperative it can be surmised that majority of respondents applied the entrepreneurship skills by working with others. Not surprisingly, predominantly middle-


aged ex-combatants found entrepreneurship skills useful, and ex-combatants who were trained on agriculture skills were more likely to take full advantage of the entrepreneurship skills by forming cooperatives and establishing businesses.

#### 2.2.4.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH ENTREPRENEURSHIP SKILLS TRAINING

Similar to the cases in the previous three types of trainings (vocational, literacy and numeracy, and life skills training), the entrepreneurship skills training was very well received at Mapel. 97.5% of respondents expressed that they were satisfied with the trainings on financial literacy, business skills, and skills related to associations/cooperatives. More than two thirds of them were very satisfied with these trainings and specifically, training contents and trainers were what they were most satisfied and appreciative about.

It appears that entrepreneurship skills are more inclined to benefit and satisfy those who self-employ in primary sectors where there are more opportunities for a group of people to work together. On the contrary, among the five respondents who were not satisfied with the entrepreneurship training, two of them were trained on auto mechanic skills, two received masonry training, and one chose plumbing. After they returned to their communities, none of the five respondents who were not satisfied were able to combine their vocational skills and entrepreneurship skills and make a profit.

**Figure 16: Satisfaction Level with Entrepreneurship Skills Training**



## 2.2.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ON THE TRAININGS AT MAPEL

When asked about what was the most satisfying aspect of the trainings, respondents mentioned the contents of the trainings and how the trainers delivered the knowledge most with limited variability based on modules. On the other hand, for the small minority who said they were not satisfied with certain trainings, the reasons vary from modules to modules. For vocational training modules, respondents were most unsatisfied with the training length. This was especially true for participants of the auto mechanic/driving training who did not actually get trained at Mapel because of external factors such as lack of training tools. In terms of the life skills training module, the only two participants (1.0%) who were not satisfied with the life skills training said they were unsatisfied because of the contents and the trainers. Finally, the five individuals (2.5%) who claimed that they were not satisfied with the entrepreneurship skills training said that

they wish they had had better training content and that the training could have been longer.

Following the questions regarding the satisfaction levels with different trainings, respondents were further asked about their suggestions for improvement on the trainings they received at Mapel in general. Not surprisingly, the majority of respondents (77.3%) suggested that more types of trainings, especially in terms of the options for trainings on vocational skills, could be offered at Mapel. The second most mentioned suggestion was the improvement on training tools as 61.1% of the respondents suggested providing more training tools. The other top suggestions that were put forward by more than half of the respondents include longer training duration (58.1%), more opportunities for ex-combatants to practice the newly-acquired skills before leaving Mapel (57.1%), and training tools of better quality (56.1%). Further, it is worth mentioning that 47.5% of the respondents suggested that the trainings should be better scheduled. More specifically, it is suggested that the trainings should be scheduled during the dry season when it is much easier to get around or during the slack season when there is not much work to do on the farm.

Figure 17: Most Satisfied Aspects regarding the Trainings





Figure 18: Reasons for Not Satisfied with the Trainings



Generally speaking, ex-combatants very well received the trainings at the Mapel Transitional Facility. While it is too early in the process to determine the impact of these programming, early indicators suggest that the ex-combatants are utilizing the training and techniques. It appears that ex-combatants are more likely to be appreciative and satisfied with the trainings if they have the opportunities to practice the new skills and to apply the skills they learned after leaving Mapel. The young age, commitment, discipline, and motivation of most ex-combatants enable them to be very susceptible to learning new knowledge and skills. The trainings delivered at Mapel, thus, play a crucial role in facilitating and accelerating ex-combatants' reintegration into civil society where they need to interact with people and find viable livelihoods.

## 2.3 LIVELIHOODS START-UP TOOLKITS

In the reintegration phase of the Pilot Program, ex-combatants are provided with various forms of support to facili-



tate their transition into civilian life. Provision of livelihood start-up toolkits is one such component. To some extent, the distribution of toolkits marks the beginning of ex-combatants' endeavor to seek sustainable livelihoods after demobilization. After careful selection of the tools for the different toolkits, the toolkits distribution was completed by a team of NDDRC, TDRP, and implementing partner UNICON in all four State capitals of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region.

With the exception of one individual who was trained in animal husbandry, 203 out of 204 ex-combatants (99.5%) in the survey stated that they received their livelihood start-up toolkits, and the types of toolkits they received were consistent with the exact types of vocational skills they were trained on.

### 2.3.1 EXPECTATIONS FOR TOOLKITS

Although the tools for the different types of vocations were not the same, ex-combatants' expectations for the tools were similar. The vast majority of ex-combatants expected to receive hand tools in their livelihood start-up kits. For the 85 ex-combatants who were trained on

agriculture, their expectations for the toolkits focused more on the basic necessities for farming such as seeds (82.2%), tractors (69.9%), and fertilizers (56.2%).



Notably, a large number of ex-combatants wished that they could have received start-up funds in order to start their own business. While it may be reasonable for ex-combatants to expect financial support, experience from other DDR countries such as Burundi and Rwanda, shows that financial benefits could not support ex-combatants' reintegration in the long-term and that only a very limited portion of such benefits were actually spent on income generating activities.

### 2.3.2 USE OF TOOLKITS

Approximately, 90% (89.1%) of the respondents said that they knew how to use the tools. 11 auto mechanic/driving trainees (18% of total auto mechanic/driving trainees) among a few others did not feel confident in knowing how to use the tools they received. As is explained in the previous section, the auto mechanic/driving training was conducted in the reintegration phase of the project, thus it was understandable that those who chose to be trained on auto/mechanic/driving were not

very familiar with the tools. Excluding auto mechanic/driving trainees, more than 93.0% of the respondents were positive that they were able to use the tools in their toolkits.

Despite stating that the types of toolkits ex-combatants received aligned exactly with the types of vocational trainings they received, it is surprising to find that approximately half (46.5%) of the respondents claimed that few things or nothing in the toolkits matched the tools used during the trainings. This is true for 57.2% (8 ex-combatants) of respondents trained on animal husbandry, 60.6% (37 ex-combatants) of those trained on auto mechanic/driving, 78.6% (11 ex-combatants) carpentry trainees, and 75% (3 ex-combatants) trainees of masonry. It is more worrying that despite excluding those who received auto mechanic toolkits, 37.8% of the rest said that the toolkits they received were different from what they used at the training. Further, it is also worrying to find out that despite most respondents were satisfied with the quality of the tools in their toolkits, 45.9% (28 ex-combatants) of those



who were trained on auto mechanic/driving claimed that the quality of the auto mechanic/driving tools were not satisfactory.

The respondents were then asked if they were still using the tools they received in the toolkits for the vocations they were trained on. The data indicates an encouraging fact that more than 60% (61.4%) of the respondents are still using the tools for their vocations. Excluding the 61 respondents who received auto mechanic toolkits, about 78.2% of the rest are positive that the tools are still in use, which to some extent reflects the usefulness of the toolkits and a high satisfaction level among ex-combatants with the toolkits they received.

### 2.3.3 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH TOOLKITS


In terms of the satisfaction level with the toolkits, the majority of the ex-combatants were generally satisfied

with the toolkits they received as 70% of the respondents confirmed that they were satisfied with their toolkits, one fifth among whom said they were very satisfied. Not surprisingly, most of those who were dissatisfied were auto mechanic trainees. Without accounting auto mechanic participants, about 75% of the rest expressed their satisfaction with the toolkits they received.

For those who were satisfied with the toolkits, they further explained that they were most satisfied about the usefulness of the tools. For those who were not satisfied with the toolkits, the main reasons include “the tools were easy to break” (77.4%) and “parts of the tools were missing when they received them” (52.8%). Further, more than half of the ex-combatants who chose animal husbandry training felt that the tools in the toolkits did not match what they learned to use during the training (nine in a total of 15 were dissatisfied with their toolkits).

Similar to the satisfaction level with trainings, the more opportunities ex-combatants have to use the tools, the more likely they are to be satisfied with the toolkits. As such, one can assume that for ex-combatants, the quality and usefulness of the tools are more important than the quantity of the tools in the toolkits.

Figure 21: Satisfaction Level with Toolkits




### 2.3.4 SUGGESTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT ON TOOLKITS


In terms of the suggestions for the improvement on the toolkits, a vast majority of the respondents suggested that the items provided in the toolkits should be of higher quality. Some ex-combatants (27.3%) suggested better means of transportation for toolkit distribution as it was not rare that some parts of the tools were lost during transport. It is also necessary to note that a small number of respondents (13.1%) mentioned the localization of seeds included in the kits, as it appears that ex-combatants from different States have different preferences for crops.

For future programming, more thought needs to be put into the practical aspects of the tools included in the toolkits and the logistical aspects of the toolkit distribution process.

Figure 22: Whether the Toolkits are still In Use



**Figure 23: Suggestions for Improvements on Toolkits**



## 2.4 STATE-BASED INTEGRATION SERVICES

In addition to the general entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings, additional agricultural focused business training was added during the reintegration phase of the Pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants that chose the agricultural livelihood path received targeted advice to support their reintegration. In addition, feedback suggested that some ex-combatants were in need of additional technical skills training, beyond what was learned at Mapel in particular vocations. Therefore, a State-based reintegration training session was undertaken two months after ex-combatants graduated from Mapel. Different from the previous trainings that were conducted collectively to all participants regardless of their States of reintegration, the follow-up in-State livelihood trainings were delivered respectively in all four States by NDDRC State managers and trained trainers.

According to the needs and issues that ex-combatants faced in their reintegration process in the communities, State-based livelihood trainings put more emphasis on teaching ex-combatants knowledge relevant to business association/cooperatives.


### 2.4.1 PARTICIPATION IN STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING

According to the data captured in the satisfaction survey, 94.1% of all 204 respondents participated in the State-based business and association/cooperatives trainings, and each of them attended two training sessions on average. Although the

trainings were hosted in the State where ex-combatants lived, more than half of all respondents (55.3%) said they travelled more than two hours for the most recent business association/cooperative trainings they attended. In Western Bahr el Ghazal, on the contrary, respondents in the State claimed that the most recent State-based training they attended was either in their payams (48.9%) or less than two hours away (24.4%).

When asked about the amount of time they spent on the State-based livelihood trainings, approximately 8 out of 10 ex-combatants (80.5%) spent at least two full days cumulatively on the trainings held in their States, with more than one fifth (22.1%) of them claiming that they spent more than two days on the trainings. Data collected in Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Lakes contributed to this general pattern of time spent on trainings, while on the contrary, three quarters of respondents in Northern Bahr el Ghazal only spent half to one full day on the trainings.

**Figure 24: Time Spent on State-Based Livelihood Training**



**Table 6: Participation in State-Based Livelihood Training**

States of Reintegration	# of XCs trained at Mapel	# of XCs trained in the States	# of XCs in Satisfaction Survey	# of XC respondents in the Survey trained in the States
Warrap	75	70	56	54
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	30	28	28
Western Bahr el Ghazal	92	60	49	45
Lakes	93	93	71	65
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>192</b>

## 2.4.2 USE OF SKILLS LEARNED AT STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING

The State-based livelihood trainings are proved to be very effective and beneficial as an overwhelming majority (93.6%) of respondents who attended the trainings said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State trainings with a further 71% of them stating that they had used these new additional skills in their real life, reflecting the effectiveness of the State-based reintegration training

As the State-Based trainings focused intensively on inspiring ex-combatants to join or initiate economic associations/cooperatives and empowering ex-combatants to build a sustainable livelihood, new skills that ex-combatants mentioned include how to better work with others, how to form associations/cooperatives, how to keep financial records, and how to manage business.

Despite most ex-combatants being positive that they learned additional knowledge and skills, the usefulness of State-based livelihood trainings was perceived differently across different vocations and States.


While most of those who were previously trained on agriculture, animal husbandry, carpentry, electrical, masonry, and welding responded positively that they have used the additional skills learned at the State-based trainings, 22 of the 61 auto mechanic trainees and three of the four plumbing training participants stated that they had no chance to apply the additional business skills. Coincidentally, most of those who have not had the chance to apply the new business skills were also those who claimed that they did not put in use the entrepreneurship skills learned at Mapel. As in the tendency found in the feedback of trainings at Mapel, those who self-employ in the primary sector or become members of associations/cooperatives are likely to benefit more from the business-oriented State-based training. Further, it is also worth mentioning that those who were trained on technical skills such as electrical, masonry, and welding are now living on the agriculture livelihood contributing to the reason why they are able to apply the association/cooperative skills.

In terms of the responses from the different States, it is evident that fewer ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes have made use of the business skills taught


at the State-based trainings compared to the other two States. 75.0% of the ex-combatants from Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 31.0% of those from Lakes were auto mechanic training participants. The sum of auto mechanic trainees in these two States accounted for 70.5% of those who chose to be trained on auto mechanic/driving in total and may help explain why State-based livelihood training was perceived to be less practical in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes.

Meanwhile, a significantly larger percentage of ex-combatants in Western Bahr el Ghazal expressed that they learned a lot of additional skills during the State-based training and that they made the most use of the skills training. This positive appraisal can be tied to the fact that approximately half (42.9%) of the ex-combatants in Western Bahr el Ghazal received agriculture training and 43 in a total of 49 of them ended up operating their own businesses. Same analysis applies for Warrap, where half of the 56 respondents were trained on agriculture and 78.6% of them started to operating their own business after reintegration.

**Figure 25: Whether Ex-Combatants Learned Additional Skills at the State-Based Training**



**Figure 26: New Skills Learned at the State-Based Livelihood Training**



### 2.4.3 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING

In terms of participants' satisfaction level with State-based livelihood training, 61.8% of respondents were very satisfied with the training, and only two respondents who chose the auto mechanic track were not satisfied with the trainings (one was from Warrap and the other from Lakes). Most of the ex-combatants attended the training and the vast majority of them said they learned additional knowledge and skills. As in the case of entrepreneurship skills training at Mapel, ex-combatants were most satisfied with the way in which trainers taught them (91.8%) and the training content (90.7%).

Based on the satisfaction level with business association/cooperative-oriented State-based livelihood training, one can assume that due to the informal nature of the market in South Sudan and the lack of formal education among ex-combatants, targeted business skills are in urgent demand by most ex-combatants, and business associations/cooperatives is a popular way among ex-combatants and within the communities to get together and support each


other. In addition, as a certain number of community members were also involved in the State-based trainings, the satisfaction level with the training also implies, to some extent, that ex-combatants have no problem interacting with community members, suggesting the successful reintegration process of ex-combatants.

### 2.4.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ON STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING

Following from the satisfaction level, respondents were asked to provide some suggestions for improvement on the State-based reintegration training. There is marginal difference between the suggestions given by ex-combatants to improve trainings in the States and trainings at Mapel in general. Most mentioned suggestions include providing more training (90.6%), more financial support (74.4%), and more employment opportunities (65.0%) among others. Interestingly, it should be noted that more than half of the respondents (56.2%) suggested that more activities that involve both ex-combatants and community members should be organized in future programs.

This suggestion reflects the willingness of ex-combatants to break the social network of ex-combatants exclusively and to become part of the larger communities. Their desire of being engaged in the community also implies the success and effectiveness of the entire Pilot Program.

For future programming, besides providing targeted support to business associations/cooperatives in the primary sector, additional thoughts can also be put into how to help ex-combatants who have technical skills and seek employment in the secondary sector benefit equally from the business skills training.



# 3 Early Results of Ex-Combatants' Reintegration

The following section looks at the economic status and livelihood of reintegrated ex-combatants. Ex-combatants interviewed in the satisfaction survey were asked questions about their current means of livelihood as well as their economic involvement in the host communities. Ex-combatants were also asked about their land status, whether they or their families have access to land, and how they make use of land. Information and analysis on ex-combatants' income as well as their income generation activities concludes this section.

## 3.1 EX-COMBATANTS LIVELIHOODS

Securing sustainable livelihoods is one of the most significant aspects in the reintegration phase and the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants should aim to provide alternative means of livelihood. As is known, livelihood is closely linked to skills. Upon demobilization, ex-combatants who spent years in the armed forces do not have enough marketable skills that could lead them to viable livelihoods. To bridge such gaps in skills, various vocational trainings were provided to ex-combatants in the Pilot Program to facilitate their entry into the civil life and help them find alternative means of livelihood.

According to the data collected, more than half the respondents said that they managed to return to the type of work they had before they joined the armed forces, except for Lakes State where 50% of respondents claimed that they started different kinds of work after reintegration. In South Sudan where there is limited means of livelihood and where the job market is fragile, it is difficult for ex-combatants to find formal employment. For this reason, a large number of ex-combatants are inclined to operate their own business both before and after the DDR Pilot Program.

### 3.1.1 SMALL BUSINESS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES

#### 3.1.1.1 SMALL BUSINESS

Of all 204 ex-combatants, more than half of them (61.3%) are making a living by operating their own business after they graduate from the Pilot Program, repre-

senting a 5% increase in the number of ex-combatants who have their own business compared to that before the Pilot Program.

Of the ex-combatants who state that they operated their own business, there are a variety of types of business that they are running. Not surprisingly, most of them (70.4%) are currently self-employed in farming while only 6.4% are working on animal husbandry and 6.4% on fishing. One fifth of these ex-combatants are owners of shops or restaurants (16.8% and 3.2% respectively), with a further 10.4% of them being carpenters. For most of these ex-combatants who consider themselves as business owners, the business that they are running is a small-scale family business. Without the necessity or ability to hire external employees, most of the ex-combatants (93% of responses) either work at the business they own themselves or work together with family members.

#### 3.1.1.2 BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES

Significantly more ex-combatants chose to participate in associations or cooperatives after they graduated from the Pilot Program. While there were only 14 ex-combatants who were members of associations/cooperatives a year ago before participating in the Pilot Program, 23.5% of respondents (48 ex-combatants) claimed during the satisfaction survey that they participated in associations/cooperatives after the DDR Pilot Program, representing an increase of more than 200%.

Not surprisingly, the types of associations/cooperatives that ex-combatants are members of fall in the same trend as the types of business that ex-combatants are operating themselves with 73.2% of the associations or cooperatives being agricultural associations/cooperatives. In terms of the number of members in the associations/cooperatives, the average number of members in each association/cooperative is 16 people with one agricultural cooperative claiming to have as many as 62 members and another agricultural association having only three members. Most of the associations/cooperatives have a mix of both male and female members. There are currently no women only associations/cooperatives in any of the four States of reintegration, and it appears that men are more likely to join associations/cooperatives than women.

### 3.1.1.3 AMBIGUITY BETWEEN SMALL BUSINESS AND ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES

To summarize the data presented above, among 204 ex-combatants who were interviewed in the satisfaction survey, 125 said that they operated their own business after leaving Mapel, and 48 stated that they participated in associations/cooperatives.

The number of ex-combatants who claimed to be members of associations/cooperatives contradicts with feedback from the beginning of the survey where 150 ex-combatants asserted that they either formed a cooperative or are in the process of forming a cooperative by using the entrepreneurship skills learned at Mapel. There may be various reasons for this inconsistency of results. One of the explanations is that the concept of cooperative/association and how to distinguish small business from business association/cooperative are ambiguous in South Sudan and may vary from one ex-combatant to another. There is a tendency that those who said they operated their own business also stated that they formed associations/cooperatives and vice versa. As most of the small businesses that ex-combatants engage in is run by a group of family members, it is possible that ex-combatants could easily consider their business as informal associations/cooperatives. However, when the questions were phrased as whether they worked with others in associations/cooperatives of a certain scale, it is likely that only those who worked in associations/cooperatives outside the family units and those who were members of groups with more than three members gave the positive answer.

In fact, several references, such as field research and anecdotal evidence, suggest that most of the ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program are members of non-registered community associations/cooperatives.

### 3.1.1.4 BANK ACCOUNT


It is a worrying prospect that despite the business skills ex-combatants were taught during the entrepreneurship training and in-State livelihood training, none of the existing business or association/cooperative has a bank account. While it is understandable that ex-combatants

– who were not used to dealing with business activities and who had very limited association/cooperative management skills – need more time to practice their financial skills and accept the use of credit, the Government of South Sudan should also make more efforts to facilitate the ex-combatants’ access to credit in order to help secure their livelihood as civilians.

### 3.1.1.5 BENEFITS OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES

Interestingly, for those who are currently members of business associations/cooperatives, when further asked about the benefits of participating in associations/cooperatives that they would not have had if they had worked alone, the most mentioned benefits were the inclusion in a larger social network (82.2%) and the improvement of friendship (66.7%) as opposed to the emphasis on economic income and various technical supports. In fact, it is such a positive observation that the majority of members in associations/cooperatives consider their participation as not only an opportunity to earn more money but also as an opportunity to expand their social capital. This is important because it shows both the willingness on the part of ex-combatants to take part in social life as well as the readiness of the communities to accept them to be part of a group. More encouragingly, data collected from the satisfaction survey shows that in most of the associations/cooperatives that ex-combatants are members of, there are generally more community members than ex-combatants. This finding indicates that ex-combatants do not mingle merely with their former peers from SPLA but have developed their friendship with commu-

**Figure 28: Benefits of Participating in Business Associations/ Cooperatives**



nity members to form associations/cooperatives since demobilization. The enhanced social capital creates the vital basis for ex-combatants to fully reintegrate in their communities in the long term.

Other frequently mentioned benefits include receiving more skills trainings, learning to make good decisions, earning more money, and sharing resources. On a more general level, it appears that by participating in associations/cooperatives, ex-combatants benefit both professionally and psychologically. Professionally, they get the chances to utilize their skills to make a living and get various supports from broader groups; psychologically, they are more included in the community activities and have forged the social bond outside the ex-combatants' unit. As such, the participation in associations/cooperatives could also be considered as contributing to the empowerment process of ex-combatants

### 3.1.2 INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES

Successful reintegration of ex-combatants is supported by the economic independence of ex-combatants through productive and sustainable livelihoods. After demobilization, livelihoods that ex-combatants take range from farming to taxi (boda boda) driving.<sup>3</sup> From the project programming perspective, it is interesting to know if the economic status of ex-combatants has changed since the DDR Pilot Program. Respondents were asked, therefore, if they could meet their household expenses at the end of each month or they had to borrow money to sustain their life in this section. They were also asked if they worked on the vocations they were trained on during the

Pilot Program and whether they perceived it as easier or harder for ex-combatants to find employment compared to other community members.

#### 3.1.2.1 INCOME

According to the satisfaction survey, approximately half of the respondents (49.2%) stated that they were able to sustain themselves without external help or using past savings. While the number of those who have money left over every month has increased by about 10% since 2013, it is a bit concerning to find that about two fifths (41.3%) of ex-combatants still rely on family money transfers (3.4%) or borrowing money (37.9%) in order to cover their monthly expenses, indicating an 8% increase compared to a year ago (33.3%).

There is a noticeable difference in the patterns of ex-combatants' monthly income in the four States of reintegration. In Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal, data collected from the satisfaction survey shows very positive trends as a majority of ex-combatants interviewed in both States confirmed that they had viable and sustainable means of livelihood since demobilization. Specifically, 17.9% of the respondents in Warrap and 53.1% in Western Bahr el Ghazal stated that they usually had money left over at the end of each month which implies great progress compared to 2013. It is worth mentioning that 11 out of a total of 49 ex-combatants in the State have stopped receiving salaries from SPLA while the vast majority of their peers in the other three States are still receiving money on a regular basis from SPLA.

Western Bahr el Ghazal showed the biggest progress in term of ex-combatants' economic conditions and the economic advancement is, to a large extent, related to their participation in small businesses as well as associations/cooperatives. Among a total of 49 respondents from Western Bahr el Ghazal, 43 of them are make a liv-

3 Boda boda drivers are motorcycle drivers who take people around to earn money.

Table 7: Disposable Income

State of Reintegration	usually have money left over		usually break-even		usually have to use past savings		rely on family money transfers		usually have to borrow	
	2014 (%)	2013 (%)	2014 (%)	2013 (%)	2014 (%)	2013 (%)	2014 (%)	2013 (%)	2014 (%)	2013 (%)
Warrap (56)	17.9	6.1	50.0	42.4	7.1	0.0	3.6	3.0	21.4	40.9
Northern Bahr el Ghazal (28)	7.1	9.4	35.7	59.4	7.1	6.2	0.0	0.0	46.4	18.8
Western Bahr el Ghazal (49)	53.1	24.4	16.3	31.7	18.4	8.5	8.2	4.9	4.1	28.0
Lakes (71)	14.3	10.0	8.6	53.5	2.9	1.1	1.4	1.1	71.4	30.0
<b>TOTAL (204)</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>44.9</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>30.7</b>



**Table 8: Economic Indicators**

Indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
GDP, constant prices (% change)	-47.6%	24.4%	7.1%	17.6%	15.7%
GDP per capita, constant prices (national currency, SSP)	1,794.7	2,130.9	2,181.1	2,454.6	2,785.2
Inflation, average consumer prices (% change)	45.1%	-0.0%	11.2%	9.0%	6.4%

ing by operating their own businesses after leaving Mapel. In addition to sustaining themselves and their families, approximately 80% (79.6%) of them also earn extra incomes by selling crops, and about a quarter (24.5%) of them raise animal for sale.

In Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes States, however, it is surprising as well as worrying to find that the economic status of ex-combatants has been getting worse since 2013 as more respondents in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes claimed that they had to borrow money compared to 2013. While it is very important to know whether they borrowed from friends or from banks and what their expenditure patterns were, such questions were unfortunately not included in the Satisfaction Survey.

Among the 13 ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal who had to borrow money at the end of each month, nine of them were auto mechanic trainees. Interestingly, most of these 13 ex-combatants claimed that they either owned small businesses or were members of associations/cooperatives. Thus it is reasonable to assume that one of the reasons why they need external financial support is because their business needs investment. In Lakes, most of the 50 ex-combatants who usually have to borrow money rely on farming to feed their families. As Lakes is the only State in South Sudan that does not have an international border, it is comparatively harder to succeed in running small businesses or engage in trade in the State.

While the disposable income of ex-combatants in different States varies significantly per the survey data, it is necessary to note that the results are inconclusive. One of the most important factors that may impact the disposable income is the inflation of the economy. In fact, the inflation rate in South Sudan is estimated to be 11.2% in 2014, representing an increase of approximately 400% from the year before. However, GDP per capita is not growing at the same pace as the inflation rate. According to IMF estimates, GDP per capita in South Sudan increased only 2.4% from 2013 to 2014. With the augmenting inflation of the economy, prices of goods and services in the market are soaring. As a result, house-

holds have to spend more money on necessities, while their income stays almost the same. One can assume that without the DDR Program and reintegration support, economic status and life conditions of ex-combatants could have been worse.


### 3.1.2.2 VOCATIONS

In order to understand ex-combatants' perception of the effectiveness of the Pilot Project and whether their monthly income has changed because of the program, respondents were asked how they felt their income had changed after participating in the trainings. Of the 204 ex-combatants, 42.6% were positive that their income had increased thanks to the vocational trainings. A further 37.3% stated that their income had stayed the same and only about 20% of them claimed that their income somehow decreased after the trainings. Similar trends of changes in income appear in all four States. Particularly positive responses came from Western Bahr el Ghazal where approximately 8 out of 10 respondents stated that they had increased income after participating in the vocational trainings and only one ex-combatant said his income decreased after the trainings. This in turn supports the impressive progress in terms of economic status made in Western Bahr el Ghazal as discussed above.

It is interesting to mention that while 46.4% of ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 72.8% in Lakes had to rely on family money transfers or to borrow money in order to meet their monthly expenses, only 21 ex-combatants in these two States (9 and 13 ex-combatants respectively) said they had less income after the trainings. It is possible that another factor that led to their deteriorated economic condition was market inflation.

Respondents were then asked if they were working on the vocations that they were trained on at the Mapel Transitional Facility. 152 out of 204 (74.5%) ex-combatants claimed that they were working on the exact vocation that they were trained on, more than half of whom (51.3%) are engaging in agriculture/farming. Unsurprisingly, among those who also have other means of livelihood (52 ex-combatants) and those who are not working on the kind of livelihood that they received training on

**Figure 29: Whether Vocational Trainings Contributed to Changes in Income\***



\*Auto mechanic trainees were removed from the sample because they were still to complete their vocational training.

(52 ex-combatants), most of them have chosen to make money by doing some work relevant to farming. This is reasonable in that as an agricultural country, agriculture/farming is one of the major livelihoods for all South Sudanese with the economy's secondary sector incapable of absorbing all the labor supply.

### 3.1.2.3 EMPLOYMENT COMPARED TO COMMUNITY MEMBERS

The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants is a complex process affected by a wide range of economic, social, and psychosocial factors. As the majority of ex-combatants mention that they currently have some means of livelihood since demobilization, it is interest-

ing to know about their own perception of demobilized soldiers' advantages or disadvantages in the job market compared to community members. To this end, respondents were asked whether they felt it was easier or harder for ex-combatants to find a job or viable livelihood.


A positive trend that emerges in all four States shows that of all ex-combatants, more than one third (34.0%) of them stated that they found it easier for ex-combatants to find employment compared to community members with a further 37.9% of respondents saying that there was no difference between ex-combatants and community members in terms of employment opportunities. This trend holds true for all eight kinds of vocations that ex-combatants

were trained on before going back to the communities, and data shows that respondents who chose to be trained on agriculture skills were more likely to feel that it was easier for ex-combatants to get employment.

Interestingly, when further asked about the reasons why they felt it was easier and harder for ex-combatants to find employment, the top three advantages and disadvantages were the same: professional skills, education, and social capital. On one hand, for those who were positive that it was easier for ex-combatants to find a job, they believed that ex-combatants had more skills trainings, more education as well as more social connections with people.


Whereas for the 48 ex-combatants who believed that the ex-combatant identity negatively affected their chance of getting employment, they felt that community members instead of ex-combatants had more skills trainings, more education, and more social connections. It seems that being ex-combatants, therefore, could be considered as both an advantage and a disadvantage depending on different individuals.

**Figure 30: Whether it is Easier for Ex-Combatants to Get Jobs**




Taking a closer look at the data, approximately half (45.8%) of those who found it hard to find a job were those who were trained on auto mechanic/driving and therefore, it is not surprising why the most mentioned disadvantages of ex-combatants included the

**Figure 31: Advantages for Ex-Combatants in the Job Market**



**Figure 32: Disadvantages for Ex-Combatants in the Job Market**



lack of skills, education, and social connection. In the rural settings where most ex-combatants reintegrated into, there was not much demand for technical skills such as auto mechanics. Social networks, therefore, plays a particularly prominent role in getting employment in the auto mechanic vocation. Further, it is generally recognized that any type of employment is closely related to skills and education, and lack of skills is always one of the main factors behind the high unemployment rates amongst ex-combatants in post-conflict countries. Despite the intensive vocational skills trainings, ex-combatants need much more time to digest and practice the vocational skills they were taught.

## 3.2 LAND


Ownership of land and cattle is of great importance in South Sudan, a predominantly agrarian country. As the majority of ex-combatants dwell in rural areas, this section focuses on the land status of ex-combatants which is a crucial indicator of the livelihood status of ex-combatants after reintegration. Respondents were asked whether they had access to land, and most importantly, how they made use of the land. Data collected during the satisfaction survey indicate that there is marginal difference between the land status of ex-combatants in 2013 and 2014. The four States of reintegration show similar, if not the same, pattern of land status.

### 3.2.1 ACCESS TO LAND

Of the 204 ex-combatants interviewed, the vast majority of them (91.2%) have access to land, and for most of them, the land that they have access to either belong to them or their families. For the 20 ex-combatants who do not have access to land, their age ranges from 20 to 53, and three of them were female ex-combatants.

Data shows that the non-access to land seems to have little negative impact

**Figure 33: Access to Land**



on their livelihood, as the nine out of the 20 survive on farming or animal husbandry through associations/cooperatives with the rest relying on the vocation skills they were trained on such as auto mechanic and carpentry.

### 3.2.2 USE OF LAND

In terms of land use, crop farming is the major agricultural pursuit in all four States with a total of 97.2% of respondents claiming that they grow crops to feed their families and a further 44.4% saying that they grow crops for trading purposes. Another important agricultural activity that respondents conduct on the land is animal husbandry. 22.8% of ex-combatants indicated that they raise animals for food and 12.2% of them said they raise animals for sale. Notably, very few ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and no respondent in Lakes breed animals for trade. It is not surprising that respondents who operate their own business are more likely to grow crops and raise animals for sale. This may help explain why there is a comparatively small percentage of ex-combatants in Lakes who use land for business purposes as the majority of ex-combatants in Lakes are not small business owners. As food security is the priority and biggest concern for South Sudanese, the crops and animals for sale are generally the surplus of household needs.


While land-use varies across different States, evident difference in land use occurs between genders. Among the nine female ex-combatants who have access to land, eight of them grow crops to sell and four of them raise animals for sale in addition to meeting household needs. It appears that in this case, female ex-combatants are more likely to engage in small business activities compared to their male peers.

Besides farming and livestock breed-

ing, a number of respondents also mentioned that they use land for other needs such as shelter and running business. 56.4% of respondents in Warrap, 25.0% in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, 40.0% in Western Bahr el Ghazal, and 19.3% in Lakes claimed their houses were on the land. For the most of the 30 ex-combatants who said they had business on the land, their business is not surprisingly related to commercial farming and agricultural associations/cooperatives. In South Sudan where land is considered as a basic element for a livelihood, there is no ex-combatant in any of the four States who leases land to others.

Finally, the only respondent who owns land but does not make any use of the land was found in Lakes State. He attributed the area's insecurity as the major reason behind not using the land as opposed to other more common reasons such as land infertility or the lack of skills to manage the land.


According to other similar studies conducted in countries with DDR programs, access to and ownership of land have been recurrent challenges for returning ex-combatants. However, as is indicated by the data, this



**Table 9: Use of Land**

State of Reintegration	Grow crops to feed family	Grow crops to sell	Raise animals to feed family	Raise animals to sell	Have a house there	Have a business there	Do not use it
Warrap	96.4%	41.8%	27.3%	14.5%	56.4%	20.0%	0.0%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	100.0%	42.9%	21.4%	7.1%	25.0%	10.7%	0.0%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	97.5%	80.0%	17.5%	30.0%	40.0%	17.5%	0.0%
Lakes	96.5%	22.8%	22.8%	0.0%	19.3%	15.8%	1.8%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>97.2%</b>	<b>44.4%</b>	<b>22.8%</b>	<b>12.2%</b>	<b>36.1%</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>

**Figure 35: Raise Animals**



is not the case for ex-combatants in South Sudan. Compared to their peers in other post-conflict countries such as Burundi and Rwanda, most ex-combatants in South Sudan have access to land and make good use of land. One of the explanations for this is that South Sudan, without severe land scarcity, holds one of the richest fertile agricultural lands in Africa. Further, as ex-combatants are generally considered as “wounded heroes” in civil society, there was little difficulty for returning former combatants in acquiring land or getting access to land. It should also be highlighted that the DDR Pilot Program well prepared ex-combatants for managing land as part of the vocational skills training, and it is encouraging to find no respondent complaining about the lack of farming skills or the lack of tools or seeds.

### 3.3 COMMUNITY OF REINTEGRATION

Whether ex-combatants have the ability to fit back in the civil society as civilians determines the success and effectiveness of their reintegration process. Such ability refers to not only ex-combatants’ capacity to earn a living and sustain themselves after demobilization, but also their ability to re-immers themselves in as many aspects of community life as possible. For this reason, when it comes to social reintegration of ex-combatants, both ex-combatants and communities play a vital role. Particularly, the social network and interactions that develop between ex-combatants and community members promote the socio-economic development of the commu-

nities which in return strengthens the reintegration of ex-combatants.


Considering the importance of building social capital and the role that host communities play in promoting social capital, questions included in this section place a strong emphasis on how ex-combatants perceive their reintegration into the communities and how they view themselves in the communities. To this end, respondents were asked the reasons why they chose their places of reintegration, how they position themselves in the host communities, and the challenges they have met in the communities.

#### 3.3.1 PLACES OF REINTEGRATION

According to ex-combatants’ registration profiles that were collected before they enrolled in the DDR Program, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (96.0%) reintegrated into the areas where they were originally from, and only less than 30% (29.2%) were positive when asked if they would consider or ever considered migrating for better jobs. Taking these elements into consideration, it is therefore, not surprising to find that 91.2% of all respondents in the satisfaction survey stated that family was their top priority when deciding the places for reintegration which also implies that most ex-combatants were reunified with their families and did not have problems joining their families after demobilization.

It is also noticeable that more than eight out of 10 respondents (82.4%) also mentioned economic reasons as another priority in choosing places for reintegration. This is a positive finding as it indicates that ex-combatants were able to think logically about how to sustain themselves after demobilization and how to achieve a better socio-economic condition. As South Sudan has been ex-

**Figure 36: Reasons for Choosing the Places of Reintegration**



periencing rapid urban growth, the rural-urban migration pattern is especially apparent in recent years. It is possible that in a few years, the general pull effects of modern cities will attract many ex-combatants to migrate to urban areas for livelihoods and better standards of living. Interestingly, data shows that female ex-combatants are more susceptible to migrating due to economic reasons as eight in 12 stated that they have considered moving for better jobs. To some extent, the economic reasons for choosing places of relocation suggest that ex-combatants are optimistic about the economic opportunities for them in civil society. Data collected during the Registration Survey in 2013 support this assumption, as 81.8% of respondents felt that their economic situation would improve in the near future.

### 3.3.2 EX-COMBATANTS' IDENTITY

In the reintegration process, the uncertainty of life after demobilization makes it highly likely for ex-combatants to struggle between former military identity and current civilian identity. In order to better understand how well ex-combatants socially and, more importantly, psychologically have reintegrated into the communities, respondents were asked how they perceive their social identity upon completing the DDR Pilot Program. A total of 85.2% consider themselves as civilians with 64.0% regarding themselves as the same as other community members. It is encouraging to see that most ex-combatants were psychologically well prepared to integrate in the communities and did not have an identity crisis. This trend is supported by the fact that most respondents were closely involved in their host communities and were not confronted with stigmatism from the community or

estrangement from their families. It also indicates that most ex-combatants are successfully adapting to civilian life as well as being accepted by their communities and families. One can further assume that as the reintegration process progresses and ex-combatants are more involved in their social networks in the communities, increasingly more will consider themselves as average community members over time.

When looking at the disaggregated data in individual States, ex-combatants in Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal were more likely to consider themselves different from other community members. This is true for 33.9% of respondents in Warrap and 42.9% in Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

While it is a bit concerning that there are still a number of ex-combatants who think of themselves as different from community members, it is understandable that it is a long-term process for ex-combatants to fully reintegrate into communities. In fact, compared to their peers in other countries with DDR programs, ex-combatants in South Sudan are doing well in terms of engaging in communities and interacting with community members. On the other hand, however, it is concerning to find that there were 30 respondents from Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Lakes who distinguished themselves from community members and still wanted to be Wounded Heroes. These 30 ex-combatants are those who are most susceptible to severe identity crisis and psychological issues after demobilization as their expected social identity has to be adjusted to reality.

Among the 21.2% of respondents who expected themselves to be civilians but different from community members and the 14.8% who expected to continue being Wounded Heroes, it would have been interesting to ask what exactly they meant by saying “being different from community members”, whether they felt or they would like to be superior to community members or they felt they were generally inferior in the community. Further research could be interesting in this aspect.

### 3.3.3 COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE

Community acceptance and social inclusion are central to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. In civil communities where various social dynamics are active, ex-combatants may

Figure 37: Expected Social Status of Ex-Combatants




Table 10: Pre-DDR Community Acceptance				
Will the community be accepting of you upon returning? (% of respondents)				
Aggregated 4 States	Yes totally	Yes partly	No	Do not know
TOTAL	85.8%	11.3%	0.7%	2.2%
Will people in your community be scared of you because you are an ex-combatant? (% of respondents)				
Aggregated 4 States	Yes		No	
TOTAL	16.4%		83.6%	
Do you feel that people in your community will be hostile to you? (% of respondents)				
Aggregated 4 States	Yes		No	
TOTAL	28.8%		71.2%	

Table 11: Post-DDR Community Acceptance				
Was the community accepting of you after returning from Mapel? (% of respondents)				
States of Reintegration	All accepting	Some accepting	A small few accepting	Not accepting
Warrap	96.4%	0.0%	0.0%	3.6%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	96.4%	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Lakes	91.4%	5.7%	1.4%	1.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>95.6%</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>0.5%</b>	<b>1.5%</b>
Are people in the community scared of you because you are an ex-combatant? (% of respondents)				
States of Reintegration	Not scared	A little scared		Some scared
Warrap	100.0%	0.0%		0.0%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	96.4%	0.0%		3.6%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	100.0%	0.0%		0.0%
Lakes	97.1%	1.4%		1.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>98.5%</b>	<b>0.5%</b>		<b>1.0%</b>
Are people hostile because you have training or reintegration assistance and salary? (% of respondents)				
States of Reintegration	None are hostile	Small few hostile		Some hostile
Warrap	100.0%	0.0%		0.0%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	100.0%	0.0%		0.0%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	100.0%	0.0%		0.0%
Lakes	82.9%	8.6%		8.6%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>94.1%</b>	<b>3.0%</b>		<b>3.0%</b>
Do you face any challenges in the host communities? (% of respondents)				
States of Reintegration	No		Yes	
Warrap	66.1%		33.9%	
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	89.3%		10.7%	
Western Bahr el Ghazal	95.9%		4.1%	
Lakes	75.7%		24.3%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>79.8%</b>		<b>20.2%</b>	

perceive different senses of inclusion and social belonging which may be either constructive or destructive to their reintegration process. Ex-combatants' self-perception of their reintegration into civilian life is, to a large extent, contingent upon how accepted and included they feel. For this reason, it is important to understand how ex-combatants perceive their level of acceptance in the community. To this end, respondents were asked how the communities accepted them and how community members treated them after their return. They were also asked about the challenges, if any, they faced when living in the communities.

The successful reintegration of ex-combatants is not based solely on ex-combatants' ability and willingness to take part in civilian life as part of the community, but also on the readiness and acceptance of the community to welcome them back and allow them to be part of the community. Very positive trend is shown from the data in terms of the level of acceptance in the community.

Data indicates that each community in all four States of reintegration is well sensitized in terms of accepting ex-combatants. An absolute majority of respondents were positive that the communities were all accepting of them after they returned from Mapel. This holds true for 96.4% of respondents in Warrap, 96.4% in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, every single respondent in Western Bahr el Ghazal, and more than nine in ten respondents (91.4%) in Lakes. Furthermore, it is also encouraging to find that very few community members are scared of (1.5%) or hostile to (6%) ex-combatants because of their identity, and the four States share the same pattern of how ex-combatants were treated by community members.

It should be especially mentioned that female ex-combatants were very well accepted into the communities, as no female ex-combatant sensed fear or hostility from host communities, and most of them found it easier to find a livelihood because of their former military identity. According to the studies on ex-combatants' reintegration in the Great Lake Regions, female ex-combatants were generally treated worse compared to their male peers and other female community members. Therefore, it is a very positive finding that female ex-combatants were not discriminated in South Sudan after their return to civil society.


From the data, it appears that the level of community acceptance and ex-combatants' inclusion in the communities is high and that ex-combatants were better received in the host communities than they originally expected. Before participating in the DDR program, 16.4% of respondents assumed that people in the community would be scared of them because of their former military identity, while only 1.5% claimed that they felt community members were to some extent scared of them. 28.8% of the ex-combatants thought community members would be hostile to them, while only 6.0% perceived hostility from the community.

There are various reasons to this high level of community acceptance in South Sudan. Besides the fact that ex-combatants are looked upon as heroes by community members and that the vast majority of them actually re-integrated back into their home communities, one of the particular reasons in this case is that most ex-combatants had been living in the communities for a while before they joined the Pilot Program. Therefore, they had had more time and opportunities to forge social bonds outside SPLA and to show community members that they were a threat neither to the security nor the livelihood of the community.

### 3.3.4 CHALLENGES IN THE COMMUNITIES

While the level of community acceptance and ex-combatants' social inclusion in the community is high, a small minority of ex-combatants still felt that they had certain challenges living in the community. One of the most mentioned challenges ex-combatants encountered

**Figure 38: Challenges Ex-Combatants Face in the Communities**





was the difficulties in receiving services such as medical service and legal service. On one hand, after having spent years in SPLA as combatants, it takes time for ex-combatants to get used to dealing with quotidian tasks and to get familiar with skills they just acquired through the training. On the other hand, it is also important to keep in mind that in South Sudan where there is very limited infrastructure, it is not only ex-combatants who

feel the difficulties in getting access to social services, but the entire South Sudanese population in general.

Taking into consideration the social indicators presented above, therefore, ex-combatants in South Sudan are adapting well to their post-SPLA life and substantial advancements have been made during their reintegration phase within a short period of time.

# 4 Conclusion

The South Sudan Pilot DDR Project attempted to test the modalities of the reintegration system and develop lessons learned for future DDR programming. It aimed to facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants by providing them with skills that could enable and enhance their livelihood opportunities in civil society.

While it is still too early in the process to determine the impact of the reintegration programming, results of the ex-combatants' satisfaction survey indicate that ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot DDR Project are adapting well to civilian life and that notable advancements in reintegration have been made within just one year.

All the conclusions reached below are self-reported opinions of ex-combatants and listed as described in the data previously presented.

## 4.1 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS

**Livelihood trainings achieved the goals of providing ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths and basic skills to secure a livelihood in the communities.**

All ex-combatants participating in the Pilot Program were eligible to receive the livelihood trainings at the Mapel Transitional Facility which included vocational training, literacy and numeracy training, life skills training, and entrepreneurship skills training. A little over 95% of ex-combatants interviewed were positive that they were satisfied with all the trainings they received. In particular, they were most satisfied with the training contents and the way in which the trainers delivered the trainings.

### Vocational Skills Training:

- Among the eight vocational training options offered, there were 85 ex-combatants in agriculture skills training, 15 in animal husbandry training, 61 in auto mechanic training, 15 in carpentry training, 13 in electrician training, four in masonry training, four in plumbing training, and seven in welding training;
- 96.6% of the total respondents stated that they learned new knowledge at the training;

- 76% of them have used the skills they learned in their daily life; and
- 95.1% of them were satisfied with the vocational training they received.
- Literacy and Numeracy Training:
- 98% of the literacy and numeracy trainings participants were positive that trainings taught them new knowledge;
- 86% of them claimed that they were able to apply the newly learned literacy and numeracy skills in their daily life; and
- 97% of respondents were satisfied with the literacy and numeracy training.

### Life Skills Training:

- 94.5% of the respondents felt that they learned something new at the life skills trainings;
- 88.2 % of them have actually used the life skills they learned;
- 98.9% of the respondents were satisfied with the life skills training.

### Entrepreneurship Skills Training:

- 97.0% of the participants were positive that they learned new knowledge during the entrepreneurship trainings;
- 80.4% of them claimed that they have made use of the entrepreneurship skills they learned; and
- 97.5% of respondents expressed that they were satisfied with the trainings on financial literacy, business skills, and skills related to associations/cooperatives.

For future programming, most of the ex-combatant participants of the Pilot Project suggested that more vocational options be provided on the vocational skills training. Regarding the improvement on the facilities and services at Mapel, focus could be put on the provision of sufficient medical care and broader involvement of participants in the decision-making process.

## 4.2 LIVELIHOOD START-UP KITS

**Overall the process of design, procurement and distribution of livelihood start-up toolkits to ex-combatants was highly successful.** With the exception of one individual who was trained in animal husbandry, 203 out of 204 ex-combatants in the Pilot Program received their livelihood start-up toolkits and the types of toolkits they received were consistent with the exact types of vocational skills they were trained on. Results of the satisfaction survey show that:

- 70% of the 203 respondents confirmed that they were satisfied with their toolkits,
- 72% of the 203 respondents were still using their toolkits with 40% of them claiming that they were using the toolkits frequently; and
- Receivers of agriculture and carpentry toolkits were most satisfied with their toolkits and used the toolkits most often.

Ex-combatants interviewed in the satisfaction survey suggested that the items provided in the toolkits should be of higher quality. In addition, for future programming, more thought needs to be put into the practical aspects of the tools included in the toolkits and the logistical aspects of the toolkit distribution process.

## 4.3 STATE-BASED REINTEGRATION SERVICES

In addition to the general entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings, additional agricultural focused business training was added during the reintegration phase of the Pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants who chose the agricultural livelihood path received targeted advice to support their reintegration. According to the satisfaction survey, **the State-Based livelihood training met ex-combatants' need for additional technical skills and addressed the issues that demobilized combatants encountered in their reintegration process.** Besides, State-based livelihood trainings put more emphasis on teaching ex-combatants knowledge relevant to business associations/cooperatives, which contributed to the increasing numbers of business associations/cooperatives formed in the communities.

**The State-based livelihood trainings are proved to be very effective and beneficial** as an overwhelming majority of the 192 respondents who attended the trainings said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State trainings, with a further 71% of them stating that they

had used these additional skills in their real life reflecting the effectiveness of the State-based reintegration training.

For future programming, financial support to ex-combatants can to be considered and improved in order to facilitate their formation of associations/cooperatives. Further, besides providing targeted technical support to business associations/cooperatives in the primary sector, additional thoughts can also be put on how to help ex-combatants who seek employment in the secondary sector.

## 4.4 EARLY RESULTS OF EX-COMBATANTS REINTEGRATION

**Agriculture and animal husbandry are the two main livelihood options for ex-combatants.** After returning to the communities, most ex-combatants have chosen to make money by doing some work related to farming. It is a positive finding that 152 out of 204 (74.5%) ex-combatants were working on the exact vocations that they were trained on, and more than half of them are engaged in agriculture/farming.

**The DDR Pilot Program contributed to the economic empowerment of ex-combatants, and the number of business associations/cooperatives has tripled in the communities after the Project.** Approximately two thirds of the Pilot participants make a living by operating their own business, and most of them are self-employed in agriculture or animal husbandry. It is also very encouraging to find that 23.5% of respondents claimed during the satisfaction survey that they participated in associations/cooperatives after the DDR Pilot Program, representing an increase of more than 200% from 2013. Further, not surprisingly, 73.2% of the associations/cooperatives are agricultural associations/cooperatives. Field research and anecdotal evidence suggest that currently most ex-combatants are participants of non-registered associations/cooperatives.

**While only approximately half of the ex-combatants were able to sustain themselves without external help or using past savings, most of them were positive that the Pilot Program, especially the vocational trainings, contributed to the increase of their income.** This needs to be put in the context of the current economic situation in South Sudan for a better understanding. Despite the increased income of ex-combatants, the country's high inflation rate results in the decrease in disposable monthly income.

**The acceptance of ex-combatants by communities and the inclusion of them in community activities were proved to be very high.** An absolute majority of ex-combatants interviewed claimed that they were very well received in the communities, and more than eight in 10 of them consider themselves as civilians in the society.

In conclusion, taking into consideration the results and analysis presented in the report, ex-combatants in South Sudan are adapting well to their post-SPLA life and substantial advancements have been made during their reintegration phase within such a short period of time.

# ANNEX 1: 2014 South Sudan Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey Questionnaire

A. RESPONDENT'S BIOGRAPHICAL AND FAMILY DETAILS			
<b>A.1</b>	<b>Enumerator ID/Name</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Abel Likambu 2. Angok Angok Deng 3. Chawuoch Nhial Alit 4. Compeo Wani 5. Deng Dennis Thiik 6. Francis Makol Mou 7. Garang Kuol Lual 8. Imbegas Habib Jaber	9. Isaac Mabor Arok 10. John Alier Atem 11. John Chol Atem 12. John Chol Maker 13. John Lasu Bethwel 14. John Mabor Makuei 15. Simon Achuil Athian 16. Yolanda Alek	
<b>A.2</b>	<b>DDR ID Number</b> <i>(please write in number on DDR ID)</i>	MAPL _____	
<b>A.3</b>	<b>Name of Respondent</b> <i>(please write in details)</i>	First	
		Middle	
		Last	
<b>A.4</b>	<b>Age</b> <i>(please write in number)</i>		
<b>A.5</b>	<b>Gender</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>	1. Male	2. Female
<b>A.6</b>	<b>Former Military Rank</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Private 2. Corporal 3. Sergeant 4. Sergeant Major 5. Regimental Sergeant Major	6. Second Lieutenant 7. First Lieutenant 8. Captain 9. Major 10. Lieutenant Colonel	
<b>A.7</b>	<b>Former Assembly Area</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Ayod (assembled in Pariak) 2. Bentiu 3. Gogrial, East 4. Gogrial, West 5. Juba/GHQs	6. Kapoeta 7. KorFlus 8. Nimule 9. Pachalla/Boma 10. Panyagor	11. Pariak (main Jonglei area) 12. Pibor 13. Rumbek 14. Tonj
<b>A.8</b>	<b>Place of Reintegration</b> <i>(please write in details)</i>	State	
		County	
		Payam	
		Boma	
		Village	
<b>A.9</b>	<b>Reasons for choosing that place of reintegration</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. Family reasons 2. Economic reasons 3. Education opportunities	4. Safety and security x. Other (please specify)	
<b>A.10</b>	<b>Before you started the DDR program, what did you hear the program would include?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. I would be trained on vocational skills 2. I would be trained on agricultural skills 3. I would be trained on literacy/english 4. I would be trained on business 5. I would receive a toolkit 6. I would receive a bull 7. I would receive a tractor 8. I would receive seeds 9. I would receive a house	10. I would receive land 11. I would be provided a job 12. I would be helped to start my own business 13. I would get additional formal education 14. I would be helped with school fees for my family 15. I would receive my salary 16. I would get additional money x. Other (please specify)	

## B. TRANSITIONAL FACILITY TRAININGS

<b>B. TRANSITIONAL FACILITY TRAININGS</b>			
<b>B.1</b>	<b>At the Mapel Transitional Facility, what did you expect would be offered?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. I would be trained on vocational skills. 2. I would be trained on agricultural skills 3. I would be trained on literacy/english 4. I would be trained on business 5. I would receive additional training to get more respect or promoted in the SPLA 6. I would get health services 7. My family would get health services 8. I would get additional money	9. I would receive a toolkit 10. I would receive a bull 11. I would receive a tractor 12. I would receive seeds 13. I would receive my salary 14. I would receive extra salary 15. I would receive land 16. I would receive a house x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.2</b>	<b>What Vocational Training did you receive in Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Agriculture/Farming	5. Electrician	
	2. Animal Husbandry	6. Masonry	
	3. Auto Mechanic/ Driving	7. Plumbing	
<b>B.3</b>	<b>Did the vocational training at Mapel teach you anything new?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little      4. Nothing
<b>B.4</b>	<b>Have you used what you learned in the class?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little      4. Nothing
<b>B.4.1</b>	<b>If B.4 = 1, 2, or 3, Yes: How did you use what you learned in the training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. I taught others in the family/community 2. Used training for improving own business 3. Establishing new business	4. Joined another business 5. Used skills to solve things in the household x. Other (please specify)	
	<b>If B.4 = 4, No: Why did you not use what you learned in your training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. Did not have access to capital 2. Did not have the right tools 3. Given tools were broken 4. Training was not sufficient/ I did not learn enough	5. Training did not apply to my life 6. Unrest/Insecurity prevented me from working in that vocation 7. Did not want to make use of the training skills x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.5</b>	<b>Were you satisfied with the vocational training you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Very	2. Some	3. A little      4. No
<b>B.5.1</b>	<b>If B.5 = 1 or 2, Yes: What were you particularly satisfied about the vocational training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. Training content was very good 2. Training length was good 3. Trainers were very good	4. Training tools 5. Length of training was correct x. Other (please specify)	
	<b>If B.5 = 3 or 4, No: Why were you not satisfied with the vocational training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>		
	1. Training content was not appropriate 2. Training duration was too short 3. Language difficulties 4. Tools were missing	5. Trainers did not deliver training content appropriately 6. I didn't understand the training 7. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.6</b>	<b>Are you currently working in that vocation?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Yes	2. No	
<b>B.6.1</b>	<b>If B.6 = 1, Yes: Are you working only in that or also in something else to make money?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>		
	1. Only in that	2. Also in something else	

<b>B.6.1a</b>	<b>If B.6.1 = 2. Also something else: What are you also doing to make money?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Farming 2. Animal husbandry 3. Open/Run shop 4. Driving 5. Trading 6. Mechanic 7. Fishing 8. Carpentry	9. Security guard 10. Health worker 11. Tailoring 12. Construction 13. Electrician 14. Masonry 15. Catering/Hotel 16. Plumbing/Waterpump 17. Casual labor	18. Welding 19. Teacher 20. Administration 21. Computers 22. Telephone/Radio repair 23. Hairdressing 24. Tannery/Leather production	25. Bee keeping 26. Restaurant/Tea shop 27. Charcoal 28. Boda boda driver 29. Money from friends 30. Money from family 31. Laundry 32. Sanduk/Savings/Loan x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.6.2a</b>	<b>If B.6 = 2. No: Why are you not working in that vocation?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Did not have access to capital 2. Did not have the right tools 3. Given tools were broken 4. Training was not sufficient/ I did not learn enough 5. Training did not apply to my life		6. Unrest/Insecurity prevented me from working in that vocation 7. Was not interested or did not want to make use of the training skills 8. Other employment opportunities came up x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.6.2b</b>	<b>If B.6 = 2. No: What are you doing now for money?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Farming 2. Animal husbandry 3. Open/Run shop 4. Driving 5. Trading 6. Mechanic 7. Fishing 8. Carpentry	9. Security guard 10. Health worker 11. Tailoring 12. Construction 13. Electrician 14. Masonry 15. Catering/Hotel 16. Plumbing/Waterpump 17. Casual labor	18. Welding 19. Teacher 20. Administration 21. Computers 22. Telephone/Radio repair 23. Hairdressing 24. Tannery/Leather production	25. Bee keeping 26. Restaurant/Tea shop 27. Charcoal 28. Boda boda driver 29. Money from friends 30. Money from family 31. Laundry 32. Sanduk/Savings/Loan x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.7</b>	<b>Has your income changed because of the vocational training?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Increased	2. Stayed the same	3. Decreased	
<b>B.8</b>	<b>Are you receiving your SPLA salary?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes		2. No	
<b>B.9</b>	<b>Did you attend the literacy and numeracy trainings in Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes		2. No	
<b>B.9.1</b>	<b>If B.9 = 1. Yes: Did the class teach you anything new?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>B.9.2</b>	<b>If B.9 = 1. Yes: Have you used what you learned in the class?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>B.9.2a</b>	<b>If B.9.2 = 1. Yes: How did you make use of your training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Help children with homework 2. Read/understand receipts 3. Read/understand signposts 4. Better/able to use mobile phone		5. Better/able to handle cash 6. Better able to run a business 7. More confident in dealing with authorities 8. Able to sign documents x. Other (please specify)	

<b>B.9.2b</b>	<b>If B.9.2 = 2. No: Why have you not used what you learned in the training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. No opportunity to apply knowledge 2. Not enough was taught/training length was not sufficient		3. I did not understand the training 4. Not confident enough to apply knowledge x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.9.3</b>	<b>If B.9 = 1. Yes: Were you satisfied with the literacy and numeracy trainings you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Very	2. Some	3. A little	4. No
<b>B.9.3a</b>	<b>If B.9.3 = 1. 2. or 3: Yes: What were you most satisfied about?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training contents	2. Trainers	3. Training tools	4. Training length x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.9.3b</b>	<b>If B.9.3 = 4. No: Why were you not satisfied with the literacy and numeracy classes?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training content was not appropriate 2. Training length was too short 3. Language difficulties 4. Education material missing		5. Trainers did not deliver training content appropriately 6. I didn't understand the training x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.10</b>	<b>Did you attend the life skills trainings in Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes		2. No	
<b>B.10.1</b>	<b>If B.10 = 1. Yes: Did the class teach you anything new?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>B.10.2</b>	<b>If B.10 = 1. Yes: Have you used what you learned in the class?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>B.10.2 a</b>	<b>If B.10.2 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: In what way did you make use of your life skills training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Solving conflicts in the community		4. Community leadership	
	2. Solving conflicts in the family		x. Other (please specify)	
	3. Health concerns			
<b>B.10.2 b</b>	<b>If B.10.2 = 4. No: Why have you not used what you learned in the life skills training?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. No opportunity to apply knowledge	2. Training did not correspond to actual needs/living situation		x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.10.3</b>	<b>If B.10 = 1. Yes: Were you satisfied with the life skills trainings you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Very	2. Some	3. A little	4. No
<b>B.10.3 a</b>	<b>If B.10.3 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: What were you most satisfied about?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training contents	2. Trainers	3. Training tools	4. Training length x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.10.3 b</b>	<b>If B.10.3 = 4. No: Why were you not satisfied with the life skills classes?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training content was not appropriate 2. Training length was too short 3. Language difficulties 4. Education material missing		5. Trainers did not deliver training content appropriately 6. I didn't understand the training x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.11</b>	<b>Did you attend the training on Financial skills, business, associations and cooperatives at the end of the time in Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes		2. No	
<b>B.11.1</b>	<b>If B.11 = 1. Yes: Did the class teach you anything new?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>B.11.2</b>	<b>If B.11 = 1. Yes: Have you used what you learned in the class?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing



<b>B.11.2 a</b>	<b>If B.11.2 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: How have you used what you learned in the class?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. Now working together with others		5. Improved an existing business	
	2. Has formed a cooperative		6. Employment opportunity	
	3. Is in the process of forming a cooperative		x. Other (please specify)	
4. Managed to establish a business				
<b>B.11.2 b</b>	<b>If B.11.2 = 4. No: Why have you not used what you have learned?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. No opportunity to apply knowledge 2. Training did not correspond to actual needs x. Other (please specify)		3. Unrest/Insecurity prevented me from working in that vocation 4. Lack of confidence	
<b>B.11.3</b>	<b>If B.11 = 1. Yes: Were you satisfied with the Financial skills, business, associations and cooperatives trainings you received?</b> (please select ONE answer)			
	1. Very	2. Some	3. A little	4. No
<b>B.11.3 a</b>	<b>If B.11.3 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: What were you most satisfied about?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. Training contents	2. Trainers	3. Training tools	4. Training length x. Other (please specify)
<b>B.11.3 b</b>	<b>If B.11.3 = 4. No: Why were you not satisfied with the Financial skills, business, associations and cooperatives classes?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. Training content was not appropriate 2. Training length was too short 3. Language difficulties 4. Education material missing		5. Trainers did not deliver training content appropriately 6. I didn't understand the training x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.12</b>	<b>What do you suggest can be improved on the trainings at Mapel?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. More/Different types of training 2. More/Different vocational skills should be provided 3. Less types of training 4. Less vocational skills should be provided 5. More trainers. 6. Better trainers. 7. Trainers/Staff should be more accessible 8. More training tools. 9. Better training tools 10. Training content should be harder/mo		11. Training content should be easier/less advanced 12. Training should be longer. 13. Training should be shorter. 14. Better time arrangement for the training/Better training schedules 15. More opportunities to practice the new skills 16. Bigger class size. 17. Smaller class size. 18. Training on job searching skills 19. Follow-up trainings 20. Nothing x. Other (please specify)	
<b>B.13</b>	<b>What do you suggest can be improved on the facilities or other services at Mapel?</b> (please select ALL that apply)			
	1. Medical care 2. Better housing 3. Psychosocial care 4. Career counseling 5. Better food 6. More food 7. More drinking water 8. More bathing water 9. Breakfast 10. Tea		11. Sanitation 12. Female services 13. Training should be shorter. 14. Better time arrangement for the training/Better training schedules 15. More opportunities to practice the new skills 16. Bigger class size. 17. Smaller class size. 18. Training on job searching skills 19. Follow-up trainings 20. Nothing x. Other (please specify)	

<b>C. LIVELIHOOD START-UP TOOLKITS</b>	
<b>C.1</b>	<b>Did you receive a start-up toolkit?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Yes   2. No
<b>C.2</b>	<b>What toolkit did you receive?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Agriculture/Farming   5. Electrician
	2. Animal Husbandry   6. Masonry
	3. Auto Mechanic/ Driving   7. Plumbing
	4. Carpentry   8. Welding
<b>C.2.1</b>	<b>If C.2=1. Agriculture/Farming: What did you expect to get in your toolkit?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>
	1. Hand tools   7. Machinery 2. Seeds   8. Generator 3. Fertilizer   9. Money to start/grow my farm 4. Bull   10. Tools that matched what we used in Mapel 5. Tractor   11. Additional tools to what we used in Mapel 6. Plow   12. High quality tools   x. Other (please specify)
<b>C.2.2</b>	<b>If C.2=2 through 8: What did you expect to get in your toolkit?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>
	1. Hand tools   5. Tools that matched what we used in Mapel 2. Machinery   6. Additional tools to what we used in Mapel 3. Generator   7. High quality tools 4. Money to start my business   x. Other (please specify)
<b>C.3</b>	<b>Were you satisfied with the toolkit you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Yes, very satisfied   3. No, somewhat unsatisfied 2. Yes, somewhat satisfied   4. No, very unsatisfied
<b>C.4</b>	<b>If C.3=1 or 2. Yes: What were you most satisfied with the toolkit you received?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>
	1. I received many tools   4. I knew how to use the tools/the tools matched the training I received 2. I received quality tools   5. The tools were very valuable 3. The tools were very useful to me   x. Other (please specify)
<b>C.5</b>	<b>If C.3=3 or 4. No: What were you most unsatisfied with the toolkit you received?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>
	1. The tools were of low quality/easy to break   6. I wanted different additional tools/items to what I received (please specify) 2. The tools were faulty/didn't work   7. I wanted more tools/items of the same kind (please specify) 3. The tools were broken when I received them   8. My toolkit was stolen in transit 4. Parts of the tools were missing when I received them   9. My toolkit was missing tools/items that others received 5. The seeds didn't grow x. Other (please specify)
<b>C.6</b>	<b>Did you know how to use the items in the toolkit you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Yes, I knew how to use everything   3. No, I did not know how to use most of the things 2. Yes, I knew how to use most of the things   4. No, I did not know how to use any of the things
<b>C.7</b>	<b>Did the items in the toolkit MATCH to what was used in the vocational training at Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Yes, matched exactly to the training   3. No, few things matched the training 2. Yes, most things matched the training   4. No, nothing matched the training
<b>C.8</b>	<b>To what degree was the quality of the kit satisfactory?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Very satisfactory   2. Satisfactory   3. Partially satisfactory   4. Unsatisfactory
<b>C.9</b>	<b>Are you still using what you received in the toolkit for your vocation you were trained in?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>
	1. Yes, frequently   5. No, I have it but do not use it
	2. Yes, sometimes   6. No, I gave it away or traded it
	3. Not often   7. No, I sold it
	4. I use it, but for other purposes
<b>C.10</b>	<b>What do you suggest can be improved about the toolkits?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>
	1. Better quality tools/items/seeds   4. Better means of transporting the tools/toolkits from the state offices to the houses 2. More different tools/items/seeds 3. More of the same tools/items/seeds   5. Choices of seeds should be localized x. Other (please specify)   6. Nothing

## D. STATE-BASED REINTEGRATION SERVICES

	<b>When you left Mapel, what did you expect to learn or receive after going to your community?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
<b>D.1</b>	1. Vocational skills training 2. Agricultural skills training 3. Business training 4. Cooperative/association training 5. Literacy/numeracy training 6. I would receive my salary 7. I would receive extra money 7. I would be provided a job 9. I would be given money to start my own business 10. I would receive a toolkit	11. I would receive a house 12. I would receive land 13. I would get additional formal education 14. I would be helped with school fees for my family 15. Career advice/counselling 16. Psychosocial care/counselling 17. Health services for myself 18. Health services for my family 19. Cooperative/Association formation counselling 20. Nothing	x. Other (please specify)	
<b>D.2</b>	<b>Since you left Mapel, was a business or cooperative training offered to you?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes	2. No		
<b>D.3</b>	<b>Did you attend a business or cooperative training since you left Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes, a business/cooperative	2. No, I did not attend		
<b>D.3.1</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: How MANY business or cooperative trainings have you attended since leaving Mapel?</b> <i>(please write in the number)</i>			
<b>D.3.2</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: How much TIME did you spend in the business or cooperative trainings since leaving Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Less than 1 hour	3. Half a day	5. 2 Full days	
	2. 1-2 hours	4. 1 Full day	6. More than 2 days	
<b>D.3.3</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: Where was the most recent training you attended?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. In my payam	2. In a payam less than 2 hours away	3. In a payam more than 2 hours away	
<b>D.3.4</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: Did you learn anything additional to the training taught in Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>D.3.4a</b>	<b>If D.3.4 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: What additional information did you learn after leaving Mapel?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. How to better work with others	5. How to keep financial records		
	2. How to form an association	6. How to manage a business		
	3. How to form a cooperative	7. How to market my goods		
	4. How to register a cooperative	x. Other (please specify)		
<b>D.3.5</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: Have you used what you learned in the class?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. A lot	2. Some	3. Very little	4. Nothing
<b>D.3.5a</b>	<b>If D.3.5 = 4. No: Why have you not used what you have learned?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. No opportunity to apply knowledge	3. Socio-political situation didn't allow to apply knowledge (external factors)		
	2. Training did not correspond to actual needs	4. Lack of confidence		
	x. Other (please specify)			
<b>D.3.6</b>	<b>If D.3 = 1. Yes: Were you satisfied with the Financial skills, business, associations and cooperatives trainings you received?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Very	2. Some	3. A little	4. No
<b>D.3.6a</b>	<b>If D.3.6 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: What were you most satisfied about?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training contents	2. Trainers	3. Training tools	4. Training length
				x. Other (please specify)
<b>D.3.6b</b>	<b>If D.3.6 = 4. No: Why were you not satisfied with the Financial skills, business, associations and cooperatives classes?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Training content was not appropriate	7. I couldn't get there		
	2. Training length was too short	8. It was too long		
	3. Language difficulties	9. I didn't understand the training		
	4. Education material missing	10. I did not need to learn those things		
	5. Trainers did not deliver training content appropriately	11. I did not want to do more training		
	6. It was too far away	x. Other (please specify)		
<b>D.3.7</b>	<b>If D.3 = 2. No: Why did you not attend?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. It was too far away	4. I did not need to learn those things		
	2. I couldn't get there	5. I did not want to do more training		
	3. It was too long	x. Other (please specify)		

D.4	<b>After you returned from Mapel, was the community accepting of you?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. All accepting 2. Some accepting		3. A small few accepting 4. Not accepting	
D.5	<b>Are people in your community scared of you because you are an ex-combatant/ex-member of armed forces?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Very scared	2. Some scared	3. A little scared	4. Not scared
D.6	<b>Are people hostile (including jealousy) to you because you have received training/reintegration assistance and salary?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Many hostile	2. Some hostile	3. Small few hostile	4. None are hostile
D.7	<b>Do you face any challenges in the host communities?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes		2. No	
D.8	<b>If D.7 = 1. Yes: What kind of challenges do you have?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Not being respected/welcome 2. Less involvement in the community activities 3. Less business opportunities 4. Harder to get services (medical, financial, legal, etc.)		5. Harder to make a living 6. Harder to form a family/get married 7. Harder to build social network with community members 8. Not being trusted x. other	
D.9	<b>What do you suggest can be improved about the DDR trainings or services after the transitional facility?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Provide more trainings 2. Provide different trainings (if yes, explain) 3. Provide less trainings 4. Provide more employment/career opportunities 5. Provide more cooperative/association formation counseling 6. Provide more financial support 7. Organize more activities that involve both ex-combatants and community members 8. Sensitize community members to accept and welcome ex-combatants into the communities		9. Provide more career advices/counseling 10. Provide medical services 11. Provide more psychosocial care 12. Provide land 13. Provide housing 14. Provide more seeds 15. Provide tractors 16. Provide bulls 17. Provide access to credit 18. NOTHING x. Other (please specify)	

<b>E. REINTEGRATION ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT</b>				
<b>E.1</b>	<b>Before you went to Mapel, did you do any of the following?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Operate my own business	4. Participate in an association (6-20 people)		
	2. Work at a full time job where I am paid by another person	5. Participate in a registered cooperative (more than 21 people)		
	3. Work sometimes where I am paid by another person	x. Other (please specify)		
<b>E.2</b>	<b>Do you currently do any of the following?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Operate my own business	4. Participate in an association (6-20 people)		
	2. Work at a full time job where I am paid by another person	5. Participate in a registered cooperative (more than 21 people)		
	3. Work sometimes where I am paid by another person	x. Other (please specify)		
<b>E.2.1a</b>	<b>IF E.2 = 1. Operate my own business: What type of business do you own?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Farming 2. Animal husbandry 3. Open/Run shop 4. Driving 5. Trading 6. Mechanic 7. Fishing 8. Carpentry	9. Security guard 10. Health worker 11. Tailoring 12. Construction 13. Electrician 14. Masonry 15. Catering/Hotel 16. Plumbing/Waterpump 17. Casual labor	18. Welding 19. Teacher 20. Administration 21. Computers 22. Telephone/Radio repair 23. Hairdressing 24. Tannery/Leather production	25. Bee keeping 26. Restaurant/Tea shop 27. Charcoal 28. Boda boda driver 29. Money from friends 30. Money from family 31. Laundry 32. Sanduk/Savings/Loan x. Other (please specify)
	<b>IF E.2 = 1. Operate my own business: Who works at the business?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Yourself 2. 1 family member	3. Many family member 4. 1 employee	5. Many employee x. Other (please specify)	
<b>E.2.3a</b>	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association" or 5. Participate in a cooperative: What type of Association/Cooperative are you currently a member of?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Farming 2. Animal husbandry 3. Open/Run shop 4. Driving 5. Trading 6. Mechanic 7. Fishing 8. Carpentry	9. Security guard 10. Health worker 11. Tailoring 12. Construction 13. Electrician 14. Masonry 15. Catering/Hotel 16. Plumbing/Waterpump 17. Casual labor	18. Welding 19. Teacher 20. Administration 21. Computers 22. Telephone/Radio repair 23. Hairdressing 24. Tannery/Leather production	25. Bee keeping 26. Restaurant/Tea shop 27. Charcoal 28. Boda boda driver 29. Money from friends 30. Money from family 31. Laundry 32. Sanduk/Savings/Loan x. Other (please specify)
	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association or 5. Participate in a cooperative: How many members are in your group?</b> <i>(please write in the number)</i>			
	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association or 5. Participate in a cooperative: Are the members of this group mostly ex-combatants, mostly community members or a mix of both?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
<b>E.2.3c</b>	1. Only ex-combatants 2. Mix of ex-combatants and non-ex-combatant community members, but mostly ex-combatants	3. Equal mix of both ex-combatants & non-ex-combatant persons 4. Mix of ex-combatants and non-ex-combatant community members, but mostly non-ex-combatant community members		
	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association or 5. Participate in a cooperative: Are the group members mostly men, women or a mix of both?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
<b>E.2.3d</b>	1. Only men	3. Mix of men & women but mostly women		
	2. Mix of men & women but mostly men	4. Equal mix of men & women	5. Only women	
<b>E.2.3e</b>	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association" or 5. Participate in a cooperative: Do you have a bank account for this group?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes	2. No		
<b>E.2.3f</b>	<b>IF E.2 = 4. Participate in an association" or 5. Participate in a cooperative: What benefits do you get from participating in the group that you would not have if worked alone?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
	1. Earn more money 2. Additional economic opportunities 3. Financial flexibility if need to borrow 4. Social networking 5. Friendship	6. Skills training 7. Learning to make good decisions 8. Shared or pooled resources 9. Supply of input products/produce 10. Legal support	11. Accounting support 12. Management support 13. Marketing support 14. None x. Other (please specify)	
	<b>Do you have access to land?</b> <i>(please select ONE answer)</i>			
	1. Yes, I have my own land	3. Yes, I have access to communal land		
<b>E.3</b>	2. Yes, I have family land	4. No, I don't have access to land		
	<b>IF E.3 = 1. 2. or 3. Yes: What use do you make of the land?</b> <i>(please select ALL that apply)</i>			
<b>E.3.1</b>	1. To grow crops to feed my family	4. To raise animals to sell	7. I lease it to others	
	2. To grow crops to sell	5. To have a house there	8. Other (please specify)	
	3. To raise animals to feed my family	6. To have a business there	9. None, do not use it	

E.3.1a	<b>If E.3 = 1. or 2. Grow crops: What crops do you grow?</b> (please select ALL that apply)		
	1. Maize	6. Sesame	11. Carrots
	2. Sorghum	7. Corn	12. Yams
	3. Millet	8. Beans	13. Greens
	4. Cassava	9. Sweet potatoes	x. Other (please specify)
	5. Ground nuts	10. Pumpkins	
E.3.1b	<b>If E.3.1 = 3. or 4. Raise animals: What animals do you raise?</b> (please select ALL that apply)		
	1. Cattle	3. Goats	5. Pigs
	2. Chickens	4. Sheep	6. Ducks
E.3.1c	<b>If E.3.1 = 9. None, do not use: Why are you not using the land?</b> (please select ALL that apply)		
	1. Affected by unexploded ordinances or landmines	4. Floods/Droughts	
	2. Settled in use by others	5. Not sure how to use land	
	3. Insecurity in the area	x. Other (please specify)	
E.4	<b>At the end of each month, do you meet your household expenses?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Usually have money left over	4. Rely on family money transfers	
	2. Usually break-even	5. Usually have to borrow	
	3. Usually have to use past savings		
E.5	<b>Did you return back to the type of work you had before you joined the armed forces?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Yes	2. No	
E.6	<b>Did you re-enlist in the Active military?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Yes	2. No	
E.7	<b>Once you complete the DDR program, what do you expect will be your military status?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Now a civilian – the same as other community members	3. Continue to be a Wounded Hero, but no longer in the SPLA	
	2. Now a civilian – but different from other community members	4. Continue to be in the SPLA	
E.8	<b>Have you ever considered moving/migration to get a better job?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Yes	2. No	
E.9	<b>Do you think ex-combatants/ex-members of armed forces find it harder, the same or easier than other non-ex-combatants to get a job?</b> (please select ONE answer)		
	1. Harder	2. Same	3. Easier
	<b>If E.9 = 1. Harder: What are the top reasons?</b> (please select NO MORE than THREE)		
E.9.1	1. Others have more skills training	4. XCs are stronger	
	2. Others have more education	5. XCs have military training	
	3. Others have more connections/know people there	6. People fear XCs x. Other (please specify)	
E.9.2	<b>If E.9 =3. Easier: What are the top reasons?</b> (please select NO MORE than THREE)		
	1. XCs have more skills training	4. XCs work in a group	
	2. XCs have more education	5. XCs are stronger	
	3. XCs have more connections/know people there	6. XCs have military training x. Other (please specify)	

# Pilot Reintegration Project Document as Implemented

October 2014










# **NATIONAL DDR PROGRAMME OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

## **PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT DOCUMENT AS IMPLEMENTED**

**END OF PROJECT  
OCTOBER 2014**



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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AES	Alternative Education System
ALP	Adult Learning Programme
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CDD/R	Community Development Driven or Rehabilitation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRA	Collective Reserve Account
CSP	Community Support Projects
CAAFG	Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
HQ	Headquarters
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IP-ICB	Implementing Partner - Institutional Capacity Building
IP-LIV	Implementing Partner - Livelihoods Support
IP-COMM	Implementing Partner - Community Support Projects
LS	Livelihoods Support
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission of the Republic of South Sudan
NDDRP	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
NOF	National Organized Forces
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PRA	Participatory Rapid Assessment
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
TCC	Technical DDR Coordinating Committee
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the World Bank
TF	Transition Facility
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
VWC	Village Water Committee
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups
WB	World Bank

## 1. PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT SUMMARY

The Republic of South Sudan is piloting the new National DDR Programme from 2013-2014. The Pilot Reintegration Project includes the reintegration services and reintegration related capacity building components of this Programme. The following Project Document describes in detail the programming integrated into this initial pilot phase as well as the background and context of the pilot. This first pilot DDR Programme serves just-under 300 members of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/South Sudan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF)<sup>1</sup> in their transition out of the armed forces into civilian life. The pilot is established and delivered in the four states of Greater bahr el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern bahr el Ghazal and Western bahr el Ghazal). The Mapel Transitional Facility located Western Bahr el Ghazal is the transitional facility serving the Greater bahr el Ghazal region.

The pilot reintegration project contributes toward the overall objective of South Sudan DDR Policy, namely "To support transformation of SPLA/ SSAF into a more professional, efficient and cost-effective armed force."

The primary goal of the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project is to test the reintegration modalities to contribute to the design of a relevant and successful full National DDR Programme. These modalities include direct services to beneficiaries and project management.

This is achieved through the following objectives:

*Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

*Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

### 1.1 COMPONENTS OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

To achieve this goal and objectives, the pilot reintegration project includes four main components:

#### ***1.1.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING***

The Institutional Capacity Building Component is conducted through training and mentoring of the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) staff. Capacity building is particularly targeted at the Project Management Unit at the headquarters and state level teams. In addition, the capacity building component includes systems development in project management and monitoring and evaluation. Additionally, in tandem with the pilot reintegration project, the pilot includes the design, development and implementation of the Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) under development by the NDDRC since early 2012.

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<sup>1</sup> The pilot was initially envisioned to serve 500 members of the National Organized Forces including the SPLA/SSAF.

### **1.1.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

A Monitoring and Evaluation system is included in the pilot reintegration project to track achievements and progress of the project, to provide updated information to guide decision-making, to detect problems as they arise and ultimately to assess the overall impact of the project and to identify lessons learned to inform the NDDRC at project closure. The M&E includes collection of registration information on all DDR participants, a baseline study of all available DDR participants while they are in the transition facility during the reinsertion phase. A community baseline survey conducted immediately following the ex-combatant baseline survey further informs the pilot. The pilot also includes a final assessment of beneficiary satisfaction conducted amongst a sample of the ex-combatants.

Project assessments are conducted at both the mid-term and upon completion of the project. A rapid assessment is conducted after the close of the pilot's Phase One to provide recommendations for project adjustment as needed and to inform development of the following phases. Following the end of the pilot reintegration project a final independent assessment of the project is then conducted by an external firm.

### **1.1.3 LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT**

Ex-combatants are eligible to receive a suite of reintegration livelihoods support services. This includes (i) livelihoods support trainings on financial literacy, entrepreneurship and associations/cooperatives to operationalize the vocational training received at the transitional facility, (ii) livelihood start-up kits correlated to the vocational trainings received in Mapel, (iii) targeted technical skills extension through either expert visits by agricultural extension workers and targeted vocational experts or supplemental vocational skills training, and (iv) assistance in accessing available government services through referral and follow up by ICRS caseworkers. These services are designed to support ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths including cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members; small farm and/or rural agricultural enterprises; and individual micro-enterprise businesses.

### **1.1.4 DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS**

The pilot reintegration project also includes targeted support for communities receiving ex-combatants after the DDR Participants graduate from the Mapel transitional facility. DDR Community Support Projects include borehole projects in 17 communities. Projects are conducted where there is a higher concentration of returning ex-combatants. Communities are selected by the NDDRC using an agreed upon selection criteria. The NDDRC further ensures that projects are placed in different communities than those receiving UNMISS Reinsertion Community Projects. Delivery of these projects is discussed and agreed upon by members of the community in question incorporating representation of a range of stakeholders. If a borehole project is not possible, the local community may suggest an alternative common good project such as the rehabilitation of common space in local markets.

Implementation of these components entails the contracting of three implementing partners (IPs) as follows:

- 1) Institutional Capacity Building through Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support and Monitoring and Evaluation (Components One and Two)
- 2) Livelihoods Support (Component Three)
- 3) DDR Community Support Projects (Component Four)

## 1.2 PHASES OF THE PROGRAMME

The overall pilot reintegration project is divided into three discreet but connected phases.

Phase One: Initiation (April to December 2013)

- Institutional Capacity Building: Capacity Building includes systems development and project management training, mentoring and support to the NDDRC staff utilizing the structure of the NDDRC and the specifically the Project Management Unit (PMU) and state NDDRC teams.
- Monitoring and Evaluation: Training and support is provided to the M&E staff of the NDDRC, ex-combatant and community baseline surveys conducted, and monitoring processes launched. Initial outcomes are evaluated at the end of this phase.
- Livelihoods Support: The financial literacy, entrepreneurship and associations/cooperatives initial training provided at Mapel transition facility followed by continuing state-based trainings and livelihoods start-up kits distributed.
- DDR Community Support Projects: The identification of community development and/or rehabilitation projects is undertaken during this phase. Preparatory environmental and feasibility analyses are undertaken as required.


Phase Two: Consolidation (April to July 2014) (delayed due to civil unrest)

- Institutional Capacity Building: Capacity building provided in Monitoring and Evaluation to develop necessary tools and systems. NDDRC staff trained in use and management of the tools and systems are conducted in this phase of the project.
- Monitoring and Evaluation: NDDRC staff continues to receive support on the use of M&E tools and systems and processes are monitored and evaluated during this phase.
- Livelihoods Support: Ex-combatants receive state-based follow-up and refresher trainings during this phase in financial literacy, entrepreneurship and associations/cooperatives. Additionally, targeted technical skills extension is provided through either expert visits by agricultural extension workers and targeted vocational experts or supplemental vocational skills training where the trainings provided in Mapel were deemed by the NDDRC to be unsatisfactory. Additionally ex-combatants receive assistance in accessing available government services through referral and follow up by ICRS caseworkers.
- DDR Community Support Projects: All DDR community projects are implemented during this phase.

Phase Three: Evaluation and Knowledge Transfer (August - October 2014)

- The process and deliverable outcomes are evaluated during this phase. The learnings, processes and systems developed are transferred to the National DDR Commission. In addition a tracer survey is conducted.
- The NDDRC continues to provide assistance in accessing available government services through referral and follow up by ICRS caseworkers.

**DIAGRAM 1: Overview of Components and Phases**



It should be noted that reintegration is a nine month process following the services provided at the Mapel Training Facility. The reintegration phase begins after the DDR Participants' graduation from Mapel in September 2013. Due to the civil unrest, services were on hold from December 15, 2013 until April 2014 thus reintegration services are available through July 2014. Final evaluation of the pilot takes place in August/September 2014.

### 1.3 MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT

The management of the pilot reintegration project is conducted by a Project Management Unit (PMU), through leadership from the National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) Steering Committee. Additional support is provided by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), as well as from Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and others partners as assigned. The Headquarters (HQ) PMU is responsible for overarching management and coordination of reintegration pilot activities, while also overseeing operations of the state teams, which manage state-level activities. TDRP maintains fiscal responsibility for the pilot's operations but co-manages this project with the NDDRC. Capacity building for the NDDRC is ongoing to support the NDDRC's work.



## 2. SOUTH SUDAN NEW DDR PROGRAMME BACKGROUND

DDR has been highlighted as a priority of the Republic of South Sudan as an integral component of the country's progress toward establishing sustainable peace and socio-economic development. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) marshalled the country's separation from the north which resulted in the group being generally held in high regard. Two years after Independence however, South Sudan remains highly militarized. The current parade of the SPLA numbers approximately 194,000, and may continue to rise as additional South Sudanese soldiers from various external forces are integrated. Many of these soldiers have received little to no military training, are illiterate and over pensionable age. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), some members of the SPLA were redeployed to other institutions including the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Brigades) and the Correctional Services (Prisons). These services are frequently referred to jointly as the National Organized Forces (NOF).

The Government recognizes that the armed forces need to transition to a more proportionately-sized and resourced national army (SPLA) which respects human rights and is under effective civilian oversight. In 2008 the government produced a White Paper on Defence concluding that the total force strength of the modern SPLA should not exceed 119,000.

A reduction in force size is needed to modernize the SPLA and to reduce the national defence budget. As of 2013 approximately 40 percent of the national budget is consumed by defence expenditures, a significant proportion of which is used to meet salary and welfare costs. Streamlining the military is in the Government's overarching interest. As the soldiers are demobilised, the number of citizens with formal access to weapons should reduce. Since those carrying arms pose a potential future source of insecurity if not appropriately managed, DDR is seen as one component of a broader security sector reform process. The South Sudan National DDR Programme will contribute to the reduction of the SPLA/South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) and other national organised forces by supporting disarmed and demobilised soldiers to transition smoothly towards civilian life.

The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants can contribute significantly to the overall process of peace consolidation and prosperity in South Sudan. Experience in other fragile states demonstrates that stabilization and the assumption of a normal life for these target groups is likely to prevent new tensions and can contribute to burgeoning economic life in small communities. The main objective of this strategy is to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and the creation of an enabling environment for sustainable development through socio-economic reintegration of people affected by the conflict. In recent years, bilateral and multinational partners have supported the launch of a large number of projects in the fields of community development and the fight against poverty. The strategy therefore tends, where possible, to create synergies between these projects to avoid duplication in the response and coordination of actors involved.

## 2.1 SOUTH SUDAN COMPREHENSIVE DDR PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

The pilot reintegration project has both social and economic reintegration objectives, which reinforce the overall objective of South Sudan DDR Policy, namely “To support transformation of SPLA / SSAF into a more professional, efficient and cost-effective armed force.”

Furthermore, these objectives are designed to work towards the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme which include:

- **Objective 1:** To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals.
- **Objective 2:** To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return.
- **Objective 3:** To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return.
- **Objective 4:** To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return.
- **Objective 5:** To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes.
- **Objective 6:** To strengthen the capabilities of: the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan.

The pilot reintegration project objectives and activities outlined within this document do not address CAAF/G and WAAF/G, although these objectives are included in the overall programme policy. This is because CAAF/G and WAAF/G are to be addressed by separate special programmes distinct from the general ex-combatants reintegration programme being piloted here. Additionally, this pilot phase includes capacity building of the DDR system and NDDRC staff but does not directly build capacity of the line ministries, civil society or private sector. However, the NDDRC will engage with these entities in later tranches of pilot programme.

### 3. PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1 DDR PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The primary goal of the NDDRC's Pilot Reintegration Project is to test reintegration approaches and modalities and develop actionable lessons which can inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan's future DDR programming. These modalities include direct services to beneficiaries and project management.

This DDR pilot reintegration project therefore aims to achieve socio-economic reintegration objectives for ex-combatants while simultaneously testing the designed economic reintegration approach and building the capacity of the management system going forward. To this end, the pilot reintegration project has both systems and learning, as well as socio-economic, objectives:

##### *Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project*

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

##### *Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project*

- To provide ex-combatants with needed skills to enhance their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

Reintegration is an extended, on-going process by which ex-combatants become socially and economically assimilated in their communities of return. In application, however, DDR reintegration assistance to ex-combatants has a limited timeframe. Reintegration programming aims to contribute to the consolidation of lasting stability and development through the improvement of social and material conditions of ex-combatants and other beneficiaries. Reintegration is a process of continuous social and economic development, initiated during the DDR phase and ideally continuing through a stabilisation period into the medium and possibly long-term. Through reintegration ex-combatants return to civilian life either in their community of origin or in new communities, and seek sustainable livelihoods.

Socio-economic reintegration should endeavour to facilitate integration of ex-combatants into local communities at the same socio-economic level as the rest of the population to minimize potential resentment or impressions of special treatment. It is critical to improve their access to economic livelihoods by facilitating their participation in existing job market and economic opportunities existing in local communities. At the same time, however, reintegration programming does not necessarily target the needs of ex-combatants alone, but is developed in consideration of the broader community recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation needs as well. Experience in other DDR programmes has found that actions supporting socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants should also incorporate consideration for host populations.

DDR programmes can catalyse long-term development and peace consolidation. Best practice reintegration models attempt to incorporate a more holistic development pathway that builds linkages between the initial phases of DDR medium-term recovery and stabilization initiatives, with consideration for longer-term sustainable development. The strategy proposed for the first tranche of the NDDRC pilot

applies these principles for comprehensive programming while promoting longer-term development and socio-economic recovery in areas where ex-combatants reintegrate.

Early fieldwork reveals that economic reintegration needs in South Sudan are dramatic and are therefore highlighted as the priority for the Pilot DDR Programme. Given that ex-combatants were frequently members of the SPLA, largely lauded and regarded well by local populations for their role in the liberation of the country social reintegration activities are not prioritized but rather are minimized for this initial tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that later can be replicated.. Depending on the findings and lessons learned of the initial pilot reintegration project, this prioritization may be revisited.

In line with this prioritization and in order to achieve the overarching reintegration objectives, the pilot reintegration project includes the following four components:

<b>Livelihoods Support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings</li> <li>• Livelihood start-up kits</li> <li>• Technical skills extension:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Agricultural extension visits</li> <li>(ii) Vocational expert visits</li> <li>(iii) Targeted supplementary vocational training</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up</li> </ul>
<b>DDR Community Support Projects</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Site selection &amp; community mobilization</li> <li>• Installation of boreholes, water pump rehabilitation or community requested common good projects</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Capacity Building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support and Systems Development</li> <li>• Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS)</li> </ul>
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Registration data collection</li> <li>(ii) Baseline Surveys – Ex-combatants &amp; Communities of Return</li> <li>(iii) Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey</li> </ul> </li> <li>• M&amp;E capacity building:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) M&amp;E training</li> <li>(ii) Creating procedures and tools</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

### 3.2 TARGET CASELOAD

Upon graduation from the Mapel Transition Facility the caseload for the pilot reintegration project included 290 individuals from the SPLA/SSAF. The pilot DDR programme was anticipated to include 500 participants however this was adjusted by the NDDRC during the initial pilot recruitment for the demobilization and reinsertion phases. The DDR National Council determined that those participating in this first pilot be able-bodied individuals falling below a designated disabilities threshold. Those who have sustained serious injuries are therefore not eligible for this pilot. Thus, the Basic eligibility criteria to enter the process includes: proof of active membership in the relevant national organized forces (verified by both photo identification and inclusion on the payroll list or being in possession of proof of

payment from the relevant national organized force), being between the ages of 18 and 65, not having severe disability, and meeting the medical staff requirements of health for participation at the transition facility. This first group is drawn from the SPLA's "Wounded Heroes" brigade, which is currently a designation not necessarily based on injury, but rather on assignment to the DDR programme. Wounded Heroes pay allocation and pay administration has been transferred to the Directorate of Veterans Affairs while operational control and responsibility remains with the SPLA.

### 3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS AND DISTRIBUTION

The pilot phase is implemented in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal). Therefore the early phases of the pilot were conducted at the Mapel Transitional Facility located in Western bahr el Ghazal.

**Table 1: Ex-combatant DDR Participants Stated Location of Reintegration by State and County**

As of September 18, 2013

Lakes	93	Warrap	75	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	Western Bahr el Ghazal	92
<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>	
Awerial	9	Abyei	8	Aweil East	16	Jur River	60
Cueibet	9	Gogrial West	3	Aweil North	2	Raja	1
Rumbek Centre	13	Gogrial East	4	Aweil South	12	Wau	31
Rumbek East	17	Tonj East	7				
Rumbek North	3	Tonj North	13				
Wulu	6	Tonj South	26				
Yirol East	16	Twic	14				
Yirol West	20						

### 3.4 PRE-PROJECT PROFILE DATA

To inform the planning of the pilot programme, the NDDRC profiled 422 of the anticipated SPLA/SSAF DDR candidates for the first tranche. This exercise only provides an initial guide of the profile of participating ex-combatants. The remaining 75 participants were yet to be assigned in order to reach the anticipated caseload of 500. The profiling data yielded useful information to help inform the features of reintegration pilot. This data was used to map communities where ex-combatants were likely to reintegrate, and provided a snapshot of basic demographic information (e.g. 403 ex-combatants are male and 22 are female, the average age is 42, etc.). Profiling data also indicated what vocational skills profiled individuals possess that could be enhanced for civilian livelihood creation, as well as what vocations they would aspire to have after leaving the army. According to the data, two-thirds of the respondents identified agricultural production as their preferred vocation.

### 3.5 KEY ENTITIES OF THE DDR PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

#### **3.5.1 NATIONAL DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION COUNCIL**

The National DDR Council was formed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit in October 2012 to mobilize and coordinate Government's ministries and organizations to ensure the highest level of political alignment and support for overall National DDR Programme (NDDRP) and its strategic direction. The National DDR Council is the decision-making body for DDR policies and sets strategic direction of the process of DDR. The Council provides high-level strategic policy guidance on DDR and approves strategic documents. The Council includes the Technical Line Ministries involved in the DDR Process and the NDDRC.

### **3.5.2 NATIONAL DDR COMMISSION (NDDRC) OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

The National DDR Commission (NDDRC) is responsible for the overall implementation of the DDR strategy and policy outlined by the National DDR Council for the National DDR Programme. The commission is the lead coordinating body ensuring coherence of DDR actions including those being conducted by implementing partners. The pilot reintegration project was developed through technical assistance from the World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) and the leadership of the NDDRC. Implementation of the pilot reintegration programme is conducted with the Commission's overarching guidance, while management of the programme further requires significant involvement of Commission staff both at the national and state levels. The Commission is headquartered in Juba with offices in each of the 10 states.

### **3.5.3 SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA)**

The SPLA is a critical partner in the DDR effort. Their release of members from their ranks ultimately begins this South Sudan DDR process. Additionally, the SPLA has contributed to the launch of reintegration pilot activities by partnering with the NDDRC and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to conduct participant profiling. All participants in the reintegration pilot come from the SPLA War Wounded Heroes. Of the anticipated 150,000 to be reintegrated in the overall DDR programme, 80,000 are to come from remaining SPLA forces.

### **3.5.4 POLICE, PRISONS, THE FIRE BRIGADE AND WILDLIFE SERVICES**

Of the 150,000 to be reintegrated in the complete DDR programme, 70,000 are to come from other National Organized Forces (NOF) institutions including the Police, Prisons, the Fire Brigade (Ministry of Interior) and Wildlife Services (Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism). As such, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism are critical partners in the DDR effort and they too must release members from their ranks to begin this South Sudan DDR process.

### **3.5.5 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH SUDAN LINE MINISTRIES**

The DDR programme in South Sudan includes a whole of government approach that calls on the participation and support of a wide variety of line ministries at the national and state levels. In addition to their participation in the National DDR Council, this may include the provision and facilitation of programme activities, policy and regulator measures as well and the provision of technical assistance on the ground. The Ministries engaged in the National DDR Council beyond the Office of the President and the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs are as follows:

- Agriculture & Forestry
- Animal Resources & Fisheries
- Commerce, Industry and Investment
- Environment
- Finance & Economic Planning
- Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
- Gender, Child & Social Welfare
- General Education & Instruction
- Health
- Higher Education, Science & Technology
- Housing & Physical Planning
- Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management
- Information & Broadcasting
- Interior
- Justice
- Ministry of National Security
- Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs
- Ministry of Interior
- Transport
- Water Resources and Irrigation
- Wildlife Conservation & Tourism
- Labour, Public Service & Human Resource Development

Line ministries each appoint a DDR focal person that is the primary contact of the NDDRC during the DDR pilot reintegration project as technical experts in their field.

### ***3.5.6 TRANSITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM (TDRP) OF THE WORLD BANK***

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan has invited the TDRP of the World Bank to pilot the reintegration component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in close collaboration with the NDDRC. Primarily the TDRP's role in the Pilot Reintegration Project includes:

- Work with the NDDRC to establish and participate in the reintegration pilot management team at the HQ PMU level serving as the management body for the project; ]
- Incorporate capacity building of the NDDRC staff and systems in the reintegration project including demonstration and use of financial and project management processes.
- Conduct financial and project management in coordination with the NDDRC and particularly the HQ PMU of:
  - The reintegration livelihood activities in the pilot reintegration project;
  - The DDR community support projects in the pilot reintegration project;
  - The institutional capacity building activities and
  - The internal M&E of the project and supporting external assessments.

### ***3.5.7 NDDRC TECHNICAL ADVISORS***

In addition to the TDRP technical assistance and advice referenced above, the Bonn Institute for Conflict Convergence (BICC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) embedded technical advisors within the commission. At the request of the NDDRC, these staff participate in the HQ PMU to provide continued technical advice and support.

### ***3.5.8 DEMOBILISATION AND REINSERTION IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS***

The pilot reintegration project is the final phase of the full NDDRC pilot programme, which includes disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion at the transition facility and finally reintegration. The NDDRC implementing partners of the demobilisation and reinsertion portions of this programme include UNMISS and UNESCO. The coordination of all partners within the overall pilot programme is crucial and under the guidance of NDDRC leadership the PMU works together with these implementing partners to ensure a coherent overall DDR programme.

### ***3.5.9 PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS***

To implement the pilot reintegration project the TDRP is contracting with Implementing Partners for 1) Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation, 2) Livelihoods Support, and 3) Community Support Projects. These entities are responsible for the implementation of the respective components as outlined below in detail in this document.

## **3.6 SYNERGIES**

Reintegration cannot be an isolated activity. It must be linked to broader recovery, reconstruction and development activities that take into account not only the ex-combatants but also the population of the communities of return within which they reintegrate and reside. Programme and projects supported by Government partners are particularly important to support the activities of socio-economic reintegration. The NDDRC is responsible for conducting stakeholder consultations to identify initiatives underway addressing other facets of DDR including female combatants, WAAF/G, and CAAF/G. These consultations also look to identify linkages with other relevant development activities such as those related to emergency humanitarian response, HIV/AIDS, refugee return and resettlement, land tenure,

human rights, food security, justice and transitional justice, governance, economic development and livelihoods, conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. Synergies are sought through these consultations with other projects and programmes in the context of reconstruction and development. The programme encourages that consultations are held between development stakeholders in order to harmonise their approaches and avoid discrepancies. This range across all development sectors: State authorities and local structures, the different departments involved in reintegration, bilateral or multilateral programmes, etc.

### **3.7 PARALLEL DDR PROGRAMME WORK**

It is critical to recognize that the work being conducted within the bounds of the Pilot Reintegration Project operates in parallel to other important NDDRC work. One important area of the overall DDR Programme work is the special programmes – including programmes for individuals with disability, WAAF/G and CAAF/G. These areas are not addressed in this pilot reintegration project as those individuals are to be served in those parallel programmes.

Another crucial parallel support to the DDR pilot reintegration project that is being conducted by the NDDRC is public information, communications and awareness. The PMU works with the Public Information team to contribute to the overall communications strategy. It is critical that accurate reintegration information be included in the overall public information and sensitization work. Messages are to be clear, honest and consistent, and must clearly convey the type of assistance to be provided to individual ex-combatants, including women combatants, and community members in order to avoid misconceptions and heightened expectations. Although the actual public information and communications agenda is technically outside the scope of the reintegration pilot, the HQ PMU and state teams are responsible for looking for opportunities for coordination and synergy across these areas.

### **3.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT**

It should be noted, that the selection of the first tranche of ex-combatants was not random, therefore not all findings of this pilot process can be extrapolated to the full quota of ex-combatants to follow. In addition, the greater SPLA and members of the national organized forces may have different needs than the pilot caseload in terms of reintegration, particularly as this first group of SPLA members in the Wounded Heroes Brigade have largely been living back in their home communities for extended periods of time.

It is important to note, however, that the purpose of the pilot is to test the economic reintegration, community project and project management modalities. In addition, the pilot is designed to build the capacity of both staff and systems for implementation and project management going forward.



## 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

The management of the pilot reintegration project is conducted by the HQ PMU, which is led by the NDDRC with support from the TDRP, BICC and contracted implementing partners. In addition to overall management of the reintegration pilot, the HQ PMU oversees and coordinates on the pilot reintegration project work with the NDDRC state teams, which are responsible for overseeing state-level activities. The TDRP has fiscal responsibility for the operations of the pilot but works with the NDDRC to ensure that the relevant persons are mentored through the process.

**Objective:** The objective of this work is to prepare the NDDRC for the implementation and oversight of the upcoming national DDR programme by improving the project management capacity and structures of the commission.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams are the management backbone of the Pilot Reintegration Project and their importance to the pilot reintegration project and potential for future reintegration programming should not be under-estimated. The HQ PMU provides the national level management of the reintegration pilot while working to complement the work of the NDDRC state teams. The model designed for the pilot ensures NDDRC leadership, continuous engagement and input throughout the project through their participation in this unit. The model further allows for capacity building of the NDDRC staff to take place at every step of the management process through a mentorship mechanism in which NDDRC is supported by implementing partners and TDRP staff. By the completion of the reintegration pilot, the NDDRC staff at both the HQ and state levels have participated in the full management cycle and through that hands-on training, have prepared to manage future DDR tranches with minimal to no assistance.

**How replicable:** The goal of forming the HQ PMU and working with NDDRC state teams during the pilot reintegration project is to leave an experienced and functional management team as well as a management and reporting system in place at the close of the pilot. The connection between the HQ PMU and the NDDRC state teams is also practiced to be replicable with the remaining six States where future reintegration programmes will take place.

### 4.1 MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

In summary, the following administrative arrangements are utilized in the Pilot Reintegration Project:

- A Steering Committee provides policy and strategic guidance to the entire pilot reintegration project oversight. The group also provides oversight of the Project Management Unit.
- A Project Management Unit is responsible for the implementation of the pilot project. The PMU is responsible for coordination of the pilot reintegration project among stakeholders and interest groups, including ensuring that the relevant ministries and other stakeholders are informed of the progress of the sector and participation of specific interest groups. The unit is established by the NDDRC and housed within the premises of NDDRC at both the HQ and state levels. The HQ PMU provides oversight and coordination of the reintegration work of the NDDRC state teams. The PMU operates in close coordination with the TDRP which is ultimately responsible for the project and financial management in the pilot reintegration project.
- The NDDRC further facilitates the pilot programme by taking the necessary steps to furnish the facility and undertake the necessary selection of state-level staff that are targeted for training and mentoring and work across the different components with Implementing Partners and the management team.

- The World Bank contracts firms or organizations to implement the pilot project, based on programme objectives, activities and specifications. Efforts were made to ensure the suitable selection of firms with existing networks, expertise in South Sudan and relevant topic area expertise.
- Implementing Partners each prepare a pilot work plan for approval by the PMU. Pilot work plans for the livelihoods and community support components should include broad consultations with stakeholders in order to avoid pitfalls from previous programming, build linkages and synergies on key sector priorities, and encourage harmonization of development initiatives across relevant sectors that may play a role in the reintegration pilot.

#### **4.1.1 REINTEGRATION PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE**

The steering committee provides strategic and policy guidance and leadership to the overall pilot reintegration project and specifically to the HQ PMU. It also has the responsibility to improve coordination and ensure harmonization of DDR initiatives. The Committee reviews the overall project status, and is available to discuss challenges and identify potential solutions. The committee was formed during the initiation phase, and met frequently monthly at first and then quarterly or as needed starting at the consolidation phase. The steering committee is chaired by the Deputy Chairperson of the NDDRC. The Steering Committee includes the following representatives:

1. Deputy Chairperson of the NDDRC - Chair
2. Member of the Commission
3. DDR Liaison of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs
4. DDR Liaison of the Ministry of Interior – Police
5. DDR Liaison of the Ministry of Interior – Fire
6. DDR Liaison of the Ministry of Interior – Prisons
7. DDR Liaison of the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism
8. Director General of Operations
9. Director General of Programmes
10. PMU Chairperson - Secretary
11. Senior Technical Assistant from TDRP, World Bank

#### **4.1.2 THE HQ PROJECT MANAGEMENT UNIT**

The HQ PMU is responsible for the day-to-day administration and implementation of the pilot project. Specifically, under the direction of the Reintegration Project Steering Committee, the PMU:

- Carries out all activities related to the project necessary for the successful implementation of the reintegration pilot; utilizes project documents as the guide for the design, preparation, and implementation of work plans; collaborates with the TDRP team to ensure performance and completion;
- Is responsible for procurement, accounting, and disbursement processes and administrative services related to planning, organizing, coordinating, implementing, and monitoring; established an accounting system to meet the reporting requirements of World Bank and other donors;
- Utilizes project management tools to document and maintain the status of the project and monitor progress in project implementation, including the impact of activities in each; monitor the activities of all participating NGOs as well as technical experts employed under the project.

The HQ PMU also operates as a forum for the NDDRC to receive capacity building support from the Project, particularly from the Capacity Building Implementing Partner—to be discussed in greater detail below—but also from the TDRP, BICC and any other identified stakeholders.

The membership of the HQ PMU includes:

1. ICRS Manager – Chair
2. Director of Reintegration - Secretary
3. Director of Programmes
4. Director of Public Information
5. Director of Procurement
6. Finance Coordinator
7. Director of M&E
8. Director of M&E
9. State Director – Northern Bahr el Ghazal
10. State Director – Western Bahr el Ghazal
11. State Director – Warrap
12. State Director – Lakes
13. HQ ICRS Caseworkers
14. TDRP Project Manager
15. Implementing Partner Representatives (Capacity Building and M&E)
16. Implementing Partner Representatives (Livelihoods Support)
17. Implementing Partner Representatives (Community Projects)
18. Technical Advisor, BICC
19. UNMISS observer
20. UNDP observer

In addition to the officials noted above, additional ad-hoc membership is determined by the NDDRC. All meetings of the HQ PMU are open to all members of the Steering Committee and NDDRC leadership team. Although the UNDP are not part of the first Pilot reintegration process, having been requested to contribute to planning for the second pilot, they are invited to participate on the PMU to ensure that there is a synchronised approach between the pilot projects

Representation by all the members of the various units within the DDR Project is an essential part the reintegration component of the DDR programme. Their presence is also crucial in ensuring complementarity with the overall DDR strategy in areas such as communications, demobilisation and reinsertion and future reintegration programming for the overall pilot DDR programme.

#### ***4.1.3 NDDRC STATE TEAMS***

At the state level, the NDDRC state teams as defined here include NDDRC staff with reintegration responsibilities, including the State Director, Reintegration/ICRS Officers as well as M&E, Public Information and Finance and Administration. In addition, the work is supported by the HQ PMU as well as designated staff of the Capacity Building implementing partner. The NDDRC state teams, as managed by the State Director, are responsible to coordinate the participation of State level Line Ministry focal points at relevant junctures during the Pilot Phase. The State NDDRC teams are also responsible for liaising with the Governor’s office and others at the state level as needed.

Each State NDDRC team manages state implementation of the pilot reintegration project, report on pilot activity status and be responsible for conducting the M&E component at the state level, which feeds

into the overall M&E system. The NDDRC state teams provide project management support for the core socio-economic reintegration livelihood activities. In addition, these entities are also responsible for all sensitization and public information campaigns within their States. The NDDRC state teams submit monthly progress reports to the HQ PMU independent from those submitted by the Implementing Partners.

The HQ-PMU is responsible for ensuring that there are direct linkages to the State teams to ensure that the State directors are an integral part of the strategic planning process as well as the implementation.

It was initially envisioned that a full committee be formed at each state office to be known as State Project Management Units (SPMU). However, each office's teams proved to be staffed at levels to be already interconnected and a separate committee at this stage was not called for. In future pilots committees may provide a benefit and should include representatives of the state's governor's office, as well as state ministries.

#### **4.1.4 JOINT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE**

A Joint Operations Committee (JOC) was developed by the NDDRC for coordination between partners and stakeholders of the full DDR pilot programme, starting with the coordination on the profiling, demobilization and registration of ex-combatants and implementation of the Mapel Transition Facility. The pilot reintegration project design called for a Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the purpose of including all stakeholders involved in the overall Pilot Reintegration process, inclusive of both UNMISS and UNESCO who are responsible for the reinsertion component of the pilot reintegration. As the JOC was a functional body performing the task of technical DDR coordination between the various stakeholders, the JOC operated as the TCC for the Pilot Reintegration Project as well.

The National DDR Council has requested DDR related line ministries to assign ministry focal points, who be included when appropriate and relevant to the tasks on hand. Their participation is coordinated through the office of the Deputy Chairperson of the NDDRC.

## **4.2 IMPLEMENTATION SERVICE PARTNER ARRANGEMENTS**

The TDRP is contracting three Implementing Partners to implement this pilot project. Each was selected based on their specialized knowledge, staff, and experience in the particular component. The components requiring implementing partners include:

1. Institutional Capacity Building and M&E
2. Livelihood Support
3. DDR Community Support Projects

The timing and service agreement for each component is unique as outlined in greater detail in the corresponding sections below. Implementation of the full reintegration pilot is complete by August 15<sup>th</sup> 2014. For administrative purposes, however, the overall pilot reintegration project is conducted in three phases:

- Phase 1: Initiation (April 2013 – December 2013)
- Phase 2: Consolidation (April 2013 – July 2014)
- Phase 3: Evaluation and Knowledge Transfer (August 2014 – October 2014)

### **4.3 FINANCIAL COVENANTS**

Adequate financial management systems including records and accounts are maintained by the Project Manager. Project financial statements are prepared and submitted to the World Bank within specified deadlines reflecting project operations according to sound audit and accounting practices. During the pilot reintegration pilot phase, the TDRP is providing direct oversight of financial and procurement activities, in accordance with World Bank rules and requirements. However this is being conducted with full engagement and awareness of the NDDRC management team and HQ PMU, therein providing capacity building to the NDDRC through demonstration of responsible financial project management practices.

## 5. COMPONENT 1: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

A key objective of the pilot reintegration project is to build the capacity of the NDDRC and other line ministries working on DDR reintegration through both staff and systems. The two major mechanisms for this capacity building are 1) through the HQ PMU and the NDDRC state teams and 2) through the development and support of an ICRS database and ICRS caseworker counselling and referral system.

**Objective:** Capacity building included in the pilot reintegration project primarily develops NDDRC staff capacity with a focus on project management and implementation. To this end an implementing partner is contracted to provide project management training, M&E training, mentoring and systems development. This capacity building is inextricably connected with the project management function conducted by the HQ PMU as outlined above. Institutional capacity building provides staff management and systems training to the HQ PMU staff, as well as, wherever possible and relevant, to the Line Ministry focal points. The Line Ministry focal points are also encouraged to participate in trainings and capacity building as appropriate to their area of work.

As the primary mechanism to achieve implementation at the state level, the NDDRC state teams are given training to setup programme systems and learning objectives of the pilot reintegration project in such a manner that enables the:

- Development of lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Development and instillation of a DDR Reintegration Management system in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The HQ PMU is the management backbone of the Pilot Reintegration Project. By the completion of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC staff at both the HQ and state levels have participated in the full management cycle and through hands on training, have experience with how to manage DDR programming that can be applied to future DDR tranches with minimal or no assistance.

The State NDDRC teams are responsible for the oversight and implementation of the livelihood and community project components at the state level. The team is led by the NDDRC staff at the state level supported by capacity building implementing partner staff.

**How replicable:** The goal of forming the PMU during the pilot reintegration project is to leave an independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system in place at the close of the pilot. This team is now practiced with how to oversee reintegration programming which can be applied in future DDR tranches.

**Implementation of the Institutional Capacity Building Component:** An Institutional Capacity Building Implementing Partner (IP-ICB) is contracted to provide project management support and to execute the activities listed below. The firm selection and contracting process was led by the World Bank. The selected organization submits an implementation plan; including a workplan and details on HQ PMU systems, procedures and staffing to facilitate the institutionalization of the HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams in the four states. The plan is developed jointly with the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and reviewed and cleared by the World Bank.

## **5.2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT TRAINING, MENTORING AND SUPPORT**

The contracted IP-ICB offers support to the HQ PMU and the NDDRC state teams in all four States. The staff mentoring process is designed to build HQ & state NDDRC staff capacity, and develop the management, oversight and implementation skills of those staff with job responsibilities relevant to reintegration activities which can be used both during and after the pilot project. The IP-ICB is to work together with the HQ PMU develop a Capacity Building Project Implementation Manual (PIM) to ensure that all pilot operations and systems are in line with NDDRC institutional operations and implementation systems.

A staff mentoring modality is adopted by the IP-ICB for the HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams through which management capacities of state NDDRC are enhanced. The IP-ICB is also responsible for capacity building on monitoring and evaluation and implementation of the baseline surveys.

The HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams provide project management support for the core socio-economic reintegration livelihood activities while also providing a forum for capacity building to the NDDRC. The goal of this component is that at the conclusion of the pilot the NDDRC is left fully capacitated to manage reintegration activities for future tranches.

The IP-ICB was further tasked to work with the HQ PMU and shepherd the drafting of a Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual (PIM) document including staffing responsibilities, reporting and procedures guide the work of the PMU. This is intended to be specific to the reintegration pilot but draw where feasible from the draft Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual in process for the overall programme. This document is to be a sustainable contribution to the on-going reintegration work of the NDDRC after the close of the project. Each Implementing Partner contributes the IP Project Implementation Plan (PIP) to be merged by the NDDRC into a single PIM.

### **5.2.1 SUB-COMPONENT TIMELINE**

An indicative timeframe for Component 1 extends for 11 months from May 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 to April 15<sup>th</sup> 2014:

1. May 15<sup>th</sup> to July 14<sup>th</sup>: Inception visit and report
2. August 19<sup>th</sup> to August 22<sup>nd</sup>: HQ PMU project management training
3. August 26<sup>th</sup> to August 29<sup>th</sup>: State PMU project management training
4. July 15<sup>th</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>: PMU support, training and state field visits
5. May to July 2014: Outstanding capacity building at HQ and states through TDRP September 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 to October 31<sup>st</sup> 2014: Assess, learn and knowledge transfer by all IPs and TDRP

## **5.3 INFORMATION, COUNSELLING AND REFERRAL SYSTEM (ICRS)**

The National DDR Strategic plan recognises that an ICRS is needed to support the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Therefore a second area of capacity building for both systems and staff is the design, implementation, training and support for an Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) for the Republic of South Sudan's DDR programme. The full ICRS process starts at profiling or registration and continues throughout the reintegration process. The TDRP is currently supporting the design and deployment of the ICRS system. The NDDRC assigned staff as ICRS caseworkers including at the HQ and state levels. These staff received multiple trainings including on career counselling and data collection and management.

**Objective:** The overall aim of the ICRS is to better support ex-combatants in their preparation and return to civilian life by strengthening the DDR service delivery to ex-combatants and the DDR program overall with access to organized relevant information.

The ICRS of the pilot DDR project provides 1) the data infrastructure to track, monitor and guide the DDR programme and 2) provide trained, informed counsellors to advise ex-combatants on their livelihood choices and other reintegration needs as services are available.

The ICRS system acts as the backbone of the overall ICRS process through which NDDRC staff collect and share information, counsel the ex-combatants and provide referrals to available services. The ICRS software and its back-end central database collects, manages and allows secure access to information on both 1) the DDR participants, which can include profiling, registration, medical screening, DDR trainings or services received, and baseline/tracer surveys, and 2) the available services through counselling, casework and referral. The system provides summarised information on DDR participant's background, personal, family composition, socio-economic profile and reintegration intentions to help plan and execute the reintegration activities. In addition the system allows the NDDRC to collect and maintain up to date information on available services and opportunities within and outside the DDR context to provide timely information to the participants in need. The system is designed to be used by ICRS caseworkers, registration operators, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff and DDR commission managers and supervisors.

To ensure NDDRC ownership and operational comfort with the ICRS, the pilot reintegration project includes multiple ICRS specific trainings including trainings on registration, baseline survey, counselling & referral, ex-combatant satisfaction survey and reintegration opportunities and services collection. In support of the ICRS process technical assistance is provided to the NDDRC information technology unit allowing them to operationalize and maintain the system.

These activities are central to the programme system and learning objectives of the pilot reintegration project, including:

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; and
- Develop and instil a system of DDR reintegration management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The ICRS is designed in consultation with the NDDRC and other partners in the DDR pilot as a customized data tracking and reintegration counselling system for use during the pilot and in the overall DDR programme. This system can be utilized as is or customized further as desired.

**How replicable:** The ICRS is developed specifically for the South Sudan NDDRC. At the close of the pilot the NDDRC has ownership of a functional ICRS system as well as a staff trained in its use. This system and team could continue ICRS operations in future DDR tranches of a full DDR programme.

### ***5.3.1 SUB-COMPONENT TIMELINE***

The ICRS requires on-going attention throughout the course of the entire reintegration pilot (April 2013 to July 2014) including system development, training and implementation by ICRS caseworkers:

1. April 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 to July 2014 : ICRS System Development and Adjustment
2. April 1<sup>st</sup> to April 15<sup>th</sup>: ICRS System TF use: Training, Initiation, Adjustment
3. April 15<sup>st</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Registration by NDDRC and UNMISS (using ICRS)



4. April 15<sup>th</sup> to September 18<sup>th</sup>: TF services tracking
5. July 1<sup>st</sup> to July 12<sup>th</sup>: Ex-combatant Baseline Survey
6. September 2<sup>nd</sup> to September 19<sup>th</sup>: Livelihoods and Toolkit Choice Discussion
7. September to December 1<sup>st</sup>: Reintegration Opportunity Initial Mapping Process
8. September 2013 to September 2014: Casework, Counselling, and Referral
9. April 2013 to September 2014: Assess, learn and knowledge transfer

## 6. COMPONENT 2: MONITORING AND EVALUATION

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

**Objective:** The M&E system of the pilot reintegration project is to provide critical data to improve operations throughout the project as well as on the true impact of the programme and contribute to the learning outputs of the project. In addition to M&E system outputs, NDDRC staff training on M&E is a key component of capacity building activities. The pilot is meant as a learning experience, an opportunity to build systems and procedures, test modalities and to build institutional capacity (systems and people). The M&E component is therefore central to the programme system and learning objectives of the reintegration pilot as listed above.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The M&E system was worked on in consultation with the NDDRC. A similar embedding and mentoring process as outlined in the institutional capacity building component was planned however M&E staff were not in place thus focus was placed on the systems development and M&E training for the full NDDRC staff rather than through individual mentoring.. Thus the M&E design, tools and systems developed during the pilot period were developed to be transferrable for future tranches of DDR.

**How replicable:** The tools developed in the pilot are designed to be relevant in future tranches of DDR. At that time the NDDRC can form a true M&E unit, which can utilize the tools developed during the pilot including the M&E Manual and the ICRS system to implement M&E. Additionally, the M&E trainings imbedded in the PMU HQ and state trainings as well as those provided in Phase 2 have prepared the broader staff team to support M&E efforts moving forward.

**Implementation:** Monitoring and evaluation is the combination of multiple processes which contribute significantly to programming effectiveness and provide necessary lessons to improve the overall DDR programme. In the pilot programme Implementing Partners track and report to the NDDRC on progress through a variety of reporting mechanisms. The NDDRC PMU receives this information and utilizes it to manage and collect lessons from the pilot. Additionally, M&E during the pilot includes the implementation of Registration data collection, baseline surveys of ex-combatants and communities and an ex-combatant satisfaction survey at completion. The Implementing Partner selected for Institutional Capacity Building is also responsible for the M&E baseline surveys, phase 1 trainings and systems support.

The M&E for the reintegration pilot includes the following key activities:

### 6.2 M&E TRAINING & MANUAL DEVELOPMENT

M&E training during phase 1 is conducted by IP-ICB team members working closely with the Capacity Building team members to incorporate M&E into the mentoring and PMU trainings at HQ and at the states. The intention is to develop a broad understanding of the importance and uses of M&E as well as training in the basic methods. This training is conducted following an assessment of the existing tools and processes.

This is supplemented by a TDRP external M&E consultant to provide additional M&E training during phase 2 of the pilot. The Technical Advisor engages with the NDDRC M&E and PMU staff to understand the internal systems and capacity. The advisor further provides technical advice to the staff on the

interrelationship between M&E and the ICRS. The advisor additionally is drafting an NDDRC M&E manual in consultation with the NDDRC to provide the basis for M&E in future DDR programming.

The M&E process is intended to be structured in such a manner to enable the flow of information to reach all departments and levels of the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams, through the establishment of feedback loops. This way information flows in a continuous two-way process ensuring that all components of the NDDRC are part of the pilot process.

### **6.3 BASELINE STUDIES**

A baseline study of ex-combatants and communities form part of the M&E tasks aimed at understanding the demographic characteristics, livelihood aspirations and social capital profiles of ex-combatants.

All ex-combatants present at the Transitional Facility during the interview time are interviewed during the baseline survey that takes place between July 5<sup>th</sup> and July 17<sup>th</sup>. This is conducted during the reinsertion period in the Transition Facility. In addition, a sample of communities that is representative of the various location types where ex-combatants return are interviewed during the reinsertion period. The baseline data for the XCs is entered into the ICRS to be used throughout the lifespan of the pilot reintegration project and available for use in programming design in the future programme.

NDDRC staff members are included in the development of the questionnaire. Further the NDDRC ICRS Caseworkers act as enumerators for the survey, after also conducting the ex-combatant registration process. The M&E team of the IP-ICB trains the ICRS caseworkers and oversees the implementation of the baseline surveys. Research inputs on the ex-combatants are entered into the ICRS system and reports are accessible to the NDDRC.

### **6.4 EX-COMBATANT SATISFACTION SURVEY**

The ex-combatant satisfaction survey is conducted at the end of phase 2 with a representative sample of participating ex-combatants. This survey explores the expectations and satisfaction level of ex-combatants with the services of the pilot DDR programme. This information contributes to the objective of testing the modalities utilized in the pilot reintegration project. Further the survey looks at the economic, and to a limited extent social, reintegration of the participating ex-combatants. Specifically the survey is conducted for the purpose of:

- Assessing reintegration approaches and modalities of the pilot reintegration project;
- Determining the current reintegration status of all ex-combatants;
- Assessing ex-combatants' participation in reintegration trainings and services;
- Understanding issues related to access to and ex-combatants' participation in reintegration trainings and income generating activities;
- Assessing the degree to which ex-combatants benefited from the program (especially from the livelihood aspect), and are actively engaged in business associations/cooperatives;
- Assessing the responses of ex-combatants to their new socio-economic status within the host communities following demobilization and reintegration;
- Assessing the satisfaction level of ex-combatants with the reintegration trainings and services provided, and obtaining ex-combatants' suggestions for improvement on the training and services; and
- Developing lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming.

## **6.5 DOCUMENTING PILOT EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED**

The pilot reintegration project is conducted for the purpose of testing modalities and collecting learnings. Thus the project documents all processes planned and executed, including those that might fail, as related to the delivery of all components of the livelihoods and community development and rehabilitation projects. Livelihood and Community Project IPs work with the state teams in creating reporting which is submitted to the HQ PMU and TDRP. Additionally final reporting summarizes experiences and lessons learned in the pilot process. The end of project Adjusted Project Document acts as an additional tool for the NDDRC in future programming.

In addition to these activities, a midterm review is conducted at the end of Phase 1 and a final external project assessment is conducted by an external evaluator at end of the project. These findings offer additional tools for the NDDRC to be utilized in the DDR full programme development.

## **6.6 M&E TIMELINE**

An indicative timeframe for Component 2 extends from May 2013 to October 2014.

- May 15<sup>th</sup> to June 14<sup>th</sup>: IP-ICB inception visit and report
- June 15<sup>th</sup> to July 5<sup>th</sup>: Design M&E system and indicators, Develop the Baseline Survey and Train ICRS Caseworkers to Conduct the XC Baseline Survey
- July 5<sup>th</sup> to July 19<sup>th</sup>: Conduct XC Baseline
- September 21<sup>st</sup> to October 12<sup>th</sup>: Conduct Community Baseline Survey
- August 1<sup>st</sup> to July 31<sup>st</sup>: NDDRC Staff Training and Ongoing Service Monitoring & Reporting
- November 1<sup>st</sup> to December 15<sup>th</sup>: Midterm Rapid Review and Sharing of Lessons
- July 1<sup>st</sup> to July 18<sup>th</sup>: Develop the XC Satisfaction Survey and Train ICRS Caseworkers to conduct the XC Satisfaction Survey
- July 18<sup>th</sup> to August 25<sup>th</sup> : XC Satisfaction Survey – Training and field work July 15<sup>th</sup> to October 31<sup>st</sup>: Finalizing of systems and knowledge transfer to NDDRC staff

## 7. COMPONENT 3: LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT

### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

**Objective:** The Livelihoods Support component of the pilot reintegration project provides livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success. The component also tests the livelihoods mechanism for future DDR tranches. The support offered in this component consists of market-oriented skills development to encourage individual, partnership or cooperative enterprises or employment for income.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The provision of quality services to the ex-combatants and their communities of return is a priority for this project. Alongside this effort, the testing of the livelihood support mechanism is at the heart of the reintegration piloting itself. Testing the livelihood track modalities provide lessons to inform and improve the future reintegration services offered through the South Sudan DDR Programme.

**How replicable:** The livelihood tracks piloted during the reintegration project are designed to inform the eventual long-term livelihood activities of the overall South Sudan DDR Programme and to be replicable where appropriate for the future tranches given differences in size and caseload demographics. The approach was developed in recognition of the National DDR Harmonized Plan. These approaches will need to be further refined amongst future pilot reintegration tranches.

### 7.2 LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES DESIGN

The economic reintegration pilot activities are designed to:

- Promote sustainable community owned and business integrated models that can function within local economic sectors;
- Employ an economy of scale approach to rural production by broadening production size through economic associations;
- Through training allow ex-combatants to successfully access livelihood and formal employment opportunities either in their community of return or elsewhere;
- Support the creation of small and mid-size businesses with collective ownership while encompassing competencies of members skills into specific core or value added activities;
- Cultivate the potential for ex-combatants to access or create economic opportunities based on simple, or basic indigenous resources;
- Establish an opportunity for ex-combatants to benefit from steady income growth either through their cooperative membership or individual entrepreneurship endeavours; and
- Create common or shared interests (social and economic) across members to support the reintegration of ex-combatants within their desired communities of return.

The livelihood tracks piloted in this project are developed to encourage broader economic development and to emphasise integration with the country's recovery and development activities. Priority tracks emphasise key DDR principles as outlined in the DDR policy documents, and align with the South Sudan Development Plan. This approach allows for:

- Sustainable economic activities with room for growth and flexible horizontal or vertical market linkage opportunities;

- Adoption of a business modeling approach to reintegration activities where sustainability is linked to profitability and growth opportunities;
- Building confidence and establishing common livelihood interests and shared opportunities across ex-combatants and communities where ex-combatants are scheduled to return and reintegrate;
- Integration of simple start up concepts with basic initial training requirements, and a capacity building through follow-up assistance;
- Development of a community integrated module where ex-combatant interests align with communities;
- Facilitation of continued engagement and alignment with development partners community development capacity building programmes;
- Working in complement with the NDDRC basic guiding principles;
- Resourcing of available local inputs; and
- Provision of support for broader national strategic plans for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.

The proposed reintegration activities for this pilot were developed based on their applicability to three main categories: rural farm based activities, rural non farming activities, and enterprises.

- **Rural Farm Activities:** Farm activities include agricultural activities for both rain-fed and irrigated systems. These activities fall broadly under agricultural production, forestry, and animal husbandry. In this report, these three activities are also referred to as core production activities as they represent key areas for encompassing a community integrated module.
- **Rural Nonfarm Activities:** These activities are also called value added activities. Rural non-farm activities includes all types of rural activities falling outside farm production such as animal husbandry, bee keeping, poultry, and fishing in addition to value added activities such as milling, food processing etc. The first segment refers to rural value added activities linked or attached to core agricultural, farming, and livestock activities such as dairy production, honey packaging and all other relevant processing activities. The second segment is service-oriented where value addition is referred to specific services that are contracted or sub-contracted by government and private sector. Examples of this segment could include solid waste management, water distribution, veterinary services, and transportation.
- **Small Enterprise Activities:** This category includes all activities requiring specific acquired or developed skills through service based types of demand in the urban cities and surrounding suburbs such as carpentry, metal fabrication, driving, administrative jobs, mechanic, driving and other blue collar work. These are mainly trading activities or service types of activities, which could fall under rural or urban locations.

### 7.3 SCOPE OF PROJECT

All ex-combatants participating in the NDDRC pilot programme are eligible to receive a suite of reintegration livelihoods support services. These services are designed to support ex-combatants in a variety of vocational paths including cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members, small farm and/or rural agricultural enterprises, and individual micro-enterprise businesses.

The sub-components of the work include:

- Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings
  - Mapel Transitional Facility-based trainings
  - State-based trainings
- Livelihood start-up kits
- Technical skills extension
  - Agricultural extension visits
  - Vocational expert visits
  - Targeted supplementary vocational training
- Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up

An Implementing Partner specializing in Livelihoods Support (IP-LIV) is contracted to lead the implementation of this component. The IP-LIV possesses the requisite expertise to conduct the following key activities:

- Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Trainings in cooperation with the NDDRC state staff. This is to include training with:
  - All ex-combatants and community members joining or creating cooperatives with further training on governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
  - All ex-combatants initiating either partnerships or individual enterprises with further training on business planning, governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
  - All interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business finance training or capital portfolio management as means to provide timely access to finance facilities to enterprises at all their growth stages while targeting their financial sustainability; and
  - All interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) with further business advisory assistance to support the creation of business plans and sustainable growth.
- Training and mentoring of NDDRC outreach staff in entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperatives.
- Coordination of Agricultural Extension in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture extension workers
- Training of Ministry of Agriculture extension workers in best practices and appropriate farming techniques for the XCs of Greater Bahr El Ghazal choosing agriculture.
- To supplement incomplete reinsertion trainings, facilitation of Targeted Vocational Trainings provided to XCs via vocational training centers
- Facilitation of a Vocational expert visit programme for interested XCs in vocational skills not covered through the targeted vocational trainings or agriculture.

At the start of the project, the IP-LIV completes a work-plan that is agreed with the NDDRC and TDP and is inclusive of team and staffing plans for coverage of the various livelihood opportunities within the HQ PMU and four NDDRC state teams, costing, management cost, and portfolio management targeting all core areas of work. This is developed into a Project Implementation Plan with input from the TDRP, NDDRC through the HQ PMU and NDDRC state teams. The PIP also incorporates information gathered through broad stakeholder consultations to ensure livelihood opportunities are in harmony with

ongoing recovery and development initiatives in communities of return. The implementation plan is reviewed by the PMU with signatory authority residing with the TDRP. The Project Implementation Plan (PIP) includes a Financial Management and Procurement Plan incorporating all the livelihood opportunity tracks.

#### **7.4 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL LITERACY TRAINING**

This sub-component is the primary emphasis of the reintegration training due to a combination of factors. Firstly, due to the informal nature of the market in South Sudan and the limited job market it is very likely that for an ex-combatant to utilize the vocational training they received in Mapel they will need to start up their own venture - be it a business, partnership or cooperative. This is in keeping with the best practice successful programs seen that focused on the entrepreneurship and financial literacy aspects of training, rather than continued vocational training (e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC). The same experience also shows us that in the absence of entrepreneurship training, no matter how well skilled an XC is, they do not succeed. Research also shows that, with the exception of agriculture, the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants will not continue in the vocation they have been taught but will use this training to first earn sufficient capital to migrate to their own chosen opportunity or use capital inputs to start in the area that they want to work in. Literature further shows that entrepreneurs who are pulled rather than pushed into a sector or opportunity have an infinitely greater chance of success. Additional DDR studies show that XCs who join or initiate economic associations or cooperatives have a greater chance of success fully reintegrating socially and economically. The caveat being that this is contingent on the size of the cooperative (small cooperatives are most successful) and the composition of the cooperative including community members.

The main thrust of this training is on empowering XCs to adopt a sustainable livelihood approach. This training includes:

- 1) A 10-day intensive training conducted at the Mapel Transition Facility during the last two weeks of camp, and
- 2) State-based follow-up trainings in both phase 1 and phase 2.

The training is an important complement to the vocational skills training provided by UNESCO at Mapel as it urges the XCs to think about those skills from a business/entrepreneurship potential perspective. Further, the trainings draw on the literacy and numeracy trainings received, providing very tangible uses of the information and including financial literacy training modules. Additionally, the training in the camp facilitates XCs to initialize thinking on cooperative or partnership work, into which they are encouraged to incorporate community members upon return to their communities.

The implementation of this training requires the following process:

- Step 1: Curriculum design
- Step 2: Phase 1: Training plan & schedule
- Step 3: Phase 1: Training of Trainers
- Step 4: Phase 1: Delivery of trainings (Mapel & State-based)
- Step 5: Assessment of training approach and adjustment
- Step 6: Phase 2: Training plan & schedule
- Step 7: Phase 2: Training of Trainers
- Step 8: Phase 2: Delivery of trainings (State-based)



#### **7.4.1 MAPEL TRANSITIONAL FACILITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL LITERACY INTENSIVE TRAINING**

To conduct the training for 290 ex-combatants, 10 South Sudanese individuals are recruited based on their background in business or related fields and language skills. They are trained during a 2-week training of trainers program in Mapel. This allows the trainers to be introduced to many of their future students and receive basic information on them, including literacy level, approximate location, possible grouping preferences, and incorporate these ground realities into the training material.

An international training expert conducts this training of trainers (TOT) and guides the full training process. The expert first develops the TOT curriculum as draft as well as the field training manual and training materials used by the trainers during the business/cooperative training for XCs. These materials are then adjusted over the course of the TOT to respond to additional information on local context and trainees' demographics, and then utilized in the Mapel and state-based follow-up trainings.

After the TOT, the 10-day intensive training on entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy is conducted. This training is conducted in the last 2 weeks of the time at Mapel Transitional Facility, having worked with UNESCO to coordinate the timing.

These trainings include 15 modules covering a variety of entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy topics on an as-needed basis depending of the needs of individual XCs and their situation. Training uses several well-known learning methods that proved to be successful in the region, such as (i) simulations and role-play, (ii) learning by doing, (iii) visuals and illustration, (iv) hands-on experience via interaction with existing businessmen, (v) individual counselling, and (vi) practice sessions. These modules are carried over to the follow-up training in the states.

The presence of the IP-LIV at the transitional facility responds to a crucial lesson learned in previous DDR programmes where a disconnect in services and information between the transition facilities and reintegration service provision presented a major concern. In the pilot reintegration project, the IP-LIV responsible for the provision of livelihoods support and the ICRS caseworkers brief the ex-combatants on their options to accurately set expectations and respond to questions so the ex-combatants enter the reintegration process fully informed.

#### **7.4.2 STATE-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP, COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL LITERACY FOLLOW-UP TRAINING**

Once the ex-combatants graduate from Mapel and return to their chosen communities, the trainers - with the support of NDDRC state level staff - circulate within the states to provide follow-up trainings to the XCs and community members joining the XCs in cooperatives or associations. The IP-LIV visits all ex-combatants choosing to participate for follow-up and refresher training between September 2013 and July 2014. The follow-up training is designed to build on the intensive foundational training provided at Mapel.

In the project's phase 2, a second 10-day ToT is provided to NDDRC's 16 ICRS caseworkers in order to ensure quality training services to XCs and to increase the capacity of the NDDRC state teams in service delivery. The training matches to that provided to the external trainers in Phase 1 with further adjustments made to localize the context and for use by the ICRS caseworkers.

## **7.5 LIVELIHOODS START-UP KITS**

To supplement the vocational training provided in Mapel, livelihood start-up kits which match to the training that each ex-combatant receives at Mapel are distributed. This process involves the initial design of the contents of each kit, contracting suppliers, logistics of warehousing and delivery, and distribution at each of the four state offices. Lessons learned from the CPA DDR were revisited in the development and implementation of this sub-component and particular emphasis was placed on 1) timely delivery of goods, 2) quality of goods, 3) relevant materials to trainings delivered, and 4) oversight of the delivery process of complete toolkits.

### **7.5.1 AGREEMENT ON MODALITY**

The consultant liaises with the NDDRC leadership & PMU to determine the modality for toolkit composition in relation to the trainings received in the TF. In this pilot start-up kits match to the vocational trainings attended in Mapel. There are 8 Vocational Trainings available in Mapel in this pilot project: Agriculture, Carpentry, Electrical, Plumbing, Auto-Mechanic/ Driving, Animal Husbandry, Welding and Masonry and start-up kits are designed for specific to each.

### **7.5.2 FORMATION OF START-UP KIT CONTENTS LISTS**

Before launching the actual procurement process, it is necessary to consult with stakeholders including the Department of Vocational Training in the Ministry of Labor and its field based Multi-purpose Training Centers (MTCs) in Juba and Wau, and other partners and experts. The Ministry of Labor and the MTCs have a role and authority to set national standards; especially so in policy and curriculum. Another expert body must be consulted to recommend standard kits for Agriculture and animal husbandry.

As a second step, the trainers in Mapel are consulted on what they consider to be priority tools that need to be included in a kit so as to enable an ex-combatant to promptly and independently engage in a vocation of his/her choice. The lists are cross-checked and finalized through discussions. The list is then preliminarily priced and submitted to the NDDRC and TDRP for a non-objection before going to bid. The content lists may need to be slightly re-adjusted following bid-opening and evaluation of potential suppliers. The final list of tools is then agreed upon by UNICON, TDRP, and NDDRC.

### **7.5.3 PROCUREMENT – RFQ, OPENING OF BIDS AND CONTRACTING**

The firm then prepares and distributes a Request for Quotations to as many bidders as possible, covering organizations operating in South Sudan as well as regionally. The RFQs include exact specifications as well as request a separation in the bid of net cost of goods from taxes, tariffs, transport, insurance or other fees. A clear, transparent process is implemented by the firm, the NDDRC and the World Bank for the Opening of Bids. The firm then contracts with the selected supplier(s) after a no-objection is received from the NDDRC and TDRP.

### **7.5.4 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE**

Goods require transport from the supplier to Juba and further to the states for distribution. Reliable transport options are compared and a reliable company contracted. The goods must either be delivered by the supplier organized into kits or must be sorted into kits upon arrival. Storage is required in Juba as the goods are prepared and packed in kits for further transport to the states. The IP-LIV is also responsible for ensuring that the kits are prepared for distribution to XCs including clear labeling and packaging in a manner able to be collected by XCs.

### **7.5.5 CONFIRMATION OF CONTENTS & PREPARATION FOR DISTRIBUTION**

A quality and completeness control is carried out by the Firm upon delivery of goods to ensure that goods delivered correspond to the goods ordered and are in good condition. Goods are checked again once arriving in the States.

### **7.5.6 DISTRIBUTION TO XCS**

The kits are delivered to the State NDDRC Offices and distributed to ex-combatants in a two day distribution process against a signature by the ex-combatant and cosigning by an NDDRC State officer, an NDDRC HQ officer, and an Implementing Partner representative.

The NDDRC is responsible for conveying the information regarding the kit distribution days to the ex-combatants and media. This is done through a variety of media, and includes public distribution methods such as radio, town criers as well as direct contact with ex-combatants.

Those kits not collected on the appointed dates are transferred to the NDDRC State Offices for distribution. The above-mentioned signing-off arrangements apply. At this point the NDDRC is responsible for further storage and remaining distribution to XCs. These continue to require co-signing for confirmation of contents and receipt.

## **7.6 TECHNICAL SKILLS EXTENSION**

In addition to the general entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings, additional agricultural focused business training is included during phase 2 of the pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants choosing the agricultural livelihood path (44%) received targeted advice to support their reintegration. In addition, feedback from phase 1 suggests that some XCs are in need of additional technical skills training in particular vocations beyond what was learned at Mapel. Therefore, in Phase 2 a sub-component of technical skills extension is included to provide these additional services.

### **7.6.1 AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION VISITS**

Of the current caseload, the largest group of individuals (129 or 290) are interested in farming post military service. This is well aligned with the current market potential particularly in areas outside the capital cities. The agriculture development potential of South Sudan is enormous. According to the African Development Bank reports, the absolute majority of the households in South Sudan are primarily dependent on agriculture and livestock and 75% of the country's land area is suitable for agriculture. At the same time, only 4% of the arable land is cultivated and farming is predominantly of a subsistence nature. This creates almost unlimited opportunities for anyone willing and able to develop him/herself within the field of agriculture, albeit with significant transport and logistical challenges. However, the constraining factors limiting the agriculture development are mainly (i) lack of knowledge, and (ii) lack of resources. South Sudan's agricultural indicators are far below the regional standard, while the natural conditions are in many cases much better than those of their neighbours.

To further support this group, Phase 2 livelihoods work includes agricultural extension training. This training is made available to build upon and upgrade the technical skills developed at the Mapel Transition Facility. The agricultural sub-component is designed to be introduced in Phase 2 to align with the growing season. The training includes improved methods, best practices, and small farm business skills. Seven agricultural extension workers of the Ministry of Agriculture are assigned to the DDR project to implement this work. Among the day-to-day responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture extension workers are to (i) train the population in the field of agriculture, (ii) promote the development and

adaptation of appropriate agricultural technology, and (iii) promote the efficient production and marketing of agricultural products. It is clear that these goals align perfectly with the goals of the South Sudan DDR program.

To prepare the extension workers for the DDR service delivery, the Ministry's agricultural extension workers attend a 7-day TOT to supplement their knowledge. In this manner, the program is well aligned with the National DDR policy which calls for the DDR program to conduct reintegration through line ministries where possible, and in so doing increase the capacity of the partner Ministry. By further training the agricultural extension workers, the program contributes a positive benefit to the communities at large where the extension workers are assigned in the course of their day to day work.

As with the entrepreneurship and cooperatives training, the implementing partner develops curriculum and training materials for a TOT and the field extension trainings. Strong relations between NDDRC and the Ministry of Agriculture are crucial as the latter will be a critical partner in any effective DDR in South Sudan.

Operationally, the agricultural extension workers are joined by ICRS caseworkers and IP-LIV state managers to comprise agricultural training teams when conducting trainings for the XCs who chose agriculture as their field of reintegration. This allows additional flexibility in the training mechanism as many ex-combatants are found to work at both a trade and farming.

#### **7.6.2 TARGETED SUPPLEMENTAL VOCATIONAL TRAINING**

Preceding the reintegration phase, ex-combatants receive training in 1 of 8 vocational areas as conducted by UNESCO at the Mapel Transition Facility. As discussed above, those ex-combatants who were to receive auto-mechanic/drivers trainings were found to require supplemental training during the reintegration phase due to challenges in implementation at Mapel. Therefore in phase 2 the project facilitates ex-combatants in the correlated track to attend driving training or auto-mechanic courses. In addition, the project covers the mandatory medical examinations as well as official license issuance fees for all XCs who attended the driving schools. The effort provides a relevant case study on the process and costs of vocational training provision in local centers rather than in cantonment camps. However, it is of note that the absorptive capacity of the training centers will require careful assessment.

#### **7.6.3 VOCATIONAL EXPERT VISITS**

In Phase 2, a small sub-component of vocational expert visits is tested for future programming. This allows the ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration fields to receive a visit by an experienced professional with proven skills in their respective field. The drivers/auto-mechanics are not eligible for this additional attention as they are attending the additional vocational training in Phase 2. The expert visits are not mandatory and XCs are free to decide if they desire additional vocational expertise. The reach of this activity is limited by experts' availability in locations close to those of the corresponding XCs.

### **7.7 LEVERAGING AVAILABLE GOVERNMENT SERVICES THROUGH ICRS REFERRAL AND FOLLOW UP**

In keeping with the national DDR policy, the NDDRC is tasked with understanding the available services of government institutions and linking XCs with those services. Through the capacity building component the NDDRC state offices host state line ministries to deepen this relationship and create connections. While there are many services available, transaction costs limit the use of many of these

services, leaving them often underutilized. In response, phase 2 includes a sub-component of assistance in accessing and leveraging available government resources. These opportunities are identified by the state teams and particularly the ICRS caseworkers and included assistance with land registration, cooperative registration, tractor usage, and timber. The DDR policy should explore how to expand these services while ensuring that use by ex-combatants does not offset their use by others in need.

## **7.8 REPORTING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The IP-LIV is responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and constraints. In addition the IP-LIV sends weekly updates in periods of high activity. These reports are submitted to the HQ PMU who distributes them further and can be fed into the M&E system. Although the field manager reports directly to his or her own implementing agency, the HQ PMU has the right to review any and all documentation collected in the field.

While all ex-combatants are encouraged to take advantage of these training opportunities and the livelihoods tracks are designed to provide clear long-term benefit to the participants, the participation of ex-combatants in the reintegration activities is on a voluntary basis and it is up to the individual to choose to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the reintegration project.

In addition to this work, the IP-LIV and the M&E team are responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of trainings, cooperative work, and the impacts of livelihood component implementation. The M&E component includes the ex-combatant satisfaction survey which is a mechanism for compiling ex-combatant participant feedback on the livelihood services offered.

## **7.9 LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT TIMELINE**

A call for expressions of interest and request for proposals was conducted during March and April 2013 and the implementing partner contracted May 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

The Project Agreement extends from May 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013 to October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2014.

### **Phase 1: Initiation**

- May 14<sup>th</sup> to September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013: Livelihood Project Preparation
- July 31<sup>st</sup> to September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013: Preparation and 10 day Training of Trainers for Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Training
- September 2<sup>nd</sup> to September 12<sup>th</sup>, 2013: Intensive Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Trainings (Livelihood Fundamentals)
- September 22<sup>nd</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013: State-Based Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Trainings
  - a. Complete trainings for Cooperative Enterprises (including community members) and/or Partnerships or Individual Enterprises training
  - b. Ensure all enterprises have a business plan
- November 1<sup>st</sup> to November 5<sup>th</sup>, 2013: Deliver livelihoods start-up kits
- November 15<sup>th</sup> to December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013: Assess work and adjust plans for Phase 2

### **Phase 2: Consolidation**

- May 1<sup>st</sup> to June 3<sup>rd</sup>: Training of Trainers curriculum preparation and TOT implementation

- June 1<sup>st</sup> to July 31<sup>st</sup>: Follow-up state-based entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings
  - Offer training opportunities to all ex-combatants;
  - Ensure at least two follow-up counselling sessions with ex-combatants during phase 2; and
  - If necessary visit enterprises that are reported to be failing and as feasible, provide additional mentoring assistance to address challenges.
- June 15<sup>th</sup> to July 31<sup>st</sup>: Technical extension skills and leveraging government programming

Phase 3: Evaluation & Knowledge Transfer

- August 1<sup>st</sup> to October 31<sup>st</sup>: Final Evaluation and Consolidation of Learning

## 8. COMPONENT 4: DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS

### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

The DDR Community Support Projects comprise the fourth component of the reintegration pilot. These projects are designed to ensure that the selected communities where high concentrations of ex-combatants return are also indirect beneficiaries of the NDDRP. As such these projects are designed to incorporate processes of social capital formation while also enabling the enhancement of livelihood opportunities for all community members. These projects are conducted where there is a high concentration of returning ex-combatants. These projects also have a clear linkage to broader recovery and development in South Sudan.

More specifically, community projects endeavour to deliver water boreholes (or if no water project is needed, specific community-requested common-good projects). Project locations target rural areas where local needs are most pressing. In these communities the IP-Comm implements a system of broadly representative community input to select the appropriate project most appropriate to meet local needs.

The Community Support Project component targets 17 communities where ex-combatants return. A consultative process is conducted on where the project is to be implemented and how it will be managed afterwards. As such this component of the pilot reintegration strategy aims to enhance social capital formation by both building community's capacity for collective decision making and providing infrastructural resources for communities.

**Objective:** The Community Projects component of the Pilot Reintegration Project aims to promote community engagement and ownership of the initiative while also reducing tensions between communities and newly assimilated combatants through improving community infrastructure that mutually benefits the groups. This component both provides direct benefit to the communities of return and facilitates long-term reintegration of the ex-combatants by enhancing social capital and long-term livelihood success. In addition this component tests the direct community support mechanism for future DDR tranches.

The following are the objectives of the DDR Community Support Project in the communities where community projects are implemented:

- *From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC's commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 17 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure project and accountability among all parties.*
- *From a micro perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties. A CDD/R approach fosters trust between the ex-combatants and rest of their communities, as well as between the NDDRC and local authorities by providing opportunities and incentives for practical collaboration on reconstruction activities of mutual importance.*

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** Community project locations are identified directly by communities in order to meet local needs with the goal of contributing long-term benefit and impact to the communities. The process whereby Village Water Committees (VWCs) are structured can have a lasting impact beyond the life cycle of the project in that there would be democratic representative structures that would be in place that can capitalize on future opportunities.

**How replicable:** The community component tests mechanisms that could be utilized in future DDR programmes and also in future CDD projects in South Sudan including social capital formation and local-level development, empowering members of the community. The process by which VWCs are selected, trained and mentored is being tested and, depending on effectiveness of the process, could be transferred to other communities. This component can further help build linkages and provide the foundation for engagement with other community-driven development initiatives, which either exist or may arise in the future.

## **8.2 SCOPE OF PROJECT**

The DDR Community Support Project is implemented in 17 selected villages in different counties in the four states where the first tranche of demobilised ex-combatants are returning. The selection of communities is determined based on an agreed upon community selection criteria with final decision the prerogative of the NDDRC done jointly with state PMU. This is done at the outset of the Project together with the HQ PMU and in line with the available resources for this component of the overall Pilot reintegration Project.

The following are the steps that have to be taken:

- Project Environmental Impact Assessment
- Project Feasibility Assessment
- Local Government and State level PMUs Orientation and Training
- Community orientation to the CDD/R & selection mentoring
- General assembly selection of community projects
- Project implementation

The DDR Community Support Project is delivered in two phases: preparation and implementation.

- Preparation Phase: this component is comprised of three segments: 1) selection of the communities to receive community projects; 2) project feasibility and environmental assessments; and 3) convening communities to select and manage projects.
- Implementation Phase: 1) Community committees; and 2) Construction of projects.
- M&E Process: Parallel to the above phases is an M&E process initiated from the outset of the DDR Community Support Project. Key functions of this process are to document lessons learned and track outcomes as well as to identify areas for improvement or remediation through corrective actions throughout all of the phases.

## **8.3 COMMUNITY PROJECT PREPARATION**

### ***8.3.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE NDDRC STAFF ORIENTATION AND TRAINING***

Community Development Project activities are initiated through an awareness campaign targeting local authorities to be undertaken by the PMU and structures within the NDDRC. This is followed by training, along with on-going awareness raising activities to improve understanding of roles and responsibilities in supporting the CDD/R process. In addition issues of good governance and people-led processes are also included in the discussions with staff both within local government and the State NDDRC teams in each of the four States. There is also capacity building, guidance, mentoring and quality control to the state NDDRC teams to enhance their ability to deliver such future projects.



### **8.3.2 COMMUNITY ORIENTATION**

Awareness raising and orientation also takes place in target communities to ensure that the population in all of the communities understands the purpose of the project as well as their rights and responsibilities in the process. It is vital to orient selected communities properly on the purpose of the project, both in terms of process and output and specifically what their role will be. In each village the project staff of the Firm, together with relevant local government representatives and State NDDRC staff call for a full community meeting in order to introduce the CDD/R project to the community, elect a community committee and select a project.

### **8.3.3 PROJECT FEASIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS**

Feasibility and Environmental assessments are undertaken using criteria agreed upon by the Firm, World Bank and NDDRC prior to committing to complete a project in a particular location and prior to construction. Regarding feasibility, for areas where water projects are selected, the sites must geologically have water available in aquifers that are appropriate for hand or solar pumps. For the environmental assessment sites must be assessed based on the agreed upon criteria which includes having proper drainage and not being near to latrines, garbage dumps or cemeteries as well as other criteria as agreed. Best practice guidelines are used to choose sites that are environmentally suitable for the intervention. Efforts are made to account for any negative environmental impact of proposed interventions. If it were assessed that a project has potential for mitigatable risk, a mitigation plan would have been developed. Finally, the land where the projects are implemented must also be officially turned over to the community if privately owned.

## **8.4 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

### **8.4.1 COMMUNITY COMMITTEE ENGAGEMENT**

Once the Community Committee is elected and the project decided upon, the Firm initiates a basic project implementation process and project management training for the Community Committee. Training includes understanding the delivery process, how resources are used, how personnel are hired and how the borehole or market place is managed after the project is completed. The design of the trainings includes understanding the nature of the infrastructural deliverables, as well as the procedures for facilitating good governance to ensure that these are genuinely 'empowering' experiences and not just mechanical steps to be completed to fulfil the operational protocol. Given high rates of illiteracy in the region, all materials developed are appropriate so that they can be used by all community members.

### **8.4.2 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

Once communities are identified and the type of community project is selected, through a competitive tendering process, the Firm identifies the most efficient service provider to carry out the construction/rehabilitation work in these areas. The process meets internationally established standards for procurement and contracting procedures and regulations. The Firm issues tenders to experienced contractors working on water initiatives throughout South Sudan. The tenders receive a no-objection from the NDDRC and World Bank. Bid opening is completed at the agreed upon location and officials from the NDDRC and World Bank are invited to observe the bid opening. Contractor selection is done in accordance with established selection criteria agreed between the Firm and NDDRC. All contracting must also receive a no-objection from the NDDRC and the World Bank.

Once contracts are issued and works ready to commence, the Firm works together with state NDDRC representatives who introduce the contractor to the community and inform the community of the

tentative start date of the project. Any community obligations that are required while the project is being implemented are also be discussed at this introduction meeting.

Once the community project is completed, the infrastructure is turned over to the community management committees to ensure its proper use, management and sustainability.

## **8.5 MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The Firm is responsible to contribute to the overall M&E process conducted by the NDDRC and M&E Firm including coordination on M&E design and data collection.

## **8.6 DDR COMMUNITY PROJECTS TIMELINE**

The Project Agreement is for 9 months August 19<sup>th</sup> 2013 to May 31<sup>st</sup> 2014:

- August 19<sup>th</sup> to September 15<sup>th</sup>: Identification of 8-12 villages and suburbs.
- September 15<sup>th</sup> to October 15<sup>th</sup>: Community selection of projects.
- October 15<sup>th</sup> to May 31<sup>st</sup>: Implementation of projects.
- June 1<sup>st</sup> to October 31<sup>st</sup>: Evaluation of all projects.

## 9. PROJECT RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

South Sudan achieved its independence on 9 July 2011. However the challenges facing what is the world's newest country are enormous. Decades of war and marginalisation have resulted in a legacy of chronic and deep poverty. While reliable and accurate indicators are still scarce it is estimated that 51 percent of the population live below the poverty line and that the country has the highest estimated maternal mortality rates in the world. Under half of children enrol in primary school and less than one in ten girls complete primary education. Less than 27 percent of the population are literate and only 14 percent of the population live within five kilometres of primary health services. A legacy of conflict and underdevelopment has produced a large number of structural challenges affecting the attainment of sustainable development processes. These include the following risk levels.

### **9.1 COUNTRY LEVEL**

- **Internal security:** In some areas internal insecurity continues to be a significant problem affecting communities. Insecurity is fuelled by the presence of high levels of small arms, conflict over cattle, water and grazing rights and a lack of economic opportunities. Poor transport infrastructure often makes it difficult for the Government to respond rapidly to security incidents and justice and rule of law institutions remain weak although they are under development.
- **Infrastructure and economy:** Poor infrastructure such as road connectivity especially from farm to markets, energy connectivity in rural areas, lack of structured irrigation systems in areas distant from riverbanks. Lack of roads has isolated all regions in the South from developing its agriculture and market potential. As a result key consumption markets in urban areas such as Juba are isolated from other regional producers.
- **Viable livelihoods and economic opportunities:** Over 80 percent of people in rural areas are subsistence farmers whose livelihoods were seriously disrupted during the conflict and who are only now just beginning to recover. Market infrastructure and linkages remain nascent and access to markets has been affected in many areas by periods of insecurity. Farming is largely subsistence-based, with small-scale farming activities limited due to lack of access to markets, land, seeds, and historical dependency on imported produce from the north and current reliance on Kenyan and Ugandan imports.
- **International funding and capital investment:** Ongoing conflict and insecurity has necessitated an emphasis of international support on emergency humanitarian assistance which has contributed to the creation of a culture of dependency and reliance, which has negatively impeded efforts to promote self-reliance and ownership. Programming related to employment or livelihoods has also generally emphasised employment generation rather than opportunity generation. Ownership therefore has been underemphasised, while funding resources have been absorbed by beneficiaries to satisfy immediate, short-term needs rather than longer-term recovery activities.
- **On-going population movement:** The end of the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan saw significant population returns from Sudan and neighbouring countries and internal population relocations. In many areas communities are still struggling to re-establish themselves both in terms of livelihoods and achieving social cohesion after years of displacement and conflict.

- Land allocation: Land value is determined by community decision and is not based on market value. Land tenure laws are still being developed, such that transfer of ownership, registration procedures and process are cumbersome and not fully clarified.
- Policy and regulatory: Key investment and employment creation policies are lacking as the DDR process seeks to incorporate some employment opportunities through small sector engagement. Other investment policies and laws, e.g. encouraging public private partnerships is also lacking.
- Loss of de-facto pensions: This group of ex-combatants from the SPLA has been classified as 'Wounded Heroes' and currently receives a monthly salary without having to work, i.e. this could be perceived as a de facto pension. It is conceivable that when this cash transfer ceases, at the end of the reintegration pilot, participants may express dissatisfaction or frustration, which could in turn lead to instability.

## **9.2    ENTITY LEVEL**

- Institutional and technical capacity: The Government of the Republic of South Sudan faces formidable challenges in terms of the development of institutional and technical capacity. During the period leading up to Independence considerable efforts were made to establish and develop institutions and policy and legal frameworks as enshrined ultimately within the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011). At the national level the Government is responsible for maintaining peace, security foreign relations, overall reconstruction and development, promoting good governance, and the protection of rights with policy implemented through line ministries. Below the national level the ten States are responsible for the delivery of public services working with lower level local Governments at County and Payam level. While these basic structures are in place capacity remains nascent at almost all levels and requires significant strengthening and development. The NDDRC capacity at the state and the national level is limited. The NDDRC lacks skilled staff specifically at the state level to support large scale programme management needs, in addition to skills, while resource allocation drawn from national government commitment is not yet clear. These limitations impede the continuation of basic operational activities and costs, such as office administration, the installation and maintenance of efficient IT solutions, wireless connectivity capacity, vehicles, and fuel, while also preventing broader institutional capacity building.

## **9.3    PROJECT LEVEL**

- Geographical proximity: among other factors, concentration of members per Payam and Boma plays a critical role on the type, size of cooperative or microenterprise activities selection and design for the first trench of 500 ex-combatants under this pilot. Given extreme dispersion of the population throughout the country, there is risk that there is an insufficient concentration of ex-combatants in a given region to capitalize on livelihood or cooperative opportunities offered through the project.
- Poor infrastructure: Lack of energy in most rural areas of the four states and limited accessibility to water beyond rain fed constrains the types of livelihood activities possible in the rural parts of South Sudan.
- Short timeframe: Given the country's pre-existing challenges, six months execution period would be difficult to meet possible delays in procurement and setting of core livelihood activities.

**Table 4: Risks Inherent to the Pilot Reintegration Project and Mitigating Measures**

Risk	Risk rating	Risk Mitigating Measures Incorporated into Project Design
<p><b>Country level</b> Security situation is failing some of the states where the pilot is taking place.</p> <p>Absence of certain policies that could have impact on the sustainability of some of the planned livelihood activities as well as on job creation potential in the future.</p> <p>On-going population movements especially in areas with short rain falls or exposure to security is apparent</p>	<p>S</p> <p>H</p> <p>L</p>	<p>The pilot activities are only target 500 ex-combatants in four States where activities designed are rurally based reducing reliance on job creation policies.</p> <p>Measures to compel government to draft conducive policies to address policy gaps in areas e.g. related to labour law and PPP.</p>
<p><b>Entity level</b> The NDDRC capacity at the state and the national level is limited. NDDRC lacks skilled staff specially at the state level to support large scale programme management needs, in addition to skills, resource allocation drawn from national government commitment is not yet clear.</p>	<p>H</p> <p>H</p>	<p>The pilot is implemented in partnership with UN, INGOs, NGOs and NDDRC while project management oversight is provided by a project management team.</p> <p>Technical and financial support designed for all rural activities is executed with the support of international partners.</p>
<p><b>Project level</b> Geographic distribution of ex-combatants' areas of return makes it difficult to travel frequently to all destinations and may impede formation of cooperatives or engagement in other livelihood activities.</p> <p>Ex-combatants may see the programme as loss of de facto pensions</p> <p>Project implementation period of six month</p> <p>Procurement delays</p> <p>Given the country's pre-existing challenges, six months execution period would be difficult to meet possible delays in procurement and setting of core livelihood activities.</p> <p>As some of the required inputs for the farming activities would be imported such as seeds, the required time procurement period may pose a challenge in trying to meet the pilot implementation timeline.</p> <p>Lack of infrastructure, roads, electricity and water in most rural parts where the pilot is executed</p>	<p>H</p> <p>S</p> <p>H</p> <p>H</p> <p>H</p> <p>S</p>	<p>The three types of interventions (cooperatives, single farm, or enterprises,) are designed to accommodate the different sizes of ex-combatants per payam and Boma. In Bomas where ex-combatants of 3 or more would be encouraged to form cooperatives. If ex-combatants representation is below 3, single farming or enterprises would be set up to accommodate geographic proximities.</p> <p>Clear communication with the ex-combatants is critical to ensure accurate expectations</p>

H-High, S-Substantial, M-Moderate, L-Low

## 10. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: OVERARCHING SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DDR POLICY FRAMEWORK

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement all armed Southern Sudanese groups were integrated into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and a DDR programme was implemented in both Sudan and South Sudan with the support of UN agencies and donors. However the CPA programme was from the outset beset by difficulties and an independent review in December 2010 suggested that at that time less than 10,000 combatants had been demobilised. According to CPA-DDR reporting only 12,225 people have been demobilised under this programme. A number of factors affected the delivery of the CPA DDR programme including uncertainties in the overall environment on the lead up to the referendum on independence and programmatic deficiencies related to its overall design and implementation. These are said to have included a failure to appropriately address the local context and to adopt community based approaches to reintegration. There was also little Government ownership of the programme and limited involvement by the SPLA.

DDR is articulated as one of the key priorities of the South Sudan Development Plan (2011-2013) where it is identified as being an important component of efforts to enable a more productive allocation of financial and human resources and to assist in broader peace building objectives by the reintegration of ex-combatants into appropriate livelihoods thereby reducing the risk of crime and recurring political violence. The Government's intentions and objectives for DDR are encapsulated within a Policy Paper on DDR produced in late 2011 and an associated strategic plan are intended to guide the development of a new DDR programme to be launched on 15 April 2013 and known as the National Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) which it is intended will be implemented between 2012 and 2020. The Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) is leading the DDR programme in South Sudan under presidential decree.

The National DDR Programme also intends to increase livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return and aims at facilitating the release, return and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups into their families and communities of return. It is intended that the social and economic reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAF/G) shall be supported through a separate area-based support programme in communities where their concentration is found to be high. It is envisaged that through the strengthening of the capacity of the NDDRC, line ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the private sector, service delivery overall to the people of South Sudan shall also be enhanced.

This pilot is anticipated to serve a first group of 500 in the new DDR Programme in South Sudan. During the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, DDR was conducted in southern Sudan with demobilisation beginning in 2009. After the CPA DDR, lessons learned were compiled and guiding documents were developed to incorporate those lessons for a New DDR. These guiding documents for New DDR include:

- Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (dated 23 September 2011)
- South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (dated 11 March 2012)
- Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP): 2012-2020 (dated 20 April 2012)
- The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Council Presidential Order No. 31/2102 (dated 12 October 2012)

## **ANNEX 2: SOUTH SUDAN NEW DDR PROGRAMME GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

The DDR policy documents outline the following guiding principles for the Republic of South Sudan's New DDR Programme:

- National ownership and leadership: The South Sudan DDR Policy and Strategic Plan make it clear that national ownership and leadership shall characterize the implementation of the programme and that.
- Strong partnership with all Stakeholders: It is recognised that while national leadership is critical, the development and maintenance of strong partnerships with Implementing Partners with a range of stakeholders is required to successfully deliver the DDR pilot programme.
- Incremental Approach: It is recognised that DDR activities need to be carefully sequenced and that the DDR programme needs to nurture and support capacity building of a range of stakeholders to achieve DDR objectives and ensure sustainability. It is further recognised that the capacity of the DDR Commission needs to be further built.
- Decentralized and Flexible Approach: South Sudan is diverse and complex in its security, social, political, economic and geographic dimensions. For this reason decentralized management arrangements shall be instituted in alignment to RSS decentralized system of governance. It is also stated that assistance to ex-combatants shall be relevant to each ex-combatant's needs and aspirations as well as appropriate to the local context.
- Maximizing Investments: It is recognised that the DDR programme requires significant investment in terms of infrastructure, training, economic revitalization and diversification, and technical assistance. However, it is also recognised that a number of investments have already been made which should be utilised to the extent possible. It is intended that the DDR programme shall make available specific opportunities where they are required but that it shall also seek to link ex-combatants to broader recovery programmes where these are available.
- Conflict-sensitivity: It is recognised that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation adopts a community approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high number of demobilised soldiers are returning.

### **ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF DDR TARGET BENEFICIARIES AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA**

The pilot reintegration project has a tight focus on the reintegration of the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche of the DDR Programme pilot phase. However, the estimated targets for the whole of the DDR programme are provided below for information.

According to the Programme Document (Final Draft 2012), between 2012 and 2020, the NDDRP will directly target the following:

**150,000 active adult members of the SPLA and other national organized forces of which 80,000** shall be active SPLA/SSAF soldiers and **70,000** active personnel from the South Sudan Police Service, Wildlife, Prison and Fire Brigade Services. In order to qualify for social and economic reintegration support, the ex-combatants must have completed the three-month reinsertion support in Transition Facilities and returned to live in a community in South Sudan. The Basic eligibility criteria to enter the process include having proof of active membership in the relevant national organized force (SPLA/SSAF in this caseload), to be on the payroll of the relevant national organized force, to be between the ages of 18 & 65, and meet the medical staff requirements of health for participation at the transition facility.

**37,500<sup>2</sup> Ex-combatants with physical and psychosocial disabilities.**

**150 communities of return/projects are to** be targeted with labour-intensive community infrastructure projects targeting both ex-combatants and other community members.

**South Sudanese in foreign armed groups.** South Sudanese returning from the Government of Sudan security services as well as South Sudanese abductees in the Lord's Resistance Army first be cleared by the SPLA/SSAF as a pre-condition for eligibility to participate in the NDDRP.

**An estimated 10,000 women associated with the armed forces and groups (WAAFG).** Although not a main target of this DDR programme, WAAFG are assisted through separate support programmes.

**2,000<sup>3</sup> Children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG).** In line with best practices, CAAFAG are assisted along with other vulnerable children in their communities of return at a ratio of **one** CAAFAG to **one** other vulnerable child. Separate project documents are to provide further details on the scope, approach and specific objectives.

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<sup>2</sup> It is estimated that 25% of the disarmed and demobilised soldiers have disabilities



#### ANNEX 4: CATALOGUING OF PILOT REINTEGRATION ACTIVITIES

To create the initial cataloguing of the reintegration activities for the pilot phase the team focused on the following complementary area questions in addition to the details furnished on ex-combatant profiles:


**Table 5: Complementary Areas of Analysis Informing Pilot Design**

Economic and enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the overall economic situation in the state(s) where the Implementing Partner is operating?</li> <li>• Which are the potentially dynamic rural and urban economic sectors?</li> <li>• Do these sectors present opportunities for male and female, elderly and disabled participants, IDPs, Youth and other vulnerable groups?</li> <li>• What opportunities are there for public-private partnership Implementing Partners, including apprenticeship Implementing Partners and on-the-job training?</li> <li>• How can participants' skills be built on and/or improved in a way that increases their employability?</li> <li>• How cumbersome are state and national procedures to registering a company, paying taxes, registering land or assets and accessing capital?</li> </ul>
Training providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What education and training providers exist in the state(s) where the Implementing Partner is operating?</li> <li>• What subject/skills and age groups do they specialize in?</li> <li>• What capacity do they have to support reintegration?</li> <li>• Are there providers whose capacity could be developed with minimal support?</li> </ul>
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What business development services are available at the state and where?</li> <li>• What services could be developed with minimum support with direct results related to the specific reintegration activities?</li> </ul>
Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What other recovery and development initiatives are being planned and implemented that the reintegration activities could link?</li> <li>• What capacity do they have to support the designed livelihood activities during or after reintegration support?</li> </ul>
Ex-combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Types of skills they have</li> <li>• Their preferred jobs</li> <li>• Preferred areas of return and Assets they own</li> </ul>

**ANNEX 5: TARGETED STATES**

The pilot is conducted in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes.

**DIAGRAM 2: Map of Pilot Area**



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL  
DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT  
Pilot Reintegration Project**

**ANNEX A**

Pilot Reintegration  
Project Document

SEPTEMBER 2013







# **NATIONAL DDR PROGRAMME OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

## **PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT DOCUMENT – REVISED**

**(18 SEPTEMBER 2013)**



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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AES	Alternative Education System
ALP	Adult Learning Programme
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CDD/R	Community Development Driven or Rehabilitation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRA	Collective Reserve Account
CSP	Community Support Projects
CAAFG	Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
HQ	Headquarters
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IP-ICB	Implementing Partner - Institutional Capacity Building
IP-LIV	Implementing Partner - Livelihoods Support
IP-COMM	Implementing Partner - Community Support Projects
LS	Livelihoods Support
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission of the Republic of South Sudan
NDDRP	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
NOF	National Organized Forces
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PRA	Participatory Rapid Assessment
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement
SPMU	State Project Management Unit
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
TCC	Technical DDR Coordinating Committee
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the World Bank
TF	Transition Facility
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
VDC	Village Community Development Committee
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups
WB	World Bank



## 1. PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT SUMMARY

This document discusses the background and context for the upcoming pilot phase of South Sudan's National DDR Programme. This document further outlines in detail the full pilot reintegration project integrated in to this initial pilot phase. The pilot reintegration project has a specific focus on the reintegration of the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche of the DDR Programme pilot phase. The first pilot DDR Programme will target 500 members of the national organized forces, which will include able-bodied candidates from Sudan's People Liberation Army/South Sudan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF). The pilot phase will be established and delivered in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal), all in the proximity of the Mapel Transitional Facility.

The pilot reintegration project has both social and economic reintegration objectives which contribute toward the overall objective of South Sudan DDR Policy, namely "To support transformation of SPLA/SSAF into a more professional, efficient and cost-effective armed force."

*Social and Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

*Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

### 1.1 COMPONENTS OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

To achieve these objectives, the pilot reintegration project includes four main components:

#### **1.1.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING**

The Institutional Capacity Building Component will be conducted through systems development, as well as training and mentoring of the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) staff within the overall Project Management Unit (PMU) and in the four state-level PMUs. Capacity building will also include implementation of the Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) under development by the NDDRC since early 2012.

#### **1.1.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

An independent Monitoring and Evaluation system will be put in place to operate throughout the pilot programme. The M&E system will be designed to track achievements and progress of the project, to provide updated information to guide decision-making, to detect problems as they arise and ultimately to assess the overall impact the project and to identify lessons learned to inform the NDDRC at project closure. The M&E will include a baseline study to be conducted with all ex-combatants while they are in the transition facility during the reinsertion phase. In addition, a rapid assessment conducted after the close of Phase One of the Pilot will provide recommendations for project adjustment as needed to inform development of the following phases. There will also be a final beneficiary assessment conducted

amongst a sample of the ex-combatants and communities. This will inform the final independent assessment of the project to be conducted by an external firm.

### ***1.1.3 LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT***

Ex-combatants will have the option to participate in livelihood support activities that will be offered in four primary areas: cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members; small farm and/or rural agricultural enterprise training; individual micro-enterprise business training; and adult or formal education. In addition the ex-combatants will be offered livelihoods fundamentals training on business and cooperative management during their time in the transition facility.

### ***1.1.4 DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS***

Through the reintegration pilot phase, the NDDRC intends to provide targeted support for communities receiving ex-combatants after the DDR Participants graduate from the Mapel training center. Community Support Projects will likely entail borehole projects in 8-12 select communities situated in more rural areas. Projects will be conducted where there is a higher concentration of returning ex-combatants. Communities will be selected by the NDDRC, ensuring that projects are placed in different communities than those receiving UNMISS Reinsertion Community Projects. Delivery of these projects will be discussed and agreed upon by members of the community in question incorporating representation of a range of stakeholders. If a borehole project is not possible, the rehabilitation of local markets may be considered as an alternative.

Implementation of these components will entail the contracting of three implementing partners (IPs). The IPs will manage the components as follows:

- 1) Institutional Capacity Building through Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support and Monitoring and Evaluation (Components One and Two)
- 2) Livelihoods Support (Component Three)
- 3) DDR Community Support Projects (Component Four)

## 1.2 PHASES OF THE PROGRAMME

The overall pilot reintegration project will be divided into three discreet but connected phases.

Phase One: Initiation (April to November 2013)

- Component 1 - Institutional Capacity Building: Capacity Building will include systems development and project management training, mentoring and support to the NDDRC staff within the overall Project Management Unit (PMU) and in the four SPMUs.
- Component 2 - Monitoring and Evaluation: Support will be provided to the M&E unit of the NDDRC to develop all the necessary tools and systems, NDDRC staff will be trained in use and management of the tools and systems, the ex-combatant and community baseline surveys will be conducted, and monitoring processes will be launched. Initial outcomes will be evaluated at the end of this phase.
- Component 3 - Livelihoods Support: The livelihoods fundamentals training and initiation of ex-combatant reintegration livelihood support will be undertaken during this phase.
- Component 4 - DDR Community Support Projects: The identification of community development and/or rehabilitation projects will be undertaken during this phase. Preparatory environmental and social analyses will be undertaken as required. Implementation of projects will begin where feasible.


Phase Two: Consolidation (December 2013 to March 2014)

- Component 1 - Institutional Capacity Building: Capacity building will be conducted in this phase of the project.
- Component 2 - Monitoring and Evaluation: NDDRC staff will continue to receive support on the use of M&E tools and systems and processes will be monitored and evaluated during this phase.
- Component 3 - Livelihoods Support: Ex-combatant will receive follow-up and refresher trainings during this phase.
- Component 4 - DDR Community Support Projects: All community development and/or rehabilitation projects will be implemented during this phase.

Phase Three: Evaluation and Knowledge Transfer (April to June 2014)

- Component 1 - Institutional Capacity Building: This will be conducted in this phase of the project.
- Component 2 - Monitoring and Evaluation: The process and deliverable outcomes will be evaluated during this phase. The learnings, processes and systems developed will be transferred to the National DDR Commission. In addition a tracer survey will be conducted.

**DIAGRAM 1: OVERVIEW OF COMPONENTS AND PHASES**



It should be noted that reintegration is a nine month process following the services provided at the Mapel Training Facility. The reintegration phase will begin after the DDR Participants' graduation from Mapel on September 18<sup>th</sup> and go through June 15<sup>th</sup> 2014. Final evaluation of the pilot will take place in June 2014.

### 1.3 MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT

The management of the pilot reintegration project will be conducted by a Project Management Unit (PMU), led by the National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). Additional support will be provided by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), as well as from Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and others partners as assigned. The Headquarters (HQ) PMU will be responsible for overarching management and coordination of reintegration pilot activities, while also overseeing operations of the SPMUs, which will manage state-level activities. TDRP maintains fiscal responsibility for the pilot's operations but will co-manage this project with the NDDRC. Capacity building for the NDDRC will be ongoing to support their work with the HQ PMU at the SPMUs.

## 2. SOUTH SUDAN NEW DDR PROGRAMME BACKGROUND

DDR has been highlighted as a priority of the Republic of South Sudan as an integral component of the country's progress toward establishing sustainable peace and socio-economic development. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) marshalled the country's separation from the north, and the army is generally held in high regard. Two years after Independence however, South Sudan remains highly militarized. The current parade of the SPLA numbers approximately 194,000, and may continue to rise as additional South Sudanese soldiers from various external forces are integrated. Many of these soldiers have received little to no military training, are illiterate and over pensionable age. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), some members of the SPLA were redeployed to other institutions including the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Brigades) and the Correctional Services (Prisons). These services are frequently referred to jointly as the National Organized Forces (NOF).

The Government recognizes that the armed forces need to transition to a more proportionately-sized and resourced national army (SPLA) which respects human rights and is under effective civilian oversight. In 2008 the government produced a White Paper on Defence concluding that the total force strength of the modern SPLA should not exceed 119,000.

A reduction in force size is needed to modernize the SPLA and to reduce the national defence budget. Currently approximately 40 percent of the national budget is consumed by defence expenditures, a significant proportion of which is used to meet salary and welfare costs. Streamlining the military is in the Government's overarching interest. As the soldiers are demobilised, the number of citizens with formal access to weapons should reduce. Since those carrying arms pose a potential future source of insecurity if not appropriately managed, DDR is seen as one component of a broader security sector reform process.

The South Sudan NDDR programme will contribute to the reduction of the SPLA/South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) and other national organised forces by supporting disarmed and demobilised soldiers to transition smoothly towards civilian life. As His Excellency President Salva Kiir stated that through DDR these soldiers will be re-deployed and re-assigned with "new and crucial duties and responsibilities" to support the Republic of South Sudan as productive civilians.<sup>1</sup>

The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants can contribute significantly to the overall process of peace consolidation and prosperity in South Sudan. Experience in other post conflict countries demonstrates that stabilization and the assumption of a normal life for these target groups is likely to prevent new tensions and can contribute to burgeoning economic life in small communities. The main objective of this strategy is to contribute to post-conflict stabilization and the creation of an enabling environment for sustainable development through socio-economic reintegration of people affected by the conflict. In recent years, bilateral and multinational partners have supported the launch of a large number of projects in the fields of community development and the fight against poverty. The strategy will therefore tend, where possible, to create synergies between these projects to avoid duplication in the response and coordination of actors involved.

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<sup>1</sup>Southern Sudan DDR Launch 10<sup>th</sup> June 2009, Juba, South Sudan

## 2.1 SOUTH SUDAN DDR PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

The pilot reintegration project has both social and economic reintegration objectives, which reinforce the overall objective of South Sudan DDR Policy, namely “To support transformation of SPLA / SSAF into a more professional, efficient and cost-effective armed force.”

Furthermore, these objectives are designed to work towards the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme which include:

- **Objective 1:** To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals.
- **Objective 2:** To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return.
- **Objective 3:** To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return.
- **Objective 4:** To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return.
- **Objective 5:** To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes.
- **Objective 6:** To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan.

The pilot reintegration project objectives and activities outlined within this document do not address CAAF/G and WAAF/G, although these objectives are included in the overall programme policy. This is because CAAF/G and WAAF/G are to be addressed by separate special programmes distinct from the general ex-combatants reintegration programme being piloted here. Additionally, this pilot phase includes capacity building of the DDR system and NDDRC staff but will not directly build capacity of the line ministries, civil society or private sector. However, the NDDRC will engage with these entities in later tranches of pilot programme.

### 3. PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1 DDR PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT OBJECTIVES

This DDR pilot reintegration project aims to achieve socio-economic reintegration objectives for an anticipated 500 ex-combatants while simultaneously testing the designed economic reintegration approach and building the capacity of the management system going forward. To this end, the pilot reintegration project has both social and economic reintegration as well as systems and learning, objectives:

*Social and Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- To provide ex-combatants with needed skills to enhance their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants into their families and communities of return.

*Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project:*

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

Reintegration is an extended, on-going process by which ex-combatants become socially and economically assimilated in their communities of return. In application, however, DDR reintegration assistance to ex-combatants has a limited timeframe. Reintegration programming aims to contribute to the consolidation of lasting stability and development through the improvement of social and material conditions of ex-combatants and other beneficiaries. Reintegration is a process of continuous social and economic development, initiated during the DDR phase and ideally continuing through a stabilisation period into the medium and possibly long-term. Through reintegration ex-combatants return to civilian life either in their community of origin or in new communities, and seek jobs and sustainable livelihoods.

Socio-economic reintegration should endeavour to facilitate integration of ex-combatants into local communities at the same socio-economic level as the rest of the population to minimize potential resentment or impressions of special treatment. It is critical to improve their access to economic livelihoods by facilitating their participation in existing job market opportunities exist in local communities. At the same time, however, reintegration programming should not necessarily target the needs of ex-combatants alone, but should be developed in consideration of the broader community recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation needs as well. Experience in other DDR programmes has found that actions supporting socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants should also incorporate consideration for host populations.

DDR programmes can catalyse long-term development and peace consolidation. Best practice reintegration models should attempt to incorporate a more holistic development pathway that builds linkages between the initial phases of DDR medium-term recovery and stabilization initiatives, with consideration for longer-term sustainable development. The strategy proposed for first tranche of the NDDRC pilot attempts to apply these principles for comprehensive programming promoting longer-term development and socio-economic recovery in areas where ex-combatants will attempt to return.

Early fieldwork reveals that economic reintegration needs in South Sudan are dramatic and are therefore highlighted as the priority for the Pilot DDR Programme. Given that ex-combatants were members of the SPLA, largely lauded and regarded well by local populations for their role in the liberation of the country social reintegration activities are not prioritized. Depending on the findings and lessons learned of the initial pilot reintegration project, this prioritization may be revisited. While social activities will still be tested, they have been minimized for this initial tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that later can be replicated.

In line with this prioritization and in order to achieve the overarching reintegration objectives, the pilot reintegration project includes the following four components:

**A. Institutional Capacity Building (ICB)**

- a. Systems Development, Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support
- b. Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS)

**B. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

- a. Identifying and prioritising action plans
- b. Creating both procedures and processes
- c. Baseline & Tracer Surveys – Ex-combatants & Communities of Return

**C. Livelihoods Support (LS)**

- a. Livelihood Fundamentals entrepreneurship and cooperatives training
- b. Livelihood Opportunities
  - i. Group livelihood activities: Cooperatives
  - ii. Individual livelihood activities: Small farms and Individual enterprise development services
  - iii. Formal and continued education
- c. Livelihood start-up kits

**D. Community Support Projects (CSP)**

- a. Site selection & community mobilization
- b. Installation of boreholes, water pump rehabilitation or rehabilitation of market places

### **3.2 TARGET CASELOAD**

The first tranche of the pilot DDR programme was anticipated to include 500 individuals from the SPLA/SSAF. The DDR National Council has determined that those participating in this first pilot will be able-bodied individuals falling below a designated disabilities threshold. Those who have sustained serious injuries will therefore not be candidates for this pilot. Thus, the Basic eligibility criteria to enter the process included: proof of active membership in the relevant national organized forces (verified by both photo identification and inclusion on the payroll list or being in possession of proof of payment from the relevant national organized force), being between the ages of 18 and 65, not having severe disability, and meeting the medical staff requirements of health for participation at the transition facility.

The actual number of DDR Participants as of the start of the 3 month Mapel training in June 2013 was 292. This first group is drawn from the SPLA's "Wounded Heroes" brigade, which is currently a



designation not necessarily based on injury, but rather on assignment to the DDR programme. Wounded Heroes pay allocation and pay administration has been transferred to the Directorate of Veterans Affairs while operational control and responsibility remains with the SPLA.

### 3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS AND DISTRIBUTION

The pilot phase will be set up and delivered in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal), which are in relative proximity to the Mapel Transitional Facility.

**Table 1: Ex-combatant DDR Participants Stated Location of Reintegration by State and County**  
As of September 18, 2013

Lakes	93	Warrap	75	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	Western Bahr el Ghazal	92
<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>		<i>Counties</i>	
Awerial	9	Abyei	8	Aweil East	16	Jur River	60
Cueibet	9	Gogrial West	3	Aweil North	2	Raja	1
Rumbek Centre	13	Gogrial East	4	Aweil South	12	Wau	31
Rumbek East	17	Tonj East	7				
Rumbek North	3	Tonj North	13				
Wulu	6	Tonj South	26				
Yirol East	16	Twic	14				
Yirol West	20						

### 3.4 DEMOGRAPHICS OF PROFILED GROUP

To inform the planning of the pilot programme, the NDDRC profiled 422 of the anticipated SPLA/SSAF DDR candidates for the first tranche. This exercise only provides an initial guide of the profile of participating ex-combatants. The remaining 75 participants were yet to be assigned in order to reach the full caseload of 500. It is to be expected that there are some differences in the individuals profiled and those who in fact participate in the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche of the pilot.

Despite these challenges, the profiling data yielded useful information to help inform the features of reintegration pilot. This data has been used to map communities where ex-combatants are likely to reintegrate, and provides a snapshot of basic demographic information (e.g. 403 ex-combatants are male and 22 are female, the average age is 42, etc). Profiling data also indicates what vocational skills participants currently possess that could be enhanced for civilian livelihood creation, as well as what vocations they would aspire to have after leaving the army. According to the data, two-third of the respondents identified agricultural production as their preferred vocation.

The following table summarizes the state and county distribution of preferred locations for reintegration indicated thus far in the profiling of the 422 who provided desired location of return and livelihood information.

**Table 2: Profiled Individuals' Intended Location of Reintegration by State and County**

Lakes	125	Warrap	86	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	112	Western Bahr el Ghazal	97
<i>8 counties</i>		<i>7 counties</i>		<i>5 counties</i>		<i>3 counties</i>	
Awerial	9	Gogrial East	4	Aweil Center	2	Wau	35
Cueibet	10	Gogrial West	5	Aweil East	60	Raja	5
Rumbek Center	27	Tonj East	18	Aweil North	23	Jur River	57
Rumbek East	31	Tonj North	27	Aweil South	10		
Rumbek North	4	Tonj West	1	Aweil West	17	Eastern Equatoria	1
Wulu	7	Tonj South	29				
Yirol East	14	Twic	2			No Response	1
Yirol West	23						

### 3.5 KEY ENTITIES OF THE DDR PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

#### ***3.5.1 NATIONAL DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION COUNCIL***

The National DDR Council was formed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit in October 2012 to mobilize and coordinate Government's ministries and organizations to ensure the highest level of political alignment and support for overall National DDR Programme (NDDRP) and its strategic direction. The National DDR Council is the decision-making body for all DDR policies and sets strategic direction of the process of DDR. The Council provides high-level strategic policy guidance to the NDDRP and approves strategic documents. The Council includes the Technical Line Ministries involved in the DDR Process as well as the NDDRC.

#### ***3.5.2 NATIONAL DDR COMMISSION (NDDRC) OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN***

The National DDR Commission (NDDRC) is responsible for the overall implementation of the DDR strategy and policy outlined by the National DDR Council for the NDDRP. The commission is the lead coordinating body ensuring coherence of DDR actions including those being conducted by implementing partners. The pilot reintegration project was developed through technical assistance from the TDRP and the leadership of the NDDRC. Implementation of the pilot reintegration programme will be conducted with the Commission's overarching guidance, while management of the programme will further require significant involvement of Commission staff both at the national and state levels. The Commission is headquartered in Juba with offices in each of the 10 states.

#### ***3.5.3 SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA)***

The SPLA is a critical partner in the DDR effort. Their release of members from their ranks ultimately begins this South Sudan DDR process. Additionally, the SPLA has contributed to the launch of reintegration pilot activities by partnering with the NDDRC and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to conduct participant profiling. A majority of participants in the reintegration pilot will come from the SPLA War Wounded Heroes. Of the anticipated 150,000 to be reintegrated in the overall DDR programme, 80,000 will come from remaining SPLA forces.

#### ***3.5.4 POLICE, PRISONS, THE FIRE BRIGADE AND WILDLIFE SERVICES***

Of the 150,000 to be reintegrated in the complete DDR programme, 70,000 come from other National organized services institutions including the Police, Prisons, the Fire Brigade (Ministry of Interior) and Wildlife Services (Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism). As such the the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of

Wildlife and Tourism are critical partners in the DDR effort and they too must release members from their ranks to begin this South Sudan DDR process.

### **3.5.5 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH SUDAN LINE MINISTRIES**

The DDR programme in South Sudan includes a whole of government approach that calls on the participation and support of a wide variety of line ministries at the national and state levels. In addition to their participation in the National DDR Council, this may include the provision and facilitation of programme activities, policy and regulator measures as well and the provision of technical assistance on the ground. The Ministries engaged in the National DDR Council beyond the Office of the President and the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs are as follows:

- Agriculture & Forestry
- Animal Resources & Fisheries
- Commerce, Industry and Investment
- Environment
- Finance & Economic Planning
- Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation
- Gender, Child & Social Welfare
- General Education & Instruction
- Health
- Higher Education, Science & Technology
- Housing & Physical Planning
- Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management
- Information & Broadcasting
- Interior
- Justice
- Ministry of National Security
- Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs
- Ministry of Interior
- Transport
- Water Resources and Irrigation
- Wildlife Conservation & Tourism
- Labour, Public Service & Human Resource Development

Line ministries will appoint a DDR focal person that will be involved in the DDR pilot reintegration project as technical experts in their field.

### **3.5.6 TRANSITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (TDRP) OF THE WORLD BANK**

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan has invited the TDRP of the World Bank to pilot the reintegration component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in close collaboration with the NDDRC. Among other activities, TDRP will work with the NDDRC to:

- Establish and participate in the reintegration pilot management team at the HQ PMU level serving as the management body for the project; and
- Incorporate capacity building of the NDDRC staff and systems in the reintegration project.

In addition the TDRP will provide Technical Assistance to the NDDRC by contributing dedicated staff to the HQ PMU in order to assist in the management of:

- The reintegration livelihood activities such as in the area of cooperatives, small farms and microenterprise development in the pilot reintegration project;
- The DDR community support projects in the pilot reintegration project; and
- The M&E of the project including internal and external assessments.

### **3.5.7 NDDRC TECHNICAL ADVISORS**

TDRP and BICC technical advisors will be embedded within the commission. At the request of the NDDRC, these staff will participate in the secretariat of the HQ PMU to provide continued technical advice and support.

### **3.5.8 DEMOBILISATION AND REINSERTION IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

The pilot reintegration project is the final phase of the full NDDRC pilot programme, which includes disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion at the transition facility and finally reintegration. The NDDRC implementing partners of the demobilisation and reinsertion portions of this programme include UNMISS and UNESCO. The coordination of all partners within the overall pilot programme is crucial and under the guidance of NDDRC leadership the PMU will work together with these implementing partners to ensure a coherent overall DDR programme.

### **3.5.9 PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

To implement the pilot reintegration project the TDRP will contract with Implementing Partners for 1) Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation, 2) Livelihoods Support, and 3) Community Support Projects. These entities will be responsible for the implementation of the respective components as outlined below in detail in this document.

## **3.6 SYNERGIES**

Reintegration cannot be an isolated activity. It must be linked to broader recovery, reconstruction and development activities that take into account not only the ex-combatants but also the population of the communities of returns within which they will reintegrate and reside. Programme and projects supported by Government partners are particularly important to support the activities of socio-economic reintegration. The HQ PMU and SPMUs will conduct stakeholder consultations to identify initiatives underway addressing other facets of DDR including female combatants, WAAF/G, and CAAF/G. These consultations will also look to identify linkages with other relevant development activities such as those related to emergency humanitarian response, HIV/AIDS, refugee return and resettlement, land tenure, human rights, food security, justice and transitional justice, governance, economic development and livelihoods, conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. These consultations will employ interactive and participatory mechanisms.

Synergies will be sought through these consultations with other projects and programmes in the context of reconstruction and development. The programme will ensure that consultations are held between development stakeholders in order to harmonise their approaches and avoid discrepancies. These will range across all development sectors: State authorities and local structures, the different departments involved in reintegration, bilateral or multilateral programmes, etc.

## **3.7 PARALLEL DDR PROGRAMME WORK**

It is critical to recognize that the work being conducted within the bounds of the Pilot Reintegration Project (as listed above) will operate in parallel to other important NDDRC work. One important area of the overall DDR Programme work is the special programmes – including the programme for individuals with disability, WAAF/G and CAAF/G. These areas are not addressed in this pilot reintegration project as those individuals are to be served in those parallel programmes.

Another crucial parallel support to the DDR pilot reintegration project that is being conducted by the NDDRC is public information, communications and awareness. The PMU will work with the Public Information team to contribute to the overall communications strategy. It is critical that accurate reintegration information be included in the overall public information and sensitization work. Messages will be clear, honest and consistent, and must clearly convey the type of assistance to be provided to individual ex-combatants, including women combatants, and community members in order to avoid

misconceptions and heightened expectations. Although the actual public information and communications agenda is technically outside the scope of the reintegration pilot, the HQ PMU and SPMUs will be responsible for looking for opportunities for coordination and synergy across these areas.

### **3.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT**

It should be noted, that the selection of the first tranche of the anticipated 500 ex-combatants was not random, therefore not all findings of this pilot process can be extrapolated to the full quota of ex-combatants to follow. In addition, the greater SPLA and members of the national organized forces may have different needs than the pilot caseload in terms of reintegration, particularly as this first group of SPLA members in the Wounded Heroes Brigade have largely been living back in their home communities for extended periods of time. It is important to note, however, that the purpose of the pilot is to test the economic reintegration, community project and project management modalities. In addition, the pilot will build the capacity of both staff and systems for implementation and project management going forward.

## 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

The management of the pilot reintegration project will be conducted by the HQ PMU, which will be led by the NDDRC with support from the TDRP, BICC and implementing partners to be identified. In addition to overall management of the reintegration pilot, the HQ PMU will oversee and coordinate with the SPMUs, which will be responsible for overseeing state-level activities. The TDRP has fiscal responsibility for the operations of the pilot but will work with the NDDRC to ensure that the relevant persons are mentored through the process.

**Objective:** The objective of this component is to prepare the HQ PMU and SPMUs for the implementation and oversight of the upcoming national DDR programme.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The HQ PMU and SPMUs are the management backbone of the Pilot Reintegration Project and their importance to the pilot reintegration project and future reintegration programming should not be under-estimated. The HQ PMU will provide the national level management of the reintegration pilot while working to complement the work of the SPMUs. The model designed for the pilot ensures NDDRC leadership, continuous engagement and input throughout the project through their participation in this unit. The model further allows for capacity building of the NDDRC staff to take place at every step of the management process through a mentorship mechanism in which NDDRC identified implementing partners and TDRP staff. By the completion of the reintegration pilot, the NDDRC staff at both the HQ and state levels will have participated in the full management cycle and through that hands-on training, ideally be prepared to manage future DDR tranches with minimal to no assistance.

**How replicable:** The goal of forming the HQ PMU and SPMUs during the pilot reintegration project is to leave an independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system in place at the close of the pilot. This team should then be able to run reintegration programming in future DDR tranches both for the remainder of the full pilot and into the full DDR programme. The SPMUs structure should also be replicable to the remaining six States where future reintegration programming will take place.

### 4.1 MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

#### ***4.1.1 REINTEGRATION PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE***

The steering committee will provide strategic guidance and leadership to the overall pilot reintegration project and specifically to the HQ PMU. It will also improve coordination and harmonization of DDR initiatives. Unless otherwise determined by the NDDRC, the Steering Committee will be chaired by the Vice Chairperson of the NDDRC. Membership will include representatives from the Ministries of National Organized Forces, as well as the Director General of Operations and Director General of Programmes and a senior representative of the TDRP, World Bank.

#### **Reintegration Project Steering Committee**

The Reintegration Project will be directed by a Steering Committee, which will include the following representatives:

1. Deputy Chairperson of the NDDRC - Chair
2. Member of the Commission
3. Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs
4. Ministry of Interior

5. Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism
6. Director General of Operations
7. Director General of Programmes
8. ICRS Manager - Secretary
9. Senior Technical Assistant from TDRP, World Bank

#### **4.1.2 THE HQ PMU**

The HQ PMU will be responsible for the day-to-day administration and implementation of the pilot project.

##### **HQ PMU**

The HQ PMU will comprise the following officials from the NDDRC:

1. ICRS Manager – Chair
2. Director of Programmes
3. Director of Reintegration - Secretary
4. Director of Public Information
5. Director of Procurement
6. Finance Coordinator
7. Director of M&E
8. M&E Officer
9. State Director – Northern Bahr el Ghazal
10. State Director – Western Bahr el Ghazal
11. State Director – Warrap
12. State Director – Lakes
13. TDRP Project Manager
14. Implementing Partner (Capacity Building and M&E)
15. Implementing Partner (Livelihoods Support)
16. Implementing Partner (Community Projects)
17. Technical Advisor, BICC
18. UNMISS observer
19. UNDP observer

All the officials heading the above units within the DDR Project will be an essential part the reintegration component of the DDR programme. Their presence is also crucial in that it should ensure complementarity with the overall DDR strategy in areas such as communications, demobilisation and reinsertion and future reintegration programming for the overall pilot DDR programme.

The HQ PMU will be located within the NDDRC headquarters in Juba and will manage the overall project.

The HQ PMU will also operate as a forum for the NDDRC to receive capacity building support from the Project, particularly from the Capacity Building Implementing Partner—to be discussed in greater detail below—TDRP, BICC and any other identified stakeholders.

Specifically, under the direction of the Reintegration Project Steering Committee, the PMU will:

- Carry out all activities related to the project necessary for the successful implementation of the reintegration pilot; utilize project documents as its mandate for the design, preparation, and

implementation of work plans; collaborate with the TDRP team to ensure performance and completion;

- Be responsible for procurement, accounting, and disbursement processes and administrative services related to planning, organizing, coordinating, implementing, and monitoring; establish an accounting system to meet the reporting requirements of World Bank and other donors;
- Utilize project management tools to document and maintain the status of the project and monitor progress in project implementation, including the impact of activities in each; monitor the activities of all participating NGOs/MFIs as well as technical experts employed under the project.

The following administrative arrangements are proposed:

- The Steering Committee will provide oversight of the HQ PMU. The Committee will review the overall project status, discuss challenges and identify potential solutions. The committee will be created during the initiation phase, and will meet monthly at first and then quarterly starting at the consolidation phase. The steering committee is to be convened by the Chair.
- The NDDRC will facilitate the establishment of HQ PMU as a unit responsible for the implementation of pilot project. The unit will be housed within the premises of NDDRC at both the HQ and state levels. In addition to the officials noted above, additional ad-hoc membership will be determined by the NDDRC.
- The PMU will be responsible for coordination of the pilot reintegration project among stakeholders and interest groups, including ensuring that the relevant ministries and other stakeholders are informed of the progress of the sector and participation of specific interest groups.
- The HQ PMU will provide oversight and coordination of the SPMUs.
- NDDRC will lead by facilitating the pilot programme, i.e., taking the necessary steps to furnish the facility and undertake the necessary selection of state-level staff that will be targeted for training and mentoring and will be working across the different components with Implementing Partners and the management team.
- The World Bank will directly contract firms or organizations to implement the pilot project, based on programme objectives, activities and specifications. Efforts will be made to ensure the suitable selection of firms with existing networks and expertise in South Sudan.
- Implementing Partners responsible for each of the components in each of the phases will each prepare a pilot work plan for approval by the PMU Steering Committee. Pilot work plans for the livelihoods and community support components should include broad consultations with stakeholders in order to avoid pitfalls from previous programming, build linkages and synergies on key sector priorities, and encourage harmonization of development initiatives across relevant sectors that may play a role in the reintegration pilot.

#### ***4.1.3 SPMUs***

At the state level, the SPMUs will consist of NDDRC staff with reintegration responsibilities, including the State Director, Reintegration/ICRS Officers as well as M&E, Public Information and Finance and Administration. In addition, the work will be supported by the HQ PMU as well as designated staff of the Capacity Building implementing partner. The SPMUs, through the State Director, will coordinate the participation of State level Line Ministry focal points at relevant junctures during the Pilot Phase.

Housed in the State NDDRC office, each SPMU will manage state implementation of the pilot reintegration project, report on pilot activity status and be responsible for conducting the M&E



component at the state level, which will feed into the overall M&E system. The SPMUs will provide project management support for the core socio-economic reintegration livelihood activities while also providing a forum for capacity building to the NDDRC. In addition, these entities will also be responsible for all sensitization and public information campaigns within their States. The SPMUs will submit monthly progress report to the HQ PMU independent from those submitted by the Implementing Partners.

The secretariat of the PMU at the State Level will comprise of the following officials from the NDDRC:

1. State Director - Chair
2. Representative of Governor's Office
3. Representative from the State Ministry of Local Government
4. Reintegration/ICRS Officer - Secretary
5. Public Information Officer
6. M&E Officer
7. Finance Officer
8. Implementing Partner (Capacity Building and M&E)
9. Implementing Partner (Livelihoods)

The HQ-PMU will be responsible for ensuring that there are direct linkages to the State level PMUs to ensure that the State directors are an integral part of the strategic planning process.

#### **4.1.4 TECHNICAL DDR COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

A Technical DDR Coordinating Committee (TCC) will be created to include all stakeholders involved in the overall Pilot Reintegration process, taking into account both UNMISS and UNESCO who are responsible for the reinsertion component of the pilot reintegration and the relevant Line Ministries who the NDDRC will work with and into whose operations the ex-combatants will be mainstreamed into once their reintegration process is completed.

The National DDR Council has requested DDR related line ministries to assign ministry focal points, who will be included when appropriate and relevant to the tasks on hand. Their participation will be coordinated through the office of the Vice Chair of the NDDRC, but from an operational perspective, their presence will be through the TCC.

The TCC will comprise of the following bodies and officials from the NDDRC:

1. Director General of Operations - Chair
2. Director General of Programmes
3. Reintegration Director
4. M&E Officer
5. Public Information Director - Secretary
6. TDRP, World Bank
7. Technical Advisor, BICC – Co-secretary
8. ICRS Manager
9. UNMISS
10. UNESCO
11. UNDP
12. National Line Ministries

Although the UNDP are not part of the first Pilot reintegration process, having been requested to plan for the second pilot, they will be invited to participate on the TCC to ensure that there is a synchronised approach between the pilot projects

#### **4.1.5 PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL**

A more detailed Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual (PIM) document including staffing responsibilities, reporting and procedures will guide the work of the PMU. This will be specific to the reintegration pilot but will draw where feasible from the draft Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual in process for the overall programme. This document will be updated over the course of the pilot reintegration project and will be a sustainable contribution to the on-going reintegration work of the NDDRC after the close of the project.

## **4.2 IMPLEMENTATION SERVICE PARTNER ARRANGEMENTS**

The TDRP will contract with three Implementing Partners to enact this pilot project. Each will be selected based on their specialized knowledge, staff, and experience in the particular component. The four components requiring implementing partners include:

1. Institutional Capacity Building and M&E
2. Livelihood Support
3. DDR Community Support Projects

It is envisaged that the Implementing Partners will sub-contract state-based sub-contractors to ensure a cost effective and timely delivery of the reintegration projects.

The timing and service agreement for each component will be unique as outlined in greater detail in the corresponding sections below. Implementation of the full reintegration pilot will be completed by June 15<sup>th</sup> 2014. For administrative purposes, however, the overall pilot reintegration project will be conducted in three phases with each component having distinct activities in each of the phases.

- Phase 1: Initiation (April 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 – November 30<sup>th</sup> 2013)
- Phase 2: Consolidation (December 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 – March 31<sup>st</sup> 2014)
- Phase 3: Evaluation and Knowledge Transfer (April 1<sup>st</sup> – June 15<sup>th</sup> 2014)

## **4.3 FINANCIAL COVENANTS**

Adequate financial management systems including records and accounts will be maintained by the Project Manager. Project financial statements and audit reports will be prepared and submitted to the World Bank within specified deadlines reflecting project's operations according to sound audit and accounting practices.

## 5. COMPONENT 1 - INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

A key objective of the pilot reintegration project is to build the capacity of the NDDRC and other line ministries working on DDR reintegration through both staff and systems. The two major mechanisms for this capacity building are 1) through the HQ PMU and the SPMUs and 2) through the development and support of anICRS database and counselling.

**Objective:** capacity building included in the pilot reintegration project will primarily develop staff capacity and project selection and implementation within the NDDRC. This capacity building is inextricably connected with the project management function conducted by the HQ PMU as outlined above. Institutional capacity building will provide staff management and systems training to the HQ PMU staff, as well as, wherever possible and relevant, to the Line Ministry focal points. The Line Ministry focal points will also be encouraged to participate in trainings and capacity building as appropriate to their area of work.

As the primary mechanism to achieve implementation at the state level, the SPMUs will be capacitated to setup programme systems and learning objectives of the pilot reintegration project in such a manner that enables the:

- Development of lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Development and instillation of a DDR Reintegration Management system in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The HQ PMU is the management backbone of the Pilot Reintegration Project. By the completion of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC staff at both the HQ and state levels will have participated in the full management cycle and through hands on training, will ideally be prepared to manage future DDR tranches with minimal or no assistance.

Housed in the State NDDRC office, state level PMUs will be responsible for the oversight and implementation of the livelihood and community project components at the state level. The unit will be led by a core management team of dedicated NDDRC staff at the state level supported by capacity building implementing partner staff.

**How replicable:** The goal of forming the PMU during the pilot reintegration project is to leave an independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system in place at the close of the pilot. This team could then run reintegration programming in future DDR tranches both for the remainder of the full pilot and into the full DDR programme.

**Implementation of the Institutional Capacity Building Component:** An Institutional Capacity Building Implementing Partner (IP-ICB) will be contracted to provide project management support and to execute the activities listed below. The firm selection and contracting process will be led by the World Bank. The selected organization will submit an implementation plan; including a detailed outline HQ PMU systems and procedures and staffing and costing plans to facilitate the institutionalization of the SPMUs in the four states. The plan will be developed jointly with the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and reviewed and cleared by the World Bank.

## 5.1 PROJECT MANAGEMENT TRAINING, MENTORING AND SUPPORT

The contracted IP-ICB will ensure that affiliated staff offers support to the HQ PMU and the SPMUs in all four States. South Sudanese staff will be selected from the State DDRC and assigned by the NDDRC to work in parallel as staff embedded to PM team where they will receive work closely with the PM team throughout the pilot phase. The staff mentoring process is intended to build state DDRC staff capacity, and create a specialized state-based team with management skills to help support future reintegration activities after the pilot phase. The IP-ICB will together with the HQ PMU develop a Capacity Building Project Implementation Manual (PIM) that will be continually updated as the project rollout to ensure that all pilot-based state operations systems are in line with NDDRC institutional operations and implementation systems and the HQ PMU implementation and operations procedures.

A staff mentoring modality will be adopted by the HQ PMU and SPMUs through which management capacities of state NDDRC and few selected state line ministries staff will be enhanced by the IP-ICB. The Implementing Partner-ICB will also be responsible for monitoring and evaluation. As such, the IP-ICB, together with each SPMU will manage the reporting of all their State level implementation and be responsible for conducting the M&E component within their State, feeding into the overall M&E system.

The SPMUs will provide project management support for the core socio-economic reintegration livelihood activities while also providing a forum for capacity building to the NDDRC. During the pilot reintegration pilot phase, TDRP will provide direct oversight of financial and procurement activities, in accordance with World Bank rules and requirements. However the SPMUs will also be directly involved. It is envisaged that by the IP-ICB will provide for a phasing out period at the conclusion of the pilot to finalize transfer of technical knowledge and unit management systems, at which point SPMUs will be fully capacitated to manage reintegration activities.

### 5.1.1 PROJECT TIMEFRAME

An indicative timeframe for Component 1 extends for 11 months from May 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 to April 15<sup>th</sup> 2014:

1. May 15<sup>th</sup> to July 14<sup>th</sup>: Inception visit and report
2. July 15<sup>th</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>: PMU support, training and state field visits
3. August 19<sup>th</sup> to August 22<sup>nd</sup>: HQ PMU project management training
4. August 26<sup>th</sup> to August 29<sup>th</sup>: State PMU project management training
5. September 1<sup>st</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup>: Outstanding PMU capacity building at HQ and states
6. September 1<sup>st</sup> to June 15<sup>th</sup>: Assess, learn and knowledge transfer

## 5.2 INFORMATION, COUNSELLING AND REFERRAL SYSTEM (ICRS)

The overall aim of an ICRS is to provide vital briefing and orientation for ex-combatants preparing them for a return to civilian life. This process should start during demobilisation but needs to continue throughout the reintegration process. The National DDR Strategic plan recognises that an ICRS is needed to support the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It is intended that the ICRS shall be provided and led by the NDDRC with technical support from partners. TDRP is currently supporting the design and deployment of the ICRS.

**Objective:** The ICRS of the pilot DDR project will provide 1) the data infrastructure to track, monitor and guide the DDR programme and 2) provide trained, informed counsellors to advise ex-combatants on their livelihood choices and other reintegration needs as services are available.

These activities are central to the programme system and learning objectives of the pilot reintegration project, including:

- Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; and
- Develop and instil a system of DDR reintegration management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The ICRS is being designed in consultation with the NDDRC and other partners in the DDR pilot to be a customized data tracking and reintegration counselling system that can be used during the remainder of the pilot and in the overall programme. This system will be fully in place by the end of the pilot reintegration project and can be utilized as is or customized further as desired.

**How replicable:** The goal of the ICRS being built at this point for the first pilot project tranche is to leave a functional ICRS system with trained staff in place at the close of the pilot. This system and team could continue ICRS operations in future DDR tranches both for the remainder of the full pilot and into the full DDR programme.

### **5.2.1 PROJECT TIMEFRAME**

The ICRS will require on-going attention throughout the course of the entire reintegration pilot (April 1<sup>st</sup> 2013 to June 15<sup>th</sup> 2014) including system development, training and implementation by ICRS caseworkers:

1. April 1<sup>st</sup> to January 31<sup>st</sup>: ICRS System Development and Adjustment
2. April 1<sup>st</sup> to April 15<sup>th</sup>: ICRS System TF use: Training, Initiation, Adjustment
3. April 15<sup>st</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Registration by NDDRC and UNMISS (using ICRS)
4. April 15<sup>th</sup> to September 18<sup>th</sup>: TF services tracking
5. July 1<sup>st</sup> to July 12<sup>th</sup>: Ex-combatant Baseline Survey
6. July 17<sup>th</sup> to October 1<sup>st</sup>: Reintegration Opportunity Mapping
7. September 2<sup>nd</sup> to September 12<sup>th</sup>: Livelihoods and Toolkit Choice Discussion
8. September 19<sup>th</sup> to June 15<sup>th</sup>: Casework, Counselling, and Referral
9. September 19<sup>th</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup>: Reintegration services tracking
10. April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 15<sup>th</sup>: Assess, learn and knowledge transfer

## **6. COMPONENT 2 – MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

**Objective:** The M&E system of the pilot reintegration project will provide critical data to improve operations throughout the project as well as on the true impact of the programme and contribute to the learning outputs of the project. In addition to M&E system outputs, NDDRC staff training on M&E is a key component of capacity building activities. The pilot is meant as a learning experience, an opportunity to build systems and procedures, test modalities and to build institutional capacity (systems and people). The M&E component is therefore central to the programme system and learning objectives of the reintegration pilot as listed above.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The M&E system will be designed in consultation with the NDDRC. A similar embedding and mentoring process as outlined in the institutional capacity building component will be provided to the NDDRC staff as well. In addition, the M&E design, tools and systems incorporated during the pilot period should be transferrable for future tranches of DDR.

**How replicable:** The goal of the M&E activity during the pilot reintegration project is to leave a functional M&E system with trained staff in place at the close of the pilot. This system and team should be able to continue M&E operations in future DDR tranches both for the remainder of the full pilot and into the full DDR programme.

**Implementation:** Monitoring and evaluation of the DDR pilot reintegration project will contribute significantly to its effectiveness and will draw the necessary lessons to improve the overall DDR programme. To do this, a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation will be created that is participatory and interactive with relevant and measurable indicators of the effects and results of the project. The Implementing Partner selected for Institutional Capacity Building will also be responsible for the M&E programme.

The M&E protocol to be developed for the reintegration pilot will include a number of key activities and studies. These include:

## 6.1 M&E PROGRAMME

Running throughout the pilot reintegration project will be an on-going monitoring process via an M&E Programme through the NDDRC's ICRS database. The objective of this is to 1) have a continual assessment of progress, 2) have access to data to inform and adjust operations of the project and 3) document all lessons learned recommending modifications or improvements to individual parts or all of the components.

1. A M&E unit will be set up within the HQ PMU team, which will create the necessary synergies with the NDDRC ICRS project, NDDRC offices linked to reintegration and all other external implementing partners and stakeholders.
2. This M&E team will set out a programme plan, which will include the execution of their duties and a mentoring component that will be aimed at capacitating NDDRC staff both in the Juba Head-Quarters and the State Offices.
3. This team will produce regular weekly communiqués, which will be distributed across all the personnel working with reintegration. A monthly report will be prepared for the Vice Chair of the NDDRC and head of the PMU Steering Committee, whose prerogative it will be to distribute further. A mid-term report will be produced the month after the initiation phase. A final independent evaluation report will be produced by July 31<sup>st</sup> 2014.

### **M&E Outcomes:**

- Weekly and monthly progress on all components of the project;
- The compilation of a data set within the ICRS management information system that will be used as both a means of analyzing the pilot but also as a baseline to monitor future impact.
- A recommendations report documenting all lessons learnt with recommendations to modify or change

## **6.2 BASELINE AND TRACER STUDIES**

A baseline and tracer study will form part of the M&E tasks aimed at: (i) understanding the demographic characteristics, livelihood aspirations and social capital profiles of ex-combatants; (ii) documenting the impacts of livelihood activities on ex-combatants and their communities, income and savings, and overall economic productivity per cooperative and small farm and enterprise; (iii) providing broader level information to NDDRC for use in documenting programme impacts in a post-pilot phase, and methods for improving programme management, and developing new and improved livelihood and capacity building products and services.

All ex-combatants will be interviewed during the baseline survey that will take place between July 5<sup>th</sup> and July 17<sup>th</sup> during the reinsertion period in the Transition Facility. A sample of ex-combatants will be surveyed in a follow-up tracer during the second to last month of the pilot. In addition, a sample of communities that is representative of the various location types where ex-combatants return will be interviewed during the reinsertion period as well as during the second to last month of the pilot. The baseline data will be entered into a simplified data tracking system that will then be used throughout the lifespan of the pilot reintegration project and will be available for use in the future programme.

Research inputs will be entered into the ICRS and findings will be generated against sets of indicators, feeding into different status reports to provide project status and policy guidance. These reports will be accessible to the HQ PMUs and SPMUs.

## **6.3 DOCUMENTING LIVELIHOOD AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS**

The M&E system will document all processes planned and executed, including those that might fail, as related to the delivery of all components of the livelihoods and community development and rehabilitation projects. The M&E process will be structured in such a manner to enable the flow of information to reach all departments and levels of the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and SPMUs, through the establishment of feedback loops. This way information flows in a continuous two-way process ensuring that all components of the NDDRC are part of the pilot process.

An impact assessment of ex-combatants and their communities will be conducted using a mixed method approach, including both quantitative and qualitative data. A simple data tracking system will build a baseline for the overall reintegration programme. The monitoring and evaluation will also be integrated into the ICRS database.

In addition to these activities, a midterm review will be conducted and a final external project assessment will be conducted by a separate, independent firm.

## **6.4 M&E AND NDDRC STAFF**

A dedicated NDDRC's M&E staff will be housed within each state office. An assigned M&E officer will manage the unit data collection, which will be coordinated with livelihood activities and community development projects. This staff member will be mentored by the IP-ICB as well as the NDDRC HQ M&E staff. The IP-ICB will be responsible for providing hands on training to assigned NDDRC M&E staff and for training the M&E staff on the M&E functions of the ICRS database. Wherever possible state-level M&E staff will be used to undertake monitoring activities, both in field data collection and overall reporting, while the HQ-M&E officer will co-author the evaluation reports. Trained ICRS caseworkers from all 10

States will be brought into the pilot project at crucial junctures to be trained to assist with the M&E. This way, the capacity building process also reaches the six non-participating states.

A TDRP external M&E consultant will be engaged to design the pilot monitoring and evaluation plan to be implemented by the various players engaged in pilot activities and components. The M&E lead for the IP-ICB/M&E will report to the PMU steering committee, but will be directly responsible to the TDRP for outputs.

As part of the institutional management capacity building component, the mentoring and training by the IP-ICB of local state staff aims to leave behind a group of state level M&E officers that are trained and operational at the end of the pilot phase. All NDDRC IT and ICRS staff will be trained and mentored on how to produce basic reports on all relevant M&E activities.

### **M&E TIMEFRAME**

An indicative timeframe for Component 2 extends from May 15<sup>th</sup> 2013 to June 1<sup>st</sup> 2014. This team should be in place by June 15<sup>th</sup> 2013.

- May 15<sup>th</sup> to June 14<sup>th</sup>: Inception visit and report
- June 15<sup>th</sup> to July 5<sup>th</sup>: Design M&E system and indicators, Develop the Baseline Survey and Train ICRS Caseworkers to Conduct the XC Baseline Survey
- July 5<sup>th</sup> to July 19<sup>th</sup>: Conduct XC Baseline
- September 21<sup>st</sup> to October 12<sup>th</sup>: Conduct Community Baseline Survey
- August 1<sup>st</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup>: NDDRC Staff Training and Ongoing Service Monitoring & Reporting
- November 1<sup>st</sup> to December 15<sup>th</sup>: Midterm Rapid Review and Sharing of Lessons
- March 15<sup>th</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Final Beneficiary Assessment & Project Assessment
- March 15<sup>th</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Finalizing of systems and knowledge transfer to NDDRC staff

The assessment of all phase one projects will be made between November 1<sup>st</sup> and December 1<sup>st</sup> which will then inform the project for Phase II. A Phase II selection process will be completed at that time.



## 7. COMPONENT 3 – LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT

### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

**Objective:** The Livelihood Support component of the pilot reintegration project will provide livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success. The component will also test the livelihoods mechanism for future DDR tranches. The support offered in this component will consist of market-oriented skills development to encourage individual enterprise or employment for income.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** The provision of services to the ex-combatants and their communities of return is the main priority for this project. Alongside this effort, the testing of the livelihood support mechanism is at the heart of the reintegration piloting itself. Testing the livelihood track modalities will provide lessons to inform and improve the future reintegration services offered through the South Sudan DDR Programme.

**How replicable:** The livelihood tracks to be piloted during the reintegration project are designed to inform the eventual long-term livelihood activities of the overall South Sudan DDR Programme and to be replicable where appropriate for the future tranches given differences in size and caseload demographics. They would need to be further tested and refined amongst future pilot reintegration tranches.

### 7.2 SCOPE OF PROJECT

The livelihood tracks to be piloted in this pilot reintegration project are designed to inform the eventual long-term livelihood tracks of the overall South Sudan DDR Programme. The livelihoods tracks being tested here are in alignment with the National DDR Harmonized Plan, which outlines support for:

- Group livelihood activities: Cooperatives<sup>2</sup>
- Individual livelihood activities: Small farms<sup>3</sup> and Individual Enterprise Development Services,<sup>4</sup> and
- Adult and Formal Education.

A public works service delivery option discussed in the National DDR Harmonized Plan is not included in this pilot as: 1) it is a short-term employment opportunity rather than one providing the opportunity for ex-combatants to build skills and create a long-term investment in sustainable livelihoods, and 2) the Public Works aspect of the full DDR Programme is largely tied to Work Brigades of DDR candidates before they enter the DDR process and by implication should not be part of the DDR process. Furthermore, it is worth noting that public works modules as part of DDR programmemes have been successful for ex-combatants with no income or access to wealth beyond their reintegration grants. In the context of South Sudan, ex-combatants are reinserted into their communities with a guarantee income of \$300 per months for nine months, and as such they will arrive with greater financial assets than mostcommunity members. Guaranteed entry into public works programmemes might deny other poorer members of the community the opportunity to earn an income, albeit temporarily. This in no way limits the NDDRC from linking those seeking temporary job placements with available public works

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<sup>2</sup>Reference in National DDR Harmonized Plan: “XCs encouraged to form... cooperatives or associations. E.g. Wildlife Cooperative Union”

<sup>3</sup>Reference in National DDR Harmonized Plan: “Vocational & technical training in 3 service tracks”

<sup>4</sup>Reference in National DDR Harmonized Plan: “Training on “business start-up and development”

positions. As discussed in the limitations section above, the full DDR Programme will have different economies of scale than the pilot phase, and modalities may need to be adjusted at that point.

An Implementing Partner specializing in Livelihoods Support (IP-LIV) will be contracted to lead the implementation of component II of the pilot reintegration pilot. The IP-LIV will possess the requisite expertise to conduct the following key activities:

- Provide all ex-combatants with entrepreneurship training;
- Provide all community members participating in cooperatives with a short entrepreneurship booster training;
- Provide all ex-combatants and community members joining or creating cooperatives training on governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
- Provide all ex-combatants initiating either partnerships or individual enterprises training on governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
- Provide all ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business finance training or capital portfolio management as means to provide timely access to finance facilities to enterprises at all their growth stages while targeting their financial sustainability;
- Provide all ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business advisory assistance to support the creation of business plans and sustainable growth; and
- Capital allocations to all ex-combatants either in cooperatives, partnerships or individual enterprises;

The economic reintegration pilot activities will be designed to:

- Promote sustainable community owned and business integrated models that can function within local economic sectors;
- Employ an economy of scale approach to rural production by broadening production size utilizing a membership invested capital approach through economic associations;
- Through training allow ex-combatants to successfully access livelihood and formal employment opportunities either in their community of return or elsewhere;
- Support the creation of small and mid-size businesses with collective ownership, including a minimum 30 percent non-ex-combatant membership, while encompassing competencies of members skills into specific core or value added activities;
- Cultivate the potential for ex-combatants to access or create economic opportunities based on simple, or basic indigenous resources;
- Establish an opportunity for ex-combatants to benefit from steady income growth either through their cooperative membership or individual entrepreneurship endeavours;
- Create common or shared interests (social and economic) across members to support the reintegration of ex-combatants within their desired communities of return; and
- Provide funding through identified academic institutions for those ex-combatants who wish either to complete secondary (or tertiary) schooling or register for long-term or other potential livelihoods training that is not provided by the project.

While the livelihoods tracks are designed to provide clear long-term benefit to the participants, the participation of ex-combatants in the reintegration activities is on a voluntary basis and it is up to the individual to choose to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the reintegration project.

The IP-LIV will submit a work-plan inclusive of costing, management cost, and portfolio management targeting all core areas of work, which is to be developed with input from the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and SPMUs. The IP-LIV workplan must include team and staffing plans for coverage of the various livelihood opportunities within the HQ PMU and four SPMUs. The work plan should also incorporate information gathered through broad stakeholder consultations to ensure livelihood opportunities benefit from and are in harmony with ongoing recovery and development initiatives in communities of return. The implementation plan will be reviewed by the PMU with signatory authority residing with the TDRP. Within a month of contract, the IP-LIV will develop a Project Implementation Plan (PIP) that will include a Financial Management and Procurement Plans incorporating all the livelihood opportunity tracks.

### 7.3 PROJECT TIMEFRAME

As with the other components, the livelihoods component will be conducted in 3 phases: Initiation, Consolidation and Evaluation and Knowledge Transfer.

The Project Agreement will extend from May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013 to June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014

#### Phase 1: Initiation

- May 15<sup>th</sup> to September 1<sup>st</sup>: Livelihood Project Preparation
- September 2<sup>nd</sup> to September 12<sup>th</sup>: Livelihood Fundamentals
  - a. September 2<sup>nd</sup> to September 12<sup>th</sup>: Transition Facility Livelihoods Discussions
  - b. September 2<sup>st</sup> to September 12<sup>th</sup>: Transition Facility Entrepreneurship Training
- September 22<sup>nd</sup> to November 15<sup>th</sup>: Livelihood Opportunities Project Delivery
  - a. Complete Cooperative Enterprises and/or Partnerships or Individual Enterprises training (including community members)
  - b. Ensure all enterprises have a business plan
- October 28<sup>th</sup> to November 1<sup>st</sup>: Deliver capital inputs
- November 15<sup>th</sup> to November 31<sup>st</sup>: Synchronize projects and complete plans for Phase 2

#### Phase 2: Consolidation

- December 1<sup>st</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup>: Follow up and Consolidation of Livelihood Opportunities
  - Visit all projects once;
  - Ensure at least three follow-up counselling sessions with ex-combatants during their month-end visits to the NDDRC offices when they collect their monthly salaries; and
  - If necessary visit enterprises that are reported to be failing and as feasible, provide additional mentoring assistance to address challenges.

#### Phase 3: Evaluation & Knowledge Transfer

- April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Final Evaluation and Consolidation of Learning

A call for expressions of interest and request for proposals for the first two tasks and the initial set up of projects for task three will be made during March and April 2013 and the implementing partner to be selected will be contracted by May 15<sup>th</sup> 2013. An assessment of all projects to be implemented will be made between November 1<sup>st</sup> and December 15<sup>th</sup> and the same selection process will be completed over the following six weeks, to enable the implementing agents to initiate their work in December 2014.

As indicated, M&E support will be brought in under a separate tender. The selected implementing partner will be responsible for monitoring and evaluating all components of the pilot reintegration process, including provision of livelihoods support.

#### 7.4 LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES DESIGN

The livelihood tracks to be piloted in this project have been developed to encourage broader economic development and to emphasise integration with the country's recovery and development activities. Priority tracks emphasise key DDR principles as outlined in the DDR policy documents, and align with the South Sudan Development Plan. This approach allows for:

- Sustainable economic activities with room for growth and flexible horizontal or vertical market linkage opportunities;
- Adoption of a business modeling approach to reintegration activities where sustainability is linked to profitability and growth opportunities;
- Building confidence and establishing common livelihood interests and shared opportunities across ex-combatants and communities where ex-combatants are scheduled to return and reintegrate;
- Integration of simple start up concepts with basic initial training requirements, and a capacity building through follow-up assistance;
- Development of a community integrated module where ex-combatant interests align with communities;
- Facilitation of continued engagement and alignment with development partners community development capacity building programmes;
- Working in complement with the NDDRC basic guiding principles;
- Resourcing of available local inputs; and
- Provision of support for broader national strategic plans for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.

Around 90% of households income is derived from livelihoods, where a combination of agriculture, livestock keeping, wild food gathering, hunting, fishing, and barter/exchange. Most of these activities are practised on a subsistence basis. Conflicts, migration of youth to urban areas, low levels of education, health problems, lack of private sector development, and high dependence on government for employment are all challenges with which to contend. Factoring in pre-existing challenges in South Sudan, the proposed reintegration activities for this pilot were developed based on their applicability to three main categories: rural farm based activities, rural non farming activities, and enterprises.

- **Rural Farm Activities:** Farm activities include agricultural activities for both rain-fed and irrigated systems. These activities fall broadly under agricultural production, forestry, and animal husbandry. In this report, these three activities are also referred to as core production activities as they represent key areas for encompassing a community integrated module.
- **Rural Nonfarm Activities:** These activities are also called value added activities. Rural non-farm activities includes all types of rural activities falling outside farm production such as animal husbandry, bee keeping, poultry, and fishing in addition to value added activities such as milling, food processing etc. The first segment refers to rural value added activities linked or attached to core agricultural, farming, and livestock activities such as dairy production, honey packaging and all other relevant processing activities. The second segment is service-oriented where value addition is

referred to specific services that are contracted or sub-contracted by government and private sector. Examples of this segment could include solid waste management, water distribution, veterinary services, and transportation.

- **Small Enterprise Activities:** This category includes all activities requiring specific acquired or developed skills through service based types of demand in the urban cities and surrounding suburbs such as carpentry, metal fabrication, driving, administrative jobs, mechanic, driving and other blue collar work. These are mainly trading activities or service types of activities, which could fall under rural or urban locations.
- **Adult and Formal Education Activities:** This category includes all continued learning that an individual ex-combatant can pursue.

The establishment of a Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) is not part of the pilot reintegration project. However, Vulnerability Indicators will be included in the ICRS system for further development at a later stage as needed. A system to flag and confirm those experiencing difficulty would need to be designed and implemented along with a determination of possible benefits associated with a VSW.

As a parallel process in support of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC will facilitate land requests of ex-combatants within communities of return. This process, however, falls outside the specific remit of the reintegration pilot.

#### ***7.4.1 LIVELIHOOD TRACK FORECASTING – PROFILED INDIVIDUALS***

Of the 422 profiled individuals that provided reintegration information, 287 individuals plan to return to payams where three or more ex-combatants are intending to return (51 payams in total), 44 plan to return to payams where two ex-combatants are going (therefore 22 payams), and 87 plan to return to a payam distinct from any other ex-combatant (4 did not respond). Of the 22 females, 10 are returning to a location with other female ex-combatants and male ex-combatants, five are returning to a location with other ex-combatants as the only female, five are planning to return to a distinct payam (2 did not respond). The following tables summarize the payam distribution demonstrated thus far in the profiling.

**TABLE 2: INTENDED LOCATION OF PROFILED INDIVIDUAL REINTEGRATION BY PAYAM GROUPING**

<b>ALL STATES</b>	Payams	XCs	% of XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	160	422	
Groups (3+)	51	287	68%
Pairs	22	44	10%
Singles	87	87	21%
Unknown		4	1%

<b>Warrap</b>	Payams	XCs	% of XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	39	86	
Groups (3+)	13	56	65%
Pairs	2	4	5%
Singles	24	24	28%
Unknown		2	2%

<b>Lakes</b>	Payams	XCs	% of XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	60	125	
Groups (3+)	13	67	54%
Pairs	11	22	18%
Singles	36	36	29%

<b>Western Bahr el Ghazal</b>	Payams	XCs	% of XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	23	97	
Groups (3+)	10	82	85%
Pairs	2	4	4%
Singles	11	11	11%

<b>Northern Bahr el Ghazal</b>	Payams	XCs	% of XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	37	112	
Groups (3+)	15	82	73%
Pairs	7	14	13%
Singles	15	15	13%
Unknown		1	1%

<b>Eastern Equatoria</b>	1	1	
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<b>No Response</b>		1	
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A total of 287 ex-combatants plan to return to Payams with 3 or more ex-combatants allowing the opportunity to potentially look at setting up cooperatives or partnerships. While those returning as either singles or pairs do not meet the minimum membership requirement for cooperative support through this programme, unless those in pairs are close enough to justify the potential opportunity of setting up a partnership. The option of creating partnerships between ex-combatants who do not settle in the same spatial unit is also left open and will be judged upon the merit of the business plan produced.

The profiled individuals were asked their areas of interest for livelihoods after their national service as well as what livelihood experience they have. Of the 287 planning to return to group locations, 237 have aligned interests in such a manner that they could feasibly join into mixed ex-combatant and community member cooperatives upon their return to their communities. These estimates suggest that approximately 57 cooperatives in 45 payams could be formed. On average these cooperatives would have just over 4 ex-combatants per group, which would then be supplemented by community membership of up to three additional members to result in the memberships of 7 or 8 members. These estimates further suggest that 185 of the 422 individuals could be considered for partnerships or individual enterprise (agricultural or non-agricultural) and/or continued education tracks.

**TABLE 3: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF PROFILED CANDIDATES BY LIVELIHOOD TRACK**

	Intended Reintegration Location with 3 or more Ex-Combatants										Intended Reintegration Location with 2 or less	
	<b>TOTAL</b>		All 3+		Potential Cooperatives				Small Farms or Enterprise		Small Farms or Enterprise	
	Pay ams	XCs	Pay ams	XCs	Pay ams	# Coo ps	XCs	%	Uni que Pay ams	XCs	Pay ams	XCs
<b>TOTAL</b>	160	422	51	287	45	57	237	56%	6	50	109	135
Warrap	39	86	13	56	11	12	44	51%	2	12	26	30
Lakes	60	125	13	67	10	11	46	37%	3	21	47	58
W. Bahr el Ghazal	23	97	10	82	9	15	71	73%	1	11	13	15
N. Bahr el Ghazal	37	112	15	82	15	19	76	68%	0	6	22	30
E. Equatoria	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1
No Response	0	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	1

## 7.5 LIVELIHOOD FUNDAMENTALS IMPLEMENTATION

The Livelihoods Fundamentals portion of the livelihoods component consists of the work primarily to be done while the ex-combatants are in the transition facility and is designed to allow for market-based decision-making. This includes:

- Transition Facility Livelihoods Discussions
- Transition Facility Entrepreneurial, Financial Literacy & Cooperatives Training

In advance of the state-based reintegration, the ex-combatants will receive vocational, life skills and literacy training at the Mapel Transitional Facility conducted by UNESCO. This programme through the IP-LIV will provide entrepreneurship training during this period and will work with UNESCO to synchronize the approach.

During the time at the transitional facility the NDDRC ICRS trained caseworkers will work together with UNESCO vocational trainers to provide vocational counselling and class scheduling. The ICRS caseworkers will focus these discussions on market-based decision making on how ex-combatants make livelihoods choices and cooperative formation, discussing what cooperatives are and why they might present a promising option to pursue. More specifically, the IP-LIV will engage ex-combatants in groups by location of intended return. These discussions, to take place following the conduct of the baseline study, will be the final opportunity for the ex-combatants to choose both their option of livelihood reintegration track and the modality within which they wish to approach it – whether cooperative, partnership or individual. This will also confirm the applicable capital inputs for the ex-combatants.

The presence of the IP-LIV at the transitional facility will also respond to a crucial lesson learned in previous DDR programmes where a disconnect in services and information between the transition facilities and reintegration service provision presented a major concern. In the pilot reintegration project, the IP-LIV responsible for the provision of livelihoods support will brief the ex-combatants on their options to accurately set expectations and respond to questions so the ex-combatants enter the reintegration process fully informed.

IP-LIV will be responsible for implementing the various livelihoods activities. After receiving confirmed Mapel Vocational training choices, the IP-LIV will start procuring all start-up kit goods. The IP-LIV will then deploy to all four states to:

- a. Identify where all the livelihood activities will be set-up;
- b. Initiate the process of sensitizing community members that wish to join the economic associations;
- c. Provide the association training modules to the prospective cooperatives upon ex-combatants;
- d. Allocate those ex-combatants choosing partnership or individual models to entrepreneurship trainings; and
- e. Ensure that all state and/or other support networks are in place, including linking up where feasible the ex-combatants regardless of their modality of livelihood options to micro-finance institutions and assisting them to register and/or incorporate their enterprises.

In the Implementation Phase, the IP will continue to circulate within all four states to follow up on all livelihood activities, while continuing to provide training to cooperatives, and to connect small farmers and enterprise owners with trainings. The IP-LIV will visit all ex-combatants choosing to participate for follow-up and refresher training between September 18<sup>th</sup> 2013 and March 31<sup>st</sup> 2014.

## 7.6 LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH ASSOCIATIONS

The suggested economic association module is intended to create economic opportunities for ex-combatants and support their reintegration into the communities where they will return. These associations would also include a minimum of 30% community members and as such enhance both the social capital of ex-combatants generally and specifically the economic potential of the ex-combatants because the community members joining associations will already have both experience and knowledge in the economic activity of that association. Association modeling for this pilot project offers other advantages as well: economies of scale, a greater power of control over land use or workspace, the purchase of inputs and outputs, namely productive resources and their marketing and sales. These advantages would accrue regardless whether the association is in the agricultural or non-agricultural sectors. These advantages should act to enhance their overall livelihood (food and cash) security making them less vulnerable to external shocks.

As a rule, although there will be flexibility for exceptions:

- All associations will be designed with a shared value added activity/component linked to associations' production.
- Agricultural and farming diversification in its production activities is intended to support association sustainability, growth opportunities while achieving social integration.
- Non-agricultural associations will also look at either complementary or value chain activities to ensure a greater chance of ex-combatants and their community members to exercise a greater control over the value of their outputs;
- Size of the association will be determined by factors such as the level of interest amongst ex-combatants, number of ex-combatants per payam and geographical proximities across the payams within a state. However, economic factors, such as the potential to succeed and available markets for the goods and/or services produced by association will determine whether such ventures proceed;
- Factors such as the proximity to markets to associations in rural areas and small urban settlements is limited and that the costs of transport and availability unpredictable, will also be taken into account;
- Notwithstanding external environmental challenges, experience has shown that the size of the association matters when measured against the likelihood of sustainable success. Unless there are compelling factors arguing others that can demonstrate the potential of success, all associations will be capped at a maximum of 12 members. This means that there will be a maximum of eight ex-combatants and four community members;
- There should be a minimum of six ex-combatants to enable the Project to form a association of nine members;
- Where are there between three and five ex-combatants, and there is a compelling case that those a cooperation will work, then consideration should be given to raising the number of community members that can join, however in no instance can there be more community members than ex-combatants;
- After formation and direct support to associations ceases, March 31<sup>st</sup>, members of associations can change their composition to reflect their own needs and desires;

Participation in the associations by community members will be voluntary, and the selection of members who join will have to be sensitively dealt with and in accordance to culturally acceptable methods. To prepare for this potential of larger community interest than allowed by this format, the IP-



LIV will take guidance from the HQ PMU on the approved system to determine membership such as a lottery system or the like. All sensitization with communities, including the selection process will be undertaken in the presence of a staff member from the State NDDRC offices.

Agro-production associations will be mainly rain fed unless irrigation is either already available in the community or was selected via a borehole by the community as the DDR Community Support Project. Farming plots are to be combined between ex-combatants and community members who choose to join the association. Geographical proximity of members is critical as it would reduce the cost of transport and commuting and would have an impact on the quality of governance and interaction among members of associations as it serves consistent working interaction among association members and thus supporting social reintegration process.

Non-agricultural associations can be of any economic activity where either a market exists in the immediate proximity or within cost effective transportation for their outputs - goods or services, or both. It is envisaged that most activities will be basic, centered around construction, the automotive industry or machine (generators, pumps, etc.) repair.

For all associations following the identification of the economic activity and identification of community members, training will be given on how an association should be formed, governed and managed. Associations will be governed by its member's governance board, which will be voted by the members to include a chair, secretary and financial officer. Its board will act and hold responsibilities of a board and will be responsible for the day-to-day activities and progress of the board. By-laws will craft governance conducts. Association members will also be the managers of its day-to-day operation while carrying their own specific roles depending on the activity or production type of the association. All members will be supported through the pilot project capacity building component with technical assistance from to set up and through the early phases of associations life, through to business planning and managing day-to-day activities.

The initial set of activities and supports will include:

- (Training) Life skills, finance and cash management, know-how, governance practices.
- (Set up) Association and enterprise set up and account management support.
- (Business linkages)- Peer-to-peer and traditional market linkages.
- (Value added shared components) to assist them to either link up to or create rudimentary warehouse, mills, etc.

Furthermore all associations will receive training and assistance in setting up social safety plans, namely: forced group saving mechanism and savings reinvestment plan, which are crucial to ensure sustainability. Those associations that do not adhere to agreed schemes can no longer expect to receive economic livelihood assistance from the Project. It should be noted that social assistance will continue to be given, through the ICRS during the larger Pilot period.

The capital structure for each association is a reflection of the total capital allocation, which will assemble the creation of the association. This capital ideally includes members' contributions (community members that cannot afford this will do so in kind and in lieu of future profits), which is to act as their membership pledge.

Other capital contributions will be in the form of fixed or variable assets from both ex-combatants and community members of the association. This could be in the form of land, vehicle (loan) or any other

fixed or variable assets that can be utilized and would have contribution on the association daily operation.

Earnings generated on a monthly basis will be paid out immediately as wages or members' time contribution, and operating costs. Remaining earnings will be diverted into a collective reserve account (CRA). The CRA account is recommended for this pilot to ensure that members do not cash out contributions made through the grant by the end of agreed business cycle (as per the business plan). It also ensures that reserved funds will be utilized to benefit the member groups and collectively could be utilized into either expanding operation or provided additional resources for members to borrow from, provide health and education funds, housing funds, etc.

Specification of such a CRA account would differ with certain options for this pilot as needs of the members across the different associations may vary. This account will serve as a reserve fund for the association. This account will be built up from monthly deductibles from members' monthly earnings. The reserve account is designed to increase the association cash assets, which could be reinvested or used as cash flow back up. At the end of the agreed cycle the decision to utilize the reserve fund could be made by members as they all agree.

The CRA account contribution will be dedicated on monthly basis from members at a small percentage of their contribution that will get from the association. If members leave the association they can cash out their own shares or any accumulated profits retained by the association, which still hold a value. Community members will not be able to cash in their contribution of that the project paid at the outset instead this is averaged out against all the remaining members and is added to the value of their contribution. Community members will however be able to cash in any retained profits at current value. Neither ex-combatants nor community members will be able to demand a cash payment against the value of any of the inputs. Once the reintegration period is over the members of the association can change the constitution according to their by-laws and create their own conditions of entry and exit into the association.

Finally an internal capital account will be created for the day-to-day running of the venture and wherein generated revenues will be allocated and managed to recover association liabilities inclusive of wages distributed to all members on monthly basis.

Visits to individual associations will be undertaken, depending on need.

## **7.7 LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS OR INDIVIDUAL**

Based on ex-combatant profiling across the four states, the concentration of the ex-combatant population across the payams varies greatly. A small number (24) noted wanting to return to the same payam while in 87 instances they intend to return to payams where there will be no other ex-combatants. Geographical distance between the payams means that the livelihood assistance they will receive will be limited to additional vocational training and where there might be two ex-combatants wishing to create a partnership, to elementary partnership training. This training will be given through training centres or institutions as identified by the IP-LIV and might be either in one session over the appropriate number of days or periodically over one or more days.

The IP-LIV together with staff from the SPMUs will endeavour to undertake at least two site visits for each ex-combatant increasing this should there be a direct call for further support. After March 31<sup>st</sup>

2014, there will be no further site visits and any assistance will be given at the SPMUs by the NDDRC staff.

Adopting flexibility in the design of the reintegration the pilot reintegration component was necessary while striving to meet ex-combatants economic livelihoods that would help them reach self-sufficiency.

#### **7.7.1 SMALL ENTERPRISES ACTIVITIES AGRICULTURAL**

As outlined above in the participant profiling, the largest group of individuals are interested in farming post military service. Small farming activities are intended to accommodate ex-combatants' livelihood selection falling under rural farming. Because of the geographic diversity of the locations of intended return, many of the ex-combatants who selected farming would be reverted with the option of holding a single farm activity as opposed to group farming or associations. Inputs for this size of farming which averages between 4-5 Fedan in size will include training on agricultural methods and small farm business management. Depending on the rain range on the state location, additional rural activities inputs would be provided to farmers to supplement dry seasons with consistent income those inputs could vary depending on their selection which could include animal husbandry, or poultry. Other inputs include training on best practices, marketing methods, and small farm management.

In addition to farming and depending on where their locations are in relation to average rain fall zones, the individual small farmer entrepreneurs will be offered further appropriate agricultural extension training, which will be supplemented with small business training. In addition, they will each be offered training in a secondary agricultural endeavour, such as poultry and animal husbandry, and other simple trading shops with hybrid type of activities such as milling, poultry keeping, or honey making as appropriate to the local market needs in order that this acts to supplement their income during period of low or no rains.

All these trainings will be conducted in centralized locations as determined by the IP-LIV, which could include existing agricultural extension training facilities, at the SPMUs, IP-LIV regional offices, mobile facilities or at the sites of salary disbursement. The training schedule must take into account the rainy season and include a feasible approach given those realities. Capital inputs and additional technical training will be provided to the equivalent value as in the association track.

#### **7.7.2 SMALL ENTERPRISES ACTIVITIES NON-AGRICULTURAL**

Those interested in non-farming could avail themselves of the (individual or partnership) enterprise development services provided through the pilot reintegration project. This will include additional business training, help with the business concept, plan and the management, discussions on investment decisions for the ex-combatants to determine how they will use the remainder of their salary use through the close of the programme and specifically how to maximize the benefit from the lump sum at the end of the 12 month period, and advocacy for job placements.

This intervention is in the conventional stream of micro-enterprising, where ex-combatants making livelihoods choices in areas such as carpentry, metal welding, driving, and mechanics will be provided with first hand training before moving on with their own business. These trainings will be conducted in centralized locations as determined by the IP-LIV, which could include the same types of training facilities described above.

At the time of writing the salary disbursement mechanism and logistics is yet to be determined and once decided will impact the service delivery options. Capital inputs and additional technical training will be

provided to the equivalent value as in the association track. This track will however focus on business development training to support the ex-combatants to use their skills effectively and profitably where possible. All ex-combatants starting up such enterprises will be assisted to develop a business plan, which will detail how they will utilise their capital inputs. Where ex-combatants dispose of their capital inputs for whatever reason, they will be excluded from further livelihood support. The challenge with this module is that, such types of activities are strictly based on service demand, and given the locations where these ex-combatants will be returning to market demand for the types of activities they have selected would be risking its sustainability. If at all possible, placement assistance will be given through the ICRS, which is expected to be fully functional in all four States during the first two months of 2014.

## **7.8 LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITY: ADULT & FORMAL EDUCATION**

Formal education was not revealed as a strong preference in the initial profiling data of 422 ex-combatants. However, two ex-combatants of the 422 mentioned an interest in adult or continued education. The approach to education support to be pursued during the pilot reintegration project entail working with the South Sudan Ministry of General Education and Instruction regarding their current Alternative Education System (AES) in addition to engaging with local vocational and higher education institutes to support inclusion of ex-combatants in education programming.

The DDR reintegration pilot will not provide full scholarships regardless of the level of adult or formal education. A grant mechanism in the form of vouchers may be used towards payment of school fees, although further discussion is required to finalize design of the specific modality. Other mechanisms are under investigation to determine how best to link up with institutions offering special programmes for adult education. However, a formal education support option should be developed for the broader DDR phase post pilot.

## **7.9 REPORTING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

As indicated above, the contracted IP-ICB will be responsible for the overall monitoring and evaluation of all components of the project. The IP-LIV project coordinator, however, will be responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and restraints. In addition the IP-LIV will prepare and present a monthly budget of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycles. These reports should be submitted to the HQ PMU who will distribute them further and will be fed into the M&E system. Although the field manager reports directly to his or her own implementing agency, the HQ PMU has the right to review any and all documentation collected in the field.

In addition to this work, the IP-LIV and the M&E team will be responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of trainings, cooperative work, and the impacts of livelihood component implementation. The M&E team of the IP-ICB should also include in the overall work-plan a mechanism for compiling ex-combatant participant feedback on the livelihood services offered. It will be important to sit with ex-combatant representatives to address issues of concern.

## 8. COMPONENT 4 – DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS

### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

The DDR Community Support Projects will comprise the fourth component of the reintegration pilot. These projects are designed to ensure that the selected communities where ex-combatants return are also indirect beneficiaries of the NDDRP. As such these projects are designed to incorporate processes of social capital formation while also enabling the enhancement of livelihood opportunities for all community members. These projects will be conducted where there is a high concentration of returning ex-combatants. These projects also have a clear linkage to broader recovery and development in South Sudan.

More specifically, community projects will endeavour to deliver either boreholes or rehabilitation of market places. Project locations will target rural areas where local needs are most pressing. In these communities the IP-Comm will implement a system of broadly representative community input to select the appropriate project most appropriate to meet local needs.

The Community Support Project component will target up to 12 communities where ex-combatants will return in order to build or rehabilitate prioritized key community infrastructure (water boreholes or rehabilitation of market spaces) through direct investment. A consultative process will result in the decision on which project will be selected, where the project will be implemented and how it will be managed afterwards. As such this component of the pilot reintegration strategy aims to enhance social capital formation by both building community's capacity for collective decision making and providing infrastructural resources for communities.

**Objective:** The overall goal of the Community Projects component of the Pilot Reintegration Project is to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance. This component will both provide direct benefit to the communities of return to facilitate long-term reintegration of the ex-combatants by enhancing social capital and long-term livelihood success. In addition this component will test the direct community support mechanism for future DDR tranches.

The following are the objectives of the DDR Community Support Project in the communities where community projects are implemented:

- *From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC's commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties.* This type of Community Driven Development/Reconstruction (CDD/R) partnership is a mechanism to ensure that reconstruction and development assistance addresses the needs and priorities of communities assimilating returning ex-combatants return according to the aspirations and the decisions of the people within these communities.
- *From a micro perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties.* ACDD/R approach will foster trust between the ex-combatants and rest of their communities, as well as between the NDDRC and local authorities by providing opportunities and incentives for practical collaboration on reconstruction activities of mutual importance.

**Usefulness beyond the life of the pilot:** Community project options will be identified directly by communities in order to meet local needs with the goal of contributing long-term benefit and impact to the communities. The process whereby VDCs would be structured could have a lasting impact beyond the life cycle of the project in that there would be democratic representative structures that would be in place that can capitalize on future opportunities.

**How replicable:** The community component will test mechanisms that could be utilized in future DDR programmes and also in future CDD projects in South Sudan including social capital formation and local-level development, empowering members of the community. The process by which VDCs are selected, trained and mentored will be tested and, depending on effectiveness of the process, could be transferred to other communities. This component can further help build linkages and provide the foundation for engagement with other community-driven development initiatives, which either exist or may arise in the future.

## 8.2 SCOPE OF PROJECT

The DDR Community Support Project will be implemented in up to 12 selected villages in different counties in the four states where the first tranche of demobilised ex-combatants are returning. The selection of communities will be the prerogative of the NDDRC done jointly with state PMU and will be done at the outset of the Project together with the HQ PMU and in line with the available resources for this component of the overall Pilot reintegration Project. An independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessment will be undertaken to ensure that the Projects are in compliance with World Bank environmental procedures before the projects are initiated.

The following are the steps that will have to be taken:

- Environmental Impact Assessment
- Local Government and State level PMUs Orientation and Training  
Community orientation to the CDD/R & selection mentoring
- General assembly selection of community projects
- Project implementation

## 8.3 PROJECT COMPONENTS

The DDR Community Support Project is delivered in two phases: initiation and consolidation.

- **Initiation Phase:** this component is comprised of three segments: 1) selection of the communities to receive community projects; 2) Environmental Impact Assessment 3) convening communities to select and manage projects.
- **Consolidation Phase:** Implementing the CDD/R
- **M&E Process:** Parallel to the above phases will be an M&E process, which will be initiated from the outset of the DDR Community Support Project. Key functions of this process will be to document lessons learned and track outcomes as well as to identify areas for improvement or remediation through corrective actions throughout all of the phases. The M&E team of the IP-ICB will work with the IP-COMM to create a framework to enable the capacity of VDCs to self-monitor and evaluate progress.

### **8.3.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE LEVEL PMUs ORIENTATION AND TRAINING**

Component activities will be initiated through an awareness campaign targeting local authorities to be undertaken by the PMU and structures within the NDDRC. This will be followed by training, along with on-going awareness raising activities to improve understanding of roles and responsibilities in supporting the CDD/R process. In addition issues of good governance and people-led processes will also be trained and mentored amongst staff both within local government and the SPMUs in each of the four States. There will also have to be a carefully measured amount of capacity building, guidance, mentoring and quality control of the local partners (LNGOs, CBOs) responsible for facilitating the implementation and post-implementation management in the villages.

### **8.3.2 COMMUNITY ORIENTATION**

Awareness raising and orientation will also take place in target communities to ensure that the population in all of the communities understands the purpose of the project as well as their rights and responsibilities in the process. Following the awareness campaign it will be vital to orient selected communities properly on the purpose of the project, both in terms of process and output and specifically what their role will be. In each village the project staff of the Implementing Agency, together with relevant Ministry representatives and the SPMUs will call for a full general assembly meeting in order to introduce the CDD/R project to the community. Prior to the general assembly a pre-meeting discussion with the village leaders should be held to secure their support and to ensure observance of and respect for local, traditional protocols and processes.

During the community orientation, the following topics should be covered:

1. Description of the CDD/R
2. Fundamental concepts of the CDD/R
3. Objectives of the CDD/R
4. The role of the State level PMUs, local government, the local implementing partner, their sub-contractors, M&E team, etc.
5. The role of the VDC
6. Question and Answer period

The project field staff should take as much time as possible during this step and should not feel that it must be conducted in one sitting. Previous experience with CDD projects has highlighted this component of the project as being amongst the most challenging. This is an important opportunity for communities and sufficient time should be dedicated to ensure full understanding of the project. A more thorough orientation may help to minimize potential problems that may arise due to confusion and misunderstanding. The presence of the project manager and or the M&E team leader at these sessions will be mandatory.

### **8.3.3 WATER COMMITTEE ELECTIONS**

One of the greatest attributes of the CDD/R is its ability to demonstrate and reinforce principles of democracy in local communities. This will reinforce that seen through the elections and referendum in recent years. The committee will play a key role in the selection and support for implementation of designated community projects. It is critical that the community trusts these VDCs. One of the best ways to generate this trust is to ensure that the VDC is democratically elected by the community. It will be essential to ensure that if there are no elections and that there is to be an appointment process, then a quota needs to be reserved for broad stakeholder participation, including for women and youth on the committee. If there are elections, then the training will have to ensure that a set of rules is created that

are acceptable to the community, that a proper nomination process is held, that time is allowed for campaigning and that the election is transparent and held by a general assembly of the village/suburb.

The objective of creating a democratic system at the community level is so that communities in a very real way begin to understand that they as a group have the power and the right to insist on elected representation and accountability of leaders. In many ways the social mobilization and awareness raising that are byproducts of the process of the project are just as important as the grant funding itself.

#### **8.3.4 COMMUNITY TRAINING AND SELECTION MONITORING**

Once the committee is elected the responsible implementing partner will initiate project implementation processes and project management training. Training will include understanding the delivery process, how resources are used, how personnel are hired and how the borehole or market place is managed after the project is completed. The design of the trainings must include understanding the nature of the infrastructural deliverables, as well as the procedures for facilitating good governance to ensure that these becoming genuinely 'empowering' experiences and not just mechanical steps to be completed to fulfil the operational protocol. Given high rates of illiteracy in the region, training should ensure all materials developed are appropriate and that they can be used by all community members.

#### **8.3.5 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

Once the implementation partners are selected they will meet with each of the VDCs and discuss the projects that were selected. The VDC will be responsible for liaising with the implementing partners and their sub-contractors.

### **8.4 DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS TIMEFRAME**

The Project Agreement is for 9 months August 19<sup>th</sup> 2013 to April 1<sup>st</sup>2014:

- August 19<sup>th</sup> to September 15<sup>th</sup> : Identification of 8-12 villages and suburbs.
- September 15<sup>th</sup> to October 15<sup>th</sup>: Community selection of projects.
- October 15<sup>th</sup> to April 1<sup>st</sup>: Implementation of projects.
- April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>: Evaluation of all projects.

A call for expressions of interest and request for proposals for the first two tasks will be made during March and April 2013 and the implementing partner to be selected will be contracted by August 30<sup>th</sup> 2013. An assessment of all projects to be implemented will be made between November 1<sup>st</sup> and December 15<sup>th</sup> and the same selection process will be completed, to enable the implementing agents to proceed with any remaining work on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2014.

### **8.5 PROJECT PARTNERS AND IMPLEMENTATION UNITS**

#### **8.5.1 INGO TRAINING AGENCY**

For the first formation and training of the communities, and the selection of the projects, an international training organization with a proven history of CDD/R relief and development support in Africa will be selected to advance community engagement and training and to facilitate project selection. The objective of the INGO will be to empower communities where ex-combatants return to be part of a development empowerment change process that promotes social capital formation, and results in the delivery of infrastructure. INGO training activities should focus on capacity building for community based development and rehabilitation initiatives, while engaging in the process of advocacy and support for vulnerable populations.



As needed the INGO will be tasked to engage relevant LNGOs to incorporate indigenous knowledge of targeted project areas and to support implementation of the up to 12 projects. Although the HQ PMU and SPMUS will be responsible for overall management of this component, the INGO will guide and mentor LNGOs on the mission and goal of the component, and on project implementation, management and reporting requirements.

## **8.6 STRUCTURE OF PROJECT**

The HQ PMU will manage overall implementation of the CDD/R component of the project within the framework of reintegration pilot. The HQPMU will devolve some of its functions to the SPMUs, which will be responsible for monitoring the process on the ground.

The SPMUs will be the teams that will have primary responsibility for making local agreements and for following up on activity implementation by communities, through the implementing agency to achieve project results. The SPMUs will make contact with local county and locality authorities to inform them of the project and involve the authorities with a role in approving micro-project applications and supporting community initiated micro-projects.

The INGO and sub-contracted LNGOs will be active in all implementation areas and will be directly responsible for the community selection and training phase, selection of projects phase and project implementation phase of the CDD/R project. The project manager of the INGOs will be supported by the HQ PMU and the SPMUs.

The INGOSs will designate Field Managers responsible for training village committees and assisting in project selection. Field managers will meet with the relevant SPMU staff monthly to report on progress and to discuss implementation and financial activities, including the distribution of funds. The delivery plans for each of individual projects will be developed by the INGO and will be subject to a review by the HQ PMU and SPMUs who will also review and endorse the Project Implementation Manual; the Project Monitoring and Evaluation Manual, monthly work plans and budgets and provide support to implementing agencies in resolving issues that constrain implementation. In addition they will review and assess M&E reports and make appropriate recommendations to implementation agencies based on these reported findings.

## **8.7 REPORTING AND COORDINATION**

### **8.7.1 FIELD MANAGER**

The INGO Field Managers will be responsible for producing a report based on the findings of the PRA. This report should include the basic findings of each of the PRA exercises. In addition to the PRA report, a village profile must also be completed. Together the PRA results and the village profile will provide very comprehensive baseline information that can be referred back to during each project cycle evaluation, community planning sessions and end of project evaluations.

Field Managers are responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and restraints. In addition a monthly budget will be presented of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycle.

For each completed community project Field Managers should produce a short report of the project.

All Field Manager reports should be submitted to the management of the implementing partner agency and forwarded to the SPMUs and HQ PMU. Although the Field Manager reports directly to his or her own implementing agency, the HQ PMU maintains ownership and authority over all documentation collected in the field.

#### **8.7.2 PROJECT MANAGER**

The Project Manager will be responsible for reviewing field manager reports and compiling a monthly project update, outlining project progress and major issues that need addressing.

### **8.8 MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The contracted M&E consultants affiliated with the IP-ICB will be responsible for the overall monitoring and evaluation of the project. The M&E team will be responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of trainings, community election processes, and the impacts of micro project implementation. Two months after a community has completed project implementation the M&E team will be responsible for sitting with the groups to gauge project effectiveness and achievement of intended outcomes. The M&E team should also hold at least two community meetings with each of the VDCs in order to get community feedback on the process and to address any issues or concerns that arise.

Certain M&E tasks will be devolved to the project staff and implementing agencies. The following are some of these M&E responsibilities:

- Evaluating the effectiveness of village trainings
- Monitoring community processes of general assembly registration, VDC elections and project selection
- Monitoring the implementation of projects
- Evaluating the performance of the VDC throughout the process
- Evaluating the impact of each project for the target beneficiaries and community

## 9. SUMMARY OF PHASES

### **PHASE ONE: INITIATION (APRIL 15<sup>TH</sup>-NOVEMBER 31<sup>ST</sup> 2013)**

Phase 1 is a start-up phase and will run for three months following the graduation of ex-combatants from the Mapel training facility. It aims to establish a HQ PMU institutional framework, mechanisms, systems and procedures and to contract Implementing Partners who will provide technical assistance and execute programme activities including setting up of economic activities falling under Component II.

#### *Phase One Outcomes:*

- Project management team contracted;
- Capacity Building and M&E Partner contracted;
- Livelihoods Implementing Partner contracted;
- Community Implementing Partner contracted;
- M&E baseline conducted;
- ICRS operational for the Transition Facility and initial livelihoods counselling;
- Activities are sourced out in the four states by number and required capital input is acquired;
- HQ PMU established and staffed;
- SPMUs established and staffed;
- M&E unit established and staffed, baseline conducted, training on reports;
- Pilot communications strategy developed and implemented;
- Establishment of cooperatives;
- Capital inputs (seeds, tools, and animals) furnished & distributed;
- Training activities continued from the transition facility to the reintegration locations; and
- Ex-combatant productive activities initiated.

### **PHASE TWO: CONSOLIDATION (DECEMBER 1<sup>ST</sup> 2013 –MARCH 31<sup>ST</sup> 2014)**

Phase 2 of the project entails the follow-up of reintegration services and opportunities to ex-combatants and community members at their place of reintegration. Opportunities offered to ex-combatants will continue to be either in the form of cooperatives, entrepreneurship around small farm activities or small enterprise training, or continued education.

#### *Phase Two Outcomes:*

- ICRS operational for reintegration support;
- Ex-combatants continue to be supported in land discussions as needed;
- Maintenance of all cooperatives;
- Follow up and refresher trainings conducted; and
- Ex-combatant productive activities continued.

### **PHASE THREE: EVALUATION AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER (APRIL 1<sup>ST</sup> –JUNE 15<sup>TH</sup> 2014)**

Phase 3 of the project entails completing M&E activities with a beneficiary assessment and community dynamics study, as well as an overall evaluation of the processes, systems and outcomes of the Pilot. The knowledge transfer process will be completed during this phase.

#### *Phase Three Outcomes:*

- Final Tracer M&E beneficiary assessment
- Knowledge transfer from Implementing Partners, TDRP and BICC to NDDRC
- Project will follow bank closing procedures and will complete the required audits.
- Continuing engagement between ICRS system/caseworkers and ex-combatants

## 10. RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

South Sudan achieved its independence on 9 July 2011. However the challenges facing what is the world's newest country are enormous. Decades of war and marginalisation have resulted in a legacy of chronic and deep poverty. While reliable and accurate indicators are still scarce it is estimated that 51 percent of the population live below the poverty line and that the country has the highest estimated maternal mortality rates in the world. Under half of children enrol in primary school and less than one in ten girls complete primary education. Less than 27 percent of the population are literate and only 14 percent of the population live within five kilometres of primary health services. A legacy of conflict and underdevelopment has produced a large number of structural challenges affecting the attainment of sustainable development processes. These include the following risk levels.

### **10.1 COUNTRY LEVEL**

- **Internal security:** In some areas internal insecurity continues to be a significant problem affecting communities. Insecurity is fuelled by the presence of high levels of small arms, conflict over cattle, water and grazing rights and a lack of economic opportunities. Poor transport infrastructure often makes it difficult for the Government to respond rapidly to security incidents and justice and rule of law institutions remain weak although they are under development.
- **Infrastructure and economy:** Poor infrastructure such as road connectivity especially from farm to markets, energy connectivity in rural areas, lack of structured irrigation systems in areas distant from riverbanks. Lack of roads has isolated all regions in the South from developing its agriculture and market potential. As a result key consumption markets in urban areas such as Juba are isolated from other regional producers.
- **Viable livelihoods and economic opportunities:** Over 80 percent of people in rural areas are subsistence farmers whose livelihoods were seriously disrupted during the conflict and who are only now just beginning to recover. Market infrastructure and linkages remain nascent and access to markets has been affected in many areas by periods of insecurity. Farming is largely subsistence-based, with small-scale farming activities limited due to lack of access to markets, land, seeds, and historical dependency on imported produce from the north and current reliance on Kenyan and Ugandan imports.
- **International funding and capital investment:** Ongoing conflict and insecurity has necessitated an emphasis of international support on emergency humanitarian assistance which has contributed to the creation of a culture of dependency and reliance, which has negatively impeded efforts to promote self-reliance and ownership. Programmes related to employment or livelihoods has also generally emphasised employment generation rather than opportunity generation. Ownership therefore has been underemphasised, while funding resources have been absorbed by beneficiaries to satisfy immediate, short-term needs rather than longer-term recovery activities.
- **On-going population movement:** The end of the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan saw significant population returns from Sudan and neighboring countries and internal population relocations. In many areas communities are still struggling to re-establish themselves both in terms of livelihoods and achieving social cohesion after years of displacement and conflict.

- Land allocation: Land value is determined by community decision and is not based on market value. Land tenure laws are still being developed, such that transfer of ownership, registration procedures and process are cumbersome and not fully clarified .
- Policy and regulatory: key investment and employment creation policies are lacking as the DDR process seeks to incorporate some employment opportunities through small sector engagement. Other investment policies and laws, e.g. encouraging public private partnership are also lacking.
- Loss of de-facto pensions: This group of ex-combatants from the SPLA has been classified as 'Wounded Heroes' and currently receives a monthly salary without having to work, i.e. this could be perceived as a de facto pension. It is conceivable that when this cash transfer ceases, at the end of the reintegration pilot, participants may express dissatisfaction or frustration, which could in turn lead to instability.

## **10.2 ENTITY LEVEL**

- Institutional and technical capacity: The Government of the Republic of South Sudan faces formidable challenges in terms of the development of institutional and technical capacity. During the period leading up to Independence considerable efforts were made to establish and develop institutions and policy and legal frameworks as enshrined ultimately within the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011). At the national level the Government is responsible for maintaining peace, security foreign relations, overall reconstruction and development, promoting good governance, and the protection of rights with policy implemented through line ministries. Below the national level the ten States are responsible for the delivery of public services working with lower level local Governments at County and Payam level. While these basic structures are in place capacity remains nascent at almost all levels and requires significant strengthening and development. The NDDRC capacity at the state and the national level is limited. The NDDRC lacks skilled staff specially at the state level to support large scale programme management needs, in addition to skills, while resource allocation drawn from national government commitment is not yet clear. These limitations impede the continuation of basic operational activities and costs, such as office administration, the installation and maintenance of efficient IT solutions, wireless connectivity capacity, vehicles, and fuel, while also preventing broader institutional capacity building.

## **10.3 PROJECT LEVEL**

- Geographical proximity: among other factors, concentration of members per Payam and Boma will play a critical role on the type, size of cooperative or microenterprise activities selection and design for the first trench of 500 ex-combatants under this pilot. Given extreme dispersion of the population throughout the country, there is risk that there will be insufficient concentration of ex-combatants in a given region to capitalize on livelihood or cooperative opportunities offered through the project.
- Poor infrastructure: Lack of energy in most rural areas of the four states and limited accessibility to water beyond rain fed constrains the types of livelihood activities possible in the rural parts of South Sudan.
- Short timeframe: Given the country's pre-existing challenges, six months execution period would be difficult to meet possible delays in procurement and setting of core livelihood activities.

**TABLE 4: RISKS INHERENT TO THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT AND MITIGATING MEASURES**

Risk	Risk rating	Risk Mitigating Measures Incorporated into Project Design
<p><b>Country level</b></p> <p>Security situation is failing some of the states where the pilot will take place.</p> <p>Absence of certain policies that could have impact on the sustainability of some of the planned livelihood activities as well as on job creation potential in the future.</p> <p>On-going population movements especially in areas with short rain falls or exposure to security is apparent</p>	<p>S</p> <p>H</p> <p>L</p>	<p>The pilot activities will be only target 500 ex-combatants in four States where activities designed will be rurally based reducing reliance on job creation policies.</p> <p>Measures to compel government to draft conducive policies to address policy gaps in areas e.g. related to labour law and PPP.</p>
<p><b>Entity level</b></p> <p>The NDDRC capacity at the state and the national level is limited. NDDRC lacks skilled staff specially at the state level to support large scale programme management needs, in addition to skills, resource allocation drawn from national government commitment is not yet clear.</p>	<p>H</p> <p>H</p>	<p>The pilot will be implemented in partnership with UN, INGOs, NGOs and NDDRC while project management oversight will be provided by a project management team.</p> <p>Technical and financial support designed for all rural activities will be executed with the support of international partners.</p>
<p><b>Project level</b></p> <p>Geographic distribution of ex-combatants' areas of return will make it difficult to travel frequently to all destinations and may impede formation of cooperatives or engagement in other livelihood activities.</p> <p>Ex-combatants may see the programme as loss of de facto pensions</p> <p>Project implementation period of six month</p> <p>Procurement delays</p> <p>Given the country's pre-existing challenges, six months execution period would be difficult to meet possible delays in procurement and setting of core livelihood activities.</p> <p>As some of the required inputs for the farming activities would be imported such as seeds, the required time procurement period may pose a challenge in trying to meet the pilot implementation timeline.</p> <p>Lack of infrastructure, roads, electricity and water in most rural parts where the pilot will be executed</p>	<p>H</p> <p>S</p> <p>H</p> <p>H</p> <p>H</p> <p>S</p>	<p>The three types of interventions (cooperatives, single farm, or enterprises,) are designed to accommodate the different sizes of ex-combatants per payam and Boma. In Bomas where ex-combatants of 3 or more would be encouraged to form cooperatives. If ex-combatants representation is below 3, single farming or enterprises would be set up to accommodate geographic proximities.</p> <p>Clear communication with the ex-combatants will be critical to ensure accurate expectations</p>

H-High, S-Substantial, M-Moderate, L-Low

## 11. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: OVERARCHING SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DDR POLICY FRAMEWORK

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement all armed Southern Sudanese groups were integrated into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and a DDR programme was implemented in both Sudan and South Sudan with the support of UN agencies and donors. However the CPA programme was from the outset beset by difficulties and an independent review in December 2010 suggested that at that time less than 10,000 combatants had been demobilised. According to CPA-DDR reporting only 12,225 people have been demobilised under this programme. A number of factors affected the delivery of the CPA DDR programme including uncertainties in the overall environment on the lead up to the referendum on independence and programmatic deficiencies related to its overall design and implementation. These are said to have included a failure to appropriately address the local context and to adopt community based approaches to reintegration. There was also little Government ownership of the programme and limited involvement by the SPLA.

DDR is articulated as one of the key priorities of the South Sudan Development Plan (2011-2013) where it is identified as being an important component of efforts to enable a more productive allocation of financial and human resources and to assist in broader peace building objectives by the reintegration of ex-combatants into appropriate livelihoods thereby reducing the risk of crime and recurring political violence. The Government's intentions and objectives for DDR are encapsulated within a Policy Paper on DDR produced in late 2011 and an associated strategic plan are intended to guide the development of a new DDR programme to be launched on 15 April 2013 and known as the National Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) which it is intended will be implemented between 2012 and 2020. The Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) is leading the DDR programme in South Sudan under presidential decree.

The National DDR Programme also intends to increase livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return and aims at facilitating the release, return and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups into their families and communities of return. It is intended that the social and economic reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAF/G) shall be supported through a separate area-based support programme in communities where their concentration is found to be high. It is envisaged that through the strengthening of the capacity of the NDDRC, line ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the private sector, service delivery overall to the people of South Sudan shall also be enhanced.

This pilot is anticipated to serve a first group of 500 in the new DDR Programme in South Sudan. During the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, DDR was conducted in southern Sudan with demobilisation beginning in 2009. After the CPA DDR, lessons learned were compiled and guiding documents were developed to incorporate those lessons for a New DDR. These guiding documents for New DDR include:

- Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (dated 23 September 2011)
- South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (dated 11 March 2012)
- Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP): 2012-2020 (dated 20 April 2012)
- The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Council Presidential Order No. 31/2102 (dated 12 October 2012)

## **ANNEX 2: SOUTH SUDAN NEW DDR PROGRAMME GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

The DDR policy documents outline the following guiding principles for the Republic of South Sudan's New DDR Programme:

- National ownership and leadership: The South Sudan DDR Policy and Strategic Plan make it clear that national ownership and leadership shall characterize the implementation of the programme and that.
- Strong partnership with all Stakeholders: It is recognised that while national leadership is critical, the development and maintenance of strong partnership Implementing Partners with a range of stakeholders will be required to successfully deliver the DDR programme.
- Incremental Approach: It is recognised that DDR activities will need to be carefully sequenced and that the DDR programme will itself need to nurture and support capacity building of a range of stakeholders to achieve DDR objectives and ensure sustainability. It is further recognised that the capacity of the DDR Commission will need to be further built.
- Decentralized and Flexible Approach: South Sudan is diverse and complex in its security, social, political, economic and geographic dimensions. For this reason decentralized management arrangements shall be instituted in alignment to RSS decentralized system of governance. It is also stated that assistance to ex-combatants shall be relevant to each ex-combatant's needs and aspirations as well as appropriate to the local context.
- Maximizing Investments: It is recognised that the DDR programme will require significant investment in terms of infrastructure, training, economic revitalization and diversification, and technical assistance. However, it is also recognised that a number of investments have already been made which should be utilised to the extent possible. It is intended that the DDR programme shall make available specific opportunities where they are required but that it shall also seek to link ex-combatants to broader recovery programmes where these are available.
- Conflict-sensitivity: It is recognised that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high number of demobilised soldiers will be returning.



### **ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF DDR TARGET BENEFICIARIES AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA**

The pilot reintegration project has a tight focus on the reintegration of the 1<sup>st</sup> tranche of the DDR Programme pilot phase. However, the estimated targets for the whole of the DDR programme are provided below for information.

According to the Programme Document (Final Draft 2012), between 2012 and 2020, the NDDRP will directly target the following:

**150,000 active adult members of the SPLA and other national organized forces of which 80,000** shall be active SPLA/SSAF soldiers and **70,000** active personnel from the South Sudan Police Service, Wildlife, Prison and Fire Brigade Services. In order to qualify for social and economic reintegration support, the ex-combatants must have completed the three-month reinsertion support in Transition Facilities and returned to live in a community in South Sudan. The Basic eligibility criteria to enter the process include having proof of active membership in the relevant national organized force (SPLA/SSAF in this caseload), to be on the payroll of the relevant national organized force, to be between the ages of 18 & 65, and meet the medical staff requirements of health for participation at the transition facility. Detailed criteria are specified under section 4.3 of the Programme Document document.

**37,500<sup>5</sup> Ex-combatants with physical and psychosocial disabilities.**

**150 communities of return/projects** be targeted with labour-intensive community infrastructure projects targeting both ex-combatants and other community members.

**South Sudanese in foreign armed groups.** South Sudanese returning from the Government of Sudan security services as well as South Sudanese abductees in the Lord's Resistance Army first be cleared by the SPLA/SSAF as a pre-condition for eligibility to participate in the NDDRP.

**An estimated 10,000 women associated with the armed forces and groups (WAAFG).** Although not a main target of this DDR programme, WAAFG are assisted through separate support programmes.

**2,000<sup>6</sup> Children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG).** In line with best practices, CAAFG are assisted along with other vulnerable children in their communities of return at a ratio of **one** CAAFG to **one** other vulnerable child. Separate project documents are to provide further details on the scope, approach and specific objectives.

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<sup>5</sup> It is estimated that 25% of the disarmed and demobilised soldiers have disabilities

## ANNEX 4: REINTEGRATION PROJECT OUTPUT INDICATORS

### **OUTPUT 1: STATE LEVEL OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT**

**The provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learned on both process and delivery are identified and captured.**

#### Score Card Indicators:

1. State project planning and prioritisation processes completed to required standard and on schedule.
2. Project solicitation and development processes developed and completed to required standard and on schedule in line with procedures agreed to prior to initiation of pilot.
3. Project monitoring, supervision and evaluation processes completed to the required standard and on schedule in line with procedures agreed to prior to initiation of pilot.

#### Substantive Indicators:

1. Enhanced capacity of HQ PMU and State Level PMUs (x4) to plan, manage and monitor programmes enhanced with Line ministries fully involved in needs and opportunity assessments.
  2. Capacity of Implementation Agents (INGOs & LNGOs) at State Level to plan, manage and monitor programmes enhanced with Line ministries involvement in needs and opportunity assessments.

### **OUTPUT 2: AGRICULTURAL LIVELIHOODS**

**Development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned.**

#### Score Card Indicators:

1. Up to 80% of ex-combatants who choose the agricultural option initiate decent and sustainable rural livelihood opportunities, as supported by entrepreneurship, cooperatives, financial management, marketing and production management training and agricultural extension training as required to build on vocational training provided in the transitional facility.
2. 90% of ex-combatants attend the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives introductory training offered at the transition facility.
3. 100% of ex-combatants receive a livelihood start-up kit within 2 months of TF graduation.
4. 80% of ex-combatants attend state based trainings on entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, marketing and production management.
5. Up to 60% of ex-combatants pursuing agricultural livelihoods are trained and assisted to set up economic associations as chosen by the ex-combatants.
6. All economic associations to have a minimum 20% (non-ex-combatant) community participation.
7. At least 24 community based infrastructural projects are completed.

#### Substantive Indicators:

1. Enhanced livelihoods capacity of Ex-combatants settling in rural areas and taking up agrarian livelihood options.

### **OUTPUT 3: URBAN LIVELIHOODS**

**Development and implementation of non-agricultural urban livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication, tailoring, and construction.**

Score Card Indicators:

1. Up to 80% of ex-combatants who participated in non-agricultural training at the Transition Facility initiate decent and sustainable livelihood opportunities, through entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, marketing, product management.
2. 90% of ex-combatants attend the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives introductory training offered at the transition facility.
3. 100% of ex-combatants receive a livelihood start-up kit within 2 months of TF graduation.
4. 80% of ex-combatants attend state based trainings on entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, marketing and production management.
5. Up to 30% of ex-combatants pursuing non-agricultural livelihoods are trained and assisted to set up economic associations as chosen by the ex-combatants.
6. All economic associations to have a minimum 20% community (non-ex-combatant) participation.
7. 35% of ex-combatants who choose to enrol in appropriate business enterprise training are referred to potential livelihood/employment opportunities mapped and recorded on the ICRS.

Substantive Indicators:

1. Enhanced livelihoods capacity of ex-combatants settling in urban areas or taking up non-agrarian livelihood options.

## ANNEX 5: CATALOGUING OF PILOT REINTEGRATION ACTIVITIES

To create the initial cataloguing of the reintegration activities for the pilot phase the team focused on the following complementary area questions in addition to the details furnished on ex-combatants profiles:

**TABLE 5: COMPLEMENTARY AREAS OF ANALYSIS INFORMING PILOT DESIGN**

Economic and enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the overall economic situation in the state(s) where the Implementing Partner is operating?</li> <li>• Which are the potentially dynamic rural and urban economic sectors?</li> <li>• Do these sectors present opportunities for male and female, elderly and disabled participants, IDPs, Youth and other vulnerable groups?</li> <li>• What opportunities are there for public-private partnership Implementing Partners, including apprenticeship Implementing Partners and on-the-job training?</li> <li>• How can participants' skills be built on and/or improved in a way that increases their employability?</li> <li>• How cumbersome are state and national procedures to registering a company, paying taxes, registering land or assets and accessing capital?</li> </ul>
Training providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What education and training providers exist in the state(s) where the Implementing Partner is operating?</li> <li>• What subject/skills and age groups do they specialize in?</li> <li>• What capacity do they have to support reintegration?</li> <li>• Are there providers whose capacity could be developed with minimal support?</li> </ul>
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What business development services are available at the state and where?</li> <li>• What services could be developed with minimum support with direct results related to the specific reintegration activities?</li> </ul>
Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What other recovery and development initiatives are being planned and implemented that the reintegration activities could link?</li> <li>• What capacity do they have to support the designed livelihood activities during or after reintegration support?</li> </ul>
Ex-combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Types of skills they have</li> <li>• Their preferred jobs</li> <li>• Preferred areas of return and Assets they own</li> </ul>

**ANNEX 6: TARGETED STATES**

The pilot will be conducted in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes.

***DIAGRAM 2: MAP OF PILOT AREA***



## ANNEX 7: PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT DOCUMENT – SEPTEMBER 18 REVISION NOTE

Revision	Pages
Number of ex-combatants who will receive reintegration assistance was changed from 500 to anticipated 500.	Document wide
Mapel Training Center is replaced with “Mapel Transitional Facility” to have standardized terminology	Document wide
“Phase II DDR Programme” replaced with “New DDR Programme” throughout document	Document wide
With regards to Community Support Projects, clarification on UNMISS collaboration was made by adding the following: “Communities will be selected by the NDDRC, ensuring that projects are placed in different communities than those receiving UNMISS Reinsertion Community Projects.	2
“Baseline and Tracer Surveys – Ex-combatants & Communities of Return” is added under Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) component	3, 4, 8
“Entrepreneurship and cooperatives training” is added to clarify Livelihood Fundamentals under Livelihoods Support component of the project. “Livelihood start-up kits” is now listed under Livelihoods Support component.	8
Sub-components of Community Support Projects component are clarified and listed	8
Eligibility criteria is outlined as the following “proof of active membership in the relevant national organized forces (verified by both photo identification and inclusion on the payroll list or being in possession of proof of payment from the relevant national organized force), being between the ages of 18 and 65, not having severe disability, and meeting the medical staff requirements of health for participation at the transition facility.”	8
Geographical distribution of participating XCs added	9
“Police Service” is removed from the participants in the current pilot. All participants from the SPLA in this tranche.	10
Management arrangements clarified – including separation in document of steering committee and PMU. Tasks of Steering Committee clarified .	14
UNMISS & UNDP Representative is added as an observer under the list of participants of HQPMU meetings as agreed by NDDRC and UNMISS.	15
Removed references to capital inputs given to cooperatives as a whole - kits are to be given to the individual XC and shared with cooperatives if the individual chooses. No cash will be given.	33-34
Community projects to be distributed to states based on concentration of returning XCs rather than equal across all states	37
Community projects section replaced “Village Community Development Committees (VDCs)” with “Water Management Committees”. PRA training not included	38 - 44
Number of community projects is updated to 8 – 10	38 - 44
Community Projects component initiation phase is clarified	39
Indicators updated to reflect project adjustments as directed by the NDDRC. The revised indicators reflect the expanded training model on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/ cooperative formation. The revised indicators also address that associations/ cooperatives are not restricted to agricultural in nature. Output 4 was removed due to potential for overlap with TF trainings.	51-52
Dates updated	4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32, 35, 42, 45

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL  
DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT  
Pilot Reintegration Project**

**ANNEX B**

Implementing Partner  
Terms of Reference

MAY 2013







# Terms of Reference

## Consultancy To Implement Livelihoods Support Component

### SOUTH SUDAN NDDR- PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

## 1 Project Background

The World Bank-TDRP wishes to hire a consultancy to establish the Livelihoods Support (Component Three) of the South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) Pilot Reintegration Project to be completed from May 15th, 2013 to October 31st, 2014. The selected Firm is to conduct livelihoods support activities for ex-combatants in the four states of reintegration - Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Livelihood activities will be offered in four primary tracks: 1) cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members; 2) individual or partnership enterprise trainings for small farms, rural agricultural enterprise or micro-enterprise business; 3) targeted vocational training including agricultural extension and limited technical vocational trainings and 4) education. The overall Pilot Project also includes three other components - capacity building, M&E, and community support projects - which will be conducted by other implementing partners and are not included in this RFP. (*See Background document for further information on the overall Pilot Reintegration Project*).

## 2 Project Objectives

The Livelihoods Support component of the pilot reintegration project will provide livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success. The component will also test the livelihoods mechanism for future DDR tranches. The support offered in this component will consist of market-oriented skills development to encourage individual enterprise or employment for income. The provision of services to the ex-combatants and their communities of return is the main priority for this project. Alongside this effort, the testing of the livelihood support mechanism is at the heart of the reintegration piloting itself. Testing the livelihood track modalities will provide lessons to inform and improve the future reintegration services offered through the South Sudan NDDR Programme. The livelihoods tracks to be piloted during the reintegration project are designed to inform the eventual long-term livelihood activities of the overall South Sudan NDDR Programme and to be replicable where appropriate for the future tranches given differences in size and caseload demographics. They would need to be further tested and refined amongst future pilot reintegration tranches.

The livelihoods component will be conducted in two phases. The first phase is from May to November 2013. The second phase was to last from December 2013 to April 2014, but due to the conflict in December 2013, the second phase will now last from March to July 2014. The National DDR commission will be conducting follow-up and collecting lessons learned and the firm will contribute to lessons learned through to June 2014, then the lessons will be compiled and presented by September 2014. A mid-term and final review will be conducted externally to review the project.

This TOR is broken into the 2 distinct phases with terms for each clearly outlined below.

## PHASE ONE

### 3 Phase 1 - Scope Of Work: Livelihoods Support Activities

An Implementing Partner (Firm) specializing in Livelihoods Support will be contracted to lead the implementation of Component III of the pilot reintegration project. The livelihoods tracks being tested here include:

- Group livelihood activities: through cooperatives or associations;
- Individual livelihood activities (including partnerships): small farms and individual enterprise development services; and
- Adult and formal education.

The selected Firm will possess the requisite expertise to conduct the following key activities and will be responsible for the completion of the following tasks effectively and in accordance with Bank guidelines or any other procedures set forth by the Bank.

- Provide all interested ex-combatants with entrepreneurship training;
- Provide all community members participating in cooperatives with a short entrepreneurship booster training;
- Provide all ex-combatants and community members joining or creating cooperatives training on governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
- Provide all ex-combatants initiating either partnerships or individual enterprises training on business planning, governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
- Provide all interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business finance training or capital portfolio management as means to provide timely access to finance facilities to enterprises at all their growth stages while targeting their financial sustainability;
- Provide all interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business advisory assistance to support the creation of business plans and sustainable growth;
- Capital allocations to all ex-combatants participating in either cooperatives, partnerships or individual enterprise trainings; and
- Provide all ex-combatants interested in further education with vouchers for education.

While the livelihoods tracks are designed to provide clear long-term benefit to the participants, the participation of ex-combatants in the reintegration activities is on a voluntary basis and it is up to the individual to choose to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the reintegration project.<sup>1</sup>

Livelihoods Sub-Components: The livelihoods support activities are to be conducted in five sub-components:

- 1) Livelihoods project preparation.
- 2) Livelihood fundamentals.
- 3) Livelihood opportunities project initiation:
  - a) Initiating livelihood opportunities through associations/ cooperatives.
  - b) Initiating livelihood opportunities through partnerships or individual training.
  - c) Adult & formal education opportunity identification and vouchers.
- 4) Livelihood Capital Input/Toolkit Distribution.
- 5) Monitoring and evaluation.

## 3.1 Livelihoods Project Preparation

### 3.1.1 Staffing

The Firm will recruit a Project Manager who will be responsible for overall administration, and overseeing the func-

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<sup>1</sup> As a parallel process in support of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC will facilitate land requests of ex-combatants within communities of return. This process, however, falls outside the specific remit of the reintegration pilot.

tioning of the Livelihood Support initiation phase. They will report directly to the TDRP and NDDRC through the Head Quarter (HQ) PMU mechanism, which is being established to drive the Project. Under the Project Manager's leadership the Firm must carry out all activities related to the project necessary for the successful implementation of the Project.

### 3.1.2 Inception Report and Project Implementation Plan

The Firm will be expected to conduct an inception report based on State field visits which will inform a Project Implementation Plan (PIP). The PIP which will also be created by the Firm will include detailed service delivery design, work plan (including team and staffing plans for coverage of the various livelihood opportunities), M&E framework, costing, management cost, and portfolio management targeting all core areas of work. The NDDRC through the HQ PMU will input into the PIP who will review the final draft which will be signed off by the TDRP.

### 3.1.3 HQ and State Level PMUs Orientation and Training

The Firm will work closely with the organisation hired to undertake Capacity Building and the HQ PMU to incorporate information on Livelihood Activities into the HQ and State level PMUs (SPMUs) trainings. The Capacity Building organisation will conduct all the PMU trainings, with support from the Firm. These will be initiated with a system and process training which will be held in Juba for all HQ PMU members and SPMU members as their tasks require. This training will be created by the Capacity Building organisation with input from the HQ PMU secretariat. A second training will be conducted somewhere in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region immediately before the start of the reintegration pilot on July 15th 2013. This training will also be created by the Capacity Building organisation with input and support from the Firm.

### 3.1.4 Community Awareness

The Firm will work with the SPMUs to create a community awareness and sensitization plan to ensure the smooth return of ex-combatants and an acceptance of their chosen livelihood activities.

### 3.1.5 Planning and capital input procurement

After receiving confirmed reintegration livelihoods choices (see "Livelihoods Fundamentals" below), the Firm will start procuring all activities capital inputs in preparation for Livelihood Opportunities Project Initiation on September 15th 2013.

The Firm will then deploy to all four states to:

- a) Work with the HQ PMU and SPMUs to identify where all the livelihood activities will be set-up;
- b) Work with the SPMUs to initiate the process of sensitizing community members that wish to join the economic associations;
- c) Allocate those ex-combatants choosing partnership or individual models to entrepreneurship trainings; and
- d) Ensure that all state and/or other support networks are in place, including linking up all of the ex-combatants regardless of their modality.

## 3.2 Livelihood Fundamentals

The Livelihoods Fundamentals portion of the livelihoods component consists of the work primarily to be done while the ex-combatants are in the transition facility and is designed to allow for market-based decision-making. This includes:

- Transition Facility Livelihoods Discussions
- Transition Facility Entrepreneurial Training

In advance of the state-based reintegration, the ex-combatants will receive vocational, life skills and literacy training at the Mapel Transition Facility conducted by UNESCO. The Mapel Transition Facility is located outside of Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal.

This program through the Firm will provide entrepreneurship training during this period and will work with UNESCO to synchronize the approach.

In the pilot reintegration project, the Firm responsible for the provision of livelihoods support will brief the ex-combatants on their options to accurately set expectations and respond to questions so the ex-combatants enter the reintegration process fully informed.

The presence of the Firm at the transition facilities will also respond to a crucial lesson learned in previous DDR programmes where a disconnect in services and information between the transition facilities and reintegration service provision presented a major concern.

### 3.2.1 Transition Facility Livelihoods Discussions

During the time at the transition facility the NDDRC ICRS trained caseworkers will work together with UNESCO vocational trainers to provide vocational counseling and class scheduling. The ICRS caseworkers will focus these discussions on market-based decision making on how ex-combatants make livelihoods choices and cooperative formation, discussing what cooperatives are and why they might present a promising option to pursue.

The Firm will then engage ex-combatants in groups by location of intended return. The Firm will conduct these discussions: 1) to get final confirmation on their livelihood choice for reintegration and 2) as needed provide additional counseling on reintegration choices based on market opportunities (e.g. is there a market, is it feasible) The Firm must be very careful not to inaccurately raise expectations on potential livelihoods and job opportunities upon return. These discussions, to take place following the conduct of the baseline study, will be the final opportunity for the ex-combatants to choose both their option of livelihood reintegration track and the modality within which they wish to approach it – whether cooperative, partnership or individual. This will also determine the available capital inputs for the cooperatives and the coordination of agricultural and non-farm business development trainings.

### 3.2.2 Transition Facility Entrepreneurship Training

A 10 day entrepreneurship training and cooperatives basics module will have to be created and delivered to ex-combatants whilst they are in the Mapel Transition Facility. The classroom sizes in Mapel only allow for 25 ex-combatants to be trained at a time. Details would still have to be negotiated with UNESCO.

## 3.3 Livelihood Opportunities Project Initiation

The Firm is responsible for initiating the various livelihoods activities as outlined below. During Phase 1 (by November 15th 2013) trainings will be completed and projects initiated for all interested ex-combatants. From January 1st 2014 to April 15th 2014 follow up visits will be conducted in Phase Two: Consolidation. After April 15th 2014, there will be no further site visits and any assistance will be given by the NDDRC staff.

### 3.3.1 Initiating Livelihood Opportunities through Associations/ Cooperatives

The suggested economic association/cooperative module is intended to create economic opportunities for ex-combatants and support their reintegration into the communities where they will return. These associations would also include an average of 30% community members and as such enhance both the social capital of ex-combatants generally and specifically the economic potential of the ex-combatants because the community members joining associations will already have both experience and knowledge in the economic activity of that association.

Association modeling for this pilot project offers other advantages as well: economies of scale, a greater power of control over land use or workspace, the purchase of inputs and outputs, namely productive resources and their marketing and sales. These advantages would accrue regardless whether the association is in the agricultural or non-agricultural sectors. These advantages should act to enhance their overall livelihood (food and cash) security making them less vulnerable to external shocks.

As a rule, although there will be flexibility for exceptions:

- All associations will be designed with a shared value added activity/component linked to associations' produc-

tion.

- Agricultural and farming diversification in its production activities is intended to support association sustainability, growth opportunities while achieving social integration.
- Non-agricultural associations will also look at either complementary or value chain activities to ensure a greater chance of ex-combatants and their community members to exercise a greater control over the value of their outputs;
- Size of the association will be determined by factors such as the level of interest amongst ex-combatants, number of ex-combatants per payam and geographical proximities across the payams within a state. However, economic factors, such as the potential to succeed and available markets for the goods and/or services produced by association will determine whether such ventures proceed.
- Factors such as the proximity of markets to associations in rural areas and small urban settlements are limited and that the costs of transport and availability unpredictable, will also be taken into account.
- Notwithstanding external environmental challenges, experience has shown that the size of the association matters when measured against the likelihood of sustainable success. Unless there are compelling factors arguing others that can demonstrate the potential of success, all associations will be capped at a maximum of 12 members. This means that there will be a maximum of eight ex-combatants and four community members.
- There should be a minimum of six ex-combatants to enable the Project to form an association of nine members.
- Where there are between three and five ex-combatants, and there is a compelling case that those a cooperation will work, then consideration should be given to raising the number of community members that can join, however in no instance can there be more community members than ex-combatants.

Participation in the associations by community members will be voluntary, and the selection of members who join will have to be sensitively dealt with and in accordance to culturally acceptable methods. To prepare for this potential of larger community interest than allowed by this format, the Firm will take guidance from the HQ PMU on the approved system to determine membership such as a lottery system or the like. Sensitization with communities, including the selection process will be undertaken with staff from the SPMUs.

### **Training on Associations**

For all associations following the identification of the economic activity and identification of community members, training will be given on how an association should be formed, governed and managed. Associations will be governed by its member's governance board, which will be voted by the members to include a chair, secretary and financial officer. Its board will act and hold responsibilities of a board and will be responsible for the day-to-day activities and progress of the board. By-laws will craft governance conducts. Association members will also be the managers of its day-to-day operation while carrying their own specific roles depending on the activity or production type of the association. All members will be supported through the pilot project capacity building component with technical assistance from to set up and through the early phases of associations life, through to business planning and managing day-to-day activities.

The initial set of activities and supports will include:

- (Training) Life skills, finance and cash management, know-how, governance practices.
- (Set up) Association and enterprise set up and account management support.
- (Running) Banking practices, access to micro-credit, etc.

The Firm will also provide training on the financial capital structure for each association which will be the reflection of the total capital allocation, which will assemble the creation of the association. In addition, all association will receive training and assistance in setting up social safety plans, namely: forced group saving mechanism and savings reinvestment plan, which are crucial to ensure sustainability. Those associations that do not adhere to agreed schemes can no longer expect to receive economic livelihood assistance from the Project. It should be noted that social assistance will continue to be given, through the ICRS during the larger Pilot period.

The Firm will have to assist associations to prepare business plans if they should seek further assistance. If the associations decide that they wish to access their capital inputs and not participate further in reintegration activities, then no business plans will be necessary.

### 3.3.2 Initiating Livelihood Opportunities through Partnerships or Individual Training

It is estimated that around half of the ex-combatants will not choose an association model through which to channel their livelihoods options and intend to return to payams where they will either initiate individual options or enter into a partnership with one or more ex-combatants or other members of their communities. Geographical distance between the payams means that the livelihood assistance they will receive will be limited to additional basic business training and where there might be two or more ex-combatants wishing to create a partnership, to elementary partnership training. The training will be made available to all ex-combatants choosing this path before November 15th 2013. The length of this training is envisaged not to exceed three days and might be shorter if necessary.

Capital inputs and additional technical training will be provided to the equivalent value as in the association track. The largest group of individuals is interested in farming post military service. Training on agricultural best practices, marketing methods, and small farm management should be offered along with training on potential secondary agricultural endeavors, such as poultry and animal husbandry, and other simple trading shops with hybrid type of activities such as milling, poultry keeping, or honey making as appropriate to the local market needs in order that this acts to supplement their income during period of low or no rains.

For those pursuing non-agricultural training the focus should be on business development training to support the ex-combatants to use their skills effectively and profitably where possible. All ex-combatants starting up such enterprises will be assisted to develop a business plan, which will detail how they will utilize their capital inputs. Where ex-combatants dispose of their capital inputs for whatever reason, they will be excluded from further livelihood support.

### 3.3.3 Formal Education Opportunity Identification and Vouchers

Formal education, including adult education and post-professional training will have a limited appeal; however the NDDR is obliged to provide scholarships for secondary, tertiary or further education, to the value of the additional post Transition Facility training and capital inputs given to the other ex-combatants. A grant mechanism in the form of vouchers may be used towards payment of education fees, although further discussion is required to finalize design of the specific modality. Other mechanisms are under investigation to determine how best to link up with institutions offering such education programs.

## 3.4 Livelihoods Toolkits/Capital Inputs

As outlined above under Section 3.1.5, the firm will develop toolkit options taking into account the interests of the ex-combatants and in line with the training provided in the Mapel training facility. The contents of the various toolkit options will be developed, sourced and purchased by the firm to include quality goods with applicability for livelihoods in the selected tracks in South Sudan.

The firm is responsible for sourcing, purchasing and distribution of the toolkits/capital inputs. Distribution may be conducted at the State NDDRC offices given that a window of no less than 2 days is provided for ex-combatants to collect their toolkits. All capital inputs need to have been delivered by October 31st 2013.

### Capital Inputs for Associations

All cooperatives will receive an injection of capital inputs appropriate to their economic activity. These inputs will be sourced and delivered to all associations through the State offices, namely the members will have to come and sign for them through the SPMU. These will be in the form of equipment (tools, basic machinery), inputs (seeds, fertilizers) or another item that is identified by the group and falls under the threshold developed for each association. It should be noted that these inputs will be of similar value to those given to ex-combatants pursuing partnerships or individual enterprises.

### Capital Inputs for Individuals/Partnerships

Capital inputs and additional technical training will be provided to the equivalent value as in the association track.

The procurement and delivery of start-up kits will enhance the efforts of ex-combatants to engage in productive and gainful employment; be it as a private venture or in a joint and cooperative set ups.

There are six key steps in the task of start-up kit distribution:

- 1) Agreement on Modality
- 2) Formation of Start-Up Kit Content Lists
- 3) Procurement
- 4) Transport & Storage
- 5) Confirmation of Contents & Preparation for Distribution
- 6) Distribution to XCs

### 3.4.1 Agreement on modality

The consultant will liaise with the NDDRC leadership & PMU to determine the modality for toolkit composition in relation to the trainings received in the TF. There are 8 Vocational Trainings conducted in Mapel in this pilot project: Agriculture, Carpentry, Electrical, Plumbing, Auto-Mechanic/ Driving, Animal Husbandry, Welding and Masonry.

### 3.4.2 Formation of Start-Up Kit Contents Lists

Before launching the actual procurement process, it is necessary to consult with stakeholders including the Department of Vocational Training in the Ministry of Labor and its field based Multipurpose Training Centers (MTCs) in Juba and Wau, and other partners and experts. The Ministry of Labor and the MTCs have a role and authority to set national standards; especially so in policy and curriculum. Another expert body must be consulted to recommend standard kits for Agriculture and animal husbandry. As a second step, the trainers in Mapel should be consulted on what they consider to be priority tools that need to be included in a kit so as to enable an ex-combatant to promptly and independently engage in a vocation of his/her choice. At this point, the lists are to be cross-checked and finalized through discussions. The list should then be preliminarily priced and submitted to the NDDRC for a non-objection before going to bid. The content lists may need to be slightly re-adjusted following bid-opening and evaluation of potential suppliers.

### 3.4.3 Procurement – RFQ, Opening of Bids and Contracting

The firm will then prepare and distribute Request for Quotations to as many bidders as possible, covering organizations operating in South Sudan as well as regionally. The RFQs should include exact specifications as well as request a separation in the bid of net cost of goods from taxes, tariffs, transport, insurance or other fees. A clear, transparent process must be designed and agreed upon by the firm, the NDDRC and the World Bank for the Opening of Bids. The firm will then contract with the selected supplier(s) after a no-objection is received from the NDDRC and WB.

### 3.4.4 Transport and Storage

Goods will require transport from the supplier to Juba and further to the states for distribution. Reliable transport options must be compared. Depending on the transport approach utilized, storage may be required in Juba and/or the states in preparation for distribution.

### 3.4.5 Confirmation of Contents & Preparation for Distribution

A quality and completeness control must be carried out by the Firm upon delivery of goods to ensure that goods delivered correspond to the goods ordered and are in good condition. If checking in Juba, goods should be checked again once arriving in the States.

In addition, the goods must either be delivered by the supplier organized into kits or must be sorted into kits upon arrival. The firm is also responsible for ensuring that the kits are prepared for distribution to XCs including clear label-

ing and packaging in a manner able to be collected by XCs.

### 3.4.6 Distribution to XCs

The NDDRC will be responsible for conveying the information regarding the kit distribution days to the ex-combatants. This must be done through a variety of media, and should include public distribution methods such as radio.

The kits are to be delivered to the State NDDRC Offices and distributed to ex-combatants by the 31st of October against a signature by the ex-combatant and cosigning by an NDDRC State officer, an NDDRC HQ officer, and a UNICON State Manager.

Those kits which may not be collected on the appointed dates will be passed on to the NDDRC State Offices for distribution. The above-mentioned signing off arrangements will apply. At this point the NDDRC will be responsible for further storage and remaining distribution to XCs. These should continue to require co-signing for confirmation of contents and receipt.

### Capital Inputs for Education

See Section 3.3.3 above.

## 3.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

The contracted organization to manage M&E will be responsible for the overall M&E of all components of the pilot reintegration project. The Firm project manager, however, will be responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and restraints. In addition the Firm will prepare and present a monthly budget of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycles. These reports should be submitted to the HQ PMU who will distribute them further and will be fed into the M&E system.

The Firm however will be responsible for:

- Evaluating the effectiveness of trainings.
- Monitoring the implementation of projects.

Further, the Firm will contribute to any external evaluation, impact assessment required of the Project, including financial audits to be submitted to the World Bank.

## 4 Phase 1 - Deliverables

The Firm, under the direction of the Project Manager, would ensure overall coordination and implementation of the Project in accordance with agreed performance targets. The Firm would also be responsible for day-to-day administration, and monitoring and reporting on pilot activities to the World Bank-TDRP team.

### 4.1 Duration of Appointment

In sum the Firm will be hired from May 1st, 2013 to October 31st 2014. Phase One of this work will be conducted from May 1st to December 31st 2013.

### 4.2 Reporting, Accounting, and Auditing

The HQ PMU will manage overall implementation of the Project within the framework of reintegration pilot. The HQ PMU will devolve some of its functions to the SPMUs, which will be responsible for monitoring the process on the ground. The Firm will designate state coordinators responsible for coordinating the teams and mentoring the staff at SPMUs. State coordinators will meet with the relevant SPMU staff to report on progress and to discuss implementation and financial activities, including the distribution of funds. The delivery plans for each of the training categories will be developed by the Firm and will be subject to a review by the HQ PMU and SPMUs who will also review and endorse the monthly work plans and budgets and provide support to implementing agencies in resolving issues that constrain implementation. In addition they will review and assess M&E reports and make appropriate recommenda-



tions to implementation agencies based on these reported findings.

#### Project Manager

- The Project Manager will be responsible for reviewing state coordinator reports and compiling a monthly project update, outlining project progress and major issues that need addressing.

#### State Training Managers

- State training managers are responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, training progress, and restraints. In addition a monthly budget will be presented of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycle.
- The State training managers will also work closely with the SPMUs staff mentoring them through the project period.

#### Entrepreneurs and Associations Training Specialist

- The training specialist will be responsible for structuring the various training modules: creation and management of association, dealing with banking and micro-lending agencies, creating business plans, etc.

#### Procurement Specialist

- The procurement specialist will be responsible for formulating the lists of livelihood toolkits types and contents, accountably sourcing and purchasing toolkits, ensuring their full and timely delivery at the state NDDRC offices, and ensuring their distribution to the ex-combatants participating in this pilot reintegration project.

#### Trainers

- The trainers will deliver the entrepreneurship basics courses and the association formation courses.

The contracted Firm will establish a designated Project account. Allocations would be deposited in the account for eligible expenditures as identified under the Project plan. The Firm would maintain a separate identifiable account to be used exclusively for project-related expenditures for phases detailing sub activities, and retain all supporting documentation for audit purposes at the completion of the pilot phase to be review by the Bank and donor.

The Firm will develop an accounting system that should be as detailed as possible to allow all the Firms Project activities to be tracked, but not limited, to the following:

- Administration and operations of each activity assigned to the Firm.
- Institution building activities and their impact – should include details of capacity building programs e.g. trainings received, equipment procured and other.
- Performance indicators against which the implementation experience is measured.
- Data that would assist in assessing impact against the base line targeted of 500 ex-combatants.
- Financial and accounting procedures.

For the financial control of project operations, the Firm would be responsible for keeping the above-mentioned data up to date. The Firm would maintain records of accounts (all statement of expenditures, flow of funds) in such a manner that they meet the requirements of the Bank and other donors. The accounts should be prepared in accordance with acceptable accounting principles and must be independently audited at the end of the contract.

The Firm will prepare monthly progress briefs on the overall project implementation for review by NDDRC, Bank and other donor. At the end of the contract period, the Firm will prepare a final report (supported by data), which would include project implementation experience, project impact. The report should contain a table of contents, executive summary, findings, tables, and specific recommendations.

### 4.3 Outputs, Delivery Schedules and Acceptance Criteria for the Deliverables

The Firm will have to complete the following outputs:

Sub-Component 1: Project Preparation - May 1st to August 30th			
Task	Deliverables	Date	How verified/to who?
Staffing and Reporting	Project Manager in place	May 15/13	Inaugural meeting to discuss Project with HQ PMU
	State coordinators and trainers in place	Aug 1/13	
	Inception report	May 31/13	Inception report
	Implement accounting system	May 31/13	Inception report
	Project Implementation Plan	Jun 17/13	Project Implementation Plan report
	Weekly Updates and Monthly project progress briefs and reports submitted to HQ PMU	May 31/13 Jun 30/13 Jul 31/13	Meetings and Reports
	Monthly state coordinator progress reports and bi-monthly progress meetings with the relevant State PMU staff	Jul 30/13 Aug 31/13 Sept 31/13 Oct 31/13 Nov 31/13	Completed training with relevant NDDRC staff from HQ and SPMUs
	Final report	Nov 30/13	Final report
HQ and SPMU trainings	Participate in HQ and SPMU trainings, including awareness training of public information officers	Aug 19/13	Completed training with relevant NDDRC staff from HQ and SPMUs
Awareness / Sensitization	Design awareness campaign for SPMUs targeting local authorities for NDDRC staff	Aug 15/13	Awareness campaign
Project identification	Livelihood activity opportunities list-including location and training modality once identify where the livelihood activities will be set-up	Aug 15/13	

Sub-Component 2: Livelihood Fundamentals - September 1st to September 15th			
Task	Deliverables	Date	How verified/to who?
Transition facility livelihoods discussions	List of meetings and notes on discussions	Sept 15/13	Progress reports
Transition facility entrepreneurship training	Entrepreneurship training materials	Aug 19/13	Training materials
	Entrepreneurship training attendance records and evaluations	Sept 15/13	Attendance records and evaluation summary

<b>Sub-Component 3: Livelihood Opportunities Project Initiation - August 1st to December 1st</b>			
<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
<b>Associations / cooperatives</b>			
Cooperatives Materials	Project Manager in place	Aug 15/13	Training materials
	Cooperative training materials & operations plan	Oct 1/13 Nov 1/13	Progress Report and Final Report
Meeting with the village leaders	Meeting report	Oct 1/13 Nov 1/13 Nov 30/13	Monthly Progress Report and Final Report
Form the cooperatives	Cooperative list	Oct 1/13 Nov 1/13 Nov 30/13	Monthly Progress Report and Final Report
Cooperative training	Cooperative training attendance records, evaluations, operations plans and training summary	Jun 17/13	Project Implementation Plan report
<b>Partnerships or individual training</b>			
Individual business trainings	Business training materials	Aug 19/13	Training materials
	Business training attendance records, evaluations, business plans and training summary	Jul 30/13 Aug 31/13	Progress Report and Final Report
<b>Adult &amp; formal education opportunity</b>			
Determine individuals selecting the education track from baseline survey	Education track list	Sept 1/13	Education track XC list
Meet with ex-combatants choosing education track	List of meetings and notes on discussions	Sept 15/13	Education track XC list
Determine locations/ availability of education accelerated learning, secondary, tertiary or further education applicable to the interested individuals	Education track options list	Oct 1/13	Education track options list
Provide ex-combatants with a referral to an educational institution and a voucher/stipend given to institution	Education track XC selection list	Oct 15/13 Nov 01/13 Nov 15/13	Education track XC selection list

<b>Sub-Component 4: Livelihoods Toolkits/Capital Inputs - July 1st to November 15th</b>			
<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Toolkit List	List of capital inputs tracks and contents to be procured	Aug 15/13	Capital Input List
Toolkit Procurement	Procurement quotes for no-objection		Procurement quotes for no-objection
Toolkit Distribution	Verified distribution lists from all 4 states	Oct 31/13	4 state distribution lists
(Co-Listed above) Provide ex-combatants with a referral to an educational institution and a voucher/stipend given to institution	Bi-weekly capital input report – education track	Oct 1/13 Oct 15/13 Nov 01/13 Nov 15/13	Bi-weekly capital input report

### Sub-Component 5: Monitoring and Evaluation - May 15th to December 31st

Task	Deliverables	Date	How verified/to who?
Monitoring and evaluation	Work with M&E consultants to create a framework to facilitate evaluation	Aug 31/13	M&E framework
	Ongoing service tracking	Ongoing	ICRS
	Evaluating the effectiveness of cooperative and individual trainings	Dec 31/13	M&E reporting

## 5 Phase 1 - Level of Effort

It is envisaged that the following level of effort will be required:

- Project Manager to commit 70 days to the project (May 15st to December 31st 2013).
- Training expert to commit 45 days to the project (July 15st to November 30th 2013).
- Four State coordinators to commit 75 days each for a total of 240 days to the project (August 15th to November 30th 2013).
- One group of eight trainers to commit 54 days each and a second group of four trainers to commit 12 days each for a combined overall total of 480 days to the project (July 15th to November 21st 2013).

Offerors are requested to present, in their technical proposal, a level of effort chart showing their expected chronogram and time allocation for the development of each of the deliverables and any assumptions made regarding the level of effort for each of the deliverables and the scope of work to be performed.

## PHASE TWO

## 6 Phase 2 - Scope Of Work: Livelihoods Support Activities

The Firm is responsible for supporting the various livelihoods activities as outlined below. During Phase 2 trainings will be completed & follow up visits conducted for all interested ex-combatants (by July 30th 2014). After July 30th 2014, there will be no further site visits and any assistance will be given by the NDDRC staff.

The selected Firm will possess the requisite expertise to conduct the following key activities and will be responsible for the completion of the following tasks effectively and in accordance with Bank guidelines or any other procedures set forth by the Bank.

- Follow-up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy & Association and Cooperatives Training as conducted in Phase One, in cooperation with the NDDRC state staff. This is to include:
  - Follow-up with all ex-combatants and community members joining or creating cooperatives with further training on governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
  - Follow-up with all ex-combatants initiating either partnerships or individual enterprises with further training on business planning, governance, incorporation, banking, accessing micro-financing, project management and marketing;
  - Follow-up with all interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) business finance training or capital portfolio management as means to provide timely access to finance facilities to enterprises at all their growth stages while targeting their financial sustainability; and
  - Follow-up with all interested ex-combatants (cooperative, partnership or individual) with further business advisory assistance to support the creation of business plans and sustainable growth.

- Training and mentoring of NDDRC outreach staff in entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperatives.
- Coordination of Agricultural Extension in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture extension workers
- Training of Ministry of Agriculture extension workers in best practices and appropriate farming techniques for the XCs of Greater Bahr El Ghazal choosing agriculture.
- Facilitation of Targeted Vocational Trainings being provided to XCs via vocational training centers
- Facilitation of an Vocational expert visit/ Secondment programme for interested XCs in vocational skills not covered through the targeted vocational trainings or agriculture.

While the livelihoods tracks are designed to provide clear long-term benefit to the participants, the participation of ex-combatants in the reintegration activities is on a voluntary basis and it is up to the individual to choose to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the reintegration project.<sup>2</sup>

**Livelihoods Sub-Components:** The livelihoods support activities are to be conducted in five sub-components:

- Follow-up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy & Association and Cooperatives Training
- Agricultural Extension
- Supplementary Vocational Trainings
- Vocational expert visit/ Secondment

The following summary indicates what livelihood paths of the XCs in this pilot group:

<i>XC Livelihood Paths</i>	
FIELD	QUANTITY
Agricultural	129
Auto mechanical/ Driving	69
Carpentry	24
Electrical	19
Masonry	6
Plumbing	9
Welding	11
Animal husbandry	23
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>290</b>

## 6.1 Livelihoods Project Preparation

### 6.1.1 Staffing

The Firm will continue to employ a Project Manager who will be responsible for overall administration, and overseeing the functioning of the Livelihood Support work. They will report directly to the TDRP and NDDRC through the Head Quarter (HQ) PMU mechanism. Under the Project Manager’s leadership the Firm must carry out all activities related to the project necessary for the successful implementation of the Project. The Project Manager will also be responsible for timely submission of all reporting.

The firm will also hire 2 technical training specialists. One training specialist with specific knowledge on business

<sup>2</sup> As a parallel process in support of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC will facilitate land requests of ex-combatants within communities of return. This process, however, falls outside the specific remit of the reintegration pilot.

and cooperatives in developing countries will 1) develop and conduct the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperative follow-up training and trainers, and 2) advise on the implementation of trainings. One training specialist with specific knowledge on agricultural methods and farming best practices in South Sudan will advise and oversee the agricultural extension pillar.

The firm will hire 4 state managers to manage the Livelihoods Support work being conducted for the XCs reintegrating in that state. State Training Managers will be responsible for coordinating the training teams, mentoring the staff at SPMUs, and preparing periodic progress reports. The managers will act as mentors to the NDDRC staff in areas of planning, strategy and coordination. As in the case of the trainers, a profile that could facilitate easier communication and understanding between staff and beneficiaries is encouraged.

The firm will further require 4 trainers to conduct the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperative follow-up trainings in the 4 states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. They will be based at each of the NDDRC state offices. They will conduct trainings and continue supporting and counseling ex-combatants on entrepreneurship development and formation of cooperatives. The effective delivery of the component will require knowledge of Dinka, the popular local language, and/or Juba Arabic. Therefore to facilitate easier rapport and communication, the profile of the trainers should include proficiency in Juba Arabic and English with a preference for Dinka speakers. These trainers could be chosen from the group trained in Phase 1 of the project. These trainers will work alongside the NDDRC ICRS caseworkers in providing the follow-up trainings so that the ICRS caseworkers are fully capacitated to conduct trainings independently by the close of the project.

### 6.1.2 Project Implementation Plan Addendum

The Firm will be expected to complete a Project Implementation Plan (PIP) Addendum which will build on the PIP submitted in Phase One. The PIP will include detailed service delivery design, work plan (including team and staffing plans for coverage of the various livelihood opportunities), M&E framework, costing, management cost, and portfolio management targeting all core areas of work. The NDDRC through the HQ PMU will input into the PIP who will review the final draft which will be signed off by the TDRP.

## 6.2 Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy & Association/Cooperatives Training

The selected firm will be tasked with the responsibility to train ex-combatants in financial literacy, small business development and cooperatives, including the formation of private, and joint ventures and cooperatives. These Follow-Up trainings will build on the foundation of trainings received by XCs in Phase 1. Further training will outreach to all XCs involved in the current program. For those XCs that are succeeding in their enterprises, partnerships, associations or cooperatives the trainings will provide Performance Enhancement methods. Those XCs who are struggling will receive additional training, problem solving and discussions of alternatives. All XCs would be assisted with additional training on money management. The trainings will be conducted in the states from March 17 to no later than July 31, 2014.

### Process

- Step 1: Curriculum design
- Step 2: Training plan & schedule
- Step 3: Training of Trainers for ICRS Caseworkers and firm-hired trainers
- Step 4: State-based follow-up trainings following model of current trainings

The business training specialist is central to the delivery of this task. He or she will lead the preparation of all the necessary components for the effective delivery of the training. He or she will be supported by the team leader and the 4 state trainers.

### 6.2.1 Curriculum Design

The firm is to develop an amended curriculum to include the follow-up training that builds on the initial trainings. In

all trainings a balance should be maintained between theory and practice – learning by doing and simulated interaction should be encouraged. The Curriculum and the training modules must be developed, reviewed and receive a no objection.

### 6.2.2 Training plan & schedule

The firm will develop and present to the NDDRC and World Bank a training plan with schedule building on knowledge from Phase 1 on location of XCs and business types in formation. This is to be drafted in advance of the Training of Trainers and can be adjusted during the training with input from the ICRS caseworkers and trainers. An agreed plan must be established before the end of the so all trainers receive aligned information and are fully aware of their responsibilities and schedule for the period of the trainings. The plans may be updated over the course of the project, as needed.

### 6.2.3 Training of Trainers

A Training of Trainers (TOT) is to be conducted in mid-March to early April 2014, as agreed in the Amended Project Implementation Plan and workplan with the NDDRC and the World Bank. The length of the training should be no more than 10 days with the exact length suggested by the firm in the responding proposal.

The training should start with a basic course similar to the TOT conducted in Mapel in August 2013 and end with an advanced session providing training on build-on training materials and methods. The participants will be NDDRC staff, primarily ICRS caseworkers. The NDDRC staff will attend the basic course which will train them in how to conduct training on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperatives. The curriculum developed for the TOT in Phase 1 should be utilized for the basic course and can be adjusted as needed. In addition to the curriculum presented in the Phase 1 TOT, the final days of the training should be dedicated to training in areas that build on the information and training provided to XCs in Phase 1.

The TOT will:

- Discuss training needs of Ex-combatants based on information collected during Phase 1 and knowledge of ICRS caseworkers.
- Finalize the XC training inputs, methods and approach, and prepare modules for the trainers to utilize in the follow-ups.
- Train the participants using the developed modules for training of trainers.
- Develop posters for creating business activities, exercises, visuals, format for use in the training of ex-combatants.

### 6.2.4 Follow-Up Trainings

The entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperative follow-up trainings are a core component of the reintegration work. Following from the Mapel based entrepreneurship trainings & Phase 1 state-based work, the firm will conduct further trainings through associations, cooperatives, partnerships or individual training – including options for business development training. These trainings are to build upon the state-based trainings provided in Phase 1 and objectives and methodology are described in detail in the TOR above.

In summary the objectives of state based follow-up trainings include:

- 1) To further support the ex-combatants to utilize the Vocational, Literacy and Life Skills trainings gained at the Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return.
- 2) To reinforce and facilitate the ex-combatants' decision on start-up of their business enterprises during the training at Mapel as individual, partnership and/or cooperatives.
- 3) To further assist in cooperative formation and offer subsequent training to ex-combatants along with community members who wish to join in formation of cooperatives and management of cooperatives in different technical sectors.

- 4) To further assist individuals/partnerships in business activities and trainings by offering further training to ex-combatants in business development, start-up and management of individual and partnership based enterprises including 1) Individual or Partnership micro-enterprise skills training as correlated to the vocational trainings received in the Mapel Transition Facility and 2) Individual or Partnership Small Farm business skills training.
- 5) To further assist ex-combatants services in handling the start-up and management process such as board formation, marketing and book-keeping initially.
- 6) To offer advice in business troubleshooting such as lack of support family members or community or selection of location appropriate to the opportunities.

Further training will outreach to all XCs involved in the current program. For those XCs that are succeeding in their enterprises, partnerships, associations or cooperatives the trainings will provide Performance Enhancement methods. Those XCs who are struggling will receive additional training, problem solving and discussions of alternatives. All XCs would be assisted with additional training on money management.

The follow-up trainings conducted will thus include:

- Money management
- Motivating / reinforcing
- Follow up to assess the progress by the Trainees
- Problem solving
- Conducting short modules on setting up cooperatives for ex-combatants along with their community
- Assistance with forms and instituting formats for use by ex-combatants for their businesses
- Guidance for Registration of their cooperatives

These trainings will be conducted following the TOT in late March/early April through late July 2014. Each XC should receive 2 follow-up visits over the course of these months. ICRS caseworkers and the firm-hired trainers will work together in teams to conduct the follow-up trainings. The locations of training will mirror that utilized in Phase 1 with trainings being conducted as closely to the local communities as feasible. Particularly, trainings will be held in communities where cooperatives were formed or were forming in Phase 1 and areas with high concentrations of individual XCs. The firm will present the schedule and logistics for trainings in their Amended Project Implementation Plan. The firm will be responsible for training materials, transportation of trainers and venue rental as needed.

Trainers will be out posted in their respective States of assignment from after the TOT training in March/early April to late July 2014. The trainers will begin providing field (State) based support immediately following the TOT. On behalf of the firm, the state managers will coordinate the state-level engagement in this component and monitor the progress. The business training expert will lead on the content and form of trainings who will work together with the project manager to coordinate the overall effort and interface with the HQ NDDRC staff through the PMU on overall programmatic implementation.

### **6.3 Agricultural Extension**

Of the current caseload, the largest group of individuals are interested in farming post military service. For this group, Phase 2 reintegration support will include further appropriate agricultural extension training, which will be supplemented with small business training. This training will be made available to build upon and upgrade the technical skills developed in the Mapel Transition Facility. The training is to include agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills. The overall orientation of the trainings is to be on livelihood success for the individuals receiving the extension trainings.

The firm will work with the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of South Sudan and the NDDRC to implement a program of agricultural extension. The Ministry's agricultural extension workers will be utilized as trainers. In this manner the program will increase the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and contribute a positive benefit to the communities at large. The firm will develop a curriculum for extension trainings and a training of trainers. The



agricultural extension workers will attend a training of trainers and then will be deployed to the states to conduct the extension work. The timing of this work will need to be aligned with the rainy season which must be included in the firm's amended project implementation plan.

#### Process

- Step 1: Assessment of training needs of Agricultural Extension workers & XCs
- Step 2: Curriculum design
- Step 3: Training plan & schedule
- Step 4: Training of Trainers for Agriculture Extension workers
- Step 5: Agricultural Extension field trainings

### 6.3.1 Assessment of Training Needs

The firm will begin the agriculture extension component by briefly assessing the training needs of the Agricultural Extension workers in Greater Bahr el Ghazal. Each state Ministry of Agriculture manages their own workers and this will require outreach to those state offices. This can be done in coordination with the NDDRC state staff. Further it is important to understand what trainings have been provided to this group, so the TOT may build on this work rather than replicate.

Additionally, the firm will conduct a brief assessment of the further training needs of the XCs. This is to include:

- Outreach to UNESCO to understand the curriculum presented during the Mapel training.
- Discussions with the ICRS caseworkers, firm-hired trainers, and XC representatives on the status and remaining training needs of XCs in the program.

### 6.3.2 Curriculum Design

The firm is to develop a curriculum for both the training of trainers and the agricultural extension field trainings. In all trainings a balance should be maintained between theory and practice – learning by doing and simulated interaction should be encouraged. The curriculum should be informed by the existing training provided to agricultural extension workers as provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. The training curriculum is to include agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills. The curriculum the firm develops will expand on the content and structure of the trainings. The Curriculum and the training modules must be developed, reviewed and receive a no objection.

### 6.3.3 Training Plan & Schedule

The firm will develop and present to the NDDRC and World Bank a training plan with schedule building on knowledge from Phase 1 on location of XCs and farm types in formation. This is to be drafted in advance of the Training of Trainers and can be adjusted during the training with input from the extension workers. An agreed plan must be established before the end of the TOT so all trainers receive aligned information and are fully aware of their responsibilities and schedule for the period of the trainings. The plans may be updated over the course of the project, as needed.

### 6.3.4 Training of Trainers

A Training of Trainers (TOT) is to be conducted on days to be agreed in late March to April 2014, as agreed in the Amended Project Implementation Plan and workplan with the NDDRC and the World Bank. The length of the training should be no more than 10 days with the exact length suggested by the firm in the responding proposal. The participants will be Ministry of Agriculture state Agriculture Extension Workers. The NDDRC will request that 11 Agricultural Extension workers be made available for the training and following extension trainings, with 3 from each WBeG, Lakes and Warrap, and 2 from NBeg. The training should be a training refresher & skills enhancement for the workers before they return to the field.

The TOT will:

- Discuss training needs of Ex-combatants based on information collected during Phase 1, knowledge of ICRS caseworkers and extension workers.
- Finalize the XC training inputs, methods and approach, and prepare modules for the extension workers to utilize in the extension trainings.
- Train the participants using the developed modules for training of trainers.
- Train the participants in use of any training materials to be utilized. Develop any additional training materials for field-based trainings such as posters, exercises, visuals, format for use in the training of ex-combatants.

### 6.3.5 Agricultural Extension Field Trainings

The Agricultural Extension field trainings will focus on agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills. The trainings are to build primarily upon the agricultural methods trainings conducted in Mapel transitional facility and on the business learnings from the state-based trainings provided in Phase 1.

**In summary the objectives of state based follow-up trainings include:**

- 1) To further support the ex-combatants to utilize the Agricultural trainings gained at the Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return.
- 2) To train the ex-combatants on agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills.
- 3) To train the ex-combatants on small farm business skills with an emphasis on livelihood success.

The field-based extension trainings will outreach to all XCs involved in the current program. These trainings will be conducted after the TOT until late July 2014, with timing contingent on timing of the Training of the Trainers. Each XC should receive 2 follow-up visits over the course of these months. The trainings are to be conducted in local communities where feasible. Particularly, trainings will be held in communities where cooperatives were formed or were forming in Phase 1 and areas with high concentrations of individual XCs. The firm will present the schedule and logistics for trainings in their Amended Project Implementation Plan.

The Ministry of Agriculture is to provide 11 Agricultural Extension workers to be made available for the training of trainers and following extension trainings, with 3 from each WBeG, Lakes and Warrap, and 2 from NBeg. Following the TOT, the extension workers will return to their respective States of assignment to conduct the extension trainings from late March/early April and late July 2014. The trainers will begin providing field (State) based support immediately following the TOT. The extension workers will be allocated 55 each field days in each of the 3 states of WBeG, Lakes and Warrap and 10 field days to be shared between the 2 extension workers in NBeg.

The firm will be responsible for training materials, transportation of trainers and venue rental as needed. The training materials to be used for agricultural extension are to be discussed and agreed to with the NDDRC.

On behalf of the firm, the state managers will coordinate the state-level engagement in this component and monitor the progress. The agricultural training expert will lead on the content and form of trainings who will work together with the project manager to coordinate the overall effort and interface with the HQ NDDRC staff through the PMU on overall programmatic implementation.

## 6.4 Supplementary Vocational Trainings for Auto-Mechanics & Drivers

Preceding the reintegration phase XCs participating in the current DDR pilot programme attended vocational training, literacy/numeracy and life skills classes at the Mapel Transition Facility. XCs received training in 8 vocational areas at the Mapel Transition Facility. Some of these trainings have been found to require supplemental trainings during the reintegration phase. To address this concern, a component of the livelihoods support work will be to facilitate XCs attending driving and auto-mechanic courses.

For those individuals who expressed interest in driving at Mapel and did not yet receive this training but are still interested in this path, phase 2 reintegration support will include driver training and licensing. For those that chose and

continue to be interested in the auto mechanic path vocational training courses at a vocational training institute will be made available. In the current caseload this consists of approximately:

- 50 XCs interested in driving classes and drivers licensing.
- 19 XCs interested in auto-mechanic training

The firm will work closely with the NDDRC, who will conduct the follow-up with the XCs to finalize which path the XC is interested in. The firm will also work closely with the NDDRC to determine which training entities have capacity to well train this group and arrange with those entities for trainings to be provided to the listed XCs.

On behalf of the firm, the state managers will coordinate the state-level engagement in this component and monitor the progress. The project manager will work with the HQ NDDRC staff through the PMU to coordinate the overall effort and on overall programmatic implementation. The state managers will coordinate the state-level engagement in this component with the NDDRC and monitor the progress.

## **6.5 Vocational Expert Visit/ Secondment**

Of the 290 participants in the current program, 92 have chosen vocations other than agriculture or automotive skills. These 92 individuals may be interested to pursue an vocational expert visit or secondment program. The NDDRC will implement an vocational expert visit/secondment effort. Through this work the NDDRC will match interested XCs with vocational expert visit training opportunities. The XCs can be facilitated in this effort in transport and accommodation during their vocational expert visit. Hosts will benefit through the additional labor and will not receive direct payment for their participation. The state managers will coordinate the state-level engagement in this component with the NDDRC and monitor the progress.

## **6.6 Lessons Learned and Nddrc Capacity Building**

The objectives of this pilot reintegration project include to “Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming.” To this end, the firm will compile lessons learned over the course of phase 2 and at the close of the project submit with the final report:

- A summary of lessons learned for each of the areas delineated above;
- Updated curriculum based on learnings if amendments are required;
- Consolidated lessons learned document on the start-up kit process; and
- Updated start-up kit recommended contents list.

One area requiring specific attention is the start-up kit contents. In phase 1 of the pilot reintegration project the firm conducted a distribution of livelihood start-up kits to participating ex-combatants. By the close of the 2nd phase of this project the firm will submit a consolidated lessons learned document on the start-up kit process as well as an updated list of kit contents informed by the lessons. To compile this updated list the firm will gather input from the NDDRC, ICRS caseworkers, ex-combatants, business trainers and agriculture extension workers.

Throughout the project all staff of the firm will look to build capacity of the NDDRC through their work. The working method will be one of partnership and mentoring where appropriate. The firm will support the NDDRC to participate in the reintegration activities listed above as agreed upon by the NDDRC and TDRP.

## **6.7 Tracer Ex-Combatant & Community Survey**

In phase 1 of the pilot reintegration project a baseline survey was conducted of both Ex-Combatants and Community members. To contribute to the lessons learned for the pilot, the firm will facilitate a tracer study designed to compare against the baseline survey. The surveys are aimed at: (i) understanding the demographic characteristics, livelihood aspirations and social capital profiles of ex-combatants; (ii) documenting the impacts of livelihood activities on ex-combatants and their communities, income and savings, and overall economic productivity per cooperative and small farm and enterprise; (iii) providing broader level information to NDDRC for use in documenting programme impacts in a post-pilot phase, and methods for improving programme management, and developing new and improved liveli-

hood and capacity building products and services.

The firm will coordinate with the TDRP and NDDRC on this component which will include finalizing the tracer survey, providing a refresher training to ICRS caseworkers, and facilitating the field work to be conducted by the ICRS caseworkers. TDRP will provide the trainer to conduct the refresher training and ICRS caseworkers will conduct the field work. A total of 16 ICRS caseworkers who are staff of the NDDRC will be involved in this work. Ex-combatants will be interviewed during the tracer survey that will take place between July and August 2014, with the fieldwork to require approximately 25 days in field. The tracer data for the ex-combatants will be entered into the ICRS system while the data for the community members will be entered into tablets. The TDRP will be responsible for producing the tracer reports.

## **6.8 Monitoring and Evaluation**

The Firm will be responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and constraints. M&E activities will be on-going with monthly reporting. The reports will include information on the following topics:

- A list with names and DDR ID of who attended which trainings and when
- Summary of trainings conducted, dates and number of attendees
- Summary of number, age and gender of community members attending trainings
- Summary of associations or cooperatives formed including type, status and number of members
- Activities that were undertaken in given period
- Impact of trainings
- Progress made among participants
- New risks and opportunities identified
- Other M&E related activities

In addition the firm will provide:

- Weekly progress reports
- Final report

In addition the Firm will prepare and present a monthly budget of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycles. These reports should be submitted to the HQ PMU who will distribute them further and will be fed into the M&E system.

Further, the Firm will contribute to any external evaluation, impact assessment required of the Project, including financial audits to be submitted to the World Bank.

## **7 Phase 2- Deliverables**

The Firm, under the direction of the Project Manager, would ensure overall coordination and implementation of the Project in accordance with agreed performance targets. The Firm would also be responsible for day-to-day administration, and monitoring and reporting on pilot activities to the World Bank-TDRP team.

### **7.1 Phase 2 - Duration Of Appointment**

In sum the Firm will be hired from May 1st, 2013 to October 31st 2014. Phase Two of this work will be conducted from March 17th to October 31st, 2014.

### **7.2 Reporting, Accounting, And Auditing**

The HQ PMU will manage overall implementation of the Project within the framework of reintegration pilot. The HQ PMU will devolve some of its functions to the State PMUs and state offices, which will be responsible for monitoring

the process on the ground. The Firm will designate state managers responsible for coordinating the teams and mentoring the staff at state offices. State managers will meet with the relevant state staff to report on progress and to discuss implementation and financial activities, including the distribution of funds. The delivery plans for each of the training categories will be developed by the Firm and will be subject to a review by the HQ PMU and SPMUs who will also review and endorse the monthly work plans and budgets and provide support to implementing agencies in resolving issues that constrain implementation. In addition they will review and assess M&E reports and make appropriate recommendations to implementation agencies based on these reported findings.

#### Project Manager (1)

- The Project Manager will be responsible for overall administration, and overseeing the functioning of the Livelihood Support work. Further they are responsible for reviewing state manager reports, compiling a monthly project update, outlining project progress and major issues that need addressing, and a weekly short update. The project manager is also responsible for compiling the lessons learned and updating the start-up kits contents list.

#### State Training Managers (4)

- State training managers will manage the Livelihoods Support work being conducted for the XCs reintegrating in that state.
- State Training Managers will be responsible for coordinating the training teams, mentoring the staff at SPMUs, and preparing periodic progress reports.
- The State training managers will also work closely with the SPMUs and state staff mentoring them through the project period. The managers will act as mentors to the NDDRC staff in areas of planning, strategy and coordination.
- State training managers are responsible for a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, training progress, and restraints. In addition a monthly budget will be presented of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycle. Finally, they will be responsible for submitting weekly state updates.

#### Entrepreneurship and Associations Training Specialist (1)

- The training specialist will be responsible for
  - 1) Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Associations/Cooperatives trainings
    - Structuring the various entrepreneurship, financial literacy and association/cooperative training modules.
    - Developing curriculums for both the TOT and follow-up field-based trainings.
    - Advise on the implementation of trainings and contribute to the training plan and schedule.
    - Conducting the TOT.
    - Engaging with the ICRS caseworkers and firm-hired trainers during the field trainings to assist with problem solving.
  - 2) Compiling lessons learned in the process.
  - 3) Editing curriculum as needed incorporating lessons learned.

#### Agriculture Training Specialist (1)

- The training specialist will be responsible for
  - 1) Agricultural Extension Trainings
    - Structuring the various agricultural extension training modules;
    - Developing curriculums for both the TOT and follow-up field-based extension work
    - Contributing to the training plan and schedule;
    - Conducting the TOT;
    - Engaging with the agricultural extension workers during the field trainings to assist with problem solving

- 2) Compiling lessons learned in the process
- 3) Editing curriculum as needed incorporating lessons learned.

#### Management Information Specialist (1)

- The Management Information Specialist will be responsible for
  - 1) Tracer survey data capture, production and validation
  - 2) MIS system adjustment
  - 3) Compiling lessons learned in the process

The contracted Firm will establish a designated Project account. Allocations would be deposited in the account for eligible expenditures as identified under the Project plan. The Firm would maintain a separate identifiable account to be used exclusively for project-related expenditures for phases detailing sub activities, and retain all supporting documentation for audit purposes at the completion of the pilot phase to be review by the Bank and donor.

The Firm will develop an accounting system that should be as detailed as possible to allow all the Firms Project activities to be tracked, but not limited, to the following:

- Administration and operations of each activity assigned to the Firm.
- Institution building activities and their impact – should include details of capacity building programs e.g. trainings received, equipment procured and other.
- Performance indicators against which the implementation experience is measured.
- Data that would assist in assessing impact against the base line targeted of 290 ex-combatants.
- Financial and accounting procedures.

For the financial control of project operations, the Firm would be responsible for keeping the above-mentioned data up to date. The Firm would maintain records of accounts (all statement of expenditures, flow of funds) in such a manner that they meet the requirements of the Bank and other donors. The accounts should be prepared in accordance with acceptable accounting principles and must be independently audited at the end of the contract.

The Firm will prepare monthly progress briefs on the overall project implementation for review by NDDRC, Bank and other donor. At the end of the contract period, the Firm will prepare a final report (supported by data), which would include project implementation experience, project impact. The report should contain a table of contents, executive summary, findings, tables, and specific recommendations.

### **7.3 Outputs, Delivery Schedules and Acceptance Criteria for the Deliverables**

The Firm will have to complete the following outputs:

<b>Sub-Component 1: Livelihoods Project Preparation - March 17th - March 21st, 2014</b>			
<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Staffing	Project Manager in place	Mar 17	Inaugural call to discuss Project with HQ PMU
	Entrepreneurship & Associations Training Specialist in place	Mar 17	Inaugural call to discuss Project with HQ PMU
	Agricultural Training Specialist in place	Mar 17	Weekly report
	State managers in place	Mar 17	Weekly report
Amend Project Implementation Plan Amendment	Project Implementation Plan Amendment including workplan	Mar 21	Project Implementation Plan Amendment report

**Sub-Component 2: Follow-up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy & Association/Cooperatives Training  
March 21st to July 31st**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Design and receive approval for Curriculum	ToT curriculum – amended from Phase 1	Mar 21	Training materials to NDDRC & TDRP
	Field-based curriculum – amended from Phase 1	Apr 1	Training materials to NDDRC & TDRP
Develop training plan & schedule	Training plan & schedule	Apr 1	Plan & Schedule sent to NDDRC & TDRP
Develop services tracking format	Approved services tracking to be used in all states	Apr 1	Format circulated to NDDRC & TDRP
Training of Trainers for ICRS Caseworkers and returning trainers	Location and logistics for training finalized	Mar 19	Plan circulated to NDDRC & TDRP
	Flights and Transport for ICRS caseworkers & trainers arranged	Mar 20	MOPs submitted
	TOT training conducted	Mar 25-Apr 1	Attendance record sent to PMU & TDRP
State-based follow-up trainings following model of current trainings	Training Records – locations, dates & times, attendance with name, gender and age;	Ongoing – late July	Weekly and monthly reports; final report
	List of Businesses formed – including type, location and status	Ongoing – late July	Weekly and monthly reports; final report
	List of Cooperatives formed – including type, location, status and # of members	Ongoing – late July	Weekly and monthly reports; final report

**Sub-Component 3: Agricultural Extension - March 17th to July 31st**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Assessment of training needs	Quick assessment of previous training received and outstanding needs of Extension Workers	Mar 17-28	Circulate assessment summary with weekly report
	Quick assessment of previous training received and outstanding needs of Ex-Combatants	Mar 17/28	Circulate assessment summary with weekly report
Design and receive approval for Curriculum	ToT curriculum & training materials required	Mar 31	Curriculum and Training materials to NDDRC & TDRP
	Field-based curriculum & training materials required	Apr 3	Curriculum and Training materials to NDDRC & TDRP
Develop training plan & schedule	Training plan & schedule	Apr 3	Plan & Schedule sent to NDDRC & TDRP
Training of Trainers for Extension Workers	Location and logistics for training finalized	Apr 1	Plan circulated to NDDRC & TDRP
	Flights and Transport for Extension Workers arranged	Apr 2	MOPs submitted
	Training materials procured	Mar 28-Apr 3	Weekly reports
	TOT Training conducted	Apr 8-15	Attendance record sent to PMU & TDRP
State-based extension trainings conducted in states	Field Training materials procured	Apr 3-15	Weekly reports
	Location and logistics for field trainings finalized	Apr 15	Weekly reports
	Training Records – locations, dates & times, attendance with name, gender and age	Ongoing – late July	Weekly and monthly reports

**Sub-Component 4: Supplementary Vocational Trainings for Auto-Mechanics & Drivers  
March 17th to July 31st**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Link with Vocational Institutes or Facilities providing necessary trainings	Bid from institutes or facilities for training	Mar 24	Bid sent to PMU & TDRP for no-objection
Coordinate with NDDRC to facilitate XCs attending classes	Training forms & summarized list of dates and locations of trainings & Training attendance record	Ongoing late July	Weekly and Monthly reports
Follow-up with sample of XCs	Follow-up report	Ongoing	Curriculum and Training materials to NDDRC & TDRP

**Sub-Component 5: Vocational expert visit/Secondment - March 17th to July 31st**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Coordinate with NDDRC to facilitate vocational expert visits for XCs	Training forms and summarized list of dates and locations of vocational expert visits	Ongoing – late July	Weekly and Monthly reports
Follow-up with sample of XCs	Follow-up report	Ongoing late July	Weekly and Monthly reports

**Sub-Component 6: Lessons Learned and NDDRC Capacity Building - March 17th to August 15th**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Collection of lessons learned and amendment of documents to reflect learnings	A summary of lessons learned for each of the areas delineated above	Sept 1	Final report
	Updated curriculum based on learnings if amendments are required	Sept 1	Final report
	Updated start-up kit recommended contents list	Sept 1	Final report

**Sub-Component 7: Monitoring & Evaluation/ Reporting - January 1st – October 15th**

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Monitoring and evaluation	Ongoing service tracking	Ongoing	Circulate assessment summary with weekly report
	Evaluating the effectiveness of cooperative and individual trainings	Ongoing- July 31	Weekly & Monthly reports
Reporting	Weekly Updates	Ongoing	Reports
	Monthly project progress briefs and reports submitted to HQ PMU	Mar 31 Apr 30 May 31 June 30	Reports
	Monthly state coordinator progress reports and twice-monthly progress meetings with the relevant State PMU staff	Mar 31 Apr 30 May 31 June 30	Meetings and Reports
	Final report	October 15	Final report



## 8 Level of Effort

It is envisaged that the following level of effort will be required:

- Project Manager to commit 55 days to the project.
- Entrepreneurship & Associations Training Specialist to commit 60 days to the project.
- Agricultural Training Specialist to commit 25 days to the project.
- Management Information Specialist to commit 45 days to the project.
- Four State managers to commit 84 days each for a total of 336 days to the project (March to July 2014).
- A Project Director to commit no more than 30 days.

Offerors are requested to present, in their technical proposal, a level of effort chart showing their expected chronogram and time allocation for the development of each of the deliverables and any assumptions made regarding the level of effort for each of the deliverables and the scope of work to be performed.

## 9 Specific Inputs to Be Provided By The Client

The following inputs will be provided by the TDRP-World Bank and NDDRC:

- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU to provide input on Firm's Project Implementation Plan.
- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU to provide the list of all selected communities.
- Via the NDDRC State NDDRC offices to provide public information officers to conduct sensitization to all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the NDDRC State NDDRC offices to provide reintegration officers to assist with convening all meetings to be conducted with all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the NDDRC State NDDRC offices to provide reintegration officers to assist with on-going communications with all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the ICRS to provide ex-combatant data including intended location of return, training experience and livelihood interests.
- Via the Capacity Building and M&E Firm to provide framework for M&E inputs
- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU to provide ICRS caseworkers to participate in Phase 2 entrepreneurship, financial literacy and associations/cooperatives trainings
- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU to provide Agriculture Extension workers to participate in Phase 2 agricultural extension field trainings
- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU to provide coordination with vocational training centers for targeted vocational trainings
- Via the NDDRC HQ PMU and State NDDRC offices to provide ICRS caseworkers to conduct the field work for the tracer survey
- TDRP to provide trainer & write the report for the tracer survey

## 10 Profile of the Firm(s) or Consortia

The services of a Firm or consortium are sought to provide the above services. The Competitive selection process of the Firm will be based on technical and financial proposal. To be considered qualified to perform the services, the Firm must be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in these terms of reference and, specifically, should be able to demonstrate:

- i. Prior and current operational and management capacity in fragile countries.

- ii. Prior international experience managing and working on livelihood projects.
- iii. Prior experience in creating business planning related training modules.
- iv. Prior international experience managing and working in or on DDR projects in particular reintegration related programs or projects.
- v. Work in South Sudan and/or Sudan.

In addition, the Firm should be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in this RFP by showing:

- i. Experience in managing a similar project funded by UN agencies, World Bank and/or other international donors.
- ii. Substantial diplomatic and interpersonal skills.
- iii. Ability to work well with teams and to share knowledge.

Furthermore, the Firm must be able to show that the personnel that would be selected to work on this project have an excellent prior knowledge of project implementation, project management, experience with livelihood projects, experience with DDR, and a recorded ability to accomplish the project objectives as listed above. The Firm would be expected to include, at a minimum, in its proposal the following experts:

- i. Team leader, with relevant experience in institutional development, project management and previous engagement in similar assignment.
- ii. Community livelihood business and cooperative training specialist.
- iii. Financial/procurement management specialist.
- iv. Agricultural training specialist.

The Team leader especially must display the following qualifications and skills:

- i. Knowledge and experience at a senior level in executing projects in challenging post conflict environments;
- ii. At least five years of experience in the delivery of community livelihood or DDR programmes or activities, as well as a record of project design and implementation;
- iii. Proven experiences in providing training in a multicultural context;
- iv. Experience of managing assistance programs in developing countries;
- v. Excellent writing skills for documentation of lessons learned and reporting;
- vi. Excellent oral and written communication skills and computer skills; and
- vii. Capacity to work and experience in managing teams in fragile environments.

The Firm can sub-contract or employ short-term experts in addition to the key experts to implement the project, although it is preferable that the firm not sub-contract. To this end, interested applicants must include their partner organizations or Firms to be sub-contracted to undertake this project (please note: Firm commitments are not necessary or binding at this stage)

The Firm will also be fully responsible and accountable for hiring the local experts (translators, accounting experts, interpreters and trainers).

## 11 Timing and Remuneration

The Firm will be hired to cover Phase One activities of this component of the pilot reintegration project from May 14th, 2013 to October 31st, 2014. The total value for this contract is USD \$1,551,500.00. The remuneration for this contract will be distributed based on phases.

Phase 1 totalling USD \$920,200.00 will be distributed over 5 payments:

- I. USD \$81,070.00 upon contract signature and commencement of services;
- II. USD \$202,675.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Inception Report;
- III. USD \$243,210.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Interim Report 1;
- IV. USD \$231,105.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Interim Report 2;
- V. USD \$162,140.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Final Report.

Phase 2 totalling USD \$631,300.00 will be distributed over 4 payments:

- I. USD \$94,695.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Amended Project Implementation Plan with Workplan;
- II. USD \$233,581.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Interim Report 3 including 1) curriculums of a) biz/cooperative and b) agricultural extension trainings and 2) field training plans for a) biz/cooperative and b) agricultural extension trainings;
- III. USD \$233,581.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Interim Report 4 including training and livelihoods status reporting;
- IV. USD \$69,443.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the World Bank of the Final Report.

Supervision will be undertaken by Mr. Stavros Stavrou (AFTCS, TDRP Senior Social Development Specialist) and Alexandra Burrall (AFTCS, TDRP Operations Officer).



# Terms of Reference

## Consultancy To Implement DDR Community Support Projects

### SOUTH SUDAN DDR- PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT

## 1 Project Background

The World Bank-TDRP wishes to hire a consultancy to complete the DDR Community Support Projects of the South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) Pilot Reintegration Project.

The selected Firm is to conduct DDR Community Support Projects in the four states of ex-combatant reintegration - Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Projects will be conducted where there is a high concentration of returning ex-combatants. Community projects will be led by community committees, who will be trained and mentored by the implementing partner to work with their communities to select a project and create a sustainable support structure for that project.

The DDR Community Support Projects will be implemented in no less than 8 and up to 12 selected villages in different counties in the four states where the first tranche of demobilised ex-combatants are returning. Community water or market infrastructure projects will be identified for construction or rehabilitation. Water projects will be a priority for this intervention though rehabilitation of existing market places will also be provided as the need is identified and as project resources allow.

The selection of communities will be the prerogative of the NDDRC guided by the selection criteria and will be done at the outset of the Project through the Project Management Unit (PMU) and in line with the available resources for this component of the overall pilot reintegration project. The NDDRC, with support from the Firm, will develop selection criteria to identify target locations for community support interventions. Engagement of local stakeholders including local government and community representatives will be essential in the finalization of the criteria. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments will be undertaken on each project to ensure that the Projects are in compliance with World Bank environmental procedures before the projects are initiated.

This community-driven development/reconstruction (CDD/R) approach aims to promote community engagement and ownership of the initiative while also reducing tensions between communities and newly assimilated combatants through improving community infrastructure that will mutually benefit the groups. Moreover, this CDD/R approach will ensure that the identified infrastructure projects address priority needs of the community that is assimilating ex-combatants, ensuring key gaps are addressed and incentivizing the community to engage in the implementation and maintenance of the project.

The overall Pilot Project also includes three other components - capacity building, M&E, and livelihoods support - which will be conducted by other implementing partners and are not included in this RFP. (See Background document for further information on the overall Pilot Reintegration Project)

## 2 Project Objectives

The overall goal of the Community Projects component of the Pilot Reintegration Project is to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance. This component will both provide direct benefit to the communities of return to facilitate long-term reintegration of the ex-combatants by enhancing social capital and long-term livelihood success. In addition this component will test the direct community support mechanism for future DDR tranches.

The following are the objectives of the DDR Community Support Project in the communities where community projects are implemented:

- *From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC's commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 8-12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties.* This type of Community Driven Development/Reconstruction (CDD/R) partnership is a mechanism to ensure that reconstruction and development assistance addresses the needs and priorities of communities assimilating returning ex-combatants return according to the aspirations and the decisions of the people within these communities.
- *From a micro perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties.* A CDD/R approach will foster trust between the ex-combatants and rest of their communities, as well as between the NDDRC and local authorities by providing opportunities and incentives for practical collaboration on reconstruction activities of mutual importance.

The process whereby community committees would be structured could have a lasting impact beyond the life cycle of the project in that there would be democratic representative structures that would be in place that can capitalize on future opportunities. The process by which community committees are selected, trained and mentored will be tested and, depending on effectiveness of the process, could be transferred to other communities. This component can further help build linkages and provide the foundation for engagement with other community-driven development initiatives, which either exist or may arise in the future.

### 3 Scope Of Work: Community Support Projects

The DDR Community Support Projects will comprise the fourth component of the pilot reintegration project. These community support projects are designed to ensure that the selected communities where ex-combatants return are also indirect beneficiaries of the NDDRP. As such, these projects are designed to incorporate processes of social capital formation while also enabling the enhancement of livelihood opportunities for all community members. These projects will be conducted where there is a high concentration of returning ex-combatants. These projects also have a clear linkage to broader recovery and development in South Sudan.

The Community Support Project component will target no less than 8 and up to 12 communities where ex-combatants will return in order to build or rehabilitate prioritized key community infrastructure (water boreholes or rehabilitation of market spaces) through direct investment. A consultative process will result in the creation of a representatively selected group of community members (including youth, women's, elders, disabled, etc.) that will form a community committee to caucus and discuss with the rest of the community which project will be selected, where the project will be implemented and how it will be managed afterwards. As such this component of the pilot reintegration strategy aims to enhance social capital formation by both building community's capacity for collective decision making and providing infrastructural resources for communities. Project locations will target rural areas where local needs are most pressing. In these communities democratically selected community committees (VDCs) will be established, trained and mentored to work with their communities to select the appropriate project most appropriate to meet local needs.

Before implementing the project, the firm will conduct a feasibility and Environmental Impact Assessment.

The DDR Community Support Project is delivered in two phases: initiation and consolidation.

- **Initiation Phase:** this component is comprised of three segments: 1) orientation of NDDRC and communities 2) convening communities to select committees, 3) training the community committees, 4) feasibility and environmental impact assessments.
- **Consolidation Phase:** this component has a single phase: 1) implementing the CDD/R

Parallel to the above phases will be an M&E process, which will be initiated from the outset of the DDR Community Support Project. Key functions of this process will be to document lessons learned and track outcomes as well as to identify areas for improvement or remediation through corrective actions throughout all of the phases. A separate M&E consultancy team will work with the Firm to create a framework to enable the capacity of VDCs to self-monitor

and evaluate progress.

The selected Firm for this project will be responsible for the completion of the following tasks effectively and in accordance with Bank guidelines or any other procedures set forth by the Bank.

### **3.1 Project Preparation**

The Firm will recruit a Project Manager who will be responsible for overall administration, and overseeing the functioning of the Community Support Projects initiation. They will report directly to the TDRP and NDDRC through the Head Quarter (HQ) PMU mechanism. Under the Project Manager's leadership the Firm must carry out all activities related to the project necessary for the successful implementation of the Project. The Firm will also hire two community development officers to assist with the project preparations at the community level.

The Firm will be expected to conduct an inception report. They will also be responsible for creating a Project Implementation Plan to include service delivery detailed design, work plan and M&E framework to be approved by the PMU.

Over the course of the project the Firm is responsible for responsibly conducting procurement, accounting and disbursement processes and administrative services related to the provision of the community support projects and submit progress reporting according to the agreed formats as requested by the PMU.

The HQ PMU will manage overall implementation of the CDD/R component of the project within the framework of reintegration pilot. The HQ PMU will devolve some of its functions to the NDDRC and the State level and the Firm will work closely with the NDDRC State Coordinators and State PMUs (SPMUs), which will be responsible for monitoring the process on the ground.

The SPMUs will be the teams that will have primary responsibility for making local agreements and for following up on activity implementation by communities, through the implementing agency to achieve project results. The SPMUs will make contact with local county and locality authorities to inform them of the project and involve the authorities with a role in approving micro-project applications and supporting community initiated micro-projects.

The Firm will be active in all implementation areas and will be directly responsible for the community selection and training phase, selection of projects phase and project implementation phase of the CDD/R project. The project manager and community development officers of the Firm will be supported by the HQ PMU and the SPMUs.

### **3.2 Local Government and State Level Pmus Orientation and Training**

Community Development Project activities will be initiated through an awareness campaign targeting local authorities to be undertaken by the PMU and structures within the NDDRC. This will be followed by training, along with on-going awareness raising activities to improve understanding of roles and responsibilities in supporting the CDD/R process. In addition issues of good governance and people-led processes will also be trained and mentored amongst staff both within local government and the SPMUs in each of the four States. There will also have to be a carefully measured amount of capacity building, guidance, mentoring and quality control to the SPMUs to enhance their ability to deliver such future projects.

### **3.3 Community Orientation**

Awareness raising and orientation will also take place in target communities to ensure that the population in all of the communities understands the purpose of the project as well as their rights and responsibilities in the process. Following the awareness campaign it will be vital to orient selected communities properly on the purpose of the project, both in terms of process and output and specifically what their role will be. In each village the project staff of the Firm, together with relevant local government representatives and SPMU staff will call for a full general assembly meeting in order to introduce the CDD/R project to the community, elect a community committee and select a project.

### 3.4 Project Selection

Once the Community Committee is elected and the project decided upon, the Firm will initiate a basic project implementation process and project management training for the Community Committee. Training will include understanding the delivery process, how resources are used, how personnel are hired and how the borehole or market place is managed after the project is completed. The design of the trainings must include understanding the nature of the infrastructural deliverables, as well as the procedures for facilitating good governance to ensure that these becoming genuinely ‘empowering’ experiences and not just mechanical steps to be completed to fulfil the operational protocol. Given high rates of illiteracy in the region, training should ensure all materials developed are appropriate and that they can be used by all community members.

### 3.5 Project Feasibility and Environmental Assessments

Feasibility and Environmental assessments must be undertaken using criteria agreed upon by the Firm, World Bank and NDDRC prior to committing to complete a project in a particular location and prior to construction. Regarding feasibility, for areas where water projects are selected, the sites must geologically have water available in aquifers that are appropriate for hand or solar pumps. For the environmental assessment sites must be assessed based on the agreed upon criteria which will include having proper drainage, and not being near to latrines, garbage dumps or cemeteries as well as other criteria as agreed. Best practice guidelines will be used to choose sites that are environmentally suitable for the intervention. Efforts must be made to account for any negative environmental impact of proposed interventions. If it is assessed that the project has potential for mitigatable risk, a mitigation plan will be developed. Finally, the land where the projects will be implemented must also be officially turned over to the community if privately owned.

### 3.6 Project Implementation

Once communities have been identified and the type of community project has been selected, through a competitive tendering process, the Firm will identify the most efficient service provider to carry out the construction/rehabilitation work in these areas. This process must meet internationally established standards for procurement and contracting procedures and regulations. The Firm will issue tenders to experienced contractors working on water initiatives throughout South Sudan. The tenders must receive a no-objection from the NDDRC and World Bank. Bid opening will be done at the agreed upon location and officials from the NDDRC and World Bank will be invited to observe the bid opening. Contractor selection will be done in accordance with established selection criteria agreed between the Firm and NDDRC. All contracting must also receive a no-objection from the NDDRC and the World Bank.

Once contracts are issued and works ready to commence, the Firm will work together with state NDDRC representatives will introduce the contractor to the community and inform the community of the tentative start date of the project. Any community obligations that are required while the project is being implemented will also be discussed at this introduction meeting.

Once the community project is completed, the infrastructure will be turned over to the community management committees to ensure its proper use, management and sustainability.

### 3.7 Monitoring And Evaluation

The Firm will be responsible to contribute to the overall M&E process conducted by the NDDRC and M&E Firm including coordination on M&E design and data collection. The proposal is to include a M&E logframe including objectives, indicators, targets and assumptions. The M&E of the overall pilot project will be identified under a separate tender and that organisation will responsible for the M&E components of the pilot reintegration process. The M&E team will be responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of trainings, community election processes, and the impacts of micro project implementation. Six weeks after a community has completed project implementation the M&E team will

be responsible for sitting with the groups to gauge project effectiveness and achievement of intended outcomes. The Firm will contribute to any external evaluation, impact assessment required of the Project, including financial audits to be submitted to the World Bank.



## 4 Deliverables

The Firm, under the direction of the Project Manager, will ensure overall coordination and implementation of the Project in accordance with agreed performance targets. The Firm would also be responsible for day-to-day administration, and monitoring and reporting on pilot activities to the World Bank-TDRP team.

### 4.1 Reporting, Accounting, and Auditing

The Firm will designate community development staff responsible for training village committees and assisting in project selection. Community development staff will meet with the relevant SPMU staff monthly to report on progress and to discuss implementation and financial activities, including the distribution of funds. The delivery plans for each of individual projects will be developed by the Firm and will be subject to a review by the HQ PMU and SPMUs who will also review and endorse the Project work plans and budgets and provide support to implementing agencies in resolving issues that constrain implementation. In addition they will review and assess M&E reports and make appropriate recommendations to implementation agencies based on these reported findings.

#### Community development staff

- Community development staff will be responsible for weekly reporting and a basic monthly report outlining activities achieved, impact of trainings, community project progress, and restraints. In addition a monthly budget will be presented of expenditures to date and funds required for the following cycle.
- All reports should be submitted to the management of the implementing partner agency and forwarded to the SPMUs and HQ PMU. Although the Field Manager reports directly to his or her own implementing agency, the HQ PMU maintains ownership and authority over all documentation collected in the field.

#### Project Manager

- The Project Manager will be responsible for reviewing community development staff reports and compiling the weekly reports to the NDDRC via the PMU and to the World Bank and monthly project updates to the same, outlining project progress and major issues that need addressing.

The contracted Firm will establish a designated Project account. Allocations would be deposited in the account for eligible expenditures as identified under the Project plan. The Firm would maintain a separate identifiable account to be used exclusively for project-related expenditures for phases detailing sub activities, and retain all supporting documentation for audit purposes at the completion of the pilot phase to be review by the Bank and donor. The Firm will develop an accounting system that should be as detailed as possible to allow all the Firms Project activities to be tracked. The Firm would maintain records of accounts (all statement of expenditures, flow of funds) in such a manner that they meet the requirements of the Bank and other donors. The accounts should be prepared in accordance with acceptable accounting principles and must be independently audited at the end of the contract.

The Firm will prepare weekly updates and monthly progress briefs on the overall project implementation for review by NDDRC, Bank and other donor. At the end of the contract period, the Firm will prepare a final report (supported by data) which would include project implementation experience, project impact. The report should contain a table of contents, executive summary, findings, tables, and specific recommendations.

## 4.2 Outputs, Delivery Schedules and Acceptance Criteria for the Deliverables

The Firm will have to complete the following outputs:

<b>Task</b>	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>How verified/to who?</b>
Project Preparation	Project Manager in place	Inaugural meeting to discuss Project with HQ PMU
	Completed meetings with PMU and SPMUs to decide on target communities	Participated in meetings with all SPMUs
	Inception report	Inception report
	Project Implementation Plan	Project Implementation Plan report
	Draft Community Selection Criteria and work alongside NDDRC to finalize	Final Community Selection Criteria
	Design awareness campaign for SPMUs targeting local authorities for NDDRC staff	Awareness campaign
	Awareness training of public information officers & NDDRC state staff	Completed training with relevant NDDRC staff from HQ and SPMUs
	Weekly updates and Monthly project progress briefs and reports submitted to PMU	Reports
	Final report	Final report
Community orientation	Initial meeting discussion with the village leaders in all designated communities.	Confirmed meetings with all communities
	Community training materials	Training materials
	Follow up community to select project	Attendance records and confirmed projects
	Draft delivery plans for each of individual projects to be developed, including costings.	Draft plans for all projects with costings
	Final delivery plans for all projects.	Completed plans for all projects
Feasibility and Environmental Assessments	Draft Project Assessment Criteria and work alongside NDDRC to finalize	Final Project Assessment Guidelines
	Conduct Assessments and report to NDDRC and WB	Assessment for each Project
	For those requiring mitigation, develop a mitigation plan	Mitigation plan for Projects as needed
Project Implementation	Develop Project Tender documents and submit to NDDRC and WB for no-objection	Project Tender Documents
	Conduct Opening of Bids in presence of NDDRC and WB	Attendance records and opening of bids summary
	Select firms and receive no-objection of NDDRC and WB for contracting	Firm recommendation and no-objection documentation
	Complete projects within agreed upon timeframe	Weekly, monthly and final reports
	Assess projects to ensure they meet specifications and environmental standards	Weekly, monthly and final reports
Monitoring and evaluation	Work with M&E consultants to create a framework to enable the capacity of communities to self-monitor and evaluate progress.	M&E frameworks within each community
	Evaluating the effectiveness of village trainings and performance of the community committees.	M&E reporting & final report
	Evaluate project implementation	M&E reporting & final report

Specifically, by the end of this project, the following will be achieved: 1) Target communities are aware of the community support projects, and overall DDR initiative, and lead the process of identifying for what there is a need of given infrastructure projects options for their communities. 2) Community Committees are established and capacitated to maintain the infrastructure planned to be constructed/rehabilitated through this project. 3) PMU representatives capacitated to support the Community Support Component of the DDR project. 4) Projects are chosen in keeping with agreed upon criteria. 5) Projects Contractors are chosen based on a transparent and responsible process. 6) Projects are implemented according to specifications and meeting environmental standards.

## 5 Level of Effort

It is envisaged that the following level of effort will be required:

- One project manager for 22.5 days.
- One community development officer for 22.5 days.
- Three to Four Community Mobilizers for 360 days.

Offerors are requested to present, in their technical proposal, a level of effort chart showing their expected chronogram and time allocation for the development of each of the deliverables and any assumptions made regarding the level of effort for each of the deliverables and the scope of work to be performed.

## 6 Specific Inputs to Be Provided By The Client

The TDRP-World bank will provide the following:

- Via the NDDRC PMU to provide input on Firm's Project Implementation Plan.
- Via the NDDRC PMU to provide the list of all selected communities.
- Via the NDDRC SPMUs to provide public information officers to conduct sensitization to all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the NDDRC SPMUs to provide reintegration officers to assist with convening all meetings to be conducted with all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the NDDRC SPMUs to provide reintegration officers to assist with on-going communications with all selected communities (transport logistics to be provided by Firm).
- Via the ICRS all required profile data on returning ex-combatants for each of the selected communities.
- Consultant to conduct environmental assessment.
- Via the Capacity Building and M&E Firm to provide framework for M&E inputs.

## 7 Profile of The Firm(S) Or Consortia

The services of a Firm or consortium are sought to provide the above services. The selected Firm will be responsible for initiating the DDR Community Support Projects of the pilot reintegration project. The Competitive selection process of the Firm will be based on technical and financial proposal.

To be considered qualified to perform the services, the Firm must be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in these terms of reference and, specifically, should be able to demonstrate:

- i. Prior and current operational and management capacity in fragile states;
- ii. Prior international experience managing and working in or on community driven development projects;
- iii. Prior work in South Sudan and Sudan.

In addition, the Firm should be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in this RFP by showing:

- i. Experience in managing a similar project funded by UN agencies, World Bank and/or other international donors;
- ii. Substantial diplomatic and interpersonal skills; and
- iii. Ability to work well with teams and to share knowledge.

Furthermore, the Firm must be able to show that the personnel that would be selected to work on this project have an excellent prior knowledge of project implementation, project management, experience with CDD projects and a recorded ability to accomplish the project objectives as listed above. The Firm would be expected to include, at a minimum, in its proposal the following experts:

- i. Team leader, with relevant experience in institutional development, project management and previous engagement in similar assignment; and
- ii. Community development specialists.

The Team leader especially must display the following qualifications and skills:

- i. Knowledge and experience at a senior level in executing projects in challenging post conflict environments;
- ii. At least five years of experience in the delivery of DDR programmes or activities, as well as a record of project design and implementation;
- iii. Proven experiences in providing training in a multicultural context;
- iv. Experience of managing assistance programs in developing countries;
- v. Excellent writing skills for documentation of lessons learned and reporting;
- vi. Excellent oral and written communication skills and computer skills; and
- vii. Capacity to work and experience in managing teams in fragile environments.

The Firm can sub-contract or employ short-term experts to facilitate any aspects of the project pending approval from the TDRP team. The Firm will also be fully responsible and accountable for hiring the local experts (translators, accounting experts, interpreters and trainers).

## 8 Timing and Remuneration

The Firm will be hired to cover Phase One activities of this component of the pilot reintegration project from August 19th 2013 to May 30th 2014.

The total amount for this contract is USD \$450,000.00. The remuneration for this contract will be distributed over 5 payments:

- I. The amount of USD \$16,575.00 upon contract signature and commencement of services;
- II. The amount of USD \$24,862.50 upon submission of and acceptance by the NDDRC and World Bank of the Inception Report;
- III. The amount of USD \$174,781.25 upon submission of and acceptance by the NDDRC and World Bank of the Interim Report 1 including project criteria, community meeting reports and final list of sites;
- IV. The amount of USD \$174,781.25 upon submission of and acceptance by the NDDRC and World Bank of the Interim Report 2 including tender documents, bid opening report and final list of contractors
- V. The amount of USD \$59,000.00 upon submission of and acceptance by the NDDRC and World Bank of the Final Report.

Supervision will be undertaken by Mr. Stavros Stavrou (AFTCS, Senior Social Development Specialist) and Alexandra Burrall (AFTCS, Operations Officer).

# **Terms of Reference**

## **Consultancy to Implement Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation**

### **SOUTH SUDAN NDDR - PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT**

## **1 Project Background**

The World Bank-TDRP wishes to hire a firm to establish the Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) Pilot Reintegration Project, limited to the work to be completed in Phase 1: May 1st to November 30th 2013.

With the objective of building local capacity, and ensuring ownership of DDR activities in South Sudan by the South Sudanese government, the firm is to conduct capacity building activities to the NDDRC including project management training, shadowing, support and systems development. They will provide this capacity building to the HQ Project Management Unit that is located in NDDRC in Juba, and to State project management units (SPMUs) in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal – Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal where the reintegration activities will be conducted. The firm chosen to conduct the Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project will systematically strengthen the capacities of local NDDRC staff at the HQ and four state offices to provide project oversight of the implementation of the livelihoods and community projects components, and to capacitate the staff to take over the PMU management at the completion of the project pilot period. The firm will be highly involved in the creation and continual maintenance of the PMU Project Implementation Manual with particular emphasis on the state aspects of the document. The PIM must be in line with NDDRC institutional operations and implementation systems.

The firm will also be responsible for: designing an M&E system; forming an M&E unit within the NDDRC, locating this within the SPMUs, administrating a baseline survey amongst ex-combatants and a sample of communities within which they will reintegrate; training staff related to the M&E and surveys; and ensuring on-going reporting.

The overall Pilot Project also includes two other components - livelihoods and community support project which will be conducted by other implementing partners and are not included in this RFP.

## **2 Project Objectives**

Relevant to the Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) components, the key objective of the overall pilot reintegration project is to build the capacity of the NDDRC through both staff and systems. The two major mechanisms for this capacity building are 1) through the formation of a national Project Management Unit (HQ PMU) and four State level Project Management Units (SPMUs) and 2) through the development and support of an Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). (See Background document for further information on objectives and the overall of the Pilot Reintegration Project)

These terms of reference have two objectives:

- Objective 1: Institutional capacity building
- Objective 2: Formation and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system

### **2.1 Objective 1: Institutional Capacity Building**

Institutional capacity building in the pilot reintegration project will primarily develop staff and systems capacity to

manage reintegration implementation by the NDDRC. This capacity building is inextricably connected with the project management function conducted by the HQ PMU and will provide staff management and systems training to both the HQ PMU and SPMUs staff.

As the primary mechanism to achieve implementation at the state level, both the HQ and SPMUs will be capacitated to set up programme systems and learning objectives of the pilot reintegration project in such a manner that enables the:

- Development of lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- Development and instillation of a DDR Reintegration Management system in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot phase.

By the completion of the Pilot Reintegration Project, the NDDRC staff at both the HQ and state levels will have participated in the full management cycle and through hands on training, will ideally be prepared to manage future DDR tranches with minimal or no assistance. The work to be completed in this phase will initiate the above process.

## 2.2 Objective 2: M&E

The M&E system of the pilot reintegration project will provide critical data to improve operations throughout the project as well as on the true impact of the program and contribute to the learning outputs of the project. The M&E system should be designed to: 1) provide a continual assessment of progress, 2) create a data flow to inform and adjust operations and 3) document all lessons learned recommending modifications or improvements to individual parts or all of the components. In addition to M&E system outputs, NDDRC staff training on M&E is a key component of capacity building activities. The pilot is meant as a learning experience, an opportunity to build systems and procedures, test modalities and to build institutional capacity (systems and people). The M&E component is therefore central to the programme system and learning objectives of the reintegration pilot as listed above.

The M&E system will be designed in consultation with the NDDRC. A similar shadowing and mentoring process as outlined in the institutional capacity building component will be provided to the NDDRC staff as well. In addition, the M&E design, tools and systems incorporated during the pilot period should be transferrable for future tranches of DDR.

## 3 Scope of Work: Capacity Building

An Institutional Capacity Building Implementing Partner (firm) will be contracted to execute the activities listed below. The Institutional Capacity Building Component will be conducted through systems development, as well as training and shadow mentoring of the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) staff within the overall Project Management Unit (PMU) and in the four state-level PMUs. The selected firm will be responsible for the completion of the following tasks effectively and in accordance with Bank guidelines or any other procedures set forth by the Bank.

### 3.1 Project Preparation

The selected organization will submit an inception report based on State field visits and a Project Implementation Plan (PIP), including a detailed outline of staffing and costing plans to facilitate the institutionalization of the SPMUs in the four states. The plan will be developed jointly with the NDDRC through the HQ PMU and reviewed and cleared by the World Bank.

### 3.2 Shadow Mentoring And Capacity Building Of NDDRC Staff

A staff mentoring modality will be adopted by the HQ PMU and SPMUs through which management capacities of NDDRC staff will be enhanced by the firm. The full approach to be taken will be reviewed by the PMU through the submission of the PIP by the firm.

The contracted firm will ensure that affiliated staff offers support to the HQ PMU and the SPMUs in all four States. South Sudanese staff will be selected from the State DDRC and assigned by the NDDRC to work in parallel as a shadow staff to firm staff as members of the SPMUs where they will conduct work in tandem throughout the pilot

phase. The staff mentoring process is intended to build HQ and state NDDRC staff capacity, and create specialized HQ and state-based teams with management skills to help support future reintegration activities after the pilot phase. The PMU will be installed at the NDDRC HQ office and within the facilities of the State based NDDRC in the four states of NBeG, WBeG, Warrap, and Lakes State. Housed in the State NDDRC office, state level PMUs will be responsible for the oversight and implementation of the livelihood and community project components at the state level. The unit will be led by a core management team of dedicated NDDRC staff at the state level supported by capacity building implementing partner staff.

### **3.3 Capacity Building of NDDRC Systems**

The firm will together with the HQ PMU develop a Project Implementation Manual (PIM) that will be continually updated as the project rolls out to ensure that all pilot-based state operations systems are in line with NDDRC institutional operations and implementation systems and the HQ PMU implementation and operations procedures. In addition the firm will be responsible for recommending operational systems at the state and HQ level. The firm will then be responsible for mentoring the SPMUs in implementing the approved operational systems.

### **3.4 PMU Trainings**

The firm will conduct PMU trainings. First, once the PIM is created, a systems and process training will be held at HQ for all HQ PMU members and state technical PMU members as their tasks require. This training will be created with input from the PMU secretariat. Second, a SPMU training will be held somewhere in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region immediately before the start of the reintegration pilot on July 15th 2013. This training will also be created with input from the PMU secretariat.

### **3.5 Project Management Support In Tandem With Nddrc State Staff**

The SPMUs will provide oversight of the livelihood and community projects components of the pilot reintegration project. In the role as mentor to the SPMUs, the firm must bring project management techniques and systems experience to the state offices to ensure the state NDDRC offices can provide the necessary project management during the pilot. The SPMUs will provide project management support for the core socio-economic reintegration livelihood activities while also providing a forum for capacity building to the NDDRC. During the pilot reintegration pilot phase, TDRP will provide direct oversight of financial and procurement activities, in accordance with World Bank rules and requirements.

## **4 Scope of Work: M&E**

An independent M&E system will be put in place that will operate throughout the pilot program. The M&E system will be designed to track achievements and progress of the project, to provide updated information to guide decision-making, to detect problems as they arise and ultimately to assess the overall impact the project and to identify lessons learned to inform the NDDRC at project closure.

The selected firm will be responsible for implementing the M&E system which will include an on-going monitoring process the NDDRC's ICRS database. The M&E will include a baseline study to be conducted with all ex-combatants while they are in the transition facility and a baseline study of a sample of communities. The M&E of the DDR pilot reintegration project will contribute significantly to its effectiveness and will draw the necessary lessons to improve the overall DDR programme. To do this, a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation will be created that is participatory and interactive with relevant and measurable indicators of the effects and results of the project.

The M&E lead for the firm will report to the PMU steering committee, but will be directly responsible to the TDRP for outputs. A TDRP external M&E consultant will be engaged to design the pilot monitoring and evaluation plan to be implemented by the various players engaged in pilot activities and components.

The selected firm will be responsible for the completion of the following tasks effectively and in accordance with Bank guidelines or any other procedures set forth by the Bank.

## 4.1 M&E Framework, System and Unit at The HQ PMU

An M&E unit will be set up within the HQ PMU team, which will create the necessary synergies with the NDDRC ICRS project, NDDRC offices linked to reintegration and all other external implementing partners and stakeholders.

This M&E team will set out a program plan, which will include all measures and indicators, the execution of their duties and a mentoring component that will be aimed at capacitating NDDRC staff both in the Juba Headquarters and the state offices. The plan must further outline a process for collecting data from Livelihoods and Community Project implementing partners.

This team will produce regular weekly communiqués, which will be distributed across all the personnel working with reintegration. A monthly report will be prepared for the Vice Chair of the NDDRC and head of the PMU Steering Committee, whose prerogative it will be to distribute further. A mid-term report will be produced the month after the initiation phase. A final independent evaluation report will be produced at the close of the full pilot reintegration project in 2014.

## 4.2 Mentoring of NDDRC M&E Staff

The M&E unit is to be managed across HQ and States as a functional team. A dedicated NDDRC M&E staff will be housed within each state office. An assigned M&E officer will manage the unit data collection, which will be coordinated with livelihood activities and community development projects. This staff member will be mentored by the firm as well as the NDDRC HQ M&E staff. The firm will be responsible for providing hands on training to assigned NDDRC M&E staff and for training the M&E staff on the M&E functions of the ICRS database. Wherever possible state-level M&E staff will be used to undertake monitoring activities, both in field data collection and overall reporting, while the HQ-M&E officer will co-author the evaluation reports. Trained ICRS caseworkers from all 10 States will be brought into the pilot project at crucial junctures to be trained to assist with the M&E. This way, the capacity building process also reaches the six non-participating states.

As part of the institutional management capacity building component, the shadowing of the firm by local state staff aims to leave behind a group of state level M&E officers that are trained and operational at the end of the pilot phase. All NDDRC IT and ICRS staff will be trained and mentored on how to produce basic reports on all relevant M&E activities.

## 4.3 PMU and M&E Unit Training

The M&E team members will work closely with the Capacity Building team members to incorporate M&E into the PMU trainings at HQ and at the states. Additionally, M&E specific staff trainings will be provided to the M&E unit. The PIP will outline the frequency and content of these trainings.

## 4.4 Baseline Ex-Combatant Study

A baseline and tracer study will form part of the M&E tasks aimed at: (i) understanding the demographic characteristics, livelihood aspirations and social capital profiles of ex-combatants; (ii) documenting the impacts of livelihood activities on ex-combatants and their communities, income and savings, and overall economic productivity per cooperative and small farm and enterprise; (iii) providing broader level information to NDDRC for use in documenting programme impacts in a post-pilot phase, and methods for improving programme management, and developing new and improved livelihood and capacity building products and services.

The firm will be responsible for finalizing the baseline survey and training ICRS caseworkers and providing necessary supplemental researchers to conduct the baseline survey. A total of 10 ICRS caseworkers who are staff of the NDDRC will be trained to collect the data and enter this into the ICRS. The firm will be responsible for supplementing the research team as necessary to complete the baseline survey of 500 participants in 2 weeks. All ex-combatants will be interviewed during the baseline survey that will take place between the 31st and 45th day of the reinsertion period in the Transition Facility. In the later phases of the pilot, a sample of ex-combatants will be surveyed in a follow-up tracer.



The baseline data will be entered into a simplified data tracking system that will then be used throughout the lifespan of the pilot reintegration project and will be available for use in the future programme.

The firm will be responsible for producing a baseline ex-combatant report within 2 weeks of completion of the last data entry into the ICRS.

#### **4.5 Baseline Community Study**

In addition, during the reinsertion period (April 15th - July 14th) the firm will conduct a baseline survey of a sample of communities that is representative of the various location types where ex-combatants return will be interviewed. In a later phase of the pilot a tracer study will be conducted.

This baseline data will also be entered into the simplified data tracking system that will then be used throughout the lifespan of the pilot reintegration project and will be available for use in the future programme.

The firm will be responsible for producing a baseline community report within 2 weeks of completion of the last data entry.

#### **4.6 Coordination with The ICRS**

Research inputs will be entered into the ICRS and findings will be generated against sets of indicators, feeding into different status reports to provide project status and policy guidance. These reports will be accessible to the HQ PMUs and SPMUs. The firm will work closely with the ICRS team to ensure complementarity of the systems and trouble shoot over the course of the pilot.

#### **4.7 Ongoing Service Monitoring and Reporting**

The M&E system will be relied upon to capture ongoing service implementation outputs. This will require ongoing Implementing Partner data collection. To achieve this, the M&E Unit will need to ensure coordination between the M&E Unit, the HQ PMU, the SPMUs, and the implementing partners.

The M&E unit will be responsible for the Weekly and monthly progress on all components of the project and the compilation of a data set within the ICRS management information system that will be used as both a means of analyzing the pilot but also as a baseline to monitor future impact.

### **5 Deliverables**

The Firm, under the direction of the Project Manager, would ensure overall coordination and implementation of the Project in accordance with agreed performance targets. The firm would also be responsible for day-to-day administration, and monitoring and reporting on pilot activities to the World Bank-TDRP team.

#### **5.1 Duration of Appointment**

The firm will be hired to complete from April 15th to November 30th 2013, namely to cover Phase One, activities of this component of the pilot reintegration project. The firm will be invited to tender for the new RFP, linked to this component (capacity building and M&E) in June 2013.

#### **5.2 Reporting, Accounting, and Auditing**

The contracted firm will establish a designated Project account. Allocations would be deposited in the account for eligible expenditures as identified under the Project plan. The Firm would maintain a separate identifiable account to be used exclusively for project-related expenditures for phases detailing sub activities, and retain all supporting documentation for audit purposes at the completion of the pilot phase to be review by the Bank and donor.

The Firm will develop an accounting system that should be as detailed as possible to allow all the firms Project activities to be tracked, but not limited, to the following:

- Administration and operations of each activities assigned to the firm.
- Institution building activities and their impact – should include details of capacity building programs e.g. trainings received, equipment procured and other.
- Performance indicators against which the implementation experience is measured.
- Data that would assist in assessing impact against the base line targeted of 500 ex-combatants.
- Financial and accounting procedures.

For the financial control of project operations, the Firm would be responsible for keeping the above mentioned data up to date. The Firm would maintain records of accounts (all statement of expenditures, flow of funds) in such a manner that they meet the requirements of the Bank and other donors. The accounts should be prepared in accordance with acceptable accounting principles and must be independently audited at the end of the contract.

The Firm will prepare monthly progress briefs on the overall project implementation for review by NDDRC, Bank and other donor. At the end of the contract period, the firm will prepare a final report (supported by data) which would include project implementation experience, project impact. The report should contain a table of contents, executive summary, findings, tables, and specific recommendations.

### 5.3 Outputs, Delivery Schedules and Acceptance Criteria for The Deliverables

The firm will have to complete the following outputs:

<i>Task</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>How verified/to who?</i>
Project Preparation	Initiation - State visits	May 10/13	Reported in SPMU monthly report
	Inception report	May 15/13	Inception report
	Project Implementation Plan (PIP) – incl. process for collecting data from Livelihoods and Community Project implementing partners.	May 27/13	Project Implementation Plan
	Lead Mentor imbedded at HQ	May 15/13	Presence of lead mentor in NDDRC in Juba
	M&E Framework program plan, including log-frame	May 17/13	Framework report
	Setup M&E unit including firm M&E staff allocated to project	May 20/13	M&E team operational
	Four support mentors imbedded in four SPMUs	Sep 01/13	Presence of support mentors in NDDRC in Lakes, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal
	Input into the NDDRC Project Implementation Manual (PIM)	Jun 01/13	Written drafts
PMU Trainings	Capacity building and M&E training materials	Jul 10/13	Training materials
	HQ PMU capacity building and M&E training	Jul12/13	Completion of training
	SPMU capacity building and M&E training	Sep 14/13	Completion of training

Baseline Studies	Complete training of ICRS staff for baseline survey	May 20/13	Completion of training
	Complete baseline ex-combatant survey	May 31/13	500 interviews of XCs completed
	Baseline ex-combatant report	Jun 14/13	Baseline ex-combatant report
	Complete baseline community survey	Oct 20/13	16 communities surveyed
	Baseline community report	Nov 15/13	Baseline community report
Financial systems	Creation of financial and accounting procedures	May 27/13	Financial and accounting procedures
	Monthly reporting of financial expenditures	Jun 30/13 Jul 31/13 Aug 31/13 Sep 30/13 Oct 31/13 Nov 30/13	Monthly communiques
Project Management Support in Tandem with NDDRC State Staff	Weekly PIM updates, compiled into monthly reports	Jun 30/13 Jul 31/13 Aug 31/13 Sep 30/13 Oct 31/13 Nov 30/13	Monthly communiques
	Compilation of all M&E data within the ICRS MIS to be will be used to evaluate the pilot and as a baseline to monitor future impact.	Jul 31/13	Joint agreement of compatible systems
	HQ PMU and SPMU project management systems recommendations – ongoing capacity building and M&E.	Nov 30/13	Systems report and viable operating systems

## 6 Level of Effort

It is envisaged that the following level of effort will be required:

- i. One lead capacity building mentor to work out of Juba and be attached to the HQ PMU – 40 days (May 01/13 to November 15/13).
- ii. Four assistant mentors to work with the SPMUS in each of the four States – 45 days each for a total of 180 days (Sep 15/13 to Nov 15/13).
- iii. One M&E expert to design the M&E system and train the appropriate NDDRC staff from the HQ and State Offices, supervise and draft reports for the baseline studies – 40 days (May 01/13 to October 31/13).
- iv. All costs associated to 10 ICRS staff to administer questionnaires to ex-combatants and community samples (salaries excluded).

Offerors are requested to present, in their technical proposal, a level of effort chart showing their expected chronogram and time allocation for the development of each of the deliverables and any assumptions made regarding the level of effort for each of the deliverables and the scope of work to be performed.

## 7 Specific Inputs to Be Provided By The Client

The TDRP-World Bank will supply the following:

- i. A project manager to assist the lead capacity building expert with identifying tasks and with their mentoring at the HQ level.

- ii. An assistant project manager to assist the four assistant mentors selectively at the SPMU levels.
- iii. An M&E expert to provide technical assistance and quality control to the firm M&E consultant, including drafting all interview tools, sampling and training of ICRS enumerators and data entry clerks. The same expert will work to assist the M&E expert with developing the M&E systems.
- iv. An ICRS IT and data base expert to provide technical assistance on all issues related to combining data with the ICRS system.
- v. Ten ICRS staff members who will administer the baseline survey to ex-combatants and at the community level.

## 8 Profile of The Firm(s) or Consortia

The services of a firm or consortium are sought to provide the above services. To be considered qualified to perform the services, the firm must be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in these terms of reference and, specifically, should be able to demonstrate:

- i. prior and current operational and management capacity in conflict and post conflict environments,
- ii. prior international experience managing and working in or on DDR projects in particular reintegration related programs or projects; and
- iii. experience of working in South Sudan and Sudan, with particular focus on South Sudan.

In addition, the firm should be able to demonstrate the ability to deliver all of the inputs specified in this RFP by showing:

- i. experience in managing a similar project funded by UN agencies, World Bank and/or other international donors;
- ii. extensive experience managing activities;
- iii. substantial diplomatic and interpersonal skills; and
- iv. ability to work well with teams and to share knowledge.

Furthermore, the firm must be able to show that the personnel that would be selected to work on this project have an excellent prior knowledge of project management, experience with DDR and livelihood development work and a recorded ability to accomplish the project objectives as listed above. The firm would be expected to include, at a minimum, in its proposal the following experts:

- i. team leader, with relevant experience in institutional development, project management and previous engagement in similar assignment;
- ii. capacity building specialist; and
- iii. monitoring and evaluation specialist.

The Team leader especially must display the following qualifications and skills:

- i. knowledge and experience at a senior level in executing projects in challenging post conflict environments;
- ii. at least five years of experience in the delivery of DDR programmes or activities, as well as a record of institutional development, project design and implementation;
- iii. proven experiences in providing management training in a multicultural context;
- iv. experience of managing assistance programs in developing countries;

- v. excellent writing skills for documentation of manuals and guidelines;
- vi. excellent oral and written communication skills and computer skills; and
- vii. capacity to work and experience in managing teams in foreign environments.

The firm can sub-contract or employ short-term experts in addition to the key experts to implement the project. To this end, interested applicants must include their partner organizations or firms to be sub-contracted to undertake this project (please note: firm commitments are not necessary or binding at this stage).

The firm will also be responsible and accountable for hiring the local experts (translators, accounting experts, interpreters and trainers).



Transitional Demobilization  
and Reintegration Program

World Bank

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