

External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project

Anthony Finn Ph.D.
Claudia Breitung

October 2014



Northern
Bahr el
Ghazal

Warrap

Western Bahr
el Ghazal

Lakes

FINAL EVALUATION
OF THE PILOT
REINTEGRATION PROJECT
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
NEW NDDR PROGRAMME

Anthony Finn Ph.D.
Claudia Breitung

October 1, 2014

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CBR	Community Based Reintegration
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EA	Environmental Assessment
ERM	Environmental Risk Management
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FMFA	Financial Management Framework Agreement
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HQ	Head Quarters
IA	Implementing Agency
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral System
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MDTF-SS	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTC	Multipurpose Training Centres
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NBGS	Northern Bahr el Ghazal State
NDDRC	National DDR Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OP/BP	Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration
RFQ	Request for Quotations
SC	Steering Committee
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPMU	State Project Management Unit
SSAF	South Sudanese Armed Forces
SSDM/A	South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
TT	Task Team
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
WB	World Bank
WBGS	Western Bahr el Ghazal State

Table of Contents

I Executive Summary	4
Project Background	4
Summary of Findings	5
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design	16
1.1 Project Context	16
1.2 Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators	19
1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries	19
1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs	20
1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification	28
2. Project Outcomes	31
2.1 Livelihood Supports	32
2.2 Institutional Capacity Building	38
2.3 DDR Community Support Projects	40
2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition	42
3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes	44
3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry	49
3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation	50
3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank	50
3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance	51
4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR	52
4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design	52
4.2 Efficiency	52
4.3 Effectiveness	53
4.4 Potential to Grow to Scale and Sustainability	54
4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome	57
5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance	58
5.1 Bank Performance	58
5.2 NDDRC Performance	59
5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners	61
5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research	61
5.3.2 UNICON	62
5.3.3 IOM	63
6. Conclusions and Recommendations	64
6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment	64
6.2 Project Design and Outcomes	66
Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing	71
Annex 2: Documents Reviewed	108
Annex 3: Consultations	80
Annex 4: Methodological Note	82

Table of Figures

Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution (Source: NDDRC)	21
Table 2. Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives	22

I Executive Summary

Project Background

1. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) DDR Pilot Reintegration Project (Phases 1 and 2) was implemented between April 2013¹ and August 2014. On December 19th 2013 the Project was suspended in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Livelihood Project activities restarted on 15th May 2014 (with works on the Community Support Projects already having recommenced during late February 2014). A follow-up learning session to this evaluation is planned for November 2014 in Juba, South Sudan.
2. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), a very unstable security situation, the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and NDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project need to align with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility.
3. Due to the ongoing conflict between the SPLA and opposition forces, increased rebel militia activity as well as inter-communal clashes in various regions of South Sudan the Project was implemented in a very unstable security context (though the Greater Bahr el Ghazal States were less conflict affected than others). The Project environment deteriorated drastically during Phase 2 with the country facing massive IDP and refugee movements, closure or destruction of essential basic services such as medical facilities and schools, increased mobilization of civilians, a shift from development assistance towards emergency relief and disruption of agricultural activities due to the fighting which has led to a major food crisis with at least one third of the population in need of urgent food aid.
4. The original Development Objectives of the Project are as follows: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.
5. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are:
 - (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
 - (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.
6. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows:
 - (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
 - (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

¹ IPs were hired in June 2013 and ICRS activities on registration and the baseline started in April 2013.

7. The first tranche of the pilot DDR programme was anticipated to include 500 individuals from the SPLA and other national organised forces. However, the final caseload of DDR participants selected by GoSS to go through the DDR process included only 292 individuals from SPLA's Wounded Heroes, which is currently a designation not necessarily based on injury, but rather on assignment to the DDR programme. Out of this group 290 ex-combatants graduated from the vocational, life skills & literacy/numeracy training in Mapel Transition Facility (TF) (the wider NDDR Pilot Programme with which the Project aligned) and received reintegration support through the Project. Besides the ex-combatants the main Project beneficiaries were community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and community members in sites where seventeen (originally planned as ten²) DDR Community Support Projects (borehole installations & rehabilitation and one Payam building rehabilitation) were implemented. According to estimates by the IA (IOM) the Community Support Projects benefited approximately 7,500 people. As five ex-combatants died during the reintegration period the caseload at Project closure is 285 individual ex-combatants.

8. The Project was implemented over two phases between June 2013 and September 2014. Phase 1 of the Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub-components (Start-Up Kits, and Training); (ii) Institutional Capacity Building, (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. Phase 2 of the Project had three sub-components: It continued and innovated the Livelihood Support subcomponent, it implemented and further developed the M&E component including through South-South exchange and it implemented the DDR Community Support Projects. In both Phase 1 and Phase 2 while not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US\$ 120,000 in Phase 1 and US\$ 120,000 in Phase 2) which finances the reintegration participation costs to the NDDRC³ and included the Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP (World Bank) to the NDDRC which was not a direct cost to the Project. All administrative costs were absorbed by the TDRP.

9. The final evaluation of the Project was conducted in August and September 2014. The evaluation included a comprehensive review of Project documentation, datasets and IA outputs, consultations with 75 individuals, and a field mission to Juba and Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal State (WBGs) where qualitative key informant interviews and qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants were conducted. The first community consultation in Nykiejo, Achot Boma, Rochdog Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 14 men and 12 women as well as separate key informant interviews (KIIs) with the village leader. The second community consultation in Nyinalel, Kuom Boma, Marial Bal Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 13 men and 1 woman including the village leader.

Summary of Findings

10. The final evaluation finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as short to medium term changes resulting from Project activities and outputs) have resulted from the Project. These fall into three broad categories: (i) knowledge transfer and behaviour change (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities); (ii) short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries (ex-

²See Project Implementation Plan (PIP). South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. DDR Community Support. September 2013.

combatants and their communities); (iii) any shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

11. In the Livelihoods Component the main outcomes are as follows: (i) learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits; (ii) learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; (iii) inclusion of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component (iv); an increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants; (v) continuous utilisation of toolkits for livelihood activities by a majority of ex-combatants; (vi) increased vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge of the Project participants (that is used by many ex-combatants to initiate livelihood opportunities), and (vii) increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives).

12. The results of the Participant Satisfaction Survey⁴ carried out in July/August 2014 show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The majority of respondents (61.4 percent) are frequently or sometimes using their tool kits, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks. Regarding the vocational skills training the XCs received in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those XCs though that received an auto mechanic training). Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes).

13. The comparison of the livelihood activities of XCs before and after the DDR programme shows an increased engagement in cooperative work (while only a minority of the programme participants indicated to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the satisfaction survey respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR). This increase in group livelihood activity most likely results from the trainings around cooperative business.

14. However, despite these positive trends these findings should not be overestimated. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success and shape of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and sustainability. Other indicators also convey a rather mixed picture of the socio-economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries at the end of the DDR pilot; for example, more than 37.9 percent report that they usually have to borrow in order to meet their household expenses at the end of the month. On the other hand 42.6 percent indicate that their income has increased because of the vocational trainings, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning. Due to these mixed results and the extremely short-time lag between the implementation of reintegration assistance and the final evaluation, definitive and detailed comments on the sustainability of the livelihood activities cannot be made.

⁴ In July/August 2014, in order to gain knowledge of the ex-combatants livelihood situation TDRP conducted a ex-combatant satisfaction survey of the those who were enrolled in the Pilot programme.

15. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behaviour. The *main* outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the reality of leading Reintegration programming in DDR; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) important breakthroughs in the States particularly in working with line ministries in order to support the IGAs of ex-combatants.

16. The evaluation reviewed the conclusion of the MTR that at the time of the MTR it was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The final evaluation makes specific recommendations regarding these issues.

17. The Community Component has mixed outcomes. While significant learning took place regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with a concentration of ex-combatants and the water interventions have improved access to clean water for target communities, the effectiveness of the Community Projects with regard to (i) promoting peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate and (ii) promoting community engagement and ownership and reducing tensions between communities and XCs, remains ambiguous.

18. The Project's objectives and design are **relevant** to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS⁵ and current Interim Strategy Note (2013-2014).

19. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012).

20. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2.

21. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

22. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects.

⁵The MDTF-SS was operationally closed on December 31, 2012, and financially closed at the end of June 2013.

MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

23. The Project **efficiency** in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory (MTR) to **satisfactory** because: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant.

24. In Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is looked into. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US\$2,759.⁶ In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were targeted with Project activities (5 had died over the course of the Project). Of the 285 targeted, 269 received services. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex-combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant remain high at US\$ 3,750.

25. **Effectiveness** is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation.

26. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2.

27. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs.

28. The Community Support component was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.⁷

29. The Pilot Reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design's effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be **replicated** and **scaled** in future programming:

⁶ Costs discussed in this section are direct costs (including IP management and staffing costs) and do not include WB or NDDRC related management or administration costs.

⁷ The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US\$ 25,000 when compared to US\$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps.

- (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system at HQ and inter-organizationally with the State level;
- (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff;
- (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff;
- (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities;
- (e) Community support projects (but with provisos about design, size and whether or not they should be managed through the NDDRC or DDR).

30. The final evaluation made the following specific findings and recommendations (that are related to (i) achievement of objectives; (ii) the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (iii) the Project design and outcomes of each Component.

Project Context and Strategic Environment

31. The evaluation finds that the Project has **satisfactorily** provided ex-combatants with skills thus enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio-economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio-economic objective).

32. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed **highly satisfactorily** generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed **moderately satisfactorily** to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective).

Project Context and Strategic Environment

33. **Conclusion 1.** The success of the Project as a pilot, testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment.

34. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear.

35. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme).

36. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical. It observed that the suspension of the Project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum is being lost; however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan.

37. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment, and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation.

38. Timing will be essential for any future DDR programming. The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attend to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme.

39. **Recommendation 1a.** The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed.

40. **Recommendation 1b.** The NDDRC be supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (which could include stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, representatives of civil society), to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled.

41. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions.

42. Despite the progress being made through the Project, DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR through dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development, institution building or infrastructure projects. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency.

43. **Recommendation 1c.** In the short to medium term specifically, the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat which has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes.

44. **Recommendation 1d.** In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics.

45. **Conclusion 2.** The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR.

46. **Recommendation 2.** While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.⁸

47. **Conclusion 3.** UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013⁹ but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was cancelled.

48. **Recommendation 3.** The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned¹⁰ which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.

49. **Conclusion 4.** The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources.

50. **Recommendation 4.** The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the

⁸ The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past.

⁹ See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013.

¹⁰ An limited in scope internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis.

NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project.

Project Design and Outcomes

51. **Conclusion 5.** The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission.

52. **Recommendation 5.** The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project.

53. **Conclusion 6.** Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF.

54. **Recommendation 6.** In reality reinsertion and reintegration are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations.

55. **Conclusion 7.** The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

56. **Recommendation 7.** The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming.

57. **Conclusion 8.** The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

58. **Recommendation 8.** The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation.

59. **Conclusion 9.** The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion.

60. **Recommendation 9.** The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future.

61. **Conclusion 10.** The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.
62. **Recommendation 10.** When estimating the impact on future programming, economies of scale should be considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities
63. **Conclusion 11.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.
64. **Recommendation 11.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any 'inclusive enough coalition' strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design.
65. **Conclusion 12.** The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC.
66. **Recommendation 12.** In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed.
67. **Conclusion 13.** The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.
68. **Recommendation 13.** The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2).
69. **Conclusion 14.** The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.
70. **Recommendation 14.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

71. **Conclusion 15.** The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

72. **Recommendation 15.** The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

73. **Conclusion 16.** As a result of the flexible design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission's cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised.

74. **Recommendation 16.** In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex-combatants).

75. **Conclusion 17.** The training of trainers (TOT) that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) have increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC.

76. **Recommendation 17.** Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment.

77. **Conclusion 18.** A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel.

78. **Recommendation 18.** In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. Ex-combatant representatives should be involved in identifying the content of toolkits. The same toolkits that will be provided to ex-combatants should also be utilised in the vocational trainings.

79. **Conclusion 19.** A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation.

Recommendation 19. In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan.

Conclusion 20. A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the wider pilot Project) thus influencing sustainability and impact of some Project activities.

Recommendation 20. Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme.

Conclusion 21. Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative)

80. **Recommendation 21.** For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work must be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative, and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC.

81. **Conclusion 22.** Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC.

82. **Recommendation 22.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend. However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component.

Conclusion 23. The Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types.

Recommendation 23. Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation.

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Project Context

83. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project¹¹ has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the programme context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC¹²; (iii) the policy context (*South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020*); (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility; (v) since 27th May 2014 a revised UN mandate removing DDR from the purview of the agency¹³; (vi) limited operational budget in the NDDRC, and (vi) the highly unstable security environment in the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS).

84. RoSS became an independent country on the 9th July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9th and 15th January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

85. During December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of 15th December fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict rapidly escalated, spreading throughout the capital Juba, to Jonglei and several other States in South Sudan resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties.

86. Peace negotiations led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started in January 2014 in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa but have been adjourned numerous times with no significant progress made up to date. They re-started on September 15th, 2014. A succession of cessation of hostilities agreements signed by GoSS and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) have been repeatedly violated or ignored on the ground in some parts of South Sudan.

87. According to the UNHCR assessment of the situation in South Sudan as of August 2014, the continuous breach of ceasefire agreements and the unstable security situation has severely affected the humanitarian situation in the country creating anything between 500,000 and 1.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and more 447,000 refugees.

88. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. The institutions of the State that began to emerge in the previous years include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. However, this process of creating effective and legitimate state structures and practices has been severely impaired by the current conflict. Since most of the country's public funds continue to be channelled towards the military and the country has been in a state of emergency for more than ten months, most government institutions face severe difficulties in fulfilling their core functions.

¹¹ Henceforth referred to as 'the Project'

¹² Henceforth referred to as 'CPA DDR'

¹³ See UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014)

89. Additionally, most donors have reviewed their development support in response to the ongoing crisis shifting funds towards the mitigation of humanitarian consequences of the conflict while suspending or redesigning a number of long term development programmes.¹⁴

90. South Sudan's economy is relatively undeveloped, largely undiversified and highly oil dependent. The greatest part of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival. RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of temporary oil flow stoppages, high inflation following independence, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities as well as the economic consequences of the current conflict.

91. Despite slight achievements in the past years South Sudan's development indicators are very poor. The country has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas, high infant and maternal mortality rates and low life expectancy.¹⁵ Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. The situation has led to a breakdown of agricultural production and resulting severe food insecurity.

92. Consequently, the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges, conflict stressors and famine all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project.

93. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme.¹⁶ The NDDR Pilot Programme consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: registration, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training delivered to ex-combatants. In Phase 2 the Project sought to compensate for poor quality training in auto-mechanic and driving provided to ex-combatants in the Mapel TF.

In Project documentation it is identified that the Project is intended to work towards the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme.¹⁷ It is, however, also stressed that the Project does not address CAAF/G and WAAF/G, since these groups were intended to be addressed by separate special programmes. While capacity building of the DDR system and NDDRC staff was stated as

¹⁴ See Donor Statement July 11, 2014.

¹⁵ 27percent of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40percent of males compared to 16percent of females are literate and 53percent of urban compared to 22percent of rural population is literate. National Baseline Household Survey (2009).

¹⁶ The Mapel TF Pilot is not part of this evaluation.

¹⁷ Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6.

a direct objective, the Project did not aim at directly building capacity of the line ministries, civil society or private sector. The Project aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank task team (TT), consultants hired by the Project and IAs sought to work in varying degrees in conjunction with implementers of the reinsertion component of the NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. However, the collaboration was hampered by an insufficient flow of information between the involved stakeholders especially in the planning stages. The at times weak information exchange seemed to be a stumbling block for closely linking reinsertion and reintegration activities. In future programme iterations it will hence be all the more crucial to have the necessary coordination structures in place to coordinate between various DDR partners.

94. As a result of the outbreak of hostilities in RoSS in December 2013 the Security Council adopted resolution 2155 (2014) in March 2014 that temporarily shifted the UN mission's main focus from peacebuilding activities to the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With this reprioritization DDR was removed from the UNMISS mandate. Most UNMISS DDR staff has consequently been transferred to other mission sections. At the time of the final evaluation there appears to be a renewed determination in the NDDRC to build relationships with the UN and lobby GoSS to press for the UN to reincorporate DDR in the next UNMISS mandate.

95. This final evaluation examines the pilot reintegration activities and does not look into the pilot reinsertion component that was funded by UNMISS. The final assessment of the wider pilot at Mapel TF pilot was planned by the UN and NDDRC to be conducted separately and in addition to an evaluation of the training sub-component (impact assessment) that was carried out by UNESCO (consultants for the final evaluation of the reinsertion phase had been identified in December 2013). Due to the outbreak of the crisis and the reprioritization of the UNMISS mandate the final evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold. All involved stakeholders as crucial regard an independent evaluation for capturing lessons learned which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.¹⁸

96. At the time of the final evaluation discussions were ongoing within UNMISS to at least maintain a small core DDR unit for planning purposes. The NDDRC appeared to be determined to seek technical assistance from such a group which could be part of a broader consortium of international stakeholders to reach out to all conflict parties and to support and monitor strategy processes evolving around DDR in the course of the Addis Ababa negotiations.

97. It should be noted that the MTR concluded that the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the involved UN agencies and that this was likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of Phase 2. The evaluation reaffirms this conclusion and recognises in terms of principles of cooperation the NDDRC has shown in Phase 2 a progressive shift in how it wishes to engage with the UN family in the future and this is informing their lobbying of the GoSS and UN regarding re-including DDR in the mandate.

¹⁸ Although the JOC started to collect lessons learned in an internal process, the final document produced by the JOC in December 2013 lacks completeness (e.g. it contains very little details about costing).

The Project is conceptualised first and foremost as a *pilot* in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, and institutional capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme. Consequently the performance of the Project can be measured against: (i) the achievements of the Project Development Objectives; (ii) the degree to which learning is being acquired, has been or is likely to be utilised including evidence that Project design and implementation in Phase 2 was adjusted to account for learning in Phase 1 including as documented in the MTR; and; (iii) emerging evidence of outcomes for targeted beneficiary populations.

1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

98. In the Project documentation the original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

99. The **socio-economic** objectives of the Project are:

- (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
- (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

100. The **reintegration programme, systems and learning** objectives are as follows:

- (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
- (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

101. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries

102. Originally the intended direct ex-combatant beneficiaries of the Project were a pre-selected group of 500. The NDDR Pilot Programme failed to secure the target caseload of 500 ex-combatants or to secure the target caseload as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme: the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned. At the time of final evaluation the direct beneficiaries are as follows. The Project benefited the 290 ex-combatants who were targeted by a variety of Reintegration supports during Phase 1. Of the 290 ex-combatants who were benefited during Phase 1, 270 directly benefited from Reintegration supports during Phase 2. According to data provided by the IA a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants in Phase 1 and in Phase 2, 129 community members benefited from activities in the Livelihood Supports component. Additionally, an IA-estimated 7,500 people directly benefited from activities in Project Component: Community Support Projects.¹⁹

103. In addition to ex-combatants and community members the Project targeted the NDDRC staff during activities in Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (Phase 1) and

¹⁹June 2014, IOM Final Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project - Consultancy to implement DDR community support projects.

through M&E capacity building in the form of a south-south exchange with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) during Phase 2. Also in Phase 2 16 ICRS Case-workers at the Commission benefited from activities in Project Component: Livelihood Supports through Training the Trainers (TOT) training in Business and Cooperatives and partially through attending two days of a seven day training module for Agricultural Extension Workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It was intended that 11 Agricultural Extension Workers would directly benefit from TOT training in Agriculture and Business/Cooperatives but due to logistical challenges 7 received the TOT input.

1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs

104. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project *outputs* are discussed below.

Project Component: Livelihood Support (US\$ 1,087,482 Implemented by UNICON)²⁰

105. In Phase 1 the Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1), the design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to increase financial literacy and entrepreneurial knowledge and support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. This follow-up training continued in Phase 2. At that stage the livelihood assistance moreover entailed agricultural extension work and training in improved agricultural methods, best practices and small farm business skills for the ex-combatants choosing agriculture. As alterations to the original project components²¹ the Project additionally implemented targeted vocational trainings that were provided to ex-combatants via vocational training centres and facilitated a vocational expert visit to deliver support to interested ex-combatants in vocational skills not covered through the targeted vocational trainings or agriculture.

106. For overall management of the component and the start-up kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, a Project Manager, a Livelihoods Training Specialist, a Start-Up Kit Manager, a Procurement Specialist, two Agricultural Training Specialists as well as one State Manager in each of the four pilot States. To deliver the training sub-component in Phase 1 UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and the 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return. In Phase 2 business/cooperative training teams were deployed in each State to conduct follow-up visits to interested ex-combatants. The agricultural trainings were implemented by 7 extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture (3 in WBGs, 1 in Warrap State, 1 in Lakes State, 2 in NBGS). Supplementary vocational trainings were conducted in close collaboration with the Wau Vocational Training Centre and the Aweil driving school.

Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US\$ 323,100) (costs only occurred in Phase 1)

107. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry's Multipurpose Training Centre in Juba (MTC) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF

²⁰Total costs for livelihoods support component. Due to the lesser number of participants than initially expected (290 vs. 500) it was agreed to spend less than the initial livelihood support budget (US\$ 1,200,000).

²¹See chapter 1.5 for a detailed description of alterations to original project components

UNESCO Vocational Trainers.²² UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30th 2013.²³ The NDDRC was present at the opening of bids. Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on 1st October 2013 and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14th October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At the time of the final evaluation distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:²⁴

Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution (Source: NDDRC)

State	Target	Actual	Rationale
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	30	30	All distributed
Western Bahr el Ghazal	92	91	1 remaining
Warrap	75	74	1 remaining
Lakes	93	93	All distributed
Total	290	288	

Source: UNICON and NDDRC

Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US\$ 764,382²⁵)

108. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four themes:

- (a) Cooperatives/associations;
- (b) Small farm or rural enterprise training;
- (c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and
- (d) Adult or formal education.²⁶

109. **Training in Mapel TF (Phase 1) (US\$ 164,500):** The curriculum as developed by the IA largely home based and adjusted while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return (delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in IGAs or in preparation to work as a cooperative).²⁷

²²UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

²³See September 2013, UNICON Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component.

²⁴Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices.

²⁵Costs incurred for the following components: i) Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; ii) State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; iii) Technical Skills Extension-Agricultural extension visits; iv) Technical Skills Extension- Vocational expert visits; v) Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings; vi) Assistance in accessing available government services.

²⁶ All ex-combatants were asked whether they would be interested to receive assistance with education or livelihood toolkits but none chose the education path.

²⁷Modules 1 to15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives.

110. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Training Curriculum;
- (b) Training Manual;
- (c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers).

111. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2nd September 2013 and ending 11th September 2013.

112. **Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 1) (US\$ 312,600).** Dynamics of training in the States after graduation in Mapel TF is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation (in Phase 1) was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the final evaluation.

Table 2. Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 1)

State	ex-combatants	CMs	Total
Warrap State	70	34	104
Lakes State	93	29	122
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	30	108	138
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	60	113	173
Total	253	284	537

Source: UNICON

113. **Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 2) (US\$ 146,433):** In Phase 2 the supplementary follow-up trainings aimed to build on the foundation of trainings received by ex-combatants in Phase 1. The trainings were intended to provide successful ex-combatants with the knowledge to enhance their business performance while those ex-combatants that face difficulties receive additional input and assistance in problem solving. The follow up during phase 1 indicated that ex-combatants were at different levels of progress regarding start-up and management of their enterprises.

114. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Training Curriculum;
- (b) Training Plan & Schedule;
- (c) Training of Trainers and resulting cohort of trainers;
- (d) State-based follow-up trainings.

115. A TOT was conducted for ten days from 16th to 26th May 2014 producing a cohort of 20 trainers (16 trainers plus 4 IA hired State managers). The curriculum entailed 13 training modules

that link up with the training content delivered in Phase 1.²⁸ A participant satisfaction survey conducted by the TDRP shows that the level of participants' understanding of the materials is very high (even though somewhat lower than that of Phase 1) but it was not possible to independently verify these findings for the final evaluation.²⁹

116. Following the TOT the trainers delivered the modules to the ex-combatants on State level. Similar to previous State based trainings it is difficult to verify whether the trainings were implemented in a satisfactory manner and to what degree the training objectives were met. According to data provided by the IA 269 ex-combatants (94 percent of the current caseload³⁰) received supplementary training (see table 3).

Table 3. Supplementary Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 2)

State	Current caseload	Trained ex-combatants	ex-combatants untrained/not found
Warrap State	75	74	1
Lakes State	90	81	9
Northern Bahr el Ghazal State	29	29	0
Western Bahr el Ghazal State	91	85	6
Total	285	269	16

Source: UNICON

According to data from the satisfaction survey 61.8% of the respondents were very satisfied with the State based training, the majority being most satisfied with the way in which trainers taught them (91.8%) and the contents of the training (90.7%).³¹

117. **Agricultural extension visits (Phase 2) (US\$ 48,417):** According to the Project Document ex-combatants are to receive assistance in farming and further appropriate agricultural extension training, which is supplemented with small business training. In line with these objectives the agricultural sub-component was introduced in Phase 2. The agricultural extension work targeted those ex-combatants that opted to pursue a career in agriculture and who had received the agriculture toolkit in phase 1 (129 ex-combatants in total).

118. The outputs for this sub-component are:

- (a) Curriculum design;
- (b) Training plan & schedule;
- (c) Training of Trainers for Agriculture Extension workers;
- (d) Agricultural Extension field trainings.

²⁸Modules 1 to 13 were: (i) Introduction and Micro lab: Expectation and Commitment; (ii) Learning Process and Curriculum Design: Illiterate and less educated people; (iii) Financial literacy/numeracy; (iv) Entrepreneurship and Business Development in Cooperatives; (v) Steps in starting a business and Cooperatives; (vi) Business and Behavioural Skills Development in Cooperative Entrepreneurship; (vii) Training in Business Plan and Financial Transactions in Business; (viii) Enterprise Management; (ix) Advance Management Skills and Systems; (x) Training and advisory in Legal Aspects: Registration and Taxation; (xi) Planning and Managing Field Level Operations; (xii) Documentation and Reporting; (xiii) Action Plan & Concluding.

²⁹IA Interim Report 3 (IR 1 of Phase 2)

³⁰The Project's current caseload is 285 ex-combatants as 5 beneficiaries of the initial caseload (290) passed away.

³¹ See : Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (2014) (Draft - in Progress).

119. A 7-day agricultural TOT focusing on small farm business skills and improved agricultural methods³² was conducted from 28th May to 3rd June 2014. An international agriculture specialist facilitated the training with the assistance of a local agriculture trainer contracted by the IA. The main participants of the TOT were seven extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture of Greater Bahr el Ghazal who already had a foundation in training agriculture. A self-assessment of the TOT participants conducted by the IA revealed that the level of understanding and confidence in delivering the modules was moderate/high. The agronomy knowledge amongst the participant group was inconsistent which seemed to challenge the knowledge transfer.³³

120. Based on their previous expertise and the knowledge acquired in the TOT the extension workers, in close collaboration with staff from the NDDRC State offices who had joined the TOT training, delivered the subsequent agriculture trainings to the targeted ex-combatants in the pilot States. The objectives of this State based follow-up training in agriculture were, amongst others³⁴:

- (a) To further support the ex-combatants to utilise the Agricultural trainings gained at Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return;
- (b) To train the ex-combatants on agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills;
- (c) To train the ex-combatants on small farm business skills with an emphasis on livelihood success.

121. The agricultural extension training was delivered to 119 ex-combatants out of the original 129 people who chose agriculture as their field of reintegration. In addition, because the extension workers were travelling together with the Phase 2 training teams, the agricultural extension training was available for the ex-combatants of other reintegration fields to attend, provided that it did not interfere with their core training following a non-objection of the UNICON state manager. The number of additionally trained ex-combatants was not recorded as no separate attendance sheet policy was introduced for them.³⁵

122. To what degree these trainings helped to support the beneficiaries to improve their agriculture livelihoods in their communities of return is difficult to assess. Due to challenging logistics and limited financial means of the Project the ex-combatants were not visited by the extension workers in their communities of origin but were trained in central locations. Given the lack of field visits to the ex-combatants' homes and the relatively limited training time it can be assumed that more extension work on a one-on-one basis would be needed to have a lasting impact on the individual XC. However, the evaluation does not have the adequate data to gauge the training impact and to substantiate this argument.

123. A total of 399 people benefited directly from training in Phase 2 (follow-up training in business skills/financial literacy/business motivation and training in agricultural business/agronomy practices). This includes 270 ex-combatants (out of which one ex-combatant

³² The modules covered during the training were: i) Introduction; ii) Numeracy and Literacy; iii) Why establish a seed business? iv) Business Planning; v) Agricultural Topics; vi) Agricultural Cooperatives.

³³ See UNICON Interim Report 3

³⁴ See TOR for Livelihood Support Phase 2

³⁵ UNICON Draft Final Report

died) and 129 community members. During phase 1 a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants. Thus the percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent.

Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (US\$ 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR)³⁶ (Phase 1 only) and South-South Capacity Building and M&E (US\$ 247,525 Implemented by UNICON) (Phase 2 only)

124. During Phase 1 only Institutional Capacity Building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been:

- (a) Inception Report;
- (b) PIP;
- (c) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs (see 2.4 below);
- (d) Draft Final Report;
- (e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC;
- (f) SWOT analysis for State Offices;
- (g) Draft M&E manual;
- (h) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC);³⁷
- (i) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal;
- (j) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys and Reports;
- (k) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS).

125. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators).

126. During Phase 2 direct Institutional Capacity Building took the form of a South-South exchange with the RDRC. This activity was planned in response to the poor quality M&E manual produced by the IA in Phase 1 and in recognition that the staffing configuration in the NDDRC during Phase 1 was not such that a stable M&E unit existed. However, the staffing issue persisted during Phase 2. The outputs of the exchange have been as follows:

- (a) An M&E manual (in draft form as of the time of final Project evaluation);
- (b) A MSPPT presentation to NDDRC HQ.

127. The chief non-Project financed activity increasing capacity in the NDDRC was the completion of the ICRS, itself an important information management system for the Commission. The ICRS, financed directly by the World Bank is the central IT system to facilitate the

³⁶Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research

³⁷August 19th to 22nd 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27th-30th 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal).

registration of ex-combatants as well as their counselling and referral to socio-economic opportunities by ICRS Caseworkers.

128. At the time of evaluation the following are the outputs of activities associated with the ICRS:

- (a) Final version (3.0) of the ICRS installed on the HQ ICRS server;
- (b) Source code and draft user manuals (ICRS User Manual V2.0 and ICRS Administrator Manual V1.0) at the time of evaluation all of which is with the TDRP for final sign-off before transfer to NDDRC;
- (c) Completed Administrator Training of the NDDRC IT Unit on installation, configuration and troubleshooting;
- (d) Completed ICRS User Training of ICRS Caseworkers.

Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 450,000 Implemented by IOM) (Phase 1 and Phase 2)

129. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance.”³⁸ It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches.³⁹ In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives:

- (a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties;
- (b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties

130. At time of final evaluation the outputs of this Component have been:

- (a) PIP;
- (b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC);
- (c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process;
- (d) Engagement of State PMUs and local government;
- (e) Community orientation to the CDD/R; facilitation of community meetings;
- (f) Training of management committees;
- (g) Project implementation;
- (h) Final report.

131. Prior to the Project start NDDRC opted to prioritise water interventions and improvements of local market places. Interventions targeted counties in the four-state target area with the highest number of ex-combatants registered in the programme. Based on location selection criteria⁴⁰ drafted by the IA (taking into account the number of ex-combatants registered in the ICRS database and a needs analysis) a matrix was drafted outlining potential target Payams. Based on the matrix the sites were selected by the local authorities in close collaboration with NDDRC and IOM. NDDRC State Coordinators and IOM field staff then liaised with community

³⁸NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36

³⁹ibid

⁴⁰See Site Selection Criteria for Water Projects, updated September 2013

members and ex-combatants to identify the priority improvement projects that were of highest priority in their communities within the available budget.⁴¹

132. According to the IA's final report it was originally proposed to implement up to 10 community projects but in the end IOM finalised 17 projects (15 boreholes with hand pumps, one Payam building rehabilitation, and one borehole with solar pumping system⁴²). All 16 water projects were coordinated with the Rural Water Departments in each State. The community projects were implemented in the following locations:

- (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (9 Projects);
- (b) Lakes States (5 Projects);
- (c) Warrap State (2 Projects);
- (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project – Payam Building rehabilitation).

133. Initially it was planned for WBGS to only drill four boreholes but due to the competitive bidding process and cheaper pump installations than originally envisioned (more hand pumps than solar pumps), a surplus of operational funds remained in the budget which was utilized to drill five additional boreholes in the State.

134. A series of community meetings (39 in total) were held with the target communities in each project site. In these meetings IOM staff explained the role of the community in managing the investment after project completion. 1285 participants (895 males and 390 females) attended the meetings. Ex-combatant engagement in these meetings was reported only in three communities. The breakdown according to States is as follows

- (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (16 meetings);
- (b) Lakes States (13 meetings);
- (c) Warrap State (4 meetings);
- (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (6 meetings).

135. Due to the outbreak of the conflict in mid-December 2013, activities were temporarily suspended and a no cost time extension was issued by the World Bank until 30th May 2014. Works on the community support projects recommenced in late February 2014 when the World Bank lifted the temporary suspension of the programme. The final Project report was submitted on 30th June 2014. This final Project evaluation did not include a technical assessment of infrastructure outputs.

Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US\$ 240,000)

136. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project.

137. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the HQ PMU which comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. While the PMU met regularly in Phase 1, meetings were less frequent in Phase 2. According to the Project Document

⁴¹See IOM Final Report

⁴²The original plan was to upgrade and convert an existing borehole into a water yard. However due to the low yield from the existing borehole, a new borehole was drilled and solar pumping system installed.

the PMU is responsible for overarching management and coordination of reintegration pilot activities. While the PMU has turned out to be an important body to align the activities of various NDDRC departments and to share information amongst the national management level, it did not entirely fulfil its role as the ‘backbone’ of the reintegration process. Although all departments were requested to continuously engage and input through their participation in the PMU, the active involvement of some NDDRC units in the PMU remained marginal. At time of final evaluation the SPMUs were not operative first and foremost due to lack of staffing in the State offices. The SC met several times during the course of the Pilot Project and the TCC in the form of the Joint Operations Committee (JOC) while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC has brought together the major stakeholders including the UN family (in Phase 1).

1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification

138. The Project was designed to be implemented in three Phases with the design and implementation of Phase 2 Project Components being flexible enough to allow the Project to react to learning from Phase 1 and to the changing situation on the ground. Phase 3 was to consist largely of evaluation and learning.

139. As per the Project documentation the original Project Phase 1 was designed as a start-up phase running for three months (15th April to 31st November 2013) with the aim to “establish a HQ PMU institutional framework, mechanisms, systems and procedures and to contract Implementing Partners who will provide technical assistance and execute programme activities including setting up of economic activities falling under Component 2 [Livelihoods Support].”⁴³ Phase 1 largely ran to schedule until the suspension of the Project on 19th December 2013.

140. In the original Project documentation Phase 2 was designed as a follow-up and consolidation phase running for four months (1st December 2013 to 31st March 2014) with the aim of reinforcing outcomes from Phase 1 through follow-up reintegration services “either in the form of cooperatives, entrepreneurship around small farm activities or small enterprise training, or continued education and opportunities to ex-combatants and community members at their place of reintegration.”⁴⁴ As a result of the suspension of the Project Phase 2 ran from 15th May 2014 until 31st July 2014.

141. The project documentation identifies a third phase which was designed as the evaluation and knowledge transfer phase set to run between 1st April and 15th June 2014. This phase was intended to complete “M&E activities with a beneficiary assessment and community dynamics study, as well as an overall evaluation of the processes, systems and outcomes of the Pilot. The knowledge transfer process will be completed during this phase.”⁴⁵ In reality Phase 3 has not been a distinct phase and of those planned-for activities that have been implemented they have come towards the close of the Project: XC satisfaction survey conducted in July/August 2013, end evaluation in August and September 2014 with a follow-up learning session planned for October 2014.

142. Aside from minor scheduling changes Phase 1 was implemented as planned however as noted above the Project was suspended on 19th December, 2014 due to the deteriorating security

⁴³ September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 42.

⁴⁴ Ibid: 43.

⁴⁵ Ibid: 43.

situation. The major implementation challenge arising from the suspension was that no progress had been made on activities in Component: DDR Community Support Projects. Activities were rescheduled to Phase 2 when the IA exceeded planned Project outcomes. The IA exceeded the planned-for number of outputs due to cost savings on construction that were subsequently put to use in an additional 5 sites.

143. Phase 2 was very lightly designed in order to allow the Project to adjust to learnings from Phase 1 and from the MTR. At design Phase 2 had the following aims:

- (a) Visit all livelihood projects, that is where ex-combatants have formed working groups (partnerships, associations or cooperatives) once;
- (b) Ensure at least three follow-up counselling sessions with ex-combatants during their month-end visits to the NDDRC offices when they collect their monthly salaries; and
- (c) If necessary visit enterprises that are reported to be failing and as feasible, provide additional mentoring assistance to address challenges.⁴⁶

144. Phase 2 encountered a rapidly deteriorating security situation and so implementation was postponed until 15th May, 2013. In the interim period partners in the Project design engaged around potential activities for Phase 2. Based on learning from Phase 1 and the MTR the originally planned-for activities were largely overhauled. Regarding the intended aims of Phase 2 the original quantitative indicators (numbers of visits to ex-combatants, number of counselling sessions) were discarded and replaced with the following activities and justifications. More detailed exploration of outputs and outcomes from Phase two is included in Section 2 and 3 below.

145. Component: Livelihoods Support:

- (a) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives to training NDDRC ICRS workers. The justification for this shift is to retain expertise in the NDDRC and increase the capacity of ICRS workers to deliver technical counselling to ex-combatants. This design element was initiated by the NDDRC SC and implemented by UNICON.
- (b) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Agriculture (which included modules on numeracy and literacy, establishing a seed business, business planning and cooperatives) to including Agricultural Extension Workers from the State Ministry of Agriculture. The justification for this shift is: (i) to foster better cooperation with line ministries in the States, and (ii) to maximise delivery to ex-combatants and civilians as Agricultural Extension Workers work with both groups to dispense guidance of agricultural practices.
- (c) Inclusion of Technical Skills Extension: additional training mainly in auto mechanic and driving but also in carpentry, masonry and plumbing to ex-combatants. The justification for including these activities was the ex-combatant identified poor quality of training in Mapel TF in auto mechanic and driving as well as challenges faced by some ex-combatants obtaining their driving license and making use of the toolkit

⁴⁶ Ibid: 26.

received as part of this component in Phase 1. These activities were led by the NDDRC in cooperation with local training institutions in the State. A total of 52 individual participated in the driving classes whereas two ex-combatants received supplementary auto mechanics training.⁴⁷

- (d) Inclusion of planned expert mentoring visits by skilled trades people. This was intended to supplement vocational training received in Mapel TF however in reality this was a minor activity. The expert visits were limited to one welding expert, who visited the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes and mentored some ex-combatants who were trained in welding and now resided in those states.⁴⁸

146. Component: Institutional Capacity Building:

- (a) Inclusion of South-South exchange in M&E. Phase 1 saw the completion of the Institutional Capacity Building component however activities focusing on M&E capacity building were not completed to the required standard and staffing challenges in the NDDRC compromised the effectiveness of those same activities. The Project included a South-South exchange with the RDRC in order to deliver M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and to draft the M&E manual for the Commission.

147. The Project documentation identifies that activities in Phase 3 were to contain a Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) and Community Dynamics (CD) survey. As a result of the changed circumstance on the ground a decision was made by the NDDRC and TDRP to cancel the surveys and replace them with a Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey (BSS). This survey was implemented by ICRS caseworkers between June and August 2014 with a final report due to be completed in September 2014, authored by the Bank TT.

148. In summary these changes to the Project largely have been driven by the deteriorated security situation and by the in-built Project flexibility to react to learning.

⁴⁷ UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2.

⁴⁸ UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2.

2. Project Outcomes

149. Following is an examination of Project *outcome* at the time of the final evaluation of the Project. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories:

- (a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities);
- (b) The short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex-combatants and their communities as per the Project aims;
- (c) The shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

150. The Project logic model is such that at the time of final evaluation the Project should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in capacity in the NDDRC and acquisition by the Commission of systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge and skills acquired during the Project, thus positively changing its institutional performance both incrementally during the Project and in any future DDR programming.

151. The final evaluation finds that there have been behavioural shifts and knowledge shifts in the NDDRC in line with the aims of activities carried out in the Institutional Capacity Building component and also generally as a result successfully implementing reintegration programming in the Pilot.

152. Behavioural shifts and knowledge have resulted from activities in the Capacity Building Component in Phase 1 and in Phase 2. They have also resulted from the sum total of activities in the Pilot for example, where in some State offices staff have shown initiative and determination to maximise outcomes for ex-combatants and to proactively involve line ministries in supporting the Pilot programme (Section 2.1 below).

153. While without a Tracer and community survey it is difficult to measure the outcomes for beneficiaries of the project, certainly there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the Livelihoods Support component. Also there are reported positive outcomes for community members through the Community Supports Project as a result of having localised access to clean water. In all cases for ex-combatants and for community members the sustainability of outcomes is unclear and as discussed below (Section 2.1 and 2.3) there are mitigating factors negatively affecting some outcomes.

154. The MTR concluded that at the time of the review was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN in South Sudan.

155. As is discussed below (Section 2.2 and Section 3) the hiatus in DDR programming will have a major negative effect on the outcomes of the Project unless managed effectively by the

NDDRC with the support of the GoSS and the external partners to the Commission including not just BICC and TDRP but also UMMISS and donors. This is particularly the case regarding outcomes from the Institutional Capacity Building component and from the creation of an ICRS.

156. The loss of DDR from the UNMISS mandate is a major challenge to the NDDRC and the GoSS. For the NDDRC it constitutes the loss of a logistical support however it also represents an opportunity to re-engage the UN in a changed external and programmatic environment. The Commission are being proactive in seeking the re-incorporation of DDR in the UN mandate if renewed in November 2014 and it is imperative that this re-engagement is highly strategic and done with a view to maximising the input from the UN both as a thought-partner in the ‘good-enough coalitions’ that design and implement DDR programming and also as a logistical partner.

2.1. Livelihood Supports

157. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the Livelihood Supports component are:

- (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits;
- (b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field;
- (c) Nascent involvement of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component;
- (d) Increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants;
- (e) A majority of Project participants has started utilising the toolkits for livelihood activities;
- (f) Project participants have acquired additional vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge which many of them utilise to initiate livelihood opportunities;
- (g) Increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives).

158. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub-component. Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components.

159. Regarding learning how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition, transfer and quality control reporting from the field, in Phase 1 UNICON worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO. Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON’s operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organisation and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organisation, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard

expected by UNICON. In Phase 2 recommendations regarding this issue were considered by the IA leading to improved reporting and less complicated implementation structures to deliver the training sub-component.

160. As mentioned above in Phase 1 all livelihood activities (training and start-up kit subcomponent) were implemented by the IA and sub-contracted service providers with no direct involvement of the Line Ministries on State level. In line with the National DDR Strategic Plan (2012-2020), the collaboration with the line ministries was significantly strengthened in Phase 2. In WBGs, for instance, the NDDRC State Office closely coordinated pilot reintegration activities with various Ministries on State level to maximize gains for ex-combatants. As a result of this collaboration selected groups of ex-combatants received additional reintegration benefits such as plots of land, timber and seeds.

161. Although these developments are still early stage, these are signs of a growing albeit loose relationship between the NDDRC and the State Ministries. Even though the above mentioned activities may have been more a result of a strong initiative of the respective NDDRC State office rather than a structured approach towards engaging State Ministries and it is uncertain to what extent this proactive involvement of the Ministries has been replicated in other States, the given example indicates that the DDR Programme can succeed in harmonizing its activities with other national stakeholders. The cooperation with the Ministries leads to greater alignment of the Pilot Project with the National DDR Strategic Plan that stipulates national institutions and local service providers to play a role in implementing the reintegration component.

162. As of now the collaboration between the NDDRC and the State Ministries on reintegration related issues appears to be loose and is at times characterized by ad hoc engagement and individual initiative. Consequentially, the related operational procedures and processes are – in parts - still unstructured and lack a holistic approach. It is, for instance, still unclear on what grounds groups of ex-combatants have received additional livelihood benefits (most importantly the level of formalisation of an association/cooperative) or what will be the impact on acquired land titles should a cooperative cease to persist. In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise such implementation arrangements. There is a risk that due to the imminent halt in the DDR Programme the emerging ties between NDDRC and other national stakeholders will stagnate thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the achieved Project outcomes.

163. Whereas in Phase 1 external trainers hired by the IA delivered training, in Phase 2 technical skills training was implemented in close collaboration with a variety of public and private and well-established local service providers. For instance, the IA coordinated its agricultural extension work with the State Ministry of Agriculture. In the agriculture context the IA trained extension workers in best practices and appropriate farming techniques. In addition targeted vocational trainings were provided to ex-combatants via existing vocational training institutions (e.g. ex-combatants enrolled in driving and mechanic courses with the Wau Vocational Training Centre; in Aweil and Rumbek ex-combatants joined classes at a driving/auto-mechanic school). This localised approach towards training not only helps to build the capacity of South Sudanese institutions and organisations but also is likely to be more cost-efficient than implementation arrangements involving external or international training institutions. With regard to future programming it remains to be seen whether the same approach can be applied. Especially when the programme is massively up scaled it is uncertain whether the existing local service providers have enough technical and human resources to handle large numbers of ex-combatants. As much it is feasible to utilise them in DDR operations, it will be

necessary to carefully assess their capacities prior to the Project start and scope the programmatic options for aligning with institution building work in the States.

164. The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. It is, however, not clear in how far the trainers were able to utilise the skills and knowledge they acquired in the TOT in the delivery of trainings to the ex-combatants. In light of the reported varying skills levels of extension workers and ICRS staff (in terms of technical but also literacy/numeracy skills) it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning short to medium term outcomes of the extension trainings.

165. According to Project documentation on the entrepreneurship TOT in Phase 2 the trainers were empowered to influence the ex-combatants and instil in them a positive attitude toward their resettlement with their communities through setting up cooperative based business enterprises. At time of the final evaluation it is clear that trainers can articulate the concepts of entrepreneurship and cooperatives and apply the training process. The trainers can also assist ex-combatants in taking key decisions concerning business start-ups.⁴⁹

166. Despite these positive gains a general critique about the TOT is that the training was relatively short given the amount of knowledge (on the training process and methods) that had to be imparted to the ICRS staff. The trained were granted limited time to develop certain key competencies and to absorb the training materials. Since the group of trainers changed from Phase 1 to Phase 2 the Project could also not build on the previous training and fieldwork, but had to start afresh thereby not being able to utilize the capabilities that had been built earlier in the Project.

167. The MTR identified that the Project assumed that reintegration programming, if implemented well, would increase confidence in the effectiveness of the DDR programme, and as a consequence, confidence in the NDDRC. The MTR noted that at the time of writing there was no evidence for this outcome. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these findings. Given the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013, the fragile security situation and ongoing mobilisation in the country there is generally little to no confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex-combatants and community members, relevant questions were not included in the Baseline surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with of SSR.

168. The expert visits that were introduced as a supplementary sub-component in Phase 2 had limited outcomes. While it was planned that a majority of ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration tracks receive a visit by an experienced professional with proven skills in their respective field, the expert visits were only offered by one welding expert. The limited reach of this activity was, according to the IA, due to lack of availability of experts in locations close to those of the corresponding ex-combatants, and the involvement of ex-combatants in agricultural work. The scaling-up of this sub-component in future programme iterations will be challenging as it is questionable whether there will be enough local experts available to carry out training on the job. Moreover, the amount of individual attention needed for each ex-combatant is very high and potentially not scalable.

⁴⁹Report by Lead Consultant to UNICON on TOT in phase 2

169. As mentioned above, the final evaluation faces challenges in measuring the outcomes for individual beneficiaries because of the missing tracer survey and constraining environmental factors. However, based on data of a Satisfaction Survey that was conducted in July/August 2014 by TDRP in close collaboration with NDDRC, it is nevertheless possible to at least identify broad trends.

170. The Satisfaction Survey aimed to find out: (i) the extent to which DDR participants are satisfied with the Pilot Programme; (ii) how well ex-combatants were reintegrated into the society; (iii) how they were faring in the host communities since being demobilized, and (iv) what were their subsequent embankments on the reintegrating process.⁵⁰ In total the survey had a sample size of 204 ex-combatants (70.3 percent of the current caseload) including 192 males and 12 females.⁵¹

171. The results of the Satisfaction Survey show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The available data though, especially around the establishment of cooperatives and associations has to be analysed with some degree of caution because there appears to be some conflict around the concept of cooperatives in the South Sudanese context (especially the clear distinction between cooperatives, associations and working groups). For future DDR programming clear-cut guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved including line ministries.

172. According to the Satisfaction Survey results the overwhelming majority of respondents (70 percent) indicate to be very or somewhat satisfied with the toolkit they received and most (89.1 percent) remarked that they know how to utilise the tools. Those respondents that had attended the animal husbandry, masonry and auto mechanic/driving classes in Mapel reported lowest levels of satisfaction with the toolkit. The respondents that express dissatisfaction with the toolkit mostly criticise that the tools were of low quality and easy to break and that parts of the tools were missing upon delivery. Another point of concern was raised regarding the types of toolkits. The study finds that 46.5 percent of the respondents mention that the toolkits they had received did not match to what was used at the vocational trainings at Mapel which obviously is a crucial point to consider in future DDR programming. Concerning the short to medium term livelihood impact of the toolkits the survey results show that the majority of respondents still make use of the materials they have received. The study finds that 61.4 percent indicate to frequently or sometimes use the kit, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks.

173. Regarding the vocational skills training in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those ex-combatants that received an auto mechanic training). The study finds that 71.3 percent of those respondents that indicate to utilise the vocational training skills mention they taught other family or community members the skills they acquired in Mapel, 57.3 percent state to make use of what they were taught to solve things in the household whereas more than half (51.3 percent) indicate to use the acquired skills to improve their own business. The respondents who report not to have used the vocational skills give as reasons that access to capital

⁵⁰See Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (Draft in Progress)

⁵¹Due to logistical and security constraints not all programme participants took part in the survey.

was lacking (69.8 percent), that they did not have the right tools (51.2 percent) and that the training was not sufficient/they did not learn enough (39.5 percent).

174. Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants (74.5 percent of the sample) report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes). Amongst the respondents that attended the carpentry course the overwhelming majority (93.3 percent) is still working in the same vocation, followed by the group of respondents that attended agriculture lessons (91.8 percent are still active in agriculture). For the other vocational tracks these figures are slightly or much lower. The study finds that 69.2 percent of respondents that attended the electrician course still work in that vocation, for auto mechanics this figure is 62.3 percent (which is an somewhat surprising result given the low level of satisfaction with the training course), welding 57.1 percent and animal husbandry 46.7 percent. The interviewees that attended the masonry and plumbing course are least successful in this respect.

175. These results show that some of the vocational trainings have not been thoroughly linked to marketable skills and knowledge was not always imparted in line with the market realities. Some vocations were simply not beneficial for starting relevant business in the communities of return. This is in part resulting from the lack of counselling on what technical skills would be useful in relation to the market opportunities in the ex-combatants' respective locations.⁵² The lack of thorough market analysis has already been a point of criticism in the CPA DDR programme - these lessons learned have obviously not been adequately mirrored in the National DDR pilot Project.

176. Out of the sample of 204 ex-combatants only 3 respondents did not take part in the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperative training in Mapel. The overwhelming majority of the respondents who participated in the course affirmed that they acquired new knowledge, with 59.9 percent indicating to have learned a lot and 31.2 percent to have gathered some new knowledge. The greater majority of participants (73.5 percent) claimed to have used some or a lot of that knowledge and skills in their daily lives whereas 6.4 percent only used very little of what was learned. Only 13.7 percent of respondents mentioned not to utilise the entrepreneurship skills. Amongst this group most respondents (79.2 percent) gave as a reason that there is no opportunity to apply the knowledge. This hints at the lack of economic opportunities and limited absorption capacity of the market in South Sudan which is a major stumbling block for many ex-combatants.

177. Those survey participants that reported using the entrepreneurship skills utilise them when working with other people (83.4 percent). Another 67.5 percent within that group also notes that they had formed a cooperative or that they were in the process of forming one (31.1 percent). This correlates with data received by the NDDRC on the formation of cooperatives in the Pilot Project. In total 17 livelihood groups⁵³ were set up across Greater Bahr el Gahazal of which most are not registered cooperatives as such but in the process of registering. These findings confirm that the training was effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. This, however, does not mean that ex-combatants solely focus on such livelihood forms. When asked how the entrepreneurship skills were utilized more than half (57.0 percent) of the respondents claim that they managed to

⁵²See also UNICON. *Consultancy to Implement the Livelihoods Support Component– Phase 2. Comments and Recommendation based on Interaction with Trainers after Phase II Follow-up* (unofficial document).

⁵³7 in Warrap State, 5 in WBGs and 5 in NBGS

establish a business. More than a third (34.4 percent) says they utilized the skills to improve on an existing business while a slight less number of the respondents (29.1 percent) mention to have found an employment opportunity because of the entrepreneurship training they received.

178. Out of the 204 respondents that took part in the survey 203 participated in a follow-up business or cooperative training after leaving Mapel, with most of them (80.5 percent) receiving training for two full days or more. Similar to the results of the Mapel training, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicate that the supplementary training on entrepreneurship and financial literacy taught them a lot or some additional knowledge (93.6 percent) and more than three quarters (80.5 percent) still make use of the training to a large or some degree. These results clearly indicate a positive impact of the State level training.

179. Other indicators convey a rather mixed picture of the economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries. In order to meet their household expenses at the end of each month, more than one third of the respondents (37.9 percent) report that they usually have to borrow from someone else, another 25.6 percent on the other hand mentions that they usually break-even and another 23.6 percent states that they usually have money left over. Equally mixed findings came out of the survey when respondents were asked whether their income changed because of the vocational training they received. 42.6 percent report that their income increased, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning.

180. When comparing the livelihood activities of the respondents before and after going through the DDR programme, there are some slight changes visible. The most striking change is the increased participation in registered cooperatives (of more than 21 people). While only 0.7 percent of the sample indicates to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR. This figure of 18.0 percent is high and must be interpreted with caution. There is a high likelihood that this increase in-group livelihood activities results from the trainings and counselling around cooperative business.

181. The final evaluation finds that this result is a positive outcome of the livelihood support component that should, however, not be over-interpreted. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and value in terms of creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants. As helpful as cooperatives are in creating a supportive environment for ex-combatants and the communities involved, cooperatives need to be understood in the broader market context and its absorption capacity. Not every vocation is equally suited for cooperative business and not every cooperative has a potential to succeed which is a point that needs to be taken into consideration more thoroughly in future DDR programming.

182. Socially, most interviewed ex-combatants (79.8 percent) mention not to face any challenges back in their home communities. The overwhelming majority report that their communities were accepting them after their return from Mapel and that they did not face any hostile or jealous reactions from other community members because of the reintegration assistance they received or their salaries. When asked about their expectations with regard to their military status upon completion of the DDR programme, 85.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they regard themselves as civilian whereas only 14.8 percent expected that they would continue to be a Wounded Hero. Although not every DDR participant hence seems to have understood or accepted that they cease to be part of the military, the overwhelming majority of

participants do acknowledge the transition process from soldier to civilian. In this respect the programme's outcomes have been moderately positive.

2.2. Institutional Capacity Building

183. The main Institutional Capacity Building component was implemented in Phase 1 of the Project and assessed at the time of the MTR (at the close of Phase 1). At the time of the MTR the outcomes of the activities in this component had focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the seeding of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. The component was intended to produce difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. The MTR identified that at the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component had been:

- (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank;
- (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same;
- (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project;
- (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation;
- (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation;
- (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC.

184. The MTR noted that at the close of Phase 1 the main outcomes from the Project components had been: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, and (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO).

185. As seen above (Section 1.5) Phase 2 supplementary activities under this Component were the M&E capacity building delivered as a South-South exchange with the RDRC. Supplementary capacity building activities implemented outside the component were: (i) the technical capacity building of the IT unit and ICRS workers around the ICRS; (ii) the programming and installation of the ICRS itself; (iii) training of ICRS case workers in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (iv) training of ICRS in delivering a PDA-based survey (the satisfaction survey). Both the ICRS and the satisfaction survey are not financed under the Project but are complementary activities implemented by the World Bank TT.

186. At the time of the final evaluation the medium term outcomes of these supplementary trainings are hard to predict. Certainly in the short term and depending on the individual concerned some of the ICRS workers will have increased understanding and skills in the basics of the financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives, as well as increased skills in delivering a PDA-based survey.

187. The NDDRC IT has experienced an increase in technical skills around working with the ICRS as a result of the training and technology transfer however as flagged by the Bank TT itself and by the IT unit there is a need for additional support and some technical functions cannot be actioned by the unit without the direct support of the Bank TT's IT consultant.

188. Similarly ICRS case-workers may have received a variety of training inputs but how these inputs can or will influence performance in the field is not clear. This Project evaluation does not constitute an institutional assessment and did not take a scientific approach to examine how the NDDRC works in the field however, though observation it is clear that the innovation and achievements evident in those State offices visited by the evaluation arise largely from the initiative and capability of the staff there. In such situations then the training may have a more-than-short-term impact.

189. Performance is influenced by many factors and at the State level where the group of NDDRC staff (ICRS workers) who have been most highly targeted by capacity building during the Project work, performance is severely negatively influenced by the critical lack of infrastructure and resources. Negative impacts of poor resource allocations resulting from the austerity budget (from delays in payment of salaries to basic budgeting items) have been exacerbated by the loss of critical infrastructure as a result of UNMISS withdrawing support (generators, power, transport) and the effects of the ongoing deterioration in security. These factors affect HQ but are far more striking at State level. The factors influencing performance are augmented by the pause in activity by some parts of the NDDRC as it waits to see where DDR will be situated and the wider SSR environment that emerges from the Addis negotiations and the current instability (Section 4).

190. In summary, all these factors contribute to a continuous erosion of 'institutional capacity'. Apart from the shape of the ICRS unit, much of the nascent systems and positive ways of working that emerged during Phase 1 have all but disappeared. Arguably the ICRS unit itself while functioning is indicative of what the IA identified as the problematic institutional arrangements and organisational structure in the NDDRC⁵⁴: it is evidence of an organisation imbalance both in terms of activity and in terms of information flow which will need to be addressed in any future programming and through the proactive leadership of the NDDRC itself.

191. The MTR identified that M&E capacity building in Phase 1 was impeded by a lack of staffing in the NDDRC. Despite the implementation of M&E capacity building activities in Phase 2 a similar situation exists now in the Commission and so M&E capabilities appear at best, rudimentary.

192. The Project did not engage in capacity building activities around public information partly because this field was covered by other partner institutions to the NDDRC such as UNMISS and BICC. Therefore the public information and communications agenda was technically outside the scope of the reintegration pilot. The NDDRC and UNMISS PI departments though faced crucial funding challenges that significantly aggravated sensitisation efforts and outreach. Although the NDDRC in collaboration with its partners carried out sensitisation events in the assembly areas prior to the start of the DDR programme, not all potential DDR candidates could be reached (partly because of lack of cooperation on the side of

⁵⁴October 30th, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC.

the SPLA commanders, difficult access to the XCs' home communities and wounded heroes communication channels being by word of mouth, discrepancy between profiled caseload and actual programme beneficiaries). Due to this gap in sensitisation ex-combatants had different and sometimes overly high expectations for their reinsertion training. Although the DDR trainers were providing orientation to the XCs upon their arrival and additional sensitisation sessions in Mapel were carried out during the reinsertion period to counter lack of sensitisation, the information provided to XCs was incomplete and lacked coherence. General information about the DDR programme during reintegration was provided by the ICRS caseworkers but not in a structured manner (i.e. following the PI strategy). For future programme iterations it will therefore be crucial to better integrate sensitisation activities throughout reinsertion and reintegration programming (e.g. information dissemination about the DDR process should be closely linked to the vocational and life skills modules). Moreover, sufficient funding needs to be availed to cover the sensitisation campaigns for the targeted recipient needs.⁵⁵

2.3 DDR Community Support Projects

193. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the DDR Community Support component are:

- (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with high concentration of ex-combatants;
- (b) Improved access to clean water for target communities where water projects were implemented;
- (c) Learning regarding the effectiveness of Community Driven Development/Reconstruction (CDD/R) Projects in the DDR context.

194. At the time of the MTR no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects were reported due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19th, 2013. The timing for the community projects turned out to be a major factor influencing Project implementation. Due to the rainy season most selected sites were completely inaccessible for several months that not only negatively affected the pace of construction works but also hindered the IA from travelling to the communities to carry out community mobilizations. Seasonal changes in South Sudan thus have to be taken into account more thoroughly in planning future DDR phases.

195. Despite the mentioned implementation challenges the IA none the less managed to deliver the required outputs after a no cost extension was issued by the WB until end of May 2014. The Project highly benefited from the IA's experience with similar types of community based Projects.

196. The evaluation finds that there seems to be an increased understanding within NDDRC of what is necessary to facilitate implementation of CDD/R projects. Through collaboration with IOM on the community sub-component the NDDRC State offices engaged in varying degrees with the communities of return although the individual livelihood support was more in the centre of NDDRC's attention. Confusion only arose with regard to the bidding process as the NDDRC seemed not be aware that the Project had to follow IOM's procurement procedures and therefore suggested utilising the GoSS procurement policy. Through a very transparent bid analysis involving the relevant NDDRC departments this issue could be solved. However, future projects

⁵⁵ See also NDDRC's internal lessons learned paper (December 2013).

should ensure that all actors are aware of the partners' respective policies and that knowledge about procurement procedures is widely spread within the organisations.

197. The community projects have brought a positive change for target communities. Although the final evaluation did not have a chance to appraise all 17 projects and only 2 sites were visited in WBS (water interventions/boreholes)⁵⁶, the evaluation find that the interventions that were assessed are providing direct and clear benefits to the communities and appear to meet local needs and priorities. For example, one water Project in WBS provided more than 1050 people with clean water which exemplifies the strong impact the Project has on local health and development.

198. The objectives of the community support projects, in particularly the overall aim to promote peacebuilding in the pilot States and the goal to demonstrate NDDRC's commitment to the larger community, are overly ambitious given the relatively small size of the sub-component. Concluding from the field visits completed in the frame of the final evaluation it appears that the communities concerned were only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC. The lack of understanding in the community of the link between DDR and local development might be partly due to the small caseload with only some few ex-combatants resettling in certain areas, it puts into question the Project's aspiration to demonstrate NDDRC's commitment to the larger community. In future one possible way to go would be to increase the scale of the community interventions to ensure visibility and to distinguish the DDR Community Support Projects from other Projects implemented by different organizations in the same community. Instead of linking the community projects to the work of DDR Commission the Project would rather emphasise its peace dividend aspect and the fact that through the assimilation of ex-combatants the community receives additional benefits. Alternatively a coherent sister CDD programme separate from DDR could replace activities.

199. The final evaluation finds that the Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types. The focus on water interventions and market rehabilitation, which originated from the belief that these interventions are simple to implement, restricted the options that were presented to the communities hence minimizing their level of engagement. An exception was the completion of the Payam building in NBS that followed a purely community driven approach (the community requested the completion of the unfinished Payam office which was of high priority but outside the preferred project categories of water and marketplace improvements). The building was completed using local skilled and unskilled labourers from the community, an approach that reinforced the community's ownership of the project.

200. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees. However, as the MTR found, both the experience of IOM in previous projects in South Sudan (outside DDR which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these risks.

⁵⁶Sites that were visited in the frame of final evaluation: 1.) Nyikejo Village (Jur River County, Rochdog Payam, WBS); 2.) Nyinalel (Jur River County, Marial Bai Payam, WBS)

201. Although the evaluation did not use an impact evaluation to assess the impact of the DDR community projects on the target population, there is anecdotal evidence that the communities have little capacity to manage newly constructed infrastructural resources in the medium and long term. Although the IA delivered trainings to members of the water management committees and consequentially knowledge on infrastructure maintenance was imparted to the community, it remains questionable whether these skills will be utilised in future. Ideally, follow-up training or refresher courses in repair and maintenance would be needed to ensure sustainability of the training impact, as would access to spare parts.

202. The community members interviewed for this study all expressed concern that in case the water borehole breaks down the community will lack the necessary financial resources to purchase the needed spare parts. Instead of seeking sustainable and self-reliant solutions to this problem (such as structured savings for the pump installation), most interviewees stressed that they would rather look for assistance from the NDDRC or other government institutions. This exemplifies a strong aid dependency that puts the CDD/R projects at risk and also aggravates the implementation of any future community project of that kind.

2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition

203. As a pilot the Project must be orientated towards trialling systems and institutional capability, documenting learning and auctioning relevant learning.

204. The MTR found that by design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing and disseminating learning. The MTR identified that throughout design and implementation that the Bank TT had worked progressively with the NDDRC, the IAs and with key external stakeholders to emphasise the learning-orientation of the Project. The final evaluation finds that the Bank TT and IAs were consistent in their orientation towards learning as evidenced by the volume of learning content in IA reporting to the Bank identifying pertinent issues and tracking challenges and recommendations for future programming including in areas outside the purview of particular IAs but within their scope of operation.

205. Also the MTR identified that the NDDRC was eager to learn by doing but that logistical challenges and human capacity were limiting factors on the ability of the Commission to fully engage and implement learning. The MTR found that the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design. Critically, the NDDRC and the Project architects should reflect fully on the recommendations and reporting of all IAs including those further down the delivery chain particularly the Training Professional Dr. Guatam Raj Jain and the Trainers who worked during Phase 1 of the Livelihoods Support Component. In place of the now-cancelled evaluation of the Mapel TF and the programme implemented there the NDDRC should engage UN thought partners in a full review of the both the programmatic learning and strategic learning from the Project interrogating all assumptions of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility including that the appropriate way to design DDR in South Sudan is using the Transition Facility Approach. Any Phase 3 learning sessions should incorporate stakeholders from the wider South Sudan DDR programming environment.

206. Observing *programmatic learning pertaining to activities*, the final evaluation finds that the learning orientation of the Project persisted into Phase 2. IAs successfully improved field M&E to accurately track outputs and short-term outcomes and the NDDRC worked to collate and manage data from the field. It should be noted that data collection in such complex, fragile and insecure areas as those presented by the Project is highly challenging and often problematic. That

said at a programme level the data-collection by IAs and that of the NDDRC has some limitations. For both the IAs and the NDDRC data pertaining to outcomes particularly numbers of functional cooperatives/associations is not reliable. For the NDDRC data sharing and learning sharing within the NDDRC is limited. This appears partly to be a result of institutional imbalance and partly a result of disconnection between human systems in the Commission (which is perpetuated by resource challenges and lack of connectivity between HQ and State offices).

207. As identified in the MTR for learning to be useful it must be actioned. The Project has demonstrated how the NDDRC can implement a pilot reintegration project and it has tracked consistently the opportunities and challenges of the implementation. The question is how the NDDRC and the Project Architects will systematically reflect on programmatic learning; on strategic learning and on how the two interrelate. Critically the learning from the Project while largely programmatic also has relevance to the wider strategic context including the design of any future DDR programming, the necessity of aligning DDR and SSR, and critically ensuring transparent GoSS buy-in to that same DDR and SSR.

3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

208. The evaluation finds that the Project has **satisfactorily** provided ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio-economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio-economic objective).

209. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed **highly satisfactorily** generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed **moderately satisfactorily** to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective).

210. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

211. At the time of final evaluation (end of Phase 2 of 3) the Project has made good progress towards meeting of its Project objectives and appears on course to meet its remaining objectives. The MTR documented how the project despite early implementation challenges had recovered to successfully implement the majority of activities in Phase 1 except those negatively affected by factors outside the control of the Project: activities in the Component Community Support Projects were affected by environmental issues and activities in the Component Institutional Capacity Building were affected by human capacity in the NDDRC.

212. The factors affecting the implementation and outcomes of the Pilot can be classified as: (i) those directly related to the Project design; (ii) those related to institutional capacity and arrangements, and (iii) those related to the external environment including the security, policy and donor environment

213. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows.

214. The factors **negatively** affecting the Project outcomes since the beginning of the pilot, some of which (as outlined below) have been addressed by the Project implementers are:

- (a) Limited institutional capacity of the NDDRC;
- (b) The external environment;
- (c) The external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants;
- (d) Data management regarding outcomes of Components Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains (addressed since the MTR);
- (e) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation (addressed since the MTR);
- (f) Quality of some outputs (addressed since the MTR).

215. The factors **positively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme (as per MTR);
- (b) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies (as per MTR);

- (c) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP (as per MTR) in cooperation with BICC;
- (d) Responsiveness and ability of IAs to become operational for Phase 2 in a short notice period;
- (e) Flexibility of IAs in reacting to a somewhat iterative project design (see point a previous paragraph);
- (f) Cooperation with line Ministries in the States.

216. Design limitations such as internal coherence, timing and the use of delivery chains.

The MTR found that in Phase 1 the implementation of the Project during the season when ex-combatants would normally tend their land negatively impacted on the achievement of outcomes relating to sustainable livelihoods by ex-combatants. However the timeframe for the Project implementation was largely outside the control of the key stakeholders other than the NDDRC as the Project was required to align with the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project that itself was poorly timed.

217. The external security environment heavily influenced the timing of Phase 2. The MTR found that the Project appeared to lack some internal coherence with a wide spread of activities matched in the Project documentation with a too-ambitious set of objectives. Similarly the MTR found that the use of delivery chains, particularly in the Component: Livelihood Supports compromised quality control and contributed to unnecessary challenges implementing training activities.

218. Some Phase 2 activities such as training under Component Livelihood Supports do not present a coherent 'flow' or logic from the Phase 1 activities. The decision to capacity build ICRS caseworkers through TOT went against the advice of the lead trainer and designer of the training curriculum and missed the opportunity to capitalise on progress made with independent consultants in the States in Phase 1. The decision to use Phase 2 to compensate for shortcomings in the training given by UNESCO in the Mapel TF (training that is programmatically unconnected to the Project) appears out of sync with the intention of a Pilot and rather appears to be compensating for the performance of other agencies in Phase 1. However that the supplementary training was delivered through local vocational institutions rather than through trainers in a Transition Facility is an important point proving that the capacity to train ex-combatants exists in the vocational training sector.

219. In Phase 2 the IA (UNICON) successfully addressed issues relating to the use of delivery chains to deliver training to ex-combatants experienced during Phase 1. In Phase 2 the IA showed a much better understood the environment and the challenges to implementation and expertly dealt with challenges encountered during implementation.

220. Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation. The IAs addressed all effectiveness and implementation delays experienced in Phase 1 and documented in the MTR (effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there). UNICON did not experience any of the effectiveness and implementation challenges it encountered in Phase 1. The IOM exceeded its delivery targets and completed all activities on time.

221. The **external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants.** The Project documentation identifies that along with testing delivery systems the Livelihood Support component will

“provide livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success.”⁵⁷ This outcome of ‘long-term livelihood success’ is greatly influenced by the external environment but also by the reality of the local markets into which ex-combatants are integrated.

222. The training given to ex-combatants by the Project is closely tied to the skills imparted during the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel. While the Project can train ex-combatants in cooperatives and entrepreneurship any outcome from that training is limited by the vocation in which the ex-combatant was trained, the quality of that training and the demand for those newly acquired vocational skills in the market place. With some vocational training it is clear that there is little obvious demand for cooperatives: for example, welding. In the case of welding the Wau ex-combatant welders’ cooperative that was formed during Phase 1 (and had land granted to it from the Ministry of Land and Physical Infrastructure via the NDDRC State office and was given a generator and plasma torch); at the time of the final evaluation this cooperative of six ex-combatants had dissolved. One ex-combatant remained in an unpaid apprenticeship with a local civilian welder. The fate of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative illustrates a clear underlying weakness in the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project which negatively impacts on the outcomes of the Project: the vocational training given to ex-combatants is based on a very general and macro-level UN-led assessment of market opportunities.

223. Unfortunately the UN has not conducted a final evaluation of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project so the effectiveness of the vocational training programme has not been measured however; from the observable evidence the main form of cooperative or associative working that is yielding returns for ex-combatants appears to be for those trained in agriculture, not the other vocational skills. This reflects a critical challenge that is universal in vocational training programmes in DDR: how the vocational training aligns with the absorptive capacity of the market.

224. Activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component encouraging the formation of cooperatives have faced other challenges. One such challenge has been the lack of clarity around the officially acceptable definition of a cooperative. In South Sudan the required number of members to register as a cooperative is 21 people: which even within the agriculture sector is a limiting factor. In reality the line ministry at the State accepts a lower number of members when recognising a cooperative but there is no set definition. Consequently the line ministry in Western Bahr al Ghazal accepted six members to register the Wau ex-combatant welding cooperative but such decisions appear to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Consequently a lack of clarity exists around how to advise ex-combatants and community members to form cooperatives.

225. The **lack of standardisation and systems** at ministerial level and in the NDDRC presents a risk factor to the NDDRC. In the case of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperatives the NDDRC state office managed to secure a grant of a parcel of land from the line ministry to enable the cooperative develop a premises or site for trading. However as with the granting of timber to the Wau carpentry cooperative (a cooperative which at the time of the final evaluation was one person as the others were reported by the remaining members as absent tending their lands) the granting of land has been on a case-by-case basis and highly reliant on the industry of the NDDRC staff thus leading to the possibility of the NDDRC being accused of bias when one cooperative gets a grant of an asset and another does not.

⁵⁷ September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25.

226. With the dissolution of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative the NDDRC is faced with the unusual situation of a land title granted to a non-existent cooperative without any clear systematic way of managing that land or the grant of land itself. In such a situation the NDDRC is faced with a reputation risk where state offices can be perceived as acquiring land for itself. Regardless of such reputational risk, purely for the harmonization of systems and to accurately gauge how to scale such important support from the line ministries it is imperative that the NDDRC formalises all the relevant definitions and procedures around cooperatives and granting of assets or resources by line ministries.

227. **Quality of outputs.** As documented in the MTR, at the end of Phase 1 in the Component Institutional Capacity Building the Project encountered poor quality baseline reporting and M&E manual from ASI/IR. The MTR noted how the M&E manual produced by ASI/IR was not completed to the highest standard so during Phase 2 and the Project employed South-South exchanges to address short fallings in the M&E activities of the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component. The outputs of the Phase 2 activities have included a good quality draft M&E manual however the NDDRC still does not have an M&E unit or the capacity to manage high quality M&E so there is no evidence of outcomes from the M&E activities.

228. The **institutional limitations** encountered by the M&E activities reflect a larger challenge encountered by the Project and which faces any future DDR programming. As documented during Phase 1 by the IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component the NDDRC is hamstrung by an unbalanced organisational structure and staffing challenges. Despite the creation of the PMU by the Project as an attempt to balance information sharing and engender engagement of staff in the NDDRC by the close of Phase 2, a limited number of staff have been involved in the implementation. The IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component warned that the creation of the PMU is a useful mechanism to ensure project implementation but it avoids the greater need to reform the organisational structure of the NDDRC and ensure that staff of all levels is engaged. The final evaluation finds that this finding remains salient. Furthermore the tendency to concentrate capacity building in the ICRS unit is likely to have further imbalanced the organisational structure of the NDDRC.

229. The negative impacts of the lopsided organizational structure are exacerbated by staff churn and the difficulties faced by the NDDRC to meet basic operational costs and salaries under austerity budgets and in the current security environment. A further exacerbating factor is the loss of logistical support as a result of the UN removing DDR from the current mandate of the organisation: in the States UN-supplied generators are locked and the NDDRC can no longer work through the UN to travel from Juba to the State offices.

230. The factors in the **external environment** negatively influencing the outcomes of the Project were as follows:

- (a) Breakdown in security and postponement of the beginning of Phase 2 until May 2014;
- (b) Loss of DDR in the UN mandate;
- (c) Refocusing of donor strategy on humanitarian response;
- (d) Continued lack of active support of the GoSS for DDR.

231. All of these factors are highly relevant to the design of any future DDR programming in South Sudan.

232. The breakdown in the security environment in December 2013 and the resulting postponement of Phase 2 had the potential to derail the remaining Phases of the Project. Arguably the most observable negative impact of the postponement has been on internal systems and capacity in the NDDRC as built during the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component and as created by the Project implementation structures (PMU, SPMU, SC).

233. In Phase 2 much of the nascent systems and ways of working that emerged from activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component have disappeared. This is both at HQ and at State level where mentors worked with the NDDRC to build capacity. Structures such as the PMU and SPMUs have not been functional during Phase 2 and so as outlined above, work to implement the Project has become concentrated in a small number of staff in the NDDRC.

234. Despite this it is clear that some cumulative outcomes of the experience of the Project remain. There is an increased sense of empowerment that, if offered the opportunity, the NDDRC can lead DDR programming. Some state-level staff show a clear increase in capacity, drive and innovation but the evaluation cannot conclude that this is pervasive as only one State was visited by the team.

235. The MTR found that prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA. The final evaluation finds that as the Project draws to a close the external environment is highly challenging to securing many of the outcomes from the Project.

236. Clearly the ongoing conflict in the country is dynamic however it is unclear how or where DDR fits in any future scenario. It can be argued that the failure of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel to secure the appropriate caseload of ex-combatants for DDR reflected a lack of buy-in by the GoSS and the SPLA. While progress was made to secure the outward support of the GoSS such as through ministerial visits to Mapel during graduation it remains the case that South Sudan is in conflict with widespread recruitment into all factions of the SPLA and in that context the real outcome of the Project: to show national leadership by the NDDRC and to visibly build the capacity of the NDDRC to lead future DDR programming is threatened. Without highest-level buy-in to both DDR and SSR any capacity built in the NDDRC will gradually dissipate as it 'waits' for direction to come from GoSS on DDR or SSR. Consequently it is critical that the NDDRC appropriately strategize about future DDR and that other stakeholders in particularly the donor community engage the parties in the Addis talks on DDR and SSR.

237. This last point is critical: engagement on future DDR and SSR programming must come at all levels in order to create any possibility on future DDR programming. Furthermore, the NDDRC must not sit idle, waiting for any decision but rather should be supported by donors and the GoSS at the least to prepare a properly designed, considered and strategized DDR/SSR programme that takes full cognisance of the heterogeneity of groups that may undergo DDR. The NDDRC and its critical thought partners (including the UN, ideally with a renewed DDR mandate even if only in limited fashion) should consider all aspects not just of the Project but also of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel and fully interrogate the assumptions, modalities and efficiencies of what has been implemented.

238. Urgently the NDDRC, its donors and the GoSS must strategize around the wholesale refocusing of the donor community on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and find space for the preparatory strategic and programmatic work for further DDR-SSR programming. Critically

there must be highest level buy-in in all parties to the Addis talks to the relevance and potential of DDR-SSR in South Sudan.

239. While there were challenges arising from the kind of vocational training given to ex-combatants in Mapel overall the implementation and outcomes of the Project were positively influenced by **the fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Reintegration programme**. As noted in the MTR in Phase 1 the design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project.

240. The **strong relationship** between the Bank TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO helped the Bank TT approach the Project in a holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. In Phase 2 this is less relevant as the Project was attempting to build on its own outputs from Phase 1.

241. Throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 a critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the **intensive support of the Bank TT and BICC** and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank's presence on the ground in Phase 1 and 2, and BICC's presence on the ground in Phase 1 has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC.

242. The **ability of IAs in Phase 2: UNICON and IOM, to become effective in the field at short notice** have proven crucial to the implementation of the Project. For UNICON overcoming and learning from implementation delays in Phase 1 greatly improved their performance and the IA had significant work to manage to redesign training curriculum for Phase 2. For IOM, familiarity with the activities and with the environment proved instrumental in the timely implementation of activities.

243. As noted above **cooperation with line ministries** has yielded results at State level including granting land and materials (teak and seeds for example) to some cooperatives. The project targeted line ministries by including agricultural extension workers in training implemented as part of the Livelihood Support component. In the case of the involvement of line ministries granting land and materials it is important that the NDDRC in cooperation with the various ministries develop guidelines and criteria for such assistance. At the time of the final evaluation it is not clear how including agricultural extension workers in livelihoods training affects how they in turn work with ex-combatants and the communities particularly given the extreme resource challenges for workers in the line ministry. However it is clear that this inclusion is an important step to building positive working relationships with the ministries that could yield good outcomes in the future.

3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

244. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. It is noted that at the time of the final evaluation project documentation is being redrafted to align with the learning from Phase 1 and the MTR. The available project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively

affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, for both Phase 1 and 2 the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of good quality and intensive.

3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation

245. Overall, the identification of risks has been **satisfactory** however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner.

246. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Project has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project. Phase 3 of the Project should clearly orientate itself to actioning two distinct categories of learning: (i) learning pertaining to project design and implementation and (ii) learning pertaining to strategic engagement in SSR and DDR for the future.

3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank

247. As per the MTR the final evaluation finds that the Project M&E framework is a high-level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs:

- (a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured.
- (b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned.
- (c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction.

248. The MTR findings around the efficacy of the Scorecard indicators, the over-ambitious nature of project objectives and the lack of indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a pilot project: that is, one orientated towards trialling, learning and innovation were not acted upon. Rather Bank M&E consisted of BTOR/AM, improved IA reporting and close monitoring of activities on the ground. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on –the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered.

249. The evaluation re-affirms the finding of the MTR that the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies.

3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance

250. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme:

- (a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning.

251. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Project has been compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011.

252. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the Bank TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary.

253. The principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity should be front and centre in any strategizing by the NDDRC regarding future programming. They should guide thinking that explicitly addressed the heterogeneity of the ex-combatants that may be targeted in any future DDR programme. Specifically, the logic that there is one army (SPLM) and that that army is an army of returned victorious heroes must be deconstructed as plainly that is not the current reality. The risks of the GoSS strategy of incorporating rebel groups into the national army as a modality of SSR-DDR must be fully interrogated.

4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR

4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design

254. The Project's objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS (now closed) and ISN FY 13-14.

255. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012).

256. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2.

257. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

258. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

259. The Project was interlinked with the MDTF-SS in three ways:

- (a) The Project's focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects.
- (b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS's funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programmes for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US\$ 36.4 million.
- (c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component.

4.2 Efficiency

260. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory to *satisfactory* because of: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant.

261. Disbursement to IPs has been as scheduled. In Phase 1 ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US\$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US\$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US\$920,200. The World Bank disbursed the fifth payment on 24th March 2014 on acceptance of final Phase 1 report. In total at the time of final evaluation eight of nine payments have been disbursed on time (US\$ 1,482,057 of scheduled US\$1,531,564). The final payment of US\$49,507 is due on approval of final report that was submitted in draft form during the week ending 5th September 2014. In Phase 1 IOM had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US\$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US\$450,000). All payments were disbursed on time in Phase 2. At the time of the final evaluation the total disbursements to IAs has been US\$2,501,070 of US\$2,451,563.

262. The MTR noted that while recognizing that if the Project leads to future programming there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, in Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US\$2,759.⁵⁸ In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were target with Project activities (5 had died in the interim period between Phase 1 and Phase 2). Of the 285 targeted 269 received services from the Project. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex-combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant is US\$ 3,750.

263. The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US\$1,817⁵⁹; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US\$2,065⁶⁰ and Burundi \$2,775⁶¹. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made?

4.3 Effectiveness

264. Effectiveness is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above.

265. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2.

266. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood

58 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs.

⁵⁹ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp. 28-29.

⁶⁰ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp. 19-22, 31-43.

⁶¹ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28.

Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs.

267. The Community Support Programme was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.⁶²

4.4 Potential to Grow to Scale and Sustainability

268. The Pilot reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design's effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be replicated and scaled in future programming:

- (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system on HQ and State level;
- (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff;
- (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff;
- (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities
- (e) Community support projects.

269. The final evaluation concludes that all components have the potential to be replicated and scaled up (at least in part) in future DDR programming. However, in order to be sustainable and effective some will require some additional inputs (like the M&E system) and/or more substantial revision.

270. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevant reintegration programme) of placing the NDDRC front and centre and emphasising national ownership. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective, efficient and relevant national DDR programme. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its role in Reintegration programming in DDR.

271. The NDDRC has significantly strengthened its leadership position in the course of the Pilot Programme and has assumed a critical role in coordination and project management. Since the beginning of the NDDRP the Commission has been actively involved in the strategic development of the Programme and its sub-components. Together with the UN, the SPLA, line ministries and other DDR stakeholders the Commission has drafted and finalized a National DDR Policy, Strategic Plan and National Programme Document that gave critical guidance for the implementation of the reinsertion and reintegration sub-component. A Joint Operations Coordination Committee that has been chaired by the Commission was set up to control, coordinate and monitor reinsertion activities in the transition facility in Mapel which indicates the

⁶² The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US\$ 25,000 when compared to US\$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps.

high level of national ownership. Although the UN took a lead in the implementation of reinsertion activities, the Commission clearly benefited from its active involvement, was able to build its capacity and played a key role in oversight. The final evaluation finds similar trends for the reintegration sub-component. The Project Management Unit (PMU) put the Commission in the centre of the project and through the ICRS department the NDDRC gained significant experience on state level in managing livelihood assistance. Important lessons have been learned that will allow modification of the DDR programme prior to replication country-wide.

272. Despite these positive trends and a visible and growing involvement of many NDDRC departments in implementation and oversight there were a range of factors that negatively influenced the extent to which the NDDRC was capacitated to assume its leadership role thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the Project. Due to financial constraints of NDDRC some of the key positions on national and state level were not filled and as a consequence certain systems and departments that the Project had planned to leave at its closure (like the State PMUs and the M&E department). Due to the imbalance in NDDRC's organisational structure (already outlined in chapter 2.2) some departments were side-lined resulting in difficulties for the IA to leave an independently functional management team that is able to run reintegration programming in future DDR tranches. Not least the lack of support from the GoSS (e.g. the delay in the establishment of the National DDR Council, lack of interest in DDR on the side of the line ministries) has exacerbated the Commission's efforts to guide and implement the Project in a fast and efficient manner.

273. Furthermore, a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was assumed that any successes thus far would hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of Reintegration programming, however, with the outbreak of hostilities mid-December 2013 and the changes in the internal security environment any progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming was damaged.

274. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. The design of the Training sub-component in the Livelihoods Support window emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The unplanned strategy of utilizing TOT methodology had the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The TOT of the agricultural extension workers in Phase 2 is a positive example that illustrates how the DDR Programme can build on domestic human resources and utilize them for training ex-combatants.

275. The principle of including community members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and approaches to cooperative working practices. Due to lack of a Community Tracer Survey the final evaluation cannot assess whether the inclusion of community members into the trainings supported social inclusion and mitigation of conflicts but what can be noted is that there is a strong community involvement in livelihood activities involving ex-combatants (for instance, the 17 working groups that have been listed so far involve 68 ex-combatants and 442 community members).

276. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual, collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission. Through the chosen approach the Pilot Project has triggered some learning on the side of the Commission especially in the field of project management and oversight. Partly stemming from external factors such as the outbreak of the conflict the capacity building stopped at a time when the Commission was just about to utilise the acquired skills in actual programming. Due to the imminent halt in DDR activities after closure of the Project the nascent capacities can most likely not be sustained over time.

277. The ICRS System that is one element of the Capacity Building component is currently inactive. Since the system is only as useful as the data it contains, the ICRS will require continuous updates otherwise its sustainability will be highly questionable. In terms of replicability the ICRS system would be ready to be utilised in future programming but would require some data adjustments.

278. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability of the infrastructure to be provided through working with communities to create community water committees and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing of boreholes and pumps. However, the final evaluation finds that the infrastructural installations are unlikely to be as sustainable due to quality of outputs. Experience not only from South Sudan but also other countries shows that success rates of maintaining hand pumps are generally low. Solar powered higher volume water pumps, for instance, would have a longer lifespan than the infrastructure that were installed in the Pilot thus mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare parts.

279. Although the Project attempted to enable some community members to independently manage and maintain the water installations, it is uncertain to what extent the communities indeed follow the suggested approach (this might vary from community to community). According to the IA this is not only a particular problem for Projects in South Sudan but also in other countries. As a way out and in order to ensure sustainability of water installations, future water community projects should ensure that the community agrees to generate income e.g. through water charges prior to the Project start. To ensure that this conditionality does not compromise on ownership the Project has to grant enough time for community sensitisations.

280. In view of the lack of a community tracer study it is also not clear whether the Community Projects have helped to foster trust between the ex-combatants and the rest of their communities (as stated in the Project objectives). Given the small number of returning ex-combatants, their limited engagement in the IA's community mobilizations and the relatively small scale of the Projects the impact will most likely be much lower than expected.

281. Further complicating factors negatively impacting on the sustainability of the DDR community projects are the manifold social problems within the communities concerned. Particularly alcohol abuse appears to be a challenge in the rural areas as it erodes the social fabric and significantly hinders the development of coping strategies of the community. For any CDD/R project such negative social influences are a significant risk that can jeopardise project success and should hence be thoroughly considered in project design and implementation.

4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

282. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19th 2013. Peace negotiations are scheduled to recommence in Addis, Ethiopia on September 15th, 2014 but the security situation remains highly unstable and a humanitarian crisis is unfolding.

283. During the MTR it was identified that it in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. Given the ongoing mobilization of civilians and violent conflict in the country it seems inappropriate to initiate any planning for subsequent DDR phases without radically revising the current DDR approach (and here especially a closer alignment with other SSR activities). Since most donors, as a reaction to the crisis, have channelled their funding and efforts to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, there appears to be very little openness to consider any short to medium term funding for DDR/SSR activities. For the Project this is a severe backlash as the momentum is likely to be lost. There will be a gap in programming which puts at risk the progress that has been made so far. Especially with regard to the capacity building that has been done a lot of investment will most likely vanish.

5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how it performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank's role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.⁶³

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

284. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SSR-DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership.

285. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex.

286. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI and IOM) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISS. The TDRP's own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC's interaction with those same agencies.

287. The TDRP's role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP's knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC's self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR

⁶³The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project.

The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP. **Bank-executed Activities** consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross-border and cross-cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender. **Trust Fund Management and Administration:** establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects.

and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme.

288. The Bank was appropriately reactive to the deteriorating security situation that forced the postponement of Phase 2 of the Project. However, the re-start of the Project in May 2014 was at very short notice affecting the preparation by IAs to implement altered project activities such as changing the livelihoods training from building on the capacity built with independent trainers in Phase 1 to focusing on the ICRS team in the NDDRC. Similarly the Bank-led ex-combatant satisfaction survey (in place of Tracer and Community Dynamics surveys originally planned) was designed with limited preparatory time.

289. While the IA and the Bank implemented these activities effectively there should be more time to reflect on changed design of activities and the reasons for this. Also, the Bank should afford itself more time to plan such M&E activities as the ex-combatant satisfaction survey. Often in programming in FCS it is generally accepted that in emergency contexts (such as that in South Sudan) and because of the context, responsive projects (such as this Project) cannot be afforded adequate preparation time or space for reflection. This does not have to be the case. Given that Phase 2 was re-started in a hurried fashion it is important for the Bank with the NDDRC to give adequate space to Phase 3 (learning) and laying the foundation for effective and efficient strategizing about potential future SSR-DDR programming in South Sudan.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

290. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance.

291. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank's own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues.

292. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs.

293. The final evaluation notes that recommendations around Bank project M&E have not been implemented and recommends that in future pilot interventions the recommendations of the MTR on project M&E are given due consideration.

5.2 NDDRC Performance

294. The NDDRC's role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP

and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made.

295. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself it identified as being unable to alter. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level. This situation has been further aggravated by the change in the UNMISS mandate and the consequent withdrawal of the mission from any DDR related activities. The NDDRC State offices that were formerly provided with fuel and communication systems through UNMISS are now largely inactive due to lack of electricity and internet services.

296. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commissions alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU. This approach of finding practical workaround significantly helped NDDRC to coordinate between its respective departments and to take the lead in implementation of reintegration activities in close collaboration with the IAs. The PMU, however, also created a parallel structure to the existing institutional arrangements thereby unintentionally marginalizing some NDDRC staff during the Project. The marginalization occurred both at strategic and at operational levels. In order to avoid such imbalances in future iterations it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations.

297. The ICRS department has strongly benefited from the Capacity Development activities throughout the Pilot Project and has played an outstanding role in the implementation of the reintegration sub-component. Taking into account that the ICRS department has been built from scratch the achievements are substantial. The ICRS caseworkers have gained significant experience in the support of ex-combatants which enables them to attend to programme beneficiaries throughout the whole DDR process (registration, data capture, follow-up and referral). Because of the involvement of the ICRS unit in extension work and training in Phase 2 the caseworkers are now also better capacitated to advice ex-combatants on socio-economic opportunities than at the Project start. As the database itself is not operative due to lack of connectivity on State level, and the financial restrictions and withdrawal of material support through UNMISS took effect before the system could be fully rolled out, ICRS has not been tested in its final version in day-to-day operations.

298. Over the course of the pilot NDDRC closely engaged with various donors to attract interest and to ensure funding for subsequent pilot phases. It was assumed that through the gains made for ex-combatants in Mapel one would also be able to start DDR operations in two more locations (Torit and Bor). From the beginning donor dialogue turned out to be very challenging due to the negative perceptions of DDR in South Sudan resulting from the CPA-DDR programme. Moreover donors were unclear about how the DDR pilot in Mapel would be replicated in other locations given that NDDRC envisioned different institutional setups for the implementation of pilot activities in Greater Equatoria and Greater Upper Nile.

299. NDDRC had a productive collaboration with the involved UN agencies. Particularly around operations in Mapel NDDRC closely liaised with UNMISS and UNESCO on national and State level. Through the interaction with the UN the Commission sought to learn and build its own capacities while ensuring that the programme followed a national strategic vision. As a result of NDDRC's challenging financial situation the focus of the interaction with UNMISS often shifted towards logistical support which was provided by the mission to NDDRC. Against this background the Commission did not always fully capitalize on the mission's DDR planning capacity. At the time of the final evaluation, however, the NDDRC positively acknowledges the strong technical, logistical and financial support that was provided by the UN in the pilot process and appears to be determined to continue the collaboration despite the fact that DDR has been removed from the UNMISS mandate.

300. Over the course of the Pilot Programme the NDDRC has assumed a strong leadership role which allowed the Commission to give strategic guidance and to coordinate the various stakeholders involved. However, the Commission would have been even more effective in taking the lead on DDR if it had received more political backing from GoSS. For instance, the delay in government contribution to the programme retarded activities and procurement of items needed to run operations Mapel. The DDR Council, which was supposed to provide political guidance was established late and did not meet as often as required. It hence did not give sufficient strategic guidance and also did not succeed in harmonizing between different national stakeholders in DDR issues. Because of this lack of harmonization on DDR Council level the NDDRC faced severe challenges in aligning its Project activities with other national programmes as envisioned in the National DDR Strategic Plan. Although the line ministries were requested by the DDR Council to provide a comprehensive and casted programme indicating how each Ministry would support implementation of the wider DDR Programme, the alignment process turned out to be very slow and cumbersome.

301. NDDRC's cooperation with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), particularly the Directorate of Veterans Affairs, and the SPLA intensified throughout the pilot process leading to close interactions between the institutions. However, due to inadequate political guidance through the DDR Council and the seemingly limited confidence and buy-in of the MOD and the SPLA into the programme, NDDRC's efforts to implement the DDR pilot were significantly undermined, as evidenced by the limited number of DDR candidates that were assigned to go through the DDR pilot process (only 290 candidates were selected instead of the targeted number of 500 people).

5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners

302. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM.

5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research

303. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics

surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project's overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI's reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process.

304. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality.

305. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity.

5.3.2. UNICON

306. Initially in Phase 1 UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation.

307. In Phase 1 UNICON's reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub-components.

308. In Phase 2 UNICON actioned its own institutional learning from Phase 1 from all aspects of Component design and implementation as well as learning on general operational issues in South Sudan. The IA improved on already strong M&E emphasising actionable learning for both the current Project and future DDR programming in South Sudan.

309. Throughout the Project communications from UNICON have been succinct and comprehensive.

5.3.3. IOM

310. Generally, IOM engaged well with the Project and exceed delivery.

311. In Phase 1 IOM faced significant implementation challenges mostly because of access restrictions to the selected Project sites because of the rainy season and the challenging road network in South Sudan. Despite these delays in construction and the Project suspension due to the outbreak of hostilities IOM in the end delivered the component in an effective manner and was able to successfully deliver (and even exceed) the project outputs within the agreed timeframe.

312. Monitoring and reporting on activities and outputs were concise, intelligible and on time. The collaboration with the NDDRC on national and State level was described by the involved stakeholders as constructive but was at times hampered by NDDRC's challenging recourse situation which aggravated joint supervision of the community projects.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Although the Project provided funds in the IOM budget for allocation to the DDR Commission for supervision of community support projects and other project related expenses, these funds were only transferred to the NDDRC at a very late stage of the Project. In the beginning IOM was not provided with sufficient information on how to administer the funds to the Commission (see 2014. IOM *Final Project Report*).

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

313. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component. Where relevant mention is made of whether or to what extent recommendations from the MTR have been acted upon.

6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment

314. **Conclusion 1.** The success of the Project as a pilot testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment.

315. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear.

316. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme).

317. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical to the success of the Project. It observed that the suspension of the project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum has been lost however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan.

318. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation.

319. Timing will be essential for future DDR programming: The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attending to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme.

320. **Recommendation 1a.** The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around

the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed.

321. **Recommendation 1b.** The NDDRC is supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (including stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, and civil society representatives) to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled.

322. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions.

323. Despite the progress being made through the Project DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR through dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development or infrastructure projects in communities. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency.

324. **Recommendation 1c.** In the short to medium term specifically the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat that has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes.

325. **Recommendation 1d.** In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics.

326. **Conclusion 2.** The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR.

327. **Recommendation 2.** While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.⁶⁵

328. **Conclusion 3.** UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013⁶⁶ but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold.

329. **Recommendation 3.** The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned⁶⁷ which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.

330. **Conclusion 4.** The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources.

331. **Recommendation 4.** The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR (above, conclusion 4) and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project.

6.2 Project Design and Outcomes

332. **Conclusion 5.** The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission.

333. **Recommendation 5.** The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project.

334. **Conclusion 6.** Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF.

335. **Recommendation 6.** In reality reinsertion and reintegration programming are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations.

⁶⁵ The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past.

⁶⁶ See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013.

⁶⁷ An internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis.

336. **Conclusion 7.** The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

337. **Recommendation 7.** The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming.

338. **Conclusion 8.** The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

339. **Recommendation 8.** The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation.

340. **Conclusion 9.** The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion.

341. **Recommendation 9.** The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future.

342. **Conclusion 10.** The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.

343. **Recommendation 10.** When estimating the impact on future programming economies of scale should be considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities

344. **Conclusion 11.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.

345. **Recommendation 11.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any 'inclusive enough coalition' strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design.

346. **Conclusion 12.** The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC.

347. **Recommendation 12.** In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed.

348. **Conclusion 13.** The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.

349. **Recommendation 13.** The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2).

350. **Conclusion 14.** The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

351. **Recommendation 14.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

352. **Conclusion 15.** The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid.

353. **Recommendation 15.** The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid.

354. **Conclusion 16.** As a result of the fairly loose design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission's cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised.

355. **Recommendation 16.** In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State

Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex-combatants).

356. **Conclusion 17.** The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC.

357. **Recommendation 17.** Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment.

358. **Conclusion 18.** A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel.

359. **Recommendation 18.** In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. The same toolkits that will be provided to XCs should also be utilised in the vocational trainings.

360. **Conclusion 19.** A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation.

361. **Recommendation 19.** In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan.

362. **Conclusion 20.** A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the pilot) including e.g. the lack of proper market analysis for the vocational skills training.

363. **Recommendation 20.** Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme.

364. **Conclusion 21.** Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative)

365. **Recommendation 21.** For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to

receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC.

366. **Conclusion 22.** Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC.

367. **Recommendation 22.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend. However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component.

368. **Conclusion 23.** The Project's aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types.

369. **Recommendation 23.** Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

Table 3. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs (Final as of September 9th 2014)

NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs					
	INITIAL BUDGET	Phase 1 TOTAL COMMITTED	Phase 2 TOTAL COMMITTED	TOTAL	<i>Difference</i>
Livelihoods Support	\$1,200,000	\$800,200	\$287,282	\$1,087,482	\$112,518
<i>Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings</i>		\$164,500	\$0	\$164,500	
<i>Livelihoods Start-Up Kits</i>		\$323,100	\$0	\$323,100	
<i>State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings</i>		\$312,600	\$146,433	\$459,033	
<i>Technical Skills Extension-Agricultural extension visits</i>			\$48,417	\$48,417	
<i>Technical Skills Extension-Vocational expert visits</i>			\$14,247	\$14,247	
<i>Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings</i>			\$63,547	\$63,547	
<i>Assistance in accessing available government services</i>			\$14,638	\$14,638	
Community Support Projects	\$400,000	\$155,750	\$294,250	\$450,000	-\$50,000
Capacity Building and Monitoring & Evaluation	\$660,000	\$519,506	\$247,525	\$767,031	-\$107,031
<i>Mentoring/Capacity Building</i>		\$442,836	\$84,519	\$527,355	
<i>Government employee Training of Trainers</i>			\$117,855	\$117,855	
<i>M&E Surveys</i>		\$76,670	\$45,151	\$121,821	
NDDRC Participation Funds	\$240,000	\$120,000	\$120,000	\$240,000	\$0
Evaluations	\$70,000	\$28,269	\$0	\$28,269	\$41,731
Contingency	\$81,711		\$78,929	\$78,929	\$2,782
<i>Juba Ex-combatant and Crime Survey</i>			\$76,540		
<i>Final transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC</i>			\$2,389		
TOTAL ALL	\$2,651,711	\$1,623,725	\$1,027,986	\$2,651,711	\$0

Annex 2. Documents Reviewed

Project Documentation

2014. NDDRC. *NDDRP. Harmonized Reinsertion & Reintegration Strategy. (draft: 15 APRIL 2014)*
2014. *XC Satisfaction Survey Results (Draft in Progress).*
2014. Anthony Finn. *Mid Term Review of the Pilot Reintegration Project of South Sudan New DDR Programme. February 2014.*
2014. NDDRC. *List of Cooperatives Formed. August 2014.*
2014. TDRP. *Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDRC-Pilot Reintegration Project.*
2013. UNESCO. *Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal. October 2013 (prepared by Forcier Consulting).*
2013. NDDRC. *NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Document – revised. September 2013*
2013. NDDRC. *NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual.*
2013. NDDRC. *National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. Monitoring and Evaluation Manual. Draft. November 2013.*
- 2013, April 19th. NDDRC. *Minutes of Preliminary Steering Committee Meeting.*
2013. Integrity Research and Consultancy. *Community Baseline Survey Report. November 2013.*
2013. Integrity Research and Consultancy. *Ex-Combatants Survey Report. December 2013.*
2013. ASI. *Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project.*
2013. ASI. *Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project.*
2013. ASI. *Work plan and Deliverables.*
2013. TDRP. *Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation. South Sudan NDDRC – Pilot Reintegration Project.*
2013. TDRP. *Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDR – Pilot Reintegration Project.*
2013. TDRP. *Background Document to Terms of Reference for Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDR- Pilot Reintegration Project*
2013. IOM. *Technical Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component.*

2013. IOM. *Financial Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component*.
2013. UNICON. *Consultancy Agreement between UNICON Limited and Christian Recovery and Development Agency (CRADA) (“Consultant”)*. August 2013.
2013. UNICON. *Technical Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan*.
2013. UNICON. *Financial Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan*.
- 2013, February 4th. TDRP. *Re: Invitation for TDRP to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in South Sudan* (Correspondence).
2012. NDDRC. *Republic of South Sudan, NDDRP Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual*.
2012. NDDRC. *Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) 2012 – 2020*.
2012. NDDRC. *National DDR Programme of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation*.
2012. NDDRC. *Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme in the Republic of South Sudan 2012-2020* (Presentation).
2012. NDDRC. *National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 2012-2020: Strategic Direction* (Presentation)
2012. GoSS. *Laws of the Republic of South Sudan. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Council Provisional Order, 2012*
2012. World Bank. *Trust Fund Administration Agreement between KfW and IBRD concerning the TDRP MDTF* (Correspondence).
2011. NDDRC. *Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on DDR*.
2011. NDDRC. *South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020*
2010. NDDRC. *Southern Sudan DDR Commission Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit*.
- n.d.GoSS. *SPLA and DDR SOP for Determining Eligibility and Selection Criteria*.
- n.d.GoSS. *SOP III on Reinsertion and Labour Intensive Projects*.
- n.d. NDDRC. *South Sudan Reintegration Pilot Programme – Indicators (Draft 1)*

Mission Reports

2014. May 17th to May 25th. TDRP. *BTOR*

2014. May 17th to May 27th. TDRP. *SMO*

2014. July 13th to July 25th. TDRP. *SMO*.

2014. July 13th to July 26th. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2014. July 1st to July 31st. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2013, April 7th to April 27th. TDRP. *SMO*.

2013, May 15th. TDRP. *BTOR: Initiation of ICRS Registration System and the Pilot Reintegration Project Steering Committee for the Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of South Sudan DDR Programme.*

2013, May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. *SMO*.

2013. May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2013. June 30th to July 27th. TDRP. *SMO*.

2013. June 30th to July 25th. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. *SMO*.

2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2013. October 18th to November 12th. TDRP. *SMO.2012. NDDRC. Information Counselling and Referral Systems (ICRS) Report on Mission 13 – 26 May 2012.*

2012, October. TDRP. *BTOR*.

2012, November 27th to December 15th. *Aide Mémoire, South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project.*

2012, November 27th. TDRP. *SMO*

n.d. TDRP. *Findings of Pilot Design Confirmation Focus Group.*

Project Outputs by Consultants

2014. TDRP. *ICRS Administrator Manual V1.0. July 2014 (prepared by Adeel Zafar).*

2014. TDRP. *ICRS User Manual V2.0 (prepared by Adeel Zafar).*

2014. IOM. *Final Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Pilot Reintegration Project. Consultancy to implement DDR Community Support Projects. June 2014.*

2014. IOM. *Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank. South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project. Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Projects. May 2014.*
2014. IOM. *Final List of Completed Projects.*
2014. IOM. *South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. Final Financial Report.*
2014. UNICON. *Draft Final Report Phase 2.*
2014. UNICON. *Interim Report 3.IR 1 of Phase II. June 2014.*
2014. UNICON. *Business & Co-Op TOT (Phase II). Curriculum and Training Modules. June 2014.*
2014. UNICON. *Agriculture TOT (Phase II).Curriculum and Training Modules. June 2014.*
2014. UNICON. *Manual for Training of Trainers – Phase 2.Conducting Training for Ex-combatants in Financial Literacy and Cooperative Entrepreneurship. August 2014.*
2014. UNICON. *Report by Lead Consultant to UNICON on TOT in phase 2 (unofficial document).*
2014. UNICON. *Consultancy to Implement the Livelihoods Support Component– Phase 2. Comments and Recommendation based on Interaction with Trainers after Phase II follow up (unofficial document).*
2014. UNICON. *State-Level Training Progress. Phase 2. June 2014.*
2014. UNICON. *Project Implementation Plan (PIP). Phase II. May 2014.*
2014. Francis Musoni. *DDR Planning, Management, Monitoring and Evaluation: A simplified outline. (presentation).*
2013. *ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC. October 2013.*
2013. ASI. *PIP South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Support provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research & Consultancy (Integrity) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).*
2013. ASI. *Work plan*
2013. ASI. *Inception Report: South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project. Support Provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research (IR) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).*
2013. ASI. *Draft Plan ASI/IR Training Sessions.*

2013. ASI. *Agenda: NDDRC Training Workshop for the Pilot Reintegration Support Project, WAU 27th to 30 August 2013.*
2013. ASI. *Training Component (Presentation).*
2013. ASI/IR. *Beneficiary Survey*
2013. ASI/IR. *Community Dynamics Survey*
2013. NDDRC with ASI. *Reintegration Workshop (Presentation).*
2013. NDDRC with ASI. *Republic of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project: Service Component (Presentation).*
2013. ASI. *Purpose and Modality of the Workshop: NDDRC Training Workshop for Pilot Reintegration Support (Presentation).*
2013. ASI. *Team Building (Presentation).*
2013. ASI. *Have Lessons Been Learned? (Presentation).*
2013. NDDRC with ASI. *Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Programme (Presentation).*
2013. ASI. *Report on ASI's Mentoring in Western Bahr el Ghazal State.*
2013. ASI. *Report on ASI's Mentoring in Warrap State.*
2013. ASI. *Report on ASI's Mentoring in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State.*
2013. ASI. *Report on ASI's Mentoring in Lakes State.*
2013. ASI. *Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation Project – Support to the NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Final Report.*
- 2013, June. ASI. *Monthly Report.*
- 2013, July. ASI. *Monthly Report.*
- 2013, August. ASI. *Monthly Report.*
- 2013, September. ASI. *Monthly Report.*
2013. UNICON. *Final Report Phase 1.*
- 2013, UNICON. *Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component.*
2013. UNICON. *Technical Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan.*

2013. UNICON. *Financial Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan.*

2013. UNICON. *Project Implementation Plan. September 2013.*

2013. UNICON. *Project Inception Report*

2013. UNICON. *Request for Quotations.*

2013. UNICON. *Agricultural Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Auto mechanics Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Carpentry Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Electrical Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Masonry Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Plumbing Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Welding Kit for No Objection.*

2013. UNICON. *Bid Adjudication Steps.*

2013. UNICON. *Opening of Bids (Minutes).*

2013. UNICON. *Financial Evaluation (of Bids).*

2013. UNICON. *Report on Bid Evaluation Results.*

2013. UNICON. *Progress Report 1.*

2013. UNICON. *Progress Report 2.*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 1*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 2*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 3*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 4*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 5*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 6*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 7*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 8*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 9*
2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 10*
2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 11*
2013. UNICON. *Training of Trainers Manual*
2013. UNICON. *Training Curriculum (Mapel)*.
2013. UNICON. *Final Report South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan*.
2013. IOM. *Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects*.
2013. IOM. *Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects*.
2013. IOM. *Project Implementation Plan*.
2013. IOM. *Log frame DDR Community Support Projects*.
2013. IOM. *DDR Community Project Location Selection Criteria*.
2013. IOM. *Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank: South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects*.

Other

2014. *International Development Partners Principles for Operating in South Sudan in the Current Context*. July 2014.
- 2012 SCL Social. *Management and Analysis of the Project Implementation Tracking Data (Reintegration Component of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project)*
2012. UNDP. *Report on the South Sudan Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities Mapping*.
2010. Stockholm Policy Group. *South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report*.
2011. GIZ. *Reintegration of ex-combatants in Eastern Equatoria State: Opportunity and Partnership Mapping*.
- 2011(a) GIZ. *Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: a Programmatic Implementation Guide*.
- 2011(b) GIZ. *Impact Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Reintegration Program of Ex-Combatants in Central Equatoria State in South Sudan (2010-2011)*.

2010. The World Bank and AFDB. *Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: Socio-Economic Study of Communities of Return.*

2002. David, Soniia and Beth Oliver. *Handbooks for Small-Scale Seed Producers.* Kampala: CIAT.

Annex 3. Consultations

NDDRC

William Deng Deng (Chairperson)
Majur Mayor Machar (Deputy Chairperson)
Obwaha Claude Akasha (Ag Director General for Operations)
Rev. Saturnino Ladu (Director of Reintegration)
Samuel Juma Yerimia (Director of Programmes)
Rosa Weet (Gender Advisor)
Peter Garang Ngor (Procurement and Logistics Coordinator)
Kuot Kuot Deng (Senior IT Officer)
Chan Moses Awuol (ICRS Manager)
William Tong Uruan (State Coordinator)
John Alier (ICRS Caseworker, WBGS)
Francis Nyibang John (M&E Officer, WBGS)
ICRS Caseworkers (x4 as Focus Group)
Isaac Mabor (M&E Officer)
Nathaniel Majok Deng (AG Finance Coordinator)
Angelo Wani (Assistant Finance Coordinator)

Other National Actors

Brig. Gen. Aloisio Emor Ojetuk (DG for Veterans Affairs)
Agricultural Extension Workers WBGS (x2 as Focus Group)
Wau Vocational Training Centre (Director)

UN Partners

Mustafa Tejan-Kella (UNMISS)
Salah Khaled (Head of Office and UNESCO Representative to South Sudan)

World Bank and KfW

Stavros Stavrou (TDRP)
Alexandra Burrall Jung (TDRP)
Kathrin Kästle (KfW)

BICC

Ada Hakobyan (BICC)

Wolf Christian Paes (BICC)

Implementing Partners and Consultants

Sergey Burnaev (UNICON)

Matt Huber (IOM)

Adeel Zafar (IT Consultant)

GuatamRaj Gain (Training Consultant)

Donor representatives

Johannes Sperrfechter (German Embassy, Deputy Head of Mission/Head of Development Cooperation)

Community Consultations

Annex 4: Methodological Note

The external final evaluation used a standard methodology of: (i) comprehensive document review; (ii) qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs); (iii) qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants (FGDs) as well as with some staff of the NDDRC, (iv) ongoing data triangulation with emerging reporting from the NDDRC, the TDRP and the IAs involved in implementation.

Fieldwork for the evaluation took place between 11th August and 29th August 2014 with site visits to Juba (Central Equatoria State) and Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal State) South Sudan. In Jur River County two community projects were visited in Roch Rochdog Payam and Marial Bai Payam where FGDs were held with community members and KIIs with community leaders. Installation of hand pumps and drilled boreholes were visually confirmed in both locations but an expert technical assessment of the infrastructure was not undertaken.

The evaluation is built upon the MTR (November 2013 to February 2014). The MTR provides one pillar of the analytical framework informing consultations and analysis with project documentation (original and revised and including the ex-combatant satisfaction survey) and IA reporting constituting the other pillar. Triangulation of the analytical framework with data compiled during the field phase and in subsequent KIIs was completed by 11th September, 2014. The format of the MTR report provides the format for the final evaluation. The final evaluation should be read in conjunction with the MTR.

Limitations encountered during the inception phase of the evaluation were as follows:

- (a) Logistical: the lack of availability of UN flights due to how the UN mandate no longer includes DDR and consequently that the Commission is no longer able to access flights through the UN;
- (b) Availability of some key informants, mainly the IOM where the two informants are currently on leave;
- (c) Unclear security situation in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes State: although the situation in and around Wau town (risk level 3) appears to be stable the GIZ risk management office (RMO) advised the consultants to minimize road movements and to restrict the planned consultations to Wau town. Regarding the security situation in Rumbek and its surrounding Payams the consultants received contradictory information from various sources. Due to the higher risk level in the State (level 4) the GIZ RMO likewise advised to limit activities to Rumbek centre. Since the situation in Lakes State remains unstable, further and sudden outbreaks of violence are possible which might endanger the planned mission to Rumbek. The consultants will continue to monitor the situation by closely liaising with the UNMISS field security coordination office and GIZ RMO. During field work the security situation in Rumbek deteriorated and in consultation with the relevant parties the team decided not to travel there.