



**United Nations Office of the
Special Adviser on Africa**



**Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone**

**Disarmament, Demobilization,
Reintegration (DDR) and Stability
in Africa**

Conference Report

Freetown, 21-23 June 2005



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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Summary of the Freetown Deliberations and Recommendations adopted at the Conference

The Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Stability (DDR) in Africa took place from 21 to 23 June 2005 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. It was co-organised by the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), with the aim of bringing together African practitioners and their international partners to share experiences and ideas about ways to improve the design, operation and implementation of DDR programmes, to better attain sustainable peace on the continent.

The Conference drew more than 100 participants, including from 15 African countries, as well as representatives of a number of donor countries and international and regional organisations. The African participants represented a broad spectrum of DDR stakeholders, including government officials, current and former members of national DDR commissions and other experts, beneficiaries of DDR programmes, members of armed forces, representatives of host communities and women's and civil society associations.

The Conference was opened by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, His Excellency, Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and co-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou Koroma and Dr. Namanga Ngongi, the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, representing OSAA.

In his opening statement, His Excellency President Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah welcomed the Conference participants to the Republic of Sierra Leone. He discussed DDR in the context of Africa's own efforts to resolve and manage its conflicts, through the peace initiatives of the African Union and regional groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With the support of other African countries and the international community, Sierra Leone was able to make the transition from war to peace, with DDR at its heart.

Mr. Ngongi delivered the address of the Special Adviser on Africa, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, who had just been named the UN's new Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. He stressed the UN's recognition of the importance of DDR, citing the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which noted that "demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations." He added that lasting and durable peace also requires integrating ex-combatants into well-functioning and well-governed societies that offer attractive long-term opportunities and benefits for all citizens.

Mr. Koroma welcomed the UN's decision to hold the Conference in Sierra Leone, as a sign of confidence by the international community in the country's return to peace and stability. Not all DDR programmes in Africa have been successful, however, and he challenged the participants to come up with recommendations for doing better. He also observed that DDR programmes cannot be implemented in a vacuum or on their own, if they are to ensure success.

Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, former President of Mano River Union/Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), presented a message conveying a civil society perspective on African DDR experiences, especially in the Mano River countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in which her group has been active. She cautioned that sometimes the way such programmes are implemented can feed a perception that they are rewarding the perpetrators of violence.

B. Other Key Messages from the Opening Session

- ↪ DDR must be guided by:
 - a) A peace agreement among the warring factions. This framework will define the role of other key actors and institutions that are critical to peacemaking, peace consolidation and peacebuilding;
 - b) the political, economic and social environment within which a DDR programme is implemented; and
 - c) a drive for genuine national reconciliation.
- ↪ The focus should not only be on the immediate requirements to remove weapons from the hands of non-state (rebel) actors and to bring them back into mainstream society, but also the inclusion of long-term stabilisation and development programmes in peace agreements.
- ↪ DDR programmes primarily emphasize the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants. However, for durable peace and sustainable development ex-combatants must be reintegrated into well-functioning and well-governed societies.
- ↪ DDR programmes are a vital component of any peace process but they cannot be implemented in a vacuum nor can they make a peace process successful on their own.
- ↪ DDR programmes must stress partnership, especially with civil society.
- ↪ Reintegration programmes must be more gender-sensitive than in the past.

C. Presentation of National Papers

National papers were presented by a number of countries that have undergone DDR experiences, including Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, highlighting the diversity, common features and central importance of DDR programmes. The papers reflected different stages, contexts and types of DDR.

Participants from other countries without formal reports, including Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia and Uganda also shared their experiences. The World Bank also made a presentation on the Multi-Country DDR Program in the Greater Great Lakes Region of Africa.

The following points were highlighted:

- While commonalities exist, there is a need to stress that each DDR process is unique, especially as regards the R's (Rehabilitation, Resettlement, Reinsertion, Reintegration).
- Lessons learned have not always been incorporated into the planning and design of subsequent DDR programmes in other countries.
- DDR programmes cannot be the solution to all post-conflict problems. Parallel programmes need to be planned and implemented, especially for vulnerable groups (including women and children). Particular emphasis should be placed on psychological counselling and support.
- The regional dimensions of DDR should be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of a programme in any one country.
- National ownership and leadership is key to any DDR programme and it must include all stakeholders.
- In order to build trust and confidence in a DDR programme key commanders should be encouraged to participate in all relevant stages.
- The underlying causes of conflict must be taken into account in designing the earlier parts of DDR.
- DDR should be embedded in a broader post-conflict reconstruction and development framework.
- Insufficient funding, weak institutions and lack of local capacity were identified as common difficulties in the implementation of DDR programmes.

D. International Initiatives

- Participants were briefed about other DDR initiatives.
- Participants noted with appreciation the efforts of SIDDR and UN IAWG DDR to improve the functioning of DDR operations in Africa and to maximize the impact on long-term development on the continent

- The UN briefed participants on the draft of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), and invited participants (especially national delegations) to provide inputs before the publication of the first edition in the fall of 2005.

E. Working Groups

Five working groups deliberated on various DDR themes from three perspectives: Strategic, Organisational and Implementation, and agreed on numerous recommendations. The deliberations led to the realisation that DDR programmes are now entering a new phase, with the focus on an integrated approach that involves all key stakeholders in a Peace Process.

F. Networking

African DDR practitioners and stakeholders met and decided to establish an operational network that addresses pressing regional DDR issues and links with other DDR initiatives and networks.

G. Recommendations

Delegates to the conference adopted the following recommendations at the end of the deliberations:

- a. DDR should not be overburdened with all post-conflict demands. Rather, it should have backward and forward linkages to the broader peace process (including peace agreements) and peacebuilding programmes. DDR should always be accompanied by parallel relief, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts for all war-affected populations, especially in the context of local communities, as well as security sector reforms (SSR).
- b. National ownership of DDR programmes is critical for success. In this regard, efforts should be made to genuinely support national stakeholders (government, civil society, warring factions among others) through technical assistance and capacity building.
- c. The international community should support and work in genuine partnership with national DDR stakeholders and it should also better coordinate its own efforts and make its DDR funding mechanisms more flexible and timely.
- d. Every effort should be made at the country-level to include regional perspectives in the design and implementation of DDR programmes.
- e. Special groups associated with warring factions (particularly women, children and the disabled) should be provided with protective measures in the design and planning stages of DDR programmes.

- f. Participants recognised that DDR programmes are complex. It was therefore recommended that an integrated approach, involving national and international stakeholders, should be used in the planning process of DDR programmes.
- g. Payment or non-payment of a reinsertion package (cash or in kind) to demobilised ex-combatants to support their transition to normal civilian life should be given careful consideration during the design phase of a DDR programme.
- h. All stakeholders should be aware of the importance of small arms collection and control at the community level following the conclusion of formal disarmament programmes.
- i. To promote long-term stability after a DDR programme, longer-term development programmes that address the root causes of the conflict (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – PRSPs or other national recovery frameworks) as well as programmes for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS should be initiated and adequately funded.
- j. The network of African DDR practitioners needs to be strengthened to share experiences and innovative ideas and convey their perspectives to the UN and other international partners. In support of these efforts, the conference proposes that African DDR practitioners and stakeholders meet every two years to review the progress made and seek ways of further improving DDR programmes and their contribution to stability in Africa.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Less than a decade ago, 25 African countries were engaged in armed conflict or were experiencing severe political crises and turbulence. Within the last six years, this dire state has dramatically improved. Today, only about 3 African countries can be considered to be in a situation of violent conflict and few countries are facing deep political crises.

2. However, international efforts at building peace have had mixed results since roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse into violence within five years.

3. In recent years, it has been acknowledged that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) are critical elements in the transition from war to peace and development. Many African countries have acquired expertise in DDR exercises, both within and outside a UN framework.

4. However, many DDR programmes have not been designed and implemented on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the specific political, social and economic contexts of conflict environments. Also, they have not always been

conceived within a larger long-term development and peace stabilisation strategy.

5. Lately, there has been a growing understanding that context-sensitive DDR, as well as other factors such as regional harmonization, are key to preventing a recurrence of conflict in post-conflict countries or neighbouring countries. Creating an enabling environment for DDR, embedding it in wider peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and successfully addressing regional and international dimensions of DDR are all vital to creating a long-lasting stability that serves as the foundation for development and effective, durable post-conflict reconstruction. It is equally important to address the needs of special groups, non-combatants, associates of ex-combatants and war affected communities; strengthen institutions, international assistance and coordination, and tackle planning challenges associated with these elements.

6. Addressing these issues from strategic, organisational and implementation perspectives is critical to achieving overall coherence and greater effectiveness of DDR programmes.

7. While there are some efforts underway to reform DDR programmes in this regard, they need to be complemented by, and benefit from, the insight and experience of African stakeholders in DDR, both implementers and beneficiaries. DDR programmes are central to the enormous societal transformation that post-conflict societies undergo. The perspectives of African stakeholders in DDR are therefore crucial in meeting the complex political and country-specific dual challenges of creating enabling environments for DDR and embedding DDR in post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

8. The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) decided to co-organise a three-day Conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Stability in Africa that took place on 21-23 June 2005 in Freetown, Sierra Leone

9. This Conference grew out of a Ministerial Breakfast Roundtable entitled "*Do Current Practices of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Lead to Stability and Development in Africa?*" organised by OSAA during the UN ECOSOC High-Level Segment on 29 June 2004. This roundtable revealed the need to examine in greater depth the issues of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and stability in Africa.

10. To ensure a coordinated UN approach in the preparation of the Conference, a UN Inter-Agency Task Force was established comprising the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the UN, UNDP, DPKO, OCHA, DDA and the World Bank. OSAA chaired the Task Force and provided secretarial support. The Government of Sierra Leone also set up a local Conference Planning Committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to coordinate local preparations for the Conference.

11. The overall aim of the Conference was to review the challenges of DDR programmes, examine the extent to which current practices of DDR programmes actually lead to stability and development and identify the necessary preconditions for success.

12. The Conference's specific objectives were to:
 - a. Deepen the understanding of the impact of DDR programmes on long-term stability and development;
 - b. capture the views of African DDR stakeholders on the challenges of DDR and stability;
 - c. provide a platform for African perspectives to be articulated and to be incorporated into current DDR reform debates; and
 - d. provide a forum for African DDR stakeholders and practitioners to build networks.

13. To capture the perspective of diverse DDR stakeholders in Africa, pre-Conference national consultations were held in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. On the basis of the national workshops, national background papers were prepared and presented at the Conference to reflect and summarise the experience and views of national stakeholders on DDR.

14. The conference, which focused on the articulation of African views on DDR and stability from the perspective of practitioners and stakeholders, complemented review efforts undertaken in the UN Inter-agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR). UN IAWG DDR aims to improve the way the UN collectively designs, implements and monitors DDR programmes while the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) focuses on funding, political and peacebuilding aspects of DDR. Representatives of both initiatives made presentations and actively supported the Conference.

15. The Conference benefited from the generous support of the governments of Sweden, Germany and Finland.

16. The Conference drew more than 100 participants, including from 15 African countries, as well as representatives of a number of donor countries and international and regional organisations (for a list of participants, see Annex II). The African participants spanned a range of DDR stakeholders, both male and female, including government officials, current as well as former members of national DDR commissions and other experts, beneficiaries of DDR programmes, members of the armed forces, representatives of host communities, women's and civil society organisations.

III. OPENING SESSION

17. The Conference was opened by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, His Excellency, Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. It was co-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou Koroma and Dr. A. Namanga Ngongi, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Democratic Republic of Congo, representing the Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser to the Secretary-

General on Africa, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, who had just been appointed the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

18. His Excellency President Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah welcomed the Conference participants to Sierra Leone. He regretted the protracted period of conflict that led to many deaths, the displacement of a large part of his country's population, wanton abuse and the violation of human rights. The President stated that Sierra Leone's conflict was the result of deprivation, disaffection and the extreme poverty of the majority of the population. He placed the Conference within the context of Africa's own efforts to resolve and manage its conflicts through the peace initiative of the African Union and regional groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He expressed satisfaction that with the support of other African countries and the international community, Sierra Leone was able to make the transition from war to peace and stressed the central role that DDR played in that transition.

19. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, stressed that to be successful, DDR had to be placed within the framework of a peace agreement, be implemented within a favourable political, economic and social environment and that there should be a genuine national drive for peace and reconciliation. DDR in itself was not sufficient to restore peace and stability. The President emphasized the need to implement long-term measures to tackle the root causes of conflict. President Kabbah expressed appreciation for the sacrifice and financial support of ECOWAS, the United Nations and troop contributing countries for the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone.

20. Dr. Ngongi delivered the address of the Special Adviser, Professor Gambari. He stressed the critical importance of DDR, citing the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which noted that "demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations." He added that lasting and durable peace also requires that ex-combatants be integrated into well-functioning and well-governed societies that offer attractive long-term opportunities and benefits for all citizens.

21. The Special Adviser on Africa emphasised that the Conference complemented efforts by international partners, in particular the Stockholm Initiative on DDR and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, to improve the implementation of DDR programmes in Africa. He informed that the Conference was organised as a response to a proposal made at a Ministerial Round Table Breakfast entitled "*Do current Practices of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Lead to Stability and Development in Africa?*" that was organised by OSAA during the UN ECOSOC High-Level segment on June 29 2004. The Special Adviser stated that the objectives of the Conference were to review the challenges of DDR programmes, examine the extent to which current practices lead to genuine stability and development as well as identify the necessary preconditions for success. Prof. Gambari thanked the Government of Sierra Leone for co-organising the Conference and expressed the hope that other countries would learn from the country's successful DDR programme.

22. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Momodou Koroma welcomed the UN's decision to hold the Conference in Sierra Leone.

This was recognized by the Government as a sign of confidence by the international community in the return of the country to peace and stability. He regretted that not all DDR programmes in Africa have been successful and challenged the participants to formulate recommendations that would lead to better results. Mr. Koroma further observed that DDR programmes could not be implemented in a vacuum if they are to ensure success.

23. Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, former President of the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), presented a message conveying a civil society perspective on African experiences, especially in the Mano River countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in which her group has been active. She pointed out that the way DDR programmes were sometimes implemented could feed the perception that they were rewarding the perpetrators of violence. Dr. Daraba Kaba stressed that it was necessary to identify the needs of special groups, especially women and children, and design and implement specific activities to meet those needs.

24. Mr. Momodou Koroma welcomed participants to the first plenary session and informed them that after extensive consultations, it was decided that Dr. Francis Kai-Kai, former Executive Director of Sierra Leone's National Commission on DDR would serve as Rapporteur for the Conference. The decision was strongly approved by applause. The Co-Chair then requested the Conference Coordinator, Mrs. Ruth Bamela Engo, to present the draft programme. Mrs. Bamela Engo reviewed the programme, pointing out where adjustments had been made. The programme was adopted. (See Annex I)

V. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH DDR IN AFRICA

25. National papers were prepared and presented by the national consultants for a number of countries that have undergone DDR experiences. These included Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. The national papers highlighted the diversity of experiences, common features and the central importance of DDR programmes in the restoration of peace and stability in post conflict countries. The papers reflected different stages, contexts and types of DDR programmes. Participants from other countries including Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Somalia and Uganda that did not have formal reports also shared their experiences. The World Bank also made a presentation on the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (MDRP) in the Greater Great Lakes Region.

A. Common Lessons

- While many commonalities exist, there is a need to stress that each DDR process is unique, especially as regards the Rs (Reinsertion, Reintegration, Resettlement, Repatriation).

- Lessons learned have not always been incorporated into the planning and design of subsequent DDR programmes either in the same countries or in other countries in the region.
- DDR programmes should not be burdened with all post-conflict problems. Parallel programmes need to be planned and implemented, especially for vulnerable groups (including women and children). Particular emphasis should be placed on psycho-social counselling and support for women traumatized by rape and other forms of sexual violence, and children traumatized by horrific war experiences.
- The regional dimensions of conflicts and DDR should be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of DDR programmes, especially in West Africa where most of the conflicts have regional implications.
- National ownership and leadership are key to the successful implementation of any DDR programme and must include all stakeholders.
- Key commanders of all the parties to a conflict should be encouraged to participate in all relevant stages of a DDR programme in order to build trust and confidence.
- The underlying causes of a conflict must be taken into account in designing the different stages of DDR programmes.
- DDR programmes should be embedded in broader post-conflict reconstruction frameworks.
- Insufficient funding, weak institutions and the lack of local capacity were common difficulties in the implementation of DDR programmes.

B. Individual Experiences

1. Angola

26. Angola experienced violent conflict for almost forty years starting from the early 1960s. The intensification of colonialism, the use of Angolans as “slave” labour for the exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources by a small group of colonials and the confiscation of most of the country’s arable land by a white minority fuelled the drive for self-determination and independence that resulted in the liberation struggle. Three nationalist movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) spearheaded the struggle.

27. Negotiations concluded in New York in 1988 for the independence of neighbouring Namibia resulted in a package deal; South African troops would withdraw from Namibia and Cuban forces that were supporting the Angolan government would pull out of the country. This was the first Angolan DDR experience, although not a classic one. The New York agreement was soon

followed by another agreement, the Gbadolite Agreement. This second agreement was in turn followed by a third agreement, the Bicesse Accords, signed by the Government and UNITA in May 1991.

28. The Bicesse Accords included a DDR programme that envisaged the disarmament of combatants of the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) belonging to the MPLA Government and those of Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA) of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the creation of an integrated Army of 50,000, (20,000 each from FAPLA and FALA, 6,000 to be selected professionally for the air force and 4,000 for the Navy) and the demobilisation of approximately 200,000 troops. The second DDR programme laid emphasis on the 'Ds' but was not fully implemented because of the resumption of the war as a result of UNITA's refusal to accept the outcome of the 1992 election. Although the DDR programme failed, it established institutions and created structures for demobilization and the social and professional reintegration of ex-combatants.

29. The Lusaka Peace Agreement of 1993 led to the creation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) and the integration of some UNITA forces into the national army. The DDR programme was a mere formality as UNITA did not fully adhere to it. Consequently, the war resumed in 1998 and ended with the death of the leader of UNITA in February 2002. The Government seized the opportunity and released a Peace Agenda which granted a general amnesty to UNITA soldiers and provided for their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. The preparation of an emergency humanitarian assistance programme, including the resettlement of the more than four million internally displaced Angolans was initiated. The cooperation of UNITA generals was sought and obtained by the Government.

30. A Joint Commission was established to supervise the implementation of the DDR programme. Thirty-five Quartering Areas were set-up nationwide for the UNITA forces and an equal number of Reception Areas for family members and dependents of the troops. Every effort was made to treat the UNITA soldiers with respect and a spirit of reconciliation characterised the process. A total of 91,127 UNITA soldiers and 288,756 family members were registered during the DDR process. Some 5,000 UNITA soldiers were integrated into the Angolan National Army, including 18 generals, and 40 of them joined the National Police. The rest were demobilized and enrolled in civilian reintegration programmes.

31. Reintegration programmes for demobilized ex-combatants started in September 2003. These are implemented through the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for Ex-Combatants (IRSEM) and include the following activities: (i) vocational training, traditional apprenticeships and on-the-job training; (ii) community works; (iii) access to tool kits; and (iv) micro-business training, advisory services and microcredit. As of June 2005, over 20,000 ex-combatants were benefiting from reintegration support and 7,800 were expected to join the programme shortly. Programme design and implementation is executed by several NGOs, both national and international.

32. The current Angolan DDR programme faces many challenges: lack of international financial support; recycling of ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized in previous DDRs, the large number of war-disabled, especially

among the Government troops; dependency syndrome amongst people who have spent many years in the military; lack of experience in reintegrating ex-combatants into urban settings; and logistical difficulties.

Key Lessons:

- ↪ DDR should be a seamless process, and the R should not be an afterthought.
- ↪ DDR should be closely linked to a political process; holding elections in 1992 while there were three armies in the country was a mistake.
- ↪ Financial resources should be sufficient and available when needed.
- ↪ Monitoring and evaluation is critical for programme adjustments to ensure success.
- ↪ Trust and reconciliation should be established early in the DDR process.
- ↪ State administration should be extended throughout the national territory to ensure successful implementation.
- ↪ Community involvement and support to families are critical for long-term stability.

2. *Burundi*

33. Burundi has experienced a long-standing political and ethnic conflict with regional ramifications that started before independence in 1962. The conflict intensified in 1972 with a Hutu invasion from Tanzania that saw a systematic killing of Tutsis. In 1993 the conflict peaked after the assassination of the first elected Hutu President. Again, Tutsis were systematically targeted. The repression of the National Army against Hutus was equally brutal. More than 300,000 persons have died in the conflict since 1993 and up to 24 per cent of the population was displaced at the worst period of the war. Destruction of infrastructure and disruption of economic activity led to a drop in per capita GNP from 180 USD to 110 between 1993 and 2000 and an increase of the population living in poverty from 35 per cent to 67 per cent during the same period.

34. Many internal negotiations took place between 1993 and 1996 with the formation of successive governments but failed to end the conflict. External negotiations between 1997 and 1999 that were facilitated by the Organisation of African Union (OAU) resulted in the signing of the Arusha Agreement of August 2000, the formation of a transitional Government the same year and a general ceasefire in November 2003. The last rebel group joined the Agreement in May 2005 but it is still in conflict with the transitional Government.

35. The Arusha Peace Agreement offered a partial amnesty to those involved in the conflict and detailed specific arrangements for the formation of an integrated National Army and the implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for ex-combatants. The OAU and the United Nations appointed Special Representatives in 1993 after the massacres to assist the parties in their reconciliation efforts. The OAU deployed an

Observer Mission in 2002 and a Peacekeeping Mission in 2003 to improve the security environment. This role was taken over by a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (ONUB) in 2004. However, the fact that not all the parties signed the agreement meant that it was implemented in an insecure environment.

36. The DDR programme drew lessons from similar operations in Africa. A National Programme for DDR (PNDDR) was formulated in 2003 and placed under the political leadership of a National Commission for DDR (CNDDR) that is chaired by the President. A Joint Operations Plan (POJ) was developed by all the parties to implement the process. The main objectives of the POJ were to:

- Disarm and demobilize 55,000 ex-combatants, including 8,000 child soldiers of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), Parties of Armed Political Movements (PMPA), and ultimately of the National Defence Forces (FDN), and assist in their reintegration into civilian life; and
- assist in the disarmament of 20,000 members of a government militia and 10,000 members of PMPA and the dismantling of their chains of command.

37. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of the World Bank provides a platform for discussion and reflection for all partners supporting Burundi's DDR programme.

38. Disarmament has not proceeded as planned in assembly areas due to mutual mistrust between the parties, but all ex-combatants entering demobilization centers are disarmed. 10,000 ex-combatants, including 2,700 children, had been demobilized by 1 June 2005. Reinsertion allowances equivalent to 18 months of wages are paid to ex-combatants, half on leaving the demobilization centers and the rest in three equal instalments paid at three-month intervals in the community of reintegration. Ex-combatants are also entitled to reintegration benefits of 500,000 to 600,000 francs (Fbu). Child ex-combatants are provided special care under a UNICEF sponsored programme. Women and the handicapped also have special programmes.

39. Burundi's DDR programme was conceived to have linkages with other medium to long-term security, social reintegration and development programmes (such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The implementation of these programmes would facilitate the phasing-out of the DDR programme.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ Continued conflict as one of the rebel movements has not respected the agreement.
- ↪ Resistance to disarm before arrival at demobilization centers because of mistrust between parties participating in the programme.
- ↪ Inaccurate numbers of armed forces communicated by the parties.

Key Lesson:

- For DDR to be implemented effectively, all parties to a conflict should participate in peace negotiations and sign the peace agreement.

3. *Democratic Republic of The Congo*

40. The Democratic Republic of The Congo (DRC) has endured many conflicts since gaining independence in 1960 although there have been intermittent periods of relative peace. The United Nations approved and deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in 1961 in the wake of post-independence political crises, and again in 1974 following the attempted secession of the Province of Katanga. The numerous signed peace agreements did not lead to durable peace and stability since some of the underlying causes of the conflict (ethnicity, decentralisation, bad governance and regional relations) were not satisfactorily resolved.

41. In 1997 a coalition of rebel movements under the leadership of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), with support from neighbouring countries, overthrew the government of President Mobutu and took power. Internal discord within the alliance and disagreements with some neighbouring countries over the activities of foreign armed groups on DRC territory led to a resumption of the conflict that saw the involvement of five Congolese belligerents; Government, four major rebel groups: Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML) and Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N) as well as six foreign countries Angola, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, in support of either the government or the rebels.

42. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), facilitated a peace process in Lusaka under the leadership of a Neutral Facilitator that started in 1998. The UN approved and deployed a Peacekeeping Mission in 1999. The peace negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of foreign forces and the signing of a peace agreement by the main warring factions in 2002 and formation of a transitional government in June 2003. All the main belligerent forces were allotted prominent positions in the transitional government. However, the armed groups in the Ituri District were not part of the peace process and did not sign the peace agreement nor were they included in the transitional government.

43. The peace agreement included specific reference to a DDR programme for the former Congolese belligerent forces and the formation of an integrated national army. A DDR programme for members of Rwandan armed groups in the DRC was also included in the agreement. It was estimated that some 150,000 Congolese combatants, including 30,000 child soldiers would participate in the DDR programme and that the estimated 25,000 members of Rwandan armed groups would be disarmed, demobilized and repatriated to Rwanda, under the leadership of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), for resettlement and reintegration.

44. An Inter-Ministerial Commission was established to handle policy matters regarding DDR with a National Programme for DDR administration set up to ensure:

- Disarmament of former armed groups and hand over of arms collected to the new integrated army;
- demobilization of ex-combatants on a voluntary basis; and
- reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants into communities of their choice within the framework of projects with sustainable benefits.

45. Demobilized ex-combatants received a package consisting of a transport allowance, food allowance and an initial safety-net payment. The total payment amounted to 110 USD. Ex-combatants are entitled to additional safety-net payments of 25 USD per month for 12 months at their chosen areas of reintegration and may also receive training if they wish.

46. The DDR programme has resulted in the disarmament and demobilization of over 16,500 adult ex-combatants and 7,651 child soldiers. About 6,248 small arms, 235,000 ammunitions, 296 grenades, 963 bombs and 973 mines have been collected. 3000 demobilized ex-combatants have been reintegrated and 10,000 are in the process of reintegration. Reintegration activities are designed and implemented in partnership with a number of NGOs, both national and international.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ Issue of disarming the civilian population.
- ↪ The continued presence on DRC territory of Rwandan armed groups.
- ↪ The establishment of linkages between DDR and other long-term reintegration and reconciliation programmes.
- ↪ Tackling the problems of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children.
- ↪ Securing adequate financial resources for the reintegration phase of the programme.
- ↪ The unfavourable economic environment in which DDR is being implemented may impact negatively on the reintegration of ex-combatants raising serious concerns about the future stability of the country.

4. Liberia

47. The fourteen-year conflict that wrecked Liberia left the population in a state of apprehension. Against the background of a DDR programme that was hastily implemented from 1994-97, following a lull in the conflict, and the ensuing donor fatigue, Liberians anxiously await the end of the brutal self destruction and regional instability that have resulted from the conflict. Failure to learn from the mistakes of the past DDR experience could derail the current peace process and destabilize not only Liberia but also the entire sub region.

48. Although mechanisms were put in place in 1994 to jumpstart DDR, the resumption of hostilities in April 1996 and the resultant looting and destruction of assets including databases seriously hindered the process. The Abuja Peace Accord of 1997 brokered by ECOWAS ended hostilities but the issue of social reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life remained unresolved. Consequently the international community and the national stakeholders opted for a “quick and dirty” approach that did not provide for adequate encampment of ex-combatants for detraumatization. The ex-combatants were thus not fully demobilized in preparation for genuine reintegration.

49. In addition, the DDR process focused mainly on gun-carrying combatants, thus vulnerable groups, including women and children and followers of warring factions, were not considered. Other major shortcomings of the 1997 DDR programme included the failure of the elected government to restructure the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in keeping with the Abuja Peace Accord since the government was preoccupied with its own security and survival. The government also failed to include leaders of other warring factions in key decision-making positions. This led to dissatisfaction and a mass exodus of ex-combatants and their regrouping in a neighbouring country to re-launch full scale war on Liberia in 1999.

50. The cornerstone of the current peace process is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 18 August 2003. The Agreement called for adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement signed by the warring factions - Government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL); establishment and deployment of an ECOWAS multinational force as well as a UN peacekeeping force; cantonment (assignment of troops to temporary quarters), disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of all combatants of the warring factions; creation of a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) comprising representatives of the warring factions, relevant agencies of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), UN, African Union and the International Contact Group on Liberia. The mandate of the NCDDRR was to coordinate and supervise DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration) activities and also conduct the elections.

51. The current DDR programme that was launched in 2003 is being implemented in line with standard DDR principles and procedures but there are existing policy and operational challenges which, if unresolved, may derail the process. Among the key challenges are the lack of national ownership and the marginalization of the National DDR Commission whose statutory functions are coordination and supervision of the process. Nevertheless, the DDR programme has addressed some conventional issues including the disarmament of 103,019 ex-combatants, well over the initial projections of 38,000. Some 28,000 weapons were collected by the official end of the DD phase on 31 December 2004. The current DDR has also addressed issues related to vulnerable groups including child soldiers, women, war wounded and followers of warring factions.

Key Challenge:

- Rehabilitation and reintegration of the large number of ex-combatants. Contributions made to a UNDP Trust Fund by some donors have permitted the engagement of 24,000 ex-combatants in various skills training and other reintegration activities. The large number of ex-combatants not covered by the reintegration programme so far constitutes a source for serious concern. They have already threatened to disrupt the 2005 elections if they are not enrolled in meaningful training programmes.

5. Mozambique

52. Conflict erupted in Mozambique as part of the nationalist struggle for independence of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. A united front prevailed until independence in 1975.

53. The installation of a one party state by the victorious Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) caused disenchantment in parts of the population that wanted multi-party democracy. This led to the formation of a rival movement, Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), in 1976. The Marxist-oriented Government also seized church-owned property and disregarded traditional rulers. These factors, combined with pressure from neighbouring countries, were at the base of the conflict.

54. In 1990 direct negotiations took place between the Government and RENAMO facilitated by Santo Egido, a Catholic Group based in Rome. The Peace Agreement that was signed by the two parties in 1992 clearly demonstrated the wish of the two leaders to end the conflict. The population was also war-weary and amenable to reconciliation and forgiveness. The Peace Agreement included a DDR programme that envisaged the completion of disarmament and demobilization in 18 months. The programme placed emphasis on disarmament and demobilization but not much on social and cultural reintegration. An integrated national army of 30,000 was to be formed. The United Nations approved and deployed a Peacekeeping Mission, ONUMOZ, to provide a security environment for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the DDR process.

55. Disarmament was made difficult by the lack of reliable information on the number of troops fighting on both sides. The strength of RENAMO's force was estimated at between 11,000 and 13,000 and the Government army was estimated to be many times the size of RENAMO's force. However, at the end of the demobilization phase over 92,000 ex-combatants had been processed, some 70,500 on the Government side and more than 21,000 from RENAMO. It was estimated that between 1.5 million and 6 million small arms and ammunitions had been distributed in the country but only 200,000 light arms and ammunitions were collected by the UN Mission in Mozambique by the end of its mandate in 1995, of which some 24,000 were destroyed. The Mozambique Christian Council is continuing the weapons collection programme and has collected an equal amount of weapons and ammunitions in exchange for basic in-kind support.

56. Demobilized ex-combatants received a reinsertion allowance equivalent to 12 months of salary, three months paid at the assembly areas and the rest at the chosen destinations of the ex-combatants. Transportation was also provided to demobilized ex-combatants but many who came from rural areas opted to settle in cities. Child soldiers were demobilized in separate centers at which they received special attention. Efforts to reunite families were successful. Female ex-combatants who had been abducted and sexually abused were reunited with their families and provided with psycho-social support. The war-disabled received attention at special centers and were entitled to pensions as other demobilized ex-combatants.

57. Reintegration that is long-term was not accorded high priority and was more difficult because of the low education levels of the ex-combatants. Skills development activities were organised for the ex-combatants but only 7,700 benefited from such activities.

58. Many organisations, both national and international, participated in the implementation of the DDR programme under the operational leadership of the Ministry for the Coordination of Social Action. Overall policy coordination was the responsibility of the National Commission for Social Coordination that was based in the Office of the Prime Minister. The United Nations approved and deployed a Peacekeeping Mission, ONUMOZ, with primary focus on disarmament and demobilization.

59. Mozambique's DDR faced many challenges, including the short-term focus of ONUMOZ, the low level of education of ex-combatants, the reluctance of many ex-combatants to return to their rural communities, the continued circulation of a large number weapons and ammunitions and financial constraints that led to the formation of a smaller integrated army (11,000 instead of the 30,000 agreed). The refusal of RENAMO to disarm and demobilize a group of 1000 soldiers based in the District of Maringue has been a continuing source of concern.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ Ensure national ownership and leadership.
- ↪ Focus on medium to long-term reintegration not just on short-term disarmament and demobilization.
- ↪ Encourage the involvement of neutral organisations in programme implementation to improve the spirit of reconciliation among Mozambique's parties in conflict.

6. Rwanda

60. Rwanda experienced one of the most brutal genocides in recent history resulting in the deaths of approximately one million people in 1994. The slaughter ended when rebels under the leadership of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) overthrew the Government. More than two million Rwandans fled to

neighbouring countries as refugees, including thousands of former soldiers of the Government's Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) and militias (Interahamwe) who participated in the genocide. A new Government of National Unity, including the RPF and all political parties that were not involved in the genocide, was formed in July 1994.

61. The Government accorded priority to the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, rebuilding institutions and reorganising public administration. In 1997, the Government decided to tackle the problem of resettling the returnees and screening ex-combatants for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Disarmament was the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence while Demobilization and Reintegration were entrusted to the newly established Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) that was placed under the supervisory authority of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. A Steering Committee composed of high-level officials from participating line Ministries was charged with policy development and coordination.

62. The overall mission of RDRC was to support the successful social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in their respective communities and to realise national security, reconciliation and development. The reintegration component was envisioned to be an integral part of the overall national reconciliation and reconstruction strategy and it supports directly the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Government.

63. With support from the international community, RDRC developed the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) that was expected to work through existing government structures. The main objectives of RDRP are to:

- i. demobilize an estimated 20,000 Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA-former rebels), ex-combatants from the Rwanda Defence Forces (current army), and 25,000 members of ex-armed groups (AG), and support their transition to civilian life;
- ii. support the re-insertion of 15,000 ex-FAR combatants;
- iii. support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants demobilized in Stage II (2002-2005) and all Stage I (1997-2002) ex-combatants who remained economically and socially vulnerable; and
- iv. facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from military to social and economic sectors.

64. Rwanda's DDR experience has been mostly positive. By June 2005, 35,367 ex-combatants, including 2,500 child soldiers, had been demobilized out of the estimated 60,000. Some 15,000 ex-combatants from the ex-FAR and ex-AG have been integrated into the National Army. Most of those not yet demobilized are members of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Demobilized ex-combatants received a reinsertion Basic Needs Kit (BNK) that is equivalent to 50,000 Frw (110 USD) for food, seeds, tools and basic household items and were also transported to the communities of their choice. In addition to the BNK,

professional soldiers (ex-RDF and ex-FAR combatants) received Recognition of Services Allowances (RSA) that ranged from 150,000 Frw (330 USD) to 500,000 Frw (1,100 USD) depending on years of service and seniority. More targeted support through a Vulnerability Support Window has been provided on grant basis to 11,770 economically vulnerable ex-combatants. Special counselling and support programmes are available for women, children and the war-disabled.

65. RDRP recognized that reintegration is a long-term issue and developed linkages with other reconciliation, stability and development programmes. Reintegration activities take place at community level. Ex-combatants are given orientation, including sensitization on HIV/AIDS, at discharge centres and communities are also sensitized prior to the arrival of ex-combatants. Support is extended to communities through locally existing institutions to encourage community involvement and enhance their capacity to sustain ex-combatants. Access to land is a key factor in deciding whether ex-combatants reintegrate into rural communities. Ex-combatants have a wide range of choices other than agriculture but most of them lack skills. Skills development was introduced late in the RDRP. Between 2002 and 2004 some 715 ex-combatants participated in skills development activities.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ The slow repatriation of former members of Rwandan armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This issue needs to be addressed with urgency to ensure durable peace in the Great Lakes Region.
- ↪ Extending the life of the reintegration phase of the RDRP. Skills development needs greater attention to enhance the possibility of ex-combatants securing sustainable livelihoods and reintegrating successfully, especially in urban areas.

7. Sierra Leone

66. The ten-year conflict in Sierra Leone ended with a negotiated settlement wherein all parties eventually became committed to stability and therefore decided to comply with the provisions of the various peace documents they signed.

67. The Lomé Peace Agreement signed on 7 July 1999 ultimately became the operational document for the peace process in Sierra Leone. One of the key provisions of this agreement was the development of a viable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDRP) for combatants of the various factions to transition the country from war to peace and consequently bring about stability.

68. The overall goal of DDRP was to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants in order to consolidate short-term security as a basis for lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The three key objectives were:

- a) Collect, register, disable and destroy all conventional weapons and munitions retrieved from combatants during the disarmament period;
- b) demobilize approximately 45,000 ex-combatants of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and paramilitary forces; and
- c) prepare and support ex-combatants for reinsertion and socio-economic reintegration upon discharge from demobilization centers.

69. In developing the DDR programme, several policies, strategies and assumptions were made and a robust institutional framework and institutional arrangement put in place. The emphasis was on national ownership and partnership with key international and national partners for effective planning, coordination and implementation.

70. The DDR programme went through three distinct phases with associated setbacks such as a coup d'état, initial non-compliance with peace agreements, programme restructuring, etc. Despite the setbacks the programme was successfully implemented and recorded some of the following key successes: establishment and management of several disarmament and demobilization centres in collaboration with key implementing partners across the country; disarmament and demobilization of over 71,000 ex-combatants; and payment of Transitional Safety Allowances to over 54,000 eligible beneficiaries that voluntarily registered for such schemes. They also benefited from economic reintegration programmes ranging from vocational/apprenticeship skills training and agriculture to formal education. Also, social reintegration measures that promoted forgiveness and reconciliation were largely achieved. Vigorous information and sensitization campaigns and monitoring and evaluation systems were key activities of the programme that contributed to the overall success of the DDRP in Sierra Leone.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ Misunderstanding of eligibility criteria
- ↪ Prolonged period of encampment
- ↪ Limited access to parts of the country to start reintegration activities
- ↪ Limited availability of credible and capable implementing partners
- ↪ Inadequate support to dependents of ex-combatants and women associated with fighting forces
- ↪ The weak programme link between DDR and RRR

Key Lessons:

- ↪ The DDR programme significantly contributed to bringing sustained peace to Sierra Leone.
- ↪ However, it did not address all the root causes of the war, which are part of a wider political, social, economic and juridical recovery effort. These

long-term issues are being addressed through democratic elections, decentralisation of governance, security sector reform, reconciliation drives, judicial reform and transitional recovery programmes (through the National Recovery Strategy) and a medium-term (2005-2007) Poverty Reduction Strategy.

8. Zimbabwe

71. Zimbabwe experienced a protracted period of conflict starting from the late 1960s. The conflict intensified in the 1970s and ended only after a peace agreement was signed in 1979. Zimbabwe had been ruled as a British colony, Southern Rhodesia, for over eighty years until the White minority declared unilateral independence (UDI) in 1965. UDI intensified the frustration of the African majority that was already agitating for independence. The White minority of 250,000 also owned most of the arable land of the country. The clamour for land redistribution and majority rule were the primary underlying causes of the conflict. Two nationalist parties, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), formed a united front and fought the Rhodesian army. The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference of 1978 laid the basis for the Lancaster House constitutional talks that resulted in the peace agreement.

72. The constitutional talks, facilitated by the UK, included all the parties to the conflict. Agreement was reached on the constitutional arrangements for majority rule but the land issue was only partially resolved. The UK was to assist financially in the purchase of land held by whites for redistribution to Africans. The total number of combatants at the end of the conflict was close to 100,000 men, women and children: 60,000 to 70,000 for the nationalist forces and 10,000 to 12,000 for the Rhodesian army. It was agreed that 40,000 men and women from the three forces would be integrated into the new Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) and the surplus troops would be demobilized and reintegrated into civil society.

73. Disarmament was undertaken in designated assembly areas and was totally voluntary and without compensation. The large majority of troops participated because the political and military leaders in whom they had confidence wanted peace. Weapons collected were recycled to ZNA. A Joint Operations Command composed of all belligerent parties managed the disarmament process and a Joint High Command supervised the process of integrating forces to form ZNA. Daily briefings and technical support from the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) facilitated the process. BMATT also provided standardized training to improve internal cohesion.

74. Demobilization was problematic and was conducted twice; 1981 in assembly areas and in 1997 for all demobilized personnel throughout the country. Payments of Z\$600 were made to all incapacitated ex-combatants and to other ex-combatants who returned to their homes. The Demobilization Directorate of the Ministry of Labour managed a compensation scheme and paid an additional amount of Z\$185 per month to each demobilized ex-combatant for a period of two years. Under pressure from the Zimbabwe War Veterans

Association, a second compensation scheme was launched in 1997. 52,000 veterans claimed compensation and each claimant received a Z\$50,000 lump sum and was entitled to a regular monthly allowance of Z\$2,000.

75. Reintegration was also problematic. Operation Soldiers Employed in Economic Development (SEED) which was designed to assist in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants failed. Its weaknesses included the lack of a clear objective, the diverse nature of the needs of ex-combatants, resistance by host communities to the return of ex-combatants and the continued operation of the Rhodesian negative propaganda machinery. In addition, resources were inadequate, particularly for land acquisition. Training programmes for a variety of skills enabled many ex-combatants to gain useful employment including setting up their own businesses but this was not adequate. Special needs of children and the handicapped were met through the establishment of schools and rehabilitation centers. Providing birth certificates and identification cards was also accorded priority.

Key Challenges:

- ↪ Inaccurate information on the strength of the forces
- ↪ Poor design of Operation SEED
- ↪ The resignation of most skilled white military officers
- ↪ Resistance from communities
- ↪ Reluctance to employ ex-combatants in the private sector
- ↪ Discrimination against female ex-combatants
- ↪ Inadequacy of resources which compromised the solution of the land issue

Key Lessons:

- ↪ A genuine spirit of reconciliation is essential
- ↪ Community sensitization and standardized military training programmes are very important
- ↪ Meeting the social and economic needs of ex-combatants is critical in order to avoid social and political tension
- ↪ Meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups and having a diversified and reliable resource base is essential

V. INTERNATIONAL DDR REFORM INITIATIVES

A. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR)

76. The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR) focuses on funding, political and peacebuilding aspects of DDR. The chairperson of the SIDDR, Ambassador Lena Sundh, briefed Conference participants on the objectives of the initiative. She emphasised that their main objective is to support DDR programmes. SIDDR focuses principally on funding, political and peacebuilding aspects of DDR. SIDDR works in close collaboration with many partners in reviewing DDR operations with a view to improving funding modalities and strengthening political and financial support for peacebuilding. She further stated that the final phase of the current review process would take place in a meeting to be held in Stockholm in October 2005.

B. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR)

77. UN Inter-Agency Working Group (UN IAWG DDR) works to improve the way the UN collectively designs, implements and monitors DDR programmes. The Chairperson of UN IAWG DDR, Mr. Kelvin Ong, made a presentation on the work of the Group. He stated that the main objective of the Group was to ensure that the entire United Nations System worked towards improving the way it collectively designs, implements and monitors DDR programmes. He informed that the Group was in the process of finalizing a publication on Integrated DDR Standards and welcomed comments and suggestions on the document and CD-ROM that were distributed.

78. Conference participants noted with appreciation the efforts of SIDDR and UN IAWG DDR to improve the functioning of DDR operations in Africa and maximize their impact on long-term development on the continent. The participants urged SIDDR and UN IAWG DDR to continue their endeavours. Participants expressed the hope that both initiatives would take into consideration the outcome of the Conference in reaching decisions on their support to DDR programmes and stability in Africa.

VII. RESULTS OF WORKING GROUPS

79. Five working groups were established to deliberate on various DDR themes from three different perspectives: Strategic, Organisational and Implementation. The Working Groups formulated numerous recommendations aimed at improving DDR programmes in Africa. Some of the major issues raised during deliberations on the reports of the Working Groups included the following:

Common Lessons

- DDR programmes need to be more comprehensive and more emphasis needs to be placed on bringing communities and ex-combatants together in the process of reconciliation.
- There should be more flexibility in the design of DDR programmes owing to weaknesses in databases. Lack of reliable data can negatively impact DDR programs during the pre-planning phase because there's often no way to accurately predict the number of people who will require services.
- Flexibility in resourcing arrangements is essential.
- The potential conflict between the pursuit of justice and the need to achieve peace and stability quickly should be accorded serious consideration.
- Payment or non-payment for arms should be carefully considered.
- The issue of weapons collection, registration and disposal needs more attention.
- The presence of foreign ex-combatants in many African conflicts needs serious consideration.

VII. DDR AND NETWORKING

80. The co-chair, Dr. Namanga Ngongi, invited Dr. Nancy Walker to introduce the topic. In her introduction she stressed the importance of networking and the need for existing networks to coordinate their efforts.

A. Building a Network of African Practitioners

81. African DDR practitioners and stakeholders met to explore ways of strengthening contacts and mutual support in the implementation of DDR programmes. They decided to establish an operational network that would address pressing regional DDR issues and also establish linkages with other DDR initiatives and networks.

82. While members recognized the relevance of existing DDR Network initiatives, it was observed that such initiatives were not sufficiently inclusive and therefore emphasised the importance of:

- Establishing a much broader and all embracing networking structure.
- Enhancing linkages with existing networks.
 - Establishing an operational network that would address pressing regional DDR issues including:
 - Roving combatants
 - Protection of children

- Female ex-combatants
- Circulation of small arms
- Training and research
- Information and experience sharing.

83. It was proposed that a steering committee be established and a hub created at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana; the steering committee should be established to include relevant national DDR Commissions, representatives of relevant agencies and NGOs such as Mano River Union/Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and as well as ex-combatants.

VIII. CLOSING SESSION AND CONCLUSIONS

84. The closing session started with a presentation by a dance group, The Freetong Players, which included songs and skits depicting conditions during the conflict and the role played by DDR. A young schoolgirl from the Annie Walsh Memorial Secondary School, Freetown, Ms. Aminata Palmer, read a poem entitled "Thank you DDR" on the conflict in Sierra Leone.

85. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Sierra Leone and Head of UNAMSIL, H.E. Mr. Daudi Mwakawago addressed the Conference in the Closing Session. In his address, the Special Representative commended the spirit of cooperation evidenced by all the stakeholders in Sierra Leone as they worked together to ensure successful implementation of the DDR programme. He also stressed the importance of considering technical, human and financial requirements in the design of DDR programmes.

86. H.E. Mr. Mwakawago emphasized that reintegration was a long-term process and should be linked to wider recovery strategies. Sufficient resources should also be available for programme implementation. He urged donors to provide long-term funding rather than focusing on quick fixes. The special needs of vulnerable groups including women and the handicapped deserved particular attention, and the high rate of unemployment was a cause for serious concern. The SRSR expressed the hope that future DDR programmes would benefit from the lessons learned from past experiences.

87. The Rapporteur of the Conference, Dr. Francis Kai-Kai, presented a Summary of the Freetown Deliberations and Recommendations. The Conference, after discussion adopted the following recommendations:

- a. DDR should not be overburdened by all post-conflict demands. Rather, it should be linked backward and forward to the broader peace process (including peace agreements) and peace-building programmes. DDR should always be accompanied by parallel relief, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts for all war-affected populations, especially in the context of local communities as well as by Security Sector Reform.
- b. National ownership of DDR programmes is critical for success. In this regard, efforts should be made to genuinely support national

- stakeholders (government, civil society and warring factions among others) through technical assistance and capacity building.
- c. The international community should support and work in genuine partnership with national DDR stakeholders and it should also better coordinate its own efforts and make its DDR funding mechanisms more flexible and timely.
 - d. Every effort should be made to include regional perspectives in the design and implementation of DDR programmes.
 - e. The special groups associated with warring factions (particularly women, children and the disabled) should be provided with special protective measures in the design and planning stages of any DDR programme.
 - f. The complexity of DDR programmes was recognised by all. It was therefore recommended that an integrated approach, involving national and international stakeholders, including humanitarian agencies, should be used in the planning process of DDR programmes.
 - g. Provision or non-provision of a reinsertion package (cash or in kind) to demobilized ex-combatants to support their transition to normal civilian life should be given careful consideration at the design phase of a DDR programme.
 - h. All stakeholders should be aware of the importance of small arms collection and control following the conclusion of formal disarmament programmes.
 - i. To promote long-term stability following a DDR programme in a given country, participants agreed that longer-term development programmes that address the root causes of the conflict (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other national recovery frameworks) as well as programmes for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS should be initiated and adequately funded.
 - j. The network of African DDR practitioners needs to be strengthened to share experiences and innovative ideas and convey their perspectives to the UN and other international partners. In support of these efforts, the Conference proposed that African DDR practitioners and stakeholders meet every two years to review the progress made and seek ways of further improving DDR programmes and their contribution to stability in Africa.

88. Dr. Namanga Ngongi, Co-Chair of the Conference, in his closing statement, expressed appreciation to participants for their active participation in the deliberations and for the concrete and useful recommendations that were adopted. He expressed the hope that current and future DDR programmes in Africa would benefit from the implementation of the recommendations. Dr. Ngongi thanked all those who helped make the Conference successful. Particular appreciation was extended to the interpreters and catering staff. Finally, appreciation was extended to the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone for the support and hospitality given to Conference participants.

89. Hon. Momodou Koroma, Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone and Co-Chair of the Conference delivered a closing statement. The Foreign Minister ended his statement by formally declaring the Conference closed.

Thank You DDR
by Aminata Palmer, 11 years old, Sierra Leone

*KABOOM! With heavy guns and bombs and jets,
Children were made to flee from their mother's laps.
Yesterday, I was invited to a conference.
They gave me a paper which said DDR
The paper said PEACE, DDR says PEACE
I asked, Peace after War?*

*I thought! My brothers, sisters, dead!
I mean DEAD! And DDR says PEACE!*

*PEACE, yes, PEACE! With Peace as white as snow,
Children can once more play accrah,
Tell stories our grannies once told us – and laugh.*

Yes! Children can freely laugh and say Thank You DDR!

ANNEX I: PROGRAMME

Tuesday, 21 June 2005

Opening Session

8:00 - 9:00	Registration
9:00 - 10:15	<p>Introductory Remarks by Co-chairs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Message from Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, United Nations Special Adviser on Africa, delivered by <i>Dr. Namanga Ngongi, former Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of The Congo</i> • <i>Hon. Momodu Koroma, Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, Government of Sierra Leone</i> <p>Messages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba, Former President of MARWOPNET</i> <p>Opening Address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone</i>
10:15 - 10:30	Tea/Coffee Break

Plenary Session I: Presentation of National DDR Papers

10:30 - 13:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sierra Leone (<i>Dr. Francis Kai-Kai</i>) • Liberia (<i>Dr. Moses Jarbo</i>) • Democratic Republic of Congo (<i>Mr. Daniel Kawata</i>)
13:00 - 14:00	Lunch Break

Plenary Session I (continued)

14:00 - 15:45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rwanda (<i>Mr. David Munyurangabo</i>) • Burundi (<i>Mr. Liberat Ntunzwenimana</i>) • Zimbabwe (<i>Mr. Moyo Sibusiso</i>)
15:45 - 16:15	Tea/Coffee Break
16:15 - 17:15	<p>International Initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG [DDR]):

	<p><i>Mr. Kelvin Ong, Chair, UN IAWG [DDR]</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR): <i>Ambassador Lena Sundh, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>
17:15 - 18:30	General Debate
18:30	Reception hosted by the Government of Sierra Leone

Wednesday, 22 June 2005

Plenary Session II

8:30 - 9:15	<p>Presentation of National Papers from Angola and Mozambique</p> <p>Interventions of African Countries without National Papers</p> <p>Overview of Main Issues and Working Group Methodology</p> <p><i>Dr. Namanga Ngongi (Former SRSG for the Democratic Republic of Congo)</i></p>
9:15 - 9:45	
9:45 - 10:15	
10:15 - 10:30	Tea/Coffee Break

Working Groups Session

10:30 – 13:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group 1 – Strategic Perspective (ENGLISH) Facilitator: <i>Mr. Kelvin Ong</i> Secretary: <i>Ms. Daiana Cipollone</i> Creating an Enabling Environment for Effective DDR DDR and Peacebuilding and Reconciliation DDR and Regional and International Challenges • Group 2 – Strategic Perspective (FRENCH) Facilitator: <i>Dr. Saran Daraba Kaba</i> Secretary: <i>Ms. Sophie da Camara</i> DDR and Specialized Needs Strengthening Institutions and Coordination Planning Challenges • Group 3 – Organisational Perspective (FRENCH) Facilitator: <i>Mr. Cyriaque Agnekethom</i> Secretary: <i>Mr. Edmond Junior De Fabrikbers</i> Creating an Enabling Environment for Effective DDR DDR and Peacebuilding and Reconciliation DDR and Regional and International Challenges • Group 4 – Organisational Perspective (ENGLISH) Facilitator: <i>Dr. Nancy Walker</i> Secretary: <i>Mr. Abdel-Fatau Musah</i> DDR and Specialized Needs Strengthening Institutions and Coordination Planning Challenges • Group 5 – Implementation Perspective (ENGLISH) Facilitator: <i>Hon. Justice Peter Onega</i> Secretary: <i>Ms. Geraldine O'Callaghan</i> Creating an Enabling Environment for Effective DDR DDR and Peacebuilding and Reconciliation DDR and Regional and International Challenges
13:30 – 15:00	Lunch Break

Plenary Session III: Reporting of Working Groups

	Groups report to Plenary Session
15:00 – 17:00	Groups 1-5 report back to Plenary
17:00 – 17:30	Tea/Coffee Break
17:30 – 18:30	General Debate on the outcome of the Working Groups and adoption of the recommendations of the Working Groups

Thursday, 23 June

Plenary Session IV: Building a Network of Practitioners

8:30 - 9:00	Overview and Methodology of Networking Meetings Facilitator: <i>Dr. Nancy Walker (AfricaNet)</i>
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Networking Session

9:00 - 10:00	Building a Network of African DDR Practitioners Facilitators: <i>Mr. Charles Achodo (UNDP Liberia)</i> <i>Mr. Jonathan Sandy (Office of National Security, Sierra Leone)</i>
9:30 - 10:00	Networking between <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), • The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG [DDR]) and • <i>Members of the African National DDR Commissions</i> Facilitators: <i>Ambassador Lena Sundh (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)</i> <i>Mr. Kelvin Ong (UN IAWG [DDR])</i>
10:00 - 11:00	Tea/Coffee Break

Closing Session: The Way Forward

11:00 – 13:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting by Conference Rapporteur on the outcome of the Conference, <i>Dr. Francis Kai-Kai</i> • Message from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, <i>H.E. Daudi Mwakawago</i> • DDR and the People (Cultural and musical performance) • Closing remarks by Co-Chairs <i>Hon. Momodu Koroma, Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, Government of Sierra Leone</i> & <i>Dr. Namanga Ngongi (Former SRSG for the Democratic Republic of Congo)</i>
13:30 - 15:00	Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:00	Press Conference
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ANNEX II: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION
CANDEIAS, Amilcar	ANGOLA	INSTITUTE FOR THE SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS (IRSEM), ANGOLA
FREIRE DOS SANTOS, Ambrosio De Lemos	ANGOLA	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF NATIONAL POLICE
SIMAO, Pembele	ANGOLA	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, ANGOLA
NJELE, Felisberto	ANGOLA	STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER OF ANGOLA (CEEAA)
ZAMBI, Hilario	ANGOLA	MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, ANGOLA
DA CAMARA, Sophie	BELGIUM	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BELGIUM
DE FABRIBEKERS, Edmond Junior	BELGIUM	MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, BELGIUM
GATOTO, Desiree	BURUNDI	CHILD SOLDIER PROJECT, BURUNDI
MASABO Salvator	BURUNDI	BUREAU DIOCESAIN DE DEVLPT DE BUBANZA (BURUNDI)
NIBIZI Isaie	BURUNDI	CNDDR BURUNDI
NTUNZWENIMANA Liberat	BURUNDI	SECRETARIAT EXECUTIVE DE LA COMMISSION NATIONALE DDR BURUNDAISE, BURUNDI
ZENOBE, Niragira	BURUNDI	PROGRAMME OF REINSERTION AND REINSTATEMENT OF WAR-AFFECTED PERSONS AND EX-COMBATANTS
KAWATA Daniel	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	COMMISSION NATIONALE DE DEMOBILISATION ET REINSERTION (CONADR), RD CONGO
SILLASEN, Grete	DENMARK	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DENMARK
HAILE, Kaleab	ERITREA	NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOBILISATION & REINTEGRATION PROGRAM, ERITREA
HASHI, Ayan Abdullahi	ETHIOPIA	OGADEN WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, ETHIOPIA
WOLTER, Detlev	GERMANY (UN MISSION IN NY)	PERMANENT MISSION OF GERMANY TO THE UN
RICHTER-ADDO, Charles	GHANA	KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTER (KAIPTC), GHANA
DARABA KABA, Saran	GUINEA	RESEAU DES FEMMES DU FLEUVE MANO POUR LA PAIX (MARWOPNET), GUINEA
TAHAGHOGHI Ali	IRAN	IRAN EMBASSY, IRAN
O'NEILL Grainne	IRELAND	DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IRELAND
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NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION
SETOGUCHI, Nobuhiro	JAPAN	JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA), GHANA
GAYFLOR, Yabah Kazaku	LIBERIA	MINISTER OF GENDER & DEVELOPMENT, LIBERIA
JARBO, Moses	LIBERIA	NCDDRR, LIBERIA
PAASEWE, Molley	LIBERIA	NCDDRR, LIBERIA
ROLAND, Isaac	LIBERIA	NCDDRR, LIBERIA
TOWALID Daniel	LIBERIA	CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT OF LIBERIA
FRANCISCO, Antonio Alvaro	MOZAMBIQUE	MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND SOCIAL WELFARE, MOZAMBIQUE
GASPAR Antonio Da Costa	MOZAMBIQUE	CEEI/ISRI MOZAMBIQUE
JORGE Mario Francisco	MOZAMBIQUE	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MOZAMBIQUE
MUNATEIA Antonio	MOZAMBIQUE	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOZAMBIQUE
KAYITESI, Eugenie	RWANDA	NDABAGA ASSOCIATION, RWANDA
MUNYURANGABO, David	RWANDA	COMMISSION NATIONALE DE DEMOBILISATION RWANDAISE (RDRC), RWANDA
RWIGEMA, David	RWANDA	KIGALI VETERAN'S CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, RWANDA
JUSU-SHERIF Yasmin	SIERRA LEONE	MANO RIVER WOMEN'S PEACE NETWORK (MARWOPNET)
BENJAMIN, John	SIERRA LEONE	KAILAHUN DISTRICT COUNCIL, SIERRA LEONE
COLLINS, Eldred	SIERRA LEONE	RUF, SIERRA LEONE
COLLINS Ben Sie-Tal	SIERRA LEONE	LIBERIA EMBASSY, FREETOWN, SL
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DAVIES, Rupert	SIERRA LEONE	PERMANENT MISSION OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UN
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GRENAWA Michael	SIERRA LEONE	RUF SIERRA LEONE
KABO Morie	SIERRA LEONE	CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT, SIERRA LEONE
KAI-KAI Francis	SIERRA LEONE	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COORDINATION OFFICE
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KOROMA, Anthony	SIERRA LEONE	MINISTRY OF YOUTH & SPORTS, SIERRA LEONE
MASSALAY, Eddy	SIERRA LEONE	EX-CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE, SIERRA LEONE

NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION
MCARTHY, Rosaline	SIERRA LEONE	NATIONAL WOMEN'S FORUM, SIERRA LEONE
PEMAGBI, Amb. Joe	SIERRA LEONE	AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UN
PRATT Memunatu	SIERRA LEONE	PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF SL
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SANDY, Jonathan	SIERRA LEONE	OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SIERRA LEONE
SESAY Fatu	SIERRA LEONE	NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY, SIERRA LEONE
UMARU Wurie	SIERRA LEONE	FOREIGN MINISTRY, SIERRA LEONE
TEJAN-KELLA Mustapha	SIERRA LEONE	DDR CONSULTANT
Mabell IYATUNDE V. COX	SIERRA LEONE	CHRISTIAN SCIENCE SOCIETY
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RYCHNER, Daniel	SWITZERLAND	SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT (SDC), SIERRA LEONE
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VAN DE GOOR, Luc	THE NETHERLANDS	CLINGENDAEL INSTITUTE, NETHERLANDS
ONEGA, Peter	UGANDA	UGANDA AMNESTY COMMISSION
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MUSAH, Abdel-Fatau	ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS), NIGERIA
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NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION
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ZAHABI, Sidi	UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), SOMALIA
ACHODO, Charles	UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), LIBERIA
ANDERSON A.	UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME SIERRA LEONE
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FOWLER Dandeson	UN-OCHA	UN OCHA SWITZERLAND
HOUDEGBE Guy Ange	UNOCI	UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE
KABIE Boni	UNOCI	UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE
KRECOUM Boua Marius	UNOCI	UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE
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McCARTY, Susan	USA	DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USA
SACKEY James	WORLD BANK	WORLD BANK, SIERRA LEONE
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