

# Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation

## Final Report



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**Project:** End of Program Evaluation, Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)  
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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AC	Advisory Committee (of the MDRP)
ACSP	Amnesty Commission Special Project (Uganda)
ADRP	Angolan Demobilization and Reintegration Program
COFS	Combatants on Foreign Soils
CSDRRPP	Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention of Child Ex-Combatants (Burundi)
D&R	Demobilization and Reintegration
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation & Resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRRP	Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (Burundi)
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda</i>
FPA	Fiduciary Principles Accord
GLR	Greater Lakes Region
HCREC	<i>Haut Commissariat de la Reinsertion des Ex- Combatants (ROC)</i>
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
IDA	International Development Agency (World Bank)
IDDRS	Integrated DDR Standards
IRSEM	<i>Instituto de Reintegração Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares (Angola)</i>
LAC	Local Ad-hoc Committee (of the MDRP)
LDP	Letter of Demobilization Policy
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF	Multi-donor Trust Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission to Congo
PNDDR	<i>Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (DRC)</i>
PRAC	<i>Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (CAR)</i>
OP	Operational Policy (World Bank)
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program
RF	Results Framework
ROC	Republic of Congo
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCG	Technical Coordination Group (of the MDRP)
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TFC	Trust Fund Committee (of the MDRP)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States Dollar
WAFF	Women Associated with Fighting Forces
WB	World Bank

# 1 Executive Summary

The MDRP is by far the largest D&R program in the world in terms of number of states involved, individuals demobilized and levels of funding. It succeeded in mobilizing USD 450 million and structuring a complex partnership around the common objective of stabilizing the greater Great Lakes Region through demobilizing and reintegrating over 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries. Key lessons from this seven year program that ran from April 2002 through June 2009 include:

- (i) National ownership, a central pillar of the MDRP, is the key to successful DDR, but inclusive stakeholder commitment to and engagement with the program is essential.
- (ii) Sustainability of reintegration efforts need to be a concern from day one.
- (iii) Particular beneficiary groups such as child soldiers and female ex-combatants, require identifiable targeting, funding and action plans, and management held accountable for results. While child soldiers was addressed through MDRP Special Projects, targeted attention to gender came only much later in the program.
- (iv) Capacity development and quality assurance will always be lacking in fragile and post-conflict settings and need to be addressed with dedicated resources and own action plans.
- (v) In order for the partnership to function, roles and responsibilities should be clear with specified objectives, indicators, target values spelled out and accountability instruments agreed to.
- (vi) Given the complexity, risks and challenges associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected environments, and D&R in particular, the World Bank should review its policies, procedures, instruments and staffing in terms of adequacy for operating and administering such ambitious interventions as an MDRP, and in particular has to commit senior management time to such programs.

The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was set up to demobilize and reintegrate into civilian life over 360,000 ex-combatants (EXCs) in the greater Great Lakes region (GLR), to contribute to peace, stability and socio-economic development and cooperation in one of the most conflict-affected regions in the world.

The MDRP was an ambitious program in terms of its objectives – addressing security, political and development issues – and in its design: it was an unprecedented partnership of national governments, donor countries, UN agencies, the World Bank and local implementers that had a regional approach yet based on national ownership.

The MDRP was set up in 2002 and closed in June 2009. About a dozen donors and the World Bank provided over USD 450 million that financed the successful demobilization of 300,000 EXCs in seven countries; helped set up national programs and national implementing bodies that took ownership and leadership of their respective D&R programs; supported cross-border learning and networks; generated new knowledge, insights and experience of great value to future D&R operations; and provided a series of lessons regarding funding, secretariat organization, national ownership, regional collaboration, capacity building and technical assistance, beneficiary targeting, quality assurance and performance tracking, and linkages to other activities.

## 1.1 Financing and Governance

Donors and the World Bank guaranteed substantial resources to the high-risk MDRP even before any programs were in place. This provided a strong *political* signal to the parties on the ground, which was helpful for mobilizing support for DDR action.

Pooling of donor resources and making them available under a common set of administrative procedures was a major advantage. But the risk of donor volatility was made apparent during the MDRP, and needs to be discussed with the donor community.

The Advisory Committee (AC) and Technical Coordination Group (TCG) were constructive meeting places for debating policy issues, new ideas and learning. More policy discussions should over time have been moved to the field, giving more voice to local partners, and more thought and resources given to how to follow up. Joint Supervision Missions were a good mutual learning and oversight mechanism that built shared understandings and thus strengthened the partnership. It was demanding to organize, interest and participation from donor capitals decreased over time, while local partner participation could have been stronger.

The MDRP as an important regional program should have been more visible inside the World Bank organizational structure. The Secretariat itself faced two challenges: Bank staff often reported to Sector Managers making MDRP leadership at times complicated, and many MDRP staff were hired from the outside. The use of external technical expertise strengthens the ability to address multifaceted problems, but these staff had limited knowledge of Bank operating practices. More time and resources should have been invested up front to ensure that such staff are properly trained, integrated and function well in the program context.

Over time, location of the Secretariat should have been reviewed. A Secretariat based in the region empowered to engage at policy level with national counterparts and a smaller office back in Washington would be in line with the Bank's decentralization. Especially in a fragile country context where issues may move fast and the ability to take quick decisions may depend on having one's nose close to the ground, a visible and high-level field presence may be helpful.

Given the complexity, risks and challenges associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected environments, and D&R in particular, the World Bank should review its policies, procedures, instruments and staffing in terms of adequacy for operating and administering such ambitious interventions as an MDRP, and in particular has to commit senior management time to such programs.

## 1.2 Portfolio Results

The GLR provided a daunting environment for the logistically complex D&R operations, yet the national programs largely met the *demobilization and reinsertion* targets.

The delays in program implementation experienced in some countries were mainly caused by political stalemates or weak management, though in some cases joint donor action, such as in the DRC, overcame such obstacles.

*Reintegration* is more complex and long-term than simple reinsertion, and while a DDR program normally cannot do full-term reintegration, monitoring systems and support should have been in place to ensure that national authorities could continue to track progress.

Livelihoods support must be realistic and market-friendly so as to reduce disappointments and possible abandonment of the DDR process by EXCs, though livelihoods viability is primarily dependent on dynamics in the larger economy.



Technologies and other support services provided for DDR efforts (ID cards, monitoring systems, databases), should as far as possible be compatible with and contribute to larger national systems, both to provide value-added to the EXCs, but also to contribute to improving larger systems and thus ensure sustainability of DDR-initiated ones.

In order to reach special groups, earmarked resources must be set aside and targeted skills and programs employed to ensure that group-sensitive approaches are employed. This was successful in the case of child soldiers but less so when it came to female EXCs, despite being an early identified group, as significant assistance only came later in the program.

Quality assurance is expensive and management intensive. As with special groups, M&E requires dedicated resources and attention. In order to track performance, databases need to be set up with clarity on which variables the program wishes to track (a fairly minimalist approach is the most realistic), preferably with consistency across countries if program similarity makes this logical and possible.

The management of such a large M&E program, and the capacity building necessary for the individual programs to be able to manage and implement it, is a task that is possible to contract out, at least partially, where different models or contracts can be used.

### 1.3 Partnership

The MDRP Partnership was broad-based, innovative and ambitious since it was addressing security, political and development issues at the same time. With hindsight it is clear that not enough thought had gone into its design, both with regards to roles and responsibilities between the different partners, but also concerning the size and skills of the Secretariat. The responsibility for ensuring that the administration of the Partnership worked lay with the Administrator, yet senior management in the Bank at times did not pay close enough attention to this.

Donor commitments varied by donor, across MDRP countries, and over time as political priorities shifted. The most important role was on the ground, yet that was often the weakest link in donor staffing with high rotation, few staff, most funding and commitments made at HQ level and not always fully communicated to the field.

Host governments generally welcomed the DDR resources but were sensitive to the policy dimensions attached. Stable/strong governments were better able to enter into such partnerships while transitional regimes are more vulnerable: they are asked to address what is often a pillar of their own power base at a time when the state is particularly weak. The ambitions of the partnership must therefore be scaled to the ability local authorities have for addressing this core area of state security: for regimes that feel exposed, SSR and cross-border issues may be second-order to plain political survival.

For a complex and multi-party collaborative partnership like the MDRP, roles and expectations need to be made explicit and operational in order to work. A dedicated framework like the Roles Matrix prepared by the MDRP is an excellent tool that should be designed early in the program, with objectives, indicators, target values, responsibilities spelled out and accountability instruments agreed to. This should be discussed and approved by the governing body, and be part of the overall program Results Framework/s, and monitored and reported on as part of overall the program's deliverables.

## 1.4 Regional Approach

The regional approach of the MDRP ensured coherence of DDR in the region as well as broad-based understanding of the DDR issues, including the need for large-scale and flexibly programmable funding. Generating agreement on this regional approach to the GLR DDR was a major achievement.

Despite the regional vision, it was easier to produce the country-specific outputs than the regional ones. The cross-border results require continued effort and focus, and unless the benefits are perceived to be significant on both sides of the border, it is difficult to sustain the interest. There is also a hierarchy of concerns where the national ones come first, and where parties therefore are at different stages in addressing their challenges (Rwanda had largely managed its internal DDR, DRC was still in the middle of a big DDR process).

The MDRP was an efficient and effective mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating financial resources for DDR, ensuring transparent funding allocations, consistent financial management and harmonized reporting. The joint learning events provided for efficient sharing of own experiences (peer learning), dissemination of new knowledge, but also was the most useful arena for building trust and cross-border relations.

For implementing countries, there may be some economies of scale on the learning and access to resources, but the cross-border transferability of “lessons learned” from joint knowledge events is limited: they must still be adapted to the national context.

For donors, the advantages are more obvious: mobilization of funds, planning, and financial and performance reporting can be standardized and at no additional cost a donor country can participate in and track dynamics in a series of countries.

## 1.5 National Ownership

*National ownership* as a principle for the MDRP program was essential. However, it should have been operationally defined so that the various dimensions could be better addressed: government versus broader national ownership; policy versus implementation dimension, the contextual understanding and its dynamics over time.

The *importance* of the concept lies in the clarity on who should be in the driver’s seat and define policies, priorities and programs. A broader concept of national ownership would have ensured that not only government officials but also a broader set of stakeholders be present who can help make DDR happen. Experience shows that actors such as civic organizations and local governments can play a key role in implementation, in particular when it comes to reintegration. Opposition groups and potential spoilers should be brought in to build trust and improve the likelihood of successfully implementing a DDR program.

## 1.6 Capacity Development

DDR implemented through a national ownership approach should assume that there will be important capacity constraints. Depending on circumstances, this might entail doing a first needs assessment, identify critical gaps, and in close dialogue with local stakeholders prepare a CD strategy that encompasses *political, management, technical and physical*

*capacity* needs. The strategy, to be credible, will require an action plan, resources, defined monitorable deliverables and staff for implementation.

While CD is a long-term development concern and questions should be asked to what extent a time-limited and focused DDR program should allocate resources to this area, DDR programs tend to last longer than expected and forward looking CD programs can thus be good value for money.

CD is skills and management intensive, which becomes an argument for more permanent presence in the field. This is a costly decision so needs to be carefully considered – but should be weighed against realistic alternatives for delivering the DDR objectives.

Linked in with this is the more general issue of knowledge management. The MDRP produced a number of studies and thus new knowledge in a number of fields important to DDR: gender, special rebel groups, lessons from demobilization exercises. In addition are the evaluations produced in a number of the countries. Together this constitutes a significant contribution to our knowledge, and joint mechanisms are useful vehicles for this. In the MDRP, other actors and in particular the donors and UN bodies could probably have contributed more actively. An extended capacity development/knowledge generation program would have allowed for more systematic programming of both hands-on knowledge but also more research-based insights.

## 1.7 Longer-term Impact and Looking Ahead

The regional dimension of the MDRP was to a large extent a success, but also a child of its times: the GLR grabbed widespread attention until the crisis subsided and its regional-political role fell. While it was able to generate high-level political support in the early phase, this commitment on the donor side decreased – a dynamic which is to be expected but needs to be borne in mind when setting up such complex mechanisms. Temporary joint mechanisms like the MDRP are therefore generally better at addressing *technical* concerns, so expectations need to be realistic when it comes to results that depend on *political* action and decision.

Upstream (policy, SSR) and downstream (sustainable reintegration) links to DDR need to be systematically identified and as far as possible established. While *implementing* such linked-in programs are beyond the scope and time horizon of a DDR process, the Impact and Sustainability of steps taken under DDR will increase with the inclusion of DDR into these broader agendas.

Funding for important public goods like peace and stability requires more predictable and equitable funding than the *ad hoc* trust fund mobilizations of the MDRP. This is a challenge for the international community in general.

Joint mechanisms are vulnerable to loss of institutional memory and “lessons learned”. The MDRP, as an important DDR program, needs to ensure that a repository for the institutional memory is found.

If the World Bank wishes to continue playing a lead role in DDR, it should look critically at the experience of the MDRP to assess whether it has appropriate systems, staffing policies, procedures and instruments when it comes to supporting what is presumably the most high-risk activity the Bank engages in.

## 2 Background and Introduction

In the past two decades violent conflicts have affected nearly half the African countries and over a third of its population. This has made the international community pay more attention to the problems of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The most ambitious response so far was the collaborative effort among African and donor countries in setting up the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa during the period 2002-2009.

As the MDRP formally closed at the end of June 2009, an end-of-program evaluation was commissioned to look at the lessons from the MDRP as a mechanism.

### 2.1 Background

The conflicts in the Greater Lakes Region (GLR) area in the 1990s had different historical roots and particular causes, including ethnic divides, conflicts over resources and power, leading to genocide, protracted civil war, regionalized fighting. While open conflicts usually had some identifiable “trigger”, most were multi-dimensional and often with trans-border dimensions.

The conflict in the DRC was particularly complex and destabilizing to the entire region. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in July 1999 foresaw the organization of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the disarmament and demobilization of foreign armed groups, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The UN Organization Mission to Congo (MONUC) was to play a central role in these activities. As an outcome of the agreement, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda pulled all or part of their military forces out of the DRC.

The MDRP was to support the transition to peace and stability throughout the region by funding the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants within and across countries. The conflict analysis informing the MDRP was carried out in dialogue with stakeholders in the countries involved, concerned donor countries, the UN and the World Bank. Based on this analysis, the MDRP was conceived of as a regional program, and was presented to the parties in Paris in April 2002 in a meeting hosted by the World Bank. Two documents were the basis for discussion: “Towards a Regional Framework for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the Greater Great Lakes Region” (World Bank 2001a), and the follow-on “Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration” (World Bank 2002a). The purpose of the meeting was to review the regional strategy and program, initiate resource mobilization for its implementation, and agree on next steps. Representatives from 13 donor countries, eight regional governments and 12 international organizations attended the meeting.

Another publication, “Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: An Agenda for the Africa Region” (World Bank 2002b) notes that many of Africa’s internal conflicts are no longer short-lived local disputes but have become constant states of instability. The publication argues that because of their very nature, African conflicts have become a development issue: *“First, civil conflicts destroy social capital and institutions. Second, some conflicts tend to follow cyclical patterns. They lock countries into destructive war-peace-war cycles, which must be broken for development to be*

*successful. Third, conflicts are increasingly taking a regional dimension, threatening neighboring countries' development"* (ibid, pp. 6-7).

Early engagement in post-conflict situations is critical to enable peace to solidify and achieve stabilization. The authors note that "windows of opportunity" arise in the immediate aftermath of a political or military agreement. The MDRP was conceived and implemented as a mechanism to capitalize on windows of opportunity arising from peace and military accords.

## 2.2 Objectives of the Evaluation

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for this evaluation list three objectives (see Annex A):

- i. Identify the results of the MDRP vis-à-vis the objective of demobilizing and reintegrating 400,000 EXCs in the GLR and assess if these activities contributed to the MDRP's development goal of increased peace and security in the GLR.
- ii. Identify the factors that contributed to the results achieved with a focus on the effect of the design features/principles of the MDRP on which the program was based.
- iii. Identify lessons and present recommendations for future programming and operations and for institutional stakeholders such as the Bank and its donor partners.

The evaluation was to be based on the existing evaluations and reviews; was not to carry out any own results assessments on the ground but build on what was already in place; and was to focus on the second objective: identify those design features of the MDRP itself that could explain results attained. There was hence no original work done at country-results level. On the other hand, the evaluation is to record and assess the results achieved against the various results frameworks – see chapter 5.

## 2.3 Methodology and Data Sources

The evaluation was carried out in three phases during the period March-October 2009.

During the *inception phase* (March-April), the team carried out a review of documents made available, participated as observers in the Reflection, Advisory Committee and Policy Forum meetings organized by the MDRP in Washington 9-12 March, and had a first series of interviews with key informants attending the meetings.

The *field phase* (April-May) consisted of interviews with donor officials before visits to six of the MDRP countries – the seventh country was only addressed through a video-conference. Further interviews with MDRP, World Bank and UN staff were carried out in Washington and New York at the end of May (a list of all informants can be found in Annex B).

*Report drafting* (June-October) included a first presentation of findings to the Trust Fund Committee in Paris on 24 June.

The focus on the second and third objectives means that attention has been on the MDRP as a mechanism and how it has functioned. This is to some extent spelled out in the Analytical Framework to the TOR (see Annex A, last part), and thus required careful reading of the MDRP strategy (see next section) and analysis of its operationalization. The report is thus structured according to the issues raised by the MDRP mechanism.



The data collection part of this evaluation happened as several other processes were taking place: (i) the closing down of MDRP operations, (ii) the start up of the follow-on TDRP, and (iii) the establishment of a number of single-country MDTFs to fund subsequent phases of DDR activities. This situation put a lot of demands on MDRP staff time, which meant that some document reviews and informant interviews took place somewhat later than originally hoped for.

## 2.4 MDRP Strategy

The MDRP strategy is based on the analysis contained in “Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: An Agenda for the Africa Region” (World Bank 2002b). This document puts forth how a partnership between the World Bank, national actors, bilateral and multilateral organizations would be the best way to capitalize on the windows of opportunity arising in the GLR in the early 2000s. The policy notes the cross-border factors that underlie the conflicts in the GLR and that therefore a solely country focused approach to resolving conflict and planning DDR activities was likely to be inadequate.

The MDRP regional strategy and structure was endorsed at a partners’ meeting in Paris on 12 April and approved by the Bank’s Board on 25 April 2002. It set out a regional planning, financing and implementation framework for the demobilization and reintegration (D&R) of an initially estimated 350,000 combatants. Nine countries in central and southern Africa were eligible for support: the Republic of Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo (ROC), Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Namibia and Zimbabwe never entered the program, so the MDRP in practice has been limited to the other seven countries.

The MDRP Strategy defines its key objectives as:

- Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts;
- Establish a single mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization for demobilization and reintegration;
- Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilization and reintegration programs.

The key operating assumptions of the strategy were:

- MDRP DDR strategy exists within a broader framework for peace and security and cannot be a substitute for that;
- No single donor or agency can address the complexity of DDR in the region;
- Partner contributions should be based on their respective comparative advantages and Governments’ preferences (varies per country);
- Coordination is necessary to ensure that the MDRP does not operate in a political vacuum and that approaches are consistent irrespective of funding source;
- Links with other efforts aimed at enhancing security and reconstructing shattered societies is important;
- National programs are prepared, appraised, and supervised by national authorities and stakeholders, supported by interested donor and agency partners.

The key principles of the MDRP which this study looks at are thus:

- **Partnership:** Successful DDR requires a range of interventions that no single actor can provide, so different actors should join their resources and skills (chapter 6).
- **Regional approach:** The conflicts in the GLR were to a large extent trans-border in nature, so a regional approach to addressing DDR was seen as required (chapter 7).
- **National ownership:** National actors must define and take responsibility for the DDR activities, for them to succeed and be sustainable (chapter 8).
- **Capacity development:** It was recognized that the local capacity to plan and implement DDR activities would be limited, so support to strengthening local capacities was seen as important (chapter 9).
- **Institutional arrangements:** The MDRP, as a complex program with many actors with not necessarily totally overlapping agendas, required a transparent and accountable institutional set-up to ensure successful implementation (chapter 4).
- **Financial arrangements:** As a large program across seven countries that would necessarily have different timelines and require different levels of funding, the MDRP needed large-scale, long-term predictable yet flexible funding (chapter 4).

#### Box 2.1: MDRP Funded Activities

In **Angola**, the MDRP funded a special project to reintegrate ex-UNITA combatants in early 2003, implemented by UNDP and FAO. The national DDR program, the Angolan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (*ADRP*), was implemented by the *Instituto de Reintegração Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares*, *IRSEM*, which is the government institution responsible for reintegration of EXCs.

In **Burundi**, the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (*DRRP*) was under the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (*NCDRR*). A special project, the Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention of Child Ex-Combatants (*CSDRRPP*) was implemented and partially funded by UNICEF.

In the **Central African Republic (CAR)**, the *Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés*, *PRAC*, was the only country-level activity not implemented by national authorities. UNDP was responsible for implementation so PRAC was funded as a special project.

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**, the *Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion*, *PNDDR*, and six special projects were funded: (i) Capacity Building and Support to the Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces, (ii) Situation Assessment and Projects for Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers, (iii) Support for the Reunification and Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in the DRC, (iv) Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces, (v) Rapid Reaction Mechanism to Support DDR of EXCs in the DRC, *RRM*, and (vi) Community Recovery and Reintegration of EXCs in Eastern DRC, *ComRec*.

In the **Republic of Congo (ROC)**, the MDRP funded the Republic of Congo Demobilization and Reintegration program, under the *Haut Commissariat de la Réinsertion des Ex-Combatants* (*HCREC*), the National Commission for the national DDR program.

In **Rwanda**, the MDRP funded the national program, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (*RDRP*) under the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions (*RDRC*).

In **Uganda**, the MDRP funded the Amnesty Commission Special Project (*ACSP*), implemented by the Amnesty Commission.

### 3 The World Bank and DDR

The World Bank's mandate precludes it from funding the uniformed services in the security sector. The Bank can therefore not fund Disarmament, but has become an increasingly important actor when it comes to Demobilization and Reintegration (D&R).

#### 3.1 Organizational and Policy Developments

The Bank became more involved in post-conflict reconstruction when it took a lead role in assisting the Palestinian territories in the early 1990s. Since the West Bank and Gaza was not a sovereign state, nor a member country of the World Bank group, nor a territory for which another member country had expressed interest in acting as guarantor, neither IBRD nor IDA could provide financing. The solution was the establishment in 1994 of a Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) into which donors could provide grants funding.

Several principles were established. The Bank did not accept earmarking of donor contributions to particular activities. The use of international firms as Financial Management Agents to monitor MDTF funds also began with the funds set up in the Palestinian territories (Scanteam 2007).

In 1995, the World Bank put in place its Operational Policy (OP) 8.50, "Emergency Recovery Assistance", and two years later OP 14.40, "Trust Funds". Bank-administered MDTFs are regulated by several Operational Policies, but established under the regulatory framework of these two OPs and their corresponding Bank Procedures (BPs). OP/BP 14.40 sets out the types of Trust Funds the Bank administers, and the conditions and procedures under which these funds are to be managed and administered. OP 8.50 outlines Bank policies under emergency conditions. Flexibility is provided by allowing the Bank to adapt to the emergency's particular circumstances in terms of form and scope of financing, and by setting more flexible conditions for retroactive funding.

#### 3.2 Bank Funding of DDR Operations

While the first MDTFs were set up to assist post-conflict societies move onto a more stable development path, they did not address the armed groups that might have been involved in the underlying conflict. This changed when the Bank began supporting D&R operations. The first ones were financed by IDA loans and grants and Bank-administered trust funds in Uganda in the early 1990s, followed by a number of other D&R programs, particularly in Africa, which provided important lessons for the development of the MDRP.

At the same time, fragile and conflict-affected states have moved higher on the World Bank's agenda, leading to more flexible Bank policies. In February 2007, five years after the MDRP began, OP/BP 8.0 "Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies" replaced the old OP/BP 8.50, producing clearer and more comprehensive guidance on MDTFs. It provides measures for quicker decision making and more delegation of authority; increases possible retroactive financing from 20 to 40%; authorizes more flexible balancing between *ex-ante* and *ex-post* controls and risk mitigation measures that for example delegate higher level of authority to Bank procurement staff.



The new OP 8.00 and other policy changes have been the result of greater management attention and support to Bank operation in post-conflict situations. However, the recent “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP 8.00) Progress Report”, concluded that: *Management attention to and support of task teams’ efforts to move faster with rapid response operations has been essential for facilitating faster approvals of emergency lending. To achieve better outcomes, however, this attention has to be matched with stronger upstream and downstream management accountability for implementation performance and an increased attention to resolving implementation issues*” (World Bank 2009, pp. 21-22). The report recommends actions the Bank needs to take to resolve implementation bottlenecks, including tighter monitoring and supervision of ex-post risk mitigation and control measures, which would require adequate budget allocations; an appropriate incentive system that empowers staff to better manage risks, which would require greater decision making devolved to the field and more targeted training and skills development for staff involved in supporting and managing operations in emergency and crisis situation; and further efforts in changing human resources policies to strengthen in-country operational expertise in fragile and conflict countries.

In 2008, one year before the MDRP closed, the World Bank and the UN reached agreement on the Fiduciary Principles Accord for UN/Bank cooperation in a crisis and conflict context (UN 2008). This simplifies considerably operational issues when MDTF funding is used for UN managed activities.

### 3.3 MDRP Criteria and Programming

The MDRP Strategy outlines eligibility criteria for financing. These are:

- Each country must be actively involved in the regional peace process.
- The government must prepare a Letter of Demobilization Policy (LDP) showing commitments to the regional peace process, D&R, and plans for social expenditure; a national D&R program is prepared; implementation arrangements with planning, coordination and monitoring capacity and participation of relevant political and security stakeholders are in place; and with safeguards and fiduciary measures.

The sequencing of the demobilization from government and irregular forces was to be set on a case-by-case basis. Implementation was to be defined locally but could be executed by or in collaboration with UN Agencies and international and local NGOs.

MDRP’s Guidelines for National Programs note that programs should generally contain six components: (i) disarmament; (ii) demobilization; (iii) reinsertion; (iv) reintegration; (v) support to special groups; and (vi) implementation arrangements. HIV/Aids prevention and mitigation measures would be included during both the D&R phase. The composition of national programs would be determined by the specific socio-political context and the socio-economic profile of EXCs. The principles provided in the guideline are:

- *Support to national ownership of programs.* The MDRP would support national programs tailored to the requirements of a given country;
- *Support to comprehensive programs.* Each country should establish a single national program that should seek to address the needs of all EXCs;
- *Beneficiary involvement.* Beneficiaries from all sides should be included in program design and implementation from the outset;

- *Participation.* The successful economic and social reintegration of EXCs requires the involvement of local authorities and communities. The MDRP would encourage their participation, and also strengthen their capacities where needed;
- *Coordination and partnerships.* The roles and responsibilities of international actors would be decided for each national program. Partnerships with political and security actors, especially those involved in the peace agreements, would be critical; and
- *Links to economic reconstruction efforts.* D&R programs would be implemented in the context of broader reconstruction efforts. They would be encouraged to coordinate and link closely with such efforts in order to benefit from associated employment opportunities and to contribute actively to local reconciliation and recovery efforts.

Special groups include female, children, and disabled or chronically ill. In the MDRP Guidelines the definition of child soldier is the same as those used by UNICEF and the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to UNDPKO: “A child soldier is any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or group. This includes those who are forcibly recruited as well as those who join voluntarily. All child or adolescent participants regardless of function – cooks, porters, messengers, girls used as “wives,” and other support functions – are included as well as those considered combatants” (UNICEF, 1999). Child soldiers would be afforded priority assistance and benefit under the MDRP either through existing national programs, or otherwise through special projects.

National programs would provide assistance to disabled EXCs and provide targeted support for the social and economic reintegration of female EXCs, ensuring that benefits are equal for and equally accessible to men and women. Impact monitoring would track results on partners of EXCs and women and identify emerging problems to the authorities.

In January 2004, in response to a partner request, the Secretariat produced “Targeting MDRP Assistance: EXCs and Other War-Affected Populations”, on beneficiary definition targeting:

- EXCs and their direct family members are MDRP beneficiaries. Dependents of EXCs should be eligible for an EXC’s benefits in the event the EXC is incapable of doing so.
- The MDRP cannot provide support to all war-affected groups (IDPs, returning refugees, war widows/female headed households, war orphans). Other partners (UN agencies, the World Bank, bilateral donors, numerous NGOs) have more appropriate mandates and capacities to support these war-affected groups.
- Disabled and/or chronically ill EXCs are afforded special assistance where possible: specialized physical rehabilitation (prosthetics, therapy), social and economic assistance, while chronically ill (including those with HIV/Aids) would have access to medical services, counseling, and reintegration support. Supplemental long-term arrangements were to be identified.
- MDRP assistance for female EXCs include guarantee of equal access to reinsertion and reintegration benefits, gender-responsive arrangements at demobilization facilities, provision of gender specific health care, etc.
- The MDRP adopted the Cape Town principles and associated definitions of child soldiers, and integrated into the national programs of Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC.

- Women and children are often under-reported at the front end of the process, partly as this is usually done by agencies not financed by MDRP, but also because these groups often do not come forward. The suggested strategy was (i) improve identification and inclusion of these groups; (ii) ensure child and women friendly environments exist at the earliest possible point of the D&R process; (iii) link up with social assistance programs for longer-term care. MDRP would seek to reach agreement with authorities and rebel factions on criteria to apply, sensitize peacekeeping forces and national armies on screening procedures, seek presence of specialized agencies and/or staff (female soldiers) at point of in-take.
- Targeted assistance to EXCs can raise issues with respect to access, exclusion, and equity *vis-à-vis* other war-affected groups. Since these issues may vary widely by country context, they should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

### Box 3.1: Terms and Understandings.

DDR concepts can be used differently by various parties:

**Demobilization** is the process in which combatants leave/disband the armed forces/groups and begin transiting to civilian life. This involves selection, preparation of assembly areas; planning of logistics; resource mobilization; select those to be demobilized; cantonment and registration; disarmament; needs assessment; provision of services; pre-discharge counseling; discharge and transport to home areas. The MDRP did not include disarmament so the strategy had a slightly different definition (i) assembly in discharge centers (cantonment); (ii) verification of EXC status and provision of non-transferable ID cards; (iii) capture of socio-economic data; (iv) pre-discharge orientation for transition to civilian life; (v) health screening and voluntary HIV/Aids counseling and testing; (vi) addressing the special needs of female and child ex-combatants; and (vii) facilitation of transport to areas of return.

**Reinsertion:** transitional assistance to help EXCs with their immediate needs after being demobilized, such as food, clothes, shelter, medical services, provision of kits and tools and short-term training, or employment. The MDRP strategy defined it as a transitional safety net and assistance would be provided for a limited period following their return to civilian life. This would typically be to cover the basic needs of an EXC household for a period of 6-12 months (World Bank 2002a, para 154).

**Reintegration** allows EXCs and their families to re-enter civilian life through gaining employment and income, and socially through settling into the communities and being accepted, so includes both social and economic aspects. The MDRP strategy notes that ‘the national programs would provide economic and social reintegration assistance to help ex-combatants establish sustainable livelihoods .... in different forms, including micro-projects; vocational training, ... apprenticeship schemes and educational opportunities; employment; housing; provision of seeds and tools; and facilitation of access to land. Where necessary, social reintegration assistance would seek to foster reconciliation’ (para. 156). The principles of reintegration in the MDRP strategy were individual choice of community of settlement; and individual choice of reintegration support (annex D, p.64).

Reintegration can target individual EXCs or communities, or both. Targeting individuals means that only EXCs (and usually their families) receive assistance. When communities are included incentives and support are also given to communities so that it is not only EXCs that are seen to be benefiting from the program. The MDRP did not target communities though some Special Projects included a community approach, such as those for Child soldiers in the DRC and the PRAC in the CAR.

The UN Secretary General’s Report on the role of UN peacekeeping in DDR states that reintegration ‘frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons; economic development at the community and national level; infrastructure rehabilitation; truth and reconciliation efforts; and institutional reform.’(para. 6 c, 11 February 2000, S/2000/101). The Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) follows this, and the EU largely uses the UN definitions of DDR (<http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/framework.php> and [http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU\\_Joint\\_concept\\_DDR.pdf](http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU_Joint_concept_DDR.pdf)). However, both the IDDRS standards and those of the EU were developed and adopted during the lifespan of the MDRP, not prior to it.

## 4 Financing and Governance

*Funding* for the MDRP came from two sources: (i) donors that provided funding through an MDTF, and (ii) IDA funding, largely grants but also a credit to Rwanda. The MDRP had four bodies to *govern, advise and inform* the parties. All partners of the MDRP were members of the *Advisory Committee* (AC) while the *Trust Fund Committee* (TFC) was made up of the contributing donors. The *Technical Coordination Group* (TCG) consisted of the national DDR bodies. During the period when Special Projects were processed, *Local Ad-hoc Committees* (LACs) were established in the relevant partner countries to ensure local participation and ownership in decision making.

The Bank was *Trustee* for the MDTF and administrator for the MDRP, and hired the management and technical staff for the MDRP *Secretariat*.

The program was originally to run till June 2007, but at the TFC meeting in London in November 2005 it was agreed to extend the program to 2009 to allow for the completion of the national programs.

### 4.1 MDRP Funding

The MDRP Strategy estimated that the program would cost USD 500 million. Donors were to contribute USD 350 million and IDA the remaining USD 150 million. The program was to consist of four components: (i) national programs, (ii) special projects, (iii) regional activities, and (iv) program management (World Bank 2002a, p. 22).

In the end, five national programs, 11 special projects and three MDRP-related projects were implemented in the seven participating countries at a total cost of USD 451 million: USD 260 million from donors through the MDTF plus USD 191 million from IDA, though where IDA later added a further USD 50 million for the DRC program.

The two funding sources provided flexibility to the MDRP as the IDA funds were to finance national programs while the MDTF could in addition pay for special projects; regional activities; and management and monitoring of the overall program.

Program implementation units of the national governments were generally responsible for the overall management of national programs, and the recipients of MDTF grants. Partner governments, UN agencies and other organizations acted as executing agencies and grant recipients for special projects, and the World Bank was responsible for executing regional activities and program management under the MDTF.

Grant agreements were prepared between the World Bank as MDTF administrator, and the recipients. These agreements applied the same financial management and procurement guidelines and procedures as the parallel IDA grants /credits. In the case of special projects, standard procedures applied with modifications for some UN and NGO projects due to the special nature of the recipient and the emergency nature of D&R operations.

The rationale for the MDRP as a consolidated funding mechanism was to ensure timely and adequate funding to eligible countries; predictable, comprehensive and well coordinated donor support to the national programs; facilitate the involvement of donors that might otherwise not be able to participate; minimize duplication of efforts; reduce the

administrative burden on governments through coordination of donor funding and the application of one set of implementation procedures; and strengthen program ownership on the part of governments. Due to the nature of DDR, national programs required intensive supervision. In addition to MDRP staff, financial management and procurement specialists were members of supervision teams. In addition donors participated in Joint Supervision Missions (JSMs).

The total receipts of the MDRP came to nearly **USD 452 million**, as shown in table 4.1:

**Table 4.1: MDRP Total Receipts** as of end 2009

<b>Funding Agency</b>	<b>In donor currency</b>	<b>In USD</b>
Belgium	EUR 10,007,938	10,992,483
Canada	CND 24,499,910	19,475,901
Denmark	DKK 26 872,000	4,033,720
European Commission	EUR 20,000,000	22,764,000
Finland	EUR 1,000,000	1,356,450
France	EUR 2,000,000	2,078,600
Germany	EUR 10,684,966	13,994,288
Ireland	EUR 500,000	659,550
Italy	EUR 1,500,000	1,714,050
Netherlands	EUR 103,000,000	125,831,219
Norway	NOK 45,000,000	6,875,376
Sweden	SEK 60,000,000	8,260,619
United Kingdom	USD 35,000,000	35,000,000
<b>Total Donor Contribution</b>		<b>253,036,256</b>
<b>Investment Income</b>		<b>7,214,774</b>
<b>Total Trust Fund Receipts</b>		<b>260,251,030</b>
IDA		191,384,533
<b>Total</b>		<b>451,635,563</b>

Source: MDRP Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter 2008, table 2/ MDRP Final ICM May 2010

MDRP total disbursement amounted to nearly USD 454 million, of which USD 370 million financed national programs (82%) and USD 55 million Special projects (12%). MDRP disbursements by source of funding (MDTF and IDA) are shown in Table 4.2 below.

The one financial problem the MDRP faced was a formal over-commitment of the trust fund, which came in 2005. The DRC national program was approved by the Bank and donors but formally without sufficient trust fund balances, while the Bank's rules are that it cannot commit funds before they are available. For IDA operations this is not an issue since these funds are monitored by the financial management system. Trust funds, however, were not part of that system, with each TF managed on its own, and for MDTFs the rule is that funds have to be paid-in and not exist simply as pledges. When the Bank's accounting department realized the discrepancy, it raised the alarm, and Bank management took a rather dim view of the incident despite the program having been cleared by all relevant departments. Within the Bank this gave the MDRP a reputation for lax oversight and controls, something one senior Bank manager felt was undeserved and a defensive over-reaction to cover up the embarrassing fact that the Bank did not have rigorous systems in place to manage trust funds. Since donors had guaranteed the funding, there was never a danger of the Bank



facing uncovered obligations and the MDRP eventually closed with a USD 9 million surplus. This incident, however, contributed to the Bank deciding to integrate TFs into the overall financial management system, thus averting future problems of this kind.

**Table 4.2: MDRP Estimated Cost and Actual Disbursement as of 30 June 2009:**

Country	Estimated Cost	MDTF		IDA	Totals
		Natl Programs	Special Projects		
Angola	112,500,000	20,711,832	4,245,592	33,691,833	58,649,257
Burundi	90,000,000	29,171,408	3,474,016	29,318,586	61,964,010
CAR	3,000,000	0	9,727,000	0	9,727,000
DRC	120,000,000	90,550,444	33,303,769	96,208,544	225,437,612
ROC	12,000,000	13,298,226	0	0	13,298,226
Namibia	4,500,000	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	52,000,000	13,601,864	0	29,147,689	42,749,689
Uganda	37,500,000	0	4,143,066	0	4,143,066
Zimbabwe	15,000,000	0	0	0	0
Sub-totals	<b>446,500,000</b>	<b>167,333,774</b>	<b>54,893,443</b>	<b>188,366,652</b>	<b>410,593,869</b>
Spec projects	<b>37,500,000</b>				
Regional Activities	<b>5,500,000</b>	<b>2,362,580</b>			<b>2,362,580</b>
Program Management	<b>8,400,000</b>	<b>24,930,694</b>			<b>24,930,694</b>
Trust Fund Admin fee	<b>2,100,000</b>	<b>1,548,098</b>			<b>1,548,098</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>500,000,000</b>	<b>250,451,183</b>		<b>191,384,533</b>	<b>439,435,241</b>

Sources: Estimated Cost: Regional Strategy (25 March 2005); MDRP Secretariat, except for CAR & IDA: MDRP Progress Report 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2008.

Estimated and actual costs by eligible MDRP countries are shown in table 4.2. As can be seen, over half the funding – about 55% - went to finance activities in the DRC.

Program management costs were originally estimated at USD 10.5 million over the program period of five years, representing 2.1% of total funding. The actual costs rose substantially in response to partners' demands for more presence on the ground, more technical staff to advise national programs, and the two-year program extension. In the end, program management took about USD 26.5 million, or just above 5.8% of the total.

## 4.2 Advisory Committee

The MDRP Strategy notes that *“An MDRP Advisory Committee would be established to help ensure the MDRP’s links to the overall peace process and to facilitate the participation of key stakeholders in the program’s planning and implementation. The MDRP/AC would comprise national governments, all interested donor representatives, key UN partners including MONUC, representatives of regional bodies such as SADC and the OUA/AU, and an NGO representative....The MDRP/AC would meet every six months to (i) review progress under the*

MDRP; (ii) review the work program for the upcoming period; and (iii) discuss the eligibility of new proposed national programs for MDRP support” (World Bank 2002a, paras 130-131).

The meeting in Paris in April 2002 was termed a ‘Partners Meeting’ while the following meeting in November 2002 in the Hague was the first formal AC and TFC meetings. They had been immediately preceded by a TCG meeting. The structure of having the AC and TFC meet in sequence, sometimes coupled with a TCG meeting, has been maintained throughout.

Counting the Paris 2002 meeting, the AC has met a total of ten times, of which only once in Africa (Kinshasa in November 2003), and the last one in Washington (March 2009). All the other meetings have been held in Europe.

The agendas have been far-reaching but focusing on three areas: (i) understanding the MDRP in the larger regional political context, (ii) discussing the links to related processes and programs, both upstream (SSR, policy reforms, peace processes) and downstream (reintegration, economic development, community involvement), and (iii) operational issues, both general and specific country issues (see box 4.1).

#### **4.2.1 Addressing Operational Issues**

A key question has been defining the boundaries for MDRP funding. Already at the April 2002 meeting questions were raised about geographic coverage (should Sudan be included since it was key to the Uganda situation?) and beneficiary definitions: should the MDRP limit its funding and thus the benefits of the program only to the EXCs and their families and leave out potential recruits to the armed groups (unemployed youth) and communities – both those in which EXCs wanted to resettle, and those that had suffered at the hands of the armed groups? The discussion regarding individual versus community benefits has been raised several times, and while the MDRP has funded both, there has been a clear preference for individual (EXC and family) beneficiaries, in line with the document presented to the AC in November 2003 (see Box 3.1 *Terms and Understandings*).

#### **4.2.2 Addressing Political Issues**

The ACs have constituted a useful forum for discussing larger regional issues, such as the links between DDR and SSR; how DDR programs can be made more sustainable through links to development and political processes and programs; etc. The discussions were often based on papers commissioned by the Secretariat, such as where discussions on COFS resulted in analytical work commissioned by MDRP on the dynamics of foreign and local armed groups in the DRC. But the AC has for the most part functioned as a forum for exchanging views, largely in line with intention, so with limited follow-up and follow-through.

### **4.3 Trust Fund Committee**

The TFC was the decision making body of the MDRP’s MDTF – the IDA grants were handled by the Bank according to its own rules, but information on these funds were always available so that the two funding streams could be considered jointly. The TFC thus monitored budget and expenditure streams of the MDRP, and approved the MDTF funding for national programs and special projects.

#### Box 4.1: Advisory Committee (AC) Meetings

**April 2002, Paris:** The meeting discussed the updated MDRP Strategy and a range of ideas regarding MDRP tasks: whether Sudan should be included; if the MDRP should target unemployed youth; the importance of MDRP beneficiaries not being responsible for war crimes. Partners wanted the Bank “ensure that the MDRP Secretariat has adequate staffing capacity to fulfill its responsibilities, including social impact monitoring” and “stressed the importance and challenge of supporting the longer-term social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Several partners emphasized the importance of community-based approaches to reintegration” (AC April 2002, minutes paras. 11-12).

**November 2002, the Hague:** The meeting discussed the first Joint Supervision Mission (JSM) which affirmed the principles underlying the MDRP: conditions for country program aid, need for national ownership, and MDRP as the only trust fund for DDR. There were concerns about slow progress on the Special Projects in the DRC, and thus a request for a permanent MDRP presence in Kinshasa.

**April 2003, Paris:** The AC noted the approval of the first Special Project in the DRC but of greater importance was that procedures had been cleared so that future projects could be processed faster. More active involvement of the MDRP on the ground in Burundi had resulted in better quality analysis. The previous recommendation of a permanent presence in DRC should be generalized across all MDRP countries and links with political processes stressed: “more in-depth political analysis... in collaboration with local partner representatives, would further enhance the quality of national programs and other MDRP activities... also requested that the Secretariat prepare a discussion paper on the linkages between DDR and SSR ... [and] prepare an options paper on how the MDRP might help in addressing the needs of [non-combatant women, children and disabled]... through linkages with humanitarian, reconstruction and other recovery efforts” (AC April 2003, minutes para 10).

**November 2003, Kinshasa:** The meeting reviewed national policies and DDR programs; progress of implementation and findings of the JSM; papers on links between DDR and SSR; and targeting of MDRP support: “...need to seek and advocate linkages with efforts in support of war-affected groups not covered under the MDRP financing.. and the recommendation to apply community- and area-based reintegration strategies where feasible was reaffirmed” (AC November 2003, minutes para. 11).

**May 2004, Brussels:** Partners wanted a focus on regional activities and support to cross-border sensitization and repatriation activities. The UN briefed on the preparations for a GLR conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development, highlighting “the importance of national ownership of the process, the role of civil society representatives” (AC May 2004, minutes paras 11, 14).

**February 2005, Paris:** The main item was the MTR (see main text). The destabilizing factor of 41,000 COFS, especially in eastern DRC, was raised, and the need for partnership with the UN in addressing this. The UN noted the option of forcible disarmament was not feasible due to lack of mandate and force size. Some parties cautioned the MDRP on issues where diplomatic efforts were ongoing. DDR in Africa and how MDRP could share its lessons with the development community was addressed.

**November 2005, London:** The diverse nature of country circumstances and practical problems of implementing DDR activities in fragile states as well as the continued slow progress on the COFS issue was noted. A special session on MDRP in the wider context of peace and security was held.

**November 2006, Paris:** The meeting returned to the DDR-SSR links, noting the Bank’s limited ability to engage in SSR, while also discussing the necessary links between DDR and transitional justice.

**December 2007, Paris:** Focus was on three MDRP tasks: (i) accelerate implementation; (ii) plan the exit; (iii) consolidate learning from MDRP. The main political theme was a presentation by EU Special Rep for the GLR discussing the conflict in the DRC and its massive civilian displacement and sexual violence. He stressed the need for a solution to peace that incorporates diplomatic, political and developmental tools, the importance of the MDRP over the next two years and the need to think beyond. The need for comprehensive approaches that align political, security, humanitarian and development elements early on was raised, but partners noted the difficulty of executing such longer term complementary activities in early post-conflict environments.

**March 2009, Washington:** The final AC meeting was preceded by a “reflection workshop” with many of those who set up the MDRP, followed by a DDR Forum to assess the state of knowledge on DDR. The AC was followed by a half-day TFC (for the donors) and TCG (for the African partners). Focus of the AC meeting was the final reports from partners on achievements on the ground, a historical overview of the conflict in the region, as well as the Secretariat’s assessment of MDRP achievements.



The more difficult issues that the TFC had to deal with were the possible budget short-falls, the mis-management of funds in the DRC program, and the threat to MDRP financing with the possibility of the withdrawal of some Dutch funds.

At the November 2006 meeting, the TFC discussed what had been identified as a projected funding short-fall. An estimated additional USD 82 million was required to fund existing commitments. In addition came further program activities foreseen in the DRC, Uganda and for expanded program management, estimated at a further USD 48 million. This would have brought the total cost of the MDRP to USD 542 million. Furthermore, even at the existing program commitment level, the MDTF would encounter a cash-flow short-fall in early 2007. Donors assured the Bank they would provide necessary funding.

TFC members expressed concerns regarding management and fiduciary control in the DRC when ineligible expenditures came to light. In the end CONADER was disbanded and a smaller management unit was established where KPMG handled accounting, and the government refunded the ineligible expenditures.

A disagreement over the direction and dynamics of the DRC program led the Dutch to want to reclaim funds for direct bilateral application rather than through the MDRP. High-level engagement on all sides ensured that the MDRP commitments remained intact, but pointed to the vulnerability of MDTFs to political shifts in donor priorities.

A special meeting of the TFC was held in May 2008 to discuss in particular the MDRP exit strategy. Of the three options presented, the parties agreed to the so-called "Transition model", whereby country-specific trust funds would be set up in those countries where this was advised, while a small-scale Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) which would ensure that regional issues could still be funded.

At the end of the MDRP program, a final TFC meeting in Paris in June 2009 walked through the fiscal picture, ensuring the parties that the program had come in on budget, that the limited unspent donor funds could largely be applied in follow-on activities, and that overall donors had been kept fully in the picture and were able to report back on fiscal and performance results that fulfilled mutual fiduciary obligations.

#### 4.4 Technical Coordination Group

The Technical Coordination Group (TCG) was an information-sharing and learning body set up to service the partner countries in Africa. The Secretariat serviced the TCG by organizing and funding the events, and participated with own staff, both to contribute and to interact with local partners. Events were either stand-alone workshops in the region, or took place in conjunction with AC/TFC meetings.

Much of the value of the TCG meetings was the implicit learning and networking that took place. The CAR delegations fairly quickly realized that they were the only country that did not have a strong say in the implementation of their D&R program, and used this to push their demands for a stronger voice in the PRAC, for example.

The trust that was built through these meetings was helpful in other ways. The so-called Pretoria Accords between DRC and Rwanda regarding the DDR of Rwandan COFS in the eastern DRC were signed at the time of the first TCG meeting in Luanda in July-August 2002. Informal talks during the TCG led subsequently to a September meeting hosted by MDRP in

Nairobi between the parties and with MONUC and UNDP, both of whom had been at the Luanda workshop.

#### **Box 4.2: Technical Coordination Group Meetings**

**July-Aug 2002, Luanda:** A first four-day TCG meeting included 13 staff from all seven countries. DDR experts from Chad, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone presented experiences from their countries as background to discussions on how to organize D&R programs in the GLR.

**August 2003, Kibuye:** A workshop was held to discuss monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and the setting up of Management Information Systems (MIS) to register and analyze M&E data.

**February 2004:** A study tour to Sierra Leone included staff from all the MDRP partners except the DRC, to understand better the Sierra Leone experience in demobilizing and reintegration EXCs.

**September 2004, Kigali:** The RDRC hosted a meeting with delegations from Burundi and Uganda to share experiences.

**Oct-Nov 2005, Kigali:** The workshop discussed the gender dimension, with support from UNIFEM and MDRP consultants, with several gender-based studies as inputs.

**June 2006, Luanda:** Five countries sent staff to look at Angola's results on reintegration.

The MDRP Secretariat then organized a meeting for technical delegations from Rwanda and DRC in Nairobi 16-20 September 2002 with UNDP and MONUC present, to develop comprehensive implementation of the DD and repatriating of Rwandese armed groups from DRC. Rwanda invited delegation from DRC to visit and see their program (MDRP QPR 2002-Q3).

**November 2006, Paris:** The TCG discussed experiences and ideas on key cross-regional issues:

*Children Associated with Fighting Forces:* Focus was on updating and strengthening the Cape Town Principles, the role of the new Principles in MDRP-supported programs and "best practices" developed within MDRP-supported programs for working with children.

*Strengthening Gender Work in the MDRP:* The key themes were the need to develop a conceptual framework on gender and DDR, and to establish a forum through which to collate, discuss and disseminate experiences with gender and DDR within MDRP.

*Re-thinking DDR:* Seeing DDR from both conflict management and development perspectives had participants reflect on DDR, security and peace-building within a wider framework of governance, justice and economic and social well-being/development.

*DDR and National Ownership:* three case studies addressed the concept of national ownership: Angola's experience with engaging formerly opposing groups; the ROC's experience with engaging parliamentarians and Uganda's experience of working with civil society organizations

**June 2007, Kigali:** The challenge of psycho-social trauma among EXCs and how to address this at individual and community levels was the main topic.

**November 2007, Paris:** The session discussed and shared experiences on working with the World Bank and to learn more about the Bank's policies and procedures, mandate and priorities within the Africa Region; and to present and discuss creative leadership in the context of DDR programs. Following this, the MDRP held its first one-day Learning Seminar (see Box 5.1).

**March 2009, Washington:** An expanded *DDR Policy Forum* with TCG, full AC and external resources persons discussed the status of knowledge on key DDR issues: global policy on conflict, security, fragile states and future DDR programming; the early recovery challenge of balancing needs of EXCs vs. victims of violence vs. constructing the foundations for peace; the debate on alternative approaches to reintegration; and regional modalities to address fragile states and regional conflicts.

## 4.5 The Secretariat

The MDRP Secretariat to begin with consisted of an MDRP manager, a trust fund (TF) administrator, a communications officer and an operations analyst supported by four DDR experts. The Secretariat was based in Washington, with two of the DDR staff posted to the

region. Bank task managers were sought to manage D&R operations and the group broadly comprised the MDRP Secretariat. As time went on, the Secretariat was strengthened with more staff in Washington and in the field.

#### *4.5.1 The MDRP Program Managers*

The first MDRP manager had been responsible for preparing the regional strategy, with good connections to the donors, the UN agencies, the partners in the region, and inside the Bank. The TF administrator was also a known DDR adviser. A year later, however, the MDRP manager moved to a different region, so the TF administrator acted as an interim manager for about a year. Then the country manager in Burundi was made the new MDRP manager, a post he kept for about a year, before in April 2005, a new MDRP manager took over and remained in post till the program ended in June 2009.

These four MDRP managers were seen to represent different approaches to the program. The first manager had the grand strategic vision and partnership strongly in mind, pushed actors to develop national plans and get the machinery in place required for implementation. His successor, while noting that he was only an interim manager, focused on getting the nuts and bolts in place to make the program function according to rules and accountability principles. The next manager had long field experience, where some informants felt there was closer attention to realities on the ground and a return to a more inclusive and listening style. The final manager was given the task of tightening procedures and clean up what was felt had become too vague a control of a difficult program, to repair the damage to donor relations following the mid-term review, and address staffing issues in the Secretariat.

The most recent MDRP management presented a work program that emphasized activities on the ground, but also had a strong communication and dissemination program as well as stepping up the number of studies and knowledge activities. To some, the result of this was improved transparency, more attention to learning with more comprehensive and easily available reporting on a much enhanced web-site. To some UN agencies in particular, it represented the Bank taking over full ownership of the program to the detriment of the larger partnership that it had been founded on, and that more attention was given to addressing donor concerns (see chapter 6).

#### *4.5.2 DDR Advisers and Task Team Leaders*

The DDR advisers were hired through an international recruitment process. 650 candidates applied, and the four selected all had UN backgrounds, though from different UN bodies. The DDR advisers were to provide advice to the national DDR bodies, while Bank staff would be the TTLs and manage the projects and programs that were approved.

This separation of functions ran into problems, principally because D&R activities required a much closer follow-up than normal Bank operations. The usual division of labor between a Bank TTL and the national government that had a loan that was to be supervised did not work in situations where national authorities had little capacity to implement, yet the outcome of the D&R program was dependent on quick response and aggressive implementation. The MDRP ended up hiring more staff, in particular in the DRC, where at one point there were about ten staff tracking the program. They were highly operational, visiting demobilization centers, inspecting training programs, looking into payment systems

and EXC identification cards, and at times pushing and cajoling local officials to move activities along rather than just monitoring and advising.

This activist approach required experience with D&R, and thus the DDR advisers were well placed to take on this TTL role. At the same time, it was also attractive to be a Bank TTL, partly because one thereby had a say in resource use, but also because it made staff more closely integrated into the Bank and hence helpful for a possible longer-term Bank career. DDR advisers were hired on contracts valid for the duration of the MDRP. At the time of hiring the DDR advisers, the message was that the Bank was building its internal DDR skills base, so moving from the UN to the Bank could be interesting from a career point of view.

The training provided to these DDR TTLs on Bank procedures and routines came late in the day, however, which at times led to decisions by them that was at variance with Bank approaches. Some also experienced a “culture clash” with Bank TTLs trained in monitoring at a distance. These TTLs were also not well integrated into the Bank organization, in part since they were hired with MDRP funding so they could not be used on other Bank activities. Even when MDRP was housed in local Bank offices, some MDRP staff felt they were “outsiders”.

## 4.6 Trustee

The World Bank was (i) manager of the MDRP Secretariat, (ii) administrator/trustee of the MDTF that was the vehicle for bilateral funding for the MDRP, (iii) supervising partner in program and project implementation, and (iv) co-funder of MDRP with direct IDA grants.

- As manager of the Secretariat, the Bank had responsibility for MDRP staff and their performance. The Secretariat has always been a clearly distinct body within the Bank, however, and the temporary contracts for most of the staff meant that the MDRP was seen by many in the Bank as a trust fund operation more than a core Bank task.
- On the supervision side, the Bank used supervision missions coupled with collaborative mechanisms like JSMs and in-country coordination meetings with donors and DDR actors. This was criticized by donors as insufficient, leading to an increase in the size of MDRP staff, strengthening of technical assistance to key countries like DRC and Burundi, though the issue of more in-depth quality assurance has been raised in the DRC context (see section 5.4).

The Bank assumed full fiduciary responsibility for the MDTF funds and as such, all MDRP used World Bank rules and procedures. This was one of the reasons the donors had wanted the Bank to take on the administrator role for the MDRP, despite the Bank not necessarily being the most logical host: the UN had a much stronger history and presence in the region, it had a broad DRR mandate, it had UN Security Council resolutions behind its peace keeping operations, and the Bank did not have programs in a couple of the GLR countries at the time of the start-up of the MDRP. But Angola and Rwanda were not happy with the UN’s DDR work in their countries, while the Bank’s IDA-funded DDR in ROC and Uganda did quite well. The Bank’s reputation for sound fiduciary management and strong convening power the bilaterals felt was important in a region of fragile states and sometimes diverging bilateral and multilateral agendas.

The Bank's policies and procedures, as noted in chapter 3, were not well adapted to the fast-changing situations on the ground that the MDRP often was faced with in some key countries. The option of special projects provided some flexibility. A major hurdle was the funding agreements with the UN agencies and NGOs. The delays led to some critical comments at early ACs, though the problems were multi-faceted, including difficult legal concerns on both sides of the table, and a lack of experience and precedent for these forms of collaboration.

Based to a large extent on this experience, the UN and Bank developed a Financial Management Framework Agreement in 2006 that was to overcome the problems and controversies encountered. In the end this was not successful, in part because it did not address a number of the more difficult issues such as procurement, but also because most UN agencies did not agree to sign it.

Two years later, in October 2008, the two multilateral bodies signed a more comprehensive Fiduciary Principles Accord (FPA) for cooperation in post-crisis situations. It provides for mutual acceptance of operational and fiduciary standards and thus simplifies the contracting of UN agencies for MDTF funded activities. It was of course too late for addressing MDRP projects, though it may be helpful to the country-specific MDTFs that are following it.

## 4.7 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

The MDRP succeeded in mobilizing large-scale funds for a program that was politically sensitive, by its nature contained high risk and uncertainty, would be difficult to implement and monitor, could not with any certainty be programmed much in advance, covered a region almost twice the size of Western Europe with seven countries of varying political, economic and security interests to the international community – and yet had to be governed largely by consensus by a partnership consisting of a dozen donors, a host of UN agencies, the African partner countries, and the World Bank.

### 4.7.1 Financing

The donors and the World Bank quickly raised the initial funds required to launch the MDRP. This allowed the program to assure participating African countries that funding would be available as soon as they fulfilled the eligibility criteria. This *financial foundation* was fundamental to the credibility of the program and hence lowered the costs and risks of the countries to commit to a national DDR process – a political decision not always easy to take in a fragile state context.

Donor funding ended up being considerably less than originally expected, and the Netherlands alone contributed half the donor contributions. While the Dutch generosity was critical to the success of the MDRP, a later possible funds withdrawal by the Dutch also revealed the weakness of an MDTF being dependent on a particular donor.

A financial over-commitment by the MDRP in 2005 on the DRC national program was an oversight but formally in breach of Bank policies. The considerable attention given to the incident was out of proportion to the actual issue – the MDRP was never in danger of not being able to fund the program. But it contributed to an improvement of the Bank systems by integrating trust funds into its standard financial management system.



The costs of running the MDRP became much higher than expected, taking nearly 6% of the funding. This, however, reflected the real costs of running a large and complex program under difficult circumstances – the original budget was unrealistically low.

#### 4.7.2 *Advisory Committee*

The AC meetings worked well as a forum for raising policy and management issues. The meetings reflect a wide-ranging agenda, looking both at upstream and downstream concerns. But the AC, as the name says, is an advisory and not a decision making body. The frustration by some is that while the AC could arrive at a common understanding on an issue, the behavior of the partners to the MDRP afterwards could be at variance with this apparent agreement. This was particularly raised with respect to some of the donors, who in the case of the DRC would agree to a line of action in MDRP fora and then in their bilateral dealings with the authorities might present a different position.

As a forum for raising and discussing issues of importance to DDR programs, the AC was useful, and the MDRP funded important studies for debate. But as some donors' *political* commitment to the MDRP receded, as reflected in the level of participation at AC meetings, the importance of the discussions decreased. While the MDRP was never meant to be a political body, it might have become more relevant if its deliberations had shifted from donor capitals to the region as national ownership improved (see later) as the MDRP constituted a fairly permanent forum for key actors in the national security field who established relations of trust. Whether this would have made any difference to more intractable issues such as COFS is questionable, but the fact that *regional* actors such as AU never assumed a stronger role in the AC was probably a weakness.

#### 4.7.3 *Trust Fund Committee*

The TFC was formally only to address issues that affected the MDTF, but in reality looked at the overall financial picture of the MDRP and later the political and operational constraints facing the program given that the AC was seen to represent views and interests that were too conflicting. It was the only decision making body in the MDRP structure, consisting of the donors and the World Bank. While the papers prepared for the TFC were only for the donors, the decisions and minutes from the TFC meetings were distributed with the concomitant AC meeting. A couple of TFC meetings have been held without an AC meeting, including the final one to close the MDRP in June 2009 and agree on the utilization of remaining funds and the follow-up activities to the MDRP.

The lack of voice by recipient partners in TFC decision making was sort of addressed by having the AC take place before the TFC, so policy issues and other matters where dialogue and consensus ought to inform funding decisions could be resolved beforehand. Nonetheless, the dominant voice of the donors in the context of a partnership based mechanism is a problem. The fact that the UN was not a part of the TFC also fuelled a feeling among UN actors that the UN was not seen as a full partner in the MDRP.

#### 4.7.4 *Technical Coordination Group*

The TCG was an experience and information sharing body. It held workshops in the region as well as seminars in connection with AC meetings with external resources, and two full-day Learning Seminars at the end of 2007 and in early 2009.

Several weaknesses of the TCG were pointed to: (i) lack of time for reflection on some of the topics – in particular that not all country experiences were given a chance to be discussed, (ii) too few from each country participated – there was not a possibility of building “critical mass” of skills and knowledge that could have operational impact; (iii) while there was clearly a set of priorities being addressed, such as gender, there was not a more careful long-term agenda or strategic thinking behind the meeting schedule that was to lead to for example achievements in terms of capacity building for DDR.

In the MDRP’s defense national informants admitted that their own ability to participate, to find more eligible participants, and fit the TCG meetings into their own planning cycle and phase of implementation, created major coordination and logistical challenges. While there had been several presentations on a medium-term TCG program, especially as of 2005, the final activity schedule ended up considerably short of the ambitions.

#### 4.7.5 *The Secretariat*

The Secretariat has been the key element in the MDRP, tying the components together, ensuring flow of information, timely decision making and implementation follow-up.

Three managers and thus different styles and priorities during the first three years of the MDRP were not helpful: consistency and clarity suffered. During the last four years, one management has been in charge, with beefed-up capacity on the ground as well as improved information and knowledge management capacities and systems.

The reliance on externally recruited staff that was later given operational responsibilities created challenges for the program. One thing was poor familiarity with Bank procedures among staff on the ground. Equally important was a schism between the cultures of TTLs that worked on DDR, and normal Bank policy-and-procedures style. The management had to support individualistic DDR TTLs get difficult programs to move on the ground while having time to maintain good relations with donors as well as with national DDR bodies that at times did not show much commitment to DDR or lacked the capacity to move fast.

This required a clear yet inclusive management with strong credibility and legitimacy, which should have been conferred by senior Bank management. This has not been in place since the first period, however. While the Bank ended up funding more than planned, the lack of Bank attention to a USD 500 million program in perhaps the most high-risk field the Bank is engaged in, in a politically volatile region of fragile states, is surprising.

#### 4.7.6 *Lessons*

- Donors and the World Bank guaranteed substantial resources to the high-risk MDRP even before any programs were in place. This provided a strong *political* signal to the parties on the ground, which was helpful for mobilizing support for DDR action.
- Pooling of donor resources and making them available under a common set of administrative procedures was a major advantage. The risk of donor volatility was made apparent during the MDRP, however, and needs to be discussed with the donor community.
- The AC and TCG were constructive meeting places for debating policy issues, new ideas and learning. More policy discussions should over time have been moved to the field,

giving more voice to local partners, and more thought and resources given to how to follow up.

- Joint Supervision Missions were a good mutual learning and oversight mechanism that built shared understandings and thus strengthened the partnership. It was demanding to organize, interest and participation from donor capitals decreased over time, while local partner participation could have been stronger.
- The MDRP as an important regional program should have been more visible inside the World Bank organizational structure. The Secretariat itself faced two challenges: Bank staff often reported to Sector Managers making MDRP leadership at times complicated, and many MDRP staff were hired from the outside. The use of external technical expertise strengthens the ability to address multifaceted problems, but these staff had limited knowledge of Bank operating practices. More time and resources should have been invested up front to ensure that such staff are properly trained, integrated and function well in the program context.
- Too little thought at the outset was put into how the Secretariat would function and how complex D&R operations would be managed inside the Bank. The assumption that the Bank would put forward its best TTLs never materialized and even in one case when the Bank responded, the Bank savvy TTL struggled to manage the complex and politically charged operation. The capacity building and technical assistance needs of the countries were not planned for, which left the Secretariat constantly scrambling to bring expertise on board and to train them adequately in Bank operations.
- Over time, location of the Secretariat should have been reviewed. A Secretariat based in the region empowered to engage at policy level with national counterparts and a smaller office back in Washington would be in line with the Bank's decentralization. Especially in a fragile country context where issues may move fast and the ability to take quick decisions may depend on having one's nose close to the ground, a visible and high-level field presence may be helpful.
- Given the complexity, risks and challenges associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected environments, and D&R in particular, the World Bank should review its policies, procedures, instruments and staffing in terms of adequacy for operating and administering such ambitious interventions as an MDRP, and in particular has to commit senior management time to such programs.



## 5 Portfolio Results

The MDRP has funded regional activities, national programs, and special projects. The regional results are discussed in chapter 7 while national efforts are discussed below.

### 5.1 Country-level D&R Results

The expected results from the use of MDRP funds were to be presented in each country's results frameworks (RFs). These RFs form the backdrop for the core results monitoring that has taken place (Annex D presents country RFs, Annex E the country backgrounds). The RFs are in some respects fairly different, as a function of the nature of the underlying conflicts:

- **Angola** fought a large-scale 20-year civil war where the cross-border dimension was marginal (though Angola was engaged in the DRC). The death of Unita-leader Savimbi paved the way for the implementation of a comprehensive national DDR program.
- **Burundi** faced a complex political and security picture where the DDR process went in phases due to the large number of groups involved.
- **CAR** experienced small-scale security challenges in the capital, with no real armed opposition through some cross-border and ethnic-based banditry and unrest.
- **DRC** was the country with the largest, most complex, and devastating set of conflicts, where the cross-border interventions by many of its neighbors aided conflicting parties. The issue of COFS was a major DRC concern, apart from trying to address the various internal schisms, which varied from one part of this vast country to another.
- In **ROC** the open conflict ended nearly 10 years earlier when EXCs self-demobilized but wanted their compensation packages to "seal the deal". The unrest in the central Pool region was to be addressed to demobilize both the youth groups there (the "ninjas") and government armed forces. There was no real cross-border aspect.
- **Rwanda** was continuing its national DDR program, where Rwandese COFS in DRC remained a difficult issue throughout the program period.
- **Uganda's** fight with the LRA had its cross-border dimension with Sudan and thus not linked with the GLR conflict. With Uganda's agreement with Sudan, the LRA has moved west and is now enmeshed in the eastern DRC unrest.

The D&R programs were to support EXCs in general, but with attention to particular vulnerable groups: child soldiers, and female, war-wounded and HIV/Aids affected EXCs.

#### 5.1.1 Demobilization

The main achievement for the MDRP as a whole has undoubtedly been the demobilization of the former combatants. All seven country programs focused on reaching the target groups, and carried out demobilization programs to ensure that the EXCs were identified and given access to demobilization benefits, though actual results vary.

Table 5.1 shows the numbers that have been demobilized. The *degree* to which all eligible combatants received full D&R entitlements varied in some countries, especially among the last to be demobilized. The typical reason was that a program ran out of time and thus had to

simplify the support made available by reducing the time provided for training, the range of training opportunities available, or transformed benefits from in-kind to cash payments.

In **Angola**, despite many institutional challenges, the project demobilized most of the 105,000 EXCs envisioned, including 100% of the UNITA beneficiary caseload. The 33,000 members of the Angola Armed Forces (FAA) soldiers were not demobilized as planned. Although significant preparatory work was carried out, the demobilization of the FAA only began on a pilot basis, with 278 processed over the life of the project. The delays were attributed to problems in establishing proper opportunities for the large number of disabled among those to be demobilized, the challenges of the severely disabled and those with chronic illnesses, political concerns about the release of a fairly large number of disabled veterans in the run up to national elections, and expectations of support from the disabled in excess of what the program had planned for. The ADRP was reformulated to remove the FAA demobilization from the project, and the MDRP grant was reduced from USD 48.4 million to USD 30.3 million.

**Table 5.1: Summary of demobilized EXCs as of end 2008**

Countries	Targets*	Results	Percentage of achievement
Angola	105 000	97 390	93%
Burundi	55 000	26,283	48%
Central African Rep.	7 565	7556	100%
DemRep of Congo	150,000	102 014	68%
Rwanda	36 000	29 764	83%
Republic of Congo	11 000	0	0%
Uganda	15 310	16 256	106%
<b>Total</b>	<b>379 875</b>	<b>279 263</b>	<b>74%</b>

\* The original targets were often based on uncertain guesstimates at the time of the design of the MDRP.

Source: MDRP Quarterly Progress Report October-December 2008.

In **Burundi**, the original target of 55,000 was all along known to be unrealistically high, but another reason less than half the original target was reached was the delays in the negotiations with the last rebel force, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU, whose demobilization only started in April 2009.

In **CAR**, the *Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés* (PRAC) led to the demobilization of a total of 7,565 EXCs, which was the number targeted, broken down across nine different armed groups. Over 86% of the beneficiaries were demobilized in the capital Bangui. While the process had been disappointing, a majority of EXCs expressed satisfaction with the demobilization kit, and the medical check-up and HIV testing were much appreciated, especially by the women.

In **DRC**, 102,014 had been demobilized by the end of 2008 as against a target of 150 000. Demobilization continued through 2009 to allow EXCs to enter ongoing socioeconomic reintegration projects by June 2010. The DRC program has experienced a number of delays due to political and management problems at the national level as well as Government shift in priorities from that of completion of army integration and demobilization to the conflict in

the east (Kivus and Ituri region). The program was provided additional financing to ensure that remaining FARDC troops and eligible militia members were processed for integration or demobilized, which is to contribute to sustained peace and security in the region.

In **ROC** demobilization as well as reinsertion activities performed poorly and were rated highly unsatisfactory in the ICR (ROC ICR June 2009). Of the 11,000 targeted for demobilization, none were demobilized by the close of the project in February 2009 for political reasons. Government-run disarmament operations in the Pool were only launched in February 2009. Due to this, demobilization and reinsertion activities for the 5,000 combatants targeted from the Pool could not be undertaken during the life of the project. The demobilization of 6,000 members of the *Force Publique* also did not take place as the government was reluctant to downsize the national armed forces before the Pool rebels disarmed.

In **Rwanda**, the main objective was to demobilize an estimated 20,000 EXCs from the RDF and 25,000 members of Rwandese armed groups, and support their transition to civilian life. Its achievement is rated moderately satisfactory. The largest number of EXCs who were demobilized and reintegrated during RDRP I & II have been soldiers from FAR and RDF for which quantitative targets have been surpassed.

In **Uganda** the Amnesty Commission (AC), in charge of D&R of rebel forces, faced many challenges in handling the logistics and the task of receiving, screening, verifying and documenting EXCs. This was complicated by delays in launching the support project and the absence of adequate capacity to deal with backlogs even as the process of registering new EXCs continued. Furthermore, the Commission lacked resources to respond to needs on the ground. These constraints were in part due to limited Government support for the Commission, so the AC was ill-equipped to step in when there were emergencies.

A number of technologies were used for issuing ID cards, both to ensure EXCs access to benefits but also to avoid benefits abuse. The most advanced was iris scanning in eastern DRC. Other innovative approaches included doing benefits payments through cell phones since no banking system existed. While the cell phone technology was part of a larger trend, ID cards were often D&R specific undertakings.

### **5.1.2 Reinsertion and Reintegration**

In the MDRP, *reinsertion* was a transitional safety net while *reintegration* is a longer-term process for EXCs and their families to re-enter civilian life and adapt economically (box 3.1).

In **Angola** the first component was to enable 50,000 EXCs and families establish their livelihoods through the provision of agriculture kits and technical support. Almost 90% of the target beneficiaries were reached, and savings realized in implementation allowed the project to support communities, enhancing community reception and social reintegration. Beneficiary interviews showed that 99% live with their families and 94% feel socially reintegrated. The external evaluation undertaken in 2008 noted that, *“in general terms, the social reintegration of EXCs in receiving communities was good and their reintegration did not cause very serious problems. There was generally good collaboration among receiving communities (for example in terms of handing over land to be divided into individual production plots), including for EXCs from other communities in the province and even from other provinces”* (Udelmann and Neves).

In **Burundi**, the reinsertion was efficient but reintegration faced major delays. The main reason was the political process and low implementation capacity. Transitional Subsistence

Allowance was given to all 23,022 (NCDRR, March 2009) but support to EXCs' reintegration into civilian life was flawed, with too many delays from demobilization to reintegration. In 2004-2006, over 80% of EXCs waited 18 months or more for reinsertion support. They spent their money whilst waiting and many ran into debt and sold their reintegration goods. Nearly all EXCs in urban areas were looking for work at the time of the PNDRR evaluation, and some of those living in the rural areas were not earning a living from the chosen activities (PNDRR evaluation, p.23). Reintegration was affected by a stagnant economy and an agricultural sector that could not absorb both EXCs and returning refugees.

In the **CAR**, four successive waves of EXCs went through the reinsertion phase of PRAC. The first received in-kind reinsertion kits according to the training they had chosen, but less than 1,000 EXCs had been reinserted two years into the program. As a result of the subsequent acceleration of activities, the later waves got less choice of training and received their reinsertion kits partially or fully in cash. – The intended support to communities was reduced to only USD 1 million of PRAC's USD 10 million. Little connection was established between community-driven projects and the reinsertion of the EXCs (CAR World Bank 2008). Of the 69 projects planned, 41 were declared completed by PRAC. The most successful ones rebuilt institutions and schools while markets and water fountains were only partially built or renovated. Monitoring of the sub-projects was poor. The evaluation team visited 35 of the 41 projects and found that 17 were completed whereas 18 remained at various stages of completion. The CAR final evaluation identified the lack of involvement of the communities in the implementation of the projects as a principle cause for the shortfall (Clemet et al 2007).

In the **DRC**, reinsertion payments were provided to all 102,014 beneficiaries, but the lack of a functioning banking system led to considerable delays in payments (Ernst & Young 2006). Instead cell phone payments were used, a bold and innovative technology (ICM p. 13). Reintegration assistance was provided to 54% of the demobilized EXCs (DRC ICM). A beneficiary study carried out in 2007 concluded that once back in the home communities 68% achieved basic self-subsistence (MDRP/CONADER 2007). However, the survey suffers from a number of shortcomings that make the numbers questionable (see section 5.3).

One concern raised in the ICM was that reintegration assistance was too individually focused and not tied into other community development assistance projects. The ICM notes that attempts were made to establish such links but without much success as the Bank-financed Social Fund, for example, could not target EXCs since it was based on a first come-first served principle with no prescribed beneficiary groups (DRC ICM, p.14).

At the end of 2009, contracts for reintegration support to adults and children from the fighting forces were still active. Additional support activities for female EXCs have been initiated and steps have been taken to expand this to other geographic areas of the country. Reinsertion cash payments are made in a timely manner and the Minister of Defense has confirmed the revised planning figures for demobilization which ultimately will allow for cost savings to be moved to reintegration activities.

In the **ROC**, socioeconomic reinsertion activities through EXC associations made important contributions to livelihoods and well-being of self-demobilized EXCs: virtually all the 19,000 beneficiaries received ID cards, 80% were active in income generating activity within 12 months and almost all have been assisted to launch an income-generating activity. As the

project did not distribute ID cards until the start of reintegration activities, all beneficiaries received income generating assistance within 12 months of receiving their cards.

**Table 5.2: Summary of Reinsertion and Reintegration Achievements, end 2008**

Countries	Activities	Target	Results	Percentage of achievement
Angola	Reinsertion	62 716	52 721	84%
	Reintegration	133 662	92 297	69%
Burundi *	Reinsertion	35 000	23 022	42%
	Reintegration	35 000	21 012	38%
Central African Republic	Reinsertion	7 565	7 533	100%
	Reintegration	7 565	7 556	100%
Democratic Rep of Congo	Reinsertion	120 000	102 014	85%
	Reintegration	90 000	52 172	58%
Rwanda	Reinsertion	47 400	44 491	94%
	Reintegration	50 000	43 891	88%
Rep. Of Congo	Reinsertion	11 000	0	0%
	Reintegration	30 000	15 179	51%
Uganda	Reinsertion	15 310	14 816	97%
	Reintegration	n.a.	n.a.	---
Total	Reinsertion	298 725	244 597	82%
	Reintegration	346 227	232 107	64%

\*: The figures for Burundi here are not the ones used by MDRP since they used the original figure of 55,000. In order to be consistent with table 5.1, the revised target 35,000 is used here, which also affects the totals.

Source: MDRP Quarterly Progress Report October-December 2008 and own calculations.

Reintegration Support to Communities was not completed as planned but has been quite successful in violence prevention. 33 community infrastructure projects were approved (83% of target), but only 16 were completed. This component was delayed because implementing agency staff were focused on the socio-economic reintegration component, and partly because local community leaders were late in providing a list of suggested community infrastructures to be rehabilitated.

In **Rwanda**, the project was to support the social and economic reintegration of all EXCs demobilized in stage II and all stage I EXCs who were socio-economically vulnerable. The achievements are rated as Satisfactory: RDRP II social reintegration has been supported at community level, which has been improved by social reintegration interventions, including sensitization of the host community; assessment of community and EXCs' perceptions of the other; and targeting some of the community in economic reintegration activities.

Overall, EXCs' living conditions improved significantly. However, a number of interventions came late during RDRP II, so posed limitations on the quality of the vocational training and especially on the innovative apprenticeship training. But these initiatives helped focus on the need for skills-training and the development of formalized apprenticeship training in



Rwanda. This has been further strengthened by the government giving priority to policies and legislation that are instrumental in creating supportive institutional structures.

In **Uganda** the Amnesty Commission almost reached the target of distributing benefits to 15,310 reporters, but there were many inconsistencies in the way reinsertion packages were provided. As a result, many who were entitled to receive packages may not have. The bulk of ACSP funding went for the cost of the packages leaving insufficient resources to strengthen the delivery mechanisms. Distribution was seen as a logistical operation and thus was not sufficiently child friendly or sensitive to the needs of the abused population.

While the Amnesty Commission had a clear mandate to support reintegration, there was little support to enable it to play this role effectively. Packages were to be a stop-gap measure until reporters could access other forms of assistance and economic opportunities that would allow them to become self-sufficient. In practice, these forms of assistance that vulnerable reporters required were often not forthcoming. Adequate procedures for referral, tracking and monitoring were not established, nor was the AC able to provide effective strategic oversight of and direction to its implementing partners. This reflected in part the lack of in-house capacity, largely because the government did not fulfill commitments in terms of staffing and funding. According to the draft evaluation report *“Overall, therefore, the ACSP had a relatively positive impact on some Reporters’ ability to reintegrate back into society. But there were many ex-combatants who fell between the cracks and remain economically vulnerable today.”*

### 5.1.3 Female Ex-Combatants

Female ex-combatants were a particular target group for the MDRP. National programs were to report on achievements by gender, and the MDRP was tasked to monitor implementation of the program on partners of ex-combatants and women in communities of return and bring emerging problems to the attention of the respective authorities

A TCG workshop on gender was held in Kigali on 31 October-2 November 2005, followed by a MDRP publication, *“Taking a Gender Perspective to Strengthen the MDRP in the greater Great Lakes Region”* (2005). Partners felt the MDRP should do more to engender DDR programs. At the AC meeting in November 2006, partners asked for a conceptual framework on gender and DDR and a forum established to discuss and disseminate experiences within MDRP. In response, the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace (LEAP) Program was launched with Danish funding in August 2007. The LEAP program included TA to national programs and projects; pilots to explore innovative ways to strengthening D&R and gender approaches, and studies and knowledge dissemination on Gender and D&R. Donors also contributed directly to the gender discussion, such as where the Netherlands commissioned a study on child-mothers in Northern Uganda (2006).

The actual results regarding demobilization of female EXCs were considered disappointing. A total of just under 10,000 are registered, where the relative *share* of female EXCs varied considerably across countries (see table 5.3).

One problem was the under-reporting of female EXCs, but where the issue of the distinction between genuine combatants and Women Associated with Fighting Forces (WAFFs) has also come up, since in most national programs WAFFs did not qualify for benefits. This was in part because eligible female EXCs did not want to come forward for fear of being stigmatized. Another problem was that most programs did not create favorable conditions and had not trained staff to receive and support female EXCs as a particular beneficiary



group. While the MDRP did produce a number of gender-based studies early in the program, this was not translated into practical approaches within most of the programs.

The low absolute and relative number of female EXCs does not reveal the extent of the problem, however, nor the short-comings in the actual services offered. While gender was to be an MDRP focus area, D&R services for female EXCs were generally unsatisfactory.

**Table 5.3: Female Ex-Combatants Demobilized**

	No of female EXCs	Total no of EXCs	Female EXCs as share of country total
Angola	3 338	97 390	3.4%
Burundi	516	26 283	2.0%
CAR	1 176	7 556	15.6%
DRC	2 610	102 014	2.6%
ROC	2 165	19 588	11.1%
Rwanda	65	29 764	0.2%
Uganda	2 141	16 256	13.2%

Source: MDRP Statistical Progress Report October 2008, table 2; Govt ROC 2009a p. 7.

Once in place, LEAP contributed to mainstreaming gender into DDR programs through training on gender to gender focal points and project staff. This was provided to the ADRP in Angola, TA was provided to mainstream gender in Burundi, it identified pilot projects for additional support to vulnerable EXCs in the DRC and developed technical guidelines in Uganda. The LEAP program has carried out studies, followed by publications, on structural unemployment, young men, masculinities and conflict in Angola, gender-based violence and on youth, exclusion and gender in conflict settings (Peeters et al 2008a, 2008b, Olinger et al 2009).

Evaluations of national programs note that a number of programs provided equal support to both female and male EXCs. But in Burundi the evaluation notes that female and disabled EXCs received insufficient support and were marginalized in the reintegration process, especially in rural areas. In Uganda, the standardized approach to reinsertion meant contents of packages were not appropriate for the women. Moreover, the MDRP Study on Female EXCs states that more gender-sensitive training is needed to promote sustainable livelihoods for female EXCs and that women's health issues are often overlooked (Dissemination Note #5).

#### 5.1.4 Child Soldiers

The issue of child soldiers attracted considerable attention. Special projects for child soldiers were established in DRC and Burundi, and a lot of efforts went into releasing children from armed groups and supporting their reinsertion and reintegration. A couple of projects furthermore had as an objective to prevent re-recruitment of former child soldiers.

In the **DRC**, four special projects focused on child soldiers. They succeeded in removing over 30,000 child soldiers from armed groups, which was a major success. The children were then taken care of by UN agencies or NGOs and subsequently assisted back into civilian life.

In **Burundi** a special project implemented by UNICEF succeeded in demobilizing and reinserting over 3,200 children, a higher number than anticipated. The independent Review found that the project fell short of its stated goals, however, particularly when it came to

assuring the long term educational and training capacity of the children. It has not delivered adequate vocational training, educational assistance, psychosocial assistance, protection interventions or recruitment prevention activities. The end of country program evaluation also underlines the difficulties in sustainable reintegration of child EXCs.

**Table 5.4: Child Soldiers Demobilized**

	Female	Male	Total number
Angola	n.a.	n.a.	13 804
Burundi	49	3,212	3,261
CAR	9	14	23
DRC	n.a.	n.a.	30,219
ROC	n.a.	n.a.	348
Rwanda	2	669	671
Uganda	1,778	3,776	5,554

Source: Monthly Progress Report October 2008, table 2; MDRP final ICM table 10.

Even if the vast majority of child soldiers no longer are combatants, the longer-term traumatic impact of their experiences remains to be understood. The level of support they received appears to have been quite variable. On the other hand, assistance to institutional development on the issue of child EXCs has been fruitful. The MDRP funded efforts led by UNICEF to strengthen the legislation and approach to child soldiers in the DRC by helping the government adopt and use the Cape Town standards and their improvements.

### 5.1.5 Disabled and HIV/Aids-affected Ex-Combatants

Support to disabled and HIV/Aids affected EXCs varied across countries, but as with female EXCs support was limited in most cases. There was, however, a distinct difference in support, as countries that had stronger governments and more resources and were well advanced into the post-recovery phase, such as Angola and Rwanda, provided much more support than weaker governments with less resources to address D&R.

In **Angola**, disabled EXCs represented a large sub-group in need of ongoing medical care and specialized training. The program supported 10,238 disabled EXCs while 5,360 were registered as receiving economic reintegration support. The program also provided physical rehabilitation, mainly orthopedic assistance, to 771 disabled ex-combatants (see table 5.5).

In **Rwanda** the RDRP was instrumental in achieving the approval of legislation providing housing and pensions to disabled EXCs. An RDRP housing scheme for handicapped EXCs, based on a Ethiopia D&R project that had been visited, has become a “good practice” example for Africa,. MDRP flexibility to finance this housing construction for war-wounded at the very final phase of the MDRP contributed to making such benefits viable.

In **Burundi**, disabled EXCs received insufficient support and were marginalized in the reintegration process. Only 10% of heavily disabled EXCs received care (PNDRR evaluation, p.143) and only 46% received socio-economic reintegration support (ICR 2009, p. 38, NCDRR PPP March 2009). The MTR also notes that there were long delays in provision of services. In the **DRC**, the number of disabled and war wounded who received support was very low, largely because the demands by the disabled were beyond what the PNDDR could offer, and

most of the eligible soldiers seem therefore to have continued in the armed forces. Only 241 out of a targeted 9,000 received support (MDRP Quarterly Progress Report 2008; ICM).

**Table 5.5: Number of Disabled who received Special Support**

	No of female	Number o male	Total number of disabled supported
Angola	22	749	771
Burundi	16	1,739	1,755
CAR	0	4	4
DRC	1	241	242
ROC	n.a.	n.a.	107
Rwanda	6	9,127	9,135
Uganda	n.a.	n.a.	---

Source: MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report October 2008, table 4.

In **Uganda**, the project was not adjusted to meet unforeseen demands and needs including those from disabled EXCs and in the **ROC** the programming has not begun.

## 5.2 Cross-border Demobilization

The key trans-border problem that the MDRP was intended to address was the combatants on foreign soils (COFS). This featured as a key topic at AC meetings, JSMs and locally through the TCG, with focus on COFS in the eastern DRC. The presence of Rwandan ex-combatants from the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR) was a priority as it was seen as a main cause of instability in the region.

MONUC was the major actor with regards to cross-border repatriation of COFS since it had a formal mandate and the force presence on the ground to both implement and enforce: with over 16,600 troops, largely in eastern DRC, it is the UN system's largest peace operation. Security Council resolution 1565 of 1 October 2004 provided new tasks and responsibilities for MONUC: it increased the mission's strength; established MONUC's mandate as "to ensure the protection of civilians", and authorized MONUC to "use all necessary means" in carrying out this task; to support the transitional government to conduct DDR and facilitate voluntary demobilization; and provide advice and assistance regarding security sector reform (SSR), DDR and training and monitoring of the police (S/RES/1565[2004] paras. 4, 5, 6). Resolutions 1649, 1756 and 1794 re-emphasized this (21 Dec 2005, S/RES/1649[2005], para. 11; 15 May 2007, S/RES/1756 [2007], para. 2; 21 Dec 2007, S/RES/1794 [2007], paras. 5, 8, 13). What was missing, however, were provisions in the national DDR program to fund repatriation of non-DRC EXCs from DRC soil. This created an institutional vacuum that led to a number of missed opportunities.

MONUC had primary responsibility for implementing the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRRR) program for repatriating COFS in the DRC. Many left after the peace agreement on their own accord, and others were repatriated to their countries of origin, but an estimated 8,000 Rwandan FDLR remain.

Following the DRC elections in 2006, the MDRP encouraged partners to intensify pressure on political leaders to implement the disarmament and repatriation provisions of the Rome

Declaration of March 2005, encourage the newly elected government to meet the similar obligations with respect to foreign armed groups under the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement and the Pretoria Accord. MDRP partners encouraged the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to strengthen their diplomatic ties to jointly advance this process. In 2007, the RDRP, with MDRP assistance, launched a cross-border communication strategy.

Expected results on COFS did not materialize, largely because the FDLR remains an unresolved issue. The issue of COFS required that the countries involved could agree on the practicalities of the COFS' return. This required positive political engagement and basic trust, which was for a long time absent in the relations between the DRC and Rwanda. The MDRP's formal role on COFS, as stated in the MDRP Regional Strategy, was in fact limited to support "*cross-border information and sensitization campaigns to appraise combatant groups of the options being developed under the MDRP and associated national programs and special projects*" and to provide "*timely and action oriented knowledge generation and research to deepen the understanding of cross-border and cross-sectoral DDR issues*". MDRP staff in fact spent considerable time to work with parties to find solutions, this was largely at technical level whereas the main issues have been political. The MDRP ended up without earmarking *specific resources* for COFS since there were no defined and agreed-upon operational plans for repatriating COFS. Instead, the MDRP has on occasion ensured links between parties in connection with returns to Burundi and Rwanda. This has enabled coordination on the two sides of the border for both physical relocation and ensuring that the receiving authorities were ready to assist and support the return. A similar process has happened with respect to children who have been able to flee Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the eastern DRC.

**Table 5.6: Targets for Demobilizing COFS, RDRP II**

	Appraisal targets	Revised targets	Achievements
Ex-AG (Repatriation from DRC)	25,000 (incl. 2,500 children)	12,500 (2004)	7,091 (incl. 674 children)

Sources: Corsia (2009) and ICR (2009)

A solution to the COFS issue did not require that COFS return to their country of origin. They could be integrated locally if the host country and belligerents agree. MONUC was working on this as part of the larger DDRRR program, but Rwandan authorities were not happy with the idea that some of the key *genocidaires* might thus avoid having to stand trial.

The idea of establishing a *regional database on EXCs*, to reduce or eliminate the possibilities of EXCs receiving demobilization benefits on both sides of a border, was not implemented. Without a regional database ex-combatants may potentially demobilize several times in different countries. The main reason the database never came about was the reluctance by national authorities to share sensitive data on ex-military personnel across borders with governments with which relations were in periods conflictual. Also data collection processes differed among countries: some used photos, others used fingerprinting or scans. The MDRP was not able to overcome the distrust nor find a solution to the different registration systems. The potential for receiving benefits several places in theory therefore remains, though in reality this was never much of a problem.

### 5.3 Quality Assurance: Monitoring and Evaluation

The MDRP was a complex and high risk program, implemented in seven countries with very different implementation time lines, speeds and capacities. Tracking performance and in particular identifying problems early should have been a strategic concern, necessitating good monitoring and evaluation (M&E) *systems* and actively monitored M&E *programs*. These varied considerably across countries.

In **Angola**, the M&E system was considered weak throughout ARDP implementation (World Bank's ISRs, evaluation reports). Support to improve the program's M&E was provided by the MDRP, including TA, a strategy for M&E with guiding principles, tools, procedures for their use and linkages between M&E and the MIS. To overcome weaknesses identified during supervision missions, two additional technical documents were produced by the MDRP.

In **Burundi**, M&E was based on a MIS that recorded all data related to EXCs as they entered the demobilization camps and continued through the R&R process, as well as data on service providers and benefits. Independent evaluations were designed to include statistics on the reintegration of EXCs along with a beneficiary assessment in order to capture qualitative data. The data were also to inform the design of reintegration activities in response to the specific profiles of the beneficiary group.

In the **DRC**, M&E was to consist of an MIS which was to have been in place and functional three months after program effectiveness, and an annual external evaluation. Under CONADER monitoring was poor and training in M&E and support to develop an M&E unit came late. The follow-on to CONADER, the UEP, has established what is considered to be a better M&E unit, though no studies had been received by the time this evaluation took place.

In **Rwanda** the MDRP provided the RDRP with analytical and advisory work and supported the program's monitoring and evaluation with studies and tracing studies, and this country has generated the best data and had the most consistent and comprehensive monitoring system and results.

The MDRP Secretariat at the November 2005 AC provided a program to ensure that both Special Projects and National Programs would be properly quality assured.

*Evaluations of Special Projects* did take place. An evaluation was done on the four child soldier projects in the DRC that provided a solid analysis of achievements (DAI 2007). The evaluation of the two UNDP projects was never finalized, where critical questions regarding performance with regards to the ComRec project were raised (Lancaster 2005).

In Burundi, the child project was assessed twice, though the quality of the studies has been questioned. The beneficiary Assessment of the Social and Economic Status of the Child Soldier (Taouti-Cherif 2006) collected views of the beneficiaries concerning their living conditions, and examined their social and economic status to that of civilian children. A *qualitative* study provided trends and dynamics amongst beneficiaries, notably the difference between reintegration in rural and urban settings. However informative this study is, the size of the sample is less than 100 and thus does not have statistical validity (Uvin 2007).

*Mid-term reviews* were carried out on the MDRP itself and some of the programs. The PRAC review *process* was controversial, but the *report* was useful to get the program back on track.



*Annual independent reviews* were carried out on the ADRP in Angola while the RDRP in Rwanda had three independent evaluations, most of these seen as of good quality.

*The final evaluation* of the CAR was quite thorough and helpful as was the one in Rwanda. The Uganda final evaluation was also comprehensive, providing a good picture of results.

The biggest program by far was the one in the DRC. Annual reviews was a realistic requirement given the size of the budget (USD 200 million), the vastness of the territory and hence complexity of the program, and the multi-dimensionality of the conflicts. But no independent program review has been carried out. For the MDTF component, which closed in 2009, the MDRP produced the obligatory Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM). The funding by IDA is still open since an additional USD 50 million was allocated to the second phase of D&R, and the Bank has therefore not produced its Implementation Completion Report (ICR). An external financial audit was carried out but it looked only at payments and the payments system (Ernst & Young 2006).

*Beneficiary surveys* were carried out both in Angola and Rwanda, and the latter also did follow-up tracer surveys, including more detailed ones for special groups. In Uganda, a survey was done of the “first batch” of LRA reporters that received packages (Baaré and Stavrou 2006). It traced and interviewed 2,052 EXCs in mid-2005 in three districts to establish a baseline for the AC’s M&E activities. No tracer study was conducted questioning the relevance of support and benefit provided by the project, however, which could served as a guiding instrument to the follow up MDTF and also informed about the impacts of the ACSP. The final beneficiary assessment foreseen was cancelled due to budget concerns.

The beneficiary survey carried out in 2007 in the DRC has a number of weaknesses (MDRP/ CONADER 2007). It did not reach beneficiaries in combat zones or in remote rural areas. It was conducted at a time when only 15,700 EXCs had received assistance, and of 784 EXCs selected only 364 (46%) were reached. The validity/reliability of the findings to the overall program is thus limited since the sample size was small; the universe selected from was made up of those who were among the first to be demobilized who on average seem to have received better kits and therefore were more likely to be satisfied; and the low response rate means the informant bias may be substantial.

## 5.4 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

The MDRP succeeded in demobilizing about 74% of the revised target of 380,000 EXCs, and assisted the reintegration of about 64% of the revised target of 361,000, both major achievements given the GLR context. All countries developed *results frameworks* (RFs) that allowed performance tracking, though with varying degrees of detail and quality (see Annex D), and varying degrees of monitoring and quality assurance of the results.

### 5.4.1 Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

First-order focus was on the *demobilization* of as many EXCs as possible. Against this objective, four countries must be seen to have achieved their targets. Constant delays meant that Burundi and the ROC still have a ways to go, though follow-on DDR programs are to ensure target achievement. The DRC experienced a series of delays as well, though at some points the donor community stepped in and put pressure on the authorities to move the process along. Without this, DRC short-comings would have been more serious.



*Reinsertion* went quite smoothly in Angola, or had already taken place with the self-demobilized in the ROC. Even in the DRC, which faced the greatest logistical challenges, reinsertion pay reached the vast majority through the use of cell-phone payments.

Where national efforts fell short was with the longer-term *reintegration* efforts, including the relevance of some of the training and re-insertion kits provided to EXCs. Few programs carried out studies to assess the economic viability of the activities that EXCs were being trained for or for which they were provided start-up kits. The major problem was stagnant national economies that did not provide many opportunities for developing sustainable livelihoods. But for a program that focused on preventing previously armed persons from returning to violence as a means of survival, this was a serious concern.

The *longer-term social and economic reintegration* once EXCs and their families had settled in their new communities has varied considerably. In Angola and Rwanda, where national governments have put considerable efforts into both supporting the EXCs but also working with the communities, this has largely been successful. The self-demobilization in the ROC that took place over the subsequent ten years has been quite successful, and the reintegration in the CAR seems to have worked as well as could be expected. In unstable environments and where perhaps unrealistic expectations were created, such as in DRC and Burundi, it will be interesting to see what longer-term results will be.

#### 5.4.2 *Special Groups*

In almost all national programs, special attention was to be given to particular target groups: child soldiers, female and HIV affected and disabled EXCs.

*Child soldiers* in DRC and Burundi were supported through Special Projects. In the DRC, UNICEF took a lead in ensuring that Cape Town principles were known and applied, assisting national authorities to make these national standards, while in Rwanda the authorities themselves organized a successful program. Coordination across the actors was ensured through active exchange of information and meetings with wide participation. Less is known about longer-term support to assist traumatized children, and the particular situation of abused girl soldiers also is relatively neglected.

*Female EXCs* were a particular target group in the MDRP Strategy. The situations of female EXCs have been looked at increasingly during the MDRP program period, so a lot more is now known about different groups of female EXCs. With the infusion of LEAP resources more targeted work is being carried out. But the underreporting of female EXCs and lack of targeted support for this group means that female EXCs have received much less, and less effective, assistance than was expected. LEAP has assisted in the development of a couple of national action plans, but overall results on the ground have been disappointing.

*Disabled and HIV/Aids* affected EXCs have faced some of the same issues as female EXCs. Angola and DRC have considerable numbers of war-disabled veterans, and Angola decided to address this issue outside of the MDRP program. Rwanda has assisted war-disabled with special housing while in the DRC most of the war-disabled chose to remain in the army to get the services offered there. When it comes to HIV/Aids affected EXCs, they have generally been provided health checks and follow up health services during the reinsertion period, and after that the assumption is that the general health care system will assist them. While EXCs

in the CAR expressed gratitude for the health care and HIV testing, there have been no studies on long-term care and access to support.

#### *5.4.3 Cross-border Demobilization*

Addressing the problem of the COFS has been important for the MDRP, but one where limited results have been achieved, largely because the FDLR remains a major unresolved political and security threat. The MDRP-funded study on the FDLR was a major input to better understanding this movement. While MONUC was to take lead on the COFS issue, the MDRP contributed with facilitation services but played a limited role in actual trans-border demobilization exercises. The program did not succeed in getting the parties to agree to a regional database on EXCs.

#### *5.4.4 Quality Assurance through M&E*

Monitoring and evaluation has been uneven. Rwanda is the only country that got a good system in place and implemented a structured program. As a result, it has the most extensive collection of tracer studies, where the first one was conducted already in 2004. It is also the only country to have carried out follow-up surveys, including dealing with vulnerable groups such as child, female, and disabled and chronically ill EXCs. A survey on the effectiveness of the RDRP sensitization program, which sought to raise awareness about the DDR process through various media, was done in 2005, and a study on the social and environmental impact of the reintegration of EXCs was also conducted. While a recent MDRP study (“Tracking Ex-Combatants from MDRP-Funded Projects”, May 2009) raises some methodological and analytical/reporting issues related to certain surveys, in Rwanda M&E must be seen to have been quite good.

The other extreme is the DRC. While there is an M&E system in place, the annual external reviews foreseen – a necessity in a large program like the DRC’s – never took place. The one financial audit looked at a fairly limited issue. The one beneficiary assessment done took place so early in the period, with a restricted geographic coverage and a strong selection bias so the results are neither valid nor reliable as far as program achievements are concerned.

The commitment to the annual reviews was one that the DRC authorities had agreed to and were responsible for executing. Priority of the international community was on implementation prior to national elections in 2006 and then turned to the mismanagement of funds and the closing of CONADER, but the acceptance of non-compliance is difficult to comprehend. The Bank and the donor community should have demanded a monitoring program to track more carefully what actually was achieved.

The MDRP Secretariat did get what appears to be very reliable numbers of demobilized EXCs from each country, broken down by gender, and the Secretariat itself tracked the financial picture very well. But the *results reporting* has varied from good (Rwanda) to very poor (DRC). For this USD 450 million program, this is probably the single largest weakness.

#### 5.4.5 Lessons

- The GLR provided a daunting environment for the logistically complex D&R operations, yet the national programs largely met the *demobilization and reinsertion* targets.
- The delays in program implementation experienced in some countries were mainly caused by political stalemates or weak management, though in some cases joint donor action such as in the DRC overcame such obstacles.
- *Reintegration* is more complex and long-term than simple reinsertion, and while a DDR program normally cannot do full-term reintegration, monitoring systems and support should have been in place to ensure that national authorities could continue to track progress.
- Livelihoods support must be realistic and market-friendly so as to reduce disappointments and possible abandonment of the DDR process by EXCs, though livelihoods viability is primarily dependent on dynamics in the larger economy.
- Technologies and other support services provided for DDR efforts (ID cards, monitoring systems, databases), should as far as possible be compatible with and contribute to larger national systems, both to provide value-added to the EXCs, but also to contribute to improving larger systems and thus ensure sustainability of DDR-initiated ones.
- In order to reach special groups, earmarked resources must be set aside and targeted skills and programs employed to ensure that group-sensitive approaches are employed. This was successful in the case of child soldiers but less so when it came to female EXCs, despite being an early identified group, as significant assistance only came later in the program.
- Quality assurance is expensive and management intensive. As with special groups, M&E requires dedicated resources and attention. In order to track performance, databases need to be set up with clarity on which variables the program wishes to track (a fairly minimalist approach is the most realistic), preferably with consistency across countries if program similarity makes this logical and possible.
- The management of such a large M&E program, and the capacity building necessary for the individual programs to be able to manage and implement it, is a task that is possible to contract out, at least partially, where different models or contracts can be used.

## 6 Partnership

MDRP was an innovative approach to coordination long before the Paris declaration was approved. It broke in fact new ground as it went beyond *donor* coordination. The MDRP structure gathered together a wider number of actors with different institutional mandates and cultures, expertise, interests, and expectations. The governance bodies included national authorities and DDR agencies, donors, the World Bank and UN bodies. Other actors were furthermore invited to MDRP activities: non-MDRP donors, representatives of regional and international bodies such as the OUA/AU, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and civil society organizations.

The fundamental reason was the one laid out in the MDRP Strategy: no single actor could address the problems facing the GLR (see 2.4). The roles expected of partners within the MDRP strategy have been broadly stated as:

- **National governments** were to play a central role, from program design, to create an environment conducive to DDR, attract the necessary support from the international community throughout program design and implementation, to defining the actual roles that other partners would play in the DDR process.
- **UN agencies** and **NGOs** were to strengthen capacities, facilitate implementation of national programs and special projects, and implement projects where central authority could not, preferably in partnership with local NGOs, .
- In areas outside government control, **UNDP** was to help coordinate project execution by other UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral project implementing agencies.
- The specific contributions of **donors, UN agencies and NGOs** would be based on their respective comparative advantages as seen and solicited by governments.
- **Donors** were to ensure MDRP links to the regional peace process and to facilitate the participation of key stakeholders in the program's implementation, and oversee the utilization of MDTF resources. Donors were also expected to coordinate efforts to ensure linkage between MDRP's DDR program and security sector reform (SSR).
- The **World Bank** was to bring in technical expertise in D&R programs, a focus on national ownership, financial leverage, and monitor expenditure data with a view to optimizing the use of resources. Additionally, the World Bank was to ensure compliance with acceptable standards for resources management and financial discipline by recipient governments.

### 6.1 Partnership and the MDRP Mid-term Review

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) carried out in 2004 produced a report, *A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation*, that was the main item at the February 2005 AC in Paris. The thrust of the report was high marks for the innovative approach, the coordination which the MDRP represented, and the unique potential that this broad coalition could bring to bear on the region's problems. On the critical side, the Bank had "*administrative procedures that are slow..., insufficient permanent presence of staff in the field, a lack of distinction between national ownership and government ownership, and a tendency to conceive of reintegration in terms of short-term*

*entitlements*” (DAI 2005, p. iv). The Secretariat had spent too many resources in getting the Special Projects up and running, though this was in part due to unrealistic expectations by donors as to what the MDRP could deliver. There was a lack of donor commitment to the policy challenges the MDRP faced, and weak commitment to DDR by governments – hence the title of the report. More specifically, the report noted that (DAI 2005, pp. 30-33):

- The Secretariat lacked strategic thrust; outreach to key donors was perceived as poor; and its focus on managing programs came at the expense of leadership in global thinking on DDR issues and drawing lessons from MDRP activities.
- The Africa Region management team had not recognized the special needs and high political profile of the MDRP, so that the main source of institutional support had been the country management line (Country Managers and Country Director).
- The donor foreign aid agencies had funds but often lacked the political clout of the ministries of foreign affairs or defense, so did not play the political role foreseen.
- National commissions, as part of the political systems of their country, were not devoid of any political agenda, and needed to demonstrate real political commitment to DDR.
- UN agencies and departments (UNDP, UNDPKO, others) felt threatened by the MDRP, and at times reacted defensively. UN implementing partners used negotiations with the World Bank to establish favorable precedent in anticipation of new streams of income.

The MDRP partners largely endorsed the MTR analysis, and February 2005 AC agreed to:

- Establish a working group tasked to clarify roles and responsibilities within the partnership and propose improved coordination systems (AC Feb 2005 minutes para 10).
- Clarify the political and technical dimensions of the program and, in this regard, ensure the most appropriate division of labor between Government agencies (both in donor and recipient countries), UN and other multilateral agencies, and the MDRP Secretariat. In this regard, it was proposed that a matrix format listing the different aspects at play per country and linking actions to be taken with respective responsible actors be developed (AC Feb 2005 minutes, Attachment 4).
- Improve communication flows and transparency within the partnership and between the MDRP Secretariat and partners, including with regard to problems and possible solutions (ibid);

A “*Matrix of Roles and Responsibilities within the Partnership of the MDRP*” was subsequently produced by the Secretariat and agreed to by partners in Kinshasa in May 2005. As an example, the matrix contains a section that assigns a division of labor between MDRP partners to address linkages between DDR and SSR (table 6.1). But there is no evidence that the nature or operations of the partnership changed. The matrix itself does not provide a framework for monitoring results and role performance since it lacks objectives and outputs for the partnership, timeframe for achievements, and instruments for accountability.

During the *Reflection Meeting* that took place among MDRP partner in Washington in March 2009, where key issues of the MDRP were discussed, *Partnership* was considered a central and innovative aspect but the division of labor between partners had at times been unclear and led to setbacks during implementation (MDRP Minutes, Reflection Meeting 9 March 2009).



**Table 6.1: Division of labor, addressing DDR-SSR linkages**

	National Governments	Donors/Bilateral partners	UN agencies, regional org'ns	NGOs	MDRP Secretariat	World Bank
<b>4. SSR/ army reintegration.</b>	<p>Primary responsibility for planning and implementation, information sharing and ensuring consistency with DDR and overall poverty reduction strategy.</p> <p>Ensure that reduction in defense expenses expedite economic recovery.</p>	<p>Should take the lead in ensuring coordinated approaches to SSR and assist to address the overlap with DDR;</p> <p>Ensure the inclusion of non-DDR partners in coordination mechanisms;</p> <p>Key responsibility for financial/ material/ technical support to SSR, including army restructuring, civil-military relations, public expenditure management and capacity building of armed forces;</p> <p>Verify that no new recruitment is undertaken.</p>	<p>Support to army integration and SSR, and coordinating role, in accordance with mandate.</p>		<p>Keep itself informed and flag issues relating to the security sector, in a timely manner which have real/potential impact upon the MDRP program.</p>	<p>Explore ways in which it can assist national and int'l approaches to SSR particularly through public expenditure review work.</p>

Source: "Matrix of Roles and Responsibilities within the Partnership of the MDRP" (23 May 2005).

## 6.2 MDRP-Bank Links

During the two first years, the MDRP enjoyed great support within the Bank. Management was heavily engaged in the design, mobilization of funding, and dialogue with partners. By 2005, the original Africa region managers moved to other positions in the Bank, and the MDRP manager also changed three times, leading to a lack of continuity as different persons brought different management styles and priorities (see 4.5).

While the Greater Lakes region was becoming less of a political concern and more simply a very poor region with extreme problems, internal restructuring in the Bank led the MDRP to become a unit within the Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Unit in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development sector of the Africa Region in 2007. While a Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Unit was established in the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) Vice-Presidency, it did have DDR as a priority field (staff interviews).

The decentralization of the Bank brought further changes for the MDRP. Initially one Country Director (CD) based in Washington managed the DRC, ROC, Rwanda and Burundi, which ensured a regional focus on the four core countries. With Bank decentralization, the DRC and ROC programs are managed by the CD in Kinshasa. The Rwanda Country Manager now answers to the CD in Kenya while Burundi and Uganda Country Managers report to the CD in Tanzania, and Angola and CAR report to two other CDs. Bank-internal coordination is thus now considerably more complex.

As a result of the recommendations by the MTR to decentralize more staff to the field, in 2005 the MDRP increased the size of the Secretariat (see 4.5.2). This complicated the internal management of the MDRP as these new staff lacked experience in Bank operations.



At the same time the Africa Region faces a daunting agenda. Half the countries are classified as Fragile and others are considered borderline cases. The poverty problems are more severe and intractable than in other regions. High-risk activities like DDR thus become a real problem since these are management intensive. In conversations with members of regional management, views varied regarding how much attention and priority the Bank ought to or feels it is able to accord DDR. This lack of clarity and consensus at management level clearly means limited consistency in Bank support.

Overall, the MDRP as a program appears less visible and strategic to Bank management. The regional nature of the program has made it particularly cumbersome from a management perspective since country management is now fragmented across six different CDs. DDR has an uncertain status both in the region and in the Fragile and Conflict-affected States Unit. MDRP management has internally had to deal with a range of complicated issues, and respond to two sets of masters: Bank management, and the partners in the MDRP and in particular the donors. On truly regional issues, consultation and decision making lines become particularly complex. To some Bank staff, this situation has left the MDRP in a very exposed situation, and for the career-minded it has become a program to shy away from.

### 6.3 MDRP-Donor Links

The partnership between MDRP and donors existed at two levels. The MDRP Secretariat in Washington communicated primarily with donor head offices, while at the country level MDRP staff on mission or posted in-country would work with local donor staff. Donors were involved in MDRP strategy elaboration, policy discussions, approval of programs, budgets and expenditures through the TFC, where HQ staff participated. The Joint Supervision Missions had HQ staff from some countries to begin with, but most donors fairly quickly handed this to local embassy staff.

The ability to secure funding was largely achieved. MDRP remained by far the most important source of funding for DDR, and the donors were satisfied with the financial management and reporting of the MDRP.

The expectation that donors would support MDRP links to regional peace processes and between MDRP's DDR programs and SSR and development programs was not met. One thing was that individual donors did not always speak with one voice. The "3 D"-agencies of a given donor ("Development, Diplomacy, Defense") could be pursuing different agendas and not be well coordinated internally. Communications between field and head offices of some donors was such that some field offices were not fully in the picture regarding HQ commitments. The fact that for most donors most of the funding for the MDRP came from budgets managed at HQ and not from the field also meant that field commitments and knowledge was limited. The high staff turnover in the field further reduced institutional memory about MDRP commitments made. Most donors also had limited capacity in the field, and in any case would concentrate on a limited number of countries and not have an overarching regional strategy that matched the MDRP. Some donors thus acknowledged that their own lack of continuous commitment and capacity contributed to the attention shifting from a political engagement to a mostly technical one.

At country level, donor involvement was often considered to have been below expectations. In *Angola*, most donors played a low-key role in the ADRP, letting the World Bank and

IRSEM lead activities, though the EU provided additional funds to expand the ADRP to support vulnerable groups. In *Burundi*, some current donor officers felt they did not have sufficient voice: the partnership was information-sharing rather than collaboration. But donors acknowledged that they themselves could have been more active, and acknowledged that early on there was considerably more cooperation and donors played a larger role. Several donors knew that there was communication between the MDRP secretariat and their HQ, but that this did not adequately filter down to the field, so the shortcoming was internal.

Donors were largely absent from the *CAR* program, while in *Uganda* donor agencies actively participated in the local coordination forum, known as the Amnesty Commission Working Group, participated in the joint supervision and monitoring missions of the ACSP and supported MDRP efforts to coordinate DDR activities in the country. Some donors felt the MDRP paid too little attention to Uganda, but were not themselves pro-active in soliciting MDRP attention nor pressured the government to deliver on its commitments to the Amnesty Commission.

In *Rwanda*, donors played a supporting role to the RDRP throughout its implementation. They participated in local meetings and coordinated their resources to RDRP programs by financing reintegration activities (vulnerable groups and disabled). Bilateral funds were channeled through their national development agencies (GTZ, KfW) and INGOs (e.g. Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam UK). MDRP partners also supported the capacity of the RDRC through financing expertise (e.g. reintegration advisor financed by DFID, health technical expert financed by Germany), while in the *ROC* only the EU is really active, among other things having provided funding for UNDP to undertake disarmament activities.

In the *DRC*, the partnership was the strongest – most active, and at the higher political level – during the early phase. It has remained good but focused more on the management of the MDRP. The partnership worked well when there were clearly articulated issues that all/most actors agreed on. World Bank managers would then mobilize the international community to make joint representations to the authorities. Key examples of this was when the authorities did not move ahead on the demobilization of the armed forces, and showed poor support for the implementation of the DDR program. Problems in this partnership have largely come from countries with major economic and strategic interests in the DRC.

Compared with initial expectations about MDRP and donor relations and roles, the donors have gone from being highly engaged at political and funding levels to becoming more focused on delivering results in particular countries. This has to a large extent left the Secretariat without strong partners to address lack of commitment and progress by national authorities to move D&R programs forward as designed.

## 6.4 MDRP-UN Links

Under the MDRP, UN agencies were to strengthen capacities, facilitate implementation of national programs and special projects, and sometimes implement activities directly. Their contributions were to be based on their comparative advantage, which UN agencies assumed included their formal mandates.

The UN was an early and important contributor to the MDRP strategy, and a strong proponent of the partnership thinking. Thanks to previous experiences in DDR and strong

presence on the ground, UN officials expected the UN to play a lead role, especially in countries with peacekeeping missions like DRC and Burundi where there was a UN Security Council mandate for their presence and role.

Instead, the UN saw its role reduced. In Rwanda the government asked the Bank to take the lead on DDR, a role the UN had played, due to dissatisfaction with UN performance. In Burundi a UN mission tried to argue for a lead role but was rebuffed. In the CAR, UNDP was made lead actor and program implementer, but subsequently criticized by the Bank-led mid-term review for poor performance.

UN staff felt the Bank was using its funding position to brush the UN aside and use the MDRP both to get closer to the donors in the field of DDR, but also to establish a stronger presence in the GLR region. The issue was not just hurt feelings – though that was also present – but questions about mandates and roles and thus access to resources and prestige in the medium term. Over time, the UN-Bank relations became more balanced and nuanced.

In *Angola*, the UNDP together with FAO implemented the Special Project. Relations between these partners remained good throughout this project, where IRSEM felt FAO in particular did a good job, but also praised UNDP for the capacity building and training program, an assessment shared by the World Bank.

In *Rwanda*, UNICEF and UNHCR partnership with the MDRP was constructive. UNICEF, among other organizations, assisted RDRP with the identification and provision of care for child EXCs, while UNCHR provided support to refugees identified as non-EXCs while the RDRP provided support to dependents of ex-armed group members.

In the *DRC*, relations with the UN went through significant changes. In the early phase UNDP was an important partner in the formulation of the MDRP Strategy and was MDRP focal point, aiding the Transition Government put together the Interim DDR Strategy in 2003. When UNDP put forward projects for funding and implementation (RRM and ComRec), it faced a conflict of interest: UNDP was a key actor on the local Ad Hoc Committee that approved project proposals, yet was also the largest single project implementer and as such a “beneficiary” of MDRP funding. The Bank therefore took over the focal role, to considerable chagrin among UN staff who felt the conflict-of-interest issue could have been solved.

UNICEF took the lead on child soldiers and was critical in ensuring coherence and forward movement on standards and coordination in this field, and a range of UN agencies have partnered in the reintegration activities. At the same time, the MDRP has not taken advantage of the considerable analytical capacities that MONUC has for assessing situations on the ground and adjusting or anticipating program changes.

The situation in *Burundi* was characterized by early effective cooperation between MDRP and the UN followed by a period of significant disagreements, though this improved again towards the end of 2007. The UN Security Council resolution (SCR) 1524 of 21 May 2004 and UN-SCR 1719 of 25 October 2006 both give the UN mandate to conduct and support DDR in Burundi. UNICEF was in charge of the special project for child soldiers, but there was disappointment that there was not more cooperation. The UN mission had actors that could have been useful and capacity that could have complemented the MDRP, lessening donor demands for more MDRP presence on the ground. Moreover, the UN Integrated Office for Burundi (BINUB) mandate includes support to SSR (UN-SCR 1719), and the Peace-building Fund also supports SSR in Burundi. There were therefore missed opportunities in Burundi to

test out how DDR-SSR links could be worked out based on closer cooperation between the parties.

In *CAR* the MDRP program was implemented by UNDP, making Bank-UNDP relations in principle clear but in practice faced hurdles. On the UNDP side, there were long periods without a fully constituted Resident Representative in place, and despite advertising internationally UNDP was not able to find an experienced DDR person to head the PRAC. The MDRP did not use experienced Bank staff, and supervision to begin with was lax, in part because MDRP management assumed UNDP could manage PRAC without much oversight. As MDRP monitoring during 2005 identified serious lags in delivery and problems with the accounts, the dialogue got testier. UNDP at the same time felt pressured by the national authorities to accept lists of EXCs that they did not believe were correct, and expected but did not get support from the MDRP in their discussions with CNDDR on this. An MTR in 2006 led to some acrimonious exchanges, but the issues were finally settled, UNDP had to refund ineligible expenditures, and an accelerated plan of action ensured that the program was completed within the foreseen timeframe. Over the last 12 months of the project period more senior staff on both sides of the table stepped in and ensured improved implementation, reporting and relations.

In *Uganda*, relations between the Bank and UNDP have been tense, as UNDP believes DDR is better handled by the UN, though UNDP was not involved in DDR in Uganda prior to 2002 (a 1992-1995 D&R of about 36,000 soldiers was funded and supervised by the Bank). Once the MDRP was established, UNDP became a member of the Local Approval Committee of the ACSP and an active participant in the Amnesty Commission Working Group, and UN Volunteers provided support to the Amnesty Commission's district teams. UNICEF has been active in the DDR coordination forum and a critical but constructive partner to the ACSP. It advised and lobbied the MDRP to adjust ACSP benefits and the mechanism for their distribution to fit children's needs. Furthermore, it transported children to receive packages and therefore enhanced ACSP operation while minimizing risks for minor Reporters.

UN-MDRP links have been weaker and gone through greater variations than intended. The UN expected to be heard as a partner and listened to in fields where it felt it had particular expertise, such as the IDDRS, community approach to DDR, etc. While this did happen in some fields, such as child soldiers, overall the UN felt the partnership was a disappointment.

One challenge has been the dual role the UN has wanted to play: as a policy adviser, and at the same time as a project implementer. The latter covers two situations. The UN has a mandate to provide services when national authorities are not able to dispense their responsibilities, so typically in emergency and fragile state situations. But UN agencies also compete for project contracts under more general development situations. It is this "commercial" side of the UN that creates tensions, because while the UN will argue its credibility as project implementer it at the same time points to its status as an inter-governmental body which thus cannot be subject to the independent audit and evaluation as for example an NGO or consulting firm. The FPA to a large extent acknowledges the special status of UN agencies when it comes to project implementation, but has not convinced Bank staff that they have full focus on quality and results management. UNDP in particular is seen as not being good at designing an early exit strategy but holding onto project roles by arguing the "service delivery imperative" where others feel this no longer holds.

There are also differences between the approaches that the MDRP has taken and the positions proposed by the UN (and some donors) in a number of fields: individual versus community benefits; cash versus in-kind benefits; the UN's complete DDR mandate versus the Bank only being able to handle D&R, and how these can be better linked; the different interpretations of national ownership. The Bank has tended to take a more bounded view of the MDRP mandate, which in itself contributed to a more technical and less political focus. This has made some of the UN positions less relevant and hence the UN as a policy contributor less interesting, as seen through MDRP lenses.

## 6.5 MDRP-National Authorities Links

National governments were to play the central role in the MDRP partnership. The Secretariat was to provide policy support to national authorities, including support to building the necessary capacities for national implementation of DDR operations. Program implementation thus crucially depended on governments' commitment and capacity – the “national ownership” issue (see chapter 8).

MDRP-supported countries were led by governments in different stages of consolidation of political power. Angola, ROC, Rwanda and Uganda had relatively stable governments, while Burundi, the CAR and the DRC had at various times transitional forms of governments.

Angola, ROC, Rwanda and Uganda were all led by a single party, though several of them had formal multi-party systems. Although to somewhat different degrees, these governing parties had relatively high levels of internal cohesion and discipline that extended to the leadership of the armed forces and an established bureaucratic apparatus that could support a DDR program. In all four countries, DDR took place in the context of countries with a strong army, in contrast to the other three countries where the army and other national institutions had suffered serious erosions of capacity, strength and/or authority.

MDRP operations in each country were to be adjusted in terms of design, capacity support, implementation channels, etc. But the MDRP at the same time had a strong harmonizing impact: DDR activities were to happen within contexts of reconciliation among parties previously in conflict, of strengthening regional stability through cross-border repatriation, and gender equity in DDR operations. The harmonization force of the MDRP framework provided constraints to how governments were to exercise leadership in the MDRP.

The different parties to the conflict were brought into the DDR program in various ways, but in no way threatened the state or the legitimacy of the authorities. For governments, DDR was for the most part of interest as it helped them to consolidate legitimacy and achieve greater stability through reconciliation measures and delivery of incentives for reintegration of EXCs. Accordingly, their commitment to MDRP-supported D&R operations was revealed through co-financing, mobilizing staff to lead national implementation, providing political clout to their national bodies to deliver DDR programs, and tapping into the capacities within MDRP partnership and outside to technically strengthen and complement their capacities to implement D&R activities. The one exception was the DRC where the Transition Government period was one of considerable uncertainty and internal positioning and attempts at “capturing” different parts of the state apparatus for own political gains. The distrust between the parties, and the reluctance by the government to demobilize parts of the army, lay behind the slowdown in the DDR program during the period around the elections.



In the countries that had achieved stable governments prior to MDRP inception, MDRP funding and support was directed towards the perceived common interests between the government and the MDRP partnership. In Uganda, a national DDR program was not of interest to the authorities, in part due to the localized nature of conflict and the perceived need to maintain a large and strong army due to the regional conflict dynamics. However, the MDRP support to the Amnesty Commissions created an opportunity to reduce the circulation of small arms and light weapons within the country and the region while providing incentives for members of dissident groups to move into civilian life.

Angola had the means to finance its DDR, but tapped into the technical skills provided by the MDRP and its partners (UNDP, FAO), but also strengthened the legitimacy of its DDR process by partnering with those perceived as neutral, skilled and transparent parties.

Rwanda entered the MDRP from a first-phase DDR program and so had clear ideas about how to benefit from the partnership and resources brought by the MDRP. The program took advantage of the full range of MDRP resources, building capacities of its implementing institution, providing assurances to donors and their constituencies on the financial probity of the program. Rwanda made the greatest use of MDRP learning and knowledge activities through, for example, commissioning surveys and tracer studies and technical assistance.

ROC had a limited but clear agenda for its DDR program and put in place a division of labor between MDRP partners, with the UNDP addressing disarmament while MDRP assisted with the reintegration of the self-demobilized and the foreseen D&R activities.

At the beginning of the MDRP period, Burundi, CAR and the DRC had more transitory authorities in place. In the CAR, the program was to begin with implemented by UNDP as the public administration had no capacity for DDR. In the DRC, once the fighting ended and the Sun City agreement was in place and the Transitional Government was established, the MDRP began supporting the development of national policies and institutions that could lead and address the country's DDR problems. There was therefore a time period when the MDRP had to take on a more prominent role in "pushing" the DDR agenda as the host governments did not have the capacity or did not give priority attention to DDR as a government area of concern.

## 6.6 Other Partnerships

While the formal partnership consisted of the actors mentioned above, the MDRP had an open and inclusive approach that meant other bodies also were invited to attend both MDRP events such as the Advisory Committee meetings, and meetings at country level. While not all bodies took advantage of this – the case of the African Union is discussed in section 10.1.2 – the African Development Bank both attended meetings and ended up becoming an important supporter. It co-financed the DRC program when MDRP funds ran out and subsequently became the most important funder for the follow-on to the MDRP, the TDRP. At national level, both national authorities as well as the MDRP invited in both implementing partners but also other relevant local stakeholders to local events. The full range of stakeholders engaged in one way or another in the MDRP was thus considerably larger than the formal partnership policy defined it to be. This "open door" policy, among other things, opens up for identifying new and innovative partners on the ground, something the DRC program in particular has benefited from and is an example of.



## 6.7 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

*The MDRP Partnership* was an innovative and wide-ranging concept in terms of the range of actors involved and the way the partnership was to address the MDRP's ambitious agenda. The Mid-term Review identified short-comings in the implementation of the partnership as a strategic challenge that required correction and attention. In response to this, the Secretariat in May 2005 prepared a comprehensive "*Matrix of Roles and Responsibilities within the Partnership of the MDRP*". Few if any resources were subsequently used to actually operationalize it, however.

Within the Bank, the political concern over the Greater Lakes region dissipated with the greater stability in the region and the original senior managers who had been involved in the design of the MDRP moved to new tasks. The MDRP ended up with lower visibility and unclear organizational placement in the Bank. The controversy over the financial over-commitment and the feeling that the MDRP was more a donor trust-fund project than core Bank business also reduced its strategic visibility. The decentralization in the Bank made *regional* programs more difficult to coordinate, and the shifts in MDRP managers and TTLs created management challenges to the MDRP itself. DDR as an issue has lost visibility in the Africa region and the Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries Unit does not seem to give it priority. The lack of strong and coherent support from senior management to a high-risk area leaves the MDRP as a program highly exposed within the Bank system and represents potentially a significant reputational risk to the Bank.

Donor enthusiasm for the MDRP also fell as political priorities shifted. Lack of coherence between donors' development, defense and diplomacy offices and sometimes incomplete links between field and head offices, as well as high rotation of staff in the field, has made long-term commitment and consistency difficult to maintain. Most donors also have a focus on some or a few of the MDRP countries and thus do not have the same regional approach to the program as the MDRP Secretariat. This together has led donors to lower their sights from ambitious policy targets through the MDRP to more focus on technical deliverables, leaving the MDRP at times without strong donor support when D&R policy challenges arose.

The MDRP-UN partnership was the one that did not contain any formal agreements and where expectations and relations have faced the most severe challenges. The UN was heavily involved in early MDRP design and expected a genuine partnering role, but as UN agencies took on implementation tasks, they became treated more as contractors than as policy equals – and contractors who furthermore refused to be externally evaluated and audited.

While there were a number of confrontations, there were examples of constructive collaboration, including in policy fields (UNICEF on child soldiers in particular), but a more could clearly have taken place. UN staff felt in particular that the Bank used its funding clout to brush aside the UN on issues where it has formal mandates by the international community, and this was seen as unhelpful.

The UN and the MDRP have taken different views on a range of DDR questions, but since the Bank has taken a more limiting view of the MDRP mandate, this has meant that the UN's positions are seen as less relevant and the UN as a policy contributor less interesting.

The partnership with national authorities has to a large extent been a function of the political stability of the partner government. In four countries single-party governments were in

power while in the other three different transition arrangements were in place. During these transition phases the MDRP thus played a more dominant role, though the MDRP has consistently been seen as a positive partner for national stability and – perhaps more controversially – as regime legitimizing.

### 6.7.1 *Lessons*

- The MDRP Partnership was broad-based, innovative and ambitious since it was addressing security, political and development issues at the same time. With hindsight it is clear that not enough thought had gone into its design, both with regards to roles and responsibilities between the different partners, but also concerning the size and skills of the Secretariat. The responsibility for ensuring that the administration of the Partnership worked lay with the Administrator, yet senior management in the Bank at times did not pay close enough attention to this.
- Donor commitments varied by donor, across MDRP countries, and over time as political priorities and thus own staff resources shifted. The most important role was to be played on the ground, yet that was often the weakest link in donor staffing due to high rotation, few staff, most funding and commitments made at HQ level and not always fully communicated to the field. These aspects of donor field capacity need to be borne in mind when designing partnership roles.
- Host governments will generally welcome the DDR resources but be sensitive to the policy dimensions attached. Stable/strong governments are better able to enter into such partnerships while transitional regimes feel particularly vulnerable: they are being asked to address what is often a pillar of their own power base at a time when the state is particularly weak and thus sensitive about external influence. The ambitions of the partnership must therefore be scaled to the ability local authorities have for addressing this core area of state security: for regimes that feel exposed, SSR and cross-border issues may be second-order to plain political survival.
- For a complex and multi-party collaborative partnership like the MDRP, roles and expectations need to be made explicit and operational in order to work. A dedicated framework like the Roles Matrix prepared by the MDRP Secretariat is an excellent tool that should be designed as early as possible in the program period, with the objectives, indicators, target values, responsibilities spelled out and accountability instruments agreed to. This should be discussed and approved by the governing body, and this should be part of the overall program Results Framework/s, and monitored and reported on as part of overall the program's deliverables.

## 7 Regional Approach and Framework

The MDRP was conceived as an instrument for building confidence for mutual disengagement by encouraging cooperation among participating countries, strengthening collaboration between key regional and international actors, making funding available for regional activities and national programs, and improving transparency across programs.

The regional character of the MDRP strategy thus had as much a political as a technical foundation. The challenge the MDRP faced was thus to structurally and technically operationalize its political underpinning. As noted in the previous chapter, the partnership principle of the MDRP was key since it was essential for establishing links to critical areas such as economic reconstruction efforts and SSR, repatriation of combatants on foreign soil (COFS), and civilian arms reduction. MDRP governance was structured to foment cooperation between various partners to address these political and technical aspects at national and regional levels. MDRP funding structure, designed to ensure comprehensive and well-coordinated donor support to the program, would also allow flexibility to support cross-border concerns and activities.

The Results Matrix designed for the MDRP Regional Strategy thus focused on the regional approach and contributions the MDRP was to contribute to at this level.

### 7.1 Regional Objectives and Results

The MDRP Strategy (World Bank 2002a) contains a results framework for the overall program. It is a classic Logical Framework matrix (“LogFrame” – see table 7.1), presenting the planned-for results in terms of Strategic Objective, Program Objectives, and Outputs.

Written sources on MDRP results include MDRP quarterly progress reports (QPRs) and monthly reports that tracked outputs as they were produced; Joint Supervision Missions (JSM) reports that provided in particular analyses of early achievements; end-of project and program Implementation Completion Reports/Memoranda (ICM/ICR); the minutes from AC and TFC meetings; and monitoring and evaluation reports and individual studies. Only the last category includes independent reviews that may also provide more detail regarding the *quality* of the results produced (see Annex C for a list of documents).

At the level of regional program achievements, these can be reviewed in light of the situation on the ground seven years after the MDRP was initiated:

***Strategic Objective:*** *Enhance the prospects for stabilization and recovery in the greater Great Lakes region.* As noted in chapter 5, the demobilization of nearly 280,000 formerly armed combatants in a volatile region and moving them away from combat command and control structures into civilian life has undoubtedly contributed to an atmosphere of much greater stability and cross-border collaboration in the region. This is of course not solely attributable to the MDRP, but the program has made the tangible and important contribution it was expected to. The extent to which this has led to recovery in the region is less positive, but the recovery is also more a function of economic dynamics than security issues.

Table 7.1: MDRP Logical Framework

Narrative Summary	Key Monitoring Indicators	Monitoring and Evaluation	Critical Assumptions
<p><b>Strategy Objective</b> Enhance the prospects for stabilization and recovery in the greater Great Lakes region.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduction in number of internally displaced and refugees</li> <li>Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries</li> <li>Evolution of social expenditures in countries, including in relation to security spending.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNHCR and Global IDP reports.</li> <li>UN Secretary General and Security Council reports.</li> <li>Country program monitoring and evaluation reports</li> <li>Public expenditure reviews.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments in the region undertake all efforts necessary to bring conflicts to an end.</li> <li>Regional bodies and the international community undertake complementary efforts in political, security and reconstruction areas.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Program Objectives</b> 1. Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both government and irregular forces. 2. Establish consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization. 3. Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national D&amp;R programs.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of international stakeholders participating in MDRP coordination mechanism; percent of DDR activities in the region undertaken within MDRP framework.</li> <li>Percent of DDR resources channeled through the MDTF; degree of variance between resource requirements and resource availability.</li> <li>Degree of harmonization of national programs</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minutes of MDRP/AC meetings.</li> <li>Reports of joint MDRP supervision missions.</li> <li>Periodic MDRP and MDTF progress reports.</li> <li>National program monitoring and evaluation reports.</li> </ul>	<p><b>(Objective to Goal)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governments and other parties to the conflicts are committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflicts.</li> <li>The international community is committed to supporting the regional stabilization process.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outputs:</b> 1. National programs prepared and implemented. 2. Special projects prepared and implemented. 3. Regional activities carried out in support of national programs and special projects. 4. MDRP and MDTF implemented in coordination with all partners.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of EXCs demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through national programs; number of such programs.</li> <li>Number of EXCs demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through special projects, and number of such projects.</li> <li>Harmonized data bases; frequency, effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.</li> <li>Efficient organization of joint missions and reports; effectiveness of technical support.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minutes of MDRP/AC meetings.</li> <li>Minutes of TCG meetings.</li> <li>Reports of joint MDRP supervision missions.</li> <li>Periodic MDRP and MDTF progress reports.</li> <li>National program monitoring and evaluation reports.</li> <li>Independent management reviews.</li> </ul>	<p><b>(Outputs to Objective)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Donors and agencies view the MDRP as the coordination mechanism for all DDR activities in the region.</li> <li>Donors allocate resources to the MDRP via the MDTF and in sufficient amounts.</li> <li>Governments in the region interested in supporting a coordinated approach to DDR in the region.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Program Components</b> 1. National programs 2. Special projects 3. Regional activities 4. Program management</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>USD 446.5 million</li> <li>USD 37.5 million</li> <li>USD 5.5 million</li> <li>USD 10.5 million.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MDTF financial progress reports.</li> <li>IDA disbursement rates.</li> <li>Periodic audit reports.</li> <li>Independent management reviews.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional governments are prepared and have the capacity to implement national programs.</li> <li>Regional governments are willing to permit DDR activities in areas beyond their control.</li> <li>Third countries are willing to absorb EXCs who do not return to their country of origin.</li> <li>Donors are willing to finance DDR activities in the region.</li> <li>Donors and agencies provide staff support</li> </ul>

**Program Objective 1:** *Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both government and irregular forces.* This objective has been achieved as all relevant countries produced a Letter of Demobilization Policy and subsequently national DDR programs that encompassed all armed groups in the country. While it has taken time to get all groups to adhere to the national program (Burundi) and some groups notably in the eastern DRC still have not signed up to the program framework, it does exist and is there for all actors to join.

**Program Objective 2:** *Establish consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization.* The MDRP established an MDTF to which 13 donors ultimately contributed and funded the needs of the program. The AC and TFC have served as the consistent fora for presenting issues, reporting on progress, and discussing shortfalls and disbursement issues. As of 2005 the enhanced MDRP web-site provided further public insight and thus enhanced transparency to all interested stakeholders, fulfilling this objective's intentions.

**Program Objective 3:** *Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national D&R programs.* To what extent the MDRP as such has performed this role is debatable: the CAR had a three-month national consultative process, the DRC organized the Inter-Congolese Dialogue etc without MDRP support. So while the MDRP did not actually produce results in this field it was because this was not necessary: the various countries did this largely on their own.

**Output 1:** *National programs prepared and implemented.* As detailed in chapter 5, all countries except Uganda implemented their national programs. While most countries still have some ways to go before the programs can be said to be fully completed, the overwhelming task has been accomplished – what remains are either second-phase demobilizations, or finalizing the reinsertion/reintegration programs. Final results as of December 2008 and comments on them can be found in Annex E.

**Output 2:** *Special projects prepared and implemented.* Those Special projects that were planned and approved have all been finalized and evaluations produced. Final results and comments on them can be found in Annex E.

**Output 3:** *Regional activities carried out in support of national programs and special projects.* This Output has by and large not been produced. The regional database was not established for political and cross-border distrust reasons. The technical knowledge sharing activities in the TCG have assisted in the fields of gender, HIV/Aids and COFS but overall did not have the structure, frequency and participation levels that would have been desirable for a more significant impact on the national programs (see 4.4).

**Output 4:** *MDRP and MDTF implemented in coordination with all partners.* The LogFrame has “efficient organization of joint missions and reports” as the key indicator for this Output. Regional Joint Supervision Missions were held during the first three years 2002-2004, and a final one in 2007, but where the level of donor participation in particular is uneven but falling. In 2005 a program of country-level joint supervision was initiated instead. Using AC meeting minutes as a barometer of the extent to which partners were satisfied with and felt involved and informed about the MDRP, the picture is positive. Overall the program has been implemented in coordination with all partners.



In general, the MDRP succeeded in using the regional framework for getting national DDR programs and activities in place, though the truly *regional* outputs – demobilization of COFS, regional database, more cross-border coherence with regards to dimensions like a strong and operational gender approach – were not as successful.

## 7.2 Regional Learning and Building of Trust

Regional learning and building trust were interlinked dimensions of the MDRP. Regional learning was based on two key activities – cross-border exchange of experiences, and the generation and dissemination of new knowledge. The participation by all regional actors in the cross-border learning events, and the full and public access to all the new knowledge generated, established personal links and transparency and equal access to the knowledge that in turn engendered trust. This trust was between MDRP as a joint mechanism, and the various actors on the ground, but also amongst the actors on the ground, and in particular among those directly engaged in DDR programs at national level. A range of tools were used to produce these results.

The most important was the *Technical Coordination Group* (TCG) and the learning events it organized (section 4.4). The workshops on gender in Kigali in 2005 and 2007 introduced a more systematic treatment of this dimension, and was later on provided more resources in the form of the LEAP program (section 5.2.3). The psychosocial trauma seminar was mentioned by a number of staff in other countries as important for their own thinking on the issue. Other events mentioned by participants were the workshop on M&E/MIS for DDR programs in Rwanda in August 2003, the DDR and Transitional Justice in Paris in November 2006, the workshops on the impact of psycho-social issues on the reintegration of ex-combatants and on leadership and communications in Kigali in 2007 (see box 4.2).

The strengths were the regional relevance (peer learning) and that almost all of the meetings took place in the region, and the informal discussions around the more formal sessions, where participants found that others were struggling with issues they themselves were facing in their countries.

The concerns were that not all the examples were equally relevant and that there tended to be some cases that dominated the dialogue so that the specificities of own situations did not get sufficient hearing. There was also some frustration at the fact that only a few staff from each country could attend, so that there was not the creation of a “critical mass” of national staff who had knowledge and could push agendas. It was also seen as difficult to follow up on new ideas and insights gained – staff did not feel empowered in the sense of knowing how to use the new knowledge that had been conveyed. The training was also largely limited to national DDR bodies. Some felt it would have been useful to include implementation agencies as participants in some of the activities.

*Joint Supervision Missions* (JSMs) have been a learning tool but perhaps even more a trust-building activity. The JSMs gathered government officials, donors and UN officials from Headquarters, donor representatives posted in MDRP countries, and MDRP staff to conduct monitoring visits across the MDRP countries. Four regional JSMs took place, the first three annually 2002-2004, and a final one in 2007. In 2005 JSMs were instead organized at country level, and this practice was continued till the end of the program. The availability of JSM reports through the MDRP website was a useful contribution to regional learning.



Questions have been raised whether greater cross-learning could have been achieved if there had been more active *local* participation in the JSMs – staff from national DDR bodies reviewing the work in neighboring countries. Some informants also felt that more local donor representatives should have participated, but the constraint there seems more to have been on the donor side: as far as the MDRP was concerned all comers were welcome. From the JSM reports it is also clear that some country visits were more popular than others, so the *regional* learning was uneven.

The MDRP Secretariat furthermore produced a series of *studies, working papers and notes* (see Box 5.2 for the larger studies and Annex C for a complete list of publications).

**Box 7.2: MDRP Studies 2003-2009** (excluding national studies)

**2003**

- Linkages between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Security Sector Reform.

**2004**

- Targeting MDRP Assistance: Ex-combatants and other War-affected population.

**2005**

- Taking a Gender Perspective to Strengthen the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the greater Great Lakes Region
- MDRP Gender Desk Study (Emily Schroeder)

**2006**

- Reintegration Assistance for Ex-combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP (Sarah Michael)

**2007**

- Ex-combatants in Burundi: why they joined, why they left, how they fared (Peter Uvin)
- Beyond demobilization: challenges and opportunities for security sector reform in the Central African Republic (Boubacar N'diaye)
- Opportunities and constraints for the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hans Romkema)
- The Social and Economic Status of Beneficiaries of the Burundi Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention Special Project (Sarah Michael)

**2008**

- The Rwanda demobilization and reintegration program: lessons from the reintegration of ex-combatants - Sarah Michael
- CAR: Lessons from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program
- Psychosocial issues in the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
- The Status of LRA Reporters (Sarah Michael)
- Contemporary Security and Development Trends in the GLR (Gilbert Khadiagala)

**2009**

- Voices of Youth in Post-conflict Burundi: Perspectives on Exclusion, Gender and Conflict (Pia Peeters, Emilie Smith, Maria Correia)
- Voices and Views: Youth in Post-conflict Rwanda from a Poverty and Gender Perspective (Pia Peeters, Emilie Smith, Maria Correia)
- Guidelines for incorporating HIV/Aids activities in Demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration programs for ex-combatants (Carla Boussen)
- Out of Work, Out of Manhood. Unemployment, young men, masculinities and conflict in Angola. (Marianna Olinger, Marcio Segundo, Marcos Nascimento and Gary Barker)
- The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program – Buying Time for Peace in the Great Lakes Region
- Study on Local armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Constraints and Opportunities for a return to peace in Eastern DRC (Mass Walimba Katangira)

The most intensive learning activities were the one-day Learning Seminar, of which there were two. The first one in Paris November 2007 discussed a series of key issues in some depth, while the second one, in Washington March 2009, was more summing up the lessons learned from the MDRP program (see Box 7.3).

### Box 7.3: MDRP's First Learning Seminar

**Paris November 2007:** The MDRP convened its first one-day Learning Seminar to promote knowledge sharing and dissemination with MDRP partners and other stakeholders. The seminar included updates on ongoing MDRP research activities, reflections on lessons and best practices at the country-level, and opportunities for exchange on priority issues within the DDR field. The seminar was divided into four sessions:

**Best Practices on Reinsertion Support for EXCs:** This session provided an overview of progress to-date on the ongoing MDRP study of the effectiveness of the use of cash transfers. The study's initial findings indicate that the effective use of monetized assistance is dependent on the country context, but that in general, small, frequent installments are seen to be effective in supporting reinsertion; whilst larger, infrequent/lump-sum payments are more effective in jump-starting reintegration activities. Overall, participants agreed on the value of monetized assistance and in particular its role in invigorating local post-conflict economies. Discussion highlighted questions of implementation modalities for cash payments, the importance of further study of cash interventions among vulnerable groups and the importance of community involvement in such programming.

**Lessons Learned on Reintegration:** In this session, panelists from Angola, Rwanda and Colombia provided a reflection on the reintegration approaches of their respective programs, their results to date, and on lessons and best practices for supporting ex-combatant reintegration. Common themes emerging from the presentations included the importance of: innovative partnerships with other stakeholders, approaches tailored to local realities, attention to the specialized needs of vulnerable groups, and counseling and social reintegration assistance within programs.

**DDR Project Exit Strategies:** The session focused on lessons from DDR programs in developing exit strategies and on the challenges and opportunities facing MDRP countries as they develop their exit strategies. Presenters noted that the concept of a 'transition strategy' may be more relevant to many DDR programs than that of an 'exit strategy.' The importance of well-developed transition/exit strategies was highlighted, particularly in contexts of fragile peace; participants advocated for strategies which were developed as early as possible within the project cycle, were realistic, and were developed through open consultation with all relevant stakeholders. Participants also noted that the transition/exit strategy theme is one around which MDRP-supported programs could particularly benefit from cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences between and across programs.

**Regional Aspects of MDRP:** This session revisited the original objectives of the MDRP regional strategy, to assess what has worked well and what could be improved, and to identify priority themes for upcoming activities such as new research products and the overall MDRP evaluation. The overall coordination mechanism of the MDRP and the platform it created for dialogue were highlighted as key successes. Commonly cited areas for improvement were knowledge-sharing, flexibility within the overall Program and the consolidation of assistance to special groups (AC Paris Nov 2007, pp 12-13).

Most of the reporting in this field has been on the activities themselves. Little is documented on what actual *outcomes* from these various events are. The interviews with local staff show that there is a positive attitude towards the training in general, though there is a differentiation between events that were seen as more useful than others, and an awareness of own inability to apply and thus successfully take advantage of all the new knowledge that was acquired. There is thus a concern that the conditions for effective learning were not always in place.

The most important benefit, according to most, was the networking and the contacts established and the trust that was built over time, since the participants tended to be the same ones from the seven countries (discussed further in chapter 9).

Knowledge management within and across seven countries is costly, but the MDRP budget for regional activities was underutilized (largely due to less than expected support for COFS), and eventually reduced from USD 5.5 million to USD 2.3 million. A more aggressive knowledge management program could have been funded, but would also have required dedicated staff for this to function.

### 7.3 Harmonizing and Mobilizing Funding

The MDRP made funding available for DDR operations in all eligible countries before any programs or projects had actually been designed. There was thus a financial commitment in the form of predictable funding for the region from the beginning of the MDRP program.

Since the MDRP followed World Bank rules and procedures, it was at times seen as slow and inflexible, especially when it came to the IDA funds. As noted (section 4.6), it took a lot longer than expected to get the Special Projects in DRC approved due to procedural issues – some related to the Bank, others to the UN.

The Special Projects facility provided the MDRP with flexibility, however. It was used to finance pilot programs (Angola, DRC), to capitalize on windows of opportunities towards peace and stability (Uganda), to buffer possible conflict by extending program benefits beyond the target group (Burundi, DRC), and to extend implementation capacity by enabling project execution by different agencies (Angola, DRC) and institutions (Burundi). It enabled DDR to take place where capacities for national execution were insufficient and therefore implemented by a partner (UNDP in the CAR).

A fragmented country-by-country allocation of resources would presumably have meant that cross-border learning and the important networking at AC and TCG events would not have taken place, meaning that the “laggards” in the region would not have benefited from the peer-learning – an underestimated benefit from regional activities, as peer learning is often more effective than more distant advice, partly for political credibility but also situation-relevance aspects.

As a consolidated funding mechanism, the MDRP minimized duplication of efforts and un-coordinated parallel financing of DDR activities. The MDRP thus invited non-contributing donors such as the US and African Development Bank to MDRP meetings at local levels as well as to AC meetings. The previous experience was one of fragmented donor funding that had created major inefficiencies and rent-seeking behavior by local actors, something the international community wanted to avoid.

One question raised is if the considerable funding of the MDRP led to an over-concentration of resources on D&R. The issue was that in a world of finite funding, mobilizing so much for the MDRP may have left fewer resources for upstream and downstream linkages without which the DDR program itself cannot attain sustainability and thus long-term impact. – This is a question the international community should look at in the wider debate of the growth of *limited-objective trust funds*, and whether this creates rigidities or permits focus on priorities. In the case of the MDRP, the argument has been that successful DDR is a necessary though admittedly not a sufficient condition for longer-term peace and stability. Full funding for DDR is thus important because if this issue is left unfinished it will constitute a continuous source of tension and renewed violence.

## 7.4 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

The MDRP brought a wide range of resources to countries in the GLR at a time when international support to move peace processes was crucial. The regional approach brought actors and resources together for a common goal. The program provided a platform for the countries in the GLR to meet, learn from each other, and thus build trust and political relations. As a confidence building instrument, the regional approach evolved relying on the capacities and political will within its partnership.

The MDRP succeeded in supporting the establishment of DDR programs in all seven countries, and to get them implemented if not fully completed in all cases. What the MDRP was not able to produce were regional outputs: demobilization and settlement of COFS, a regional and fully shared database on EXCs, and a more shared and better quality approach to vulnerable groups implemented across the region.

The learning events and knowledge generation was, however, a regional dimension that was successful. A number of instruments – TCGs, JSMs, studies, notes and reports – were organized or produced that increased knowledge and skills and built own confidence. It was this regional dimension that enabled the incorporation of lessons learned from other DDR programs into national programs, though a better structured and strategic approach could have provided better results, especially regarding treatment of vulnerable groups.

As a regional program the MDRP was able to re-allocate scarce technical skills across the region as programs were initiated and problems arose. This flexibility was important since programs moved quite different from the expected: only at the end of the seven-year MDRP period did the ROC program, which had been expected to be one of the easiest to initiate, actually begin demobilization. “Locking in” DDR skills for seven years to have them available when the ROC was finally ready to move would not have been viable.

On the funding side, the MDRP was able to mobilize sufficient funds to finance the identified DDR needs. From the objective of providing complete, coordinated and continuous funding for DDR, the MDRP was a success. A question is if this “ring-fenced” programming of D&R potentially “deprived” necessary upstream and downstream activities from funding – donors did not have sufficient funds to implement all the links, leaving the MDRP as “an island of excellence” in a sea of uncertainty and hence questionable sustainability. The immediate objective of the MDRP, however, was to secure demobilization of as many as quickly as possible – and for this the funding mobilization was successful.

One question posed was whether the regional approach was worth it or whether a country by country approach would have been better, in order to ensure a more context-specific and targeted country programming. While the answer today is that countries are moving towards national funding mechanisms, at the time of the establishment of the MDRP, the regional approach clearly was the most appropriate.

### 7.4.1 Lessons

- The regional approach of the MDRP ensured the broad-based understanding of the DDR issues, including the need for large-scale and flexibly programmable funding. Generating agreement on this regional approach to the GLR DDR was a major achievement.

- Despite the regional vision, it was easier to produce the country-specific outputs than the regional ones. The cross-border results require continued effort and focus, and unless the benefits are perceived to be significant to both parties, it may be difficult to sustain the interest. There is also probably a hierarchy of concerns where the national ones come first, and where parties therefore are at different stages in addressing their challenges (Rwanda had largely managed its internal DDR, DRC was still in the middle of a big DDR process).
- The MDRP was an efficient and effective mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating financial resources for DDR, ensuring transparent funding allocations, consistent financial management and harmonized reporting.
- The joint learning events provided for efficient sharing of own experiences (peer learning), dissemination of new knowledge, but also was the most useful arena for building trust and cross-border relations.
- For implementing countries, there may be some economies of scale on the learning and access to resources, but the cross-border transferability of “lessons learned” from joint knowledge events is limited: they must still be adapted to the national context.
- For donors, the advantages are more obvious: mobilization of funds, planning, and financial and performance reporting can be standardized and at no additional cost a donor country can participate in and track dynamics in a series of countries.



## 8 National Ownership

National ownership was a fundamental principle of the MDRP, where the MDRP Strategy states that *“the MDRP would promote country ownership of national programs”* (annex 3, para 119.i). The guidelines to national programs states that the MDRP would *“support national programs tailored to the requirements of a given country. To optimize flexibility and to exploit emerging opportunities, the timing of national programs would be determined by national leaders in consultation with international partners”* (para 150.i). National ownership as a principle was supported by all the MDRP partners, based on the lesson that unless there is national ownership, DDR processes are likely to fail.

### 8.1 Definition and Understandings

“National ownership” was not specified in the MDRP strategy or supporting documentation. *National* and *government* ownership is used inter-changeably. There are therefore several issues that need clarification: (i) *who* are the local ‘owners’, (ii), *what* is ownership, (iii) ownership of *what*: a political process, implementation, design, management, and (iv) how different *contexts* affect national ownership and thus implementation of the DDR process.

#### 8.1.1 Ownership: National versus Government

The local owners were in the MDRP strategy defined to be national governments. The first JSM found that governments strongly emphasized the need for national ownership, which they defined as government ownership (MDRP JSM 2002, p. 2). There does not seem to have been a discussion in the MDRP partnership during this first period why beneficiaries, civil society and other stakeholders could not be included, in large part a reflection of the World Bank’s policy of largely working with governments.

The most common form of making national ownership visible was by establishing national DDR commissions. While the actual composition of these varied some, the mechanism was largely the same independent of context, and dominated by the national authorities.

The 2005 MTR highlighted problematic areas with national ownership and its effects in the field and reported that partners viewed national ownership differently. It also noted that the concept, what it meant and its consequences, had in fact been discussed and objections raised by partners at the AC, including the definition of it as government ownership only (DAI 2005, pp.7-8). In Paris 2005, the Chair concluded that partners had endorsed the analysis in the MTR, which included that national ownership had affected implementation speed. However, the proceedings also stated that *‘In all of the MDRP countries, national commissions are in place and operational national programs have been agreed and financed. While fundamental changes of the current set-up may be difficult and disruptive and we do not believe this would be justified or effective, we agree that fine-tuning within a specific national setting, for example by further enhancing civil society engagement and involvement, should be looked at and this will be pursued.’* (AC February 2002, p.18)

At the AC in November 2006, it is acknowledged that *‘the practical applications of the concept and the experiences of MDRP-supported programs in addressing questions of national ownership have rarely been discussed and shared’*. A session during the meeting explored the challenges of

national ownership in the context of DDR. It was agreed that these issues were important for the MDRP to discuss further and would be explored as part of the MDRP Secretariat's ongoing research and analytical work.

Interviews for this evaluation repeated the findings of the MTR, namely that seeing national ownership as government ownership was too narrow. Civic organizations, beneficiaries and communities had limited ownership of the program, which may have been reflected in the outcome: a limited focus on for example female combatants and war-wounded. This usage meant the MDRP was dependent on government even when it was clear governments were the reason why DDR processes did not move forward (DAI 2005, para.33). MDRP staff were fully aware of this dilemma but questioned whether a more inclusive approach would have produced better results.

### *8.1.2 Ownership: Political versus Operational*

The Strategy does not clarify what the national actors should 'own'. Many MDRP partners spoke of it in operational terms, with a focus on *implementing* DDR programs. Others saw it in terms of political and decision-making ownership. In the 2004 JSM report, a reference to Angola says '*National ownership of the program remains high as exhibited by the estimated USD 155 million that Government has invested in the disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion phases of the program, and other parallel reintegration efforts being undertaken by several Government ministries (ibid)*'. Here it defines ownership as political willingness and financial resources to have and conduct a DDR process.

Some stakeholders felt the Bank saw national ownership in terms of operational and implementation capacity. In a post-conflict setting it is clearly unrealistic to expect a government to have much operational/financial implementation capacities, and to allocate the limited capacities that exist to DDR. Having this as a *yardstick* for ownership is thus not helpful. To the extent that a country improved its ownership through building implementation capacity, the demand on national authorities to build these skills and organizations was probably helpful (see chapter 9).

A view held by some was that national ownership really was not helpful in such environments, as the issue was not about who *owns* the process, but who is capable of implementing DDR operations irrespective of whether that includes local stakeholders. This was emphasized in the context of conflict/immediate post-conflict countries such as the DRC and Burundi. This reflected a limited definition of ownership as implementation capacity only and the need to get DDR done quickly in the context of tense environments.

## **8.2 Ownership on the Ground**

The seven MDRP countries reflected quite different contexts, from elected governments to transitional authorities, from stable internal security to on-going conflict, from wealthy state (Angola) to one of the poorest countries in the world (CAR). The *political* and *resource* pre-conditions for the two forms of ownership thus varied widely.

### *8.2.1 Angola*

Angola had a stable government and a much better economy than its neighbors. The national program was designed with broad participation of local stakeholders, including local

authorities, traditional leaders and NGOs. EXCs were able to select the area of resettlement and their economic reintegration options according to their profile and expectations (Angola ICR, p.6).

### **Box 8.1: TCG Discussions of National Ownership**

During the Paris November 2006 TCG meeting, the key topic was DDR and National Ownership. The practical applications of the concept and the experiences of MDRP-supported programs in addressing questions of national ownership have rarely been discussed and shared. This session explored some of these issues and the particular challenges and trade-offs for national ownership in post-conflict contexts, based on country examples and where some key points were raised:

#### **1. Angola's experience with engaging formerly opposing groups:**

The participation of opposing groups (such as specific allocations of posts within IRSEM to UNITA representatives) reinforced trust among ex-combatants and the program, helped to ensure that the program was adjusted the expectations of different beneficiaries and better mobilized all potential beneficiaries to take part in IRSEM programming.

#### **2. Republic of Congo's experience with engaging parliamentarians:**

Parliamentarians and administrative officials have been an important partner for the commission given their proximity to population and their potential roles in accompanying program activities on the ground and in organizing community information/sensitization activities to help gain community support for the project. However, in order for officials to be able to play these roles, they require up-to-date and regular information from the commission.

Given the legal foundations of many programs, government and parliament are already involved in establishing the institutional framework for DDR processes, including elements such as veteran's issues, army integration, security sector reform, etc. This existing engagement with DDR can be used as a foundation for additional linkages.

#### **3. Uganda's experience of working with civil society organizations:**

Civil society organizations are often a crucial partner for DDR programs because of their high proximity to, and credibility with, local populations. However, a lack of harmonization or standardization of approaches between NGOs, and among NGOs and national program structures can cause conflicts and inefficiencies on the ground. Similarly, given the accountability of many civil society organizations to external donors, it is crucial to ensure that the approaches they adopt are appropriate to the local context. Setting up regular and two-way channels of communication and information-sharing are therefore key – both among groups implementing services and projects on the ground and among donors and supporters of these agencies – in order to minimize duplication, build on respective strengths and ensure a holistic approach to demobilization and reintegration programming.

Two key cross-cutting issues were also raised, namely:

- With national ownership comes national responsibility: whether government ownership is manifested in terms of program design, oversight or implementation of a DDR program, its ownership should also be understood and measured in terms of its accountability to government structures and to the people.
- National ownership does not just mean government ownership: the concept of national ownership too often focuses on government, to the exclusion of individuals and communities. Yet community involvement can be especially important for sustainability and developing an effective exit strategy. How can national ownership truly be broadened to include governments and the people they represent?

It was agreed that these issues were important for the MDRP to discuss further and to be explored as part of the MDRP Secretariat's ongoing research and analytical work on national ownership.

The creation of a favorable environment was conducive to the political and national reconciliation process. Contributing to this were the adoption of an Amnesty Law, the program's strong emphasis on community participation (civil society, churches), the

involvement of various sectors and institutions in the demobilization process, the continued dialogue with the former belligerent groups, large sensitization campaigns and the promotion of a permanent involvement of UNITA into the full DDR process. Another reason was that there was a clear and unchallenged leadership (there was a clear victor to the conflict), also when it came to the management of DDR activities.

Local authorities were key players in the reintegration process and were widely involved in the M&E of ex-militaries' reintegration support. Their involvement represented an efficient and permanent follow-up of reintegration support and facilitated the reconciliation and the promotion of peace at the community level.

The government contributed the largest share of funds to the project (USD 76 million) and covered the total cost of demobilization. It also contributed counterpart funds to the various project components. Both financial independence but also political support to DDR enabled the national coordinating body IRSEM to clearly lead the national program.

### 8.2.2 Burundi

Burundi and the DRC were the contexts in which defining national ownership as government ownership was most difficult, since both had transitional governments, limited economic stability, and continued conflict.

In January 2003, the Burundi transitional government began to prepare a national Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (DRRP). A National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) was established on 28 August 2003, and an Executive Secretariat (ES) was put in place to finalize preparation and lead implementation of the NCDRR as well as to coordinate the contributions of international partners. The NCDRR included 17 provincial offices, and one ex-combatant mediating in each community. The UN mission to Burundi, ONUB, took on the responsibility of supporting the disarmament process as of 1 June 2004 though the DRRP only started early December 2004. The DRRP was guided by a Joint Operations Plan that served as a Memorandum of Understanding for ONUB, the MDRP and the NCDRR.

National ownership evolved in two stages – first under the transitional government and then under the elected one. The transitional government supported the demobilization so that all armed factions party to the peace agreement could become political parties prior to the elections in 2005. A process that was estimated to take one year took nine months.

The relationship between the ES/NCDRR and the elected government, which was difficult, affected national ownership. After the elections in 2005 the government replaced the original ES which was viewed as weak in program management and unable to provide strategic leadership. But the government was not effectively involved in the DDR process and there was very limited political leadership for a considerable part of the NCDRR, and the relations between the commission and the government faced difficulties. 'Ownership' of DDR was *de facto* in the hands of the ES, which was *operational* ownership. But NCDRR was the government body designed to provide *policy* guidance to the ES/NCDRR and this did not happen. It was only in 2007 that the program again became a priority for the government. The ES led the process with limited national or external oversight. It was therefore viewed by some of the stakeholders not as GOB ownership, but 'the ownership of one', namely at the time the head of the DDR commission, although both political and operational ownership increased over time.

### 8.2.3 Central African Republic

In the CAR, the government had come to power through a military coup and was seen as fragile. It had, however, established an open National Dialogue that ran October-November 2003. This provided a political commitment to the DDR program and policy subsequently put forward to the MDRP. The need for stabilizing the country through a broad-based disarmament and demobilization program was accepted by all as important.

However, the capacity to formulate the contents of the program was limited. The authorities thus got assistance in outlining their approach to DDR and SSR from the UN, the JSM missions in 2002 and 2003, and from MDRP staff who came on missions during this period. UNDP then formulated large parts of the practical PRAC program, in dialogue with the authorities but in conformity with UNDP standards and experience.

The capacity to implement this program was very weak. The new government faced a number of issues that required its attention, not least of all a national reconciliation process that needed to be handled directly by national actors. Political capacity for DDR was thus limited. But management capacity was also poor as the authorities had no real experience managing a DDR program. Its previous DDR efforts had largely been about collecting weapons and retraining civilians who handed them in. The program had largely been run by UN agencies, and carried out under the previous administration.

The program was also complex because apart from addressing the needs of the EXCs, it was to have a community mediation and development component. UNDP was therefore contracted to implement the project, since it was expected to have the capacity to handle this wider agenda well.

### 8.2.4 Democratic Republic of Congo

In the DRC national ownership differed between the two periods of the transitional government, and the subsequent elected government.

During the transition period, much of the peace and DDR processes were given forceful support and sometimes leadership by the international community. The UN, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), chaired the meetings of the *Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition* (CIAT), where many of these issues were discussed and agreed to.

On the national political side, the transition arrangements included the allocation of roles and positions to different political fractions in order to achieve “fair” shares of responsibilities and resources. This meant that the notion of a coherent national ownership was unrealistic. It thus took time to agree to the structure and mandate for the national management body CONADER, in particular its relations to the armed forces and the process of restructuring the army, and to put it together in terms of staff and management.

CONADER faced the situation of many other DRC institutions, where different sections of the organization were loyal to different political movements, who focused on the coming elections and how to position themselves best for these. Building CONADER as a competent national agency for managing the national DDR program (PNDDR) and providing decision makers with quality information and inputs for policy making was thus up against other more urgent and specific agendas for many of the senior staff.



During this period, national polity was hence fragmented with limited attention paid to the PNDDR, though there was a notional concern that the DDR process move ahead and contribute to the stabilization and increased control over national territory. There was clear opposition among several actors in the transitional government to DDR, because each party to the conflict wanted to keep intact their command and control structure over their respective groups until the elections had been held. This points to the challenge of ownership in a situation of conflict or uncertainty where the parties are reluctant to support a process of DDR when the peace process is yet not settled.

Once the elected government was in place, *formal* ownership was established and made clear to the donors. This did not translate into a more visible commitment to DDR, however. During the fall of 2007, after the establishment of the new management body UEP, the PNDDR process was largely paralyzed because the Government did not appoint a person empowered to disburse resources. There was in general little interest in moving the remaining part of the DDR process forward, until the Bank informed the government that funds allocated for the final phase of demobilization and reintegration would be lost.

While lack of capacity to implement decisions clearly was a major hurdle, the political commitment to DDR still had to be pushed by providing visible and large-scale incentives. The government was more concerned with defense reform and integration of combatants into the new armed forces (SSR) than with D&R of EXCs. In 2009 DDR support has again grown stronger, in part presumably due to increasing political experience and capacity. That formal ownership belongs to the government has been settled, however, which was important to in order to make clear where responsibilities lie.

### 8.2.5 Rwanda

Rwanda exhibited similar political stability and commitment as in Angola. The Government provided political, financial, human resources and policy support to the national RDRC program. The National Commission was therefore able to maintain strong ownership of RDRP throughout program implementation, leading to strong financial support by the donors, enabling the RDRC to act as the national coordination mechanism for DDR activities.

RDRP developed links to line ministries such as Ministries of Local Government and Health. Local NGOs and INGOs were program partners as they implemented complementary activities and provided technical support to the RDRC in areas such as child soldiers. RDRP programmatic extension through educational and vocational training occasioned links with the private sector such as training institutions and private companies. Communities were inherently involved in the RDRP as they played a crucial role in reconciliation, but were also responsible for identifying vulnerable individuals for the Vulnerable Group Support Window of the RDRP and therefore monitoring reinsertion and reintegration of EXCs.

### 8.2.6 Uganda

The MDRP programming took place in dialogue with the national authorities, donors and UN agencies, though provincial and district authorities in conflict areas were not invited in. The *political* ownership for programming including the actual decision to put in place a national program was thus clear.

The MDRP project was welcomed by the Amnesty Commission, which until then had been working under limiting financial and skills conditions. Aware of their own weak capacities

and previous experience with the logistics of providing amnesty and benefits to reporters and the difficult security conditions in project areas, the AC requested increased financial support from the MDRP. Furthermore, prior to MDRP support, extension to the Amnesty Act took place at six month intervals. With the MDRP, GOU agreed to extend the Amnesty Act for the full two-year period that the ACSP was to be implemented. As mentioned in the ACSP Final evaluation, this *kept the political space for amnesty open at a time when it was under threat and guaranteed the Amnesty Commission's existence and function for the duration of the project* (Amnesty Commission 2008, p. 9). The fact that the World Bank had greater clout in negotiating the duration of the Amnesty Act than the agency mandated to implement it shows the vulnerability of the Amnesty Commission.

The final evaluation of the ACSP states that the support provided by the ACSP to build the AC's capacity to fulfill its mandate was insufficient, indeed a missed opportunity which hurt the AC's *"credibility in the eyes of its implementing partners and potential reporters"* (ibid, p. 78). The MDRP's own assessment recognizes that the Commission remained a weak institution and that weaknesses in the original project design were not sufficiently addressed. Due to the fact that this was a small project in the MDRP portfolio, the Project did not receive sufficient attention and resources from the Project team, nor from MDRP management (ICM 2009, p. 10).

## 8.3 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

Five dimensions to national ownership have been raised in the context of the MDRP; (i) the *importance* of national ownership (ii) the *understanding* of government versus broader stakeholder ownership, (iii) the *policy versus implementation* dimensions, (iv) the importance of differing *contexts*, (v) how ownership has or could be supported to *evolve* over time.

### 8.3.1 Importance of National Ownership

National ownership was an important principle in the MDRP Strategy as it acknowledged that it must be national stakeholders who take the lead and responsibility for the DDR process. It was therefore crucial that the MDRP had national ownership as a principle. It was how this principle was defined and understood that led to issues with it in the field.

### 8.3.2 Understanding of National Ownership

The MTR noted that there were considerable differences between partners in the MDRP in how they defined and understood national ownership. The most common criticism was that the Bank and the Secretariat did not apply a broader definition including local stakeholders.

In post-conflict societies governments or transitional authorities are often a main reason why DDR processes do not progress as expected or hoped for, as in the case of the DRC. The government must be involved in DDR and have ownership since some things can only be done inside government structures, but ownership needs to be broadened to include other stakeholders. This is particularly important to ensure successful reintegration. In Angola including other stakeholders was important for the successful speedy reintegration of 100,000 former Unita combatants. In Rwanda including the communities in the DDR processes enhanced the success of the reintegration efforts. Broader ownership can also

ensure that key issues are not marginalized, as in Burundi where the government did not pay sufficient attention to female EXCs.

It was not only more stable governments that implemented more inclusionary processes, but so did the vulnerable government in the CAR. The National Dialogue was used to bring together factions from around the country to agree on basic principles for national unity and development, and DDR was an area where it was possible to agree.

### *8.3.3 National Ownership: Policy versus Implementation*

National ownership was largely understood as implementation responsibility, yet most of the countries lacked the capacity to implement programs and projects. But the critical factor for moving a DDR process along was the political will and commitment on the side of the national authorities. Where this was strong, ways were found to implement even complex programs. Angola, with weak capacities and a history of keeping civil society and the private sector on a tight leash, invited in a range of actors, including UN agencies and NGOs, to carry out a large-scale and complex D&R program, yet with strong leadership from the authorities. Rwanda has similarly been accused of a strong state-ist bias yet it decentralized implementation and invited in other actors to help carry out the ambitious program.

In cases where political will for DDR was lacking, the MDRP as a partnership needed to act as a coherent political supporter, and in some cases did: in the DRC the international community criticized the authorities for unacceptable delays in demobilizing government soldiers, and this clearly broke the log-jam at that moment. While the overall lesson is that the international community by and large can do little to prod local political will – the failure of the policy of conditionality – in a fragile/post-conflict setting the leverage of the international community is often greater and the political imperative of overcoming narrow and particularistic agendas of the authorities-in-power may be greater, and thus should be considered more aggressively than was sometimes the case in the MDRP.

Even where national ownership was understood to be limited to the implementation of DDR, actual usage differed. To some, fragile environments and “windows of opportunity” meant that direct implementation was important to ensure that vulnerable groups would become safer and benefit from actual DDR on the ground – an argument made on occasion by UN bodies – while the Bank was reluctant to move unless the government took charge, to ensure “national ownership”. This difference was sometimes attributed to a discussion on the possible trade-off between what is seen as short-term but important gains to the intended beneficiary populations when direct intervention is undertaken, versus building national ownership and thus longer-term commitment by having national actors take the lead.

### *8.3.4 Context for National Ownership*

National ownership varied according to countries’ level of fragility versus stability, political will and available resources. Designing MDRP with national ownership as government ownership led to problems in some countries with transitional or weak governments.

An early criticism of the MDRP at the AC was the lack of presence on the ground and thus the ability to understand local context (Box 4.1). This was seen as critical for the design and support of DDR programs. In countries with strong governments like Rwanda and Angola this was not a problem. But in fragile environments, such as the early phase in Burundi and the CAR, earlier adaptations and adjustments could have avoided later problems.

### 8.3.5 *The Evolution of National Ownership*

Linked to the above point about understanding context well is the issue of the *dynamics* of ownership. This issue has been extensively debated in fields like development and SSR, where ownership is not about formal possession, but influence, capability, and responsibility for planning, implementation, policy making and execution, and in particular how this can be strengthened over time. A nuanced view of ownership takes into consideration that it is a process that evolves over time, but at the same time is entirely context dependent and thus will vary from society to society. Demanding or expecting “ownership” as something that should be in place or a pre-condition for support in a complex context can be unhelpful. Rather it should be seen as a key challenge in any fragile environment, and which therefore calls for careful analysis and a plan of action if it needs supporting and strengthening. This was missing from the MDRP as a strategic component.

### 8.3.6 *Lessons*

- *National ownership* as a principle for the MDRP program was essential. However, it should have been operationally defined so that the various dimensions could be better addressed: government versus broader national ownership; policy versus implementation dimension, the contextual understanding, its dynamics over time.
- The *importance* of the concept lies in the clarity on who should be in the driver’s seat and define policies, priorities and programs.
- A broader concept of national ownership would ensure that not only public authorities but also civic organizations and other stakeholders are heard and contribute to the choices made. Broad participatory processes are particularly important in fragile state/post-conflict society settings. This can improve implementation and is particularly important for the reintegration component to be successful.

## 9 Capacity Development

Capacity is considered a strategic issue in most development work, and has been a constant concern also of the MDRP. The concept itself has been variously defined, where UNDP first used "*The ability to perform assigned functions efficiently and effectively*" but later changed this to "*The ability to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives*" (UNDP 2002, p. 2). The concept of "assigned functions" is important since it notes that some tasks can be pre-defined and thus improved through training. The more recent definition, however, recognizes that one needs to go beyond this and learn to set and achieve new objectives and solve problems. This is hence something that is context sensitive and requires active learning and development rather than transfer of existing knowledge. The OECD/DAC Governance Network uses "*The ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully*" (OECD-DAC 2006, p. 12). This brings in the three levels that are normally used when discussing capacity development (CD): individuals, organizations, and institutional/societal.

A definition that combines the important elements of these three definitions would then be: "***Capacity is the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to perform assigned tasks well, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives***". From this follows that "***Capacity Development is processes or activities designed to improve desired ability***" (Scanteam 2008, p. 18). This is the understanding of CD that will be used here.

### 9.1 MDRP Strategy

Capacity development (CD) was not set a specific objective in the MDRP strategy. But the strategy mentions the importance of CD multiple times, and states that one rationale for the multi-country/regional approach was knowledge sharing: "*the regional approach would facilitate knowledge sharing and capacity-building across country level DDR efforts*" (World Bank 2002a, para.62). In its lessons learnt section the Strategy acknowledges that because of existing weak capacities in target countries "*funding has often been slow to reach implementing agencies and communities. There is thus an immediate need for targeted capacity-building to enhance government implementation capacity at the central and local levels*" (World Bank 2002a, para.66.ix). The strategy also emphasizes that implementation of DDR in the Great Lakes faces the challenge of weak local capacity and that therefore the UN agencies and NGOs are important in order to strengthen capacities.

Despite these insights, the only reference to CD is that the "*regional activities that are essential for the MDRP to achieve its objectives consist of, among others, ..., capacity building*". In the Logical Framework a critical assumption is that regional governments are prepared and have the institutional capacity to implement national programs. Thus in the guidelines to the national programs it is emphasized that "*staff development at the central and local levels would be critical for effective program implementation*" and "*targeted capacity-building of partner organizations, including local governments and communities, would be undertaken as required to attain the objectives of the national programs*" (World Bank 2002a, para.84, 164-165).

As noted in chapter 8, assuming that governments have political will and implementation capacity to successfully move large and complex DDR programs in a post-conflict context is often unrealistic. Particularly with national ownership as a linchpin for the overall Strategy



there is a need to assess the will and capacity that exists (baseline study), and acknowledge that where this is missing it may take time to get in place. One reason for the Special Projects was exactly that capacities in many of the contexts were not present or implementation would take too long if governments were to take direct responsibility.

In the MDRP Logical Framework capacity is referred to as implementation capacity as understood at a more technical level – not the capacity to plan, design or have political ownership of the process. This was also highlighted at the AC meeting in February 2005 which stated that *“while progress had been made in all of the seven active MDRP countries, key challenges remained in the areas of operational preparedness, reintegration planning and implementation capacity”*.

Capacity is however not only capacity to implement. A more structured view is to differentiate between different forms of capacity: (i) political capacity to take informed decisions in the field of DDR – for example in the context of larger SSR challenges, (ii) overall management capacity to run a large and complex program (including financial, budget, planning, monitoring, and knowledge of Bank procedures), (iii) DDR technical capacity (setting up and running centers, identification and verification schemes, logistics for handling transport, awareness of the different groups’ needs, referral systems, support for reintegration, facilitation in the dialogue with local communities etc.), and (iv) physical capacity (infrastructure including offices, supplies and equipment).

There is obviously never a complete absence of capacity. In particular national actors have capacities that the externals do not, especially in understanding the context and having relations to the parties. But CD, particularly of technical and management capacities, often has to be part of the DDR process when the strategy stipulates national ownership.

## 9.2 Capacity Development in MDRP Countries

CD needs varied tremendously across countries, from the CAR where it was an explicit part of the original project design of PRAC, to Rwanda that had experience with a first phase of its DDR program and thus had a solid experience base to build on.

### 9.2.1 Rwanda

In Rwanda strong Government support to the DDR program enabled the RDRC to build needed capacities at both institutional and organizational levels to effectively deliver the RDRP program. The Government delivered policies conducive to supporting RDRP sustainable impacts, and provided political clout to RDRP to negotiate the financing and design of the RDRP with partners as well as to lead national DDR coordination.

The RDRP I was implemented by UNDP. GOR’s decision to implement the second phase through RDRC meant that the Commissions had to strengthen their capacities, adapting capacity building activities to GOR policies (decentralization, war-disabled) and changes in program redesign (adding components such as Education and skills training). A CD plan was designed to meet RDRC’s needs to implement, monitor, evaluate and coordinate functions. The World Bank and other MDRP partners supported RDRC CD efforts.

The RDRP appraisal recognized that the institutional structure required strengthening at all levels: central, provincial and community. It was foreseen that positions could be filled by qualified EXCs. Accordingly, the RDRC developed, with help from MDRP, a capacity

building plan that included a training plan, purchase of equipment, technical assistance (TA), and studies. RDRC officials felt MDRP staff had been helpful and the World Bank played a supportive role through continuous consultations and providing useful inputs throughout program implementation. The RDRP Technical Annex proposed the commissioning of a number of studies, of which a considerable number have been completed.

MDRP Implementation Support Missions were seen as helpful, and MDRP staff provided assistance to the structuring of the RDRC, including the creation of a separate M&E department; and the inclusion of additional activities in order to strengthen support to reintegration and community development, such as vocational training, apprenticeships, formal education, literacy training, psycho-social assistance and labor intensive works known as Community Based Reintegration.

The RDRP evaluation notes that the training program for district officials was helpful, although not sufficient in scope and quality to meet program needs. Staff turn-over at RDRC undermined capacity building efforts, however, with a brain-drain to the private sector.

Informants at RDRC and from the donor community believe insufficient focus was given to build needed capacities for repatriating AG-combatants from DRC. It was expected that, being a regional program, MDRP would come up with more creative strategies to enable the repatriation component to be more effective (e.g. linkages and coordinated activities with MONUC, NGOs and INGOs working in DRC). However, in this connection the MDRP financed a communication consultant to the RDRC.

### *9.2.2 Angola*

In Angola, IRSEM's credibility among implementing partners was low, so the ability of the agency to effectively manage such a complex project in a high risk environment is noteworthy. Capacity building was part of the Special Project administered by UNDP. Through this, IRSEM staff were trained at the start of the project. Before implementation began, an intensive training program was carried out for IRSEM and implementation partners at the central and provincial levels. This allowed IRSEM to take on the complex task of running and monitoring more than 250 sub-projects with a large number of implementation partners, all with varying levels of capacity.

The ADRP had a weak M&E system that remained poor, as noted in the Bank's ISRs and independent evaluation reports. Support to improve M&E was provided by the MDRP, including TA, a strategy for monitoring and evaluation, including guiding principles, tools, procedures for their use and linkages between M&E and the MIS. To overcome weaknesses identified during supervision missions, two additional documents were produced by the MDRP: (a) a guide for the participation of vulnerable groups, including eligibility and selection criteria, registration forms, and procedures to insert their data into the MIS; and (b) a strategy for assistance to disabled ex-combatants (Angola ICR, June 2009).

IRSEM felt that MDRP staff provided important TA and training in areas such as the MIS, M&E, assistance to disabled EXCs and other vulnerable groups (especially women), and organized a very useful study tour in Sierra Leone. However, IRSEM believed that the MDRP support would have had more impact if the funding had been more flexible. The task

of learning and using Bank rules and procedures was made more difficult by the fact that there was no MDRP staff posted in Luanda.

Under the MDRP agreement with Angola, an independent financial management and procurement agent was contracted (KPMG/FRANNAN). Despite this, the program experienced excessive bureaucracy (KPMG/FRANNAN responding to the demands of IRSEM but functioning under World Bank rules and supervision), insufficient pro-activeness on the part of KPMG/FRANNAN, slow response from the Bank on questions regarding procedures and non-objections, limitations of the local market, and limitations on the financial management of Implementation Partners (IPs). Additionally, the low fund limit imposed on the account receiving MDRP funding, delays in the transfer of funds both from abroad and delays due to the procurement procedures slowed down implementation and thus undermined the credibility of the program.

### *9.2.3 Uganda*

In Uganda the ACSP provided the Amnesty Commission with capacities that enabled the institution to function at a level not achieved in the first years of its existence. This contributed to demobilization and reinsertion efforts since it improved the legitimacy of the amnesty process. But insufficient attention was paid to the capacity needed to deliver the project, both at institutional and political levels.

When ACSP was designed, the AC was diagnosed as having serious financial and capacity constraints. The assumption was that GOU would provide the necessary human and financial resources, but GOU support did not materialize at the agreed level. One result was insufficient capacity to address conflict sensitive issues (content of benefits, mechanism to deliver packages to minors and women, risk to Reporters in collecting packages) and linkages to reintegration activities. The final evaluation noted that the project missed the opportunity to build the AC's capacity to effectively fulfill its mandate, so at project closure the AC remains institutionally weak. The foreseen Beneficiary Assessment was not carried out, leaving the Amnesty Commission unable to fully document its results. The Beneficiary Assessment could also have provided better guidance for future DDR activities under the new national DDR project.

### *9.2.4 Central African Republic*

The CAR was clearly a country that required capacity development in all fields of DDR, and the UNDP project document had an important CD component with a set of dimensions that were to be monitored for performance reporting purposes. But no system was really set up, no baseline data collected, and no national system or capacity for collecting, analyzing, disseminating and discussing data was put in place. During the first phase no CD was done, as the project focused on implementing activities itself rather than train national actors, including the national commission (CNDDR).

This weakness was picked up in the mid-term review, resulting in the MDRP placing a full time consultant on the ground to support the project and the CNDDR. USD 200,000 were then also provided to the CNDDR for CD and implementation work, so then considerable learning took place. There was limited direct training, however, so much of the improvements came about due to peer learning from the MDRP consultant and at the TCG events and AC meetings. But it seems clear that a planned CD program could have

addressed the obvious needs much better and faster than the indirect route of largely implicit learning. Since the project did foresee CD, the failure was that an explicit capacity building program had never been designed, staffed or properly budgeted for.

### 9.2.5 *Burundi*

Prior to the start of the national program, Burundi received CD support through a World Bank Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) grant. It funded the preparation of the national program and training and study tours, including visits to the then-ongoing program in Sierra Leone. This had payoffs in the early implementation of the national program, even though elections ultimately resulted in a change in political actors and a new set of project counterparts.

Over the life of the project, the MDRP provided considerable technical support to the Executive Secretariat, including one full time experienced DDR staff based Bujumbura and long term consultants in communications, M&E, and logistics and planning. However, this was not sufficient given the capacity and skill-levels with regards to finances, oversight and management. The risks were set out in the technical annex, and while measures were put in place to improve capacity, the ICR acknowledged it was too limited, which led to issues of mismanagement and delays in implementation (Burundi ICR 2009, p.13).

The 2009 ICR rates the quality of supervision as moderately satisfactory. There were supervision missions four or more times a year from 2005 to 2008, and an MDRP staffer was in place from 2005 to 2008. There were, however, three TTLs during the duration of the project, which the ICR noted led to “the team was not fully able to maintain continuity in supervision and data collection”. But capacity did improve with MDRP assistance, primarily in the technical areas. An assessment of the institutional capacity of the ES in 2005 noted the need for more TA and supervision for the NCDDR, but most of the recommendations were not implemented. Financial management was not given sufficient assistance and supervision, with a lack of internal audits in the NCDDR. In October 2008 a Government commission conducted an audit which led to the dismissal of the ES head.

The ICR concluded that the project would have benefited greatly from more TA and supervision, particularly in 2007 and 2008 with reintegration and assistance to disabled EXCs (Burundi ICR 2009, p. 18). The inadequate capacity affected the NCDRR’s relations with implementing partners; the problems of corruption; and delays in projects.

### 9.2.6 *Democratic Republic of Congo*

The DRC had virtually no capacity in place for handling the PNDDR when it was designed. CONADER was therefore put together as a new body to manage this large-scale and logistically challenging program. The head office was in Kinshasa, with CONADER originally criticized for not being present on the ground where the demobilization and orientation activities took place. Regional offices were eventually established, though flow of information and management continued to be considered weak.

The program had to address a number of unforeseen challenges. CONADER was largely a management body, and contracted out most of the specific tasks to firms, UN bodies or civil society organizations, but then was to manage these contracts. A non-falsifiable identity card system had to be put in place and the data entered real-time in a nation-wide database to ensure that individuals could not receive demobilization benefits more than once. Ensuring

that the monthly payments during the first year of the reintegration process reached the 100,000 plus EXCs was a further monumental task, where cell phone payments seem to have worked amazingly well<sup>1</sup>.

Since CONADER was a new organization, the MDRP provided a USD 5 million project that provided training and supported CONADER in planning and operations. International consultants supported CONADER in areas of strategy and management, operations, logistics, reintegration, communications and sensitization, joint operations, and MIS/M&E, and an international firm provided finance and procurement support. Germany, France and the US financed technical experts, as did the UNDP in gender and reintegration. Finally the MDRP at the peak had eight staff that provided day to day support to CONADER.

This support, however, was not well received. CONADER staff sidelined and at one point pressured internationals to leave. There was strong resistance to the hiring of the firm for financial management and procurement, which led to months of delays.

The MDRP and Bank also provided training to around 600 local staff, but high staff turn-over and variable training meant Bank procedures were not well understood, so “ineligible expenditures” was supposedly an unknown concept for CONADER staff until the issue came up in connection with the corruption audit. Training in M&E and support to develop an M&E unit came quite late in the process.

The inefficiencies and mismanagement eventually led CONADER being dissolved and replaced by the Unit for Project Execution (UEP), in mid-2007. It is a much smaller body consisting for the most part of the best staff selected from CONADER and thus has performed quite well. UEP is given good marks for improved planning, more structured monitoring and supervision, better reporting, and overall more attention to results and close follow-up with the implementation partners in the field. While UEP now has an M&E unit, the training and setting up of this unit has come late in the day.

There has not been a formal CD program in place, and UEP staff felt that the MDRP had seen CONADER/UEP as temporary entities and therefore did not provide sufficient training.

### 9.3 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

In post-conflict societies all forms of skills and organizational capacity needed for DDR tend to be limited or even absent. It is therefore critical that capacity is looked at as an issue in itself, understood, supported and enhanced.

The experiences in the MDRP countries are that there has been a significant degree of technical capacity-building both through MDRP staff on the ground and indirectly through AC and TCG meetings. But since CD was not a defined area of support with a specified objective, there was no strategy, action plan, budget or dedicated staff to coordinate this. The MDRP funding mechanism did not sufficiently target the assistance or adapt it to country-

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<sup>1</sup> An Ernst & Young 2006 audit reported a payment error of only 0.2%. This very impressive result needs to be understood in light of how the system worked: once a person had been identified, the actual electronic transfer by and large did not fail. What the audit did not verify is if the persons identified were eligible, the right persons etc – the audit simply checked if payments were made to those who had been registered as recipients.



specific contexts. As has been seen in other situations, capacity-building has often been more successful in those countries that had the best capacity already in place: “you need capacity to absorb additional capacity”. Those whose capacities were weak struggled more to build them further, and in the case of the DRC there was at times outright opposition to capacity building.

The ability to build capacity is also linked with a presence on the ground to support and mentor progress. The MTR (DAI 2005) highlighted the need for more MDRP field staff, and as a result more were deployed. Local stakeholders and donors noted that even more presence in the field would undoubtedly have strengthened capacity-building activities, since these are management and skills intensive.

The question remains whether the MDRP should have built more DDR capacity or not. One argument was that the need for DDR expertise is time limited and that it is more rational to purchase or hire those skills from outside rather than build up a skills set for which there is time-limited demand. One thing is that large-scale DDR operations tend not to be as quick as hoped for. While Angola was able to carry out its DDR program as one fairly smooth continuous operation, in Burundi, ROC, DRC, Uganda there have been phases and waves of demobilization, and the reinsertion and reintegration processes in particular have taken considerably longer and been more complex than envisaged.

For the Africa region as a whole, the need for DDR skills will – unfortunately – probably remain for some time. Establishing a *regional* skills pool might therefore be quite useful.

Given that there seems to be considerable value-added to having local DDR skills, a formalized program would clearly have been useful. The question is how it should have been structured, because in some sense there may have been an *excess* of new knowledge available: most of the national programs were not able to appropriate and actually put to use all the insights created. There were also extreme time pressures to put in place DDR programs and implement quickly before elections. The challenge may therefore be less on the information/knowledge generation side than on the local adoption, adaptation and application sides. This is partly a national management issue – how much time and resources to set aside for internal learning and implementation – and partly a coordination issue – to what extent the key stakeholders across borders could find together to decide on priorities and see if there were more efficient ways of sharing knowledge and learning.

The country cases show that in some cases there was limited support to more overarching management, planning, quality assurance and financial/accounting management capacities. Much of this would be classic project management skills, where an additional dimension was learning Bank procedures and policies. In most of the countries visited these were skills that local stakeholders felt should have been given a lot more attention, not least of all because these are generic skills that would be useful also outside a DDR context but still applicable to large-scale funding programs.

The MDRP did support capacity-building efforts for program implementation and M&E through technical assistance over the projects and through the Secretariat. This was provided in the form of administrative and management training to staff at Commissions, M&E training and tracer studies, purchase of equipment and software, and study tours. The AC and TCG meetings as well as JSM visits also contributed to aspects of this, though once again without a clear program that contained benchmarking, target values and thus monitorable

deliverables for CD. Given the importance attached to the principle of national ownership, operationalizing this in terms of the various capacities that needed to be in place would presumably have led to more attention to medium-term CD and how to achieve this, both at technical and management levels.

### 9.3.1 Lessons

- DDR support should assume that there will be important capacity constraints, do a first needs assessment, identify critical gaps, and in close dialogue with local stakeholders prepare a CD strategy that encompasses *political, management, technical and physical capacity* needs. The strategy, to be credible, will require an action plan, resources, defined monitorable deliverables and staff for implementation.
- While CD is a long-term development concern and questions should be asked to what extent a time-limited and focused DDR program should allocate resources to this area, DDR programs tend to last longer than expected and forward looking CD programs can thus be good value for money.
- CD is skills and management intensive, which becomes an argument for more permanent presence in the field. This is a costly decision so needs to be carefully considered – but should be weighed against realistic alternatives for delivering DDR objectives.

## 10 Longer-term Impact and Looking Ahead

The MDRP was the largest D&R program the international community has so far undertaken, in terms of number of states involved, individuals demobilized and supported, and funding levels.

The main success criterion is the degree to which the MDRP has contributed to continuous peace, stability and the conditions for recovery and development in the Greater Lakes region, discussed in chapter 7. But another measure is the extent to which the MDRP has generated lessons and positive spillover effects for future D&R interventions.

### 10.1 Program Achievements and Sustainable Results

The MDRP made important contributions to the enhanced stability that has taken place across the Greater Lakes region during the MDRP period. The successful demobilization of 280,000 former combatants plus more than 30,000 children separated from armed groups has meant that over 300,000 individuals have handed in their weapons and been removed from combat command structures and situations. At the same time, the improving political situation and relations in the region gave the various governments more confidence to move ahead with large-scale demobilization, so the two processes reinforced each other.

The *sustainability* of these achievements depends on the framework conditions that the demobilized EXCs face. In Angola, CAR and ROC, the relative internal stability and clear desire on behalf of the EXCs to get on with their lives bodes well. But differences in the underlying socio-political forces are critical. The regional/ethnic differences, cross-border conflicts and overall grinding poverty means that stability in the CAR is more fragile than in the other two, as both Angola and ROC seem to have addressed the political differences better but also have more resources with which to face the future.

The DRC still has unstable regions in the east, and the enormous natural wealth of the country make it a continuous target for outside as well as internal groups that wish to wrest control of these resource streams. The various ethnic-political fault lines remain, albeit not in such extreme forms as in the 1990s. But the last 20-30 years show that it may not take that much to re-ignite a sense of exclusion and anger with possibilities of renewed fighting in the DRC-Rwanda-Burundi triangle.

Whether former combatants can be re-mobilized if unrest reappears will in part depend on the success and sustainability of their reintegration. Ensuring a sense of social belonging and a long-term stake in national economic development provide powerful incentives for former combatants to continue their civilian lives. Supporting national governments address the needs of EXCs will remain an important matter for state stability.

Also important is whether the MDRP has left behind contributions that can reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of violence; that can help contain armed conflicts if and when they occur; and can help to quickly assist the demobilization of those combatants that wish to leave. This depends to a large extent on whether relevant lessons have been learnt and appropriate capacities to address such situations are in place.

### 10.1.1 Regional Approach

One of the most important and ambitious aspects of the MDRP was its regional approach: to engage all the GLR states in joint action in order to address the cross-border dimensions of DDR, but also to help contain possible further or renewed conflagrations.

The individuals and institutions that designed the MDRP were visionary and creative in their efforts, and the MDRP has made important contributions in the field of cross-border collaborative mechanisms for DDR work:

- The MDRP brought all interested governments around the table. That made it more inclusive and perhaps less threatening to those national authorities who on a given issue felt pressured or vulnerable. It also provided a forum to generate consensus and impose coherence on a sometimes fractious international community, exactly to make the pressure on recalcitrant belligerents more effective. The MDRP succeeded to a perhaps surprising extent to pursue these somewhat contradictory objectives: none of the actors invited in ever left the mechanism.
- It provided a sizeable pot of money which was not earmarked, so it was able to quickly program when windows of opportunity appeared. It avoided “aid orphans”, so while the programs of the CAR and ROC could be questioned with regards to regional and strategic importance, the fact that they also received support was important to the credibility of the open-mindedness that the regional approach wanted to convey.
- The MDRP established a unique partnership of national governments, donors, UN bodies and other stakeholders. It created the TCG and AC that brought individuals with similar responsibilities in different countries together and built trust in a region where conflicts had weakened or destroyed whatever meeting places had existed.
- The MDRP brought in technical skills and organizational experience that were helpful to national DDR bodies. These advisers provided a regional perspective to their advice because they themselves participated in the regional-perspective debates and information flows that the MDRP was promoting. While national DDR bodies clearly focused on own responsibilities, they were constantly made aware of how their work compared with or fitted in with what the neighbors’ were doing.
- The MDRP produced new knowledge on issues of regional concern or impact, such as gender, and COFS (Romkema 2007).

While the MDRP had a clear regional approach, there was never a clear regional program as such. On the COFS issue, where MDRP staff spent considerable time and effort, donors were reluctant to give the MDRP a clear role in this field. The pressures, not least of all from the international community, was to get the operational parts of the MDRP – the national programs and special projects – up and running as quickly as possible, and thus time and attention was focused on this.

The *approach* and *mechanisms* which the MDRP established were therefore useful, but perhaps primarily because of the context. The concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of the conflict in the GRL, and its knock-on effects on strategic and economic interests especially in the DRC, were perhaps fairly unique in leading to a consensus about the need for a truly regional approach. This is to a large extent reflected in the fact that most of the MDRP countries are now setting up country-specific MDTFs to continue their DDR programs, and

no longer see the regional dimension as necessary. The donors clearly also agree with this, as they are providing the funding for these country funds.

This is furthermore reflected in the actual *results* achieved as far as more specific *regional* outputs are concerned. The problem of the COFS remains unfinished business, the regional EXC database never came into being, there is no organized regional DDR capacity that can be mobilized in case of future needs. The MDRP as a *mechanism* no longer exists apart from the much-scaled down follow-on Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). There is thus no institutional permanence from the MDRP. While this was never the intention, it means that institutional memory may easily be lost. Anchoring the *lessons* in a permanent, known and accessible institution is thus an issue for future programming.

### 10.1.2 MDRP as a Policy Body

The MDRP was never meant to be a strong *political* actor. It thus was not formally part of the interim coordination body in the DRC (the CIAT), for example. The intention in the MDRP strategy was for the donors to assume main responsibility for this dimension, though this was never spelled out in practical terms and some donors clearly were reluctant to assume this role. The MDRP was encouraged by donors to link up with the regional political processes, such as the International Conference on the Greater Lakes, but largely for information-sharing and possibilities for coordination.

The MDRP invited multilateral actors that were not directly involved in the MDRP to the ACs, in particular the African Union, but it seems to have been present at only one (in 2005), and never played a visible role. While this was an African Union decision and not an MDRP failing, the end result was that the handing-over of MDRP responsibilities was only to national bodies, not to regional ones – perhaps a missed opportunity. The AU and sub-regional bodies clearly have limited capacities in the field of DDR, but at the same time this is an area that they and member governments have signaled as politically important, as reflected in several regional peace-keeping operations like ECOWAS. While the MDRP did not have in its mandate to provide capacity support to supra-national bodies like the AU, the international community might wish to reflect around how best inter-African bodies can be assisted to play a larger and more constructive role in these fields, and how highly operational programs like MDRP can contribute to this.

Regarding the political dimension of the MDRP, it faced two challenges. The first is that sovereign states do not cede much own decision making power to joint mechanisms like an MDRP. The other is that the World Bank, as administrator, both is prevented from taking on a strongly political role by its mandate, but also wants to be seen as a technically focused manager, not a political actor.

Regarding the first issue, there was *more* willingness to join forces at the political level in the case of the MDRP than one could normally expect because (i) there was genuine concern about the potential regional collapse, (ii) there was general acceptance of the fact that the problem was of such a complexity and magnitude than no single actor could address it alone, (iii) there were synergies to be had from bringing in the UN and the Bank, both on the technical and convening power side, (iv) the larger bilateral actors were on different sides of the problem in several instances, and having a more joint mechanism serve as the organizing body provided a neutral arena for hammering out agreements.



While thus pre-conditions for success were largely in place, the MDRP did not succeed to play this role the way some had hoped. In specific instances, notably on the demobilization in DRC, the international community jointly pressured the authorities to take action. But on other occasions either the Bank did not take the initiative or the MDRP was told, such as at a couple of ACs, that it should not overstep its boundaries and engage in issues that were being addressed elsewhere. This was a message that came from some of the big bilateral actors and also parts of the UN. The latter was concerned with “mission creep” by the Bank onto arenas where the UN is mandated to take a lead.

Whether the Bank is a purely technical body or also a political actor is a fairly constant topic of discussion. But it is often convenient to the Bank and the donors to assume that the Bank only play a technical role. In some situations donors do not want the Bank to enter the stage since it has considerable weight and may interfere with donor agendas. In other situations it is useful to all parties that the Bank is seen as providing fairly neutral technical advice, which makes it easier for the parties to come to an agreement. The criticism of the Bank that it did not more successfully intervene politically in issues like the COFS must therefore be seen up against the advantages of presenting a more neutral façade<sup>2</sup>.

The MDRP has therefore not left any specific regional or any principled political legacy when it comes to DDR. It has shown the potential and the limitations of joint political action in the context of shared DDR work, but that such consensus-based deliberative bodies face major and structural hurdles when it comes to joint political action.

### *10.1.3 Capacity Development*

Lack of policy formulating and implementing capacity was known to be a major challenge. But capacity development was not viewed as a strategic element of the program, so there was never an analysis of what kinds of capacity ought to be strengthened for what purpose within the MDRP as a program or in the individual program countries. Burundi seems to have been the only place where a mapping of needs and capacities was carried out, but even that one was limited to the national DDR commission rather than the larger program.

The MDRP never developed a strategic vision of how the MDRP could contribute longer-term to Africa’s ability to address future DDR operations better. One possibility could have been to look at options for developing DDR capacity plan for the GLR, which by extension could have been thought of for Africa. Not pursuing such an avenue was probably an opportunity missed.

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<sup>2</sup> The UN, with its political mandate in conflict situations, has found that the direct interventionist role does not necessarily win you friends. The UN role in Angola led to strained relations with the authorities for a number of years. While MONUC was key to stabilizing the DRC, the strong role of the UN during the Transitional Government phase rankled on the DRC side, and was one of the reasons the authorities wanted the Bank to take over the lead role on the MDRP. The spill-over from this mandate to assume quasi-government responsibilities in situations where government presence is weak is a contributing factor to why the UN is at times seen as overstepping its role on service delivery tasks. This was one reason UNDP was not asked to take the lead in Rwanda when MDRP funding came, and was a major part of the criticism of UNDP’s role in the PRAC.

## 10.2 Knowledge Generation and Quality Assurance

The MDRP was a complex program addressing a high-risk activity in a fragile state setting. The level of knowledge about the issues was probably lower and the probability of something going wrong was therefore higher here than in most other fields the World Bank provides financing for. Given the USD 500 million funding level and the political stakes in the program, one would have expected a fairly aggressive learning and quality assurance program as a means of managing this high risk.

### *10.2.1 Generating new Knowledge*

As of 2005, the MDRP increased the studies and reports produced. In some fields, especially gender, the program has tried to be more systematic about embedding and applying this in national programs. Getting funding for the LEAP component has been important and will presumably continue to produce new insights and should provide a basis for better operational performance in this field. Three dimensions to knowledge management could have been addressed better.

The first is a more strategic view of what kinds of knowledge the MDRP could generate. This is a failure of the larger partnership, since there do not seem to have been pro-active inputs and ideas provided by the other actors for an MDRP knowledge agenda<sup>3</sup>. This is disappointing since there were important issues where the MDRP could have generated new data: individual versus community benefits; the appropriateness of cash versus in-kind benefits; how to link the first-stage reinsertion into local communities with longer-term sustainable reintegration; what kinds of psycho-social support can realistically be provided in fragile state contexts that can address the longer-term problems EXCs and in particular former child soldiers face, etc.

The second dimension is the lack of a systematic link between known knowledge management institutions and the MDRP. Donor countries could have been more constructive and forthcoming in terms of offering services from own research institutions that are known to be working in these fields, for example through contracts that would provide a more systematic series of studies or monitoring services to the MDRP. While the MDRP has had resource persons from such institutions carry out studies or provide introductions at AC or TCG events, what has been lacking is more systematic contracting, which would have helped get more long-term structure into the knowledge generation.

The third dimension is that national DDR bodies should have received more assistance to appropriate, adapt and apply the new knowledge that was generated by the MDRP, both on the policy and operational sides. While all of this was made accessible on the web-site, acquiring new capacity is costly. External knowledge management institutions or other relevant bodies could have been part of the answer by contracting them to assist national DDR bodies build capacities in these areas.

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<sup>3</sup> This is not saying that DDR work was not on-going elsewhere. The large-scale effort of the UN system to develop the Integrated DDR Standards – IDDRS – was being carried out during this period, and a number of studies were being funded by bilateral donors, and the MDRP web-site provided links to a number of these resources.

### 10.2.2 Quality Assurance

Variability in project objectives and implementing arrangements, differences in the monitoring and variable qualitative of M&E noted in section 5.3.2 meant that the MDRP did not have sufficient data from all program countries to track overall program performance along some important dimensions.

One answer to this problem might have been a contract with one or more research or evaluation milieus to help build local monitoring systems and skills through structured monitoring. Another possibility was to fund an arrangement similar to the one on the finance and procurement in the DRC by contracting a body to make up part of the secretariat but accountable for the work done.

## 10.3 DDR External Links

The MDRP strategy lays out the limitations of DDR as a tool: it is addressing an immediate security threat, and thus is an important – sometimes necessary – but not sufficient step to durable peace and stability. This in turn is a prerequisite for longer-term socio-economic and political development. The DDR thus often represents the famous “window of opportunity” that might appear when a stable phase appears during a conflict.

The ability to respond quickly, constructively, appropriately and comprehensively to D&R needs is the “internal” challenge that any DDR program needs to address. But the need for links both upstream and downstream to the DDR program is also something the MDRP Strategy had identified as an issue the MDRP needed to tackle, and something the Advisory Committee debated on several occasions.

### 10.3.1 Upstream Links

One of the ambitions of the MDRP was to assist countries redirect resources away from the security sectors towards social development. While not formally part of the MDRP results framework (see table 7.1), and probably an unrealistic objective within the relatively short time span of a DDR process, it reflects the concern that DDR – a costly operation in the short run – needs to show stakeholders that it will free up important resources for social development over the medium term, and thus build a strong political commitment for DDR from this perspective. Little has been achieved in this area. As previously noted, the short term budget implications of DDR is often for *increases* to the security sector. But for the idea of the DDR as providing medium-term fiscal benefits, the MDRP and the World Bank in general could have tried to develop some medium-term fiscal scenarios that showed how this could be achieved. There is a question of how important the fiscal argument is for mobilizing political support for DDR, but as long as the argument is being made, the actors should have made more of an effort to make it credible.

The need for conceptual and real links to SSR was identified in the MDRP strategy and discussed in early AC meetings. The Secretariat prepared a concept paper on the issue for debate, and it was to be followed up, but little happened. This was mostly an issue for the donors and the UN, since the Bank cannot engage much in SSR discussions except with regards to public finance management (PFM) dimensions. This aspect of SSR was raised at the AC, and could have been pursued by the Bank both from the short-run general budget balance perspective, but even more from the medium-term fiscal and development point of

view. The argument made by the IMF at the November 2005 AC – that large-scale DDR programs may have important budgetary consequences – points to the need for the Bank to take the macro-economic aspects of big DDR interventions more seriously.

The Bank has historically not included the security sector in its PFM work, but has lately done so in a couple of fragile state contexts, such as Afghanistan. This would no doubt be useful in a number of GLR states as well. A suggestion was made in the DRC but rejected by officials there while a study on SSR in the CAR has contributed to the SSR work there. To what extent this would have generated value-added to public budgeting and planning is not clear – the security sectors tend to be politically sheltered – but since the MDRP had made this a point of discussion it should have been pursued more by the partnership as such.

### 10.3.2 Downstream Links

The critical downstream link that has been pointed to is the concern that EXC reintegration is sustainable, which means that the first-phase DDR-supported reinsertion and reintegration is followed up by more long-term economic and social integration and development efforts. This is largely a government responsibility. But the MDRP could have or the TDRP might still assist governments think through possibilities and options regarding how to ensure the long-term success of their costly DDR efforts.

Here the links to the Bank's Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and countries' own Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are variable. In Rwanda, the government included the issue of EXCs into its PRSP thinking, noting the need for ensuring the sustainability of the reintegration through providing realistic livelihoods options for those demobilized. In other countries this has not been addressed, except at a *pro forma* level. One argument that has been raised, however, is that a country (and a CAS) cannot have a particular beneficiary group as the point of departure for its analysis and programming. The poverty challenges all of these countries face are massive, and there are numerous beneficiary groups that need to be included – not least of all the *victims* of the violence rather than the perpetrators of it. Despite this, the Bank's country economist in one of the key countries noted that they "missed the boat" on providing at least a political signal in the CAS by mentioning EXCs as groups that should be given consideration when programs like labor-intensive road construction or agricultural rehabilitation is mentioned.

The other aspect of this is the linkage to civil society actors in general – how to strengthen the knowledge about and ability to support the reintegration of EXCs. In Angola and the DRC, international, national and local NGOs/CSOs have been involved in activities such as training and micro-credit provision, supporting child soldiers, and so on. But more work could have been done to support and organize CSO contributions and longer-term involvement in the reintegration of EXCs and in particular vulnerable EXC groups

## 10.4 The MDRP Mechanism

The MDRP should revisit (i) the links between the MDRP and its external partners, and (ii) the role and management of a program such as the MDRP inside the Bank.

### 10.4.1 Links to External Partners

The partners to the MDRP should carry out a critical reflection on the rights and obligations of partners in consensus-based mechanisms that are established to deliver important public goods. The matrix that the MDRP developed in 2005 is a constructive starting point for clarifying a number of questions (chapter 6).

When it comes to *funding* commitments, several issues should be looked into. One is how binding commitments are by donors. The case of one donor wishing to withdraw funding committed created anxieties within the MDRP that should have been unnecessary.

The other is the equity of burden-sharing. In many MDTFs, the “80-20” rule holds: 20% of the donors provide 80% of the funding. In the case of the MDRP, the Dutch provided nearly half the funding. This imbalance may expose the more generous donors to a sense of others not contributing their fair share thus in fact *increasing* the riskiness of the generosity of the big donors.

The voluntary nature of MDTFs makes them very different from the assessed contributions that a UN Security Council is able to impose in the case of peace-keeping operations. But this major difference between how funding is provided for global or regional public goods that are quite close in nature is worth reviewing. This is not an issue to be raised in the context of the MDRP, but should be part of a larger dialogue within the international community about how joint mechanisms like MDTFs can be made more robust and predictable for such medium-term larger-than-usual efforts.

A particular issue is the costs of running such an operation. The original shoe-string budget of around 2% of the funding and the underlying assumptions of a minuscule secretariat in Washington was unrealistic. In the end the overhead costs nearly tripled, which the donors accepted, but less than 6% overhead must still be considered low for the complexity of the program and the difficulty of the environment. Given the number of knowledge generation and quality assurance tasks that were *not* carried out, it is clear that a realistic management budget could have been even higher, especially if more of the activities were to be based in the region.

Another dimension that should be looked at concerns the *contents provision* to the common mechanism. The MDRP Secretariat was largely on its own when it came to this aspect of the program, whereas there is considerable potential for more external contributions, as noted above. One thing is that bilateral donors tend to think of MDTFs as a simple service that they are purchasing by having the MDTF secretariat take on all the tasks. But donor country knowledge management institutions could be a major asset for such joint mechanisms.

A greater failure was the lack of a more inclusive dialogue with the UN system. There are a number of issues that need sorting out in the dialogue between these two parts of the multilateral system, as is well known. The substantial improvements in the high-level dialogue between them over the last couple of years in the fields of fragile and conflict-affected states are very positive. But there needs to be a much richer dialogue on the technical levels as well. The Bank has been invited to participate in the UN working group in the field of DDR, where among other things the IDDRS is discussed and further refined. To some Bank staff, this is a time intensive activity that they feel they can ill afford given the scarcity of own DDR capacities. But this raises the question of whether the Bank and the UN can come to an agreement on possible divisions of labor and responsibilities. The FPA opens



up for easier mutual contracting under MDTFs and thus can make the larger discussion on task sharing easier to address. There are a series of issues that must be resolved, however, such as the Bank's concern that some UN agencies, and UNDP in particular, improve their management and commitment to document results when assuming responsibilities for implementation.

#### *10.4.2 Bank Commitment to DDR*

Another question is the capacity and priority the Bank intends to accord DDR. Several statements by Mr. Zoellick over the last several years show a greater concern for DDR within the Bank. But the Bank has not demonstrated strong leadership on DDR, there is no obvious "champion" of the MDRP at the Africa Region level as there was in the early years, nor does the Bank appear to have taken steps to translate the general concerns voiced by Mr. Zoellick into enhanced capacity.

The establishment of the Fragile and Conflict Affected States unit in the OPCS Vice Presidency is a major improvement in terms of the Bank's overall grouping of its capacities to work in fragile environments. But the unit does not have DDR as an explicit area of concern in terms of operational capacity that can support the regions. DDR capacity in the Bank was largely in the MDRP, yet over the last couple of years several senior DDR experts have left both that program but also the field of DDR and no replacements have so far been recruited. The Africa Region, which is the most affected by conflict, has one conflict adviser whose remit goes well beyond the more narrow field of DDR, so the operational unit in the Bank has also not built its capacity in this field.

Whether the Bank should or really wants to assume greater responsibilities in the field of DDR is thus an issue to clarify. The question is if this high-risk activity that requires considerable senior management attention is strategic enough to the Bank's core concerns that it will commit management time to this. The fact that the Bank was willing to take on the MDRP at the time the program was designed is highly commendable: whereas the Bank had managed several large-scale DDR programs before then, most had been based on peace agreements being in place so that the parameters for the intervention were reasonably clear. In the case of the MDRP, not only was the program regional and thus quite fluid, but in key countries like the DRC the situation was one of open conflict, and hence extreme risk.

The Bank's procedures are not set up to handle this kind of unpredictability, and senior skills and risk-takers are required to make this work. But while the Bank has improved its operational procedures (OP 8.0), the Bank's Board has made it clear that it wants to align trust fund operations with normal Bank procedures. The Bank may therefore be negating its own work at becoming more relevant in fragile state environments by removing flexibility and risk-taking. A number of staff interpret the signals from the Board as implying that working in high-risk environments is not going to be rewarded. This would make it important that Bank management make clear what policies and intentions actually are.

Large-scale funding for DDR can in part be done through an MDTF, like in the MDRP. Parts of the management can be contracted out or particular skills can be hired in to ensure that quality assurance – both at entry and during implementation – are handled well. The one task the Bank cannot relinquish is the overall management responsibilities. This requires above all a clear commitment from senior management and the deployment of qualified staff.

## 10.5 Findings, Conclusions and Lessons

The MDRP succeeded in demobilizing over 300,000 armed combatants, which is a major contribution to regional stability. The *sustainability* of this demobilization is fragile in several of these countries, however, pointing to the need for a DDR program to track and – where needed – help program longer-term reintegration and not be limited to a ring-fenced Demobilization and Reinsertion program.

The regional *approach* of the MDRP has been critical for bringing a wide range of actors around the table, providing a non-threatening environment to parties that may be in conflict, mobilizing resources for joint programming, and providing a forum for exchange of views, experiences and new knowledge. But regional/cross-border *results* such as in the field of COFS, remained scarce.

The MDRP played an important role in quasi-political terms at the height of the concerns of a Greater Lakes debacle, but as soon as key actors felt that the issue was within manageable bounds, the level of political engagement in the MDRP fell. The *regional* and *policy* dimensions of the MDRP have thus been less important than originally envisaged.

The actors clearly appreciated the regional mechanism for learning and meeting, and especially since there were no other such joint forum available at the level of the DDR bodies. But the follow up to the MDRP is in the form of national MDTFs – each country has wanted to manage its program and resources more directly, to ensure tailoring to their particular conditions. The bottom line therefore seems to be that the value-added of setting up a fairly sophisticated and expensive regional mechanism must be seen as obvious and beneficial to all, as was the case with the MDRP in its initial stages.

Lack of capacity is always an issue in fragile state contexts, yet no capacity development strategy was proposed, nor a capacity needs assessment done or discussed. This should have included strategic/policy capacities; project management and financial/ accounting skills; and technical DDR knowledge. The MDRP did provide significant capacity support in key countries such as the DRC, though the view that DDR operations will be so short-lived that there is neither time nor need for training is for the Africa region as a whole unfortunately not true. The MDRP probably represented a missed opportunity for creating a more structured DDR skills pool.

The MDRP as a complex program in fragile environments required good quality assurance and provided opportunities for generating new knowledge. On the knowledge side much was done, but a more structured program based on priority issues to study, collaborating with external research institutes/knowledge management centers, and more attention to helping national DDR bodies acquire, adapt and apply new knowledge was not exploited.

Quality assurance was variable, in part as a function of the quite differing framework conditions. The MDRP countries thus did not produce monitoring data that would permit a more carefully differentiated picture of achievements and shortfalls. Contracting external actors to set up or even carry out these tasks and build local capacities could have been done along the same lines as was done for financial accounting and management in the DRC, though it should be noted that some countries were not interested in more rigorous performance tracking.

The MDRP Strategy noted the need for the program to develop upstream and downstream linkages, to ensure embeddedness in national politics and resource allocation decisions. While these issues were discussed on a number of occasions, there was insufficient follow-up. This is one area where the MDRP as a more political body could have and should have succeeded, and where the shortcomings are ones of the collective partnership, as the donors in all the countries were engaged in various of these areas. The lack of results in these fields is to some extent also a function of the often limited national ownership of the DDR program as restricted to national authorities and viewed as a technical concern rather than as an integral part of the national development agenda.

The voluntary nature of donor funding to collaborative mechanisms like MDTFs may leave the administrator of the MDTF vulnerable to shifts in donor priorities. One way of addressing this is trying to ensure a reasonably balanced funding profile and avoiding the “all eggs in one basket” problem when one or a few donors are totally dominant. But the formal commitment should also be clarified so that high-risk programs do not face a problem of uncertainty and unpredictability when it comes to financing.

Realistic costing of administering and quality assuring large-scale programs in difficult environments needs to be reviewed. Delivery of results with the kinds of quality and documentation that the international community demands is much more costly than in standard development environments, and overhead costs should reflect this.

The dialogue with the UN is improving, the FPA provides a better basis for mutual funding of activities, but there is still some way to go before the Bank is at ease with some of the UN agencies as implementing partners, and before the UN is comfortable with the Bank as a legitimate actor in DDR. Clarity on roles and capacities need more work and requires cooperation and good will on both sides.

But the major question is the extent to which the Bank wants to take on a leadership role in DDR. This is among the most risky and thus management-demanding tasks per dollar spent within the Bank, and one where current management seems ambiguous to what extent it wishes to assume responsibility. While speeches show greater concern and understanding of the DDR issue and the new OP 8.0 offers more flexibility, the trend towards greater alignment of procedures indicates less risk-taking and a reluctance to accept that DDR cannot be “business as usual”.

### 10.5.1 Lessons

- The regional dimension of the MDRP was to a large extent a success, but also a child of its times: the GLR grabbed widespread attention until the crisis subsided and its regional-political role fell. While it was able to generate high-level political support in the early phase, this commitment on the donor side decreased – a dynamic which is to be expected but needs to be borne in mind when setting up such complex mechanisms. Temporary joint mechanisms like the MDRP are therefore generally better at addressing *technical* concerns, so expectations need to be realistic when it comes to results that depend on *political* action and decision.
- Upstream (policy, SSR) and downstream (sustainable reintegration) links to DDR need to be systematically identified and as far as possible established. While *implementing* such linked-in programs are beyond the scope and time horizon of a

DDR process, the Impact and Sustainability of steps taken under DDR will increase with the inclusion of DDR into these broader agendas.

- Funding for important public goods like peace and stability requires more predictable and equitable funding than the *ad hoc* trust fund mobilizations of the MDRP. This is a challenge for the international community in general.
- Joint mechanisms are vulnerable to loss of institutional memory and “lessons learned”. The MDRP, as an important DDR program, needs to ensure that a repository for the institutional memory is found.
- If the World Bank wishes to continue playing a lead role in DDR, it should look critically at the experience of the MDRP to assess whether it has appropriate systems, staffing policies, procedures and instruments when it comes to supporting what is presumably the most high-risk activity the Bank engages in.

## Annex A: Terms of Reference

### *End of Program Evaluation, Terms of Reference, November 2008*

#### *Summary*

This note sets out the draft Terms of Reference for an end of program evaluation of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Great Lakes Region in Africa. This note outlines the background to the regional program including its history and structure. This is followed by the objectives of the evaluation including reference to a draft framework for analysis and final sections on scope/ methodology and schedule for delivery.

#### *Background*

Since the early 1990s the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been embroiled in a series of closely interlinked conflicts. These conflicts are the result of a complex interaction of domestic and cross-border factors in several countries of the region. Several peace initiatives, often led by African leaders, have sought to foster peaceful settlements among the parties. Most of these have included Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) provisions as integral parts of the peace agreements.

Endorsed in donor meeting in Paris in May 2002 by eleven donor partners and the World Bank, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was established to support a regional planning, financing and implementation framework for the demobilization and reintegration (D&R) of an estimated 400,000 combatants in GLR. The program targets ex-combatants in seven countries: Republic of Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo (ROC), Rwanda and Uganda. Based upon the framework of the 1999 Lusaka peace agreement the focus of the program has been the DRC with the establishment of other national programs seen as a major contribution to regional peace and stability. The MDRP will be closing on June 30, 2009.

The design of the MDRP was based on a strategy prepared by the World Bank in consultation with interested stakeholders (including governments, donors and UN agencies) and approved by the World Bank board of directors in March 2002.<sup>4</sup> Objectives set out in the strategy were: (i) to provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts; (ii) to establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization for demobilization and reintegration; and (iii) to serve as platform for national consultative processes. The strategy also presents ten guiding principles for the MDRP as follows: national ownership, confidence building, harmonization of DDR activities, knowledge sharing, optimization of external assistance, special target groups, special projects, coordination of reconstruction efforts, transparency, and flexibility.<sup>5</sup> The MDRP financed the following main activities:

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<sup>4</sup> Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, March 25 2002

<sup>5</sup> Page XXX, Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration.



- **National D&R programs** in Angola, Burundi, the DRC, the ROC and Rwanda.
- **Special projects** in Angola, Burundi, the CAR, the DRC and Uganda which focus on special needs groups such as child soldiers.
- **Knowledge generation and dissemination** among MDRP partners and the larger international community.
- **Regional and cross-borders initiatives**, such as support for the demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of combatants operating on foreign soil (COFS) and cross-cutting themes such as gender.

To carry out the above activities, the lead agency, the World Bank, established the following key structures:

- The **MDRP Partnership**, which included national governments (with primary responsibility for the implementation of national programs) donor governments (represented by MDRP focal points), key bilateral and multilateral players including UN agencies and peacekeeping missions, the World Bank and other actors involved in D&R in the region. Three entities composed of members of the partnership make up the governance structure of the MDRP (Advisory Committee, Trust Fund Committee and Technical Coordination Group);
- The **MDRP Secretariat**, which was housed in the World Bank and was responsible for facilitating and overseeing the implementation of MDRP and providing technical support to country clients; and
- The **MDRP Trust Fund**, which includes both a Government-executed portion to finance D&R operations, as well as a World Bank-executed portion that funds the MDRP Secretariat, Special Projects, technical support to project counterparts and regional activities.

Policy-makers and analysts increasingly agree that DDR programs are an effective tool for stabilizing postwar environments.<sup>6</sup> This said, DDR is but one key factor contributing to peace and security and is not meant to be a substitute for the political processes required to bring about peace. Indeed, D&R is a process that “buys time for peace”, in other words it provides a small window for peace so that the underlying causes of conflict and war can be addressed and resolved. The MDRP Regional Strategy recognizes the limitations of D&R and, in addition to political solutions, identifies the following complementary factors as relevant to the success of D&R: security (including local security, security sector reform, civilian disarmament, and voluntary disarmament); economic and social recovery. The range of factors contributing to peace and security has methodological implications when it comes to evaluating D&R programs.

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<sup>6</sup> See Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy (2007). “Demobilization and Reintegration,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (4): 531-567; Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2004). “Greed and grievance in civil war,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 2004 56(4):563-595; doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.

### *Implementation of the MDRP*

The program has undergone a number of phases:

- **First phase: 2002-2004** – negotiation and launching of national programs, the primary MDRP financing window, in Angola, Burundi, DRC, ROC and Rwanda. All these were new programs save for the Rwanda program which was a continuation of early efforts at D&R in the late 1990s.

During this first phase whilst grant agreements were being negotiated and new government structures created, the MDRP financed a number of Special Projects. These were intended to support national D&R processes where for political reasons (Uganda) or capacity reasons (CAR) the government was not prepared to have a national program. In turn, these Special Projects financed early D&R activities, for example with a focus on children, in advance of the national programs.

- **Second Phase: 2004-2008** – implementation of national programs, continuation of coordination, and work on cross-border issues such as combatants on foreign soils. During this time also the MDRP Secretariat expanded from 6 to 20 staff at its peak, including short term and extended term consultants in support of national structures.
- **Third and Final Phase: 2008-2009** – closure of programs (the first in March 2008 in DRC) and creation of new single country operations (such as in Uganda). All projects are due to close by end of 2008 save for the ROC which will close in March 2009 and for the parent MDTF to close in June 2009.

### *Objectives*

The objectives of the end of program evaluation are three-fold:

- i) To identify the results of the MDRP vis-à-vis the objective of demobilizing and reintegrating 400,000 ex-combatants in the GLR (through the support of national D&R programs, special projects, knowledge generation and dissemination and regional and cross border activities) and assess if these activities contributed to the MDRP's development goal of increased peace and security in the GLR.
- ii) To identify the factors that contributed to the results achieved with a focus on analyzing the effect of the innovative design features/principles of the MDRP on which the program was designed and based.
- iii) To identify lessons and present recommendations for future programming and operations as well as for institutional stakeholders such as the Bank and its donor partners.

### *Scope and Methodology*

The evaluation would be carried out in three phases. A first phase would involve a review of documents and literature, data collection (both quantitative and qualitative) on the results of the MDRP in terms of the first objective, and the design of analytical framework to understand the factors contributing to the results of the MDRP (see attached annex for key features, issues and questions to be considered in the analytical framework). A second phase would involve interviewing and data collection using the analytical framework. A third phase would involve report preparation.

The evaluation will proceed as follows:

### **First Phase**

- a. Selection of a team leader, and a two-four person team with the requisite D&R technical, sub-regional, international and institutional knowledge;
- b. A review of existing sector, regional and D&R program knowledge conducted to inform the formulation of evaluation criteria and to assess the overall MDRP strategy;
- c. Review of existing studies, national country program evaluations, independent evaluations and key MDRP partnership documents such as the mid-term review.
- d. Preparation of a draft section one of the report, the results of the MDRP, and finalization of an analytical framework and detailed work-plan.

### **Second Phase**

Interviews with key stakeholders including:

- a. Counterpart offices and field offices in all seven countries of operation – Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda;
- b. Donor country and partner representatives in Washington, DC during the MDRP March meetings as well as national capitals as needed;
- c. Current and former MDRP staff.

These interviews will facilitate a multi-faceted assessment of the implementation of the MDRP.

### **Third Phase**

Finalization of report based on qualitative analysis outlined above.

#### ***Reporting, Implementation Plan and Chronology***

- Draft TORs submitted – November 2008
- Selection Process of Team Leader – November 2008
- TORs shared and finalized – December 2008
- Recruitment of other team members – December 2008
- Activity to commence – January 2009
- Interim findings in inception report (10-15pages) – February 2009
- Preliminary findings presented by way of Interim Report (15-20 pages) (with a PowerPoint Presentation) – March 2009
- First Draft Report delivered (English version – 60 pages)– April 2009
- Translations into French/ Portuguese – April 2009
- Commentary – May 2009
- Finalization of report – June 2009

The consultancy team will work independently from the MDRP Secretariat. However, a liaison focal point from the Secretariat will: (i) assist in setting up appointments and helping with travel; and (ii) assist in compiling key documents not found on the MDRP website.

### *Budget*

An in-depth budget will be prepared before the TORs are finalized.

### *Consultant Qualifications*

The consultancy should comprise a team of four persons, including:

- A team leader
- One expert in the DDR of ex-combatants
- One consultant specialized in institutional development in post-conflict settings
- One local consultant with knowledge of DDR and/or post-conflict programming.

The team leader should have in-depth knowledge of World Bank procedures, the international system, multi-donor trust funds, DDR, and post-conflict situations in the Great Lakes region.

### *Attachment 1: Framework for Analysis*

- **Partnership:** The MDRP was designed on the basic premise that no single donor or agency would be able to address the complexity of DDR issues in the Great Lakes Region and that partnerships would be essential for establishing links to critical areas such as security sector and civilian arms reduction. The key question to be addressed in the evaluation was whether the MDRP Partnership contributed to the results and achievements of the program and if so, how? If not, why not and what could have been done to strengthen the impact of the Partnership on the program? What roles were donor partners expected to play in implementing the regional strategy? Did they fulfill these roles? Did the MDRP further international donor coordination as expected? Did donors avoid funding parallel initiatives? Were relevant comparative strengths brought to bear? Were there missed opportunities for linkages and partnership? Did the partnership bring about a complementarity of inputs on the security, diplomatic and humanitarian fronts? Did the partnership successfully tackle cross-border issues? A starting point will be the MDRP matrix of roles and responsibilities agreed to by the partners in Kinshasa in May 2005.<sup>7</sup>
- **Regional Approach:** The MDRP was designed as a regional program with the objective of: (i) *building confidence* for mutual disengagement by improving transparency across programs and encouraging cooperation among participating countries; (ii) *harmonizing approaches* and the treatment of ex-combatants of all parties to the conflicts strengthening collaboration between key regional and international actors; (iii) *knowledge sharing*: and capacity-building across countries; (iv) *supporting cross-border activities* that facilitate the disarmament and demobilization and reintegration of irregular forces operating in areas outside of the control of national authorities and providing resettlement assistance in third countries to ex-combatants who will not return to their country of origin; and (v) providing flexible financing and optimizing resource allocation across countries. How effective was the MDRP's regional approach in these five areas? What difficulties did the MDRP encounter in implementing a regional approach? How could these difficulties have been surmounted? Was it worth it or would a country by country approach have been just as effective?
- **National Ownership/Implementation:** One of the distinguishing features of the MDRP was its emphasis on national ownership, which was to be achieved by having national governments responsible for implementing DDR programs (the exception was CAR where the UNDP was contracted to manage the D&R program). The evaluation would thus examine if national implementation contributed to greater ownership, and in turn if this contributed to program results and achievements? Under what political and institutional conditions was national implementation effective?
- **Programming Features:** Key features included supporting disarmament as a distinct phase without associated benefits; eligibility criteria which included combatants with arms and excluded groups such as women associated with fighting forces; reinsertion

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<sup>7</sup> Matrix of Roles and Responsibilities within the Partnership of the MDRP, 23 May 2005



benefits in the form of cash payments to maximize beneficiary choice and reduce administrative costs; and targeted reintegration support. A special projects window was established to provide assistance in areas not controlled by national authorities, to act as a precursor or replace a national program or program component, to supplement or support a national program (e.g. child soldier activities), and to provide a flexible response in the case of an emergency.

- **Institutional Arrangements:** Following on the principle of partnership, institutional arrangements for the MDRP were designed to facilitate the participation of national, regional and international stakeholders. Two committees were set up: one for addressing policy issues under the program (Advisory Committee) and one for MDTF financing issues (Trust Fund Committee); and a technical coordination group (TCG) on national counterparts established to promote knowledge sharing. An MDRP Secretariat was established in the World Bank to oversee and facilitate the implementation of the MDRP. For its part, the Bank's role was to (i) house and manage the MDRP Secretariat; (ii) administer the MDTF; and (iii) co-finance of national programs. An MDRP Secretariat was set up to this end. In addition, the MDRP established joint supervision missions on a yearly or bi-yearly basis to monitor progress in-country, promote information sharing and generate lessons from the program. Mission members included staff from the Secretariat and focal points of partner organizations. The evaluation will involve examining these different institutional elements with a view to identifying how they contributed/hindered the MDRP from reaching its objectives and how institutional arrangements could have been altered to increase results.
- **Financing Arrangements:** The MDRP established two windows, IDA and a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to mobilize grant resources from the donor community. The assumption was that a consolidated funding mechanism would help to: ensure comprehensive and well-coordinated donor support to the program, facilitate the involvement of donors that might otherwise not be able to participate, minimize duplication of efforts, reduce the administrative burden on governments through the application of one set of implementation procedures, and strengthen program ownership on the part of governments. Funds were co-mingled and non-tied. The MDRP started with a funding gap that will only be closed when the program ends, total funding needs are identified, and budgets are consolidated. Key questions include how did the financial arrangements contribute to or impede program results? Did the financial mechanisms used allow for rapid and flexible disbursement of funds? Is there an appropriate balance between simplicity and controls regarding procurement?

## Annex B: List of Informants

### Angola

#### *Government Officials*

General António Francisco de Andrade, Director, IRSEM

Mr. Fernando Gonçalves, Program Manager, IRSEM

Ms. , Chief, Financial Department, IRSEM

#### *Other Informants*

Dr. Fernando Gonçalves, FMPU Manager

### Burundi

#### *Government and DDR commission Officials*

Gén-Bde Félix Mvukiye, Chef de Cabinet du Ministre, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants

Lieutenant-Général Germain Niyoyankana, Minister of Defence, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants

Col. Isaïe Nibizi, Conseiller Principal Défense / Sécurité, 1ère-vice Présidence de la République

Mr. Jérобоam Nzikobanyankaa, Secrétaire Exécutif, CNDRR

Mr. Herman Tuyaga, Conseiller Principal du Bureau Chargé des Questions Economiques, Présidence

Mr. Silas Ntigurirwa, previous Secrétaire Exécutif, CNDRR

Mr. Charles Muvira, Consultant, former head of economic reintegration, CNDRR

Mr. Simon Kururu, Consultant, former Director for information and sensitization at CNDDR

#### *National and international implementing partners and others*

Ms. Leanne Bayer, Chief of Party, PADCO Burundi

Mr. Joseph Bigirumwami, President, Ikibiri

Mr. Poncien Bikebako, Director, management unit, Twitezimbere, Bujumbura

Ms. Claudette Gravel, National Coordinator, Oxfam Québec

Mr. Gilbert Batungwanayo, Consultant, GFA Consulting Group

#### *International Partners*

Ms. Bintou Keita, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, BINUB

Mr. Gustavo Gonzalez, Country Director, UNDP

Mr. Mbaye Faye, Director SSR-SA, BINUB

Mr. Gérard Chagniot, Senior SSR Advisor, SSR-SA, BINUB

Mr. Hunter Fraser, SSR-SA Officer, SSR-SA, BINUB

Mr. Arthur Boutellis, Programme Officer, SSR-SA, BINUB

#### *Donor Officials*

Mr. Gilles Landsberg, First Secretary, *Belgian Embassy*

Mr. Alain Darthenucq, Ambassadeur Chef de Délégation, *EU*

Mr. Yves Manville, First Secretary, *French Embassy*

Mr. Arthur Kibbelaar, First Secretary, *Netherlands Embassy*

Ms. Vibeke Soegaard, First Secretary, *Norwegian Embassy*

Ms. Sue Hogwood, Head, *DFID, UK*

#### *World Bank Staff*

Ms. Mercy Tembon, Country Manager, Burundi

Mr. Madjior Dingamadji, former MDRP Secretariat Representative in Burundi

### Central African Republic

Scanteam visited the CAR in 2006 on a general review of MDTFs, and material from some of those interviews have been used here and those informants are thus also listed below.

#### 2009 Interviews

##### *Government Officials*

H.E., Mr. Jean-Francis Bozizé, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Ex-combatants, War Victims, Disarmament, and Restructuring of the Armed Forces

Mr. Etienne Mpecko, Deputy Coordinator, CNPDR

Comandant Jules Kogbia, National DDR Expert, Military Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, member of the CNPDR

Mr. Sakamoko Ndjaye, Executive Secretary, CNPDR

Ms. Julienne Fiolenga, ALPC, member of CNPDR

Mr. Eugene Binguimale, ADEPSS, Ministry for Social Affairs, member of CNPDR

Ms. Mathilde Kiko Yazimango, member of CNPDR

Captain Dieudonne Gueret, Administrative and Financial Secretary, CNPDR

Mr. Godefroy Didie Guelembe, CNPDR

Mr. Mustapha Issen, ex-Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Section, PRAC now Director National Statistics Office, member of CNPDR

Mr. Antony Caille-Lahoutou, Expert in Communication and Sensitization, CNPDR

### ***International Partners***

Mr. Renner M. L. Onana, Representative of the OHCHR for Central African Republic, Head of the BONUCA Human Rights Section (formerly with MONUC in Eastern DRC)

Mr. Moriken Camara, Head of Operations, Rule of Law Project/UNDP, former head of Operations and Finance, PRAC project unit

### ***Donor Officials***

Colonel Patrick Marconnet, Defense Attaché, *Embassy of France*

### ***World Bank Staff***

Mr. Justin Kouakou, Resident Representative of the IFC, World Bank Country Manager a.i.

### **2006 Interviews revisited**

#### ***Government Officials***

Mr. Come Zoumara, Chairman, CNDDR/Presidential Adviser, National Defense matters

Minister Tchakpa M'brede, Deputy Chairman, CNDDR

Father Celestine Kette, Member, CNDDR

Mr. Antoine Ngongo, Mayor, Sibut District

Mr. Jean de Dieu Sepokpode Bobanzengue, Deputy Mayor, Sibut District

#### ***Donor Officials***

Mr. Milko Van Gool, *EU Delegation*

#### ***UN and World Bank Officials***

Mr. Toby Lanzer, UN Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative, UNDP

Mr. Jean-Charles Dei, Resident Representative, World Food Programme

Mr. Bruno Geddo, Resident Representative, UNHCR

Mr. Fabrice Boussalem, Recovery Adviser, UNDP

#### ***MDRP Officials***

Mr. Demba Kissima Tandia, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP-PRAC

Mr. Jean Passendoun, Head of Programme/Sibut, UNDP-PRAC

Mr. Gregory Gromo Alex, Task Team Leader/ World Bank MDRP

Col. Mamert Sinarinzi, DDR Advisor, World Bank/MDRP

## Congo, Democratic Republic

### *Government Officials*

Prof. Grevisse Ditend Yav, Project Administrator, Project Execution Unit (UEP), PNDDR

Mr. Ndt'so Valentin, Deputy Administrator, UEP-PNDDR

Ms. Patricia Tuluka, Vulnerable groups specialist, UEP-PNDDR

Mr. Gregoire Tamboire, Evaluation Adviser, UEP-PNDDR

Mr. Marcel Atigri Abihosse, Evaluation Adviser, UEP-PNDDR

Mr. Claude-Bernard Ogou, Procurement Specialist, KPMG, UEP-PNDDR

### *Other National Stakeholders*

Mr. Nelson Paluku, former Deputy Minister of Defense

Mr. Guezing Kizinga, Project Manager, Caritas DRC

### *International Partners*

Mr. Ross Mountain, Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General, MONUC

Mr. Christian C. Manahl, Head, Political Affairs Office, MONUC

Ms. Yasmin Thiam, Political Adviser, D-SRSG, MONUC

Mr. Ivor Richard Fung, Head, Human Security and Peace Consolidation Unit, UNDP

Ms. Judith Tuluka Suminwa, Security Governance Program Specialist, UNDP

Mr. Steven Lauwerier, Deputy Representative, UNICEF

Ms. Tasha Gill, Child Protection Specialist, Post-Conflict and Emergency, UNICEF

Mr. Aliou Maiga, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF

Mr. Jean Francois Hasperue, Political Adviser, EUSEC (EU Security advisory team)

### *Donor Officials*

Ms. Linda Newport, Project Manager, Human Rights/Economics Section, EC

Mr. Yaron Oppenheimer, First Secretary, *Netherlands Embassy*

Ms. Cheryl Anderson, Peace and Stability Team Leader, *USAID*

Mr. Mohamed S. Dansoko, Peace and Stability Team, *USAID*

### *World Bank and MDRP Staff*

Mr. Philippe Mahele, Country Manager a.i., Senior Procurement Specialist

Mr. Abdou Salam Drabo, Poverty Reduction Adviser/Donor Coordination

Mr. Rene Bauman, Consultant, MDRP Secretariat

Mr. Ben Burckhart, Consultant, MDRP Secretariat

Ms. Giselle Tabu, Consultant, MDRP Secretariat



## Congo, Republic of

### *Public Officials*

Ms. Madeleine Yila-Boumpoto, Director of Cabinet, High Commission for the Reinsertion of Ex-combatants (HCREC)

Ms. Beatrice Mpassi, Economic Adviser, HCREC

Mr. Joseph Mbossa, National Coordinator, Implementation Unit (UGP), National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Program for Ex-combatants (PNDDR)

Mr. Michel Kounga, Coordinator, Demobilization and Reinsertion, UGP/PNDDR

Mr. Anatole Bansimba, Coordinator, Child soldiers and other vulnerable groups, UGP/PNDDR

Ms. Antoinette Kobi, Coordinator, Prevention and Management of Conflicts, UGP/PNDDR

Mr. Michel Niama, Director, Monitoring and Evaluation unit, UGP/PNDDR

Mr. Aubin Christian Bazinga, Head of financial unit, UGP/PNDDR

Mr. Bienvenu Boudimbou, Deputy, Communications Unit, responsible for social mobilization, UGP/PNDDR

### *International Partners*

Mr. Yves Smith, Senior Technical Adviser, Small Arms Collection Project, UNDP

### *Donor Officials*

Mr. Laurent Wastelain, Head of State of Law program, *European Commission*

### *World Bank Staff*

Mr. Midou Ibrahima, Country Manager

Mr. Mahamat Goadi Louani, Senior Human Development Specialist, Country Manager a.i.

Mr. Bienvenu Monthe Biyouidi, Economist/Operations Officer

## Rwanda

### *Government Officials*

Mr. Jean Sayinzoga, Chair, RDRC

Mr. Francis Musoni, Coordinator, RDRC

Mr. David Sabiti, M&E Officer

Mr. John Zigira, Commissioner RDRC

Mr. Faustin Rwigema, Coordinator RDRP

### ***International Partners***

Mr. Joe Felli, Head of office for MONUC in Kigali  
Ms. Francesca G. Calvi, DDRRR Liason Officer, MONUC  
Mr. Ivan Timnev, Senior Political Officer, MONUC  
Ms. Felicite Mukantambara, UNICEF  
Ms. Honorine Sommet-Lange, UNHCR Deputy Representative (Protection)  
Ms Carole Vignaud, Protection Officer, UNHCR

### ***Donor Officials***

Mr. Mathias Kende, First Secretary, *Belgian Embassy*  
Mr. Alex Carrasco, *Canadian Embassy*  
Mr. Frans Makken, Ambassador, *Netherlands Embassy*  
Mr. Richard Bomboma, Country Director/Head of Mission, *Swedish Embassy*  
Ms. Malin Ericsson, Second Secretary, *Swedish Embassy*  
Ms Laurie Hunter, Political Officer, *UK Embassy*  
Mr. Richard Kaminski, *US Embassy*  
Mr. Stefan Klingenbiel, Director, *KfW (Germany)*

### ***World Bank Staff***

Mr. Toni Kayonga, Operations Officer  
Mr. Alex Kamurase, Operations Officer  
Ms. Chantal Kajangwe, Procurement Specialist, Acting Country Manager

### ***Other Informants***

Mr. Wilem Manschot, Physician, KfW Consultant

## **Uganda**

### ***Government Officials***

Mr. Peter K. Onega, Chairman, Amnesty Commission  
Mr. Damian Kato, Secretary, Amnesty Commission  
General (ret) Emilio Mondo, Executive Secretary, Uganda Veterans Assistance Board

### ***International Partners***

Mr. Jose Neil Manzano, Programme Specialist, UNDP  
Mr. Cornelius Williams, Chief, Child Protection, UNICEF

### ***Donor Officials***

Ms. Ester Loeffen, *Netherlands Embassy*

Mr. Benjamin van Anker, *Netherlands Embassy*

Mr. Warner ten Kate, *First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy*

Ms. Rita Sandberg, *Norwegian Embassy*

Mr. Gerald Owachi, *DFID, UK*

Mr. Graham Carrington, *Conflict and Humanitarian Adviser, DFID, UK*

### ***World Bank Staff***

Mr. Kees Kingma, *Senior Social Development Specialist*

Mr. Mbuba Mbungu, *Senior Procurement Specialist*

### ***Other Informants***

Mr. Randy Harry, *USAID*

## **Donor Officials, Head Offices**

Major Junior de Fabribeckers, *focal point 2004 – present, MFA, Belgium*

Ms. Frances Tanner, *former focal point 2002-2006, CIDA, Canada*

Ms. Marie-Frederique Roche, *focal point, CIDA, Canada*

Ms. Toni Michelsen, *Chief Adviser, MFA, Denmark*

Ms. Katharina Buse, *Chargée de Mission, Bureau de la Prévention des Conflits et de la Reconstruction, MFA, France*

Mr. Jelte van Wieren, *Peacebuilding and Good Governance Division, MFA, the Netherlands*

Mr. Martin Koper, *Peace and Security Adviser-Africa, MFA, the Netherlands*

Mr. Aldo Ajello, *former EU special representative to the Great Lakes*

Ms. Karolina Stasiak, *EU*

Mr. Haavard Hoksnes, *Senior Adviser, Africa Department MFA, Norway*

Ms. Vibeke Soerum, *Adviser, Africa Department, MFA, Norway*

Mr. Tom Eriksen, *Senior Adviser, World Bank Section, MFA, Norway*

Mr. Hans Petter Henie, *Senior Adviser, World Bank Section, MFA, Norway*

Ms. Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen, *Adviser, World Bank Section, MFA, Norway*

Ms. Lena Schildt, *Deputy Team Director, Africa Department, Sida, Sweden*

Mr. Nick Bates, *MDRP focal point, DFID, UK*

Mr. Patrick Merienne, *MDRP focal point, DFID, UK*

## UN Officials, Head Offices

Ms Ayaka Suzuki, Chief DDR unit, UN-DPKO

Ms Margareth Carey, UN-DPKO

Mr. Kelvin Ong, former Chief of DDR Unit, UN-DPKO

Mr Jared Rigg, SSR Unit, UN-DPKO

Mr. Bruno Donat, Information Officer, UN-DPKO

Mr. Simon Yazgi, Program Officer, UN-DPKO

Mr. Babacar Cisse, former UNDP ResRep, DRC

Mr. Bruno Lemarquis, Deputy Head, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP

Mr Peter Batchelor, Chief, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, BCPR, UNDP

Mr. Luc Lafreniere, Senior Adviser and DDR Team Leader, BCPR, UNDP

Ms Sophie da Camera, Senior Adviser, BCPR, UNDP

Ms Tunga Ganbold, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office

Ms. Liselotte Woltmann, Deputy Executive Coordinator, UNDP Trust Funds Office

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## Annex D: MDRP Results Frameworks

Each of the seven participating countries had to develop a results framework of one kind or another, with performance indicators that would allow for monitoring of progress.

### Angola

The Angola program had three performance dimensions as far as the target groups were concerned, and then a fourth dimension addressing program management.

**Table D.1: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), Angola**

<b>PDO:</b> To help consolidate economic stability in Angola and in the greater Great Lakes region	(i) Demobilizing up to an estimated 105,000 combatants from the UNITA Military Forces and 33,000 FAA ex-combatants; (ii) Support their reintegration into civilian life; and, (iii) Contribute to facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from military to social and economic sectors.
<b>Component</b>	<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>
<b>Demobilization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* About 85,000 ex-FMU EXCs are demobilized by 31 Dec 2002.</li> <li>* An additional estimated 20,000 ex-FMU EXCs are identified, registered and demobilized by 31 March 2003.</li> <li>* About 33,000 FAA EXCs are demobilized by 31 December 2005.</li> <li>* Each demobilized EXC has received a discharge certificate and is included in the MIS database.</li> <li>* Each demobilized ex-FMU EXC has received his or her full transitional assistance package within six months of demobilization.</li> </ul>
<b>Reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* At least 20,000 demobilized EXCs receive targeted reintegration assistance in each full year of program operation.</li> <li>* Average costs for reintegration assistance do not exceed USD 700 equivalent.</li> <li>* At least 50% of those demobilized are involved in some form of economic activity within 3 months of having received reintegration assistance.</li> </ul>
<b>Special target groups</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Each demobilized disabled EXC has started to receive medical rehabilitation assistance within 18 months of demobilization.</li> <li>* Each demobilized underage EXC has received targeted reintegration assistance within 6 months of demobilization.</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation Arrangements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* The six key provincial IRSEM offices are fully operational within three months of Project effectiveness and all 18 provincial IRSEM offices are fully operational within nine months of project effectiveness, in accordance with criteria set forth in the Program Implementation Manual.</li> <li>* First round of primary-contractor contracts are finalized within four months of Project effectiveness.</li> <li>* An independent evaluation is carried out annually, including through the use of beneficiary opinion polls, in accordance with terms of reference agreed with the Association.</li> </ul>

Source: World Bank Report T7580-ANG, "Technical Annex for an Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project", 7 March 2003, main text plus table 8 "Key Performance Indicators", p. 57.

Additional financing obtained from the EC in 2005 allowed to extend component three (support to vulnerable groups) beyond the original beneficiaries in order to target the larger communities where ex-combatants resettled

## Burundi

**Table D.2: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), Burundi**

<b>PDO:</b> To contribute to consolidating peace in Burundi and the Great Lakes region through the implementation of relevant articles of the Arusha Peace Accord and subsequent ceasefire agreements.	
<b>Component</b>	<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>
Demobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Ex-combatants from the APPM, FAB and NDF are demobilized in accordance with the criteria and procedures set out in the Program implementation manual.</li> <li>· At least 14,000 EXCs are demobilized annually.</li> <li>· All EXCs are registered, receive non-transferable ID cards and their data is captured in the MIS.</li> <li>· The demobilization process does not, on average, exceed 10 days per individual EXC.</li> </ul>
Reinsertion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Each demobilized EXC has received his/her TSA within 30 days of scheduled payment dates.</li> <li>· TSA payments are utilized for reinsertion needs of family units.</li> </ul>
Reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Ex-combatants have access to reintegration assistance within 9 months of their demobilization.</li> <li>· At least 40% of EXCs are engaged in sustainable income-generating activities within 18 months of demobilization.</li> <li>· Average income levels of EXCs are similar to average community incomes in their communities of settlement within 24 months of their demobilization.</li> </ul>
Special target groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· All demobilized female EXCs have received reinsertion and reintegration benefits under the Program in the same amount and according to the same procedures as demobilized male EXCs.</li> <li>· Each demobilized disabled EXC has received medical rehabilitation assistance within 18 months of demobilization.</li> <li>· Each demobilized child EXC has received targeted reintegration assistance within 12 months of demobilization.</li> </ul>
Implementation arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· 17 Provincial Program Offices are operational within 6 months of Grant effectiveness in accordance with criteria set forth in the Program implementation manual.</li> <li>· An independent evaluation is carried out annually and includes an analysis of environmental and social monitoring indicators.</li> </ul>
Public expenditures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Recurrent expenditures on defense are a maximum of FBU 49.4 billion in 2005, FBU 36.1 billion in 2006 and FBU 23.8 billion in 2007. At the same time, expenditures on health and education combined increase by FBU 6.7 billion in 2006 and FBU 19 billion in 2007.</li> </ul>

Source: World Bank Report T7616-BU, "Technical Annex...to Republic of Burundi for an Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program", 24 February 2004, general text and table 8 "Key Performance Indicators", p. 47.



## Central African Republic

**Table D.3: Results Framework, Central African Republic**

<p><b>PDO:</b> Contribute to the efforts undertaken in the CAR regarding defense and security, and of the disarmament, demobilization and the social and economic reinsertion of EXCs in their host or home communities, thereby contributing to stability in Bangui and rural areas.</p>	
<p><b>Component</b></p>	<p><b>Key Performance Indicators</b></p>
<p>A maximum of 7,565 EXCs disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in a sustainable manner in the economic and social life of their home or hose communities.</p>	
<p>The capacities of the communities receiving the largest number of EXCs enhanced to ensure the sustainable reintegration of the EXCs.</p>	
<p>Projects improving the security conditions and the capacity of conflict prevention and conflict resolution will be implemented in, and by, the communities that are the most vulnerable from the security view point.</p>	

Source: UNDP Project Document, "Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Community Support Project, p. 12. Bangui, 5 February 2004.

There was a more formal LogFrame Annex to the project document which the team has not been provided.

## Democratic Republic of Congo

Table D.4: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), DRC

<b>PDO:</b> Assist the recipient in creating long-term sustainable social development and supporting macroeconomic stability in its territory		<b>Indicators:</b> (a) Demobilization of approximately 150,000 ex-combatants, while providing support for their reinsertion and social and economic reintegration; (b) Contribution to reallocation of recipient's resulting budget savings from defense to social and economic sectors.
<b>Program Phase</b>	<b>Key Program Performance Indicators</b>	
Macro Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 30,000 Ex-Combatants demobilized by the end of the first year of the project and an additional 80,000 demobilized by the end of the second year</li> <li>- Number of Refugees and IDPs returned home.</li> <li>- The ratio between social sector expenditures and defense expenditures increases each year of the project from 23% (in 2002).</li> </ul>	
DRCDRP: General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timely disbursement of funds.</li> <li>- MIS in place and functional three months after Project effectiveness.</li> <li>- An external evaluation of the implementation of the Project is carried out annually in accordance with Section 111.2 of Schedule 4 to this Agreement and includes an analysis of environmental and social monitoring indicators</li> </ul>	
DRCDRP: Sensitization and information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sensitization and information tools for EXCs in place in a timely manner and in accordance with PNDDR.</li> </ul>	
DRCDRP: Demobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Orientation Centers are established according to the timeline in the JOP.</li> </ul>	
DRCDRP: Transition/ Reinsertion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- First reinsertion payment to all demobilized Ex-Combatants made upon discharge from demobilization sites; and second and third reinsertion payments made within three months of their programmed date and in accordance with the PIM</li> <li>- Less than 5% error (double or incorrect payments) made in reinsertion payments.</li> </ul>	
DRCDRP: Reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 60% of demobilized EXCs engaged in productive economic activities (or schooling) 1 year after demobilization.</li> <li>- Active program for female EXCs within 6 months of the start of the demobilization process.</li> <li>- 70% of child soldiers associated with Armed Groups successfully reintegrated in their chosen reintegration site within 12 months of leaving the transit centers.</li> </ul>	

Source: World Bank Report T7618-DRC, "Technical Annex...to the Democratic Republic of Congo for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project", 3 May 2004, general text and Table 4 "Key Performance Indicators", p. 36.

Each of the Special Projects had their own results matrices which have not been included here since focus is on the overall performance of the major program.

## Republic of Congo

**Table D.5: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), Republic of Congo**

<b>Project Development Objectives</b>	<b>Key performance indicators (outcome)</b>
<p>(i) Contribute to improvement of security through disarmament and demobilization of up to 11,000 combatants</p> <p>(ii) Support social reintegration through rehabilitation of social infrastructure and conflict management and reconciliation</p> <p>(iii) Support economic reintegration through income generating activities to EXCs</p>	<p>Significant proportions of EXCs take part in community wide decision making procedures.</p> <p>Beneficiary EXCs standard of living at program's end similar to non-combatant community members.</p> <p>Ex-combatants able to compete for economic opportunities as other civilians in the community within a year of resettlement.</p> <p>30 community infrastructure projects in function and use after one year of being completed.</p> <p>Perceived reduction in community-level violence and conflict.</p>
<b>Component/ activity</b>	<b>Key performance indicators (outputs)</b>
<p><b>Demobilization/ Reinsertion</b></p> <p>(i) Encampment, demobilization and registration of Pool combatants</p> <p>(ii) Information and sensitization of combatants from Pool and Force Publique</p> <p>(iii) Reinsertion of combatants from Pool and Force Publique</p> <p><b>Reintegration</b></p> <p><b>Social Reintegration</b></p> <p>(iv) Identification of eligible backlog EXCs</p> <p>(v) Rehabilitation of social infrastructure</p> <p>(vi) Conflict management and reconciliation in communities</p> <p>(vii) family reunification and psycho-social support for children EXCs</p> <p><b>Economic Reintegration</b></p> <p>(viii) Income generation for ex combatants</p> <p>(ix) Special assistance to children and disabled</p>	<p>5000 demobilized from the rebel forces in the Pool</p> <p>6000 demobilized from Force Publique</p> <p>Reinsertion pay of \$150/person disbursed to demobilized eligible for reinsertion benefits</p> <p>30,000 beneficiaries identified according to selection criteria and issued non-falsifiable ID cards</p> <p>80% of beneficiaries active in income generating activity within 12 months after receiving ID cards</p> <p>40 community infrastructure projects completed by program end</p> <p>20 communities benefited from conflict management activities</p> <p>Each demobilized child soldier has received targeted reintegration assistance within one year of receiving ID card</p> <p>Each disabled EXC has received medical rehabilitation assistance within one year of receiving ID card</p>
<b>Inputs</b>	<b>Process indicators</b>
<p>Financial agent effectively carries out reinsertion payment.</p> <p>Demobilization centers provide necessary services</p> <p>Registration team recruited within 3 months of effectiveness.</p> <p>Eligible combatants identified according to criteria and beneficiary category (reinsertion + reintegration or reintegration only).</p> <p>Support for EXCs toward reintegration activities.</p> <p>Community social infrastructure projects identified and selected.</p> <p>Conflict management component operationalized.</p>	<p>- Financial agent responsible for disbursement of reinsertion pay contracted within 6 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- 2 demobilization centers fully operational within 8 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- MIS fully functional in HQ and antennas within 6 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- Implementation partner for HIV/Aids sensitization contracted within 6 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- Eligible candidates for reinsertion receive support within 6 months of receiving ID card</p> <p>- 10 proposals for community infrastructure rehabilitation received with 12 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- Partnerships with experienced organizations in conflict management established within 6 months of effectiveness</p> <p>- Partnerships with experienced organizations with children,</p>

	youth, and disabled established - All 7 antennas fully operational within 6 months of effectiveness - Conflict management strategy articulated within 6 months of effectiveness
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Source: World Bank Report 33787, "Technical Annex...to the Republic of Congo for an Emergency Reintegration Program", 14 December 2005, Annex 1 "Key Performance Indicators", pp 37-38.

## Rwanda

Table D.6: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), Rwanda

<b>PDO:</b> Consolidate peace in the Great Lakes region and foster reconciliation within Rwanda	<b>Indicators:</b> 1. <b>Demobilize</b> an estimated 45,000 ex-combatants from the RPA and members of armed groups, and support their transition to civilian life (Appraisal: 20,000 Ex-RDF; 25,000 Ex-AG); 2. In the spirit of the Arusha agreement, support the <b>reintegration</b> of ex-FAR (Appraisal: 15,000 Ex-FAR); 3. Support the social and economic <b>reintegration</b> of all ex-combatants to be demobilized during stage II and all stage I ex-combatants who remain socially and economically vulnerable; 4. Facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from defense to social and economic sectors.
<b>Component</b>	<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>
Demobilization	* About 5,000 EXCs from the RPA are demobilized every six months in 2002 and 2003. * Each returning EXC from an armed group is demobilized in accordance with the criteria and procedures set out in the Program implementation manual. * Each ex-FAR EXC has received an ID card and is captured in the MIS database.
Reinsertion	* Each demobilized EXC has received a BNK within one month of demobilization. * The time elapsed between registration in a Provincial Program Office and bank payment of the first installment of the recognition of service allowance to each demobilized RPA EXC does not exceed 2 months. * Each ex-FAR EXC has registered at a Provincial Program Office and has received his/her recognition of service allowance within 6 months of registration.
Reintegration	* Reintegration grant payments to demobilized EXCs are made no later than 9 months after demobilization. * Average costs for reintegration assistance under the Vulnerability Support Window do not exceed FRw 150,000.
Special target groups	* All demobilized female ex-combatants have received reinsertion and reintegration benefits under the Program in the same amount and according to the same procedures as demobilized male EXCs. * Each demobilized disabled EXC has received medical rehabilitation assistance within 18 months of demobilization. * Each demobilized child EXC has received targeted reintegration assistance within 12 months of demobilization.
Implementation arrangements	* 12 Provincial Program Offices are operational within 3 months of Credit effectiveness in accordance with criteria set forth in the Program implementation manual. * At least 50% of CDCs are administering the approval process of grants for income-generating activities within 12 months of Credit effectiveness. * An independent evaluation is carried out annually and includes an analysis of environmental and social monitoring indicators.
Other	* Recurrent expenditures on education and health reach FRw 36.4 billion in 2002, FRw 40.8 billion in 2003 and FRw 45.7 billion in 2004.

Source: World Bank Report T7498-RW, "Technical Annex...to the Republic of Rwanda for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program", 25 March 2002, Table 4 "Key Performance Indicators", p. 42.

Revisions were made to the targeted number for demobilization, to 22,000 RDF and 12,500 Ex-AG, and 13,000 ex-FAR for reinsertion. One component was added, of supporting the repatriation and reinsertion of an estimated 5,600 dependents of ex-armed group members (introduced in 2005 with an estimated 9,300; adjusted in 2007 to 5,600).

## Uganda

Table D.7: Key Performance Indicators (Results Framework), Uganda

<b>Goal:</b> The Amnesty Commission effectively contributes to promote peace and reconciliation in Uganda through the return and reintegration of Reporters into normal civilian life.	<b>Outcome Indicator:</b> Amnesty Act provides incentive and framework for dialogue-based end to insurgencies.
<b>Component</b>	<b>Key Performance Indicators</b>
<b>1: Sensitization.</b> Carrying out of information dissemination activities aimed at explaining the Amnesty Act of 2000 including the procedures for claiming amnesty and the benefits of the Act, through the provision of the technical advisory services and carrying out of workshops.	Communities, rebels, state and non-state actors understand and appreciate the Amnesty Act and the role of the Amnesty Commission. Up to 9,567 additional Reporters apply for amnesty.
<b>2: Demobilization.</b> Demobilization of and provision of support to Reporters including issuance of amnesty certificates, provision of medical assistance and psychosocial counseling.	All persons seeking amnesty are received and processed in accordance with agreed standards, procedures and timeframes.
<b>3: Resettlement.</b> Provision of support to assist in the resettlement of Reporters into their communities including provision of basic needs items such as clothing, mattresses, and blankets; and provision of reinsertion payments to Reporters.	Backlog of 5,743 Reporters processed within 6 months of project start, and up to 9,567 new Reporters provided with standard reinsertion package.
<b>4: Social and Economic Reintegration.</b> Provision of social and economic support to Reporters, including: (i) carrying out of sensitization and reconciliation of communities to facilitate reintegration of Reporters, (ii) provision of material support of Reporters in carrying out income generating activities, and (iii) facilitation of access to vocational training, non-formal education and formal education to Reporters and their communities.	50 per cent of Reporters engaged in gender and generational appropriate community based programs.
<b>5: Institutional Strengthening.</b> Strengthening of the Amnesty Commission capacity in, among other areas, project and financial management, monitoring and evaluation and procurement, through provision of technical advisory services.	Amnesty Commission has adequate human, institutional and financial capacity.



## Annex E: Country Backgrounds

### Angola

#### *Special Project*

This project was rated by the MDRP/World Bank as having performed satisfactorily. In spite of some administrative difficulties, the Government of Angola and IRSEM have expressed overall satisfaction with the technical support provided by both UNDP and FAO.

This special project filled a key gap at a critical point in the Angola peace process and served as a model for others in the MDRP portfolio both from a technical standpoint and in terms of the institutional arrangements between the Bank and the UN partner.

**Table E.1: Objectives and achievements, Angola Special Project**

Objectives	Assessment (World Bank)
Implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the first component aimed at enabling 50,000 ex-combatants and their families to achieve self-sustenance from their land for one year through the provision of agriculture kits and technical support.	<p>Almost 90% of the target beneficiaries for agricultural assistance were reached, and savings realized in the implementation of the component allowed the project to augment the support to communities thereby enhancing community reception and social reintegration.</p> <p>An independent review of the larger Bank project in the areas covered by this project found a high and positive level of community acceptance of returning ex-combatants.</p>
Implemented by the United Nations' Development Programme (UNDP), this component consisted of a number of pilot activities designed to test the underlying assumptions and approaches regarding economic reintegration as a basis to inform the reintegration activities to be implemented under the ADRP. Activities were to be implemented to enable ex-combatants to carry out income-generating activities in three main areas: (i) Provision of business management training and micro-credit, (ii) Carrying out of community works activities such as rehabilitation of infrastructure and provision of public services, and (iii) Vocational training.	<p>The project was successful in providing income-generation assistance support to more than the planned number of beneficiaries through vocational training, micro-credit and community works. However, it is unclear whether or not all those that participated in these activities were eligible post-Luena ex-combatants. Furthermore, insufficient data exist to say if the income-generation activities have been sustainable.</p>
Capacity building for the implementation institution, the IRSEM, through the provision of technical advisory services and training (UNDP).	<p>Greater difficulties were experienced with certain administrative aspects of project implementation on the part of UNDP including procurement of key inputs and final accounting under the project that remains outstanding.</p> <p>Most importantly, this project is considered a model for capacity building of the national counterpart agency that has paid off immediate dividends through the IDA and MDRP Trust Fund financed national program.</p>

#### *The Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP)*

Several external evaluations were undertaken to monitor the ADRP, including three external evaluations (Sep/Oct 2005, June/July 2007 and Nov/Dec 2008), a mid-term review of the vulnerable groups component commissioned by the EC (April/May 2007) and an environmental and social impact assessment (Oct 2007).

The results of the ADRP reported here are from two sources: the ICR produced by the MDRP (Angola ICR, 25 June 2009) and the Final Evaluation of the ADRP (Hendrickson et al, 2009).

ICM (2009) main findings:

- Overall, the ADRP should be applauded for its significant achievements, especially if compared to other projects in Angola's portfolio. The project was faced with an executing agency with low credibility and capacity and generally low capacity in the country. Despite these challenges, the project demobilized almost 100,000 ex-combatants and put in place a vast network of some 250 IPs to provide reintegration support. Moreover, the project was highly innovative in putting in place support to widows and communities.
- Although up to 105,000 members of UNITA could have been supported by the project, only slightly over 97,000 were identified and resulted in eligible beneficiaries. This represented 100% of the UNITA beneficiary caseload and the fact that the project was designed with capacity for an extra 8,000 does not indicate that the activity has not reached its objectives of demobilizing and reintegrating all UNITA personnel.
- FAA soldiers were not demobilized as planned, despite the commitment in the LDP in 2003. Demobilization was to have been completed by 31 December 2006. Although significant policy, planning and operational preparatory work was carried out, the demobilization of the FAA only began on a pilot basis, with 278 processed over the life of the project. These delays were attributed to: (i) difficulties in establishing adequate opportunities for the large number of disabled among those proposed to be demobilized; (ii) specific challenges regarding the severely disabled and those with chronic illnesses; (iii) political concerns about the release of a fairly large number of disabled veterans in the run up to national elections; and (iv) expectations of support from the disabled in excess of what the program had planned for. To reflect the delay, the ADRP was reformulated to remove the FAA demobilization from the project scope, and the MDRP grant was reduced from USD 48.4 to USD 30.25 million.

**Table E.2: Commitments under Luena MoU**

	Male adults	Female adults	Children	Total Achieved	Target	Realized % of Target
<b>Demobilization of EXCs</b>						
Demobilized	94,052	3,338	0	97,390 UNITA: 97,112 FAA: 278	Total: 138,000 UNITA: 105,278 FAA: 33,000	70.6% 92.5% 0.8%
<b>Reinsertion support to EXCs</b>						
In kind (kits)	42,534	1,141	0	43,675	62,716	69.6%
In cash	51,787	933	0	52,720	62,716	84.1%

Sources: ICR (June 2009) and Final Results Report, IRSEM (June 2009)

***Result 2: Improved livelihoods of program beneficiaries (at a minimum) to the level of the communities of resettlement***

Under the ADRP framework, the numbers of the economic reintegration component at closing (December 31, 2008) were the following:

- Around 500 sub-project proposals were received and 265 sub-projects approved under the framework of ADRP. However, due to the time limitations to analyze,

approve and contract all the sub-projects, only 177 were funded by ADRP. The remaining sub-projects (88) will be financed and implemented under the framework of the new Government Reinforcement of Reintegration Program (PGRR).

- The reintegration opportunities created by these sub-projects and the beneficiaries registered into the MIS, as well as the percentage of registers in relation with the target are shown into the following table.

**Table E.3:**

Type of beneficiary	Target	Opportunities (*)	Registered/MIS (*)	% registers /targets
Ex-combatants (primary opportunities), excluding women and disabled ex-combatants	91,718	70,526	57,494	62.7
Youth and children associated with fighting forces	16,000	26,245	14,535	90.8
Women (**)	16,000	22,466	10,196	63.7
Disabled ex-combatants (**)	12,500	10,238	5,358	42.9
Complementary opportunities for ex-combatants	20,160	18,750	5,716	28.4
Total	156,378	148,225	93,299	59.7

Note: The column "Target" shows the target numbers of demobilized ex-combatants. "Registered/MIS" shows the number of beneficiaries that were recorded in the MIS (not all demobilized were registered).

"Opportunities" refers to the number of reintegration options offered to beneficiaries.

(\*) Including 3,115 beneficiaries of the sub-projects implemented under the Special Project and the beneficiaries of FAO agriculture kits that didn't receive assistance through a sub-project.

(\*\*) Including 1,981 women and 3,691 disabled ex-combatants.

***Result 3: Increased social acceptance of program beneficiaries in destination communities.***

Beneficiary interviews showed that 99% are living with their families and the great majority of them feel socially reintegrated (94%). Some 99.4% consider that they have been well received by the community without any problem of social acceptance. The external evaluation undertaken in November/December 2008 noted that, "in general terms, the social reintegration of ex-combatants in receiving communities was good and their reintegration did not cause very serious problems. There was generally good collaboration among receiving communities (for example in terms of handing over land to be divided into individual production plots), including for ex-combatants from other communities in the province and even from other provinces".

***Result 4: Significantly reduced levels of social and economic vulnerability of special target groups.***

IRSEM placed increasing importance on vulnerable groups in the last two years of the program. Due to the limited time available to implement the project, some outputs were not delivered, which meant a reduction of 45% of the total project payment (consulting services and reimbursable costs). For example, training on wheelchairs and seating as well as auditive rehabilitation was not provided; and equipment planned to be purchased under the procurement plan has not left the port of origin.

Assistance to **disabled EXCs:**

- In terms of economic reintegration, ADRP created opportunities to support 10,238 disabled ex-combatants while 5,360 were registered into the MIS as receiving economic reintegration support. The program also provided physical rehabilitation (mainly orthopedic assistance) to 777 disabled ex-combatants as registered by the MIS.
- This was the most challenging area of ADRP due to the lack of capacity of the existing Physical Rehabilitation Centers and the scarcity of logistic conditions (transportation, housing, etc.) to undertake the medical screening of the disabled and to provide the required specialized services (always at the provincial capitals).

**Youth and children** associated with fighting forces:

- Support reached a total of 14,535, and included access to education (11,758 direct beneficiaries registered into the MIS), support to the promotion of income generating activities (1,496 beneficiaries registered) and vocational training (897 beneficiaries registered).

**Women:**

- The program created opportunities for 22,466 women and registered 10,196 of them into the MIS. Assistance included the provision of agriculture inputs and technical assistance, support to the promotion of income generating activities (micro loans) and the delivery of short-term vocational training. Women also benefited from health centers and day-nurseries that were constructed or rehabilitated through on-the-job training of ex-combatants supported by the project.

Surveys undertaken by IRSEM showed that the **social reintegration** of ex-combatants targeted by ADRP was very successful:

- Around 99% of interviewed beneficiaries are living with their families;
- The number of children per family increased since the demobilization time until now from 1.15 to around 5 (in average);
- Around 99% of interviewed beneficiaries consider themselves as having been well accepted by the community; and
- More than 90% consider themselves as reintegrated in their communities of resettlement.

In terms of **economic reintegration**, even if ex-combatants generally consider themselves as being better off than other community members, the situation is still complex and needs to be monitored by IRSEM as follows<sup>8</sup>:

- More than 50% of the beneficiaries are integrated in economic activities (employed or self-employed);
- Around 80% of the beneficiaries consider that they have a level of monthly income smaller than the national minimum salary;
- More than 60% have tried to find employment, but only a minority is employed (4,53% in the first interview);

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<sup>8</sup> Further details in annex 5.

- At least 75% use the tools received from the program;
- More than 90% of the interviewed have land for agriculture.

***Result 5: Increased capacity to coordinate, supervise and manage the delivery of assistance to target groups by the Program Implementation Unit (IRSEM).***

ADRP enabled IRSEM to strengthen its capacity in reintegration. Essentially, IRSEM staff was trained before and during program implementation and will benefit from the lessons generated for future projects.

Internally within IRSEM and its structures, the main obstacles were: the model established for the FMPU – external to IRSEM; the lack of articulation between the programming part and the financial part of the program; the conception and management of information/communication between units and between the provincial and central structures; and the insufficient empowerment of IRSEM and its human resources. Although these problems were addressed systematically throughout project implementation, gaps remained that affected project efficiency.

Although important investments were made in terms of recruitment and training, M&E was “in global terms, inadequate, insufficient and slow. The system of monitoring did not work promptly enough in the identification of insufficiencies and in the indication of timely corrective measures”.<sup>9</sup>

**The Final Evaluation of the ADRP**

The results reported by the Final evaluation confirm those reported in the ICR. However, the evaluation reports that:

- Support provided to EXCs and the community: ADRP approach – focus on EXCs, generated resentment and conflict in various communities. In other parts of the report, it is stated ADRP support to communities promoted reconciliation. It remained unclear if either statement was an overall finding or if both things happened in different regions of the country. Thus the extent to which ADRP was successful in reintegrating EXCs remains unclear in the evaluation report.
- The value of the economic reintegration projects implemented by NGOs was low: The report states that many of these projects trained EXCs and community members in skills they had either no natural ability and capacity or interest in pursuing (e.g. training in farming to people who never worked as farmers and wanted to go to city), they trained them to form cooperatives but they had no other skills or resources to maintain the cooperatives/livelihood.
- For most, land distributed was too small to secure livelihood.

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<sup>9</sup> Cristina Udelsmann & others, Report of the ADRP Annual Independent Evaluation, December 2008.

## Burundi

### *The Burundi Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (DDRP)*

The results of the DDRP have been documented in: *Évaluation finale du Programme National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (PNDRR)* (2008) ACT Consultants and Case d’Afrique; *Evaluation biannuelle indépendant du PNDDR pour les exercices 2005 et 2006*, ORT MONDIALE, 2007; the *Mid-term Review: A partnership in need of reaffirmation*, DAI, 2005; and *Verification Surveys Joseph Butoyi, La troisième quatrième enquête de vérification des paiements des allocations de réinsertion*, CNDRR, 2007 and *CNDRR, La quatrième enquête de vérification des paiements des allocations de réinsertion*, 2008.

- Peace consolidation was the overall objective of the PNDDR, but no performance indicators were linked to it. Without the program it is difficult to imagine army integration taking place since there was a need of addressing the ‘surplus’ of ex-combatants, hence it played a key part in peace consolidation. However, although one can rightly argue that DDR in Burundi helped improve peace in the country and in the region, other variables also play central parts and it is difficult to measure the impact that each variable had.
- 23,022 adult combatants were demobilized out of the revised estimate of 34, 734, which means that 75% of the revised target was reached (PNDRR evaluation p. 143). The original target of 55,000 was not reached, however this was an overestimate of combatants and also influenced by the delays in negotiations with the FNL-PALIPEHUTU and cannot be viewed as a failure. According to the final PNDRR evaluation the original targeted goal for demobilization was unrealistic.
- Transitional Subsistence Allowance was given to all 23,022. (NCDRR, March 2009) Almost all ex-combatants (99%) have received reinsertion support (Sample V S 4, p.6).
- The support to ex-combatants’ reintegration into civilian life was flawed. There were too many delays from demobilization to reintegration. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, more than 80% of ex-combatants waited eighteen months or more for reintegration activities. The demobilized spent their money whilst waiting on reintegration activities and many ran into debt and sold their reintegration goods. Nearly all ex-combatants in urban areas are looking for work (PNDRR evaluation, p.23).
- Female and disabled ex-combatants received insufficient support and were marginalized in the reintegration process. Only 10% of heavily disabled ex-combatants received care (PNDRR evaluation, p.143). And only 46% received socio-economic reintegration support (ICR, 2009, p. 38, NCDRR, PPP March 2009). The MTR states that there were long delays in provision of services to disabled ex-combatants. More attention should have been given to the special needs of women, especially regarding reintegration in rural areas.
- 18,709 *Gardiens de la Paix* (out of the original objective of 20,000) and 9,674 *Militants Combatants* (out of the original objective of 10,000) were demobilized and all of these were given a one-time payment of USD 91 in reinsertion support.



- A reallocation of government expenditure from defense to social and economic sectors has not happened. The PNDDR has had no impact on this level (PNDRR evaluation, p. 121). The targets for defense spending were: 49,5 FBU billions in 2005; 36,1 FBU billions in 2006 and 23,8 FBU billions in 2007. However, in 2005 defense expenditure amounted to 53.6 FBU billions, in 2006 to 50,41 BFU billions and 50,1 FBU billions in 2007. Police expenditure was 16,2 FBU billions in 2005, 30,5 FBU billions in 2006 and 30,5 FBU billions in 2007. (PNDRR evaluation, p.99).

### *The Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention of Child Ex-Combatants (CSDRRPP)*

The results of the DRR of child ex-combatants have been documented in two reports: (i) Report of the Independent Review of the Special Project for Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi (2005) and (ii) Beneficiary Assessment of the Social and Economic Status of the Child Soldier, special project beneficiaries in Burundi (Taouti-Cherif, 2006). It is important to note that the latter does not evaluate the reintegration program, but collects personal perceptions of the beneficiaries concerning their living conditions; examining social and economic status from the point of view of beneficiaries comparing it with that of the civilian children.

As of March 2009, according to ES/NCDRR data, 3,261 child-soldiers had been released from armed groups and 3,259 of these had been reunited with their families. 3,017 had received Transitional Subsistence Allowance.

The Independent Review of the Special Project found that the project successfully facilitated the demobilization and reintegration of over 3,000 children, a higher number than had been anticipated; and that it has achieved success in the dimensions of demobilization and immediate social reintegration. It highlights that the early rapid response to demobilization may have been key in pushing the peace process forward. However, it has fallen short of its stated goals; particularly in assuring the long term educational and training capacity of its beneficiaries. It has not delivered adequate vocational training, educational assistance, psychosocial assistance, protection interventions or recruitment prevention activities. All which are part of the project objectives. Nor has the project made much progress towards assisting the development of government capacity to carry on either reintegration or protection activities beyond the life of the project. Moreover, the project has been plagued by administrative and financial delays. A central problem was that the former child-soldiers had turned adult by the time of assistance and the support did not adequately reflect their different needs. The review concludes that it is a project that has little likelihood of long term success.

The end of country program evaluation also underlines the difficulties in sustainable reintegration for child ex-combatants.

The Child Soldier beneficiaries assessment found that the results are relatively positive if one compares reintegrated children with their civilian peers. On the social level, reintegration is occurring and the children seem to be adapting to their communities and taking part in community activities. But the assessment highlighted that there were some resentment from the communities towards the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries from BAF and GP have fewer

problems than the children who were associated with APPM, who feel more isolated in their communities.

The economic situation of the respondents is not very good since Burundi remains a very poor country. However, according to the social and economic indicators used by the study, the special project beneficiaries are as well off and sometimes seem to fare better than their civilian peers.

It must be noted however, that the beneficiaries' assessment has some methodological issues; of the former child-soldiers interviewed the majority of respondents were between 17 to 21 years of age. The majority of the respondents in control group (civilian children) were between 13 and 18. There was a younger skew in the ages of the control group which may have affected findings. For example, finding that the proportion of former child-soldiers caring for spouses, children or siblings are much higher than among civilian children is simply a reflection of the considerable difference in ages between respondents and control group.

## Central African Republic

The national project **PRAC, Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés** (*project for reinsertion of ex-combatants and community support*) was assessed in the MDRP's Implementation Completion Report (June 2009):

### **Disarmament**

Disarmament was very low with only 190 arms collected from the 7,556 demobilized EXCs. The general insecurity made EXCs reluctant to give up their arms, but there were also questions how many of the self-proclaimed ex-combatants really had weapons to hand over.

### **Demobilization**

A majority of EXCs expressed satisfaction with the demobilization kit since, like the majority of Central Africans, they lacked any type of asset. The medical check-up and HIV testing were also appreciated, especially by the women. Over 86% of the beneficiaries were demobilized in Bangui.

### **Reinsertion**

Four successive waves of EXCs went through the reinsertion phase of the program. The first wave received in-kind reinsertion kits according to the training they had chosen, but the following groups had less choice in training and more often received their reinsertion kits partially or fully in cash. Less than 1,000 EXCs had been reinserted two years into the program. As a result of the subsequent acceleration of activities, the later waves benefited from a significantly reduced choice of training.

Long-term training such as school or university and rural activities were the most successful at reinsertion. Long-term follow-up was deemed very important by many EXCs interviewed. The choice of training was also key in determining the success of reinsertion: fishing and retail were not as successful as animal husbandry or mechanics.

The small trade training option, chosen by almost half EXCs included the least amount of actual training. Its kits were disbursed entirely in cash.

### **Community support**

Out of the 69 sub-projects planned, 41 were declared completed by PRAC. Most of them rehabilitated existing structures while others built new ones. The mid-term review identified the lack of involvement of the communities in the implementation of the sub-projects as an issue. The most successful ones were rebuilt institutions and schools while markets and water fountains were only partially built or renovated.

Monitoring of the sub-projects was poor. The evaluation team visited 35 of the 41 projects and found that 17 were completed whereas 18 remained at various stages of completion.

The intent to support communities did not match the initial expectations. Of PRAC's budget of USD 10 million, only USD 1 million went to community support. These activities regularly suffered from being understaffed and lacking funds. Furthermore, little connection was established between community-driven projects and the reinsertion of the EXCs (MDRP 2008).

## Democratic Republic of Congo

### *The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Program (PNDDR)*

The PNDDR (*Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion*) had the following results table for its performing monitoring:

**Table E.4: PNDDR Results**

Activity/area	Target	Results
Demobilization of EXCs	150,000	102,012 (99,404 male, 2,610 female)
Reintegration support	90,000	52,172 (58%)
Support and reinsertion of war wounded	9,000	242 (241 male, 1 female)

Sources: PNDDR PPP, March 2009; MDRP, Quarterly Progress Report, October – December 2008.

Achievements and activities have been documented in Implementation Status and Results reports (ISRs, of which there have been 16 since October 2004 through August 2009), the Implementation Completion Memorandum for the program overall (ICM 2009), MDRP quarterly progress reports, and the general MDRP Mid-term Review (DAI 2005). There was a Mid-term Review carried out by the MDRP itself, an audit carried out by Ernst and Young on payments and the payments system (Ernst & Young 2006), and a beneficiary survey *Sondage sur la réinsertion de ex-combattants* (MDRP/CONADER 2007), but no independent performance evaluations.

Overall, results can be seen to be:

- *Peace and stability* has improved in the DRC since 2002, but the PNDDR itself has not specified any performance indicator on this dimension. The continued conflict in the eastern parts of the DRC cannot be seen so much as a result of unsuccessful DDR but rather unresolved basic conflicts between some of the key belligerents in the region, just as the successful demobilization of over 100,000 EXCs cannot be *attributed* to the PNDDR but rather to the successful political processes that led up to the signing and subsequent implementation of these agreements. At the same time, having the resources to implement the D&R program was clearly key to moving the overall DDR process forward, and the MDRP was the key to successful funding of the program.
- **102,014 combatants** were demobilized against a targeted value of 150,000 (the MDRP tends to include the child soldiers demobilized when tallying the figures, but the child soldiers were largely demobilized through the Special Projects and not the PNDDR).
- **30,219 child soldiers** were demobilized through the Special Projects.
- *Reinsertion payments* were provided to all 102,014 beneficiaries, but due to problems with cash transfers there were considerable delays in payments (Ernst & Young 2006). This led to frustration among the EXCs and criticism. The initial technology was bold and innovative, but too innovative since it never functioned as intended (ICM p. 13). Spreading the payments over 12 months was found to be impractical due to the difficulties with payment. Payments were therefore cut down to three or even two or one (ICM, p. 14).
- *Reintegration assistance* was provided to 54% of the demobilized EXCs (ICM) (MDRP progress report states 58%) A beneficiary study carried out in 2007 concluded that once back

in the home communities 68% achieved basic self-subsistence (MDRP/CONADER 2007). However, the survey did not reach beneficiaries in combat zones or in remote rural areas. It was conducted at a time when only 15,689 had received assistance, and out of 784 reached, only 364 (46%) responded. The validity/reliability of the findings must therefore be seen to be low, since the sample size was small; the selection was far from random; the universe selected from was made up of those who were among the first to be demobilized who on average seem to have received better kits and therefore were more likely to be satisfied; and the low response rate means the self-selection bias is substantial.

- One concern raised in the ICM was that reintegration assistance was too individually focused and not tied into other community development assistance projects, though the ICM notes that attempts were made to establish such links but without much success (it points to the fact that the Bank-financed Social Fund was not able to target EXCs since the Social Fund was based on a first come-first served principle and not geographically targeted. Similar issues of non-overlap of beneficiary target groups made linkages difficult) (ICM, p.14).
- Support to *special target groups* was to be provided. 2,610 female EXCs were supported, but as noted in several studies, female EXCs face particular disincentives to come forward for support (see MDRP News and Noteworthy #10 of 24 October 2008). Only lately, in particular under the LEAP program, have specialized programs for female EXCs been established. According to the ICM many female EXCs were assisted by other projects set up by other organizations dealing with women affected by the conflicts. However, no numbers are provided and it must be noted that female EXCs have different and particular needs compared to women affected by conflict.
- The number of *disabled and war wounded* who received support was very low, largely because the demands by the disabled were beyond what the PNDDR could offer, and most of the eligible soldiers seem therefore to have continued in the armed forces. Only 242 out of a targeted 9,000 received support (MDRP Quarterly Progress Report 2008; ICM).
- Assistance to *institutional development and program implementation* was a specific objective. As noted below, the PNDDR struggled to execute the program, but improvements were made over time due to in part MDRP support (ICM).
- Reallocation of spending from defense to social and economic sectors cannot be established, partly because security sector budgets are unreliable and incomplete. While there seems to have been overspending on the defense budget, there have also been substantial increases in pro-poor spending (ICM). It should also be acknowledged that the argument for this particular measure to be relevant as a success criterion for the MDRP can be called into question.

#### *Special Projects: Child Soldier Projects (four projects)*

The results of the Special Projects for Child Soldiers have been documented in the 'Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the DRC' (DAI 2007) and the various ICMs for the six projects.

**Table: Child Soldiers Demobilization Figures, March 2006**

Children Demobilized	Children Reunified	Children in Reintegration	Children Completed Program	Girls	Self-demobilized
21,827	17,305	12,511	605	3,538	2,336

Note: UNICEF did not provide beneficiary figures to the evaluation.

Source: DAI 2007.

#### **(i) Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children (Belgian Red Cross)**

- Only 100 of the 340 communicators and 1,000 out of the 2,000 volunteers received the training outlined in the objectives. Moreover, only 56 of the 100 communicators trained were at the time of the DAI evaluation involved with the program. However, the evaluation underlined that even if the targets were not reached the national BRC staff seemed competent, but that this may have been a result of direct involvement in the project rather than due to training received (DAI, pp.56-57).
- Sensitization and prevention is difficult to evaluate since the impact of such training will only become visible in the long-term and much after the end of the program. However, the evaluation emphasized that operational details lacked in the project proposal i.e. clear tasks, exact definitions and work plans (DAI, p. 57).
- Only 553 out of the planned 2,400 children were demobilized (23%), 238 had been reunified with families (9% of target), and a minimal 101 children had completed reintegration (4.2% of 2,400). Planning for this objective was insufficient including; an underestimation of CAFF to be transferred and their duration in transit care; insufficient logistical capacity in Equateur; limited planning for after reunification.
- The evaluation noted that the CTOs were well kept and clean, but this may have been a result of limited occupancy and that the married couple installed with the CTO worked well. Although there were single sex occupancy older and younger boys slept in the same rooms protection against abuse by older boys had not been factored in, this type of abuses has happened elsewhere (DAI, pp. 60-61). A problem was length of stay in CTOs some children had been there more than a year, when the objective was three months. Another issue was follow-up for CAFF in rural areas which was very difficult, some therefore returned to the cities to pursue vocational training since there were not options in their villages for their chosen profession. The BRC had sufficient flexibility for find solutions for these cases (DAI p. 63). However there was an urban bias in reintegration activities and rural CAFF did not receive regular follow-up (DAI, p. 65). A primary concern of the evaluation was the BRC's non-systematic integration of self-mobilized in reintegration activities.

#### **(ii) Projects for Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers (NGO Group)**

- The NGO Group's first objective, profiling armed groups and assessing their willingness to demobilize children, appeared according to the evaluation to have achieved its aims (DAI, p. 71). It mapped armed groups and their potential CAFF and led to the publication of a report.



- In the project proposal detailed surveys and mapping were outlined and this was not reflected in the final output, although very useful insights were garnered from the work undertaken it was not as in-depth as set out in the objectives (DAI, p. 71).
- 3,620 had been demobilized of the target of 10,391 at the time of the evaluation, 273 had completed reintegration, 5,836 were in reintegration. The discrepancies between demobilized and in-reintegration were a result of self-demobilized. However, there are unexplained numbers for example, CARE demobilized 899 CAFF, counted 3,184 in reintegration, hence 2,285 should be self-demobilized, but CARE reported only 1,315 self-demobilized – the discrepancy was not explained (DAI, p. 81). Follow-up on reintegration has not been clear. Overall the NGO Group achieved 47% of its goal relation to children released from armed groups and 56% in relation to children involved in reintegration activities.
- Other issues included an over-reliance of MONUC in relations to logistics, which had a negative impact upon the project when they could no longer assist in this matter. This could have been foreseen during project design (DAI, p. 73). All of the agencies relied on MONUC for air transport, which has been unreliable, resulting in children in transit experiencing long delays waiting more than a year to be reunited with their families.

### **(iii) Reunification and Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers (Save the Children)**

In February 2006 4,580 children had been reunified with their families and 5,902 demobilized, 230 had completed the program (5.1% of target 4,500) and 3,092 were in reintegration (DAI, p.91 and 97). Therefore 68% of the target was in reintegration in February 2006.

- In terms of reaching girl CAFF the SC-UK published a report on how to deal with girl CAFF which included numerous practical recommendations. The evaluation did not find that there was operational commitment in the project to the implementation of the recommendations and approaches set out in the report (DAI, p. 99). However, it did find that the strategies used to reach girls were in general appropriate (DAI, p. 104).
- Multiple training programs were undertaken to ensure capacity building, which was critical for the support and facilitation of the setting-up and implementation of the PNDDR. This activity of the SC-UK Special Project appeared to have been successful, although development of the reintegration module of the training was late (DAI, pp. 104-105).
- An additional key issue was that no specifically targeted approach was tailored to 16-18 year olds whose needs are entirely different to 8-10 year olds.
- Implementation of activities was delayed, especially concerning follow-up of children in economic or educational reintegration projects.

### **(iv) Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration (UNICEF)**

- The objectives of this project were an enormous task. There were some problems with the program design; there were insufficient UNICEF staff to support local partners;

planning for reintegration activities began late; there was no timeline for handover to CONADER, or work plan, this had led to problems of accountability (DAI, pp. 41-42). However, UNICEF successfully finalized the interim child soldier PNDDR.

- UNICEF did not provide the DAI evaluation with statistics on demobilization of child soldiers under the MDRP. It stated that 11,752 had been demobilized, 9,341 reunified and 3,361 (112% of target of 3,000) participating in reintegration activities. However, the evaluation believes this data to be cumulative and includes numbers prior to MDRP funding (DAI, p. 42).
- They conducted 32 out of a projected 66 national trainings (UNICEF conducted 17, CONADER 2, SC-UK 13). UNICEF were committed to assist the DRC government in the development of the PNDDR and establishing coordination mechanisms at national and provincial level before receiving MDRP funding and did so with MDRP funding. The evaluation concluded that UNICEF provided CONADER with the tools and skills necessary and that UNICEF cannot be blamed for CONADER's inability to reach its objectives, but that CONADER should be held accountable. (DAI, p. 44).
- Other issues included; lack of a tailored approach to 16-18 year olds; reintegration follow-up and monitoring was poor, particularly in rural areas; many local partners were lack capacity; and reintegration started late.

#### *Special Projects: UNDP Administered Projects (two projects)*

UNDP implemented two Special Projects, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the Community Recovery and Reintegration project (ComRec). The results of these two projects are documented in Philip Lancaster (2005), "Preliminary report on the evaluation of UNDP-executed special projects financed through the multi-donor trust fund of the MDRP".

#### **Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)**

- Broadly the RRM was designed, implemented and managed well, its major weakness was that it depended upon normal UNDP procurement procedures when intending to be a rapid response mechanism (Lancaster, 2005, p. 11 and 12). Normal UNDP procurement procedures slowed down response time.
- The support of the RRM was critical to the development of the PNDDR, where a key contribution was through the provision of funds and expert consultants (Lancaster, p. 18).
- RRM managed on a limited scale to bridge the gap between demobilization and reintegration by for example creating interim employment activities for 3,000 out of 15,000 ex-combatants in Ituri (Lancaster, p. 20). Thus stopping pressure from demobilized soldiers. It has had a significant impact upon communities in all areas (Lancaster, p. 24)
- Proportion of funds committed to the objective of peace and reconciliation through communications strategies was not evident. The impact of RRM is difficult to differentiate from other strategies and casual factors implemented by other actors in the area of peace and reconciliation.

### **Community Recovery and Reintegration (ComRec)**

- ComRec's approach to DDR reflects current thinking on reintegration, however, the preliminary evaluation concluded that the ComRec plan overreached its capacities, and its objectives were not possible within the limited budget and time available (Lancaster, p. 13). Moreover, the implementation strategy was more appropriate to a development project in a peaceful society than one in a (post-)conflict society.
- ComRec only placed 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects. The preliminary evaluation suggest that this is a result of a passive management, who failed to 'anticipate personnel, training, logistics or financial needs' thus resulting in broken promises to ex-combatants and security incidents due to poor management support (Lancaster, p.19).
- Where community projects were implemented for reintegration of ex-combatants they have had 'a near miraculous' effect (Lancaster, p.19). However, far too few projects were implemented compared to the need and the objectives.
- There were long delays between demobilization and reintegration projects.
- Due to lack of communication lessons learnt (positive and negative) were not applied in other provinces thus having a negative impact on the project overall.
- The preliminary evaluation states that the human resources management of ComRec was extremely poorly handled and as a consequence crippled performance (Lancaster, p.20).

## Republic of Congo

The results reported below are from the MDRP's Implementation Completion Report (June 2009). The closing date of the project was extended beyond the time of this review and the results reported may change.

Objectives	Achievements
Contribute to consolidating peace through the demobilization of up to 11,000 combatants	Of the 11,000 beneficiaries targeted for demobilization activities, none were reached by the close of the project.
Support social reintegration through the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and conflict management reconciliation	Of 20 communities targeted, conflict management activities were undertaken in 171 communities and involved over 14,000 people.
Support economic reintegration through income generating activities to 30,000 ex-combatants	Of the 30,000 beneficiaries targeted for reintegration activities, only the 19,000 self-demobilized beneficiaries targeted were reached by the close of the project.
Key Performance Indicators	Achievements
1. Significant proportions of ex-combatants take part in community wide decision making procedures.	According to the results of a beneficiary survey conducted in 2009 on a sample of 474 beneficiaries, 74% of respondents participated in community-decision making procedures. 95% of beneficiaries took part in social activities in their communities. Moreover, 83% felt that they had good personal and professional relationships with their neighbors. This points to successful social reintegration by project beneficiaries.
2. Beneficiary ex-combatants standard of living at program's end similar to non-combatant community members.	According to the 2009 beneficiary survey, 96% of project beneficiaries felt that their incomes were equivalent to, or greater than, those of their neighbors (75% felt that their income was higher than others; 21% felt that their income was equivalent). Moreover, 85% of beneficiaries said that their income had improved with their participation in the project and 89% of beneficiaries said that with their current income they were able to meet the essential needs of their families. All of these elements point to successful economic reintegration.
3. Ex-combatants able to compete for economic opportunities as other civilians in the community within a year of resettlement.	Strikingly, 89% of ex-combatant beneficiaries felt that they had an equal or greater opportunity to gain employment, as compared to others in their community; (54% felt that their opportunities were equivalent; 35% felt that they had greater opportunity than others in the community).
4. Thirty community infrastructure projects in function and use after one year of being completed.	By the close of the project, 16 community infrastructure projects had been completed and an additional 17 were still underway. As these 16 projects were completed within only 1-3 months of the project closing date, their use one year after completion could not be measured.
5. Perceived reduction in community-level violence and conflict.	Based on the 2009 beneficiary survey, 97% of project beneficiaries felt that violence in their community had diminished since they first returned from the war. 98% considered that the activities of the project had contributed to the reduction in violence in their community.

### Demobilization/Reinsertion : Rating: HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY

Of the 11,000 beneficiaries targeted for demobilization activities, none were reached by the close of the project. Unfortunately, government-run disarmament operations in the Pool,

(which were a precursor to the demobilization and reintegration activities planned under this project since combatants under arms cannot be project beneficiaries under ODA rules), were only launched in February 2009. Due to the very late start of disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion activities for the 5,000 combatants targeted from the Pool could not be undertaken during the life of the project. The demobilization of 6,000 members of the Force Publique also did not take place as the government was reluctant to downsize the national armed forces before the Pool rebels disarmed.

**Socioeconomic Reintegration.** Rating: MODERATELY SATISFACTORY

Socioeconomic reinsertion activities implemented by the project have made a good contribution to the livelihoods and well-being of self-demobilized beneficiaries on the whole.

Output indicators for this component: 30,000 beneficiaries identified according to selection criteria and issued non-falsifiable ID cards.

- 18,965 project beneficiaries received ID cards. This represents 99.8% of the actual number of project beneficiaries (19,000), but only 63.2% of the original project target (30,000).
- 80% of beneficiaries active in income generating activity within 12 months after receiving ID cards.

99% of the 19,000 actual project beneficiaries have been assisted by the project to launch an income-generating activity. As the project did not distribute ID cards until the start of reintegration activities, all of these beneficiaries were supported with income generating assistance within 12 months of receiving their cards.

**Reintegration Support to Communities.** Rating: MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY.

This component targeted the completion of 40 social infrastructure rehabilitation projects at the community level (activities such as rehabilitation of schools, bridges and water points, establishment of community seed/plant banks etc.). Implementation of this component was launched very late in the life of the project, partly because the attention of the implementing agency staff was first diverted to the complex socioeconomic reintegration component (contracting of numerous implementing partners, need for intensive field supervision etc.), and partly because of the long timeframe involved in receiving from local community leaders a list of suggested community infrastructures to be rehabilitated by the project. Due to its late start, the component was not completed.

Output indicators for this component: 40 community infrastructure projects completed by program end

- 33 community infrastructure projects were approved for implementation (82.5% of target), but only 16 projects (40%) were completed by the close of the project.

**Special Groups.** Rating: MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.

This component included specialized services for vulnerable beneficiaries including former child soldiers, female ex-combatants and ex-combatants with war disabilities or psychosocial issues. Activities undertaken included: functional literacy training and economic livelihood training for former child soldiers; assistance to former child soldiers to acquire birth certificates/identity documents; information and sensitization seminars for female ex-

combatants; seminars for ex-combatants and their spouses/partners on themes including gender violence, drug use, and HIV/Aids and sexually transmitted diseases; provision of prostheses to handicapped ex-combatants; training of trainers on providing specialized support to ex-combatants (and other community members) with visual and auditory handicaps; and provision of supplies and medicines to the national psychiatric service to support ex-combatants and other community members with psychological issues. (\*NB – all medical/health services listed here are in addition to the medical services made available to all ex-combatant beneficiaries, to which special groups also had access).

Output indicators for this component:

Each demobilized child soldier has received targeted reintegration assistance within one year of receiving ID card.

- Project beneficiaries included 348 former child soldiers. 100% have been assisted in developing an income generating activity; a specialized 1-month literacy, numeracy and commerce training was also provided to 81% of former child soldiers (those who were assessed to have low levels of literacy and numeracy).

Each disabled ex-combatant has received medical rehabilitation assistance within one year of receiving ID card.

- In addition to the ongoing medical services provided to all ex-combatant beneficiaries during the life of the project, additional assistance was provided to disabled ex-combatants. For example, 38 prosthetics were provided to the project's 37 war-disabled beneficiaries in the month prior to the close of the project. In addition, appropriate aides/equipment/devices were provided to all 70 beneficiaries with visual or auditory impairments (36 visual, 34 auditory).

**Reduction of Conflict and Violence.** Rating: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY.

The original output target for this component was the completion of conflict management activities in 20 communities. This target was greatly exceeded; conflict management activities (including cultural and sports activities, workshops on the culture of peace, citizenship and national reconciliation, seminars on human rights and peaceful resolution of conflict etc.) were undertaken in 171 communities and involved over 14,000 people. In addition, as part of this component, the project worked in partnership with key stakeholders to develop a national observatory on conflict. This agency would be a permanent body in the Republic of Congo and is currently being finalized by the office of the President of the Republic.

Output indicators for this component: 20 communities benefited from conflict management activities

As detailed above, more than 171 communities (more than 8x the original target) benefited from project activities related to conflict management.

#### **Lessons Learned:**

The availability of pledged counterpart funding should be a condition of effectiveness.

Several project activities depended on the outcome of peace/political negotiations. Future projects in which political resolution is required as a precursor to project



components/activities may want to consider designing the project in discrete phases, with clear activities and objectives for each phase.

The project was designed to provide small grants to beneficiaries for their livelihood micro-projects. However, at the design stage, not enough consideration was given to how efficient financial transfers from the project headquarters to beneficiaries and implementing partners in the provinces could be made.

Project indicators should not be pegged to project steps which are anticipated, but not guaranteed.

The design of the project's information management system was overly complex and sophisticated for the Congolese context.

Clear sensitization of beneficiaries about the identification and eligibility verification process is essential, as is the simplicity and timeliness of the process.

The use of an external Financial Management Agency (FMA) can be a valuable tool in projects where the implementing agency has weak financial management and/or procurement capacity, but precise TORs and regular oversight of their mission are required.

## Rwanda

### *The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)*

The results reported below are from the MDRP's Implementation Completion Report (June 2009) and the program's final evaluation (Consia 2009).

**Table E.6: RDRP II performance against (revised) objectives.**

Objective	Achievements CORSIA (As of Dec 31 <sup>st</sup> 2008)	Achievements ICR
PDO 1: Demobilizing 22,000 RDF ex-combatants and 12,500 members of ex-armed groups and support their transition into civilian life.	22,675 RDF (incl. 2,364 children) ex-combatants, and 7,091 (incl. 674 children) members of ex-armed groups have been demobilized.	The 11,098 RDF ex-combatants demobilized during stage 1 that were considered socio-economically vulnerable have all received VSW support. In addition, the VSW has been extended to 17,678 ex-combatants demobilized during RDRP II, bringing the total to 28,756 ex-combatants.  Specialized social rehabilitation assistance has been provided to 674 ex child soldiers who were demobilized during RDRP II and medication rehabilitation support has been provided to 8,400.
PDO 2: In the spirit of the Arusha agreement, support the reintegration of about 13,000 ex-FAR.	12,969 ex-FAR demobilized under RDRP I have received RSA; and 3,233 ex-FAR have received VSW support.	Of the estimated 13,000 FAR ex-combatants which were to receive reintegration support 12,969 received RSA and 3,233 received VSW support.
PDO 3: Support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be demobilized during stage II and all stage I ex-combatants who remain socially and economically vulnerable.	VSW support has been granted to a total number of 33,684 ex-combatants; and some 3,218 Ex-combatants have benefited from additional reintegration support that was initiated in 2006.	A comprehensive group of reinsertion benefits and reintegration benefits were provided to up to 28,249 RDF ex-combatants.  Additional re-integration support was delivered to 64.4% of intended beneficiaries through formal education support (669); vocational training (1885), apprenticeship training (664), and in 2007 an adult literacy training program (2,093). Additional targeted reintegration support was delivered to special target groups: child (672), female (all received VSW support plus access to skills training), disabled and chronically ill (11,844 EXC received medical rehabilitation support).
PDO 4: Facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from military to social and economic sectors.	Expectations at initiation of RDRP II met. Trend of falling military spending to benefit of social sectors is reported to have continued: military expenditure 2000-2005 decreased from 27% of public recurrent expenditures to 12%; while expenditures for social services over the same period have increased from 40% to close to 44% of recurrent expenditures.	GoR military spending has been consistent at 1.9% in 2005 and 2006 (most recent figures available). Real term reduction in USD spending has been from USD 60.6 million in 2001 to USD 45 million in 2005. Analysis by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that military spending by the GoR as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 3.4% in 2001 to 1.9% in 2005, staying at this level in 2006. In USD spending went from USD 60.6 million in 2001 to USD 45 million in 2005 to USD 47.8 million in 2007.

The MDRP Implementation Completion Report (June 2009) assesses the overall outcome rating of the RDRP II to be **satisfactory** based on substantial relevance, an average of satisfactory PDOs, and satisfactory efficiency. The results achieved by program Development Objectives (PDO) follows.

PDO 1: Demobilize an estimated 20,000 ex-combatants from the RDF and 25,000 members of Rwandese armed groups, and support their transition to civilian life:

- The achievement of this PDO is rated as moderately satisfactory: (i) while net total of demobilized amounts to 78.58% of the original net estimate during the RDRP II the downward revision of physical estimates of the numbers of AG to be repatriated was substantial and (ii) the sensitization and communications strategy to reach AGs in DRC lacked some efficacy and was only revised in 2007.

PDO 2: In the spirit of the Arusha Accord, support the reinsertion of ex-FAR:

- The achievement of this PDO is rated as satisfactory because during RDRP II FAR ex-combatants that were demobilized during RDRP I received effective counseling about using RSAs and VSW support for education, vocational training and apprenticeship. Of the estimated 13,000 FAR ex-combatants which were to receive reintegration support 12,969 received RSA and 3,233 received VSW support. However, only after 2005, following recommendations from evaluation studies in recognition of the importance of education and skills for reintegration, has there been an increasing encouragement of ex-combatants to use their VSW for further education, vocational training and apprenticeships.

PDO 3: Support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be demobilized in stage II and all RDRP stage I ex-combatants who remain socio-economically vulnerable.

- The achievement of this PDO is rated as satisfactory. Through RDRP II social reintegration has been supported by existing socio-cultural structures at community level which have assisted ex-combatants gaining acceptance by their communities. These structures have been augmented by the social reintegration interventions under RDRP II (and by the economic reintegration measures), including (i) sensitization of the host community; (ii) assessment of community perceptions and ex-combatant's perceptions of the other; (iii) targeting some of the community in economic reintegration activities.

PDO 4: Facilitate the reallocation of Government expenditure from defense to social and economic sectors:

- The achievement of this PDO is rated as satisfactory (see Table above).

#### *Main Lessons Learned*

- The RDRP should have created a better sensitization effort towards repatriation of AG members much earlier in its lifespan.
- RDRP has, from the outset, given importance to the inclusion of the community in reintegration interventions, which enabled a better reintegration process by transferring the ownership of the process from the RDRC to the ex-combatants community.

- The RDRP skills training should have been included as an integral part of reintegration support earlier during program design, resulting in a duplication of resources later in the Program, and possibly some lost opportunities as well.
- The RDRP **psycho-social support** capacity ought to have been prioritized and strengthened much earlier in the RDRP.
- *A strong national ownership* is instrumental for the DDR process. The ability of the RDRC to liaise with the GoR at the highest echelons and whenever necessary in a very short time period, to deal with issues on hand has been a strong foundation of the program.
- The RDTRP should have planned for an **exit strategy** in the Project Implementation Manual and this should have been an item on the Implementation Support Mission agenda's from the MTR.

The Final Program Evaluation of the RDRP Stage II (Consia, 2009): was to update data and information from previous evaluations, assess overall implementation of the Program and to identify lessons learned and present recommendations to inform possible future similar programs. The evaluation took place from December 2008 to February 2009.

The main findings are :

#### *Disarmament and Repatriation*

1. Far the largest number of ex-combatants that have been demobilized and reintegrated during RDRP I & II have been soldiers from FAR and RDF for which quantitative targets have been surpassed. It could be argued that the large number of especially ex-RDF demobilized has justified the Program.
2. A constant problem – and challenge – has been the much below planned number of ex-armed groups (AGs) that have repatriated to Rwanda. However, it is acknowledged that the issue of AG-combatants under the command of the FDLR in DRC is of a regional and international political nature and their disarmament and demobilization depend first of all on the Government of DRC and MONUC.

#### *Demobilization and reinsertion*

3. It is the impression of the evaluation team that RDRP II has implemented a relevant, effective and efficient demobilization and reinsertion process that has shown flexibility to changing needs, and that has prepared the ex-combatant and the receiving community for the reintegration thereby contributing to ensuring proper use of subsequent reintegration support and services. The Pre-Demobilization Orientation Program (PDOP) has addressed psycho-social and medical problems and taken up practical issues with direct involvement of relevant public institutions in order to introduce ex-combatants to institutions and available services.

#### *Reintegration*

4. The design of RDRP has addressed economic reintegration through various tailored initiatives that have to a large extent enabled ex-combatants to secure their livelihoods. Overall, ex-combatant's living conditions have improved significantly.
5. The GoR has placed political priority on developing policies and legislation, which are instrumental in creating supportive institutional structures. Similarly, the

existence of traditional and recently established socio-cultural structures at community level have helped ex-combatants to better gain community acceptance.

6. The RDRP has been able to develop linkages and partnerships with a wide range of partners within government, private sector and civil society. Apart from partnerships, the Program has facilitated capacity development among national institutions in various fields such as psychosocial welfare and medical rehabilitation.
7. The Program recognized that ex-combatants are a heterogeneous group with specific support needs, and been able to provide a balanced approach (specialized and general support) involving specialized/tailored assistance to vulnerable groups, while at the same time seeking to include moderately disabled ex-combatants into RDRP regular support activities.
8. Family reunification of child ex-combatants has been successful with virtually all child ex-combatants having been able to join their families or foster families after rehabilitation. [Lessons learned from the MDRP Study on Reintegration of Children of RDRP beneficiaries (MDRP, September-October 2008) notes that child ECs are not a homogeneous group and require tailored support. It also observes that after demobilization, 77% of them continue with education, vocational training or apprenticeship and their drop-out rates are low.]
9. The Program provided reinsertion and reintegration benefits to female Ex-Cs, but also deemed that all female ex-combatants were eligible for Vulnerable Special Window (VSW) support, and subsequently all female ex-combatants have received VSW support. [Lessons learned from the MDRP Study on Female EXCs (MDRP, September-October 2008) states that more gender-sensitive training is needed to promote sustainable livelihoods for female ex-combatants and that women's health issues are often overlooked. It concludes that more space for discussing gender issues throughout the DDR process would be valuable, such as the importance of explicitly targeting vulnerable female EXCs and need for additional investment on livelihood support for females.]
10. In general the RDRP economic reintegration interventions have integrated elements and features showing ability to respond to changes and needs of specific groups of ex-combatants. However, these interventions came rather late during RDRP II thereby impacting the potential quality and outcome of the services.
11. Late implementation of economic reintegration interventions and financial constraints posed limitations on the quality of the vocational training and especially on the more innovative apprenticeship training. Nonetheless, these initiatives have helped to focus on the need for skills-training, and not only for ex-combatants. They also assisted in the development of vocational training facilities for disabled, and supported the development of formalized apprentice-ship training in the country.

#### *Institutional set-up and Management*

12. The RDRC/ RDRP institutional set-up and management structure has been relevant and effective in securing implementation of the agreed program. This is partly due to strong national ownership to the Program. Other important elements are competent staff and the fact that RDRP established the necessary institutional capacity right

from the start of the Program. The considerable presence of RDRP staff at the local level has no doubt contributed to effective and efficient implementation of the Program.

#### *Lessons Learned*

The effectiveness and positive impact on reintegration of RDRP II interventions can, among others, be attributed to the following:

- RDRP has, from the very start, been based on a strong National ownership expressed through Government commitment to reconciliation and peace that has given the Program its high profile;
- RDRP has from its initial phases established the necessary institutional capacity;
- RDRP has shown flexibility and ability to adjust to changes in accordance with the findings and assessments of the various studies undertaken on different aspects of the Program;
- RDRP has in most of its efforts given importance to the inclusion of the community, and other community members than just ex-combatants, in reintegration interventions;
- Although introduced rather late in Program implementation, RDRP has placed emphasis in supporting education and skills training as part of reintegration activities;
- RDRP has been instrumental in achieving the approval of special legislation providing housing and pensions to disabled ex-combatants;
- Also, it appears that the Program has contributed to increased attention to the need for skills training in the society at large; and introduced innovative training programs that could help to improve formal vocational training and more importantly contribute to the development of a recognized national apprenticeship training system.

However, the lessons to be drawn from the implementation of the RDRP II also include:

- The Program should probably at an earlier stage have paid more attention to how to improve the weakest link in the demobilization; that is to have invested more and earlier in the difficult task to encourage Armed Group members in the DRC to lay down their weapons and return to Rwanda;
- Training should have been included as an integral part of reintegration support earlier during Program implementation;
- The considerable number of RDRP staff that continued to be present at the district level up to June 2008 probably delayed effective handing over of responsibility for attention to ex-combatants to permanent local government institutions. The mainstreaming effort should have been a gradual process initiated at an earlier stage of Program implementation.



## Uganda

### The Amnesty Commission Special Project (ACSP)

The results of the ACSP have been documented in two reports: (i) the Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM, 2009) and (ii) the Final Evaluation of the ACSP (Hendrickson et al, 2009).

#### ICM (2009) main findings:

- Measurable development impacts have been limited. Overall it is perceived that the Project has made a contribution to an improved environment for peace and development.
- The sensitizing of communities and potential Reporters by the Amnesty Commission about the Amnesty played an important role in the Government's Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Northern Uganda facilitated the peace talks with the LRA, which led to increased confidence among the people in Northern Uganda to return to their original homes and fields.
- The MDRP framework within which the Grant was provided has facilitated the partnership with other donors and the UN agencies. The Amnesty Commission has also utilized the Project to enhance its operational collaboration with some key development organizations in the country, especially in the North.

Original (no changes)		ICR (2009): Overall Project performance rating: Moderately Satisfactory
<b>Activities</b>	<b>Outcome Indicators</b>	<b>Results Achieved ICR (2009)</b>
1: <b>Sensitization.</b> Carrying out of information dissemination activities aimed at explaining the Amnesty Act of 2000 including the procedures for claiming amnesty and the benefits of the Act, through the provision of the technical advisory services and carrying out of workshops.	Communities, rebels, state and non-state actors understand and appreciate the Amnesty Act and the role of the Amnesty Commission. Up to 9,567 additional Reporters apply for amnesty.	Rating: SATISFACTORY Results reported: - Confidence in the Amnesty Commission among more than 2000 LRA Reporters interviewed in 2005 was high. (MDRP Dissemination Note No. 2.) - An additional 10,513 Reporters applied for amnesty since the original project design in early 2004. Assessment of results: - The results reported above are satisfactory. But it should also be noted that: 1) Reaching the active rebels with messages on the amnesty proves difficult in remote areas and especially in the light of active misinformation and violent threats by rebel commanders. 2) No surveys or other assessments on the general awareness of the various target groups about the Amnesty Act were available.
2: <b>Demobilization.</b> Demobilization of and provision of support to Reporters including issuance of amnesty certificates, provision of medical assistance and psychosocial counseling.	All persons seeking amnesty are received and processed in accordance with agreed standards, procedures and timeframes.	Rating: MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY Results reported: - Standards and procedures were followed during and following reception as established and elaborated in the Amnesty Commission's internal guidelines and the Project Implementation Manual (PIM), accepted by the Bank. - The outreach of the AC into areas where rebels and their collaborators reported has been less effective than foreseen. The ability of the AC to prevent Reporters to

		<p>be recruited into the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) was insufficient.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Delays in effectiveness of the Project and in procurement/delivery processes, as well as security concerns in different areas in the North, meant that during the life of the Project a certain backlog of Reporters who had not yet received their resettlement package persisted. Delays occurred between reporting and the delivery of the reinsertion package.</li> </ul> <p>Assessment of results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Even with occasional discussions between the MDRP partners and the GoU during the annual MDRP Joint Partner Missions on the issue of recruitment into the UPDF, significant numbers of Reporters have been recruited.</li> </ul>
<p><b>3: Resettlement.</b> Provision of support to assist in the resettlement of Reporters into their communities including provision of basic needs items such as clothing, mattresses, and blankets; and provision of reinsertion payments to Reporters.</p>	<p>Backlog of 5,743 Reporters processed within 6 months of project start, and up to 9,567 new Reporters provided with standard reinsertion package.</p>	<p>Rating: MODERATELY SATISFACTORY</p> <p>Results reported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Shortly after project effectiveness (January 2005), by the end of March 2005, there was a backlog of 10,664 Reporters (of which 6,594 were from the LRA).</li> <li>- In November 2005 – 6 months after the launch of the project – 5,375 Reporters had received her/his reinsertion package.</li> <li>- At project closure, 14,816 Reporters (out of the 15,310 foreseen) had received a reinsertion package (97%).</li> </ul> <p>Assessment of results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Due to a larger inflow of rebels and collaborators than expected, the backlog at the end of the project was still 1,440 Reporters.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4: Social and Economic Reintegration.</b> Provision of social and economic support to Reporters, including: (i) carrying out of sensitization and reconciliation of communities to facilitate reintegration of Reporters, (ii) provision of material support of Reporters in carrying out income generating activities, and (iii) facilitation of access to vocational training, non-formal education and formal education to Reporters and their communities.</p>	<p>50 per cent of Reporters engaged in gender and generational appropriate community based programs.</p>	<p>Rating: MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY</p> <p>Results reported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The reports and other evidence available do not allow a quantitative assessment of the number or share of Reporters that found access to community-base programs.</li> <li>- The draft evaluation report concludes that "Overall, therefore, the ACSP had a relatively positive impact on some Reporters' ability to reintegrate back into society. But there were many ex-combatants who fell between the cracks and remain economically vulnerable today."</li> </ul> <p>Assessment of results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation by the Amnesty Commission does not allow assessing how effective the Commission has been in referring Reporters to ongoing support projects. The Commission did not have a very systematic approach in referring Reporters. But in the second half of the Project's implementation the Commission engaged more closely with some key partners that assisted in the reintegration and livelihood development of Reporters. The follow-up with Reporters to assess outcomes and the impact of support has been limited, without a formal and systematic approach.</li> </ul>
<p><b>5: Institutional Strengthening.</b> Strengthening of the Amnesty Commission capacity in, among other areas, project and financial management, monitoring and evaluation</p>	<p>Amnesty Commission has adequate human, institutional and financial capacity.</p>	<p>Rating: MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY</p> <p>Results reported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Amnesty Commission hired all the staff that was agreed upon in the project proposal, namely a project manager, M&amp;E specialist and 4 senior resettlement officers.</li> <li>- The Commission also hired as agreed the services of</li> </ul>

and procurement, through provision of technical advisory services.		<p>a qualified Financial Management Agency, which served the project and thus the Commission throughout the Project period.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In addition, the AC reallocated resources to ensure the services of an IT expert to ensure the proper running of the AC's MIS.</li> <li>- Following the end of the project, the AC again manages to keep functioning with very little operating resources and just the Commissioners and core staff.</li> </ul> <p>Assessment of results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The additional staff members that the Project provided were in place through most of the Project. It could however not overcome problems at the level of the staffing at the Commission itself. Many of the staff at the Commission lack qualification (and often the motivation) for the complex jobs that they are expected to do.</li> <li>- It should also be noted that the AC is by its very nature a temporary institution. The GoU has not assigned its most dynamic people to the Commission.</li> <li>- The M&amp;E systems set up with assistance of the Project show to be weak and the Commission itself has not taken full charge of their continuation.</li> <li>- Due to the limited financial allocation in the Government budget, the Commission remains very dependent on donor funding to implement its mandate.</li> </ul>
All activities	Outcome Indicator: Amnesty Act provides incentive and framework for dialogue-based end to insurgencies.	<p>Rating: SATISFACTORY</p> <p>Results reported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- This project objective has been achieved. A formal dialogue between the GoU and the LRA started in mid-2006. The agreement reached between the two delegations has not yet been signed. But cessation of hostilities agreement reached in August 2006 has contributed to considerable improvement of security in Northern Uganda. Only very few LRA-related incidents have occurred in Uganda since mid-2006.</li> <li>- Informal discussions between leaders of the ADF and the Amnesty Commission chairman have been ongoing; recent developments appear to be leading to a formal negotiation.</li> <li>- The Amnesty Commission played a considerable role in the sensitization component of the Government's high-profile Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Northern Uganda, which helped in the move towards a non-military solution to the conflict.</li> </ul> <p>Assessment of results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The contribution of the Amnesty Commission to the non-military solutions to the conflicts is seen as very positive. The increased level of activity of the AC as a result of the Project made it easier for the Commission to maintain its relative independence and to take initiatives when opportunities for dialogue and information exchange occurred.</li> </ul>
Partner Performance		<p><b>World Bank: MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.</b></p> <p>Supervision of this Project by the Bank was carried out regularly. In the second half of the Project implementation, the TTL (MDRP Secretariat member) moved his base from Washington DC to Kampala (in December 2005). Although most of the TTL's responsibilities were outside Uganda, he regularly interacted with the recipient, also in between missions. Nonetheless, weaknesses in the original project design</p>

		<p>have not been sufficiently addressed. Due to the fact that this was a small project in the MDRP portfolio, the Project did not receive sufficient attention and resources from the Project team, nor from MDRP management. Given the sometimes poor reporting provided by the recipient, the Bank team also should have considered earlier on to strengthen the M&amp;E capacity of the Project. A beneficiary assessment of the project, which was decided upon and for which a company had been selected, was aborted at the eleventh hour by MDRP management.</p> <p><b>Amnesty Commission: MODERATELY SATISFACTORY.</b> The Amnesty Commission is as such a rather weak institution, with Commissioners and staff selected not primarily on their management skills. The financial resources made available for even the core activities of the Commission are insufficient. Nevertheless, the AC has shown to be able to keep its work out of political turmoil and guide the project activities with some success.</p>
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#### Final Evaluation of the ACSP (Hendrickson et al, 2009):

- Overall the ACSP complemented wider peace and stability efforts in Uganda and the wider central African region in a moderately satisfactory manner. By hastening the return and surrender of many ex-combatants involved in the country's internal conflicts, the ACSP effectively complemented (and to an extent made up for the limitations of) the government's other military and peace instruments, such as negotiations. Mediation efforts by Amnesty staff were also essential in terms of shoring up the credibility of the Government's peace initiatives which often suffered from gaps between its rhetoric and its actions.
- The ACSP was not, however, sufficiently conflict sensitive. Because of its narrow focus on delivering packages, insufficient efforts were made to anticipate or mitigate the community divisions which arose because of the provision of benefits to ex-combatants at the exclusion of other civilians.
- In addition, the ACSP was largely silent on the wider question of encouraging demilitarization at the national level, which was a regional MDRP priority, on the expectation (at least until 2006) that a national DDR program would be forthcoming at some stage in the future.

#### Results by numbers:

Target	Results
Up to 9,567 additional Reporters apply for amnesty	10,513 Reporters applied for amnesty
Backlog of 5,743 Reporters processed within 6 months of project start	5,375 Reporters had received her/his reinsertion package. The backlog at the end of the project was still 1,440 Reporters.
Up to 9,567 new Reporters provided with standard reinsertion package	At project closure, 14,816 Reporters (out of the 15,310 foreseen) had received a reinsertion package (97%).

**Results by targeted beneficiaries and regional coverage:**

The vast bulk of the reporters (96%), came from four main groups: the LRA (12,215 or 55.4% of the total), the West Nile Bank Front (4,115 or 18.7%), the Uganda National Rescue Front II (3,113 or 14.1 %), and the Allied Democratic Forces (1,834 or 8.3%).

The gender distribution of reporters shows that 79% were males, 21% female. In terms of age, 6,834 (or 31%) were below the age of 18, 5,212 were between the ages of 18-23, and 3,092 between ages 24-28, and 2,288 were aged from 29-33. These figures tally with the fact that a significant portion of reporters were either kidnapped by the LRA or joined the LRA as children.

A break-down in these numbers by region shows that more than half were registered in the North (23% in Gulu, and 30% in Kitgum/Pader), 32% in the northwest, and 8% in the west, 4% in the central region, and 3% in the east. While not all of these reporters were ultimately resettled in the region where they first registered, this gives a rough indication of where project beneficiaries can be found.