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# **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone**

*Case Study*

**Christiana Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer**

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## **1. Introduction**

It is frequently asserted that effective disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in conflict-afflicted states can help reduce the chances of conflicts resuming and act as a platform for economic, political and social development. This follows the steadily growing importance attached to DDR as an instrument of conflict management and human development. Given the fact that many of these programmes take place in some of the world's poorest countries, it thus makes sense to ask whether such programmes have arrested human insecurity through related programming, or, duly, established a receptive environment in which development can flourish. The literature is full of 'lessons-learned' assessments which attempt to chart the factors that account for the success (or failure) of a given DDR programme. Few assessments have in fact been made of these broader dimensions. This paper seeks to fill that gap.

At the macro-level, and with some justification, Sierra Leone's DDR process is widely regarded as a success story, and elements of the Sierra Leone 'model' are being replicated in neighbouring Liberia, in Burundi, and now as far away as Haiti. A total of 72,490 combatants were disarmed and 71,043 demobilised, and 63,545 former combatants participated in the reintegration segment, including 6,845 child soldiers. Participation rates in the DDR programme were high and peace has been maintained in the six years since the war came to an end. Despite this, the tangible benefits of DDR in Sierra Leone seem scant. Little attention has been paid to whether or not the programme was similarly successful at the micro or individual level, that is, whether DDR, with related programming, was human security oriented in its design and implementation.

In conducting the study from a human security perspective, this research differs in many respects from some "traditional" DDR research work. It is the result of a field survey which allowed the authors to track the progress of DDR participants and local communities in post-war Sierra Leone. Its "bottom-up" focus is mainly on communities and individuals that benefit, or the contrary, from DDR, rather than on top-down perspectives. At the community human security level, the way DDR looks and the pre-occupations of those going through DDR are often very different to those doing the implementing or directing DDR operations. Human security implies concerns and approaches centred on communities and individuals that are at risk and notions of vulnerability and exclusion that do not necessarily loom large when DDR mandates are planned and peace agreements concluded, when a prime objective is to end armed violence. Nevertheless, for DDR to make a substantive impact, it ultimately has to gel at the community level; not least because it is crucial for long-term peace that returning ex-combatants are integrated into communities and communities themselves feel part of recovery. DDR has not always been very effective at supporting this.

The primary purpose of this study is to aid in the assessment of the impacts of DDR programming and planning on human security in post-conflict settings using Sierra Leone as a case study, which will be used to inform the evaluation of existing interventions and underlie the development of effective future operations. A particular focus is whether development goals were explicitly incorporated or not. Consequently this report specifically aims to examine the impacts of DDR and related processes in terms of whether they:

- had negative or positive impacts upon community safety and security and in reducing insecurity and victimisation in Sierra Leone;
- contributed to increasing or decreasing economic and social well being (such as livelihoods, social capital and reconciliation, including ‘freedom from want’ considerations);
- Empowered community and individual engagement and participation in the design and delivery of DDR.

This case study is also linked to a concurrent research in neighbouring Liberia, and the findings of both research papers have been combined in a West African regional case study.

## **1.1 Methodology**

As stated above, key objectives of the research project was to assess DDR in Sierra Leone “through the eyes of the poor”. This bottom-up approach therefore required marrying the views of the community experience with a more nuanced view of representative individual experiences. In order to capture both of these perspectives, the study utilises a combination of primary and secondary research methods, divided into two phases. During the first phase, substantial desk research was conducted to investigate and review documentation relating to the topic. The second phase, which has involved data gathering, has built upon the initial desk review with field interviews of relevant stakeholders in Sierra Leone at the national, district and community level, including chieftdom and local authorities, security personnel, humanitarian aid workers, international officials, ex-combatants, local civil society organisations, ex-combatants, international non-governmental organisations and national government officials, with an emphasis on the poor in each community.

The preliminary scoping trip to Sierra Leone took place in November and December 2006. A preliminary report was presented in March 2007 at the DDR Project Review Meeting at the Centre for International Co-operation and Security, University of Bradford. It provided information on:

- the extent to which DDR in Sierra Leone was human security oriented in its design and implementation;
- some of the impacts DDR had (negative and positive) upon the human security of individuals, communities, the vulnerable and others; and
- the implications for policy and the future design of DDR including linkages with related programming.

The draft also included some initial observations and recommendations, but the focus was to begin to map the situation on the ground, to start a dialogue primarily with stakeholders involved in, or impacted upon, by the DDR process in Sierra Leone on the ground, and to prepare for the second field assessment.

A second follow-up research trip to Sierra Leone was undertaken by an independent consultant between May and June 2007 to explore in more depth issues raised in the first draft and test the credibility of the preliminary recommendations made in the first draft article with local communities and stakeholders. This included impact assessment work in the provinces, specifically in the Kono and Kailahun districts, both in the Eastern provinces. District selection, and subsequent community selection, was based on a number of criteria:

- **Inclusion of borderland areas:** site selection had the benefit of capturing particularly strong location-specific grievances (e.g. border issues) that have great national significance;
- **Intensity of grievances:** the research explicitly sought sites with populations that experienced some of the worst violence during the conflict and may face increased barriers to reintegration;
- **Presence and scale of DDR interventions:** the presence of and quality of DDR interventions will provide richer data particularly in relatively isolated communities.

The study targeted a sample of nearly 250 ex-combatants from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Civil Defence Forces (CDF), and around 20 members of the local communities. The main method for gathering information was through focus group discussions and individual semi-structured interviews in the respondent's local language. The sample also includes a substantial number of former child combatants who were over 18 when the conflict ended and women associated with the fighting forces (WAFF). Selection of the sample was determined by, inter alia, access, the availability of subjects, and gender representation, focussing on vulnerable persons and communities. The survey elicited a detailed profile of the combatants, including their socio-economic backgrounds, their experiences of DDR and the realities they have faced since reintegration. More follow up research was, in particular, conducted into links between DDR and related processes such as access to justice and DDR/SSR (Security Sector Reform), particularly in the light of the work being done on the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) and recent public surveying of attitudes to the police and security.

## 1.2 Main findings

Among the main findings are the following:

- This study is seen as another of the numerous streams of surveys, lessons learned and best practices by donor governments on DDR in Sierra Leone. In general, respondents felt that there is little indication that the findings are treated with seriousness;
- The predominant observation is that DDR's potential to improve human security was not fully realised. Poor levels of funding, uncoordinated planning and ineffective short-term reintegration activities have contributed to widespread unemployment and poverty among segments of ex-combatants' populations. These have, in turn, impacted upon their dependents and wider communities;
- Claims that DDR in Sierra Leone was a "people-driven" programme is invalid. It is generally perceived to be a foreign-driven exercise that largely ignored the needs and concerns of local communities and ex-combatants;
- Respondents argued that DDR lacked a clear monitoring and follow-up mechanism at the community or individual level, and no corrective measures were designed to assist ex-combatants who had failed to reintegrate;

- The special needs of vulnerable groups were inadequately catered for in the planning and implementation stages of DDR. DDR failed child combatants, particularly women and girls as many were classified as dependents only;
- There is a striking consistency among respondents, ex-combatants and local communities alike, that sustainable initiatives for demobilisation and reintegration were not planned. Programming decisions did not appear to be based on information on ex-combatants' needs and viable opportunities in local communities;
- Complaints about the DDR programme also centred on its administrative efficiency and bureaucratic design: unpredictable delays in the payment of cash allowances or delivery of toolboxes, short training periods and little or no support provided for finding or creating employment;
- Ex-combatants also identified a clear set of priorities for improving DDR: local consultation and genuine community involvement from the outset; special provision for vulnerable groups; collection of comprehensive data to inform sustainable reintegration on ex-combatants' educational level, disabilities, occupation preferences, and family ties; longer periods of training; job creation and access; and promotion of micro and small businesses.

### **1.3 Structure of the report**

This paper is divided into five sections. The first parts review the factors that gave rise to the need for a DDR programme and outline the various stages and modalities of the programme, highlighting a number of practical limitations to the DDR agenda. The next section weaves together DDR and related programming including SSR, arms reduction programmes and access to justice. Section four presents the impacts of DDR upon the human security at the micro level. This section delves into questions of “for whom” DDR was being conducted and the, in certain instances, damaging unintended negative impacts DDR had upon, in particular, vulnerable groups and communities generally. Lessons can be potentially learnt from this in terms of orienting DDR processes to approaches that are more human security-sensitive. The final section outlines the main policy considerations, while consistently arguing for a more human-security prudent agenda.

## **2. Background to DDR in Sierra Leone**

In January 2002, when the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) declared its more than decade-long war officially over, the international community showered it with praise for a successful DDR programme that paved the way for a stable post-war political order. An official with the World Bank characterised the US \$ 36.5 million project as “the best practice example throughout the world of a successful disarmament demobilisation reintegration programme”.<sup>1</sup> This turn of events was unexpected for a country that experienced a brutal conflict which captured international attention, and a stop-and-start peacebuilding effort lasting more than four years.

Violent conflict between elected governments, the mutinous military and the RUF rebel movement characterised the country between 1991 and 2002. An estimated 50,000 people were killed and thousands more injured or maimed. Over two million people were displaced with 500,000 fleeing to neighbouring countries. Most of the country's social, economic and physical

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<sup>1</sup> Official quoted in UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Sierra Leone: Disarmament and Rehabilitation Completed after Five Years”, *IRIN News Briefs*, 4 February 2004.

infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, such as roads, hospitals, schools, and commercial enterprises. Communities were torn apart, livelihoods destroyed, the economy slumped and societal relations put under enormous strain.

The conflict occurred as a result of both internal and international dynamics. Internally, it had its roots in chronic poor governance, widespread corruption, and the marginalisation and disempowerment of the rural communities, through monolithic and inefficient central government control over economic and political activities.

Overlaying all this, were mounting foreign debts, worsening terms of trade for the country's limited export commodities, and misguided economic policies. A series of macroeconomic and structural reforms prompted by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the attendant stringent conditionalities, exacerbated economic instabilities instead of stabilising the economy and restoring growth. The consequences were political instability as citizens expressed their dislike of the changes, eventually leading to the conflict in 1991. Poverty is widespread and since 2000, Sierra Leone has consistently been ranked among the least developed countries in the Human Development Index (HDI).

When the RUF attacked Bomaru in 1991 from neighbouring Liberia, few Sierra Leoneans had heard about the organisation and fewer still knew who the leaders were. They initially seemed to only pose a localised threat, but this later changed as vicious battles were waged for the control of major towns and economic centres. The fight for Sierra Leone during the decade-long conflict blurred any clear line of demarcation between the categories of "government allies", "rebel", "collaborator", "regional and international actors". It became a regional war with global connections: A predominantly Nigerian-led ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group's), which had been formed in 1990 to establish peace in Liberia, and was subsequently given the additional mandate to intervene in Sierra Leone, was firmly aligned with the government, backed by the civil militias and had at the very least received military assistance from the British government and the United States. Private military companies, first, the Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) Ltd and later, the Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International were also contracted by the government to provide security and train the Kamajor militia. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), renegade members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), entered into an "alliance of convenience" with the RUF, the primary rebel group in the Sierra Leone conflict, who in turn enjoyed considerable political, military and economic patronage from some regional states including Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, as well as Libya.<sup>2</sup>

Amidst fighting, elections were held in 1996, heavily pushed for and financed by the international community. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. He was however overthrown in May 1997 by the AFRC military junta, led by Corporal Johnny Paul Koroma. Attempts to cut back numbers in the army and the loss of privileges of junior officers, who felt economically and politically marginalised, as well as hostility to the increasing influence of the Kamajor civil militia, were partly behind the coup. The junta was ousted by ECOMOG forces and in 1998 Kabbah returned from exile as President. By January 1999 the RUF occupied swathes of Freetown again with widespread massacres being committed, only for them to be driven out once more by ECOMOG forces. The Freetown attack radically changed the national

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<sup>2</sup> The national army was known as the RSLMF from 1991-1998, as the National Army from 1999, and as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces since 2001. For a detailed explanation of the regional nature of the Sierra Leone conflict, see Solomon, C., "Regionalisation of Domestic Conflicts in the Mano River Basin", *African Renaissance*, June/July 2004.

political landscape as well as international responses to the country's situation. From a position of strength, the RUF reached a negotiated settlement with the GoSL when signing the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.

According to the terms of the Agreement, in exchange for calling a halt to the war and disarming, the RUF was given posts within the government, and guaranteed the right to form a political party to contest elections, and the United Nations (UN) Mission in Sierra Leone was formed (UNAMSIL).<sup>3</sup> Predictably nothing of the kind took place. The RUF violated Lomé including launching attacks on civilians and UN peacekeepers. British forces were deployed to Freetown to evacuate UK citizens and secure the airport to allow the arrival of UN reinforcements.

Finally an effective presence, the Abuja Agreement was signed in November 2000, which kick-started elements of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The UN finally took a leadership role in disarming the factions and by January 2002 President Kabbah declared that disarmament was complete and the war over. In March, the State of Emergency was lifted. Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on the 10 and 14 May 2002 respectively. Around 81 per cent of the eligible population voted and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and its leader, Kabbah, emerged as the overwhelming victors.

## **2.1 Overview of DDR programme content and phasing**

The long process of DDR, implemented and co-ordinated by the UN and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), started in 1998 with the first of 3 distinct phases. Phase II was launched in October 1999, as indicated by the Lomé peace agreement, with financial support from a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) as well as by Emergency Recovery Credits and a Post-Conflict Fund grant. Phase III ran from May 2001 to January 2002. Over the three phases, in four years, 72,500 combatants were disarmed and demobilised, including 4,751 women (6.5 per cent) and 6,787 children (9.4 per cent), of whom 506 were girls; 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed.

These phases suffered severe setbacks at certain points, including initial non-compliance with peace agreements, programme restructuring and resumptions of armed conflict, and it was not until the closing stages of DDR in 2001 that these were finally reined in. The expectation that DDR would underpin stability and security proved unfounded for much of the DDR phases and civilians in some areas continued to be attacked and children recruited. Some protection came from CDFs who also, on occasion, persecuted those suspected of colluding or being involved with the rebels.

Institutional gaps, combined with a crippling post-conflict economic, social and political environment provided the backdrop to the DDR programme. Poor governance systems at the central and local levels created a context within which other conflict factors flourished, for example, disgruntlement of unemployed youth and former combatants. From the central level to the local level, administration was characterised by arbitrary rule by the few, who oftentimes attempted to stay in power for life, once elected. Similarly, on the local level, power was fixed to the institution of the paramount chief, who is elected for life. Popular grievances over central

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<sup>3</sup> While the AFRC was largely sidelined during the negotiations in Lomé, its leader Johnny Paul Koroma, was later made Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP).

government's and chiefs' abuse of power in the past do not appear to have been greatly prioritised in this process, fuelling socio-economic divisions. Moreover, the political system had limited legitimacy. The Kabbah government was viewed locally as a shell and pandering solely to the dictates of donors.

The requisite infrastructure necessary for the range of DDR activities were non-existent, weak and fragilely institutionalised. Government ministries and institutions were typically under-funded and poorly equipped. The capacity of these ministries and institutions to deliver essential public services at all levels was severely reduced. Social capital was depleted either from deaths or flights out of the country, creating a limited pool of local skilled force. Expatriates were therefore recruited at significantly higher costs to restart essential government functions and begin a new social cycle.

It was clear from the outset that the Sierra Leone economy, which had been depressed by the conflict, would not be able to absorb the vast majority of ex-combatants, making difficult, sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. Employment prospects were slim, especially for those lacking technical or knowledge-based skills. Even those in various professions, such as school and college teachers, often experience delays in receiving regular payment of wages. Casual employment opportunities may be found, though frequency varies considerably. For instance, adult casual labourers make about Le 80, 000 (approximately £16 or US \$ 32) per month (based on a 20-day, eight-hour-per day, five-day work week) in Freetown. No additional benefits such as health care, employment insurance, or pension, are received (or deducted). More importantly, since Sierra Leone was starting from ground zero, money circulation in the economy was merely the result of the infusion of aid money, including credit money.

## 2.2 Disarmament and demobilisation

<b>Box 1: NCDDR gender-disaggregated data on DDR</b>								
<b>Group</b>	<b>Number Girls</b>	<b>Per cent</b>	<b>Number Boys</b>	<b>Per cent</b>	<b>Number Women</b>	<b>Per cent</b>	<b>Number Men</b>	<b>Per cent</b>
RUF	436	1.8	3,229	13.3	3,925	16.1	16,735	68.8
AFRC	41	.5	375	4.2	530	6.0	7,914	89.3
SLA	22	N/A	445	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CDF	7	.0001	1,996	5.3	296	0.8	34,890	93.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>6,181</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>

### 2.2.1 Qualifications for entry

Adults, 18 years and older, were eligible for entry into DDR by presenting a weapon at any of the official reception centres across the country. During phases I and II, knowledge of the assembly and disassembly of a weapon, usually an AK-47, was also used by DDR officials to determine entry into the programme, even for those under 18. During these phases "wives" and dependents were not eligible for entry. In Phase III, group disarmament was allowed, meaning a group could bring in a weapon.

### 2.2.2 Phase I: September – December 1998

Against an unstable background, DDR was initiated in February 1998, with the goal of dismantling some 32,000 of the various fighting forces between July 1998 and January 2000.



DDR only lasted between September and December 1998 as loopholes in the programme limited its effectiveness. The international community's reluctance to provide implementation funds and related programme deficiencies contributed to its disintegration. In addition, security problems in the countryside made implementation slow and sporadic. ECOMOG's glaring failure to provide security allowed remobilisation and rearmament of all factions. The result was the devastating January 6 invasion of Freetown in 1998, during which a conservative estimate of 5,000 civilians were killed. In the absence of security and safety, many civilians left the country if they could and business and livelihoods came effectively to a halt.

Only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed and these were mainly ex-Sierra Leone Army (SLA)/AFRC who surrendered to ECOMOG (2,994 AFRC and ex-SLA; 187 RUF; and 2 CDF). Of this total number, some 189 were child soldiers.<sup>4</sup>

### **2.2.3 Phase II: October 1999 – May 2000**

A second phase began in 1999, after the Lomé Agreement was signed, and it continued until 2000 when conflict broke out anew. During this period, UNAMSIL succeeded ECOMOG with a mandate to disarm 45,000 combatants, of which 12 per cent was presumed to be women, and provide security.<sup>5</sup> It was also to collect, guard and arrange for the destruction of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment turned in at disarmament centres. In addition, reinsertion packages were initiated including a transitional safety allowance (TSA) of US \$ 300 in two payments for combatants.

However, various factors undermined the disarmament and demobilisation process. UNAMSIL, with a rather limited mandate initially to supervise DDR was inadequately funded, poorly-equipped and under manned. Disarmament started before the demobilisation centres were ready and there were insufficient observers to register the combatants or the necessary equipment. Certain classes of weapons like hunting rifles and single and double-barrel shotguns, weapons used mainly by the CDF, were initially exempted, which created disarmament imbalances between the CDF and RUF. This was aggravated by inadequate security measures that allowed the RUF to violate the ceasefire. In parts of the countryside, especially in the north, the RUF continued to terrorise communities and normal trade and livelihoods proved impossible to resume in a climate of insecurity. This resulted in the programme's suspension in May 2000, following the hostage crisis. During this period, a total of 18,898 persons were disarmed.<sup>6</sup>

### **2.2.4 Interim phase: May 2000 – May 2001**

The violence of May 2000 put a stop to demobilisation. In this interim phase, some limited disarmament took place of 2,600 combatants, but it was not until 2001 that more comprehensive DDR took place.

### **2.2.5 Phase III: 18 May 2001 – January 2002**

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<sup>4</sup> Zongwe, M., "Preliminary Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone", UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section Assessment, 6 April 2002, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Zongwe, M., "Preliminary Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone", p. 2; S/RES/1260, 20 August 1999; United Nations, *Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/1999/1003, 28 September 1999, para. 37.

<sup>6</sup> Zongwe, M., "Preliminary Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilisation in Sierra Leone", p. 2-3.

UNAMSIL rapidly recovered from its initial setbacks of phase II. The bulk of demobilisation took place after the mission was beefed up, following the British intervention, in 2001-02. In this critical and substantive phase, almost 75,000 people registered as ex-combatants at DDR camps and 60 per cent were processed between May 2001 and January 2002 when the conflict was officially declared over.

With hindsight of the failed attempts at DDR, the programme was thoroughly overhauled and re-oriented. DDR became a national process and under the guidance of the NCDDR, a Tripartite Commission comprising UNAMSIL, the GoSL and the RUF was responsible for overall planning and implementation. Including the RUF enhanced their confidence in the demobilisation process without which they would likely have engaged in acts of non-compliance to delay the demobilisation calendar. Further, during Phase III, the SLA was dropped from the list of armed groups to be involved in disarmament and demobilisation. The government had decided to reform the army as part of the peace process.<sup>7</sup>

Disarmament was conducted at reception centres around the country in five phases:

- The assembly of combatants: receiving, screening, and processing ex-combatants;
- Collection of personal information: the collection of personal identification and data, information, registration, and the verification of weapons or ordnance delivered by the ex-combatants;
- Verification, collection and disabling weapons and ammunition prior to their destruction;
- Eligibility certification: Verification and authorisation of the ex-combatants by UN observers for their inclusion as beneficiaries in the DDR programme;
- Transporting screened and disarmed combatants from disarmament sites to demobilisation centres.

Disarmament commenced in the Kambia (RUF) and Port Loko (CDF) districts and proceeded to cover the entire country. Surprisingly, the response by the RUF in Kambia was overwhelming, whilst turn out at the Port Loko site was quite low, due to CDF mistrust of the process. Tripartite meetings between the GoSL, the RUF, and UNAMSIL, were conducted on a monthly basis in order to assess the level of disarmament and to deal with any problems that might be hindering the process. The process for implementing the disarmament and demobilisation programme involved selecting a pair of districts to be disarmed simultaneously within a one-month timeframe. When these were completed, disarmament was commenced in two new districts.

Following Kambia and Port Loko, the process moved to the Kono and Bonthe districts. Despite concerns regarding RUF acceptance of disarmament, it proceeded without too many problems and these districts were officially declared disarmed by the end of September 2001. By 3 September 2001, in fact, UNAMSIL had supervised the disarmament of about 16, 057 ex-combatants.

At Gandorhun, CDF-instigated disturbances in August 2001 caused the reception centre to be closed, resulting in delays to the process. The dispute was related to the surrender of hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, and mines, which were classified as ammunition under

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone", S/2000/992, 16 October 2000, para 54(e).

the NCDDR disarmament guidelines, and not as weapons. The CDF objected, wanting them to count as weapons, but the dispute was resolved after UNAMSIL intervention. There were also other problems associated with a lack of trust between the RUF and the CDF, which had an impact on the pace of disarmament.

Further, in Koinadugu and Moyamba districts, the RUF boycotted tripartite meetings to protest against the decision to hold elections on 14 May 2002. A September tripartite Makeni meeting resolved many issues and gave new impetus to moving the disarmament process forward.<sup>8</sup>

In some districts there were problems regarding disarmament, where the RUF and CDF were reluctant to disarm without simultaneous surrendering of arms. And at times, the NCDDR failed to deliver entitlements, such as identification and travel allowance, to ex-combatants, resulting in setbacks to the DDR process, and increasing tensions in the camps. Some combatants, for example, refused to leave camps because of the slow release of entitlements. During July and August 2001 there were riots, demonstrations and beatings of NCDDR staff in the demobilisation camps in Lunsar and Port Loko.

Once disarmed, combatants were sent to demobilisation sites where they received pre-discharge orientation, a small amount of reinsertion and transportation allowance, their benefits packages, counselling, and were discharged. Children, 17 years of age and younger, were sent to Interim Care Centres (ICCs), and could select to enter skills training or an educational programme of their choice. In the community, combatants benefited from training programs (largely vocational skills including auto repair, furniture-making, etc.) designed to ease their re-entry into the local economy.

### **2.2.6 Perspectives on Disarmament/Demobilisation**

Admittedly, moving more than 70,000 combatants through this process is from an operational standpoint an accomplishment in itself. In the course of the field assessment, however, respondents answered the semi-structured questions, detailing their experiences with disarmament and demobilisation.

The first observation that must be noted is that in our sample, 87 per cent of respondents entered the DDR programme while the 13 per cent did not participate in DDR for a variety of reasons. In the case of the CDF, contrary to the popular belief that their members were not interested in DDR because they only fought to defend their villages, it was discovered that they were frustrated by their inability to gain entry to DDR. Firstly, most of the CDF combatants that did not enter DDR were ineligible as they were not able to present a serviceable weapon or ammunition. In Kono, 1,999 of the total number of Donso militia (CDF), over 45 per cent of them, were excluded because of this as the ratio of militia to a weapon was 6:1. Secondly, a good number of militia members were considered ineligible for DDR, as the shotguns they possessed did not meet the required entry criteria. Records for the Kenema CDF show that only about 14 per cent of fighters were armed with weapons acceptable to NCDDR as a basis for demobilisation. The actual number of CDF fighters in Kenema District was 16,491. Also, militia members argued that they had a special reason to disarm. President Kabbah had allegedly assured them in Conakry, Guinea, in 1998 that they would be rewarded for fighting

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<sup>8</sup> The NCDDR decided to refuse to accept the inclusion of single or double-barrelled guns and locally made hunting rifles as categories of weapons that could be surrendered by ex-combatants. It was agreed that these would be covered in a separate community arms collection programme.

alongside government troops. He specifically promised them assistance with housing, construction materials and credit. These promises were not kept.<sup>9</sup>

The CDF have been left to stew in their resentment, arguing that the lion's share of DDR resources was funnelled to former RUF combatants. Neglected militia members suggested that it was the threat of an RUF return to the bush that had terrified the international community, with its iconic images of amputations and other atrocities against civilians, and it would have signified the failure of the peace process. Despite the fact that the CDF had fought on the side of the government and were unquestionably (in their own minds) "tougher" fighters, it was the RUF that was rewarded with incentive packages, jobs training and reintegration benefits, while the CDF members were given short shrift.

Despite official policy, the possession of a weapon, even with a group, and knowledge of its assembly and disassembly was repeatedly used by administrators to determine entry into DDR. This proved to be a particular difficulty for women and girls who did not always have a weapon in their possession. There were several reasons why women and girls found themselves without weapons at this critical time, key of which were that their guns were taken away by their commanders and handed to male fighters; and many had used weapons from a communal source not possessing guns themselves.

During demobilisation, male and female combatants were not housed separately, giving rise to protection issues. Close proximity between WAFF and their former commanders or 'bush husbands' was a major problem. Worse, they were forced to engage in sexual activities which in turn resulted in more unwanted pregnancies. This was compounded by poor security measures leaving WAFF vulnerable to abuse and continued violence, particularly from former fighters from a different faction. A likely reason for this oversight is that the camps were run mostly by men and lacked understanding of gender issues that might have been potentially addressed had women administrators been involved.

In contrast to what was a relatively smooth disarmament process, demobilisation was fraught with problems. It was limited in duration and ignored the specific needs of the vulnerable groups of WAFF, ex-child soldiers and combatants' dependents, contrary to Dr Francis Kai Kai's claim that "in the designed programme we [NCDDR] made every provision for the female ex-combatant".<sup>10</sup> The encampment period was widely viewed to be too short to effect any substantial and sustained change in behaviour and attitudes, and was, in some cases, certainly too short to break up existing command and control structures amongst the armed factions. The power that commanders' continue to hold over their followers is not insignificant. This is still evident five years after the conflict. During focus group discussions with the different factions, former commanders acted as gate keepers to the wider "ex-combatant communities", led the group discussions and attendance lists were compiled according to the former rank of respondents.

In the case of the CDF, there was the widely erroneous belief that women and girls were not involved in the militias. In fact, they were fully initiated members of the Kamajors and the Gbethis, although the former was originally a male-only traditional hunting society. Initiated

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<sup>9</sup> Respondents were present at this meeting, where other sensitive national issues were planned and discussed. They were senior members of the Donso militia and are willing for their names to be disclosed, if necessary. Focus group discussions with Donso militia in Kono, May 2007.

<sup>10</sup> UNOCHA, "IRIN Interview on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration", *IRIN*, 28 March 2003.

women and girls were included in all ceremonies and rituals, and served in various roles such as frontline fighters, herbalists, spies, and initiators. For some of the interviewees, official denial of their presence was a calculated attempt to perpetuate and strengthen the myth that male CDF fighters could not have sexual contact with a girl or woman as that could reverse the perceived magical powers of a fighter's charms. This myth prevented them from entering DDR and collecting their benefits.

Many child soldiers who would have been eligible for DDR did not come forward for several reasons. Many children were tempted by the cash allowance and consequently posed as adult combatants at demobilisation camps, or fearing rejection and stigmatisation, preferred to self-reintegrate. Also, shortcomings in the screening process meant that children who did not have knowledge of weapons were labelled as "separated children" rather than child soldiers and were reunited with their families without receiving demobilisation benefits. From discussions with "bush wives", some of them fall into this category. The discrepancy between estimated ex-child soldiers and actual participants was particularly notable in the case of girl soldiers. Only 8 per cent of children who went through the DDR process were girls, although an estimated 3,000 did not participate.<sup>11</sup> This confirmed that the focus of DDR was on the main fighting forces, and 'peripheral' groups were inadequately catered for.

Respondents had fundamental complaints of perceived bureaucratic incompetence, inefficiency and allegations of corruption at various phases of disarmament and demobilisation. They reported that during assembly, registration and documentation of combatants was not comprehensive. Photo identification (ID) cards did not have an identical format, which made monitoring the distribution of demobilisation benefits difficult. While the majority of combatants received a photo ID upon registration, some ID cards were without photos, and a good number of combatants did not immediately receive their ID. Upon collection, they were informed that the computer had not "picked up" their names. Cards were punched as if the full TSA had been received on a take-it-or-leave basis. As a result of these lapses, it is assumed that many non-combatants managed to easily gain entry into the programme and hijack combatants' benefits. It was particularly alleged in Kono that corrupt NCDDR officials admitted relatives and friends as combatants. In general, however, there is no way of determining how many illegitimate participants took part in the DRR programme. Moreover, TSAs varied from location to location. Some combatants received a lump sum of Le 110, 000, others Le 300, 000 and, again, others Le 60, 000 over a six month period. Promises to return with the balance were rarely made good.<sup>12</sup>

Interviewees commented on the paucity of benefit packages, including civilian clothing and basic necessities, particularly in terms of the physical needs of women and girls. Combatants received a one-off supply of household utensils: one towel, one blanket, one sleeping mat, one plastic plate and cup respectively. Soaps, toothpastes and toothbrushes were supplied every fortnight. Delivery of civilian clothing was described by respondents as a "lucky dip", as second-hand clothing was randomly distributed amongst former combatants irrespective of size and gender. It was up to recipients to try and exchange ill-fitting items amongst themselves or wear them as best as possible. The number of items per person varied but generally covered a one-off supply of underwear, trousers, shirts and sandals or shoes. Women and girls did not

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<sup>11</sup> Some former child combatants admitted to disarming with bullets and becoming eligible to receive TSAs. Focus group discussions with former child soldiers in Kailahun, June 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with former RUF combatants and child soldiers in Kono and Kailahun, May-June 2007.

receive proper sanitation materials, including feminine hygiene products. They were told by some DDR officials to use leaves as they used to do in the bush.<sup>13</sup>

While the demobilisation goal of the encampment period was of minimal success, former combatants did benefit from the services provided and this should not be discounted. Of particular value were the medical screening process and the counselling for women, however limited. It was also important to have the child protection agencies separate children from their commanders by transporting them to ICCs, even it was only for a limited time.

### **2.3 Reinsertion/reintegration phases and activities**

Key to the success of Sierra Leone's DDR programme was the effective reintegration of ex-combatants who have disarmed and demobilised. The reintegration aspect of the DDR programme aimed at facilitating ex-combatants' re-entry into civilian political, social and economic life. It was designed to provide ex-combatants: with vocational skills training and formal education opportunities which would enable them to engage in sustainable employment and livelihoods, access to micro enterprise schemes, tools for various trades as well as farming and to support social acceptance through social reconciliation. Indeed, without a comprehensive "R" component, the "DD" may largely be a wasted effort as impoverished, unskilled and disgruntled ex-combatants are prone to taking up arms once again.

In total 63,545 former combatants were reintegrated, of whom 6,845 were former child soldiers. Although these figures are impressive, approximately 9,000 former combatants did not complete the entire programme. In other words, about one in eight ex-combatants (12.5 per cent) did not make it to the reintegration phase. Difficulties in terms of disarmament and demobilisation, funding and a climate of insecurity held back reintegration to as late as 2001.<sup>14</sup> Further, a persistent problem was the lack of local partners who had sufficient training to deliver medium and long-term reintegration activities, particularly in places such as Kailahun District in the east, where cross border security threats imposed limitations on working with ex-combatants. Trainers were not necessarily qualified or motivated, and training itself suffered from poor quality and was almost entirely classroom based. However, by 5 January 2002 almost 48,000 combatants had been demobilised. Transitional allowances were given to support ex-combatants during their first three months in chosen resettlement locations and reintegration payments, financed by the MDTF, totalled almost US \$ 8.7m by the end of the first quarter of 2002.

By the close of March 2002, 15,295 ex-combatants were engaged in medium-term reintegration support and 5,594 had completed reintegration activities. The NCDDR had been able to place 23,000 beneficiaries into various projects.<sup>15</sup> By October 2002, 56,751 ex-combatants had registered for reintegration. Of these, 14,220 had completed skills training and 19,073 were in ongoing skills training programmes.

#### **2.3.1 Skills training for economic reintegration and limitations**

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<sup>13</sup> Meetings with WAFFs in Kailahun, June 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Fanthorpe, R., "Humanitarian Aid in Post-War Sierra Leone: the Politics of Moral Economy", HPG Background Paper, London: ODI, 13, February 2003, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Fanthorpe, R., "Humanitarian Aid in Post-War Sierra Leone: the Politics of Moral Economy", p. 7 and p. 13.

Economic reintegration into a population as impoverished as Sierra Leone has been a formidable challenge. Skills acquisition through apprenticeships and vocational training was seen as a key component in keeping ex-combatants from returning to violence and to help ease their re-entry into the local economy. Vocational training in skills such as carpentry, car mechanics, building, plumbing, and metal work were the foci.<sup>16</sup> Tool kits for trades such as carpentry, plumbing, and auto repair were provided after the apprenticeship or when training scheme were completed. NCDDR also backed this up with minimal assistance on job-seeking strategies, and referred ex-combatants to labour intensive public works, or development projects implemented in parallel programmes.

Much of what was hindering the transition from skills training to sustainable employment was not simply ex-combatants' high expectations of acquiring a job upon completion of the course and disinclination to accept "unattractive options", as has been suggested by NCDDR officials. There is little evidence that needs assessment and socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants was properly surveyed in Sierra Leone to determine sectors where sustainable economic livelihoods could be built for ex-combatants. The absence of a coherent planning strategy was aggravated by even shorter training periods of two-three months, instead of the initially stipulated period of six months.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, respondents reported that there were significant delays in the delivery of training, allowances and toolkits. Some ex-combatants had to wait six months before receiving their first cash payment. Lack of employment opportunities led to ex-combatants selling their tool kits given to them to boost their livelihood prospects, even though they were meant to assist the ex-combatants kick-start life anew. A result of inconsistent and ineffective training was the inability of ex-combatants to secure livelihoods, as well as a better future for themselves and their dependents.

A key issue which hamstrung economic reintegration operations was that many ex-combatants had a limited educational background, despite skills training packages, and consequently their absorption into the formal sector was highly problematic. By and large, urban reintegration was comparatively successful. Although ex-combatants could find jobs in the urban informal sector, it was often much harder to obtain employment in the urban formal sector, simply because there were hardly any available. Even for those who received some limited vocational training, the difficulties of finding a job are minimal and very dependent on the sector they were assigned to. In Kono, Freetown and Bo, for example, those working in construction said they had no problem after their training to find a position in town, whereas metalwork apprentices were far more pessimistic. On the other hand, rural reintegration was hampered by two main factors: lack of skills and depressed labour market. This was combined with misdirected targeting. RUF, for example, were sent to areas where they had no family connections (although in some instances, they expressly requested this) and skills' training was sometimes directed towards areas where a needs assessment would have shown that there was no demand. Further, alternatives to violence were not created for the majority of ex-combatants who are also among the poorest groups in Sierra Leone – a potentially worrying situation. In places

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<sup>16</sup> However, in Makeni for example those ex-combatants having gone through short-term apprenticeships did not have the experience to build sustainable work as they had to compete with craftsmen with decades of experience. Interview with Christopher John, SLP, Makeni, 11 November 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Respondents alleged that a good number of training centres in Kono and Kailahun were established by relatives of NCDDR officials and inadequately resourced. It was imposed that all trainees should wear training uniforms, and these could only be purchased at the training centres at a cost of Le 25, 000 per person. Focus group discussions with former RUF combatants in Kono, May 2007.

such as Bo and Kono, former CDF officers remain without worthwhile livelihoods or are impoverished and are not receiving assistance.

One obvious opportunity and need was to divert ex-combatants to agricultural skills and work, particularly as considerable numbers of former combatants had been engaged in this sector prior to their entry into the conflict. Further, there was a desperate need to increase agricultural production following its decimation during the conflict.<sup>18</sup> The NCDDR agricultural reintegration package was less attractive than the vocational training package with its associated financial benefits.<sup>19</sup> In the event, it is estimated that 16 per cent of ex-combatants opted for agriculture compared to 60 per cent for artisanal training. Many ex-combatants, particularly those in the RUF, were unwilling or unable to rejoin rural communities engaged in smallholdings agriculture despite the fact that in a survey of ex-combatants, it was found that 33 per cent of respondents were farmers before the war. Ex-combatants wanted technical and material support necessary to establish their own co-operatives and engage in small-scale agricultural production, which NCDDR was either unable or unwilling to support. Thus, an opportunity to engage ex-combatants in community recovery was lost. NCDDR made re-adjustments to its agricultural support to attract more participation, and looked at cash support for farm wages and supplementary food. However, this did not appear to substantively improve the situation.

An impact of this lack of agricultural take-up was to further exacerbate the trend of depopulation of the agricultural sector and the countryside and the movement of civilians to urban centres, such as Freetown, which dramatically grew in size during and after the civil war. The increased population of Freetown had drastic impacts on the social and economic well being of both ex-combatants and civilians with the infrastructure unable to support a rising population and the growth in slums and poverty. Many ex-combatants in Freetown currently eke out a barely sustainable existence.

At the same time, DDR programming faced the difficulty that many ex-combatants had grown accustomed to extorting money and resources from civilians and that the idea of hard physical labour in agriculture seemed a poor option for most combatants. Also, many were attracted to the lure of diamond mining and the prospect in their own minds of making considerable money from it, although the reality was often quite different.

Labour-based schemes, whether in agricultural or other settings, were seen as an attractive short-term option. However, once again they raised issues regarding their longer-term viability in terms of integrating ex-combatants into communities and meeting their economic needs, and the sustainability of creating a public works force composed mainly of ex-combatants. Ex-combatants were, for example, trained in building construction, road maintenance, and work supervision by the NCDDR in partnership with the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) and local contractors. Sierra Leone was, and still is, reliant on labour-based work, which held out perhaps the best immediate prospect for ex-combatants, as it was localised and attracted participation within the community. However, ex-combatants did not fully take up the opportunities presented in this sector. Moreover, this can only be sustained when economic circumstances allow for expansion of public services and as such, should be addressed within the overall economic development frameworks.

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<sup>18</sup> Focus group discussions with former Donso militia and RUF combatants in Kono and Kailahun, between May and June 2007.

<sup>19</sup> Arthy, S., "Ex-Combatant Reintegration: Key Issues for Policy Makers and Practitioners, Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone", Working Paper, London: DFID, August 2003, p. 5.



The major impediments to skills training as a reintegration tool can be summarised as follows:

- Much of the reintegration assistance was only for a six-month period which was insufficient to provide the in-depth training crucial for ex-combatants wishing to be competitive in the labour market. And the two or three month training programmes, as has been noted, were often of little value in terms of learning a trade;
- The high mobility of many ex-combatants, moving from region to region, made it difficult to deliver effective assistance;
- Both local and international implementing partners had a limited capacity for delivering long-term reintegration;
- There was low supporting assistance from donors and the GoSL in social and physical infrastructure in terms of creating employment and supporting job placement. In fact, limited economic growth and the slow pace of private sector initiatives meant that even when ex-combatants developed marketable skills their opportunities were frequently limited;
- Low levels of skills and education invariably disqualify from entering the job market. Bereft of employment and livelihoods, ex-combatants are driven to armed criminality or petty crimes;
- The role of local communities in supporting ex-combatants was not fully utilised.

### **2.3.2 Education**

Given that many ex-combatants had received little or no education during the conflict, it was essential that DDR linked with education. Efforts were made to create linkages, but once again programming struggled to make a substantive impact. Improving education opportunities was seen as particularly important by NCDDR, as 36 per cent of ex-combatants surveyed never attended school and only 1 per cent of the entire 'fighting population' were schooled up to higher education level.

Of particular concern were children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) and their lack of education. Formal education was an attractive benefit for demobilised child soldiers, 90 per cent of whom in our survey expressed their desire to continue with their education. In order to enable demobilised child soldiers to enrol in school at educational levels consistent with their ages, a Community Rapid Education Programme (CREP) was designed to accelerate the learning process of 10 to 14 year olds, compressing the six-year national primary school curriculum into three years. CREP was also made available to other groups of children affected by the war, such as displaced children. A major obstacle to the programme was that teachers and parents often objected to having former child soldiers enrol in their schools as they feared a disruptive effect on other children. Besides, providing child soldiers with packages of uniforms, school materials and school fees created feelings of resentment amongst other children and their families.

To minimise the hostility towards ex-child soldiers, NCCDR worked with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to give education to these children through the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP). CEIP was intended to support ex-child soldiers' reintegration as a component of a wider community-focussed education recovery programme, whereby it provided both demobilised child soldiers with school fees and a standard package of education material assistance to schools that accepted the children. This created a major

incentive to schools and communities to accept the children, as well as ameliorate the rejection they might otherwise had endured.

It was claimed that by May 2002, NCDDR had placed 6,452 former fighters in school and had provided sponsorship of school fees, textbooks, uniforms and a subsistence allowance for one year. Some ex-combatants undertook professional qualifications in computer studies, accountancy and management. However, substantial numbers of ex-combatants remained, and still remain, outside the formal education sector, not least because they are unable to access the school system. However, a continuing challenge in Sierra Leone is the lack of job opportunities that can be accessed even when ex-combatants have been through schools and acquired qualifications.

### **2.3.3 Social reintegration/reconciliation**

One of the more focused elements of reintegration efforts in Sierra Leone were early attempts at fostering sensitisation and reconciliation between communities and ex-combatants. Prior to demobilisation, NCDDR community sensitisation exercises were undertaken to ease the settling in of ex-combatants into communities supported by campaigns in the media and on radio stations. Ex-combatants were targeted by NCDDR prior to their return to communities and pre-discharge counselling emphasised community orientation, with a special re-entry plan. This social adaptation and development plan was developed jointly by NCDDR and other international organisations, and implemented by local civil society organisations.

The reintegration programme sought to allay resentment through putting the message across to communities that they would benefit, directly and indirectly, from the fact that ex-combatants would be rehabilitated and become independent and less likely to commit acts inimical to communities. This was further eased by the involvement of community-based social reintegration organisations with 64 out of 149 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone being targeted by the end of Spring 2002.

Ex-combatants were also brought to *ad hoc* community reconciliation meetings in various parts of the country. In serious cases, where war crimes were alleged, NCDDR acted as a facilitator with traditional leaders to facilitate the return of ex-combatants. In a further bid to strengthen reconciliation, community-based purification rites were performed to welcome the “child” back: kola nuts offering to symbolise peace and reconciliation, cleansing rituals that cleansed the earth of the blood that had contaminated it and drove out the evil spirits. NCDDR encouraged ex-combatants to undertake tasks that might be beneficial to communities, such as civil works, street cleaning, and helping to rehabilitate shelter. It also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, and other projects that helped to rebuild social capital. However, DDR failed to support civilian populations faced with the reality of reintegrating former combatants. Efforts at fostering reconciliation were not sufficiently comprehensive in places like Kailahun and Kono, which were hard hit by the conflict, and have resulted in the creation of pockets of combatant communities that are insulated from the larger communities. Instead, in communities across Sierra Leone, local groups took on the responsibility of bridging the gap between communities and former combatants, oftentimes with little or no support from the national and international programmes established to ensure successful reintegration.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/UNAMSIL’s Stopgap Programme, which commenced in October 2001, in particular attempted to address time lags that ex-combatants

were experiencing in receiving their reintegration benefits, especially in the east of Sierra Leone bordering Liberia. These delays led to volatility among concentrations of ex-combatants and threatened the human security of communities in the region. Stopgap projects provided short-term labour intensive engagement working with the rehabilitation of vital community infrastructure. By June 2003, 69 Stopgap projects had been approved with a total commitment of US \$ 844,000.<sup>20</sup>

The social reintegration impact of Stopgaps was considerable with ex-combatants working side-by-side with community members, rehabilitating community infrastructure and agricultural land, which they had often destroyed or pillaged themselves. Further, the programme helped rehabilitate health centres, schools, water systems, and garbage collection.

A further measure was the setting up of social reconciliation programmes in areas of critical tension in the south, east and northern parts of Sierra Leone where the rebels had been particularly active. These were backed up by information dissemination exercises to try and foster trust between communities and ex-combatants.

Initially, reconciliation or assimilation was difficult. Not least due to some of the entrenched attitudes of ex-combatants. Many CDF fighters considered themselves “hard done by” and not adequately compensated, given that they saw themselves as “liberators”. A number of them failed to acknowledge, or comprehend, that many killings during the conflict were morally wrong. And it is also alleged that RUF ex-combatants held on to property looted during the conflict, despite the presence of the original owners in the community. The fact that some RUF ex-combatants still professed loyalty to their leaders detained by the Special Court, and that former AFRC members were integrated into the new national army, were sources of unease for many communities.

Ex-combatants initially found the process extremely difficult when they were frequently reminded about atrocities and their role in the conflict by communities in which they lived. Further, community resentment over the “special” treatment of ex-combatants was an issue, as in other DDR contexts. In early community sensitisation sessions and radio “phone-ins”, comments such as “those who have ruined us are being given the chance to become better persons financially, academically and skills-wise” were frequently voiced.

Although there was only a small degree of retribution against ex-combatants, there is still a degree of latent hostility to ex-combatants among civilians in Sierra Leone. They are ironically referred to as “new citizens” and are readily accused of armed robberies, petty crimes and rapes.

### **2.3.4 Reintegration financing issues**

Reintegration financing shortfalls were a major barrier in Sierra Leone to putting into place sustainable programming. In June 2002, for example, it was feared that existing funds would dry up by August. The UN Secretary-General warned in May that a lack of funds was delaying the resettlement of thousands of former combatants. In June, there were around 20,000 ex-combatants waiting to go through the NCDDR process. A major problem was that most of the

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, “The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned Report”, Freetown: UNAMSIL, 2004, p. 8.

donor funds were invested in disarmament and demobilisation, leaving little for the reintegration phase.

This had important human security consequences for ex-combatants and communities in which they were located. Many ex-combatants envisaged their allowances being paid instantly, but it was not uncommon for them to experience delays in payments of between three to seven months, causing widespread discontent and on occasion riots and violence. The problem had historical underpinnings. In 1999 one of the main objectives of the peace process was laying the foundations for security, and in terms of DDR, the government made resource promises that could not be met.

NCDDR tried targeting ex-combatants with short-term reintegration programmes, but because of limited funds reintegration was held back, while local NCDDR partners also had difficulties in delivering medium- and longer-term reintegration, due to a lack of resources.

## **2.4 Reintegration and vulnerable groups**

### **2.4.1 Women associated with fighting forces**

Women were among the worst affected by fault-lines in the design and implementation of DDR in terms of both their safety and security and economic/social recovery. The number of women associated with the fighting forces was estimated to be around 12 per cent, and had been involved in a variety of activities. During focus group discussions with ex-WAFFs conducted for this study, over half stated that they had fighting experience; one third indicated that they had received basic military and weapons training; and two thirds stated that they were “bush wives”, in addition to performing other roles. However, gender programming aimed at women was largely absent in DDR and there was little recognition of the formidable challenges faced by women ex-combatants. There was also initially a low participation rate of 5 per cent of women in the Stopgap programme which sought to address some of the shortfalls of the DDR process, although steps were taken to address this.<sup>21</sup>

The way DDR was conducted exposed women to risk and did not effectively promote their economic and social interests. Women ex-combatants frequently were not separated from male ex-combatants or provided with adequate sanitary facilities. They were also exposed to risk in transit to camps, within the camps, and on leaving them and returning to communities. When they reached communities they were also vulnerable to being rejected as well as being abused and attacked.

Further, a key mistake was the exclusion of the “bush wives” of ex-combatants from the DDR programme. They often fared even worse than women combatants in that they received no benefits through the formal DDR process.

A “bush wife” or “war bride” or ‘rebel wife’ is a young girl or woman who was abducted by a rebel and, in most cases, coerced and terrorised into living with that rebel as a wife. In our survey only two respondents admitted to an existing relationship with their “husbands” prior to the conflict and to have willingly accompanied them to the bush. Use of the word “wife” by the perpetrators was deliberate and strategic. It demonstrated a rebel’s control over a woman. His

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<sup>21</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/UNAMSIL, *The Stopgap Programme*, October 2001-July 2003, p. 15.

psychological manipulations of her feelings rendered her unable to deny him his wishes. By calling an abducted girl “wife”, the rebel openly staked his claim as her “husband” and proclaimed her “untouchable” to the other rebels.<sup>22</sup>

### **Box 2: Role of bush wives**

A “bush wife” is in charge of her “husband’s”, the commander’s, compound in his absence and exerted substantial power. She could select and send troops on attacks and raids, send girls and boys on reconnaissance missions, distribute weapons and decide how food and looted items were shared out among those in the compound. She was accompanied by bodyguards, both to provide protection in case of an attack and to prevent her escape, and was herself armed.

A “bush wife” carried her “husband’s” possessions as they trekked across the countryside. She also cooked for him when food was available, washed his clothes, gratified his sexual needs whenever he wanted and generally protected his possessions in his absence. She endured his insults and assaults, repeatedly, and bore the brunt of his anger, especially after they suffered a defeat or an ambush failed. Further, a “bush wife” was expected to show undying loyalty to her “husband” for his protection and reward him with “love” and “affection”. She was not expected to attempt to escape as this was deemed disloyal. Punishment for disloyalty was always harsh and so “wives” were led to believe, would be met by severe beating and or death.

“Bush wives” were however spared gang rapes and were ensured regular meals, in addition to protection. In some instances, some commanders had more than one wife. They were the ones who could afford to live in big houses. A commander would have his favourite ‘wife’ he visited regularly for sex but would still demand sex from his other wives. If he tired of any one “wife” he would simply throw her out of his ‘house’ and leave her at the mercy of the other rebels, or send her to the frontline to fight.

### *Social reintegration*

Social responses of fear, denial, stigma and discrimination have accompanied female ex-combatants and ‘bush wives’ in Sierra Leone. Discrimination spread rapidly, fuelling anxiety and prejudice against the women. 90 per cent of the ‘bush wives’ in the study who have not returned to their communities have been rejected by their families and communities. They cohabit in groups of five and make weekly contributions towards the household budget. Female combatants have difficulties adjusting to civilian life. Having lived a military life for a long time, many found it difficult to accept traditional family roles once more. In many areas ‘bush wives’ are seen as an embarrassment; they are believed to bring shame upon the family or community. In some predominantly Islamic communities ‘bush wives’ are viewed as immoral and as a punishment from God. Stigma militates against proper reintegration and creation of livelihoods. Relatives and friends who could have helped provide money or jobs are unwilling to associate with ‘bush wives’, or victims are too ashamed to disclose their status.

“Bush wives” suffer additional stigma different from those who suffered sexual violence during attacks and raids, generally because they lived for long periods, sometimes eight years, with their “husbands” in the bush. They are accused of benefiting materially from the

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<sup>22</sup> Bangura, Z., and Solomon, C., “The phenomenon of ‘forced marriage’ in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone and, more specifically, in the context of the trials against the RUF and AFRC accused only”, Expert Report, May 2005.

associations with their husbands and received booty seized from looting sprees. Others, it is alleged, became trained fighters and went on “missions” with their husbands. Locals argued that any person who lived with a rebel longer than a week was tainted and acquired “rebel behaviour”. Therefore, “bush wives” are viewed as extensions of their husbands and are rejected for that reason.

### *Economic reintegration*

Economic reintegration for ex-combatants is generally complicated and WAFF tend to face more specific difficulties than male ex-combatants in economic reintegration. The inability to access credit, own land, plus a return to prevailing pre-conflict labour patterns in which women were mostly associated with informal work are but a few of the complex and sensitive issues that create concern. A majority of those interviewed said they were schoolchildren or petty traders at the time of their abduction, but have not been able to go back to school or undergo any form of vocational skills training since the end of the conflict.

Many families were impoverished by the conflict and did not have the means to support returning women ex-combatants who were at the same time stigmatised. Significant numbers that have returned have been compelled, in effect, to resort to prostitution to survive in places such as Makeni, Kono, Freetown and Kailahun, despite non-governmental organisation (NGO) programmes to divert them from this, educate them and teach them skills. Many women had to abandon schooling during the conflict and have little prospect of returning to it now given their economic predicament.

For some women ex-combatants the only realistic option has been to stay with their “husbands” or abductors in the hope of receiving some economic support, although some have developed emotional attachments to them. However, many male ex-combatants are socially excluded and poor and have little prospect of sustainable livelihoods further damaging the prospects of women associated with them.

By not making special provision for these women, DDR programmes have missed an opportunity to intervene to reduce negative social and economic impacts on their well-being.

### *Physical and psychological abuse.*

“Bush wives” suffered wide ranging gender-based violence (GBV) in many forms including rape, sexual slavery and exploitation. It impacted on their physical, emotional, psychological and social well-being, with problems such as repetitive episodes of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), HIV, multiple unwanted pregnancies, chronic abdominal pain, substance abuse and mental illness. Specialist programmes to provide long term crucial care and support to help young women return to normal life were however conspicuously absent.<sup>23</sup>

## **2.4.2 Children associated with fighting forces**

Precise figures about the number of children previously associated with the fighting forces do not exist. Children entered the DDR programmes through a number of avenues: some via reception areas; others surrendered to ECOMOG or UNAMSIL; while others were referred to

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<sup>23</sup> UNAMSIL, “The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned”, Freetown: UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section, August 2003, p. 25.

child protection agencies through the police; or brought in for demobilisation by their families. Once in the camps or reception areas, breakdowns in DDR further impacted upon children.

There were problems in moving children quickly and appropriately through demobilisation. In Phase II, this was meant to happen within 72 hours. This was an acknowledgement of the risk of children continuing to be associated with adult former combatants in the adult section of the camp. But resource shortfalls meant that it was difficult to put children into separate facilities in camps and the 72 hour target was rarely achieved in part, it was alleged, because of the slow pace at which NCDDR and UNAMSIL registered children, thus delaying their movement into interim care. In Lungi, for example, delays in providing separate facilities meant that for long periods children were dependent on the adult camp for sanitation and water facilities.

Further, in the camps ex-combatant commanders were reluctant to give up control of children and child protection agencies found it difficult to get access to them. It was noted that:

Children provided labour for food preparation, fetching water, selling in the market etc. Girls were kept under particular control and represented a presence amongst “Camp Followers” that contrasted sharply with their absence in demobilisation. Commanders threatened to kill them if they left.<sup>24</sup>

Conversely, combatants’ families, including children, many of whom were internally displaced persons (IDPs), were excluded from the DDR process. They received no services from NCDDR or from NCRRR, as IDPs, despite the fact that they outnumbered combatants by four to one.

In order to avoid the perception that the use of children as combatants was being rewarded, and TSAs finding their way into the hand of commanders, children did not receive the US \$ 300 TSA. Instead, they received services such as family tracing and reunification and access to community reintegration. Unlike adult combatants they were not required to present a gun to secure access into DDR. These measures, designed to protect children and ease their reintegration into communities, were sometimes viewed unfavourably by DDR personnel and by children. Some military observers adopted the position that children deserved the same rewards as adults and allowed children to receive benefits. Some of the first children arriving at the camps felt let down by this policy believing that the programme would provide them with a US \$ 300 TSA, immediate enrolment in a school, and vocational training or access to schools.

In a similar twist, the lack of immediate benefits to the commanders deterred other commanders from bringing in children. They perceived allowing children to be demobilised as weakening their “manpower” with few benefits in return. In some instances, children exited the programme and sought to find a weapon so that they could return and attempt to qualify for the adult TSA.

### *Social reintegration*

Exclusion was a concern from the onset. One area of difficulty was that little was done to facilitate acceptance of returning children by local communities. Some communities regarded the reintegration of ex-RUF child combatants with great suspicion. This was particularly the case in CDF-controlled areas in the South with some families even ‘disowning’ their own

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<sup>24</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund, “The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces”, Freetown: UNICEF, 2003, p. 13.

children by not registering children who had been separated from them during the conflict for tracing.<sup>25</sup>

The complexities of the role of family and communities, and the cultural and social construction of childhood and adulthood, were destroyed, making reintegration difficult. What we see emerging is that children, traditionally regarded as indicators of family wealth, and a source of future security for older family members, are now transformed into sources of insecurity. The value of the extended family system which provide protection and the sense of belonging to a family or community was destroyed. Parents had lost their old age pension guarantee, and the children had lost their social safety net. Children who are rejected by their communities face a bleak future as rejection by the community is one of the worst experiences that an individual can face in Sierra Leone. Those who have resettled in new communities have had to learn a new ethnic language and adjust to a new custom.

The difficulties within DDR particularly impacted upon girls. Girls as young as 10 years old had been abducted and taken away from their families, some for as long as 8 years. They suffered considerable sexual abuse, psychological trauma, yet large numbers of girls who were eligible for DDR did not come forward to be registered and reintegrated. Girls often tried to remain anonymous and avoided the potential stigma of applying for demobilisation or tended to bypass formal systems. However, this generally had severe economic consequences and left them open to victimisation and abuse. Many girls, particularly those with babies, had little choice but to try and access income opportunities that provided instant cash and felt that they could not afford to go through long-term skills training which might have led to more sustainable outcomes for them.

Girls with babies particularly feared that the babies would be stigmatised as ‘rebel’ babies on their return to communities. UNICEF noted that:

Some families rejected the girls. Others left in shame at their failure to fulfil the roles expected of them. Some became commercial sex workers; others returned to their commanders in the bush. Many girls gravitated towards a life of going back and forth to the bush, torn between the security offered by family and community relations and those offered by a combatant.<sup>26</sup>

Because so little is known about girl mothers and their children, the complexities of the girls’ relationships with their children, the fathers of their children, remains unclear. During our survey, there were discussions around infanticide and similar issues: girl mothers that have killed their children intentionally; girls that have left children behind while fleeing, thus rendering the children vulnerable; girls that love these children even if they are born out of sexual violence, and protect them. Respondents could identify with all the categories although none admitted to infanticide or child abandonment.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> However, in some cases parents and communities had actively encouraged children’s engagement in the conflict; UNICEF, “The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces: Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone 1998-2002”, Freetown: UNICEF, 2003, p. ix.

<sup>26</sup> UNICEF, “The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces”, pp. 16-17.

<sup>27</sup> Obviously none of the respondents admitted to infanticide or abandonment. They knew of a “friend” whom it had happened to. Focus group discussions with “bush wives” in Kailahun, June 2007.



CAFF, particularly girls, received little or no strategic rehabilitation assistance to recover from their war experiences and change in identity. All the girls in our survey stated that they were virgins when they were abducted and returned as mothers. Others hated their “husbands” but were forced to live with them for long periods. All detest having to struggle with their children, but most of all they resent the stigma.

### **Box 3: Righting earlier ineffective reintegration**

The Sierra Leone Red Cross has undertaken extra activities for the relatively large numbers of WAFF in Kailahun, who feel that reintegrating in their home communities is impossible. The Child Advocacy and Rehabilitation Centre (CAR) provides an intensive ten months skills training programme, accompanied by the provision of toolkits, certification and regular follow-up every six months. The programme has been praised by WAFF, former child soldiers and community members alike for its practical hands-on and community-oriented approach. Sensitive to the needs of its target populations, CAR also provides medical care, crèche facilities and a daily hot meal for WAFF and their children.<sup>28</sup>

## **3. DDR Links and Related Programming**

Reintegration from 2001 was part of an overall integrated recovery strategy in Sierra Leone that included judicial reform, Security Sector Reform (SSR), economic development, and the return, resettlement, and support of refugees and IDPs. However, in practice these elements, and other forms of programming, were not fully co-ordinated or integrated in Sierra Leone. The lack of linkages, or ineffective, linkages between DDR and related processes such as SALW control, SSR and access to justice have meant that opportunities to address human security issues in Sierra Leone such as risks, vulnerabilities and community protection in a holistic and co-ordinated manner have not been fully grasped.

### **3.1 Access to justice**

Sierra Leone is characterised by legal pluralism, that is, a rudimentary formal justice system based on British common law exists along with customary law, in which chiefs and local administrators exercise judicial power and solve conflicts. These traditional institutions operate beyond state oversight, since customary law is not codified nor are rules of procedure in Native Courts unified, and collaborate together with Poro and Sande power associations, councils of elders, and other forms of dispute resolution. Attention should be paid to the interface between statutory and customary law but in Sierra Leone, customary law is the primary arena in which citizens look for justice. The statutory system is seen to mostly benefit urban elites, who are most likely to avail themselves of that system.

A fully functional and effective rule of law system is a critical component of the reintegration process. For victims, it is imperative that they have access to a fair justice system. The main role of entrenched rule of law is to provide a level playing field for all groups in society and, consequently, to elicit a sense of equal treatment before the law for all groups. The link between rule of law and national reconciliation is indirect. Reintegration is not a factor within the formal criminal justice system, which is simply a means by which someone guilty of a

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<sup>28</sup> Meetings with ex-child combatants, WAFFs in Kailahun, June 2007.

criminal offence can be brought to justice. This is the responsibility of the State and does not involve the victim, save in terms of their role as a witness. Any reparation the victim may acquire would be through the civil justice system, but this does not amount to reintegration. At another level though, the mere equality of access of all groups to a transparently fair judicial process, helps to advance the goals of social cohesion as all groups are assured that the judicial system can be fair to all.

Barriers to access to justice impact all residents of Sierra Leone, though to varying degrees. Some characteristics of social groupings are associated with greater inaccess, though not necessarily exclusively, such as gender, age, ethnicity and ex-combatants.

Many ex-combatants participated in the Truth and Reconciliation process where they offered explanations and expressed remorse for their actions during the conflict. However, they continue to face barriers to access in both the common and customary law systems. Though ex-combatants have equal claim to citizenship, they face more difficulty accessing justice due in particular to the characteristics of their social category.

One of the foremost barriers preventing ex-combatants' (and other Sierra Leoneans') access to justice is cost. Ex-combatants comparatively have lower education and skills levels, and less access to employment opportunities, a familiar phenomenon in Sierra Leone, where unemployment is high. Being economically disadvantaged limits their ability to seek justice in disputes as they are unable to meet the prohibitively high costs of accessing justice that come in a variety of forms: direct costs of services (court fees, legal representation) fines and transportation

In addition to cost barriers, the overwhelming majority of ex-combatants encounter structural obstacles to justice. They oftentimes have little understanding of the extreme formality of the court procedures, and do not speak English, the language of the formal justice system, steeped in legalese.

Despite the considerable effort and success of the United Kingdom's (UK) Department for International Development (DfID)-funded Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), many court facilities are yet to be built outside of the district headquarter towns. Difficulties for remote courts to recruit skilled officials and limited opportunities for appeal mean that for many Sierra Leoneans, the formal justice system has no impact on their lives and traditional justice systems remain the primary avenue by which to obtain access to justice.

### **3.2 Reintegration and local governance**

Chieftdom administrations were heavily criticised for their autocratic rule and contributive role to the conflict. By traditional law, the Paramount Chief is empowered to enforce traditional law, which he did arbitrarily, and monopolised land and women.<sup>29</sup> Excesses of chiefs went unchecked by the central government as they levied taxes at will and meted out large fines, punishments and banishments arbitrarily, often at a level incommensurate with offences.

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<sup>29</sup> Sesay, M.G., and Hughes, C., *Resolving Go Beyond First Aid : Democracy Assistance and the Challenges of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone*, Working Paper 34, The Hague: Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme Conflict Research Unit (CRU), January 2005, p.55.

The control chiefs exerted over their subjects was a strong push factor for many young men to leave their villages and join the RUF. Popular grievances cited were:

- Fining, flogging and jail were some of the common punishments. Severe penalties were especially imposed for youths accused of engaging in illicit affairs with married women;
- Chiefs deliberately victimised youths by imposing heavy and unjust fines. Unable to pay the fines, criminal summonses were issued on the youths which made them run from the village, resulting in grievance. Court fees are the main source of revenue for chiefdoms, which provides an incentive for some Chiefs and local court officials to charge excessive fines;
- Chiefs used “community labour” law as a pretext to order able-bodied young men in their chiefdoms to work on agricultural projects, but protected their own children from doing communal work;
- Chiefs withheld benefits meant for the community, resulting in defiance by youths;
- Youth have less voice in community decision-making and are generally perceived as irresponsible and disrespectful.

The Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) report notes that “Chiefs lost sight of their traditional roles and neglected their duties to their subjects”,<sup>30</sup> and encourages them to return to their traditional roles and functions of articulating and promoting the needs and concerns of their subjects in the rural areas, and protecting them from discriminatory rule by a Freetown-based central government.

Chiefdom administrations were reinstated in much of the south and east from September 2000 as part of the DfID-funded 2000-2002 Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme (CGRP). The intake of 63 out of a total of 149 Paramount Chiefs from the 2002 elections for vacancies caused by deaths of chiefs during the war marks some change. Many are highly educated, and maintain business or professional interests in Freetown and internationally. Several of the new chiefs have returned from studies overseas, and unlike their illiterate predecessors, are familiar with community and international development.

Respondents confirmed that they have access to traditional justice and have the sense of justice being served in the native administration courts. This is a fundamental break from previous malpractices and enhances community reintegration of ex-combatants.

### **3.3 DDR and SALW control**

Following the closure of the DDR programme in January 2002, disarmament was not in any way complete. Several factors suggested that Sierra Leone was still not arms free and that these shortfalls had the potential to, impact upon community security and safety, and economic and social well being. Continued reports of armed crime and violence, the risk of an influx of weapons from neighbouring Liberia, and the fact that the Sierra Leone Police’s (SLP) Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) programme did not have a nationwide reach, all suggested that there was a need for further weapons collection.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Report on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, October 2004, p.122, paragraph 256.

<sup>31</sup> Lochhead, A., and Greene, O., “Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of Small Arms Projects on Arms Availability and Poverty - Case Study for Sierra Leone”, Freetown: UNDP Arms for Development Programme, March/April 2004, p. 9.

The GoSL, in collaboration with UNDP embarked on a CACD II (in order to distinguish it from the SLP's CACD). CACD II served as a preparatory assistance phase for the subsequent Arms for Development (AfD) programme. CACD II used the "carrot" approach with local communities to pinpoint known arms caches, unlike the "cordon-and-search" technique applied by the SLP during CACD.<sup>32</sup> The project was designed in such a way that the focus went beyond the mere collection of weapons. The programme aimed to promote a mindset in which people abandoned weapons ownership for a "weapons-free-environment". As an incentive to ex-combatants and communities, chiefdoms were allocated US \$ 20,000 for development projects once they were weapons-free. Key elements of the programme included:

- Sensitisation of chiefdom communities and social mobilisation against SALW;
- SALW drop-off areas (metal boxes with padlocks) for people who wanted to hand-in residual weapons in the community, placed under the custody of trusted community members like the village Imam;
- Weapons were handed over to SLP, who in collaboration with UNAMSIL, divided them into two categories: "safe and licensable" or non-licensable and licensable but unsafe';
- House-to-house searches by the SLP to confirm whether a chiefdom was weapons-free;
- A participatory approach which permitted the whole community to determine and prioritise developmental needs.<sup>33</sup>
- In some cases, alternatives to firearms are provided; for example, the construction of traps and nets to protect crops from wild animals to reduce the need for firearms.

At the end of the programme a special ceremony was held at which the Paramount Chief and his/her Chiefdom Recovery Committee (CRC) were awarded with an arms-free certificate along with the US \$ 20,000, provided by UNDP.

The AfD was a practical approach to micro-disarmament. More important, this strategy emphasises the link between security and development. For instance, community leaders and members choose and manage identified projects, which have ranged from market centres, primary schools and health centres.

SALW programming can connect beneficially with DDR. It has the capacity to target armed groups and individuals not targeted in DDR and create livelihoods through a weapons-for-livelihoods programmes; contribute to creating community security and confidence by collecting surplus weapons; deal with regional and border issues that DDR rarely addresses; take forward community sensitisation; utilise community reconciliation and dispute mechanisms neglected during DDR; and follow up on gender and child combatant issues unaddressed during DDR processes.

Criticisms of CACD pertain mainly to administrative bungling, incomplete weapons surrender in communities, failure to address regional concerns and allegations of corruption. In Kono, respondents claimed that some hunters held on to their local weapons, or had new ones locally manufactured, or smuggled in across the border from Guinea. Also, respondents suggest that it is a common occurrence now for bullets to be found in meat bought at the town markets. Discrepancies in the cash payments communities received did not go unmentioned. Community leaders complain that despite being judged weapons-free, their communities

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<sup>32</sup> Lochhead and Green, "Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of Small Arms Projects on Arms Availability and Poverty - Case Study for Sierra Leone", p. 9.

<sup>33</sup> Lochhead and Greene, "Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of Small Arms Projects on Arms Availability and Poverty - Case Study for Sierra Leone", pp. 10-11.

received varied amounts of cash payments of US \$ 11, 15 or 18, 000, instead of the stipulated US \$ 20, 000.<sup>34</sup>

### **3.3.1 Armed groups**

Armed groups tend to fall outside the DDR process as do ex-combatants who have failed to register in formal DDR processes. Armed groups and civilians also often require different approaches to ex-combatants who are under centralised control. Armed groups often require a more incentive-based and participatory approach which SALW programming can provide. In Sierra Leone, combatants who opted out of the DDR process to fight in other conflicts in West Africa had the opportunity to participate in AfD projects when the GoSL closed down the formal DDR process.

### **3.3.2 Community confidence and security-building**

SALW programmes can be phased to address confidence-building shortfalls and insecurity during DDR processes. A key weakness of DDR has been its inability to bear down on weapons possession and display in communities, creating insecurity and incentives to retain and use arms. SALW programmes can build confidence by creating weapons-free-zones in communities.

### **3.3.3 Reducing cross border vulnerabilities through SALW programming**

SALW programming can help to address the problem of regional arms flows undermining DDR processes particularly in vulnerable border communities. This includes training and strengthening customs and border police and cross border commissions. These progressive plans are undermined by the general institutional deficiencies that plague the security forces. With 36 border crossing points in Kono District and only one manned by the security forces, cross-border smuggling appears to be thriving and difficult to contain.<sup>35</sup>

### **3.3.4 Community sensitisation**

SALW programming can add to DDR by seeking to change attitudes to SALW possession, which often remains largely unaffected by DDR programmes which have tended to target immediate weapons collection priorities rather than attitudes. This type of programming should be phased in at an early stage of DDR and includes sensitisation and social mobilisation against SALW possession through educational programmes, the use of theatre,<sup>35</sup> dance, the media, and other mediums.

### **3.3.5 Drawing on local dispute/reconciliation mechanisms**

Establishing local conflict prevention and dispute mechanisms is a SALW programme technique that may help combat ex-combatant and community tensions. Further, SALW programmes are in a better position to address reconciliation issues than DDR programmes which tend to cut off at the point of short-term reintegration of ex-combatants into communities.

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<sup>34</sup> Meetings with local women's groups, local authorities and ex-combatants in Kono, May-June 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with police and Donsos in Kono, May and June 2007.

### **3.3.6 Linking DDR and SALW to protect vulnerable groups**

SALW programmes can play an important role in efforts to address the long-term needs of groups such as child soldiers and women combatants. DDR processes tend to kick-start the reintegration of child soldiers, for example, with short-term programming that may only last a year or so, but which require follow-up if they are to be sustainable.

## **3.4 Linkages between DDR and Security Sector Reform**

The impact of the security sector on human security has been a major issue in Sierra Leone since the 1960s. During the past four decades, the security sector has been consistently implicated in human rights abuses and in terrorising communities as well as undermining democracy. There has been longstanding recognition that SSR was required if the cycle of coups and human rights abuses that had dogged Sierra Leone were to be averted. SSR was initiated during the conflict, but proved abortive. Article XVII of the Lomé Peace Accord signed on 7 July 1999, for example, prioritised SSR.<sup>36</sup> But little progress was made as the government was plunged into crisis as the conflict flared up again and President Kabbah was forced to leave Sierra Leone.

However, by 2001, the time was ripe for re-visiting SSR. This was recognised in a series of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), recovery plans, and strategies.<sup>37</sup> The UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention<sup>38</sup> in Sierra Leone, for example, set objectives which included building an effective Sierra Leone state which was accountable and exercised full control over its armed forces. It also set out the importance of building-up new, effective, non-political, accountable and disciplined armed forces and police. The Security Sector Review for the 2001 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) postulated developing a national security environment that would ensure national recovery and the reduction of poverty and that would be supported by well-equipped and well-trained security forces. The UK took the lead role in operationalising many of these SSR and good governance commitments primarily through the Security Sector Project (SILSEP), with DfID spending UK £ 21 million on the Sierra Leone armed forces between 2000-2002 alone working in concert with the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD).

### **3.4.1 The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces**

One of the first steps was to establish a new MoD in 2000 with a mission to “formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate a strategic defence policy for the Republic of Sierra Leone

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<sup>36</sup> Lomé Peace Agreement, 1999, see: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>, accessed November 2007.

<sup>37</sup> The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK government and the GoSL set out agreed GoSL commitments in the security sector and related areas of governance reform. These included: a Sierra Leone Police force, national security systems and the RSLAF operating effectively; and accountable and affordable defence systems in place along with improved governance including an anti-corruption strategy. While the UN Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy (PBRS) set benchmarks in terms of: strengthening the capacity, accountability and loyalty of the SLP; supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants; limiting the circulation of small arms in Sierra Leone; addressing external security challenges and promoting regional stability; consolidating state authority; strengthening the rule of law; and restoring local governance.

<sup>38</sup> For an evaluation of the UK’s conflict prevention approach in Sierra Leone, including SSR, see: Ginifer, J., (with input from Kaye Oliver), “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone”, Evaluation Report, EV 647, London: DFID, March 2004.

Armed Forces (RSLAF) that is effective and fostered within a framework of democratic governance”.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to the past, civilians were put in place in senior positions in the military administration. Concurrently, reform of the RSLAF was started. The RSLAF, assisted by the International Military Training and Advisory Team (IMATT), had core objectives of: reducing the army’s size; making it more militarily proficient and better trained; over-hauling its command structures and staffing; introducing new training; making it democratically accountable both to the government and improving its civil relations; and delineating its roles and responsibilities in a post-conflict situation. Efforts were made to implement new recruitment codes, with an emphasis on education, qualification, professionalism and discipline. By stressing the need for vetting of potential recruits, it sought to avoid the ethnically and regionally-based armed forces of the past.

In terms of technical proficiency and accountability progress has been made in Sierra Leone. The RSLAF’s size has been reduced, it has been re-equipped and some its internal command and recruitment problems have been addressed that led it to become a politicised force that usurped governments and also one that attacked and robbed civilians. A functioning Office of National Security (ONS) and a Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) with suitably qualified personnel, and the publication of the Defence White Paper is also a notable outcome of the reform process.

However, equally critical is its capacity to address negative impacts on human security and engage with civil society and communities. This has been a problematic process. In terms of external threats to human security, the RSLAF’s capacity to act as a security provider against external threats and guard its borders is still in doubt, particularly after the withdrawal of the UN which provided personnel to assist in this process. Destabilising development in neighbouring Guinea, the current fragility of recovery in Liberia, and movements of ex-combatants across Sierra Leone’s poorly patrolled borders all have the capacity to impact upon human security. Further, the RSLAF itself has been, and remains in many civilians’ perceptions, a threat to community security, particularly in areas such as Bo where the army has been viewed with great antipathy due to human rights abuses prior to and during the civil conflict, or Kailahun where majority of the members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion are ex-combatants. Within this framework, many in civil society have advocated SSR should focus on engagement between the RSLAF and communities to build confidence that it no longer engages in predation against civilians. In June 2002, the Defence Advisory Team (DAT), now re-named SSDAT, noted, among other things, that there needed to be effective RSLAF engagement with civil society, including:

- a communications strategy to promote RSLAF reconstruction/nation-building activities;
- establishment of RSLAF liaison committees with civil society or similar forms of engagement;
- establishment of accountability and human rights as central to the RSLAF’s future training strategy.<sup>40</sup>

In conjunction with IMATT, the RSLAF moved to address some of these issues. The RSLAF identified the need to work more closely with local communities, and supported them through

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<sup>39</sup> Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence Mission Statement, [www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5\\_gov/5\\_2mod.htm](http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_gov/5_2mod.htm), accessed November 2007.

<sup>40</sup> See, Ginifer and Oliver, “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra Leone”, p.17, citing Roderick Evans, David Jones, and Graham Thompson, Defence Advisory Team, “Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II; Output to Purpose Review”, London: DFID, July, 2002.

initiatives such as rebuilding schools, water wells, and sports facilities. Information campaigns through Radio UNAMSIL, for example, disseminated information about key projects. While to address the poor human rights record of the army, international law became a compulsory part of training and a court-martial process developed. However, it is not clear how impeded this thinking is in the RSLAF. Its relationship with civil society remains problematic and it is still not fully trusted or forgiven for its part in past atrocities against civilians and issues of impunity remain largely unaddressed. Overarching this has been a lack of civilian confidence in Parliament to hold the military to account. Historically, there had been virtually no effective oversight of the security sector in Sierra Leone. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector remains weak despite donor attempts to support parliamentary capacity-building.<sup>41</sup>

However, there has been a refining of the National Security Structure in Sierra Leone and a third national security exercise was held in November 2006 which has been described as a model for West Africa.<sup>42</sup> The current objective is to further reduce the RSLAF below current levels of over 10,000.

### **3.4.2 The Sierra Leone Police: A Force for Good**

The Sierra Leone police prior to 1997 were known for their corruption, unaccountability, lack of professionalism, and abuse of human rights. As a consequence, many civilians and communities had little faith in the SLP in maintaining law and order and underwriting human security once the conflict ended. After the elections in 1996, the government drew upon DfID's assistance to reform the police with the UK assisting in redefining the SLP's role, composition, oversight and budget allocation, and conditions of service. In November 1999, at the request of President Kabbah, a senior UK police officer was appointed Inspector General (IG) of Police, funded by DfID. The hope was that a British IG would create space in which to develop a new generation of uncorrupt, untainted Sierra Leone police leaders. President Kabbah apparently believed that a break was required, both in practice and in image, so that the SLP could recover credibility and habits of honesty.

A structured reform programme referred to as the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) was established for the SLP. The initial emphasis of the CCSSP was on basics: re-establishing a visible policing presence in the Freetown Peninsular and strengthening the capacity of the SLP to provide security during the 2002 election. The bulk of early UK assistance supplied the police with uniforms, vehicles, communications, and basic necessities (medicines, water, and sanitation). The results were greater SLP visibility in the capital, greater capacity to respond to the public, and improved morale. In 2003, the UK IG returned home and was replaced by a Sierra Leonean.

Beyond the basics, a Community Relations Department (CRD) was established to work in concert with all divisional commanders to promote local needs policing, to develop and implement various crime prevention strategies with local unit commanders, and to provide an efficient link between the police and communities. A Complaint, Discipline and Investigations Department (CDID) was tasked with investigating complaints from the public about police misconduct and corruption. This started to provide a framework to curb extortion and

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<sup>41</sup> Bernadette Lahai, "Parliamentary Oversight: The Sierra Leone Experience and Constraints", paper presented at workshop to "Strengthen Legislatures in Commonwealth West Africa", 22–25 February 2005, Kimbima Hotel, Aberdeen, Freetown, Sierra Leone, [www.cpahq.org/BernadetteLahaiSierraLeone\\_pdf\\_media\\_public.aspx](http://www.cpahq.org/BernadetteLahaiSierraLeone_pdf_media_public.aspx), p.7, accessed November 2007.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Ray England, police adviser, Freetown, 10 November 2006.



harassment of civilians by the police. A particularly successful strategy adopted by the SLP has been the establishment of Family Support Units. These units provide improved service to victims of sexual and domestic abuse and also begin to prevent such crimes by raising their profile. The units are staffed jointly by police officers and social workers who together deal with family issues and child protection. Twinned with this, were the setting up of oversight mechanisms, such as the Police Council, the highest police body with the power to provide civilian oversight of policing.

In March 2005, the JSDP was set up which as well as addressing issues such as prison conditions and out-of-date laws, sought to deal with community related issues such as community relations with the police, access to justice to the poor, and also vulnerable groups such as juveniles and juvenile courts.<sup>43</sup> The JSDP has as a guiding principle the meeting of the needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised.<sup>44</sup>

It was recognised that the justice sector in Sierra Leone often did not prioritise and was not responsive to the needs of the people. Further, the majority of the people in Sierra Leone did not see the justice sector as a supportive body that delivered fair outcomes and was best avoided. Therefore, the JSDP sought to build confidence in the justice sector and hold it to account to the people. A key dimension of this has been to improve police and community relations. For much of the post-DDR period, support to the SLP has focused on a national security concept in the context of post-conflict crisis and emergency assistance rather than the current situation of poverty reduction, recovery and community confidence-building. Under the JSDP, the move has been to local needs policing designed to meet the expectations and needs of local communities where the SLP works with communities and shares information. This new approach is delivered through empowered local command units assisted and overseen by local partnership boards involving members of the community.<sup>45</sup> The creation of security mechanisms at various levels (Platinum, Gold, Silver and Bronze) has the potential to address co-ordination and accountability issues. Platinum, for example, decides security policy and functions at the strategic level, Gold at the operational level, and Silver at the four regional levels, while Bronze operates at the level of police divisions and local commanders. The police partnership boards involve civil society representatives<sup>46</sup> and regularly meet to deal with complaints and explain police and security actions.

Nevertheless, question marks remain as to whether the SLP can be fully trusted to act in community interests or bring to account those engaged in criminal activities, as evidenced by rising gun crime in Freetown. Whatever the institutional safeguards introduced since the conflict, corrupt practices in the SLP persist including roadblocks and “checks” of vehicles designed to extort “fines” from those travelling by road.

Despite an increase in salaries<sup>47</sup> and improvements in conditions of service, accusations are widespread about bribery, corruption and heavy-handed policing. In a worrying incident in March 2005 that threatened to get out of hand with escalating civil mobilisation on the streets,

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with Honor Flanagan, Deputy Programme Manager, Justice Sector Development Programme, Freetown, 9 November 2006.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with Charlotte Duncan, DFID, Freetown, 7 November 2006.

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), “Inception Report”, June 2005, and “Progress Report”, June 2006, p. 5.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Ray England, police adviser, Freetown, 10 November 2006.

<sup>47</sup> However, they are still acknowledged not to be high enough. Interview with security sector official, Freetown, November 2006.

protestors in Freetown were allegedly fired upon by police armed with AK-47s. Subsequent official inquiries proved inconclusive and did little to reinforce civil society's perspective that the security services, including the police, remain a danger to civilians. The protest and the police's heavy-handed response were reminiscent of the Steven's era in the eyes of many civilians. Further, burglary is increasing in Freetown, with the police seemingly unable to protect local residents. There have been reports of armed robbers discharging weapons, especially in the east end of Freetown, in the Kissy, Wellington and Tengbeh Town areas, which the police have been slow to react to.

In a nationwide perception survey conducted in May 2006, there was some evidence that programming was beginning to address issues of people's confidence in the police. For example, 55.8 per cent of respondents were positive about their relationship with the police.<sup>48</sup> However, in areas such as Bo (47.2 per cent) and Moyamba (50.0 per cent) respondents had mixed feelings about the police,<sup>49</sup> while 82 per cent agreed that more police should be deployed in communities.<sup>50</sup> Mistrust of the police remains high as was exemplified by serious riots in Kenema in November 2006 when a motor cycle rider was killed by a car and locals thought the police were not investigating the death sufficiently seriously.<sup>51</sup>

The way SSR has been designed and implemented in Sierra Leone has had ramifications for human security. First, the initial exclusion of elements of the CDF during DDR and difficult relations between elements of the army and the CDF holds out the prospect of troubled community relations with the security sector in areas where ex-CDF reside. Armed groups need to be integrated into SSR whenever possible to give them "buy-in" and to forestall future potential violence. However, this was complicated in Sierra Leone by elements of the CDF mistrusting the military and refusing to participate in SSR. The initial lack of SSR engagement with civil society generally has been a source of tension and suspicion in communities which suffered during the conflict from security sector human rights abuses.

Second, SSR was not closely linked with DDR in terms of its design. A SSR strategy was not in place when DDR was mandated and agreed, rather SSR emerged later. This led to disjunctions between these two processes. One element of this was the above lack of CDF integration but more broadly it was not clear what type of security sector and what objectives would underpin the new national army that DDR was feeding ex-combatants into.

Third, DDR would have benefited from an approach under which sensitisation both within the security sector and communities to SSR could have been implemented during DDR. This could have sought to allay concerns regarding the threat posed to communities by the military and police and by highlighting the objectives of SSR in terms of accountability and good practice.

Fourth, continued difficulties and corrupt practices within the security sector that are eroding civilian confidence suggest that screening during DDR for ex-combatants being integrated into new national armies and the police should be scrutinised.

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<sup>48</sup> Braima Koroma, "Nationwide Perception Survey of the Sierra Leone Police: Public and Police Perceptions", Freetown, May 2006, p.6.

<sup>49</sup> Braima Koroma, "Nationwide Perception Survey of the Sierra Leone Police: Public and Police Perceptions", p.ii.

<sup>50</sup> Braima Koroma, "Nationwide Perception Survey of the Sierra Leone Police: Public and Police Perceptions", p.ii.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with security sector official, Freetown, November 2006.

Last, it is important to ensure that SSR is integrated and co-ordinated not just with DDR, but also with democratisation, justice, reconciliation and other related processes. Democratisation, for example, can lead to greater civilian oversight and transparency in the security sector; improved justice systems allows for the prosecution of those in the security services committing human rights abuses; and reconciliation processes, such as truth and reconciliation commissions can potentially lead to engagement between the military and civilians including over atrocities and impunity.

## **4. Impacts of DDR upon the human security of individuals, communities, and the vulnerable**

### **4.1 Insecurity, victimisation and safety shortfalls**

DDR was not effectively safeguarded and protected by military contingents between much of 1996-2001 with dire security and safety consequences for civilians, communities, and those combatants who wished to demobilise.

#### **4.1.1 Insecurities during disarmament/demobilisation**

DDR frequently broke down with ex-combatants returning to conflict, predation on communities, and with knock-on impacts upon recovery. Neither ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, private security forces, nor the UK were able to create nationwide conditions for safety and security until 2001. Further, many thousands of ex-combatants had to wait more than a year following demobilisation to access reintegration opportunities. This led to ex-combatants becoming involved in violence and led to mounting frustration among ex-combatants and alienation from communities, who regarded ex-combatants with heightened suspicion and fear. Further, poor storage of weapons and the fact that SALW continued to be readily available, including through cross-border movements, heightened the vulnerability of communities, particularly in border areas. It was largely left to post-DDR small arms and light weapons (SALW) programming to grapple with issues of civilian weapons which continued to destabilise some communities. These were not included in the formal DDR process.

#### **4.1.2 Community insecurities connected with ex-combatant return**

The return of ex-communities had potentially serious safety and security impacts for both communities and ex-combatants. These were ultimately contained but they created considerable fears, tensions, and some victimisation in communities. It was more through community engagement, rather than DDR programming, that widespread violence was averted. Nevertheless in 2001, CDF and RUF continued to attack civilians in places such as Makeni and exercised power over civilians and communities.<sup>52</sup> By continuing to hold onto stolen property in the early stages of reintegration and the threat of violence they created anxiety in communities already traumatised by the civil war. The lack of a strong DDR linkage with SSR, and in particular the use of police to underwrite community security and safety, could be regarded in retrospect as a possible oversight, even though the police were regarded with suspicion in many communities.

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<sup>52</sup> Retributions against RUF in Makeni were limited to initial attacks following the collapse of the movement. Ex-combatants currently there have been largely tolerated or accepted in the community. Interview with ex-RUF combatant, Makeni, 11 November 2006.

There are signs that the human security implications of the incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants, particularly youths, into communities are now being felt. In places such as Freetown, Bo, Kono and Kailahun, there is an increasing tendency of youths, including ex-combatants, to be involved in armed robbery and anti-social behaviour including the formation of large gangs allegedly intimidating communities.<sup>53</sup> In Kono alone, two murders so far have been committed this year and it is alleged that ex-combatants were the perpetrators.<sup>54</sup> Further, ex-combatants remain a constituency that can be readily mobilised.<sup>55</sup>

#### **4.1.3 Community insecurities in border areas**

In traditionally unstable border regions, such as Kono and Kailahun, significant numbers of poor and desperate youths who failed to benefit from reintegration programmes pose a potential threat to local order or even national security if they were mobilised. In Kailahun ex-combatants suggested that they were willing and able to push back the Guinean military forces that are occupying Yenga, if re-armed and suitably compensated.<sup>56</sup>

Further, there are indications that crime has increased post-DDR and community security lessened in comparison with the period before the civil conflict. This would seem to be connected with the impacts that the conflict has had on livelihoods, social capital, and some individual's attitude to violence. In a nationwide perception survey, published in May 2006, 70 per cent of respondents reported to be very concerned about the levels of crime in their community.<sup>57</sup> In Freetown, around 60 per cent of respondents were very fearful of becoming a victim of crime that threatened their personal safety, and in Kenema, Bo, Makeni and Moyamba the majority of residents indicated being somewhat fearful.<sup>58</sup>

The net impact of incomplete reintegration is that many communities may have to contend with the prospect of elements in their community being potentially vulnerable to re-recruitment if conditions in Sierra Leone deteriorate. In the absence of full trust in the RSLAF and the SLP, both in terms of whether they will return to human rights abuses and whether they can provide protection from internal and external threats, insecurity issues still confront communities.

#### **4.1.4 Victimisation of vulnerable groups and a lack of protection**

An impact of the way that DDR was designed and implemented was the further marginalisation and victimisation of vulnerable groups. The exclusion of many girls, boys, and women from entry into formal DDR, although they were sometimes beneficiaries of other forms of programming, contributed to their victimisation by former commanders, communities,

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<sup>53</sup> Ex-combatants in Kailahun admitted to participating in armed robberies in order to "survive".

<sup>54</sup> Meetings with Kono Women's Organisation Network, Kono, May-June 2007.

<sup>55</sup> The view was expressed that a cause or an excuse for trouble could readily mobilise a number of poor and disaffected ex-combatants. Interview with security sector official, Freetown, November 2006.

<sup>56</sup> Several unsuccessful attempts by the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone to settle a simmering border conflict at Yenga in Kailahun have led to frustrations on the side of Sierra Leonean residents in that area. Local communities and ex-combatants reported that the Guinean military are involved in agricultural activities, mining in Sokoma village, forced labour and at one point, attempted to impose local taxes on Sierra Leoneans still living in those areas. Respondents mentioned a training camp between Guinea and Liberia, where most of their former commanders are currently undergoing training, the validity of which remains unclear.

<sup>57</sup> Braima Koroma, "Nationwide Perception Survey of the Sierra Leone Police: Public and Police Perceptions", May 2006, p. 8.

<sup>58</sup> Braima Koroma, "Nationwide Perception Survey of the Sierra Leone Police: Public and Police Perceptions", p. 10.

and families. In not receiving adequate protection and benefits they became economically impoverished and were highly vulnerable to being rejected by communities and families who themselves were usually impoverished by the conflict. This led to many working in the sex trade and being subject to rape and violent abuse domestically.<sup>59</sup> Currently, in places like Freetown, many girls and boys live on the streets or scrape a living through theft and petty trading. On the streets they are vulnerable to abuse and violence. In an economic climate where Sierra Leone has marginally recovered from the conflict and the majority of the population is struggling to survive there is little capacity for communities to help abandoned and often traumatised children. In Kono, there is a markedly increase in domestic abuse and widespread reports of rape cases involving children as young as two months. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that perpetrators are exclusively ex-combatants.

## **4.2 Economic and social well being (including livelihoods, social capital and reconciliation)**

### **4.2.1 Misdirected skills/livelihood initiatives**

DDR failed to develop effective transitional livelihood options for ex-combatants and has contributed to their current poor economic prospects. This was an opportunity missed. Initial well-directed skills targeting might have stood the chance of developing options for ex-combatants to find viable livelihoods particularly if linked with longer-term programming such as development. This was compounded by the short-term six month training period which gave little prospect of providing credible skills and professional development. Attempts at putting ex-combatants into short-term apprenticeships, for example, were unlikely to be successful as many apprenticeships required years of engagement and the paying of ‘masters’ to take on apprentices. Further, skills training courses offered were often unprofessional including a lack of quality control, failures to link them to market opportunities, and complex management structures involving multiple agencies.<sup>60</sup> One ex-combatant commented that “peace is here [in Sierra Leone] but so is poverty”.<sup>61</sup>

Comprehensive data across Sierra Leone is not available on livelihoods currently pursued by ex-combatants but interviews show that training undertaken under DDR has not usually significantly contributed to ex-combatants’ well being. Youth unemployment is extremely high and includes many ex-combatants. Ex-combatants have tended to find some work as motor cycle drivers, security guards, petty traders, and other insecure forms of employment which have little hope of giving them a sustainable income that can adequately support themselves or their partners or families.

The upsurge of motor cycles in Bo and Kono is largely a post-war phenomenon. In the case of the CDF in Kono, this can be traced, in part, to the inadequacies of the UNDP-led CACD II which exchanged local shotguns for fishing nets instead of hunting wires. This blunder effectively destroyed their livelihoods and as one former Donso member put it: “from hunters, we are now wood-cutters, coal burners and motor bike riders”. The motor cycles are versatile; they go everywhere, even into the remote villages and mining camps, whatever the state of the roads and the rains. Motor cycle taxis offer more scope for owner-operators; they are less expensive to buy, and can be acquired on credit from suppliers at a payback rate of one million

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<sup>59</sup> In Makeni, the lack of support associated with DDR led to women being diverted to the “sex trade”. Interview with Musa A. Kabia, Access to Justice Project Officer, CDHR, Makeni, 11 November 2006.

<sup>60</sup> Insight from Simon Arthy in personal email.

<sup>61</sup> Focus group meetings with DONSOs, Kono, May-June 2007.

Le per month for 6 months. Otherwise, daily rental from the owner is for a fee of Le 25, 000, allowing a slim margin of daily profit of Le 5000 to Le 6, 000. Potential weaknesses on its own side are the need to improve safety (clients refuse full-face helmets, for fear of tuberculosis), adequate footwear, speeding and dangerous riding, and for dealing with passenger complaints.

Further, given that significant numbers of ex-combatants are estranged from their families they lack the economic support that the extended family can potentially provide. In the provinces with diamond production, such as Kono, Kenema and Bo, labour opportunities in collecting diamonds are readily available, but the rates of pay are low. Further, the mining areas, near borders, are unstable, poor and sometimes violent, once again giving few prospects of long-term sustainable employment for ex-combatants.

There are also indications that the impact of DDR skills training targeting, which in effect de-prioritised the agricultural sector, was to contribute to the movement of ex-combatants to urban areas, particularly Freetown. Lured by the supposed glamour of life there, ex-combatants at the same time tried to escape the stigma of returning to rural communities and having to re-establish their often troubled relationships with traditional authority. Once in urban areas, the harsh reality has been that many ex-combatants have sunk further into poverty. This suggests that linking DDR training to opportunities in urban areas, or conversely making training attractive in terms of returning to rural areas, are important priorities if the economic well being of ex-combatants is to be enhanced.

One of the potentially most interesting, in Kailahun District, is led by a partnership of RUF and CDF ex-combatants. Projects of this kind demonstrate some kind of horizontal solidarity, and potential for self-integration. Government, for the longer term security of the nation, needs to take these emergent interest driven agrarian groupings seriously, since they offer the potential to incorporate a large number of rural jobless young people, and to benefit from the short-term action plan for agriculture adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture (e.g., farmer field schools).

#### **4.2.2 Ex-combatant “special treatment”, the need for reconciliation prioritisation and the building of social capital**

Bringing together ex-combatants and communities, or at least not negatively impacting upon opportunities for social reintegration between them, has been acknowledged as a key dimension of DDR. DDR in Sierra Leone did not fully manage to avoid negative impacts in this area.

The provision of TSAs and assistance to ex-combatants in a monetary form under DDR created community resentment as it fostered the impression of combatants being given “special treatment”, a particularly sensitive issue in communities that had been terrorised by the RUF and to a lesser extent abused by the CDF and the security forces. There was considerable resentment to the idea of providing targeted assistance to ex-combatants rather than simultaneous and equitable targeting of ex-combatants, other war-affected persons, and communities.

Since the end of DDR, there has been an acceptance in many provinces of the presence of ex-combatants. However, this may not be deep-rooted and could readily disintegrate under social or economic pressure. DDR, by not finding fully effective ways to socially reintegrate ex-combatants into communities, or to effect reconciliation over much of the country has contributed to a situation where there are still social distinctions between civilians and ex-

combatants even if these are not made explicit. When this is combined with a still high degree of trauma over the atrocities of the conflict among the general population, this is a potentially divisive situation.

NCDDR did seek to bring community leaders into assembly areas (AAs) and help negotiate the return of ex-combatants, but this did not fully translate into an effective social reintegration programme. Ex-combatants that fail to socially reintegrate not only suffer the psychological and economic impacts of their alienation, they also present risks in terms of crime and community safety. Some of these impacts were felt in Sierra Leone following DDR. In fact, efforts undertaken by communities themselves, including traditional cleansing rituals and approaches, have probably contributed the most to social reintegration in Sierra Leone. Communities were particularly proactive in taking initiatives to promote reintegration by bringing together ex-combatants and the civil population in meetings and dialogues, community work, and cultural and sporting activities.

DDR follow-up programming, such as UNAMSIL's Stopgaps, UNDP's Arms for Development (AfD) programming, the GTZ-supported ReAct programme, and DFID's Community Reintegration Programme (CRP), have contributed to social reintegration. They have sought to improve the ex-combatants/community interface through initiatives such as joint work schemes, sensitisation and development.

The building of social capital was not a DDR priority. Nevertheless, given that the conflict had a devastating impact upon social capital across Sierra Leone by undermining family relations, fragmenting communities and destroying much of the trust and social solidarity across the country, including traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, this would seem to be an area where DDR should at least seek to avoid negative impacts. Poorly-handled and preferential treatment of ex-combatants during DDR tended to initially work against the re-building of social capital in Sierra Leone. However, the Sierra Leone experience drew attention to the importance of ensuring ex-combatants are not privileged over civilians and communities, particularly when the latter are having to come to terms with economic stagnation and destruction caused by the conflict and by the actions of many ex-combatants.

### **4.3 Failures to engage communities in the design/delivery of DDR to minimise human security shortfalls**

DDR in Sierra Leone had community-oriented dimensions, but it did not draw upon a community participatory approach or for communities to be the prime beneficiaries. Its early pre-occupations, not reasonably, were to end the civil war and dismantle the fighting forces, combined with short-term schemes to ease ex-combatants into civilian life, rather than to prioritise medium or long-term engagements with communities. Nevertheless, the lack of community-informed perspectives and participation in some of its programming as they were rolled out had significant negative impacts. This might have been addressed in a number of ways.

First, communities could have been consulted more to avoid the negative consequences of poorly targeted skills training. In terms of skills training there was a distinct lack of data collected on the labour market in communities and nationally. This data, if it had been collected, might have given better indications of where support should have been directed. This was, in part, an issue of national capacity and the difficulties of undertaking research following a civil war where infrastructure was devastated and resources were meagre. However, the

impact of this lack of data was the provision of skills training in areas where ex-combatants were not always able to find employment. Research and consultation in communities could have potentially identified the best and most sustainable areas for skills training to take place bearing in mind local employment opportunities. These varied across provinces and regions. This suggests that local participation in the design and implementation of skills training in DDR is critical.

Second, DDR did not draw upon vulnerable groups to input in the design of programming that affected them. Children, for example, did not participate directly in the design and delivery of the formal DDR process or in monitoring or evaluation. In fact, many vulnerable groups were either excluded from programmes, or were offered assistance that was sometimes inappropriate and impacted upon their economic/social well being and security and safety. Consultation and participation with vulnerable groups could have ameliorated many of these negative impacts. Women, girls and boys associated with the fighting forces, for example, arguably understood the dilemmas they were likely to go through during DDR and in returning to communities better than externals who played a major role in designing and directing DDR programming.

Negative impacts may have been avoided or minimised if communities and vulnerable groups had contributed to addressing difficulties in terms of:

- Insecurity for vulnerable groups, particularly women and girls in camps and in transit to communities, some of whom were assaulted and raped. Vulnerable groups could have advised on ways of underpinning their security and averting victimisation;
- The exclusion or hostile reception to vulnerable groups associated with fighting forces on their return to communities, in part because of ineffective sensitisation and consultation including with women and women's groups and community leaders;
- A dearth of economic opportunities for vulnerable groups upon return to communities due to poor targeting including a lack of consultation on their preferred options and opportunities with the result that children and women were left to fend for themselves on the street, or had to resort to begging, theft, or petty trading;
- A lack of engagement of youths and children, who continued to be sidelined during DDR and in other post-conflict programming, but who often had distinct preferences in terms of reintegrating into communities and civilian life. These were not fully supported.

## **5. DDR policy/programming recommendations from a human security perspective**

The Sierra Leone experience suggests that human security deficits during DDR and related processes can have long-term impacts upon recovery even though issues of state stability and ending conflicts initially loom large and are the main targets of DDR. Specifically, excluding youths/children or offering them little protection during DDR can create the conditions for their future exclusion, alienation, and re-recruitment into conflict or criminality. Women and girls, who were excluded from DDR or offered few benefits in Sierra Leone, constitute important actors in post-conflict communities who can contribute to reconciliation and play important roles in leading communities towards recovery. When DDR fails to prevent negative impacts on these vulnerable groups during the DDR process, it frequently leaves them at risk, impoverished and unable to contribute to community recovery.

More broadly, communities and their economic and social well being constitute an important element of state recovery and stability, particularly, as in Sierra Leone the emergence of a rebel



movement was driven by poor community governance and the lack of an equitable relationship between the provinces and central government. What DDR can do is start to put in policies and initiatives that contribute to kick-starting community recovery and assist in protecting the vulnerable from risks and victimisation. When these are co-ordinated or dovetail with related programming such as longer-term development and SSR, this can have a considerable impact upon community safety and security and the longer-term prospects for recovery.

The policy/programming recommendations below, drawing upon the Sierra Leone experience, seek to suggest how DDR can more effectively support human security and avoid negative impacts upon community recovery. DDR in particular should, it is suggested:

### **5.1 Assistance to vulnerable groups as a key human security priority**

This means considering a broad constituency of vulnerable groups associated with fighting forces, such as bush wives, girls and boys, disabled fighters and dependents, as eligible to participate in DDR and linked processes. The classification into several target groups and sub-groups should be based on the ex-combatants' different needs requirements and aspirations. This allows for the development of a differentiated, relevant and cost-effective approach. By doing so, the specific needs of the group can be tailored to DDR in a variety of areas. The programme can contribute to reducing the victimisation of vulnerable groups during encampment and on their returns to communities. It also assists in avoiding their subsequent exclusion and descent into poverty which sometimes results from their lack of access to DDR benefits or from unsympathetic DDR programming. In particular, DDR needs to prioritise the special needs of girls, boys, and women, who as the case of Sierra Leone shows, were neglected during DDR and who have not fully benefited from other forms of programming. DDR needs to take into account that vulnerable groups are liable to violence during and after DDR and re-recruitment or abduction. This means planning for physical protection and also access to counselling and support and ensuring their participation in the delivery and planning of reinsertion/reintegration programmes to avoid negative impacts. Shortfalls in these areas have created groups, particularly of youths and ex-combatants, who are severely disadvantaged.

### **5.2 Prioritise community safety and security during DDR and peacekeeping/peace operations**

This involves deploying peacekeepers/military contingents in support of DDR that have the capacity to provide security and order not only at encampments but in surrounding areas where communities are sited. For much of DDR in Sierra Leone, international and national forces were unable to protect communities. In some instances, ECOMOG and national forces abused communities and attacked and killed civilians contributing to human insecurity. Further, the RUF managed to continue to control communities during the DDR process, particularly in the east, where diamond mining contributed to their ability to purchase arms and continue the conflict. These high levels of insecurity strengthened community suspicions and resistance to ex-combatant reintegration into communities and also the willingness of fighting forces to give up their weapons. Further, community safety and security issues are projected into the post-DDR phases. DDR needs to link with associated programming that addresses community insecurity issues, such as policing.

### **5.3 Ensure DDR links with policing to maintain community safety and security**

DDR planning should include assessments of the role of police forces in providing safety and security in communities following DDR, and preferably during DDR. This includes a police role in sensitising communities to the return of ex-combatants, providing protection for ex-combatants and vulnerable community members, and ensuring that SALW possession is addressed, particularly among civilian elements who may have concealed SALW. DDR planning needs to take into account SSR issues, such as the extent to which the police have been reformed and are conversant with community policing and human rights, and the extent to which the police themselves present a human security threat to communities. The community oriented approach of local needs policing, introduced under the CCSSP<sup>62</sup> and built upon by JSDP, in Sierra Leone should be introduced or connected to DDR as soon as it is feasible in post-conflict situations.

#### **5.4 Ensure that DDR targets sustainable and realistic skills and livelihoods options in communities to avoid negative human security impacts**

DDR was wholly inadequate in meeting the needs of ex-combatants and communities. It appears to have failed to take into account some of the ‘lessons learned’ from DDR in other post-conflict countries and in fact repeated some of the more obvious ones in Sierra Leone. DDR needs better information, including through community participation and input, into the skills, competences and livelihood options that can be credibly sustained in the specific context of communities that ex-combatants return to. More robust data for skills training needs to be collected in advance of DDR programmes.

Communities need to buy-into these options to avoid negative impacts. It is desirable that skills training should involve community engagement, as in the case of apprenticeships. Returnees trained in skills for which there is no demand in communities will only lead to discontented ex-combatants, and further, ex-combatants competing with established community members potentially leading to tensions. In Sierra Leone, skills training was poorly targeted and poorly taught, did not mirror local labour opportunities, and has contributed to high levels of unemployed amongst ex-combatants. Further, as in other contexts, there is a need to link DDR skills training to longer-term development strategies. A key element in constructing realistic livelihoods for ex-combatants, including youths, is to persuade them to move away from war economy means of earning a livelihood, such as robbing civilians, and to make civilian work, as in agriculture, more attractive. This process involves sensitising these groups into what is a realistic option in peace-time. Notions such as enrichment through diamond mining are unlikely to be realised by most ex-combatants.

#### **5.5 Prioritise community engagement and participation, including vulnerable groups, in the design/implementation, monitoring and evaluation of DDR to maximise human security**

DDR should be people-centred and locally owned. That is, the engagement of locals from the outset, who understand the community context within which DDR is taking place and who can contribute to conflict-sensitive DDR, is critical and can engender local ownership, build confidence and trust and also strengthen social capital. “Local ownership” proved to be more rhetoric than reality, as community engagement in Sierra Leone was very limited. DDR and arms reduction initiatives were significantly top-down and heavily driven by external donors. This raises the important question “for whom” was DDR planned and implemented. A

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<sup>62</sup> The Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) ended in June 2005.

participatory framework encourages acceptance of and support for the programme and should include a wide range of actors: local civil society and community based organisations, including gender oriented organisations and traditional leaders. Children and youths should also be regarded as stakeholders and consulted in the set up and design of DDR. In particular, young men and women should be involved in decision-making processes in reintegration programmes to ensure their specific concerns are dealt with. Similarly, IDPs, refugees and the sick and disabled should have input.<sup>63</sup> A balance however, must be struck between the interests of donors and those of the beneficiaries. Communities can play an important role as intermediaries for resolving problems and also provide guidance to ex-combatants in their reintegration efforts.

Without systematic community impact into monitoring and evaluation it will be difficult to determine how programming should be adjusted to take into account negative human security impacts. Community stakeholders will often be in a good position to evaluate these. Donors must be flexible and genuinely open to embrace local insights. Further, monitoring and evaluation is essential in capturing lessons-learnt that might be of value in human security terms.

## **5.6 Place gender issues at the forefront of DDR both to address vulnerabilities associated with gender but also to ensure that women in particular have the opportunity to contribute to community security and recovery during and following DDR**

Options for prioritising gender issues include: putting women in stakeholder leadership positions in DDR processes; using the capacities of women's organisations to engage in DDR; encouraging women to enter into the security sector; and increasing the awareness among ex-combatants of the need to include women and girls in DDR. Women and women's groups have a key role to play in sensitisation, reconciliation, and in awareness campaigns and sensitisation to prepare communities to receive ex-combatants, supporters and their dependents. Other DDR gender specific measures include: prosecuting GBV and sensitising the justice system and communities to this form of abuse; designing education for the needs of girls and women; and allocating resources to support ex-combatants and others to care for children impacted upon by armed violence. Male gender issues, such their involvement in SGBV, violent masculinity, and the inability of men to fulfil their perceived roles, such as the household provider, following conflict, remain largely unaddressed in DDR.<sup>64</sup> Key recommendations include:

- Women combatants should be kept separate from men in camps and encampments should guarantee women's safety, for instance through security guards or fenced women's quarters;
- In order for women to feel safe, female protection workers and support workers at the demobilisation sites are essential;
- Camps should install special facilities for women and children such as separate sanitation facilities, food adapted to children's needs and distribution of appropriate clothing for all ex-combatants;
- Create appropriate health provisions for women and dependents children, including reproductive health facilities

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<sup>63</sup> Interview with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, 8 November 2006.

<sup>64</sup> See the women, gender and DDR section of the, UN Inter-agency Working Group on DDR, "Operational Guide: To the Integrated DDR Standards", New York: UN Inter-agency Working Group on DDR, 2004, pp. 193-204.

- Target “bush wives” and other abducted girls and women as beneficiaries in DDR programmes and put in place sensitisation programmes for their return. Also, protect them against stigmatisation and victimisation.
- Create mechanisms, including incentives, to break the relationship between children and youths associated with fighting forces and their commanders both during DDR and subsequently;
- And also, invest in work to lessen community fears and apprehension regarding children associated with fighting forces returning to areas where they have been engaged in violence.

### **5.7 Address the exclusion or poor provision for youths in many DDR processes and their potential to adversely impact upon human security**

Youths are frequently not beneficiaries of DDR processes and those youths that pass through DDR do not usually receive special targeted assistance as children do, for example. Nor do they tend to be involved in programme design and decision-making. Further, youths are often exploited by commanders during DDR and by others in positions of authority. Thus, DDR tends to do little to begin the process of assimilating youths into communities and new ways of living. The potential for youths to resort to modes of behaviour learnt during conflict that damage community security and safety is manifest.

DDR programmes need to be specifically tailored to youths to address their special educational and vocational needs, to deal with trauma and exposure to violence, and to address their often problematic relationship with authority. Career guidance is particularly important as many youths have little or no experience of employment, are poorly educated, and have difficulties in identifying and accessing civilian opportunities. These might include measures such as encouraging youth entrepreneurship and micro finance directed at youths, labour intensive physical and social infrastructure projects, and partnerships with the private sector. Youths can also play important roles in reconciliation.

### **5.8 Further develop child protection during and following DDR to avert the victimisation of children**

The issue of children/girls associated with armed groups needs to be nested within child protection work at the community level broadly. This captures for example the linkages and harmonization with work on sexual exploitation and violence and separated children. This moves to a community based analysis of child protection needs and responses/duty bearers -- one that reflects the socio-cultural dynamics of the community.

Child protection measures have been strengthened since the DDR process in Sierra Leone. However, there is still a need to improve the human security of children during DDR processes. This might be achieved through measures such as: protection during conflicts; undertaking steps taken to prevent their recruitment or re-recruitment; securing their release from armies and armed groups; ensuring their separation from ex-combatants during demobilisation and reintegration; protecting them through judicial processes and frameworks; and prosecuting those responsible for the recruitment of children for military purposes. Critically, children should be protected from stigmatisation and abuse on their return to often impoverished and traumatised communities where goodwill has often been undermined by children’s involvement in violence against communities. Children should contribute to the development of the demobilisation process they are registering for, and they should be included in the

planning and evaluation of reintegration efforts. There is also a need to strengthen community structures to support reintegrating children during and following DDR.

### **5.9 The need to address IDP and refugee vulnerabilities and their capacity to destabilise DDR and community recovery**

IDPs and refugees present challenges to DDR. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether they are combatants or civilians. However, at the same time, they often include extremely vulnerable groups who require protection. Processing IDPs and refugees during DDR will require liaison with neighbouring countries, their protection on return to their country of origin, and close co-operation between agencies and organisations involved in DDR. Further, DDR programming needs to plan for the possibility that refugees, including ex-combatants posing as refugees/IDPs, can destabilise communities or camps where they are sited, and create tensions that can lead to clashes and violence with communities.

### **5.10 Ensure that regional/cross border dimensions that impact on community security and safety are addressed**

Conflict and security assessments need to be made of how regional/cross border dimensions impact on DDR in certain communities. These assessments need to influence how DDR programming is undertaken in border communities and ensure community safety and security through, for example, strengthened connections between DDR and customs and border policing, and special DDR programmes for refugees. DDR also needs to plan for, or deal with, cross border movements of ex-combatants and combatants who have the capacity to destabilise communities.

### **5.11 Take into account the human security impacts of excluding some armed groups from DDR**

Those designing and implementing DDR need to be aware of the impact of not demobilising certain groups on communities, even if these groups are regarded as peripheral to the peace process. Stigmatising armed groups as ‘negative’ forces, or as unsuitable for integration into national armies, is a risky strategy as they may have the capacity at the community level to intimidate, engage in war economies, or hamper reconciliation and recovery. Community-sensitive DDR requires assessments of what impact excluding armed groups from benefits and reintegration has on safety and security.

### **5.12 Strengthen the link between DDR national commissions, NGOs, and local actors to ensure human security considerations are highlighted**

It is well-established that national commissions have a central role to play in DDR, but there is a need to ensure that they do not neglect community participation. It is sometimes asserted that externals do not fully comprehend local DDR contexts, but similar observations apply to national commissions who sometimes disregard local perspectives and focus more on the national picture. They are also often over-stretched. This suggests there should be formal mechanisms to strengthen links and co-ordination between the two so that human security risks and vulnerabilities can be identified.

### **5.13 Make stronger DDR connections with reconciliation**

The protracted nature and the severity of the conflict in Sierra Leone produced a fragmented and deeply-scarred society, which now must learn how to co-exist peacefully. DDR should connect more strongly with traditional community reconciliation and dispute mechanisms which are often damaged during conflict but which, as in Sierra Leone, have a critical role in holding communities together following the stresses of conflict. DDR has a poor record in doing this.

The potential for successful reintegration and reconciliation already exists in a given community and is rooted in its traditional culture. External actors are often unaware of, or relegate the mechanisms local communities have and use to restructure the social fabric after conflict. Essentially, this bottom-up approach covers a vast array of under-utilised traditional agencies that may not have been mobilised to respond to the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

DDR should more often include community engagement in the negotiated/mediated movement of ex-combatants from demobilisation camps into community reconciliation schemes. This has the potential to avoid many of the insecurities and tensions inherent in reinsertion and reintegration.

#### **5.14 Target strategies and approaches that equalises/shares the benefits given to returnee ex-combatants and communities to counter negative impacts and community resentments**

This contributes to human security by potentially bringing ex-combatants and community together, strengthens social capital, and lessens the likelihood of ex-combatants becoming alienated and engaging in criminal or anti-social activities. There needs to be a continuing working dialogue between communities and ex-combatants during and following DDR including instruction in why communities might be hostile to ex-combatants returns and also to alleviate community hostilities and negative attitudes to youths and other vulnerable groups.<sup>65</sup>

#### **5.16 Introduce human security issues into DDR planning prior to/during peace negotiations and the formulation of DDR mandates**

This should include the likely impacts of DDR interventions on communities. Special provision for vulnerable groups, in particular, should be agreed on during peace negotiations and written into peace agreements.

#### **5.17 Look at ways that trauma/psychosocial problems among ex-combatants and communities can be addressed more fully and effectively within the context of DDR**

These issues have tended to be neglected in DDR programming but trauma and psychosocial issues often constitutes a major, and largely unreported, barrier to community recovery. Trauma, for example, often manifests itself in violent behaviour that poses a threat to communities, an inability to engage in reconciliation, and to pursue economic and livelihood opportunities.

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<sup>65</sup> UN Inter-agency Working Group on DDR, “Operational Guide: To the Integrated DDR Standards”, pp.188-89.

## 5.18 Draw to a much greater extent on the opportunities to link and co-ordinate DDR with related programming and create sustainable responses to human security issues

Better linkages and co-ordination between DDR and related programming can enhance vulnerable group protection and community safety/security. DDR in itself is limited in scope. It seeks to stabilise situations and begin the process of reintegrating ex-combatants and vulnerable groups. However, if human security is to be sustained it is necessary for DDR to link better with longer-term forms of programming that can more effectively underwrite economic and social well being (such as development) and also programmes that directly address security such as peacekeeping and SSR. Further, DDR needs to link with programming that address some of the root causes underpinning conflict such as good governance and access to justice. Areas of useful linkage include:

- *DDR/SALW programming*: Community-directed SALW programming, when co-ordinated with DDR, can address shortfalls in DDR in areas such as providing sensitisation to de-stabilising ex-combatant returns, collecting civilian weapons, and by kick-starting Quick Impact Development Projects.
- *DDR/SSR*: Ensuring that community perspectives and human security needs are incorporated into the planning and design of DDR and SSR, so that in particular, the security sector does not present a threat to civilians and communities following DDR. Further, a SSR strategy should be ideally formulated at the same time as DDR, and linked with it when feasible, to avoid destabilising consequences for human security, such as the exclusion of armed groups that present a threat to community security and safety.
- *DDR/Peacekeeping*: Communities would benefit from better support and protection from peacekeeping and other military contingents during DDR. Communities, and vulnerable groups within them, often suffer worst in human security terms from breakdowns in DDR when they are vulnerable to attack from armed groups, rebels, and national armies. Police protection, where the police are trusted, is also valuable in reducing tensions when ex-combatants return after often having committed atrocities in communities.
- *DDR/Transitional Justice*: Justice processes can potentially deal with issues of impunity, exclusion and grievance that are not usually addressed during DDR and which often lie dormant. Justice that is accessible for youths who are often abused during conflict or by traditional authorities is an important measure to compensate youths who are excluded from DDR benefits. The juvenile justice measures introduced under JSDP in Sierra Leone such as the 2006 draft National Juvenile Justice Strategy are potentially valuable approaches for engagement. Further, mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) can start to deal with issues between communities, ex-combatants and the military, although in Sierra Leone the TRC had little impact. By instigating justice reform concurrently with, or shortly after, DDR, safety and security in communities is sometimes enhanced.

### Annex1: Border Crossing Points in Kono District

NO	NAME OF TOWN		CHIEFDOM	ROUTE	RESPONSIBILITY	REMARK
	SIERRA LEONE	GUINEA				
1	<b>Boindu</b>	<i>Yebema</i>	Soa	Via Sukudu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
2	<b>Boedu</b>	<i>Makoh</i>	Soa	Via Sukudu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
3	<b>Yorgbodu</b>	<i>Dugbema</i>	Soa	Via Sukudu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
4	<b>Gbongbokor</b>	<i>Gbesay</i>	Soa	Via Fiedu Ma	<b>Police/Immigration</b>	River Crossing

5	<b>Dugbudu</b>	<i>Maah</i>	Soa	Via Duwuma	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
6	<b>Baidu</b>	<i>Gbangba Bengu</i>	Soa	Via Duwuma	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
7	<b>Maakor</b>	<i>Ndabaa</i>	Soa	Via Duwuma	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
8	<b>Yebema</b>	<i>Kpakpaa Bendu</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Gbenden	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
9	<b>Puidu</b>	<i>Sunga</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Gbenden	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
10	<b>Kaadli</b>	<i>Gborokordu</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Gbangba	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
11	<b>Fandu</b>	<i>Tongorma</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Korwadu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
12	<b>Nongorwa</b>	<i>Paewahun</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Korwadu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
13	<b>Kbakodu</b>	<i>Bambaa</i>	Gbane Kandor	Via Kunteh	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
14	<b>Begbeleh</b>	<i>Bendu Sandeya</i>	Mafindor	Via Kunteh	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
15	<b>Wasaya</b>	<i>Fandu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kunteh	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
16	<b>Kaledu</b>	<i>Yendeh</i>	Mafindor	Via Dgededu	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
17	<b>Gbendadu</b>	<i>Baedu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
18	<b>Dendor Bengu</b>	<i>Kelgbadu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
19	<b>Kormondu</b>	<i>Keladu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
20	<b>Sosowada</b>	<i>Kalegbema</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
21	<b>Gbendama</b>	<i>Kalgbema</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
22	<b>Kaadu</b>	<i>Manor</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
23	<b>Kaeseneh</b>	<i>Yendeh Kabadu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
24	<b>Kolobengu</b>	<i>Kaeseneh Gbord</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
25	<b>Yardu</b>	<i>Mangbandu</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
26	<b>Sagbana</b>	<i>Konorma</i>	Mafindor	Via Kamiand	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
27	<b>Gbogboma</b>	<i>Konorma</i>	Lei	Via Seima	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
28	<b>Mansakondu</b>	<i>Yeafula</i>	Lei	Via Seima	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
29	<b>Lewa</b>	<i>Koelorbengu</i>	Lei	Via Seima	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
30	<b>Korunbaya</b>	<i>Yindeme</i>	Lei	Via Seima	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
31	<b>Yindeme</b>	<i>Kandemela</i>	Lei	Via Seima	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
32	<b>Totor</b>	<i>Kundobengoloh</i>	Toli	Via Kondewa	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
33	<b>Kondewakor</b>	<i>Seimasensen</i>	Toli	Via Kondewa	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
34	<b>Yarawadu</b>	<i>Bendukoadea K</i>	Lei/Koinadugu	Via Kombaye	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing
35	<b>Yarawadu</b>	<i>Forokoneya</i>	Lei/Koinadugu	Via Kombaye	Civilian/Mocky	River Crossing

## Annex 2: List of Interviewees

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Town</b>
	Paramount Chief Konobundol	Paramount Chief Kangama Chiefdom, Head of all Chiefs	Kono
2	Veronica Dauda	Centre for Democracy and Human Rights/Koedia Association	
3	Fanta Kabba	Gbba Women	“
4	Fanta Yajah	“	“
5	Mbalu Bangura	“	“
6	Fatmata Daramy	“	“
7	Mr. S.M.S. Bayoh	“	“
8	Mariama Kamara	“	“
9	Yatta Komba	“	“
10	Siatta Bayoh	“	“
11	Sia Gongor	“	“
12	Aminata Bangura	“	“
13	Fatmata Farama	“	“
14	Mariama Borboh	Yatatonda Women’s Association	“
15	Fanta Sidibay	“	“
16	Fatmata Musa	“	“
17	Aminata Boi	“	“
18	Numa Sandy	“	“
19	Sia Samba	“	“
20	Mariama Bayoh	Kono Women’s Organisation Network	“
21	Nyama R. Mansaray	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs	“



22	Hawa Charles	Park Lane Women's Association	“
23	Sia B. Nyandehun	Coalition of Eastern Women's Association	“
		Ex-CAFF, RUF	Kailahu
1	Morie Lusame	Sierra Leone Red Cross CAR Programme	“
2	Lansana Musa	“	“
3	Fatmata Kamara	“	“
4	Foday Juana	“	“
5	Fayiah Nabieu	“	“
6	Lucy Sonula	“	“
7	Massah Jalloh	“	“
8	Saidu Borbor	“	“
9	Peter Sandy	“	“
10	Tamba Banya	“	“
11	Sahr Fomba	“	“
12	Sapha Lamin	“	“
13	Finda Kandeh	“	“
14	Sao Augustine	“	“
15	Lucy Tamba	“	“
16	Sahr Jimmy	“	“
		Ex-WAFF, RUF	Kailahu
1	Memuna Bockarie	Sierra Leone Red Cross CAR Programme	“
2	Mamie Dauda	“	“
3	Kadiatu Gbassay	“	“
4	Easter Sam King	“	“
5	Hannah Alpha	“	“
6	Hannah Momoh	“	“
7	Lucy Tucker	“	“
8	Jenneh Sandy	“	“
9	Sao Augustine	“	“
10	Mariatu Abu	“	“
11	Christiana Karimu	“	“
12	Jestina Kongoma	“	“
13	Hawa Jayah	“	“
14	Aminata Bundu	“	“
15	Yatta Morie	“	“
16	Musu Turay	“	“
		Ex-RUF	Kailahu
1	Sama Jusu	“	“
2	Enssah Momoh	“	“
3	James Konneh	“	“
4	Morie Lamin	“	“
5	Alammy Sesay	“	“
6	Peter F. Gborie	“	“
7	Emmanuel Kenneh	“	“
8	Sam King Alpha	“	“
9	James Musa	“	“
10	James Amara	“	“
11	Osman Fofanah	“	“
12	Tamba Mackathey	“	“
13	Hawa Edison	“	“
14	Watta Bockarie	“	“
15	Julius Kallon	“	“
		Ex-CDF Donso Militia	Kono
1	Sahr B. Ansumana	“	“
2	Moses Lebbie	“	“
3	Komba Marni	“	“

4	Sahr D. Momoh	“	“
5	Aiah Thomas	“	“
6	Sahr Lahai	“	“
7	Joseph S. Tamba	“	“
8	Aiah S. Kamanada	“	“
9	Komba M. Gbongbor	“	“
10	A.S. Lebbie	“	“
11	Kai Marah	“	“
12	Sahr Ellie	“	“
13	A. O. Kellie	“	“
14	Komba Aruna	“	“
15	C.O. Chesima	“	“
16	A. M. Kellie	“	“
17	Aiah Allieu	“	“
18	Tamba Aruna	“	“
19	Aiah Aruna	“	“
20	James Kellie	“	“
21	Sahr Kamanda	“	“
22	S.S. Yaryah	“	“
23	Sahr Buffa	“	“
24	James K. Kellie	“	“
25	Sahr Nyama	“	“
26	A.O. Kellie	“	“
27	Sahr Nat Kellie	“	“
28	Sahr James Kellie	“	“
29	Kandeh Farama	“	“
30	Kai T.D. Mambu	“	“
31	Tamba Aruna	“	“
32	Aiah R. Momoh	“	“
33	Komba Lebbie	“	“
34	Foray Allieu	“	“
35	Tamba Yaah	“	“
36	Sahr Allie	“	“
37	Aiah Allieu	“	“
38	Aiah Aruna	“	“
1	Sahr M. Mattia	Ex-RUF	Kono
2	Frank M. Ndovo	“	“
3	Saidu K. Kallon	“	“
4	Sahr Feyia	“	“
5	Ibrahim Marah	“	“
6	Tamba Borbo	“	“
7	Aiah Mondeh	“	“
8	Sahr Moiwa	“	“
9	Bockarie Saffa	“	“
10	Mohamed Blango	“	“
11	Ishmael Maturie	“	“
12	Aiah Fandeh	“	“
13	Nathe Kanawa	“	“
14	Tamba Kainbay	“	“
15	Alex Mafinda	“	“
16	Tamba D. Mbayoh	“	“
17	Emmanuel Sandi	“	“
18	Sahr Josiah	“	“
19	Tejan Sesay	“	“
20	Lansana Jonny	“	“
21	Sallu Jalloh	“	“
22	Foray Lebbie	“	“

23	Saa Moriba	“	“
24	Kumba Joseph	“	“
25	Sahr Komba	“	“
		Ex-CAFF, RUF	Kono
1	Aiah Yomba	Mr World Carpentry Shop	“
2	Sahr Yamba	“	“
3	Aiah Danga	“	“
4	Francis Nyuma	Kono Technical Vocational Centre (K-Tech)	“
5	Steven S. Lebbie	“	“
6	Joseph Senessie	“	“
7	Mohamed Sesay	“	“
8	Mohamed Mansaray	“	“
9	Tamba Mondeh	“	“
10	Tamba F. Gandi	“	“
11	Mohamed Blango	“	“
12	Tamba Boo	“	“
13	Tamba Komba	“	“
14	Tamba Kainbay	“	“
15	Emmanuel Sandi	“	“
16	Osman Allieu	“	“
17	Mohamed Bangali	“	“
18	Safea Mafinda	“	“
19	Komba Jimmy	“	“
20	Tamba D. Mbaya	“	“
21	Nat Kanawah	“	“
22	Mohammed Koroma	“	“
23	Aiah Senesie	“	“
24	Emmanuel Forbie	“	“
25	Kalifala Mansaray	“	“
26	Jacob Morsay	“	“
27	Karamokoh Kamara	“	“
28	Komba Bernard	“	“
29	Augustine Senessie	“	“
30	Aiah Foray	“	“
31	David S. Bockarie	“	“
		“	“
		Ex-WAFF	“
1	Adama Blango	“	“
2	Gladys F. Moiwa	“	“
3	Agnes Y. Moiwa	“	“
4	Augusta Kpaka	“	“
5	Elizabeth Momoh	“	“
6	Susan Kalokoh	“	“
7	Isatu Sella	“	“
8	Jennet Mbayoh	“	“
9	Yata Mansaray	“	“
10	Finda Komba	“	“
11	Sia Marian Momoh	“	“
12	Sia Farama	“	“
13	Finda Gbamanja	“	“
14	Isatu Senessie II	“	“
15	Naomi Komba	“	“
16	Matta Koroma	“	“
17	Kumba Lavalie	“	“
18	Mariama Nowah	“	“
19	Fatmata Turay	“	“
20	Gladys Komba	“	“

21	Aminata Sesay	“	“
22	Fatmata Kamara	“	“
23	Finda Mansaray	“	“
24	Sarah Conteh	“	“
25	Teressa Kamanda	“	“
26	Sia Thomas	“	“
27	Rebecca Okangba	“	“
28	Mahawa Momoh	“	“
29	Hawa Turay	“	“
30	Mariama Lamin	“	“
31	Fanta Mattia	Progressive Women’s Association (PROWA)	“
32	Naomi Kellie	“	“
33	Ferehmusu Sesay	“	“
34	Fanta Sam	“	“
35	Kadiatu Kamara	“	“
36	Isatu Jalloh	“	“
37	Umu Hawa Barry	“	“
38	Sia Lamin	“	“
39	Bondu Sogbeh	“	“
40	Mariama Barrie	“	“
41	Isatu Bangura	“	“
42	Mariama Musa	“	“
43	Janet Vandi	“	“
44	Isatu Fornah	“	“
45	Isata Jabbie	“	“
46	Yei Bessibe	“	“
47	Mariama Marah	“	“
48	Bintu Kallon	“	“
49	Yei Gbanga	“	“
50	Janet Kellie	“	“
51	Aminata Sandi	“	“
52	Fatmata Marah	“	“
53	Dora Kanu	“	“
54	Salymatu Conteh	“	“