



Department
for International
Development

**PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTORS IN LIBYA**

**FINAL REPORT
(WITH RECOMMENDATIONS)**

FOR THE
DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

AUGUST 2013

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

DFID	Department for International Development
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
GNC	General National Council
IDI	In-depth Interview
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LSF	Libyan Shield Forces
LYD	Libyan Dinars
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
PI	Paired Interview
SSC	Supreme Security Committee

<i>Amiyah</i>	Local Arabic dialect
<i>Fatwah</i>	Islamic legal pronouncement
<i>Munteqa</i>	Local area, e.g., urban district, or valley
<i>Shabiyah</i>	Pre-revolutionary administrative region
<i>Shari'a</i>	Islamic law
<i>Thuwwar</i>	Revolutionaries

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Naji Abou Khalil, with the support of Adrian Carriere and Laurence Hargreaves, all from Altai Consulting. Quantitative and qualitative research was managed by Usama Al Senosy and conducted by Imad Al Dine Al Kout, Mohannad Bejawi, Abd Al Rahman Al Basir and Ebtihaj Embaya, all from Istishari Research and Consulting, Altai's Libyan research partner.

Altai Consulting is grateful to the Libyan Ministry of Interior for its support and feedback throughout the research, to the many stakeholders in the security and justice sector who informed these findings, and to the thousands of Libyans who kindly and candidly shared their opinions.

Unless specified otherwise, all images in this report were taken by Altai Consulting.

This publication was produced by Altai Consulting for review by the Department for International Development. The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department for International Development.

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 2013, Altai Consulting was commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) to conduct a national survey on attitudes towards the Libyan security and justice sectors, with a particular focus on understanding awareness of and attitudes towards the National Police. It is hoped that the findings in this report will be used by DFID and its Libyan Government counterparts to better target policies, operations and improvement programs.

The majority of Libyans had a positive view of security, with 67% reporting that local security was 'very good' or 'good', while 37% said that the current security situation was 'a lot better' or 'somewhat better' than before the revolution, and 45% said current security was better than during the NTC period. Similarly, the majority of Libyans believed that the crime situation in their areas has become 'a lot better' or 'somewhat better' over the past six months. These positive perceptions, however, must be qualified by the high reported rates of crime as well as widespread worries amongst Libyans with regards to criminal activities: almost 1 out of 20 Libyans reported that they or a close member of their family were victims of kidnapping, 1 out of 7 were robbed at illegal checkpoints, 1 out of 14 were victims of house robberies, and 1 out of 33 victims of murder. Libyans believe that criminal activities and insecurity in general are mainly caused by armed individuals (53%), lack of police (37%), ineffective police (27%), and illegal or irresponsible brigades (24%). As a general trend, levels of crime and insecurity are high in the East (especially in Benghazi) and even more so in most districts in the South, and young Libyans, especially young men, are more pessimistic about the security situation.

In order to combat these high levels of crime and insecurity, most Libyans believe that more National Police (80%) and more Traffic Police (69%) would help to reduce crime in their area, while only 22% and 10% respectively believed that having 'more local brigades' and 'more brigades from other cities' would be an effective way to improve the crime situation. Concurrently, the top priorities for the Ministry of Interior should be to remove arms from the street, to address problems with armed individuals and gangs, and to rebuild the capacity of the state police forces.

According to Libyans from all districts, the National Police is the most visible, effective and appropriate security provider across the nation. Effective measures to improve perceptions of the National Police would involve a better, more professional appearance, greater respect for civilians, better reactivity, and an increased effectiveness at dealing with crime. Very few Libyans, often less than 1% in a given district, believed that other security providers such as the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), the Libya Shield Forces (LSF), and other independent brigades were effective security providers or should be in charge of security. Finally, although the National Police was perceived as only moderately effective and slightly corrupt, the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) scores slightly worse in terms of effectiveness and corruption.

While the Libyan security landscape is composed of a multitude of different official, semi-official, and unofficial actors, the justice landscape mainly consists of the state justice system, although alternative sources of justice exist despite their relatively low popularity. This lack of serious alternatives explains why the majority of Libyans refer to the state justice system when they are victims of a crime, although they are very critical of its poor performance and do not trust the system as a whole. Similarly, judges are seen

as moderately effective but significantly dependent on external forces such as brigades to exercise their job and ensure their protection. Nevertheless, the majority of Libyans are in favor of trial and rehabilitation (training) of former judges rather than total exclusion from the judicial system. As a result, Libyans would like the Ministry of Justice to take strong measures to improve the justice system. In this aspect, compliance with Islamic values and the trial of former regime officials appeared to be vectors of legitimacy to improve perceptions of the justice system and allow the Ministry of Justice to implement reforms more smoothly.

The above findings reveal that while Libyans would prefer to have official state actors ensuring security in the country, they also recognize that the National Police lacks the necessary capacity and support to effectively ensure security, and the same can be said to a greater degree for the state justice system. Indeed, the potential for a security and justice vacuum in various parts of the country comes with it a series of risks for the Libyan government. First, worrying results from the South of the country point to a serious risk of general destabilization in the region. Second, armed individuals across the country are gaining political and social influence over elected and other legitimately appointed government representatives through the use of violence, setting a dangerous trend. This, coupled with the lack of effective and capable security and justice bodies, may encourage more individuals to take security and justice into their own hands, increasing tensions and reprisals. Third, poor security on inter-city roads creates a space for criminal and other security incidents, many of which are politically motivated and fuel tensions between different communities and cities. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the distrust, pessimism and frustration of young Libyans may be the country's most serious risk, as armed and well equipped young men who lack access to economic and political opportunities become increasingly frustrated and reject state authority.

In order to mitigate these risks, the government should intervene quickly in areas where several security or military bodies coexist to coordinate and unify their actions under one legal umbrella, while at the same time pursuing and reinforcing its campaign to collect arms through a gradual and targeted buy-back campaign for armed individuals and members of brigades once the integration process is well under, so as not to fuel tensions. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice could engage with heads of brigades, local notables, and tribal leaders to identify persons involved in criminal activities. When said persons are under the protection of semi- or unofficial security bodies, the Ministry could negotiate with the same leaders to remove this protection and prosecute offenders. To improve security on a local level, the Ministry of Interior could institute a community or neighbourhood police body, where a responsible officer is entrusted to work in a specific area and engage with local citizens on a daily basis, also creating an effective means of collecting information on community tensions and issues. The Ministry of Interior could also reinforce the Traffic Police, a largely apolitical security body, and provide distinct uniforms and vehicles to all official security bodies in order to increase the visibility of state actors. In order to target youth, young figures from semi-official revolutionary brigades could be appointed to positions of importance within the National Police and other official security and justice bodies, based on qualifications, trustworthiness, and future potential. The government could then design targeted advertising campaigns in order to promote the 'success stories' of these young individuals. Finally, concrete symbolic gesture such as trials of top regime officials and transferring control of prisons to the judicial police would be effective measures to improve the perception of the justice system.

2 INTRODUCTION

In March 2013, Altai Consulting was commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) to conduct a national survey on attitudes towards the Libyan security and justice sectors, with a particular focus on understanding awareness of and attitudes towards the National Police.

DFID has an opportunity to support Libya's democratic transition by providing reliable, unbiased and timely information on public perceptions of the Libyan security and justice systems to the Libyan Ministries of Interior and Justice, in order that they can better target their operations and improvement programmes.

While it is common in Libya to hear of frustrations about the continued existence of brigades outside of the government command structures, or the lack of a visible and effective national police force, it is also common to hear positive sentiments regarding developments in the security sector, particularly with regard to newly trained police units or the demobilizing of independent brigades. However, the true opinions of the nation in these domains remain poorly understood, and often debate is dominated by a vocal minority. With this in mind, between April and May 2013, Altai conducted a nationwide survey assessing awareness and attitudes towards different actors and policies within the security and justice sectors, which has built a reliable 'Spring 2013 baseline' of public opinion. This has led to several modest recommendations for DFID and its Libyan security sector counterparts for optimizing policies to meet public demands. Field research comprised of a statistically-representative mobile phone survey with 2,317 respondents, and qualitative research in 11 Libyan cities, including Paired Interviews (PIs) with ordinary Libyans and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with policemen, brigade members and GNC members.

This report builds on other security and justice assessments conducted in Libya, including International Crisis Group's *Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya* (April 2013) and *Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts* (September 2012), as well as the German Institute for International and Security Affairs' *Fault Lines of the Revolution – Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya* (June 2013), and Small Arms Survey's *Libya's Evolving Armed Groups* by Brian McQuinn (October 2012).

The report proceeds as follows: first, there is an explanation of the research scope and methodology, followed by a primer on Ghadaffi-era and post-revolutionary security and justice sectors and the structures within them. Then, there is a brief analysis of survey respondent profiles before attitudes towards the security sector are presented, starting with attitudes towards security and crime in general, and then a deeper study of attitudes towards official security actors (the National Police and National Army) and semi- and un-official actors (such as the Supreme Security Committee, Libya Shield Forces, and brigades under different levels of Ministry of Interior control). Then, attitudes towards the justice sector are presented, followed by a discussion about attitudes towards current policies and concerns in both sectors. The report concludes by highlighting key findings and identifies areas of opportunity for DFID and its Libyan counterparts to make positive contributions to both the Libyan security and justice sectors and for optimizing policies to meet public demands.

3 RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 RESEARCH SCOPE

The overall objective of the research is to provide the Department for International Development (DFID) and its Libyan Government counterparts with a detailed and reliable assessment of the national attitudes towards the Libyan police and justice sectors, in order that the Libyan Government can use this information to better target policies, operations and improvement programs.

The research had several specific aims:

- To inform the Libyan Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Ministry of Justice about the public's awareness of and attitudes towards the security and justice sectors, with a particular focus on understanding awareness of and attitudes towards the National Police
- To build a 'Spring 2013' baseline dataset that is statistically meaningful at both a national level and for several key cities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata and Sabha), which can be meaningfully disaggregated by gender and age group
- To design the questionnaire and methodology in such a manner that the research can easily be repeated in the future, in order to track important indicators over time
- To assess perceptions of security at a national and local level, and understand how this perception has changed over recent months, and how people feel with regards the future
- To assess perceptions of crime levels at a national and local level, and understand how crime levels are perceived in relation to other areas of the country, and how crime levels have changed over time
- To assess attitudes towards official, semi-official and unofficial security actors, and understand why Libyans might prefer one security provider over another
- To assess attitudes towards official and customary justice providers, and to understand why Libyans might prefer one justice system over another
- To assess the extent that the success of the transitional justice process will alter perceptions of the state justice system
- To assess the levels of support for the current government security and justice policies.

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

The results presented in this report have derived from three research modules:

- **Landscape Mapping**, which involved a literature review of recent reports, and KIIs with experts, policemen, judges, brigade members and politicians, in order to identify the past and present security and justice structures, identify current issues, and support the design of the quantitative and qualitative research tools
- **National Survey**, which involved interviewing 2,312 Libyans in 22 districts to produce robust quantitative data on Libyan attitudes towards the police and justice sectors
- **Paired Interviews**, which involved conducting 30 PIs with youth and middle-aged male and female Libyans in 11 Libyan cities, in order to gather ordinary and frank attitudes towards police and justice sectors and the security and justice actors within them.

Together, these three sources of information have allowed Altai to develop a rich contextual understanding of Libyans' attitudes towards the police and justice sectors.

3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.3.1 Landscape Mapping

To develop the research team's understanding of Libya's complex post-revolutionary security and justice landscape, and to support the development of the primary research tool, a wide-ranging literature review was conducted, as shown in Table 1 below.

Title	Author(s)	Year	Content Description
<i>Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya</i>	International Crisis Group	2013	This report aims at offering a comprehensive understanding of Libya's judiciary past and present status. It also enumerates its today's main challenges.
<i>Divided we stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts</i>	International Crisis Group	2012	This report offers a comprehensive overview of the principal security actors within Libya, and the main challenges preventing the Libyan authorities of promoting unified and official security and army forces, in order to monopolize the legal use of force by the state.
<i>Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Ghadaffi</i>	International Crisis Group	2011	This report describes in a knowledgeable and detailed way the security landscape that has emerged in the immediate aftermath of the revolution.
<i>Explosive situation: Ghadaffi's abandoned Weapons and Threat to Libya's Civilians</i>	International Human Rights Clinic. Research coordinated by Bonnie Docherty	2012	This report examines the risks of exposure of the Libyan civilian population to abandoned weapons.
<i>Libyan Islamists Unpacked: Rise, Transformation and Future</i>	Brookings Doha Center/Omar Ashour	2012	This report gives a valuable outline of the principal Islamist trends and their recent evolution in the wake of the 2011 uprising.
<i>Au Coeur de la Libye de Ghadaffi</i>	Patrick Haimzadeh	2011	The author, who was a former French diplomat in Libya, gives an in-depth view of main political dynamics in pre-revolutionary Libya and that are contributing to shape the country's political future.
<i>Post-Ghadaffi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future</i>	Youssef Mohammad Sawani	2012	This study addresses main social and political features in post-revolutionary Libya.
<i>British Crime Survey</i>	British Government	2010-2011	This study was examined in order to see how large national surveys on this topic are conducted in the UK.

<i>Awareness and Attitudes towards the Policing and Justice Systems in Sanaa</i>	Yemen Policing and Justice Program/Yemen Polling Centre	2010	This report shows an example of a study with similar objectives that was conducted in Yemen and funded by the UK Government.
<i>Cognitive Effects Assessment Afghanistan (Police and Security Evaluation)</i>	Altai Consulting	2010-2013	Five surveys conducted by Altai in North-eastern Afghanistan measured perceptions of police and army and security over time.
<i>Fault Lines of the Revolution – Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya</i>	German Institute for International and Security Affairs	2013	This report aims at understanding the way Libya’s different political and military actors position themselves in the light of post-revolutionary alliances in the country. It explains the way the two camps interact whether on economical, security or political fronts.
<i>‘Libya Rule of Law priorities’</i>	International Legal Assistance Consortium	2013	The study offers a comprehensive description of the judiciary in Libya and of each component’s main challenges. It also details the main obstacles facing the rule of law implementation in Libya
<i>‘After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups’</i>	Small Arms Survey	2012	The report proposes an in-depth assessment of Libya’s main armed groups capacities with a focus on Misrata.

Table 1: Literature Review

As part of the landscape mapping, a number of KIIs were conducted by Altai’s international consultants. At the start of the research these took place mainly in Tripoli, but over the course of the research, where security permitted, KIIs were conducted in each of the cities visited for the PIs, in order to gain a deeper local understanding of the variances in the security and justice sectors across Libya.

3.3.2 National Survey

The quantitative survey gathered information on attitudes to the security and justice sectors from the Libyan population. This was achieved through a mobile phone survey conducted with over 2,302 randomly-selected people from all 22 districts of the country, in order to produce extremely robust national results. To guarantee the sample was representative of the actual Libyan population, quotas were defined for each district according to a Proportional-To-Population methodology, alongside quotas for gender (equal numbers of male and female respondents) and age (quotas were set for five different age bands, starting at 16 years). In addition to the national-level survey, four of the most important Libyan cities were substantially over-sampled, namely Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata and Sabha. These ‘key cities’ were selected in agreement with DFID because of their regional importance. This sampling framework made use of data from the 2006 Libyan Census, and the 2013 population pyramid estimated by the United States Census Bureau. The final questionnaire used for the survey is shown in Appendix A.

It is instructive to review key characteristics of the survey respondents. Overall, a total of 2,302 persons were interviewed between May 5th and May 26th 2013.¹ The final gender ratio was 56% male and 44% female, a slight difference that was balanced out in the post-weighting process. No quota was set on ethnicity, but Arabs were the most interviewed (89%), followed by Berbers (8%), and Tebu and Tuwareg (<1%). Quotas were set on age, and as such, youth between 16 and 19 represented 9% of the sample, while 27% were aged between 20 and 29 years, 29% between 30 and 39 years, 19% between 40 and 49 years and 16% were more than 50 years. The composition of the final sample are detailed in the table, map and charts below.

Location		Gender		Age Group					Overall
Region	District	Male	Female	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+	
West	Tripoli	266	192	103	130	113	59	53	458
	Misrata	204	196	95	125	93	45	42	400
	Aziziyah	48	42	19	26	20	14	11	90
	Margab	49	43	19	26	23	14	10	92
	Jebel Gharbi	33	27	14	18	15	7	6	60
	Zawiyah	35	28	14	18	12	7	12	63
	Niqat Al Khoms	30	28	13	19	14	6	6	58
	Sirte	19	14	5	11	12	5	0	33
	Nalut	10	9	5	5	6	1	2	19
East	Benghazi	196	192	93	114	91	49	41	388
	Jebel Akhdar	18	19	10	12	8	3	4	37
	Al Marj	17	19	7	10	10	5	4	36
	Al Wahat	24	17	9	11	12	4	5	41
	Darnah	18	16	9	10	7	4	4	34
	Al Butan	16	16	9	9	5	5	4	32
	Al Kufrah	5	6	4	4	3	0	0	11
South	Sabha	181	172	84	101	82	44	42	353
	Murzuq	7	8	3	5	5	2	0	15
	Wadi Shati	28	22	8	22	12	2	6	50
	Wadi Al Hayat	9	9	1	7	7	1	2	18
	Al Jufrah	4	4	1	2	2	3	0	8
	Ghat	3	3	2	4	0	0	0	6
Libya		1220	1082	527	689	552	280	254	2302

Table 2: Final sample composition by district, age and gender

¹ In reality, 2375 interviews were conducted, although 73 interviews were discarded for not being sufficiently candid




Figure 1: Districts, regions, and sampling density




Figure 2 - Sample Group by Ethnicity (left) and Age Group (right)

In this report, the national and key city results are presented with 95% confidence that the results lie within $\pm 3\%$ and $\pm 5\%$ of the real situation respectively. For data disaggregated in terms of age, the error margin is greater than 5%. Data for numerically smaller groups, such as certain income brackets or ethnic minorities, are not statistically representative and are only intended to be indicative of the general trends. Numbers in charts may not add to 100% due to rounding.

3.3.3 Paired Interviews

In order to help interpret the results from the quantitative survey, a series of PIs were conducted shortly after the survey data was analysed. PIs were assembled spontaneously with 2 'ordinary' Libyans of similar socio-demographic profiles; for example, young women at Tripoli University, young men at a *shisha* cafe

in Misrata, older men in Bani Walid at a local tribal leader’s house, and young women working at a hospital in Benghazi. The interviewees usually knew each other and were encouraged to frankly discuss and debate their opinions within the boundaries of a semi-structured, open-ended guideline that was administered by a trained Istishari consultant, accompanied by an Altai consultant where security permitted. The guideline used for the PIs is shown in Appendix B.

The PIs had two main objectives:

- To obtain a deeper understanding of the local security and justice landscape, the presence of different security and justice actors, local issues, and trends
- To understand reasons behind trends identified in the quantitative survey.

In total, 30 PIs with a total of 60 participants have been conducted in 12 Libyan cities. In each of these cities, 2 PIs were organized, split by gender, education level (high-school/University) and age (16-25 year old youth/45+), according to Table 3 below. Conducting this large number of PIs in such a range of locations ensures that a diversity of opinions are collected.

City	High-school educated young males (16-25)	Young females (16-25)	Older men (45+)	University-educated youth (16-25)
Tripoli	1	1	1	1
Benghazi	1	1	1	1
Misratah	1	1	1	1
Ajdabiyah	1		1	
Al Baydah	1		1	
Bani Walid	1		1	
Gharyan	1		1	
Kufrah	1		1	
Murzuq	1		1	
Sabha	1		1	
Sirte	1		1	
Zuwarah	1		1	
			TOTAL	30

Table 3: Paired Interviews conducted across 12 Libyan cities

4 CURRENT SECURITY AND JUSTICE LANDSCAPE

4.1 THE JUSTICE SECTOR

The aim of this section is to map out the Libya's post-revolutionary justice sector. Unlike the security sector, which has changed dramatically after the revolution, the post-revolutionary justice sector has kept many of the fundamental structures that existed under the previous Ghadaffi and even Senosy regimes, so an assessment of the pre-2011 revolutionary structures is important.

4.1.1 Pre-2011 Revolution Justice Sector

Under the Senosy regime (1951-1969), a judiciary was created with two divisions, the civil judiciary and the *shari'a* (Islamic) judiciary. Upon his arrival to power, Ghadaffi created a committee to review the compliance of the Libyan law with the rules of Islam. The committee determined that Libyan law was sufficiently compliant with Islamic law, and as a result, *shari'a* courts were closed.

The ordinary justice system was regarded as a fairly weak institution under the Ghadaffi era. Low salaries for judges and lawyers and the prevalence of tribal allegiances over professionalism made the system ineffective and corrupt. Political interference also greatly weakened the system. The ordinary civil judiciary initially promoted by the Ghadaffi regime did not last long, and was often overridden by extraordinary justice structures, such as military courts, ad-hoc revolutionary tribunals, state security tribunals, and People's Courts. People's Courts were officially established in 1988 by Law No. 5 with the mission 'to try political and security crimes.'² These courts took a wide-ranging interpretation of this mission statement, which in practice often overlapped with the role of the ordinary justice system. In addition, People's Courts were often used to short-circuit the procedures that would guarantee defendants' rights. At this time, many judges working within the People's Courts were invited to join the ordinary justice system, which contributed to blur the lines between the two jurisdictions. The International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC)³ explained that under the Ghadaffi regime, '... judges were frequently expected to serve in special courts and faced the possibility of transfer to career-ending judicial backwaters for refusing to serve.'⁴ People's Courts were abolished in 2005 in Saif el-Islam's efforts to improve the regime's international image.

4.1.2 Present-day Justice Sector

In general, the ordinary justice system inherited from the Ghadaffi regime still exists in Libya, although the post-revolutionary authorities have made changes in the oversight of the sector, and as might be expected following the revolution, there are great inconsistencies between the theoretical structure and what is functioning on the ground in certain regions.

The Courts

² International Legal Assistance Consortium, 'Libya 2013', May 2013, Page 21

³ The International Legal Consortium is an NGO composed of lawyers, judges and other legal experts focusing on countries in political transition

⁴ Ibid.

The Libyan justice system is unitary and hierarchical, and consists of four levels of courts:

- **District Courts:** The District Courts operate at a local level and have one judge. They are empowered to settle commercial and civil cases concerning claims less than 1,000 LYD (around \$850) and a few specific family law cases.
- **Courts of First Instance:** The Courts of First Instance have two functions. First, they operate as a first ‘appeals court’ for District Courts. Second, they operate as first degree jurisdiction over the majority of civil, commercial and family cases that District Courts cannot cover. Also, First Instance Courts are competent to try infractions and offences.
- **Courts of Appeals:** There are seven Courts of Appeals in Libya (Dernah, Benghazi, Kufrah, Misratah, Khoms, Tripoli and Zawiyah). They operate on two levels. First, they hear appeals in commercial, civil and family cases from the First Instance Courts. Second, they operate as first degree jurisdiction over administrative cases and felony crimes.
- **The Supreme Court:** The Supreme Court is the highest court in the Libyan justice hierarchy and is based in Tripoli. It assumes a wide range of functions: it acts as the Court of Cassation for administrative, criminal, civil and family cases, the Constitutional Court, and is empowered to settle electoral disputes.

Whereas the subordinate courts are funded by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court enjoys financial independence from the executive branch, as it is funded directly by the General National Congress (GNC).

The Prosecution

The role of the Libyan prosecution system is to ‘assign prosecutors the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters.’⁵ Prosecutors are appointed by the HJC, and funded by the Ministry of Justice. In this system, each Court of Appeal or Court of First Instance possesses its own prosecution office, and in many cases, prosecutors are embedded within police stations in major cities. These police station-based prosecutors are in charge of ‘investigating criminal complaints, filing criminal cases, pursuing cases before the courts, and implementing the final decisions.’⁶

Oversight and Auxiliary Structures

The **High Judicial Council (HJC)** oversees the justice system and is in charge of promoting access to justice, creating new courts, and it also manages the appointment of judges. In 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) passed Law. No. 4 so that the HJC was no longer chaired by the Ministry of Justice and chaired exclusively by seven senior judges. This reform aimed at improving the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch. This change carried a positive symbolic weight, but was not sufficient to ensure full judicial independence as the HJC remains funded by the Ministry of Justice.

The **Fact Finding and Reconciliation Committee** is a new committee created by the NTC in the aftermath of the revolution to address deficiencies in the justice system. It aims to assess ‘the violation of human rights and basic freedoms committed by the former regime.’ Violations committed by the revolutionary

⁵ International Legal Assistance Consortium, ‘Report Libya 2013’, May 2013, Page 21

⁶ Ibid.

side are not assessed by the committee, something that was confirmed when Law No. 38 was passed in 2012 to provide amnesty to persons who committed ‘acts made necessary by the 17 February revolution.’⁷ This approach has prevented the Committee from accomplishing its mission of national reconciliation in a highly divided political landscape, as numerous cases of human rights violations and torture committed by armed groups were reported during the revolution. Since then, the Ministry of Justice introduced an amendment of Law No. 4, extending the competencies of the judiciary to pursue all crimes committed by both sides of the conflict.

The **Committee for the Promotion of the Judiciary** is a second new committee created by the NTC in 2012. No further information could be collected as the Committee appears to be inactive to date.

The **Judicial Police** are under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and are in charge of protecting judiciary officials, securing courts and prisons and ensuring the transportation of prisoners. Maintaining these functions appear to be challenging in today’s context as in several instances they have been unable to provide adequate security to judges and transported detainees.⁸

Libya’s justice system is summarised in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 - Libya's Justice System

4.1.3 Implementation of the Justice System

In post-revolutionary Libya, this theoretical state justice system framework is often imperfectly implemented. This research has uncovered four main reasons why this is the case: violence and threats against judges and prosecutors, revolutionary control over judicial police, the inability of judicial police to protect detainees, and the possible strengthening of a competing Islamic justice system.

Violence and threats against judges and prosecutors. Judges are often subject to political and physical threats and suffer from an alarming lack of security and protection. The killing of the President of the

⁷ International Legal Assistance Consortium, ‘Report Libya 2013’, May 2013, Page 33

⁸ Gunmen ambushed a Libyan police convoy. See ‘Libya : Security Problems Persist in Tripoli’, AllAfrica.com, April 18th, 2013.

Criminal Division at the Court of Appeal of Jebel Al Akhdar in Darnah on June 16th 2013 exemplifies the threat to the state justice system in some areas of the country, notably in the East and some central towns such as in Sirte or Bani Walid.⁹ The head of the District Court in Bani Walid (who is also the head of the Shura Council) confirmed this state of affairs:

*The prosecution office is absent from Bani Walid as it has no means to protect itself. The community is represented by tribal leaders and elders, who provide justice. As the public prosecution is on hold, the investigation of serious crimes has been delayed. We only try some minor family law cases.*¹⁰

Prosecutors also report being subject to threats, possibly more so than the judges, as they are in charge of verifying the legal basis and conditions for detention. This role is highly sensitive in Libya, as 3,000 out of 8,000 'conflict-related' detainees are believed to be held as of May 2013 by semi-official or unofficial brigades that often ignore judicial procedures.¹¹ This prevents prosecutors from exercising their mandate and often exposes them to major security risks. Amnesty International illustrated the challenges faced by prosecutors, and explained that 'some prosecutors and criminal investigators willing to address violations by *thuwwar* (revolutionaries) lack the capacity to enforce summons or arrest orders. Several have faced intimidation and even violent attacks at the hands of armed militias.'¹²

Revolutionary control over Judicial Police. Field research revealed that this problem was particularly present in Misrata, where thousands of detainees are still held in prisons.¹³ Lines are often blurred between state-run prisons and those administrated by brigades operating under the Ministry of Interior. A member of the Misrata Shura Council reported that 'prisons are controlled by the Judicial Police, whose functions are fulfilled by the Misrata Revolutionaries Union.'¹⁴ In his view, there was no difference between the judicial police and brigades, as the latter have an explicit mandate from the Ministry of Interior. This situation undermines the legal authority of prosecutors.

Inability of judicial police to protect detainees. The difficulties of the judiciary to ensure their own security as well as the security of the detainees under its authority threatens the state justice system. The killing of a detainee while he was being transported under the protection of the judicial police in April 2013 is symptomatic and indicative of this problem.

Possible strengthening of a competing Islamic justice system. The Grand Mufti of Libya, Sadeq Al Gharyani, who is the head of the Supreme Council for Fatwa, has played an increasingly important political role since he was appointed in 2011 by the National Transitional Council (NTC). Although fatwas (Islamic legal pronouncements) have no legal authority in the Libyan justice system, it appears that these pronouncements have an effect on the government. For example, Grand Mufti Gharyani officially

⁹ 'Assassination of a Judge in Darnah' Al-Sharq, June 16th 2013: <http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2013/06/16/869136>

¹⁰ KII with Bani Walid Shura Council, May 2013

¹¹ International Legal Assistance Consortium, 'Report Libya 2013', May 2013, P.42

¹² Amnesty International, 'Libya: Rule of Law or Rule of Militias', July 2012, P.9

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ KII with Misratah Shura Council Member, Misratah, May 2013. The Misratah Revolutionaries Union was created in 2011 by Col. Salem Jeha to coordinate and control dozens of brigade operating in and outside Misratah.

demanded that the Social Affairs Ministry forbid Libyan women from marrying foreigners, following which the Ministry submitted a bill to this effect to the GNC.¹⁵

4.2 THE SECURITY SECTOR

The aim of this section is to map out Libya's post-revolutionary security sector. Unlike the justice sector, where the Ghadaffi system is still largely in place after the revolution, the National Army and National Police have emerged from the revolution highly fragmented and much less influential than new security actors that have proliferated across the country. However, Libya's main security actors are generally, with varying degrees of command and control, under the supervision of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This subsection examines the traditional and new security actors in moderate detail, as local and national attitudes to security are all too often influenced by them.

4.2.1 Security Actors under the Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior oversees two major security actors: the National Police General Directorate and the Supreme Security Committee (SSC).

The National Police General Directorate

The National Police General Directorate is present in all 22 districts of Libya,¹⁶ giving it a national reach rarely achieved by other security actors. Several policing departments work under the General Directorate, including the National Police, the Municipal Guard, the Diplomatic Protection Police, the Judicial Police, and the Patrols Police.

The National Police suffer from many structural and operational problems. Reliability and commitment of policemen is one of the main challenges for the National Police, as one estimate by an international security expert suggests that only 40% of registered policemen are currently serving. In addition, policemen are underpaid in comparison to other newly-created policing actors such as the SSC, which lowers police morale. A substantial number of policemen have opted to join the SSC in certain localities.¹⁷ A police station commander, interviewed in Tripoli, presented an extremely negative picture of the National Police, explaining that 'nothing has been done since the revolution; the government has been supporting bandits and criminals instead of the police.'¹⁸ This impression was shared by several other policemen interviewed during field visits. A police officer from Misrata further explained that '... the power today is in the streets. The police are unable to enforce the law. Besides, apart from personal connections, there is no coordination mechanism between the national police and the SSC and brigades.'¹⁹

The Supreme Security Committee

The SSC was created in late 2011 by several revolutionaries, including Abderrezak Al Aradi, Omar Al Khadrawi and Fawzi Waniss Al Ghadhafi, with the aim of bringing together many revolutionary brigades

¹⁵ 'Interdiction to Libyan Women to Marry foreigners', Al Hayat newspaper, March 27th 2013.

<http://alhayat.com/Details/497231>

¹⁶ KII with an international security expert, Tripoli, April 2013.

¹⁷ KII with a police officer, Tripoli, April 2013

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

under one command and control structure in order to provide security following the weakening of the National Police and the National Army after the revolution.²⁰ By mid-2012, the number of recruits had reached around 90,000, and rose to 180,000 by March 2013.²¹ Although the SSC was moderately successful at keeping peace, their image has been tarnished due to events of September 2012, where the SSC units were accused by some members of the newly-elected GNC of being complicit in the destruction of Sufi shrines in Tajura.²² The SSC has also had to deal with a growing reputation for drug dealers and criminals,²³ while in addition, several NGOs operating in Libya condemned the implication of some SSC units in cases of torture and kidnapping.²⁴ The SSC units are based mainly in the West, while it is believed that the SSC has largely been disbanded in Benghazi and Misrata.²⁵

The head of the SSC in Tripoli recently renewed his commitment to disband the SSC by the end of 2013, showing a degree of SSC compliance with the Ministry of Interior. Also according to the head of the SSC, discussions are being held with SSC heads from other cities to dissolve the SSC very soon. However, some Ministry of Interior and GNC directives have yet to be fully implemented, having been rejected by SSC units from Suq al-Juma, Misrata and Tajura. For example, following the announcement of their dissolution by the Ministry of Interior, some SSC brigades stormed the Ministry of Interior offices in Tripoli in early January. Hence, the legal status of many SSC units remains unclear, which contributes to the overall confused state of affairs in the security sector. The events of late June 2013 in the Abu Salim area of Tripoli are a concrete example of this confusion, as brigades operating under the MoD clashed with other groups mainly operating under the Ministry of Interior. While these skirmishes are often motivated by political considerations, they also underline the battle for legal legitimacy as each party believes it possesses the right to the legitimate use of force. Following these events, the Zeidan government has renewed its commitment to apply resolution 27, passed by the GNC to evacuate all armed groups from the capital.²⁶ However, it remains unclear if this decision should be applied to brigades operating under the SSC.

4.2.2 Forces operating under the Ministry of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff

The National Army

Under the former regime, the eastern-based National Army was understaffed and highly fractured, 'with independent lines of communication'²⁷ among different brigades. According to a foreign Defense Attaché based in Tripoli, the Libyan National Army has inherited these serious structural problems as it lacks commissioned soldiers as well as low ranking officers.²⁸ In addition to the National Army, the former regime relied on a number of loyal brigades. According to a Brigadier general interviewed in Tripoli, the most important brigades were under the command of Ghaddafi's sons: the famous 'Brigade 32' was headed by

²⁰ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 'Fault Lines of the Revolution', May 2013, P.16

²¹ Ibid. 17. P.25

²² International Crisis Group, 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts', International Crisis Group, September 2012, P.12

²³ 'Being Hashim Bishr, Head of Tripoli SSC', Libya Herald, June 10th, 2013.

²⁴ Amnesty International, 'Libya: Rule of Law or Rule of Militias', July 2012.

²⁵ KII with British Embassy official, Tripoli, June, 2013.

²⁶ 'The Government Communiqué Concerning Tripoli's clashes' PMO official Facebook page.

²⁷ International Crisis Group, 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts', September 2012, P.10.

²⁸ KII with a foreign Defence Attaché, Tripoli, March 2013.

Khamis Ghadaffi and the Special Forces by Saada Ghadaffi. Other brigades were also present in different cities such as Tarhuna, Benghazi or Bani Walid, and mainly relied on local recruitment and tribal affiliation. These brigades were better equipped and trained than the regular National Army units. After the revolution, many of their members died or have fled the country, while others are detained in state or brigade-run prisons.²⁹ Some former brigade soldiers have joined newly created divisions in the National Army, a reason why the First Infantry Division of the Border Guards Command (Al Qa'qa') is accused by revolutionary brigades to have integrated some 'Brigade 32' members.³⁰

As of today, the National Army is still fragmented and weak. Some divisions or brigades play a crucial role in the security landscape, but the lack of coordination and unclear chains of command weaken the Army's effectiveness. According to army officers interviewed over the research period, not much has been done to improve the National Army working conditions. Salaries are still very low and no major reforms have been implemented so far, except for the Navy that appears to attract particular foreign assistance.³¹

4.2.3 Brigades operating under the Army Chief of Staff

Numerous revolutionary brigades were integrated into the National Army in order to pacify the country. In some cases, these brigades were integrated into traditional army commands or newly created corps, including the Military Intelligence, Military Police, Border and Infrastructure Guards, Mobile National Force, and the National Guard.

Mobile National Force

The Mobile National Force is a relatively new unit created in May 2012 gathering a number of revolutionary brigades and national army officers and units. The main brigades operating under this corps are the Al Zawayah Martyrs Brigade, Wadi Shati Brigade, Fares Al Sahraa (Sebha), Al Maghaweer Brigade (Ubari), and the Murzuq Brigade. The Mobile National Force played an important role in imposing ceasefires in Sebha, Mezda, Bani Walid and Zuwarah. Its role has since declined as new projects to redesign the army are currently being undertaken.

Border and Infrastructure Guards

This corps of the National Army was created in 2006, although they were not activated until much later. Since January 2013, efforts have been undertaken to rebuild this corps under the Command of General Obeidi. New units formed of revolutionaries and regular army soldiers were integrated into the Guards, including the First Infantry Division (Al Qa'qa' brigade), one of the most controversial brigades due to its involvement in clashes with other brigades. The First Infantry Division is headed by a civilian, and gathers a number of brigades notably from Zintan as well as regular army soldiers. It operates in Tripoli, Melitah, Ubari and other locations. In late June 2013, the First Infantry Division was involved in deadly clashes with SCC branches in the Abu Salim area of Tripoli.³²

²⁹ KII with a National Army Brigadier general, Tripoli, March 2013

³⁰ Salem Derbi, Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade operating in Darnah, accuses Al Qa'qa' of being trained by the U.S and having integrated brigade 32 members. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpYVnkoK4Co>

³¹ Ibid.

³² 'Libya: arms speaking' Almanaralink.com, July 1st 2013. <http://www.almanaralink.com/press/2013/07/34003>

The National Guard

The National Guard was created by the Deputy Minister of Defence Khaled el-Sharif. It is composed of 8,000 revolutionaries, mostly selected amongst the Tripoli Military Council of Abd Al Hakim Belhaj. It was designed to protect state institutions, oil fields and other sensitive sites. The National Guard's structure is now being reviewed. According to an international security expert, the new structure will most likely follow the model of the American National Guard and the French *gendarmarie* and will be under the direct command of the Prime Minister.

4.2.4 Semi- and Un-official Military Actors

Local Military Councils

Local Military Councils (LMCs) were created a few days after the fall of Tripoli, an initiative of the NTC to help secure the country. Some LMCs were even created before the NTC's decision, notably in Western cities, despite the opposition of the NTC's Executive Committee headed at the time by Mahmud Jibril. Since then, LMCs have enjoyed legal authority even though many were dismantled, marginalized or bypassed by revolutionary coalitions. In Tripoli, 122 LMCs were created in the aftermath of the city's liberation,³³ although very few are still effective today. In Bani Walid, existing LMCs appeared to be marginalized by the population and no longer play a significant role in ensuring security.³⁴ In Misrata, the LMC is suffering from the growing influence of the Misrata Revolutionaries Union (MRU), composed of local brigades. In the Nafusa Mountains, a group of brigades led by Zintanis created the Western Mountains Military Council, whose area of operation extends from Ghadames in the West to Sabha in the South and Zuwarah on the coastline.

Local Revolutionary Coalitions

Local Revolutionary Coalitions are the result of attempts by brigades to unify their efforts, coordinate their actions and in some cases, play a more significant political role. These attempts were more or less successful, resulting in the formation of National and Local Coalitions.

National Coalitions

In the weeks and months following the liberation of Libya, meetings aiming at gathering revolutionaries under a single national label generally failed. One of the most famous attempts was the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition (RBC) created in Misrata in late 2011.³⁵ However, the national dimension of the RBC did not endure and brigades from Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains withdrew shortly after its creation. The RBC no longer plays a significant political or military role. Other national coalitions such as the western-centric Revolutionaries High Committee have managed to survive, although its authority is more moral than real as brigades operating under its authority are largely autonomous.

³³ KII with a revolutionary commander from Fashloom, Tripoli, June 2013

³⁴ KII with local notables, Bani Walid, May 2013

³⁵ The RBC was headed by Fawazi Buktaf, one of Benghazi's most pre-eminent Muslim Brotherhood figures, and founder of the February 17th Martyr's brigade. Buktaf was appointed Libyan Ambassador to Uganda in June 2013

Local Coalitions

Local coalitions gather brigades belonging to same city or region, with objectives such as better organization and defending the locality. The well-known Misrata Revolutionaries Union (MRU) is one of the most powerful local coalitions, gathering 40,000 men and relying on a network of well-coordinated brigades who also operate outside of Misrata (in Sabha, Sirte, Tripoli, etc.).³⁶ Overall, the MRU has played an important political role over the last two years, as demonstrated when the MRU facilitated the hand-over of the Al Marsa Misrati brigade's bases in Tajura to the National Army thanks to their capacity to mediate with and influence brigades from Misrata. Today, it is believed to be headed by revolutionary hardliners after the withdrawal of Salem Jeha, the Army Colonel and original founder of the MRU.³⁷ In Tripoli, the main local coalition is the Tripoli Division, which assembles the capital's most important brigades.³⁸ In late 2011, these brigades formed the Supreme Security Committee of Tripoli under the Command of Hashem Bishr.³⁹

Libyan Shield Forces

The Libyan Shield Forces (LSF) were created in early 2012 through Law No. 47 passed by the NTC in order to support the National Army in its peacekeeping missions, notably in Kufra, Sabha and Zuwarah. LSF groups together an undetermined number of brigades from across the country. Brigades from Misrata and Benghazi are strongly represented and provide almost 80% of the LSF's fighters.⁴⁰ The LSF are organized on a regional scale and divided into three regional commands covering the eastern, central and western regions of Libya.

LSF in the Eastern Region

LSF in the Eastern Region is mainly composed of brigades originating from or based in Benghazi. They operate in the south of country, notably in Kufra. However, Shield 7, one of the most powerful LSF brigades in the East, has declared its withdrawal from Kufra following the GNC decision on June 9th 2013 demanding Libya Shield brigades in the East hand over their bases to the National Army's Special Forces division (Al Saeqa).⁴¹ This decision followed protests after Shield 1's attack on armed demonstrators in Benghazi, which left more than 30 dead.⁴²

LSF in the Central Region

In the centre of Libya, LSF is mainly composed of brigades from Misrata. They operate in all central districts including Sirte, Al Jufra and even as far south as Sabha and Murzuq. In 2012, LSF in the Central Region played a decisive role in imposing a ceasefire between Zuwarah on one side, and Regdalin and Jmeil on

³⁶ Small Arms Survey, 'Libya: Evolving Armed Groups', July 2012

³⁷ Jeha is now Libya's Defence Attaché in the UAE

³⁸ Tripoli's Division is a coalition of local brigades: Red Flags brigade, Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, Al Madina Martyrs Brigade, etc. It is the main armed force in Tripoli central districts

³⁹ 'Being Hashem Bishr, Head of Tripoli SSC' Libya Herald, June 10th 2013

⁴⁰ KII with an army general-brigadier, Tripoli, March 2013

⁴¹ 'Libya Shield 7 announces its retreat from Kufra'. Libya Shield 7 official Facebook page

⁴² Shield 1 is said to be the first LSF brigade to have been created

the other.⁴³ LSF in the Central Region also played a leading role in Bani Walid's second conflict in September 2012. Today, some of these brigades are in charge of protecting oil fields in Sirte and Jufra.

LSF in the Western Region

The LSF in the Western Region is less visible and effective than the others due to intercity tensions. In theory, it is composed of forces provided by the LMCs of Misrata, Al Khoms, Zliten, Misselata, Tarhuna/ Shield 4 and Bani Walid/28th Brigade. The LSF in the Western Region claimed they may be called upon by the government to play a more important role in Tripoli, following clashes between militias from Zintan and from other areas in Tripoli (Abu Salim, Suq Al Juma, etc.) in June 2013.⁴⁴

Military Governors

Military governors control zones established in areas of the country that have witnessed instability due to military confrontations involving revolutionary brigades, tribal militias or local communities. Hence, several cities and regions were declared 'military zones' by the GNC, including Sabha, Kufra, Sirte and Bani Walid.⁴⁵ As a consequence, these zones are ruled by military governors and cannot hold local elections.⁴⁶ Local notables in Bani Walid explained that 'the city was declared a military zone to prevent the population from electing a representative local council.' Indeed, the members of the Bani Walid's Local Civil Council were designated by the GNC. In addition to tensions with local communities, military governors suffer from an obvious lack of means and capacity. The military governor responsible for the south of Libya, General Al Thehabi, complained publicly about 'the lack of coordination and material. Groups are operating on behalf of the government, without referring to the military governor.'⁴⁷

This highly complex security landscape and the involvement of some revolutionaries in unpopular activities, in addition to the police reforms stalemate has shaped perceptions of the population towards security, crime and different security actors. The following chapters describe how Libyans today evaluate security and main crimes trends and perceive groups whose *de facto* or *de jure* role is to ensure peace and stability.

⁴³ KII with a member of Al Marsa Brigade (from Misratah), Tajura, April 2013

⁴⁴ LSF- Central Region official Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/Der3Libya?fref=ts>

⁴⁵ On April 1st 2013, the head of the NTC declared the South a 'Military Zone.'

⁴⁶ KII conducted in Bani Walid, May 2013

⁴⁷ Al Manara Newspaper, Facebook page, June 26th, 2013. [Al Manara Newspaper Facebook Page](#)




Table 4 – Libya's Security Sector

5 PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

In this section, general perceptions of security are presented in order to provide an overview of the perceived local and national security context. These perceptions are divided into four categories: local and national security, worrying scenarios and incidents, main causes of insecurity, and security providers.

The majority (67%) of Libyans believed that local security was ‘very good’ or ‘good’ in their area, while 37 and 45% respectively said the current security situation was ‘a lot better’ or ‘somewhat better’ than before the revolution and during the NTC period. Libyans are more worried about gunfights between armed groups and traveling by car between cities than moving around their area by night or conducting their daily activities.

The main causes of insecurity as reported by Libyans include armed individuals (53%), lack of police (37%), ineffective police (27%), and illegal or irresponsible brigades (24%). Finally, 32% of Libyans believe that the National Police are the best security providers, followed by the National Army (14%), although a significant percentage also reported that either they provided their own security, or that ‘no one’ did. The National Police was also selected by 62% of Libyans as the most appropriate security provider, again followed by the National Army; only 1% of Libyans believed that the SSC or the LSF should be in charge of providing security.

5.1 LOCAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The following subsection examines perceptions of local and national security, with the current situation analysed comparatively with the pre-revolution and NTC periods. While Libyans are generally positive about the current security situation, perceptions change dramatically depending on location, with Libyans from the southern region and certain cities in the East (notably Benghazi) expressing a much more negative perception of local security. Nationally, although many Libyans believe that security was better before the revolution, the majority also see security as improving since the NTC period.

5.1.1 Local Security

Overall, the majority of Libyans have a positive perception of local security, with 67% qualifying the local security situation as ‘very good’ or ‘rather good’ (see Figure 4 below), a perception that was confirmed during qualitative research. Nevertheless, this positive national level figure must be nuanced as perceptions of local security change dramatically depending on the city or region in question.




Figure 4 - How would you evaluate security in your area? (by location, n=2302)

In the western region, more than 75% perceived local security as ‘very good’ or ‘rather good’, 8% higher than the national average. Indeed, the western region of Libya contains some of the cities perceived as the safest in the country, including Nalut, Misratah, Gharyan, Khoms, Zawiyah, and Zuwarah. The sole exceptions to this positive trend in the western region are Aziziyah and Sirte, two cities where the majority of citizens supported the Ghadaffi family during the revolution. Fieldwork has confirmed this tendency in Sirte, where frequent cases of murder and kidnapping were reported in early May.⁴⁸ The security situation does not seem to have improved, according to the same respondents who were interviewed again in late June.

In Misrata, 86% reported that security was ‘very good’ or ‘rather good’, and PI respondents explained that social cohesiveness played a large role in ensuring a safe and secure environment, and that the MRU provides security using the 40,000 men under their command to help police the city. Despite this positive perception of security, KIs and PIs conducted in the city revealed that Misratis have a tendency to externalize the causes of insecurity. Ibrahim, a 20 year old university student, explained that:

The security situation is very good, although it has been deteriorating over the past few months due to the government’s reluctance to respond to the demands of youth, unemployment and drugs proliferation ...Security is good because our young men are involved with the SSC, the LSF, and the Misrata Revolutionaries Union, even though the government does not provide our leaders with the necessary means to provide security.

While perceptions from the East of Libya fall only slightly below the national average, in Benghazi only 10% of respondents perceived security as ‘very good’, while 20% consider that it is ‘very bad.’ This negative state of mind in Benghazi probably fuelled tensions that led to confrontations between the LSF and armed demonstrators on June 8th 2013, as each party accused the other of responsibility for the general lack of security. Further complicating the security situation in Benghazi, many brigades were forced by popular pressure to leave the city following the death of former US Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Although their retreat was followed by a period of relative calm, from February 2013 they have

⁴⁸ PIs conducted in Sirte, May 2013

begun to reappear in the city, perhaps explaining the negative perception of local security reported by Benghazi residents. Fieldwork conducted in Benghazi in early July confirmed the presence of armed groups, whether independent or operating under the government’s authority. All interviewees in Benghazi explained that the security situation has been deteriorating over the last six months. Randa, a 23 years old nurse, said that ‘the government is not capable of providing security due to undisciplined brigades. Still, I hold the government responsible for more than 80% of the situation.

In the South, the percentage of respondents perceiving security as ‘very good’ or ‘rather good’ drops to 45%, and is just 33% in Sabha. 27% of Sabhans explained that security in their area (*munteqa*) was ‘very bad’, making Sabha the district in the whole country that is perceived as the most insecure. The fieldwork conducted in Sabha in late June confirmed this perception. Three car bombs and continuous gunshots and RPGs had been heard over the night of June 25th by the field team present in Sabha. According to Hamid, a 47 year old Sabha resident, ‘such incidents are very frequent in Sabha and the situation has been deteriorating significantly over the last six months.’




Figure 5: How would you evaluate security in your area?

5.1.2 National Security – Past and Present

Although perceptions of current local security are generally positive across the country, many Libyans believed that security has deteriorated since the outbreak of the 2011 revolution. Almost half of all Libyans interviewed reported that national security had become either somewhat or a lot worse when compared with before the revolution (see Figure 6 below), highlighting the existence of significant security problems throughout the country. This negative perception is strongest in Benghazi and Sabha, where 58% and 66% respectively described the national security situation as worse than before the revolution. Frequent attacks against police and army officers contributed to negative perceptions in these cities. A Benghazi activist living in Tripoli remarked ‘If state representatives are not able to protect themselves,

what do you expect people to think about security and the state?⁴⁹ Older Libyans (35+ years) tend to be more optimistic about the current security situation, compared with younger Libyans, who are rather more pessimistic and distrusting of the security institutions.




Figure 6 - How would you evaluate Libya's security situation now, compared with before the revolution? (by gender, age, location, n=2302)

In Figure 7 below, a trend of improving perceptions begins to emerge, with the majority of Libyans either positive or neutral regarding developments in current national security when compared to the NTC period. Indeed, more than 20% of Libyans have no opinion regarding the current security situation when compared to the NTC period, a figure that rises to more than 35% in the South. This neutrality may be due to a significant and troubling lack of awareness of government policies, but also could mean that the government disposes of an important margin for progress if it improves its communications campaign and security policies.




Figure 7– How would you evaluate Libya's security situation under the Zeidan government, compared to under the NTC? (by location, n=2302)

⁴⁹ PIs conducted in Tripoli, May, 2013

5.2 WORRYING SCENARIOS AND INCIDENTS

The following section examines the perceptions of security risks with regards to three incidents or activities: travelling by car between cities, moving around locally by night and gunfights between armed groups. Libyans were most worried by gunfights between armed groups and travelling around by car between cities (see Figure 8 below), tempering to some extent the overall positive perception of security. A fourth scenario, conducting daily activities, was proposed to survey respondents, the vast majority of whom perceived no associated risk.




Figure 8 - How worried are you about the following activities? (n=2302)

5.2.1 Travelling by Car between Cities

More than half of the Libyan people (55%) reported being ‘very worried’ or ‘rather worried’ about travelling by car between cities (see Figure 9 below), an activity that appears to be a serious concern for most Libyans. The percentage of worried Libyans peaks in Sabha at 69%, but is still quite high in Misrata at 46%. In Sabha, the high percentage who see travelling by car between cities as a serious security risk is most likely due to the lack of state security providers outside urban centers in the South, a situation that could be improved with more official police and army checkpoints. Furthermore, tensions between cities may have contributed to reinforce fears about travelling. PIs conducted in Sabha and Murzuq have confirmed the same worries. Respondents referred to organized criminal gangs operating in the region, composed of illegal migrants from Chad and Niger. A 58-year old Tebu elder from Murzuq explained:

The security has deteriorated particularly in the South due to substantial increase of illegal migration and smuggling. It has become a daily phenomenon. Sometimes, we see caravans of smugglers several times a day. Besides, many cases of murder are reported outside the city, often committed by criminal gangs and individuals unfairly accused of being members of the Tebu tribe, while they are mainly foreigners.⁵⁰

In Misrata, where respondents reported one of the highest perceived levels of local security in the country, inhabitants were worried about travelling between cities. One PI respondent explained that he

⁵⁰ PIs conducted in Murzuq, June 2013.

was not afraid to travel inside Misrata, even at night, but that he was worried about travelling between cities. He went on to cite several examples of truck drivers and incidents at checkpoints where victims were robbed, shot, or kidnapped while travelling outside the city. Tensions between cities may also lead to increased security risks while travelling: in early June 2013, clashes erupted in Tajura between local brigades and the Misratan brigade Al Marsa following the kidnapping of three Misratis at a checkpoint. The incident was contained after an agreement forcing the Misratan brigade to leave Tajura and hand over its base to the National Army.




Figure 9 - How worried are you about travelling by car between cities? (by location, n=2302)

5.2.2 Moving Around Your Area at Night

Libyans were less worried about moving around their area by night compared to travelling by car between cities. On the national level, 36% of Libyans expressed concerns about moving around by night, with residents of Sabha and Kufrah (both 64%) being the most worried, confirming the trend of Sabha in particular and the South in general being more dangerous than the East and especially the West. A 47-year old man interviewed in Sabha confirmed the results of the National Survey: ‘the National Police is completely absent at night. Gunshots and local street skirmishes are heard almost every night. Sometimes, RPGs and other grenades are used.’⁵¹

5.2.3 Gunfights between Armed Groups

As many Libyans are worried about gunfights between armed groups (55%) as they are about travelling by car between cities. In Sabha, 79% of residents reported being worried about gunfights, with 53% reporting being ‘very worried.’ Fear of armed groups seems to be correlated to the degree of cohesiveness between armed groups in a given city. For example, in Misrata brigades and other armed groups are organized by powerful leaders and represented by the MRU, while in Benghazi and Tripoli many competing groups coexist, often not so peacefully. In Sabha, competing groups are further divided along tribal, ethnic and regional lines and are often involved in armed clashes.

⁵¹ PIs conducted in Sabha, June, 2013




Figure 10 - How worried are you about gunfights between armed groups? (by gender, location, n=2302)

5.3 MAIN CAUSES OF INSECURITY

Five main causes of insecurity were reported by Libyans: (1) armed individuals, (2) lack of police or ineffective police, (3) general public disorder, (4) illegal or irresponsible brigades, and (5) drug and alcohol dealers and addicts, as illustrated in Table 5 below. Almost no Libyans see religious fanatics, violent protests, or foreign interference as serious causes of insecurity.

	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+	Male	Female	Tripoli	Misrata	Benghazi	Sabha	Libya
Armed individuals	52%	51%	57%	54%	51%	48%	58%	50%	60%	52%	47%	53%
Lack of police	41%	40%	38%	27%	32%	38%	35%	32%	36%	40%	35%	37%
Ineffective police	25%	27%	27%	28%	30%	28%	25%	26%	22%	32%	27%	27%
Public disorder	23%	29%	27%	31%	25%	28%	25%	31%	30%	29%	36%	27%
Illegal/irresponsible brigades	25%	24%	21%	26%	22%	24%	23%	21%	16%	33%	41%	24%
Drug/ alcohol addicts	20%	18%	20%	19%	16%	18%	19%	21%	22%	17%	17%	19%
Drug/ alcohol dealers	15%	10%	11%	8%	13%	14%	9%	8%	21%	13%	10%	12%
Unemployed youth	10%	8%	8%	9%	8%	9%	9%	8%	9%	5%	9%	9%
Lack of social cohesiveness	4%	6%	3%	2%	4%	5%	4%	3%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Religious fanatics	4%	3%	3%	6%	2%	4%	3%	3%	2%	5%	5%	3%
Illegal migrants	4%	3%	3%	4%	3%	4%	3%	1%	3%	4%	14%	3%
Tribalism/tribal clashes	3%	4%	4%	2%	1%	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	13%	3%
Foreign interference	4%	3%	1%	1%	4%	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Violent protests	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Don't know	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	4%	4%	4%	2%	1%	3%

Table 5- What are the main causes of insecurity in your area? (Unprompted; by age, gender, location; n=2302, multiple responses possible)

5.3.1 Armed Individuals

In all cities and among all age groups, armed individuals were spontaneously identified as the main cause of insecurity (cited by 53% of Libyans), a finding supported by the fear and worry expressed in the section above with regards to 'gunfights in the streets', as well as qualitative reports collected during KIIs and PIs of armed youths contributing to insecurity.

In Misrata, armed individuals were cited by 60% of residents, a surprising result as most armed individuals in the city belong to popular and respected brigades. This finding may point to a change of mood among Misratians concerning some revolutionary brigades operating in the city, which was confirmed by a member of the local Shura Council who said that 'many young men who participated in the revolution are victims of unemployment and drugs proliferation due to government carelessness, and they now cause some problems.'⁵²

5.3.2 Lack of Police or Ineffective Police

When taken together, lack of police and ineffective police are the main causes of insecurity reported by Libyans. Although armed individuals and drug dealers or addicts may be the groups directly behind various types of abuses and criminal activity in a number of cities across Libya, the lack of an effective police force is perceived to contribute to the state of insecurity. Indeed, while the majority of Libyans believed that the National Police should be the main body maintaining order (see Figure 11 below), in many if not all districts across Libya they have yet to develop a monopoly on the use of force.

Older people are less likely to suggest that lack of police is causing insecurity. Elders know that security under Ghadaffi was not due to an effective police but was rather relying on social cohesiveness and fear from state security apparatus. This explains their lower expectations towards the National Police. Younger Libyans have other expectations of security providers based on more modern standards.

5.3.3 Irresponsible Brigades

Irresponsible brigades are identified as a main cause of insecurity across all groups, but especially by residents of Benghazi and Sabha. In Benghazi, up to 33% of the population identified irresponsible brigades as a cause of insecurity. It worth mentioning that the national survey was completed prior to the clashes between LSF (Shield 1) and demonstrators on June 8th2013. The killing of more than 30 persons and the subsequent attacks against the National Army are likely to discredit the brigades' legitimacy even further whether they were involved or not in these attacks.

In Misrata, while 60% of the population identified armed individuals as a cause of insecurity, only 16% considered irresponsible or independent brigades as a cause of insecurity. This is explained by the revolutionary legitimacy that these brigades still enjoy in Misrata, even though some of their members are involved in crime and insecurity. In other words, insecurity is imputed to individual misconduct rather than to undisciplined brigades. Furthermore, the government is held responsible for this state of affairs as 'it has been neglecting the young revolutionaries.' A local resident interviewed in Misrata in May was

⁵² PIs conducted in Misratah, May 2013

even more accusatory against the government holding it responsible for drugs proliferation in the city.⁵³ In making these types of judgments against the government, Misratis tend to externalize the problem and to some extent to remove all sense of responsibility from brigade members and commanders. This state of mind is reflected by an incident cited by an interviewee in Misrata:

*A few days ago, two persons tried to rob a gas station to steal money for their drugs. One of them was injured during the attack. He was sent to Tunisia by influential local figures to receive appropriate treatment. This favour is usually reserved by local authorities for revolutionaries and brigade members. Revolutionary legitimacy is misinterpreted and sometimes offers political immunity to members of brigades involved in criminal activities*⁵⁴

The situation is different in Sabha, where 41% of residents accused irresponsible brigades of being a main cause of insecurity. Unlike Misrata, where brigades are organized under the authority of the MRU and the LMC, the landscape is more fragmented in the South. Persons interviewed were hence unwilling to call these groups 'brigades' and were more inclined to refer to them as 'armed groups.' The different terminology used in the South by the population indicates that revolutionary legitimacy is not as decisive as in Misrata to determine one armed group's acceptance.

5.3.4 Drug Dealers and Addicts

Drug addicts were identified as a cause of insecurity in Misrata by 22% of inhabitants. A member of the Shura Council noted was of the opinion that security problems in Misrata were not political but rather related to drugs and prostitution.⁵⁵ Security and crime problems relating to drug and alcohol addicts appear to be more present in the western region than in the eastern or southern regions (17% identified as a cause of insecurity in Benghazi and Sabha in comparison to 21% and 22% in Tripoli and Misrata respectively.) This tendency was even more evident during fieldwork conducted in different cities. In Gharyan, Misrata, Sirte, Bani Walid and Tripoli, young drugs addicts are often described as a major source of insecurity. This issue seemed to be less pressing in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Al Bayda, Sabha, and Murzuq.

5.4 SECURITY PROVIDERS

The following section presents and analyzes the various local security actors such as the National Police and National Army, the SSC, LSF, LMCs and other local brigades. Respondents were asked to explain who best provides security, who should provide security, and whether a range of security actors help or hinder the local security situation in general.

5.4.1 Most Effective Local Security Provider

On a national level, the National Police was perceived as the best provider of security, by 32% of Libyans, with the National Army in second place with 14% of Libyans considering it as the best provider of security

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ PIs conducted in Misratah, May 2013

⁵⁵ KIs conducted in Misratah, May 2013

(see Figure 11 below). Competing security actors such as the SSC and the LSF were rarely perceived to be best at providing security, as at a national level, they were cited by only 5% and 3% of Libyans respectively.




Figure 11 - Who best provides security in your area? (by location, n=2302)

Libyans perceived the National Police as the best security provider, even in revolutionary strongholds such as Benghazi. Nevertheless, these results should be nuanced, as confusion between semi-official security actors such as revolutionary coalitions and the National Police may exist, perhaps explaining these high results. A member of the Shura Council in Misrata confirmed this blurring of roles and affiliations, explaining that:

The Supreme Security Committee was dissolved in Misrata and its members were integrated into the intelligence apparatus, the judiciary police and the anti-crime agency. Furthermore, the Misrata Revolutionaries Union is a part of the Judicial Police and operates under the Ministry of Interior.⁵⁶

17% and 15% of Libyans in the South and East of Libya explained that they rely on ‘no one’ to provide security in their area, rising to 21% in Benghazi and Sabha. Such a high percentage explaining that no one provides security highlights a serious security vacuum perceived by the population, further confirmed by the finding that 12% of Libyans said that the local population (‘we do’) is responsible for its own security. It is worth mentioning that no Tripolitarians considered the LSF as the best provider of security, which indicates that they are almost non-existent in Tripoli. This tendency is confirmed in most of the western cities visited, with the exception of Misrata and Tarhuna, which is known to host the LSF Shield 4 unit.

5.4.2 Most Appropriate Security Provider

62% of Libyans believed that the National Police should be in charge of handling security, an encouraging finding for the government. Other groups such as the SSC and the LSF were only cited by 1% of Libyans.

While the National Police was consistently favoured much more than the National Army as the most appropriate security provider, the National Army’s position strengthens substantially in the south. 31% of

⁵⁶ KIs conducted in Misratah, May 2013

Libyans in the South (30% from Sabha and 39% from Murzuq) believe that the National Army should be in charge of handling security, compared with 14% nationwide. This is related to the types of threats faced by Libyans in these desert regions: heavily armed smugglers, foreign criminal gangs, porous borders, and terrorist threats. Fieldwork confirmed this state of affairs as insecurity is mainly due, according to interviewees in the South, to ‘foreign elements’ involved in smuggling and other types of criminal activities.

In the southern region, 6% of Libyans believed that they should handle security themselves, without the help of brigades or state security providers. This was particularly relevant in Murzuq where the interviewees explained that they provided their own security. According to a 61 year old Tebu male interviewed in Murzuq, ‘security is exclusively provided by Tebu tribe members under the label Murzuq Freeman brigade.’ This reality is not only due to the ‘complete absence of official security actors’⁵⁷ but also related to a general distrust of Murzuq inhabitants towards outsiders. Another Tebu interviewed in Murzuq, added: ‘we don’t want any policemen from outside Murzuq’.⁵⁸




Figure 12 - Who should be in charge of handling security? (by location, n=2302)

5.4.3 Effect on Security

The survey asked Libyans to contrast the National Police, SSC, and brigades under and not under Ministry of Interior control. The National Police are perceived to have the most positive effect on security, with 30% of Libyans explaining that they ‘help a lot’ and 36% that they ‘help a little’ (see Figure 13 below).

While 55 and 67% of residents of Tripoli and Misrata respectively perceive the SSC as having a positive influence on security, only 38% of Sabha residents see them as having a positive influence, including only 11% who report that they ‘help a lot.’ Reported perceptions drop even further in Benghazi, where only 31% of residents believe that the SSC has a positive impact on security, including only 6% who report that ‘help a lot.’ The relatively low score for the SSC in Benghazi and Sabha may be due to their weak presence in these cities, further complicated by uncertainty with regards to their role, competencies, and

⁵⁷ PIs conducted in Murzuq, June 2013.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

composition. Finally, fear of retaliation may explain the large percentage of Libyans who reported that the SSC has neither a positive nor a negative impact on security.




Figure 13 - What effect do the following actors have on security? (by location, n=2302)

Brigades not operating under the Ministry of Interior receive a slightly lower score from survey participants, only 8% of whom believe that they 'help a lot' with regards to security. Even in revolutionary strongholds such as Misrata, only 22% of residents believed they had a positive impact on security, compared to 24% who reported that they had a negative impact on security. Indeed, on a national level, 21% of Libyans believe that brigades not under the Ministry of Interior help improve security, compared to 27% who believe they actually damage the security situation (34% in Tripoli). It appears that revolutionary legitimacy is no longer sufficient to obtain popular support, and that Libyans are losing patience with brigades who operate outside of a legal, state-sanction framework.




Figure 14: What effect do the following actors have on security?

6 PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME

In the following section, data collected on Libyan perceptions of crime are presented and analysed, including occurrence rates of typical criminal acts (robbery at checkpoints, murder, kidnapping, house burglary, land ownership disputes, sexual assault, and sexual harassment), responses to crime, as well as potential crime reduction policies.

While the majority of Libyans believe that the crime situation in their area has become ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’ better over the past 6 months, discrepancies exist between and in some cases within districts. For example, less than half of Libyans from the southern region believed that the crime situation had improved. While a significant percentage (between 26 and 35%) of Libyans were worried about all types of crimes, robberies at illegal checkpoints and house burglaries were the most frequently reported criminal incidents, followed by land ownership disputes, kidnapping, and murder. Indeed, a significant number of Libyans reported that they or a close member of their family had been victims of robberies at illegal checkpoints (1 out of 7 Libyans), house burglaries (1 out of 14), land ownership disputes and kidnapping (1 out of 20), and murder (1 out of 33).

In order to combat these alarming trends in criminality, most Libyans believe that more National Police (80%) and more Traffic Police (69%) would help to reduce crime in their area, while only 22 and 10% respectively believed that ‘more local brigades’ and ‘more brigades from other cities’ would help to improve the crime situation.

6.1 EVOLUTION OF CRIMINALITY

Libyans were asked to assess the evolution of criminality over the last six months in their area, then to compare the situation in their area to their perception of the national security average. Overall, Libyans were positive about the evolution of their area’s crime situation over the last six months.

Examining perceptions of criminality by location, it appears that Tripoli and Misrata residents feel safer than other areas, as 25% of the populations believe the crime situation has become ‘a lot better’ over the last six months. Interestingly, 10% of Tripoli and Misrata residents consider that the crime situation is ‘a lot worse’. This is likely due to important disparities in criminality found among different neighborhoods within the same city. As an example of these local disparities, a student at Tripoli University noted that:

Abu Salim is the safest area in Tripoli as inhabitants, who were pointed out as being pro-Ghadaffi, tend to keep low profile and avoid confronting the National Police or brigades in charge of security as they do not enjoy political or military support. This contrasts with revolutionary neighborhoods, where young men enjoy revolutionary legitimacy and possess arms such as in Fashloom, Suq A Juma or Tajura.⁵⁹

Conversely, in Sabha and Benghazi, less than 15% of residents consider that the crime situation has significantly improved, while more than 20% consider it has become much worse. This is probably due to

⁵⁹ PI in Tripoli, April 2013

the renewed fighting observed in the South over the research period as well as the tensions linked to continued political assassinations in the East.

In terms of gender, Libyan females feel less secure than males with regards to crime in their area. Whereas 60% of Libyan men consider that the crime situation has improved over the last six months, this figure drops to 45% for females. This is likely because women hardly have access to the police and justice systems outside their husbands and because they are rather less likely to resort to self-defense tactics such as carrying individual arms, unlike males.




Figure 15 - How would you evaluate the crime situation in your area over the last six months? (by gender and location, n=2302)

When asked to compare the crime situation in their region with the national average, Libyans tended to be generally more optimistic about their own area. This not only reveals a strong sense of local identity that unifies Libyans from the same area but also demonstrates a general concern for advancing a positive image of their own communities. This feeling was similar across genders. Indeed, more than 60% of males and females considered that the crime situation in their area is ‘a lot better’ or ‘somewhat better’ than the national average. Overall, perceptions of criminality in comparison to the national average were lower but follow the same trends as absolute perception of crimes in the same areas. The crime situation in eastern and southern Libya is more alarming than in the western part of the country, although disparities in perception exist between certain urban neighbourhoods. For example, in Benghazi, although residents perceive the crime rate as “somewhat” or “a lot better” than the national average in areas such as Al-Khesh (63%) and Garyounes (50%) and Tabalino (100%) in the southwest of Benghazi, in others areas residents perceive the crime rate as “somewhat” or “a lot worse” than the national average, such as Al Majoura (59%) in the centre and Al-Urobah (46%) in the north.




Figure 16– How you rate crime in your area compared to the national average? (by gender and location, n=2302)

6.2 OCCURRENCE OF CRIME AND LEVELS OF CONCERN TOWARDS CRIMES

The following subsection assesses the reported occurrence of different crimes in Libya as well as levels of concern towards particular crimes.

6.2.1 Occurrence of Crime

The occurrence of eight popular types of crime was tested in the survey, namely sexual harassment, sexual assault, disputes over land ownership, murder, kidnapping, robbery at SSC checkpoints, robbery at illegal checkpoints, and house burglary. Significant variations are found across cities.

In **Tripoli**, despite a general feeling of security in the city as shown in Chapter 5, residents are reportedly at high risk of becoming victims of theft and abductions. In the last year, more than 10% of residents reported that they or a member of their close family had been a victim of a robbery at an illegal checkpoint, 6% of kidnapping, and 3% of murder. These results are likely due to the proliferation of individual arms among the population and could be underestimated as fieldwork showed many were afraid to report crimes.

In **Sabha**, more than 15% of residents reported being victims of robbery at an illegal checkpoint and 10% had been victims of house burglary over the last twelve months. Despite social cohesiveness that generally works to prevent such crimes, in Sabha and other surrounding areas, locals often attribute them to ‘foreign elements’ such as ‘sub-Saharan illegal migrants.’⁶⁰

In **Sirte**, crime rates appear to be rather higher than in other locations. Up to 25% of Sirte residents reported that they had been victims of robbery at illegal checkpoints or house burglary. A remarkable 10% of the residents confirmed that a member of their family was a victim of murder. Fieldwork in Sirte confirmed these trends, as a general feeling of insecurity was felt in the city and activity was kept minimal. A shop owner in the central district reported that he had heard of three kidnapping cases over the last two weeks and that a new murder case was reported each week. He explained that:

⁶⁰ PIs in Murzuq, June 2013.

The crime rate has considerably risen over the last six months, notably after the withdrawal of ‘revolutionaries’ from Benghazi who had constituted a local branch of the SSC, who were asked to leave the city by local tribes. Today, drug consumption and newly established families contribute to high rates of crimes, notably kidnapping and murder.




Figure 17 - Have you or a close member of your family ever been a victim of the following crimes? (by region, n=2302)

By referring to newly established families, the interviewee – who belongs to Al Furjani tribe⁶¹ - designates the tribes of Warfalla and Gadhafda as being ‘foreigners.’ Indeed, tribal disputes and lack of social cohesiveness explain to some extent high crime rates in Sirte. On June 13th, clashes erupted at Sirte University between members of Warfalla and Furjani leaving 2 dead and 15 injured.⁶²

Overall, occurrence of crime seems to be more frequent in Tripoli than in Benghazi and Misrata. The result in Misrata seems in accordance with results regarding perception of security, where the security is perceived as better. However, results in Benghazi and Tripoli appear contrast to some extent with the perception of security in both cities. Indeed, security in Tripoli is perceived as being better than in Benghazi by inhabitants despite a higher rate of reported crimes as revealed by Figure 18 below. This is explained by the fact that insecurity in Benghazi is ‘mainly due to politically motivated crimes, with car bombs and targeted assassinations that are covered more extensively by the media.’⁶³

⁶¹ Al-Furjani and Al-Hemali tribes are the original local tribes of Sirte. New tribes joined in the city, notably under the Ghadaffi era, including the Warfalla and the Gadhafda.

⁶² Phone Interview with local resident in Sirte, June 2013.

⁶³ KII with local correspondent of a foreign media outlet in Benghazi, Tripoli, June 2013.




Figure 18 - Have you or a member of your family ever been a victim of the following crime during the last 12 months? (by location, n=2302)

6.2.2 Concern towards Crime

In addition to rate of occurrence, levels of concern towards the eight crimes listed above were tested among Libyans. When asked to what extent they feared to be targeted by criminal acts, one in three Libyans reported being very worried about being a victim of a crime.

Examining the results by gender, women seemed more likely to be worried about crimes than men. No less than 40% of Libyan women declared being very worried about all crimes mentioned (except land ownership disputes), against 25% of men. This reflects the results obtained earlier where women generally judged their areas to be less safe than men.

Disaggregating by location, it was clear that feelings of insecurity are highest in Sabha. One in two Libyans there were ‘very worried’ about potential crimes in the city. This is likely due to the security vacuum in Sabha and in the southern part of Libya in general. PIs conducted in Sabha in June 2013 suggested that if the population does not receive security support soon enough, Sabha residents would be likely to seek refuge among the wide range of unofficial sanctioned security actors present in Sabha and its surrounds. Also, if security is not improved, residents of Sabha may seek protection within their tribe or community, which could lead to further tensions and civil strife. These observations were not restricted to Sabha but were common to several southern districts. Conversely, Misrata appears to be the safest major city in comparison to Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha, as less than 20% of Misratans reported being very worried about the eight types of crimes. This might be due to the MRU’s capacity to punish undisciplined brigades. As explained by a local businessman in a PI:

In late 2011, the Al Saadawi brigade, which refused to adhere to the newly constituted coalition in the aftermath of the revolution, was forced by the MRU to abandon its position on the Western gate of Misrata. The brigade was arbitrarily arresting people at this checkpoint.⁶⁴

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata	Sabha	West	East	South	Libya
House Burglary	23%	38%	35%	30%	22%	46%	29%	31%	40%	30%
Robbery at Illegal Checkpoint	26%	39%	37%	32%	22%	47%	32%	30%	40%	32%
Robbery at SSC Checkpoint	25%	36%	34%	31%	21%	44%	30%	30%	31%	30%
Kidnapping	24%	43%	34%	35%	25%	49%	33%	32%	41%	33%
Murder	27%	43%	37%	36%	27%	50%	34%	34%	41%	35%
Land Ownership Disputes	20%	31%	29%	28%	18%	37%	25%	26%	27%	26%
Sexual Assault	25%	42%	34%	35%	24%	46%	32%	34%	40%	33%
Sexual Harassment	25%	43%	34%	35%	25%	45%	32%	34%	41%	33%

Table 6- Percentage of participants who said they were 'very worried' about the above crimes (by gender and location, n=2302)

6.3 RESPONSES TO CRIMINALITY

The following subsection examines perceptions towards various responses to criminality among Libyans. Overall, a large majority of Libyans (80%) believed that more National Police would reduce crime in their area, and more than half of them (60%) would spontaneously turn to the police if they were victims of crime.

6.3.1 Crime Prevention Measures

Survey respondents were asked to rate the efficiency of eight crime-prevention measures: increasing the presence of National Police, traffic police, local brigades or SSC; bringing brigades from other cities, increasing the number of National Police checkpoints, creating women's police units, and giving the community the right to elect the police commander.

A majority of Libyans (80%) believed that more National Police would 'definitely' reduce crime in their area. This shows that Libyans widely accept the authority (and the monopoly on the legitimate use of force) of the National Police. A PI respondent from Tajura, a revolutionary stronghold east of Tripoli explained that 'before the revolution, I was afraid of the police and did not respect them. Today, although I do not fear them anymore, I do respect them'.

The second most popular measure to reduce crime was to increase the number of traffic police (70%), showing that more visible police could contribute to improving perception of safety. The idea to increase the presence and numbers of brigades - either local, external or under the Ministry of Interior - seems unpopular. No more than 22% of Libyans believed more local brigades will 'definitely reduce crime' while

⁶⁴ PIs in Misrata, May 2013

only 10% consider that increasing the number of brigades from other cities would improve the crime rate in their area. This indicates that the police have gained in legitimacy at the expense of ‘all types of brigades’, and that revolutionary legitimacy no longer seems sufficient to guarantee popular support for these brigades.




Figure 19 - Do you think the following ideas could reduce crime in your area? (n=2302)




Figure 20 - Do you think the following ideas could reduce crime in your area? (Misrata and Sabha, n=753)

Figure 21 below shows that in some districts where the population is mainly composed of ethnic minorities, such as Murzuq and Zuwarah, respondents believed that having more local brigades would help security. Nevertheless, in other mainly tribal districts such as Ghat and Awbari, where brigades are involved in illegal activities, respondents were less convinced that more local brigades would help security. Similarly, in districts where the majority of the population is concentrated in large urban centers such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, and Aziziyah respondents did not believe that more local brigades would help security. In Sirte and Aziziyah, local brigades are composed of revolutionary minorities which do not enjoy popular support. Finally, it is interesting to note that almost half of Misratians are in favour of more local brigades, higher than other major urban centres, indicating strong sense of local identity.




Figure 21 - Percentage of respondents who said that "More local brigades" would help security (by district, n=2302)

6.3.2 Perceptions of Anti-Crime Actors

The National Police are the security body Libyans prefer to refer to if they have experienced crime. 60% of Libyans would go to the National Police if they were the victim of theft, an abduction, a land ownership dispute, or a sexual assault. Responses are uniform across all different types of crime, with 'nobody' being the second most popular choice at 18%. Very few Libyans (less than 4%) said they would go the SSC, LSF or the local brigade if they were a victim of a crime.

Also notable is that there are no significant security actors competing with the National Police. Indeed, alternative security providers such as the SSC, local brigades, tribes and notables are mentioned in this regard by only 5% of Libyans. More than 20% of Libyans would refer to 'no one' if they were victims of a crime. This indicates a general distrust in the National Police in certain areas. PI respondents in Sirte and Bani Walid explained that despite a sincere loyalty to the state, the National Police barely exist and communities tend to rely on themselves to ensure their own security. For instance, in Bani Walid, regardless of the presence of a local military council and a local brigade, residents count mainly on themselves for protection from burglary or abduction.⁶⁵ This is mainly due to the fact that the 28th of May Brigade, which is the main component of the LMC, represents the local pro-revolutionary minority and was associated with the attack against Bani Walid in September 2012 after having been expelled in January 2012 by local armed inhabitants. In other terms, the LMC do not enjoy the necessary local legitimacy that would allow it to operate as an anti-crime actor, and are instead considered as source of division. A local notable explained that 'they have participated in exactions, along with brigades from Misrata, when they entered Bani Walid.' Indeed, the legitimacy of local actors in charge of anti-crime policies is decisive to determine its efficiency.

In terms of responding to sexual assault, there seemed to be little variation across locations, as the National Police remain the preferred security provider across all Libyan cities surveyed. The percentage of people referring to the National Police in the case of sexual assault appears less important in southern

⁶⁵KII with Bani Walid Shura Council Members, May 2013.

districts, where more than 20% would go to their family and tribe. This is most likely due to the prominence of conservative values in southern Libya and to the reduced presence of state institutions.




Figure 22 - Who would you go to if you or a member of your family was a victim of sexual assault? (by location, n=2302)

The figure below confirms the regional disparities observed in terms of preferred security provider. More Libyans from the South said they would go to their tribe for help in the case of all crimes than Libyans from the West and East. Similarly, more Libyans from the South said they would go to their family for help in the case of serious crimes, e.g. murder, kidnapping, or sexual assault.




Figure 23 - Percentage of participants who said they would go to their tribe in the case of murder (by region, n=2302)

Finally, disaggregating the data by age groups, it is interesting to note that older Libyans tended to prefer the National Police. This might be explained by two factors. First, as a matter of fact, elders were more used to deal and refer to the police. Second, the youngest generations were most likely to have contacts within revolutionary brigades composed of members generally belonging to the same generation.




Figure 24 - Percentage of participants who said they would go to the National Police in the case of sexual assault (by age group, n=2302)

7 ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLICE

The following section presents Libyan attitudes towards the National Police, including perceptions of their presence and visibility as well as their effectiveness, honesty, and capacity. In general, of all the unofficial and official security actors across the country, the National Police and the traffic police are the most visible security actors. In addition, Libyans interact with the National Police more than any other security body, generally to report a crime. Although most Libyans believe that the National Police are efficient, approachable, and contribute to security, a significant percentage also see them as corrupt.

Generally speaking, however, perceptions of the state police actors are mostly positive. Most Libyans believe that improvements to the National Police would involve a better, more professional appearance, greater respect for civilians, better reactivity, and an increased effectiveness at dealing with crime. These suggestions correlate with suggested top priorities for the Ministry of Interior (see Chapter 10): to remove arms from the streets, to address problems with armed individuals and gangs, and to rebuild the capacity of state police forces.

7.1 PRESENCE AND VISIBILITY IN LIBYA

When asked how often they see different policing and military actors (National Police, Traffic Police, National Guard and Municipal Guard), 64% and 71% of Libyans reported seeing National Police and traffic police daily. This high visibility is probably partially attributable to the former Interior Minister Ashur Shweil's commitment to generally 'increasing the police's visibility and presence (*al-tamazhor*).'⁶⁶

The National Guard forces, a newly constituted body operating essentially in Tripoli, is the next most visible, with 19% daily visibility. This body was founded by Khaled Al Sharif⁶⁷ and has benefited from important media coverage. Finally, the Municipal Guard seems to be absent from the police landscape, with less than 10% of Libyans reporting to see it daily, although they were seen on a daily basis by respondents from southern districts such as Murzuq (35%), Jufrah (44%) and Ghat (51%). Local Civil Councils seem to be paralysed in many areas, which certainly impacts the activity of their Municipal Guards. Fieldwork revealed that number of Local Civil Councils have no allocated budgets by the state.⁶⁸

Not surprisingly, 60% of males see the National Police on a daily basis, compared with just 45% of women. This is likely due to the fact Libyan men are traditionally more exposed to outdoor life and enjoy a greater freedom of movement in a conservative society.

⁶⁶ "Ministers of Interior and Defence Set Forth their Plans for Libya", Libya Herald, 12 December 2012. <http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/17/ministers-of-interior-and-defence-set-forth-their-plans-for-libya/>

⁶⁷ Khaled Al Sharif is very close to the former head of the Tripoli Military Council Abd Al Hakim Belhadj; both were members of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

⁶⁸ KIs conducted in Bani Walid, May 2013




Figure 25 - How often do you see the following security actors? (Response: Daily, by gender, n=2302)

In terms of location, Misrata is the city where residents reportedly see the National Police most often, with 63% reporting seeing them daily (see Figure 28 below). However, despite this, and the generally positive perception of security in the city, no policemen could be seen in the city during fieldwork, and the PI and KII respondents all agreed on the necessity to reinforce the police ‘who are absent.’ This perception of high visibility of policing is partially due to confusion within the Misrata police landscape, where local state institutions (local civil and military councils as well as the local branch of the National Police) have been taken over by revolutionaries, and the MRU has been operating under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Indeed, 40,000 combatants from Misrata are registered on the government payroll, many of whom might appear to Misratans to be fulfilling the role of National Police.⁶⁹ As explained by a member of the LMC, ‘there is no distinction between the revolutionaries and the police.’⁷⁰ In addition to their military power, the revolutionary brigades in Misrata have gained local legitimacy. Their victory in the Local Civil Council elections in February 2012 – organized in Misrata despite the opposition of the NTC – confirms this local legitimacy.

In Benghazi, almost 50% of residents reported seeing the National Police on a daily basis. The previous Interior Minister Ashur Shweil, a former policeman from Benghazi, used the city as a national example for reforming the National Police. His enterprise was partly successful as the SSC in Benghazi was completely disbanded and 3,000 SSC members have joined the police.⁷¹

In Sabha, 46% of the population reported seeing the police on a daily basis, which is relatively high compared with the security issues the city faces. This is due to the fact that their presence is only reported during the day, while most crimes occurs at night according to interviewees in Sabha⁷² Furthermore, despite their high reported visibility, PIs indicated that the presence of the National Police does little to help solve security problems in Sabha, and respondents suggested that visibility is not synonymous with

⁶⁹ Brian McQuinn, Small Arms Survey ‘After the Fall, Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups’, October 2012, P.13

⁷⁰ KII in Misratah, May 2013.

⁷¹ German Institute for International and Security Affairs, ‘Libya: Fault Lines of the Revolution’, June 2013, P.33

⁷² PIs conducted in Sabha, June 2013.

efficiency and that the former Minister of Interior’s plan to increase the visibility of the police will not be enough to tackle the city’s security problems in any depth.




Figure 26 - How often do you see the National Police? (by location, n=2302)

7.2 INTERACTIONS

This section aims at assessing the frequency and causes of interactions with the National Police. Tripoli recorded the highest rate of interaction whereas Misrata has the lowest. Across the country and in main cities, ‘reporting a crime’ was the main motivation for interaction. It worth noting as well that ‘seeking work’ is one of the most popular motivations, which indicates that the National Police are an attractive employer in terms of job stability and salary.

Survey respondents were asked whether they had interacted with the National Police over the past 12 months. 15% of Tripolitarians had interacted with the police (see Figure 27 below), which may be explained by the stronger urban traditions in Tripoli compared to other Libyan cities. A Tripoli-based police officer explained that ‘... after having tried to complain to brigades, people in Tripoli always turn to the police. However, we don’t always have the necessary means to help them’⁷³. The police officer further noted that brigade members were often involved in criminal activities, making the National Police the most legitimate organization Tripolitarians can ultimately refer to. The high rates of police interaction in Sabha and the South are likely so due to the highest rates of criminality identified in these regions.

⁷³ KII conducted in Tripoli, April 2013.




Figure 27 - Percentage of Libyans reporting having interacted with the National Police over the past 12 months (by location, n=2302)

Most interactions with the National Police were to report crimes. 66 % of police interactions in southern Libya involve reporting a crime, a high rate commensurate with levels of criminality in the South. In comparison, this percentage drops to around 30% in Tripoli. In Misrata, which registered the lowest rate of police interaction among the four major surveyed cities, 20% of interactions are motivated by the will to join the police.

Also notable is that complaints against the National Police are almost inexistent, reflecting a general state of impunity and contributing to a lack accountability of police forces. This is likely an inheritance from the previous regime, where the population rarely complained when police abused their power. This state of affairs applies to new security actors as well, notably revolutionary brigades.




Figure 28 – What was the nature of the interaction you had with the National Police? (by location, n=2302)

7.3 IMPROVING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

In Sabha, 50% of residents spontaneously considered that better appearance and uniforms of policemen would improve the perception of the police in the city. This does not only reveal the necessity to have more visible police, but also points to the importance of creating distinct and recognizable police identity

distinct from other semi-official and unofficial security actors. This state of affairs is common to all cities in Libya but seems more prevalent in Sabha as shown in Table 7 below. An SSC member interviewed in Tripoli explained that 'we are wearing policemen's uniforms and using their cars that we seized in late 2011. It is almost impossible to distinguish SSC members from policemen.'⁷⁴

50% of Misratis believed that having a more respectful police would improve their perception of police forces. This is likely because many of the revolutionaries integrated into the National Police lack professionalism and basic training. According to a Misrata Shura Council member interviewed for this research:

The SSC has been dissolved in Misrata and its members integrated into the Intelligence Services, the Military Police and the National Police. As most new police officers in Misrata are recruited from local groups and SSC, they broadly lack the required training and professionalism in dealing with the population.

One in three Libyans believed that the police need to be more reactive. The police in Libya today often lack the means to be so. A colonel in charge of a police station in Tripoli, which had only one patrol car at its disposal, explained his station's difficult situation:

The police were already miserable under Ghadaffi, who had deliberately impoverished them. We were used to wearing the same uniform for more than five years and salaries were very low. However, we were able to fulfill our mission relying on the state authority and iron fist. Once the regime disappeared, fear of the police was gone. We have nothing left to exercise our duties. Sometimes, I have to use my own car for intervention operations.

Better reactivity is hence conditioned by the government's capacity to become involved and reinforce the National Police. According to this colonel, nothing has been done to date in this regard, rather, he believed that government efforts have been focused on organizing and training revolutionaries in order to absorb them into the police.

As regards police discipline at work, an international security expert working closely with the Ministry of Interior explained that there are 130,000 men and women in the Libyan police forces, only 40% of whom have joined their offices, and even then only after the government had set an ultimatum that it would stop paying salaries.⁷⁵ 14% of Libyans consider that prolonged working hours are necessary to improve the perception of the police, which climbs to 27% in the South, indicating a particular problem there with police dedication.

In terms of gender, 25% of males consider that better appearance of police cars would improve police perception compared to only 13% of women, who are rather more interested in police following up on crimes. For men at least, new cars could well increase respect and admiration towards the police.

⁷⁴ KII conducted in Tripoli, April 2013.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

	Sabha	Tripoli	Misrata	Benghazi	West	East	South	Libya
Better appearance - Uniforms	50%	42%	41%	37%	38%	39%	39%	39%
More respectful	42%	40%	50%	30%	37%	37%	38%	37%
Better reactivity	32%	39%	36%	34%	34%	35%	29%	34%
More effective in dealing with crime	31%	34%	30%	34%	27%	28%	33%	28%
More presence in public places	24%	24%	15%	33%	18%	25%	25%	21%
Better appearance - Cars	18%	13%	17%	17%	15%	23%	18%	18%
More car patrols	20%	10%	10%	17%	12%	12%	19%	12%
Longer working hours	18%	15%	16%	16%	13%	14%	27%	14%
More foot patrols	16%	13%	14%	16%	15%	13%	14%	14%
More strength in dealing with security matters	8%	14%	19%	16%	12%	13%	6%	12%
Better cooperation with other security actors	8%	7%	10%	5%	7%	5%	8%	7%
More presence at government buildings	4%	3%	4%	2%	4%	2%	3%	3%
Less checkpoints	0%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%	2%
Removing former regime loyalists	1%	1%	4%	2%	3%	2%	0%	2%

Table 7 - What would improve your perception of the National Police? (by location, multiple responses possible, unprompted, n=2302)

7.4 EFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION, CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECURITY, AND APPROACHABILITY

When the National Police in Misrata and Sabha are perceived to be effective this is generally for different reasons. 35% of Misratans believed the police were very effective, as police forces in Misrata benefit from both revolutionary and local legitimacies (see Figure 29 below). A Misratan policeman operating in Tripoli explained:

In practice, the political isolation law has already been applied to the police in Misrata. As of today, the police are composed of policemen who had joined the revolution and numerous revolutionaries. Lines between the state and the revolution are deliberately blurred in Misrata.

In Sabha, which was one of the last cities to join the revolution, perceptions of police efficiency are also positive, with 25% of Sabhans judging that they are very effective. Unlike Misrata, where high rates of approval for the police are linked to their revolutionary credentials, in Sabha efficiency is more interpreted as being the result of the absence of any other efficient security body, as revealed by PIs conducted in the southern city. Aside from the National Police, only the Fezzan Martyrs brigade was cited by interviewees as playing a minor role in providing security. In the southern districts outside of Sabha, however, perceptions of police efficiency are rather less positive, probably because the police are less present

outside of the main urban centre and due to a general distrust in state institutions, notably among ethnic minorities.⁷⁶

Finally, it should be mentioned that Libyans’ perceptions of police effectiveness may also be biased by their will to see the return of the National Police. Despite the poor reputation of the National Police under the former regime, Libyans are eager to see the National Police in charge of security again, even in revolutionary strongholds. As a Fashloom Martyrs brigade member explained: ‘if I was a victim of a crime, I would refer to the National Police, as my brigade is not trustworthy.’ Despite a poor perception in Benghazi, the National Police enjoy the support of the population. A journalist from Benghazi interviewed in Tripoli shared an example to illustrate this support:

Following the assassination of the American Ambassador in Benghazi, a general mobilisation was organised in the city, called ‘Friday to rescue Benghazi’, which called for dismantling of brigades. On the Wednesday preceding the demonstration, brigades with Islamist credentials tried to attack police stations, which provoked the local community to deploy human shields around police stations.⁷⁷

In other terms, poor performance or reputation of the National Police have not significantly impacted the support of the population. However, Libyans’ current perceptions of the police may change if nothing is done by the government to reinforce them.




Figure 29 - Do you think the National Police are effective? (by location, n=2302)

When asked to what extent they believed the National Police are corrupt, almost 60% of Libyans reported that the National Police were ‘definitely corrupt’ or ‘somewhat corrupt’. This stark contrast between perceptions of efficiency and corruption is likely because the National Police developed a very bad reputation under the former regime, where bribes were commonplace. Low salaries and policemen accumulating several jobs created conflicts of interest and encouraged corruption.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ PIs conducted in Murzuq, June 2013.

⁷⁷ KII with local correspondent of a foreign media outlet in Benghazi, Tripoli, June 2013.

⁷⁸ KII with a police station chief conducted in Tripoli, April 2013.

In Misrata, only 18% of the population considers that the National Police are ‘definitely corrupt’, the lowest value seen across the four key cities. This result, in addition to the one observed in the previous graph in Misrata, shows a renewal of trust in the National Police, explained by the integration of revolutionaries into Misratan police units. In Sabha and in the South, perceptions of corruption among the police are higher (more than 25%), which might be explained by police involvement in tribal politics and other connection with local networks.




Figure 30 - Do you think the National Police are corrupt? (by location, n=2302)

Survey respondents were asked whether the National Police had improved in their area over the last six months. Perceptions of the National Police’s track record vary across locations. Again, Misrata registered the highest satisfaction, with 40% of Misratans considering that the National Police has ‘definitely’ improved over the last six months. It confirms the general positive trends observed in previous graphs in this chapter. Indeed, many Misratan revolutionaries have recently graduated from local police academies and have joined various National Police units such as the Anti-Crime Agency and Judicial Police. In addition, the Ministry of Interior has made significant efforts to absorb the 40,000 ex-combatants from Misrata into local, regional and national level security actors. Sentiments are similarly positive in Tripoli, where 37% believe the National Police have ‘definitely improved’, probably more due to increased police presence, notably in central districts of the city.

In Sabha and Benghazi, only around 18% consider that the police have definitely improved over the last six months. There are two explanations for this rather negative perception. First, comparatively positive perceptions mentioned above in Misrata and Tripoli are not strongly related to performance and an objective track record, rather their revolutionary credentials and visibility. Second, the security situation in Benghazi and Sabha is perceived as less positive than in its western counterparts.




Figure 31 - Do you think the National Police have improved over the past 6 months (in your area)? (by location, n=2302)

8 ATTITUDES TOWARDS SEMI- AND UN-OFFICIAL SECURITY ACTORS

The following section presents an analysis of Libyan attitudes towards semi-official and unofficial policing and military actors (SSC, LSF, brigades under the authority of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, and independent brigades). Out of all these different security actors, the SSC and LSF are the most visible, although none of these actors were reported to be as visible as the National Police, possibly due to confusion between unofficial, semi-official and official security actors.

Furthermore, a majority of Libyans believed that the LSF should be integrated into the National Army, the SSC into the National Police, and that LMCs and brigades under the Ministry of Interior should be integrated into both the National Army and the National Police. A higher percentage of Libyans believed that independent brigades should be disbanded rather than integrated into official security actors, perhaps signalling a frustration with the lawlessness of these unofficial bodies.

Libyans reported interacting less frequently with the SSC than with the National Police, especially in the southern and eastern regions of the country, where the SSC is less active. In addition, the SSC was seen as slightly less effective, less approachable, and contributing less to security than the National Police, and slightly more corrupt than the National Police in all four major cities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, and Sabha). Although Libyans perceived the SSC as a moderately effective policing body, a strong national consensus exists to disband the remaining SSC brigades and integrate them into the National Police.

8.1 PRESENCE AND VISIBILITY IN LIBYA

In order to determine the rate of visibility, presence and popularity across Libya, survey respondents were asked how often they saw semi- and un-official security actors.

8.1.1 National Level Findings

Only 34% of Libyans reported seeing SSC members on a daily basis (See Figure 32 below), although they are the most visible of the unofficial or semi-official security actors. Indeed, 20% less Libyans reported seeing the SSC on a daily basis than the National Police, even though there are 165,000 registered SSC members across Libya compared with 130,000 policemen.⁷⁹ Lower visibility figures for the SSC may be the result of an inability to distinguish SSC members from the National Police, a finding supported by the 20% of Libyans who claimed to not know how often they see semi- and un-official security actors.

LMCs also appeared to be less visible than the National Police, with 33% of Libyans saying they never see them. As one member of the SSC interviewed in Tripoli explained: ‘the district of Tripoli used to have 122 military councils, although a large majority have been disbanded.’ While LMCs were formed at the initiative of the NTC to help cities organize their own defence, numerous brigades have since left the LMCs, notably in areas such as Suq Al Juma and Tajura.

Finally, revolutionary brigades not operating under the Ministry of Interior are the least visible of all security actors, with only 16% of Libyans claiming to see them on a daily basis, and 43% who said they never see them at all. Two points help to explain this result: first, most brigades are operating under the

⁷⁹ KII with an International security expert conducted in Tripoli, April 2013.

authority of the Ministries of Defence and Interior as they have financial interest in doing so. Second, some of the independent brigades were officially disbanded, for example Abu Salim Martyrs in Berna was officially disbanded by its commander Salem el Derbi in September 2012, following the attack against the Embassy. However, elements suspected of having been members of the brigade are still in the outskirts of Derna.⁸⁰




Figure 32 - How often do you see the following security actors? (n=2302)

8.1.2 The Supreme Security Committee

The visibility of the SSC differed depending on the region or city in question, with Libyans from the West, and from Tripoli in particular, reporting that they see SSC members more frequently than Libyans from the South and the East. 45% of Tripolitarians reported seeing the SSC on a daily basis (see Figure 33 below), due to the strong presence and high levels of activity of the SSC. Nevertheless, according to a recent decision by the Ministry of Interior, some of the largest brigades were stripped of the SSC label, notably the Suq Al Juma brigade and the Al Fursan brigade from Janzoor, even though the brigades continue to assert that the Ministry has backed down from this decision. Up to this stage of research, their legal status is unclear as they are still active on the ground. Interestingly, cars and armed men with SSC labels have become less visible in Tripoli over the last two months.

In Misrata and Benghazi, although SSC brigades have been officially disbanded, 36% and 28% of residents continue to see them on a daily basis. The continued presence of the SSC in these cities could be explained in two ways. First, some Libyans may find it difficult to distinguish SSC members from other official or unofficial security actors, and many former members of the SSC are in many cases still operating on the ground as brigade members.⁸¹ Second, orders originating from Tripoli are not always executed, due to the SSC being composed of brigade coalitions. The SSC's image has been tarnished following reported human rights violations and involvement in the destruction of Sufi shrines, which likely incited the government and some local authorities to announce that the SSC would be disbanded. The extent to which this process has been accomplished varies from one place to another. Also in Misrata and Benghazi, 20% and 29% of

⁸⁰ KII with a Benghazi based journalist conducted in Tripoli, June 2013.

⁸¹ KII with former member of the SSC conducted in Fashloom Tripoli, May 2013.

residents claimed to never see the SSC, indicating that brigades within the SSC operate according to a logic of territorial control.




Figure 33 - How often do you see the Supreme Security Committee? (by location, n=2302)

8.1.3 Libyan Shield Forces

The LSF are most visible in their strongholds of Misrata and Benghazi: out of 13,000 men enrolled across Libya, 7,000 are stationed in Misrata and 4,500-5,000 in Benghazi,⁸² and as a result 30% and 28% of the population reported seeing the LSF on a daily basis in Misrata and Benghazi, whereas in Tripoli and Sabha, this falls to 19% and 18% respectively. The LSF in the Western Region, however, due its smaller organization and intercity competition in the West is less effective and visible. Following clashes opposing the SSC to the Borders and Infrastructures First Division, rumors have circulated on some Tripoli SSC branch Facebook pages about an eventual intervention of the LSF (Central and Western Divisions) in Tripoli, which indicates that their actual presence is rather limited and localized.

When disaggregated by region, LSF appear to be less active in the South of the country than in the East and the West. Similarities in levels of LSF visibility in the East and West are due to the fact the group is mobile across these regions, although this mobility may be decreasing as a result of recent events, such as the confrontations between LSF – Shield 1 and local armed demonstrators in Benghazi. Since then, Shield 7 has announced its retreat from the Southern districts, and the LSF regional and local identities are becoming increasingly muddled.

⁸² LSF- Central Region official Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/Der3Libya?fref=ts>




Figure 34 - How often do you see the Libyan Shield Forces? (by location, n=2302)

8.1.4 Independent Brigades

One of the most prominent of the independent brigades in Benghazi, Ansar Al Sharia, are still present and ensure a policing role in the city as revealed by the national survey, PIs and KIIs. However, they tend to keep a lower profile than in 2012, when they organized military parades in Benghazi. This strategic show of force is no longer adopted by the group, which is now involved in several charitable activities.⁸³ Although independent brigades are less visible in the East and West compared with official security actors, in the South they are almost as visible as brigades operating under the Ministry of Interior and the LSF (see Figure 35 below). These southern independent brigades are in some cases affiliated with local tribes, ethnic minorities, or even criminal networks involved in cross-border trafficking developing their own survival financial means.⁸⁴ The greater presence of independent brigades in the South may also help to explain the higher crime rates (see Chapter 5).




Figure 35 - How often do you see independent brigades? (by location, n=2302)

⁸³ KII with a Benghazi-based journalist based in Tripoli, June 2013.

⁸⁴ KII with an International researcher on Libya conducted in Tripoli, April 2013.

8.2 INTEGRATING OR DISBANDING BRIGADES

One of the largest and most pressing challenges for the Libyan government, and in particular the Ministries of Interior and Defence, is to decide how to proceed with the many brigades that are either loosely or not at all affiliated with the state. To shed light on attitudes towards this key issue, Libyans were asked what they thought should happen to the unofficial security actors discussed above, including:

- 1) Completely integrating brigades with the National Police or National Army
- 2) Partially integrating some elements into the National Police
- 3) Disbanding 'bad' elements of brigades
- 4) Disbanding brigades completely.

The majority of Libyans want brigades loosely affiliated with the state to be integrated into the National Police or National Army. Groups such as the LSF, SSC, and brigades under the command of the Ministry of Interior receive more support for integration than LMCs (see Figure 36 below). A significant percentage of Libyans (32%) would prefer to see independent brigades completely disbanded. Only 2% said that they should keep their autonomy.




Figure 36 - What do you think should be done with the following security actors? (n=2302)

8.2.1 Libya Shield Forces

The majority (65%) of Libyans believed that the LSF should be integrated into the National Army, with a further 13% stating that they should be integrated into the National Police. On one hand, this indicates that most Libyans believed that the LSF has played a constructive role in the post-revolutionary context, yet on the other hand, it also shows that most Libyans do not yet view the LSF as part of the National Army, despite claims by the LSF to the contrary as they seek to gain legitimacy. Only 4% recommend that the LSF maintains their autonomy. As explained by a KII respondent from Benghazi:

The Libyan Shield Forces have not been involved in kidnapping or torture cases unlike brigades operating in Misrata and Tripoli. However, the population expects to see only official security actors being in charge, and this expectation was the main driver behind the demonstrations triggered on June 8th, 2013. Furthermore, the supposed political positioning of Shields 1, 3, 7, and

*10 have considerably fuelled tensions. In Benghazi, only Shield 2 is considered as not being a part of the Islamist trend.*⁸⁵

8.2.2 The Supreme Security Committee

To a lesser extent, a similar conclusion can be drawn for the SSC. 51% of Libyans recommend integrating them into the National Police, and 22% believe they should be integrated into the National Army, even though the SSC is currently operating under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. This confusion is most likely due to the SSC having conducted several military operations, such as averting the attempted coup d'état in 2012 by Colonel Habshi, a former army official and head of the local council of Tarhuna.⁸⁶ Like the LSF, very few Libyans believe that the SSC should keep its autonomy or left in their current state.

8.2.3 Local Military Councils

Although they also operate under the government's authority, a larger percentage of Libyans (21%) support the complete or partial disbandment of LMCs. As LMCs are often involved in local politics, in many cases they do not exhibit necessary level of neutrality to act as legitimate security providers. As mentioned, in Bani Walid, the LMC is run by a local revolutionary brigade (May 28th Brigade), which only represents a minority of the city population. Members of the Shura Council explained to Altai that the brigade was accused of participating in the September 2012 assault against the city, which was led by Misratis. As a result, the LMC has been marginalized and cannot effectively police the city. PIs conducted in Sabha revealed that the LMC was taken over by the Awlad Suleiman tribe, which has complicated relationships with many other local components such as the Gadhafda tribe or the Tebu.

8.3 INTERACTIONS WITH THE SUPREME SECURITY COMMITTEE

Overall, Libyans interacted slightly less frequently with the SSC than with the National Police, although significant distinctions exist between regions, notably in the South and the East of the country (see Figure 37 below). In the South, interactions with the National Police are more frequent than with the SSC, a trend that is also observable to a lesser extent in the East, likely due to the SSC being less present in these regions than in the West. In addition, Libyans from the East and the South seem to be more reluctant to accept the SSC than Libyans from cities such as Misrata or Tripoli. Misrata is the only city where locals interact more frequently with the SSC than with the National Police.

⁸⁵ KII in Benghazi, June 2013

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflict', September 2012.




Figure 37 – Did you interact with the National Police or the SSC in the past 12 months? (by location, n=2302)

28% of survey participants interacted with the SSC for work, either as members of the SSC or for other professional reasons (see Figure 38 below); indeed, even policemen declared that they hoped to join the SSC due to the increased salaries and prestige. Other popular interactions included reporting a crime (19%) and calling for help (16%).




Figure 38 - What was the nature of the interaction you had with the SSC? (by location, n=2302)

When reporting a crime, more Libyans favour the National Police over the SSC in all cities across the country (see Figure 39 below), even in Misrata, where people interact more frequently with the SSC than the National Police. The National Police are most likely the preferred interlocutor for reporting a crime due their increased level of professionalism and functionality. The National Police are the only body entitled to open a case and transmit it to the prosecution, and SSC members lack the most basic of training in handling cases.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ There are worrying signs of a lack of professionalism within the SSC. Altai’s researchers struggled to interview some SSC members in Tripoli as they were under the effect of drugs at the time.




Figure 39 – What type of interaction did you have with the SSC or the National Police? – Answer: Report a Crime (by location, n=83 (National Police) and 42 (SSC))

8.4 SUPREME SECURITY COMMITTEE: EFFICIENCY, SECURITY, AND APPROACHABILITY

The following subsection presents perceptions of the efficiency, corruption, contributions to security, and approachability of the SSC in comparison with the National Police. Overall, the National Police are perceived as more effective, slightly less corrupt, more approachable, as well as making a stronger contribution to security, although regional differences exist, particularly with regard to the perceptions of corruption.

8.4.1 Efficiency

In Tripoli, 27% believed the SSC are effective, a similar result to the 23% scored by the National Police (see Figure 40 below). This is the highest appreciation overall for the SSC seen across Libya. This is logical, as the SSC have a stronger presence and are better organized in the West and in Tripoli in particular. However, the survey was unable to differentiate between SSC and SSCT, although the SSCT are believed to account for most of the positive perception. The SSCT enjoys a positive relationship with the Ministry of Interior, and is cautious to foster a positive image regarding their contributions to order and security. The SSCT has conducted a number of ceremonies to hand over prisons, military bases and weapons to the National Police, and has promised to dismantle the SSC by the end of the year.⁸⁸ Due to their efforts to remain neutral during clashes between other militias (such as the fighting between Zintan and Abu Salim’s Ghnewa brigades) or during political disputes, the SSCT has developed to some extent a reputation as being an objective and fair security body at a Tripoli-level.

Despite Misrata being another stronghold for the SSC, the National Police are perceived by Misratans as being more efficient in this Western city. It may be the case that the popularity of revolutionary brigades is overestimated in Misrata, as more and more are implicated in criminal activities and public disorder, or that Misratans find it hard to distinguish between the two groups as they often share cars, uniforms and

⁸⁸ ‘Being Hashim Bishr’, Libya Herald, June 10th, 2013

offices. A Shura Council member interviewed by the field team explained that the SSC had effectively been dismantled in Misrata, which would understandably lead to lowered efficiency.




Figure 40 - Percentage of Libyans who definitely believe that the following groups are effective (by location, n=2302)

8.4.2 Contributions to Security

The National Police were generally seen as contributing more to security than the SSC, with the exception of the southern region of the country (see Figure 41 below). Indeed, in the East the National Police were seen as more effective by a significant margin, with 68% of Libyans in the East claiming that the National Police contribute ‘definitely’ or ‘somewhat’ to security, compared to 48% who believe the same for the SSC. This is most likely because the SSC are a product of Tripoli and the West, and that the political identities and motivations of certain SSC members might be, in some cases, a source of division. In some areas that were reluctant to join the revolution and where security today is provided by SSC brigades, there is a general discontent towards SSC units. For example, when a Zintani brigade launched an assault on the SSC base in Abu Salim neighborhood in Tripoli late June, many young men from the area joined the attackers to dislodge the SSC Ghneiwa brigade.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Abu Salim Media Channel, https://www.facebook.com/AbuSalim.media.channe?hc_location=timeline




Figure 41 - Do you think the SSC contribute to security? (by location, n=2302)

In major cities, the perception that the National Police contribute more to security than the SSC prevails, although the opposite tendency exists in the South. Indeed, for Libyans originating from ethnic minorities or tribal communities, trust in the National Police’s contribution to security is limited due to the persecution they were subject to under the former regime.⁹⁰ Indeed, over recent decades, the Tebu and local Arab tribes were marginalized to the benefit of newly settled tribes (Gadhadfa and Warfallah), which has created a general distrust towards state institutions. Thus, the decentralized organization of the SSC might appear as a more attractive solution for security as it allows southerners to manage their own security. Indeed, Tebu SSC brigades have been created in certain localities as revealed by PIs conducted in Sabha and Murzuq. Some interviewees in Murzuq expressed their refusal to see policemen from outside the area.




Figure 42 - Percentage of Libyans who definitely believe that the following groups contribute to security (by location, n=2302)

⁹⁰ 6 out of 23 Touareg respondents claimed they did ‘not really’ believe that the National Police contributed to security, a significantly higher percentage than other ethnic groups.

8.4.3 Approachability

37% of Libyans believe that the National Police are ‘definitely’ approachable, compared to 27% who believe the same for the SSC (see Figure 43 below). This result is likely because the National Police is less politicized and more inclined to interact fairly and objectively with all Libyans. Furthermore, despite that SSC members outnumber the National Police, the SSC’s presence is concentrated in several key locations (Tripoli, Misrata, etc.), whereas the National Police is more spread out across the entire country.




Figure 43 - Do you think the SSC are approachable? (by location, n=2302)




Figure 44 - Percentage of Libyans who definitely believe that the following groups are approachable (by location, n=2302)

8.4.4 Merging the SSC with the National Police

On several occasions, the Libyan government has announced plans to disband the SSC and to integrate former members into the National Police on an individual basis. Although this plan has yet to be executed, only 54% of males and 27% of females were aware of this. In Sabha, only 32% of residents were aware of the plan, most likely due to poor media coverage and poor government communications in the South (see Figure 44 below).

Nevertheless, a large majority of Libyans would support disbanding the SSC and merging it into the National Police if the government chose to do so (see Figure 45 below). Support drops to 62% in Misrata, a revolutionary stronghold, but climbs to 75% in Benghazi. The proposed reform enjoys stronger support in Benghazi for several reasons; that the SSC is a creation of western Libya, that residents of Benghazi favour official security actors such as the National Police and National Army (a tendency common to most districts in the East), and that the proposal was being driven forward by the former Minister of the Interior Ashur Shweil, a popular former police official from Benghazi.




Figure 45 – Percentage of participants who said they were aware of the government’s plan to merge the SSC in the National Police (by gender and location, n=2302)




Figure 46 – Would you approve of disbanding the SSC and merging it into the National Police? (by gender and location, n=2302)

Almost 50% of Libyans would like to see the SSC integrated into the police within a maximum time frame of one month. The fact that such a significant percentage of Libyans feel that the proposed integration should happen so quickly shows that the required reforms are perceived as very urgent. Again, Libyans from the East of the country are the most eager to see the SSC disbanded and integrated into the National Police, although this sentiment is strong across the entire country. It worth noting that 51% of Libyans answered ‘yes, somewhat’ in comparison to only 18% who said ‘yes, definitely’. These results reflect a serious unease about a potential security vacuum. Indeed, most PIs, except some of those conducted in Misrata, expressed a wide support to the plan of integrating the SSC into the National Police on an individual basis, while highlighting the necessity to reinforce the latter in parallel or as a priority. In some

locations, such as in Sirte, Bani Walid or Murzuq, the National Police are absent and need to be deployed before disbanding any competing semi- or un-official security actors.




Figure 47 - Within what period of time should the SSC be disbanded? (by location, n=2302)

8.5 THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY IN PREVENTING CRIME

Only a small percentage (5%) of Libyans believe that their community is doing a ‘very good’ job at preventing crime (see Figure 48 below). Communities may have difficulties preventing crime due to the emergence of a number of new security actors such as brigades, politicians, and former opponents of the old regime who have returned from exile, which may well have disrupted traditional social cohesion.

In addition to new security actors, a generational gap is emerging between youth who have played a major role in the revolution and who are increasingly exposed to the outside world, and older community members. The gap between young and old becomes clear through perceptions of communities’ abilities to police themselves:

In Sirte, for example, young men described the city as very unsafe, decrying the community’s efforts as insufficient to provide security, while their elders praised the tribal leaders for their role in maintaining security. The national survey reinforced the version given by young men interviewed in Sirte, with 44% of locals estimating the community’s role in preventing crime is rather bad, in comparison with only 34% of total positive answers (‘very good’ or ‘rather good’). Furthermore, several incidents were reported in June, including clashes at University of Sirte between competing tribes left two dead and 15 injured.⁹¹ The lack of capacity and legitimacy of local tribes to provide security encouraged some radical groups from outside Sirte, affiliated to Ansar Al Sharia, to settle back in the city starting in June, where they made a public declaration later in the same month.⁹²

In Kufra, a similar situation exists to some extent, as 26% of the population estimated that the community played a ‘rather bad’ role. This result is high if the importance of local and tribal identity in the South is

⁹¹ Phone Interview conducted with local residents in Sirte, June 2013.

⁹² Ibid.

considered. Indeed, tribal clashes were identified as a main cause of insecurity by 13% of the population in Sabha (see Chapter 5). This tendency was confirmed by PIs in Sabha and Murzuq where some interviewees, in spite of recognizing the community’s role in maintaining social order, pointed out their responsibility for the instability.

Fieldwork in Bani Walid indicated that petty crimes committed by young males were particularly prevalent in the city, indicating that social cohesiveness and social bounds are no longer sufficient to control a generation that seems eager to break social order after having toppled the previous regime. A local notable explained that ‘this state of affairs could soon see minor problems being transformed into major contentions between tribes and families. Furthermore, some cases of felony crimes are on hold until the return of the police.’




Figure 48 - How would you evaluate the community's role in preventing crime? (by location, n=2302)

9 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

In this section, general attitudes towards justice are presented in order to provide an overview of the perceived local and national justice context. Attitudes towards the justice system are divided into four categories, detailing perceptions of the justice system as a whole, judges, Shari'a law, justice providers, and finally the top priorities for the Ministry of Justice.

This section shows that the Libyan justice landscape mainly consists of the state justice system, although alternative sources of justice exist despite their relatively low popularity. This lack of serious alternatives explains why the state appears as the preferred justice provider for Libyans. Yet, despite strong allegiances to the official justice system, Libyans are very critical of its poor performance and do not trust the system as a whole. Similarly, judges are seen as moderately effective but significantly dependent on external forces such as brigades to exercise their job and ensure their protection. This subsection further shows that Libyans have nuanced views concerning the future of judges active under Ghadaffi, as the majority of Libyans are in favor of trial and rehabilitation (training) of former judges rather than total exclusion from the judicial system.

As a result, Libyans would like the Ministry of Justice to take strong measures to improve the justice system. In this aspect, compliance with Islamic values and the trial of former regime officials appeared to be vectors of legitimacy to improve perceptions of the justice system and allow the Ministry of Justice to implement reforms more smoothly.

9.1 PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The following subsection examines the effectiveness, integrity and accessibility of the justice system.

9.1.1 Effectiveness of the Justice System

When asked to evaluate the effectiveness of their justice system, 52% of Libyans stated that it was not effective. This general lack of trust in the workings of official justice is slightly more visible in the East, where up to 54% consider it as ineffective.

The causes of these negative perceptions are manifold. First, these are likely due to a systematic impoverishment of the judiciary under the former regime. Judges and lawyers were underpaid and subject to important political pressures. Second, the incompetence of the administrative apparatus is slowing legal procedure, rendering legal work extremely heavy and slow. Since the uprising, the justice system has been completely paralyzed. Despite a return to normal in Tripoli, the judiciary remains vulnerable to all types of political and security pressures as it is unable to provide for its own security and lacks the means to enforce its decisions⁹³. The Judicial Police, in spite of the government's efforts, are unable to provide protection for the judiciary. The killing of a Judicial Police officer and prison commander in Tripoli on June 25th is likely to deepen the sentiment of vulnerability⁹⁴.

⁹³ International Legal Assistance Consortium 'Report Libya 2013', May 2013, Page 7.

⁹⁴ 'Assassination of Romi Prison Commander in Tripoli', Al Watan newspaper, June 25th 2013.




Figure 49 - Do you think the justice system is effective? (by location, n=2302)

9.1.2 Integrity of the Justice System

Survey respondents were asked to what extent their justice system was corrupt. Overall, there seems to be an association between inefficiency and corruption of the Libyan justice system as results for both questions broadly coincide. More than half of the Libyans interviewed believe their justice system is 'definitely' to 'somewhat' corrupt.

Disaggregating by region, it is clear that the justice system is seen as particularly corrupt in the East of the country, as 63% considers justice is corrupted in this region. This is likely due to greater involvement of tribal politics in judiciary affairs in Eastern Libya. Tellingly, 22% of Libyans could not answer this question. This might be the result of a general lack of knowledge and interest in the public justice system, a finding confirmed through qualitative interviews in the field. Indeed, many interviewees, especially among women and younger generation confessed having no background on the subject.




Figure 50 - Do you think the justice system is corrupt? (by location, n=2302)

9.1.3 Accessibility of the Justice System

Survey respondents were then asked if they thought their justice system was approachable. Results vary in terms of gender and location. Disaggregating by gender, it is interesting to note that more male Libyans find their justice system 'definitely' approachable (25%) than females (16%). This gap is best explained by

the conservative values of Libyan society. A 19 year female old student at Misrata University explained that she had ‘no background regarding the justice system. As required by our societal values, I would refer to my family before going to the justice system.’

Different cities have different perceptions of the accessibility of the justice system. Differences are most striking between Benghazi and Misrata, as 26% of Libyans in Benghazi find their justice system definitely approachable against only 16% of Misratans. This might be due to the fact that the justice system in Benghazi, which was liberated in a short period of time, was less effected by the revolution, in contrast to the justice system in Misrata. Further, the control of revolutionary brigades over public life in Misrata may have altered access to justice in general, notably since they have controlled the Local Civil Council following February 2012 elections.⁹⁵




Figure 51 - Do you think the justice system is approachable? (by location, n=2302)

9.2 PERCEPTIONS OF JUDGES

The following subsection examines perceptions of judges’ effectiveness, independence as well as the attitudes towards their future in the justice system.

9.2.1 Effectiveness of Judges

Overall, 40% Libyans tend to think that judges are ‘somewhat’ to ‘definitely’ effective. However, this percentage drops to 22% among persons whose revenues exceed 2501 Libyan Dinars. This may be due to the fact that richer Libyans are generally more involved in civil pursuits than criminal ones. Indeed, due to a heavy administrative apparatus and a continuous implication of politics in civil pursuits, civil and commercial cases often take a long period of time to be resolved and tend to be subject to corruption. According to a key Informant interviewed in Tripoli late March: ‘this reality had side effects as some land owners dispossessed by Ghadaffi referred to armed groups to recover their rights by force instead of referring to a justice system where cases would last for ages’

⁹⁵ KII with an International Researcher on Libya conducted Tripoli, April 2013.




Figure 52 - Do you think that judges in Libya are effective? (by income, n=2302)

9.2.2 Independence of Judges

More than 40% Libyans believed judges are ‘somewhat’ to ‘definitely’ under the control of brigades (unofficial and semi-official security actors), although small variations can be observed across the Libyan territory. In Benghazi and the East, the share of positive responses is notably higher, with 46% of positive responses against 40% in the West and 38% the South. This is likely due to the fact judges have been targeted by assassination attempts in the East during the research period, a situation that might have incited judges to seek protection with the brigades, as the state is not able to offer them the basic protection they need. To cite but one example, on June 2013, the President of the Appeals Court of Darna was assassinated in front of the local courthouse on June 18th.⁹⁶ The situation is no better in the rest of the country. It is interesting to note that Misrata judges were perceived to be the least controlled by brigades, even though the city is host to the largest number of brigades.

⁹⁶ ‘Lawyers slam ‘alarming’ growth of attacks on judiciary’, Libya Herald, June 19th 2013.




Figure 53 - Do you think that judges in Libya are under the control of the brigades? (n=2302)

9.2.3 Future of Judges

Survey respondents were asked what treatment should be applied to judges active under the Ghadaffi regime. Survey respondents overall have very nuanced positions. 36% believe that ‘only those who sentenced opponents and revolutionaries should be excluded’, 14% believe that judges ‘should be inspected by the Integrity Commission’ and 12% that they ‘should be trained’. Only 12% of the population seems to support collective punishment.

Perceptions of the future of judges vary across cities. Attitudes towards judges’ future in post-revolutionary Libya are most moderate in Benghazi. While severe in their perception toward the judiciary, Benghazi residents seem rather more clement with state officials, a significant number of whom joined the revolution in its early days.⁹⁷ In other terms, Benghazi seems to be less determined to topple all the persons who composed the former justice or police systems, a finding reinforced by their lukewarm opinion towards the Isolation Law. Misratians are less clement with their judges, as 16% support collective punishment (‘all of them should be tried’ or ‘all of them should be excluded’).

⁹⁷ KII with a Benghazi-based lawyer, Tripoli 2013.




Figure 54 - What do you think should happen to judges in Libya? (by location, n=2302)

9.3 PERCEPTIONS OF SHARIA LAW

When asked whether Libyan law was compliant with Sharia law, more than 60% believed that Libyan law was ‘somewhat’ to ‘definitely’ in conformity with Sharia law, although results vary substantially across locations. While 41% of Tripoli residents acknowledged Libyan law is ‘definitely’ compliant with Sharia law, this percentage drops to 21% in Misrata. This was likely due to Tripoli residents being generally perceived as less conservative than Misratians. Indeed, fieldwork in Misrata suggested that political legitimacy in this city derives from a tight combination of revolutionary and religious affiliations. For instance, some of Misrata’s main revolutionary brigades are affiliated to Salafi-Jihadi trend, as is the case for Al Faruk brigade.⁹⁸

Finally, 53% of Libyans had no strong opinion about how compliant their law was with Sharia law. As the country is slowly moving towards drafting its new constitution and debates over compliance with Sharia law are expected, data suggests that Libyan public opinion is likely to remain volatile on this issue.

⁹⁸ ‘Libyan Islamists Unpacked’, Omar Ashour, Brookings Doha Center, May 2012.




Figure 55 - Do you think that Libyan law is compliant with Shari'a law? (by location, n=2302)

9.4 PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE PROVIDERS

This subsection examines the preferred justice providers for Libyans and their motives for choosing a given recourse to justice. It shows that if Libyans were to be victims of crimes, they would first and foremost turn to the state justice system to seek justice. This subsection further highlights younger generations' reluctance to resort to formal state institutions as opposed to older ones. Finally, Libyans mainly chose to resort to state justice and tribal elders out of feelings of trust and fairness for both systems.

9.4.1 Preferred Justice Providers

When asked where they would go to seek justice if they were victims of crimes, a vast majority of Libyans said they would first resort to the state justice system (see Figure 56 below). This wide endorsement of the state judiciary is reinforced by the absence of any strong alternative or competing justice system for Libyans to turn to in case of a crime, such as tribal leaders, local councils or religious notables. Indeed, 14% affirmed they would resort to 'no one' in the case of crime. This is followed by 'tribal leaders', although only 6 to 8% of Libyans rely on them to seek justice. PI respondents often explained that they would choose the state justice system as their justice provider because they feel 'it is the right thing to do', although they acknowledge it might not be the most efficient way to seek justice. Omar, a 52 year old man from Tajura, explained: 'even though I know that the state justice system lacks competence and takes much longer than referring to family or friends for a case to be solved, I would go to the state justice system. I believe that it is the right thing to do.'

Preferences for justice providers do not vary much depending on the type of crime considered. While 60% of Libyans would refer to the state justice system in the case of a crime, this percentage decreases only slightly when it comes to sexual crimes or harassment. This slight decrease is likely explained by the conservative nature of Libyan society and a reluctance to evoke sexual crimes in the public sphere.

The strong reliance on the state justice system points to the great responsibility lying in the hands of the Libyan state. As there are no competing justice systems, a collapse of the state justice system would very likely create a vacuum that traditional tribal and local structures would hardly be able to fill. Even in very traditional cities such as Bani Walid, where tribal councils play a considerable role, residents complain

they are still waiting for the state to do justice on behalf of the victims of crimes committed during and after the revolution. As explained by a local notable from Bani Walid ‘our tribal system has reached in its limits. We are waiting for the justice system to react and to solve these issues. In the meantime, each community seeks to protect itself by its own means.’ In Bani Walid, the killings committed during the different episodes of the conflict are still fuelling tensions and preventing a return to normal life.⁹⁹

In Benghazi, the traditional system seems to have reached its limits as well. In early 2013, tribes signed an agreement with each other that stipulates that the latter will not offer impunity to their members in case they are involved in murder cases. This agreement came about because tribes have been increasingly unable to control their members, notably those enjoying the support of new actors such as revolutionary brigades or political parties. Due to an increase in incidents of murder, tribes who sought to protect their own members suspected of murder put themselves at risk of reprisals and confrontation with the tribes of the victims.¹⁰⁰

Facing this general state of impunity and the incapacity of traditional social structures to face this threat, the state needs to act urgently and reactivate the state justice system to arrest and punish criminals.




Figure 56 - Who would you go to seek justice if you were the victim of the following crime? (n=2302)

When disaggregating by age groups, it is interesting to note that elders (above 55 years of age) were slightly more inclined to refer to the state justice system than younger generations. This is likely due to the fact that elders were more accustomed to the institutions of the old regime. The slight reluctance of younger generations to resort to the official justice system is indicative of a general distrust in institutions, especially those inherited from the old regime. Field research also revealed a general lack of interest in the problems related to the justice system among young male and female PI respondents, as number of them expressed no interest in answering this question.

⁹⁹ PIs and KIs conducted in Bani Walid, May 2013.

¹⁰⁰ PIs conducted in Ajdabiyah and Benghazi, June 2013.




Figure 57 - Percentage of Libyans who said they would go to the state justice system for the following crimes (by age group, n=2302)

Many of those who reported they would go to tribal leaders in case of crime were located in the South, followed by the East and the West. These variations are due to the different social structures in these regions and the relative weight of tribes in public affairs. Libyans from the West refer less to tribal leaders, likely due to a highly urbanized landscape, whereas the South is likely more reliant on tribal leaders due to the prominence of tribes in Southern Libya.

In the East, PIs conducted in Al Bayda revealed that in the case of a land ownership dispute, residents would refer to tribes as they do not possess official documents asserting their ownership of property, and ‘tribal leaders know very well and in detail each person or family’s property.’¹⁰¹




Figure 58 - Percentage of Libyans who said they would go to tribal leaders for the following crimes (by region, n=2302)

¹⁰¹ PIs conducted in Al Bayda, June 2013.

9.4.2 Motivations for Referring to Justice Providers

When asked about their reasons for choosing the state justice system as their preferred justice provider in case of crime, 42% said it was because it was 'trustable'. For an additional 39%, the fairness of the state system was the main reason why they would turn to it, while 36% would choose the state justice system because they could not rely on anyone else. Only 20% of Libyans would refer to the state justice system for its speed and quickness in resolving disputes. Along with the 52% of Libyans who believe that the justice system is 'not really' or 'not at all' efficient, this finding confirms the overall lack of efficacy perceived by Libyans.

Nevertheless, variations can be observed across regions and locations. Trust matters more in Sabha (50%) than in Tripoli (42%), Benghazi (37%), and Misrata (35%). Perceived fairness, on the other hand, is the primary reason why Misratis refer to the state justice system (57%), compared to between 32% and 34% of Libyans from the other three main cities. While trust and fairness are important for many Libyans, 48% and 45% of Libyans from Misrata and Sabha also reported that they turned to the state for justice as they had no one else they could rely on, despite the existence of tribal councils, local notables, and civil councils in both cities. Furthermore, 19% of Misratis explained that they referred to the state justice system because it was otherwise impossible to get justice, a significantly larger percentage than the other three cities. In Sabha 17% and 14% of residents said they would turn to the state justice due to proximity and personal connection, respectively, illustrating the importance of local relationships in Sabha when accessing justice.

The table below summarizes expressed motivations for resorting to the state justice system to seek justice, with highest levels of approbation within each segment of the population shown in dark green and the lowest in light green.

	Sabha	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata	West	South	East	Libya
Trustworthy	50%	42%	37%	35%	43%	40%	39%	42%
Fair	32%	34%	32%	57%	41%	27%	36%	39%
Nobody else that I can rely on	45%	34%	40%	48%	37%	36%	35%	36%
Quick	18%	19%	15%	18%	21%	18%	19%	20%
Cheap	23%	8%	27%	16%	16%	32%	24%	19%
Other	7%	12%	9%	6%	8%	4%	7%	8%
Impossible to get justice	9%	7%	6%	19%	7%	5%	6%	7%
Knowledge of the local context	3%	4%	2%	7%	6%	3%	4%	5%
Near by	2%	4%	1%	4%	4%	17%	3%	4%
Refused to answer	4%	5%	3%	2%	4%	2%	3%	4%
Personal connection	3%	1%	2%	3%	3%	14%	3%	4%
Don't know	0%	3%	3%	3%	4%	2%	2%	3%
Not big enough to take to the government	2%	1%	4%	3%	2%	4%	2%	2%

Table 8 - Why would you go to the State Justice System to seek justice in the case of murder? (by location, multiple responses possible, n=2302)

When asked why they would refer to tribal elders in case of murder, 52% of Libyans said it was because they are 'trustworthy', and 39% because they are 'cheap' and 'fair'. 'Knowledge of the local context' ranked fourth on this metric, with 24% of Libyans.

Significant variations can be observed across locations. In the South, 79% affirm that tribal elders are their preferred justice provider because they are 'trustworthy'. This is likely due to the prominence of tribes in the South and the deeply rooted traditions that prevail in this area. It is interesting to note that in the East, where tribal presence is stronger, this percentage drops to 44% against 54% in the West. This result might be related to what has been explained in Chapter 8 in the section on the community's role in preventing crime, where tribal leaders involvement in providing justice appears to have reached some limits facing the rise of new social actors since the revolution.

It is also worth noting that in Tripoli, 34% of those who would refer to tribal elders are motivated by the fact elders have a better 'knowledge of the local context.' Although this might appear surprising for the urban center of the country, there are still a number of neighborhoods composed of homogenous communities originating from the same village or city (Gharyan, Zintan, Misrata, etc.). A tribal elder might be aware of these specific rural traditions, whereas a judge would ignore them.

Costs is one of the main drivers of reliance on tribal elders for justice in Tripoli and Benghazi, whereas in Misrata and Sabha the fairness of tribal elders is more important. 27% of the population who would refer to tribal elders in Sabha is motivated by low costs. However, this percentage climbs up to 68% in the South. PIs conducted in Murzuq have not revealed any explanation, although it could be due to lower incomes in desert regions and the high costs of long distance travels. The table below summarizes reported motivations for resorting to local elders to seek justice, with highest levels of approbation within each segment of the population shown in dark green and the lowest in light green.

	Sabha	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata	South	West	East	Libya
Trustworthy	75%	66%	63%	52%	79%	54%	44%	52%
Cheap	27%	52%	49%	32%	68%	50%	22%	39%
Fair	43%	19%	26%	40%	24%	32%	49%	39%
Knowledge of the local context	11%	34%	29%	18%	18%	26%	24%	24%
Near by	40%	13%	20%	18%	42%	24%	19%	24%
Don't know	0%	0%	25%	18%	11%	12%	26%	18%
Quick	17%	13%	22%	18%	20%	17%	11%	15%
Personal connection	5%	7%	10%	14%	4%	9%	6%	7%
Nobody else that I can rely on	11%	8%	5%	4%	2%	8%	1%	4%
Other	10%	7%	3%	0%	1%	4%	2%	3%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	5%	2%
Impossible to get justice	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	5%	2%
Not big enough to take to the government	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%

Table 9 - Why would you go to Tribal Elders to seek justice in the case of murder? (by location, multiple responses possible, n=2302)

10 CURRENT ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

This chapter aims to assess the general attitudes of Libyans towards government security and justice policies, tries to identify two or three key reforms that might reinforce its popularity, and concludes with a discussion of ‘top priorities’ for the Ministries of Interior and Justice, as reported by Libyans.

10.1 GENERAL SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES

The support for the government is rather mitigated when it comes to its security policies. Only 26% of Libyans consider that the government is ‘definitely’ handling security in a good way. This is due to high expectations of Libyans with regards to the government, which delivered a number of promises concerning security that are hardly fulfilled today.

Based on findings during fieldwork, the general impression is that Libyans support the political line adopted by the Executive branch, but are still eager to see the first results of these policies. The level of public patience towards the government is undoubtedly starting to decline. This state of mind is reflected by the 51% of Libyans who are relatively undecided (‘Yes, somewhat’:30% and ‘No, not really’: 21%). Any future improvements to the security situation would require concrete and visible actions to address the skepticism of these ‘middle ground’ Libyans.




Figure 59 - Do you think that the government is handling security in a good way? (by gender and location, n=2302)

Overall, a strong majority (68%) of Libyans believed that the justice system is becoming more democratic, transparent and fair. This positive feedback is likely related to multiple reforms that have been voted by the NTC and the actual minister of Justice (see Chapter 4). It is also explained by Libyans’ aspiration to see their justice system become more reliable. An interviewee in Tajura put it this way: ‘If I were a victim of a crime, I would go to the state justice system because I believe that it is the right thing to do even though I know that I have little chance to recover my rights.’¹⁰²

¹⁰² PI conducted in Tajura, June 2013




Figure 2 - Do you think the justice system is becoming more transparent, democratic and fair? (by location, n=2302)

Similarly, the government’s plan to install CCTV across all cities in Libya garners massive support from Libyans. Such strong support demonstrates the willingness and desire of Libyans to accept concrete, visible reforms aimed at improving the tenuous security situation across the country.




Figure 3 - Do you agree with the government's plan to install CCTV across all cities? (by location, n=2302)

10.2 TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

10.2.1 Perceptions of Top Priorities

When asked about the top priority for the Ministry of Interior, Libyans generally agreed spontaneously on two essential issues that need to be addressed: the removal of arms from the streets and the reconstruction of police forces.

41% of Libyans considered that the Ministry of Interior’s top priority should be the removal of arms in the street. This result matches with the fieldwork findings, as arms proliferation was consistently identified as the main source of insecurity. Furthermore, all the police officers interviewed during this research affirmed that arms proliferation was the main cause of their inefficiency, and said they could not chase criminals because they are outgunned.

35% of Libyans identified the reconstruction of police forces as a top priority for the Ministry of Interior. Even in Misrata, where up to 76% said that the police have improved over the last six months, the population prioritizes the reconstruction of the police forces and the removal of arms from the streets. This shows that the police are not perceived yet as fully effective and that the current security actors are not providing sufficient security.

Notably, arresting those suspected of committing crimes under the Ghadaffi regime, and merging semi-official and unofficial brigades into the National Police are perceived as much lesser priorities for the Ministry of Interior.




Figure 60 - What do you think should be the Ministry of Interior's top priority? (by gender and location, unprompted, n=2302)

10.2.2 Top Priority for the National Police

When asked what the top priority of the National Police should be, 20% of Libyans spontaneously reported that 'enforcing the law' should be the police's main concern (see Figure 61 below). This implies that Libyans are not satisfied with the way the law is enforced as of today and would like the National Police to fully ensure its law enforcement functions. 'Clearing the *munteqa* (area) from armed gangs', 'replacing revolutionaries in policing tasks' and 'disbanding local armed groups' account for more than 20% of total responses. In other terms, one in five Libyans believes that the top priority for the police should be to confront different armed groups and to replace informal security actors where necessary.

Interestingly, with only 2% of responses, very few Libyans consider supporting revolutionary brigades as a policing priority. As the revolution becomes more distant, new fault lines have emerged to which the population is clearly demanding responses linked to the reconstruction of the state and the rebuilding of a National Police and a National Army, rather than supporting other revolutionary claims.




Figure 61 - What do you think should be the top priority for the National Police? (n=2302; unprompted)

10.3 TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

This subsection examines Libyans’ perceptions of the top priorities for the Ministry of Justice, and assesses their perceptions of the Ministry’s decision to transfer Libyan prisons under state control. It shows that across all locations, the application of the law and its conformity to Islamic values is critically important. While Southern Libya favors a stricter application of sharia law, the East and the West would prefer to see symbolic trials in order to turn the page of the revolution and move forward. The findings presented below further highlight Libyans’ general endorsement of Ministry of Justice’s decision to transfer the control of prisons to the state.

10.3.1 Perceptions of Top Priorities

When Libyans were asked about the Ministry of Justice’s top priorities, 28% believed that ‘applying the law in a way that is compliant with Islamic values’ should be the main concern of the Ministry. This was followed by the desire to ‘try formal officials’ (20%) and provide ‘training and support to judges and lawyers’ (18%). The exclusion of judges who worked under Ghadaffi does not seem to be a priority, with only 3% of Libyans explaining that exclusion should be a top priority for the Ministry of Justice.

Perceptions of top priorities for the Ministry of Justice vary across location and broadly align with attitudes towards Sharia law assessed above. Sabha and Misrata saw the application of the Sharia law as a priority in more significant proportions. This is likely due to the more conservative tribal values in Sabha as well as the fear of being subject to foreign values imported by ‘illegal migrants’ as reported in Murzuq during fieldwork. PIs conducted in Sabha and Murzuq confirmed serious concerns about ‘thousands of migrants arriving every day’. Furthermore, migrants were accused of smuggling drugs and alcohol.¹⁰³ In Misrata it seems that the promotion of new elites involved in the revolution is reinforcing the prominence of religious values, as the city itself has no reputation for being particularly conservative. Newly established political elites commonly use religious references, and in some cases belong to parties with Islamic

¹⁰³ PIs conducted in Sabha and Murzuq, June 2013

tendencies. Prominent figures representing Misrata at the GNC (Salah Badi) and heads of brigades and MRU belong to the Salafi spectrum.¹⁰⁴

Interestingly, Benghazi and Tripoli residents are more likely to ask the Ministry of Justice to try former regime officials than Libyans from the revolutionary stronghold of Misrata. This is likely due to the fact Misratan Courts have already started to try former regime officials, which is not the case in other cities. The Court of Appeals of Tripoli has postponed in June the trial of Abdullah Al Senosy to August 2013. Meanwhile, its counterpart in Misrata has already sentenced to life imprisonment one of the regime former officials.¹⁰⁵ As noted by a local brigade member interviewed in Tajura: ‘people and combatants need symbolic trials to satiate their desire of vengeance. But even that, the government does not seem able to provide it.’¹⁰⁶




Figure 62 - What should be the Ministry of Justice's top priority? (by location, n=2302)

10.3.2 Attitudes towards the Ministry of Justice's Prison Reform

Libyans were very favorable towards the decision of the Ministry of Justice to transfer the control of prisons to the state, as 76% reported they ‘definitely’ agree with the measure. Nevertheless, fieldwork suggested a great level of confusion in some cities, where PI respondents thought the state was already in charge of prison control. In Misrata for instance, many locals believed prisons are already under government control, while they are under the MRU, which operates under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and has a mandate of Judicial Police. A Shura Council member in Misrata once expressed his full support to the reform while adding that prisons were according to him already under state control. Further fieldwork observations showed that a great number of Misratis would like to set conditions for

¹⁰⁴ German Institute For International and Security Affairs, ‘Fault Lines of the Revolution’, May 2013, P.14

¹⁰⁵ Al Manara Newspaper, Facebook page, June 26th, 2013. [Al Manara Newspaper Facebook Page](#)

¹⁰⁶ KII conducted in Tajura, May 2013.

the transfer of prisons. As mentioned by a PI respondent, Misratis agree with handing over prisons to the judiciary police, but only 'if the latter is strictly composed of young men from Misrata. We don't trust the others as relations between cities have been deteriorating in the aftermath of the revolution'. In late June 2013, the head of competing brigade from Zintan publically accused Misratan brigades of running secret prisons.¹⁰⁷




Figure 63 - Do you agree with Ministry of Justice's decision to transfer control of prisons to state control? (by location, n=2302)

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Libya Douwaliya (International).

11 CONCLUSIONS

The section below summarizes key findings from the main body of the report and identifies areas of opportunity and risks based on these key findings. Finally recommendations are provided to address these risks and opportunities.

11.1 KEY FINDINGS

11.1.1 Perceptions of Security

The security situation in the South appears to be very poor and volatile in comparison with other regions of the country. In Sabha, 27% of the population said the security situation was ‘very bad,’ a relatively high figure compared to most other districts. This perception is even more serious in other southern districts such as Ubari and Murzuq, where 55% and 45% perceive the security situation as ‘very bad’ or ‘rather bad’, respectively. Further, 64% of Libyans from the South expressed concern about moving around their area by night, a significantly higher percentage than the West or the East.

Younger Libyans tend to be more pessimistic about the security situation. 52% of Libyans aged 16 to 24 consider that the security situation was better before the revolution compared to 41% of Libyans aged 55 and above. This general pessimism is alarming as the younger generation constitutes the majority of the population, in addition to being the most active and heavily armed.

Libyans tend to feel insecure when they travel by car between cities. This may be due to the rising tensions between cities since the uprising, with many attacks motivated by politics, as confirmed during fieldwork. Criminal activities also seem to be a driver for such concerns, notably in Sabha where such activities peak at 69%. PIs revealed that kidnapping, murders and carjacking were the most common.

Armed individuals and irresponsible or unofficial brigades are considered to be the main source of insecurity in Libya. Even in Misrata, where perceptions of security are better than in other locations and where brigades are supposedly more disciplined and organized, armed individuals are identified as the main cause of insecurity. That the majority of Libyans cite armed individuals as the main cause of security may also mean that the solution of delegating security to brigades has reached its practical limits.

The National Police are widely considered to be the best security provider across the country (cited by 32% of Libyans). Nevertheless, a significant percentage of Libyans also stated that either ‘no one’ was an effective provider of security or that “we” provide our own security, pointing to an alarming security vacuum and the absence of a legitimate security actors. 62% of Libyans believe that the police should close these gaps in security provision and play the main role in enforcing the peace.

11.1.2 Perceptions of Crime

Residents of Tripoli and Misrata believe that their districts are safer than most in the nation, while residents of Benghazi and Sabha are less positive about safety in their districts. 69% and 75% of Tripolitarians and Misratans believe that the crime situation is better in their munteqa than the national average, while this figure drops to less than 50% in Benghazi and Sabha. Fieldwork confirmed that Libyans in Benghazi and Sabha feel that they have been abandoned by the state security apparatus.

A significant percentage of Libyans reported being concerned about becoming a victim of crime, even in relatively safer cities such as Tripoli and Misrata. 27% and 37% of Misratans and Tripolitarians reported that they were very worried about being murdered. In Sabha, almost one resident out of two is very worried about becoming the victim of a crime.

The majority of Libyans believe that the crime situation has improved over the last 6 months, although this perception is less positive in Sabha and Benghazi, reinforcing the sentiment of having been abandoned by the state.

The vast majority of Libyans (80%) believe that more National Police will definitely help to improve the crime situation, compared to 36 and 22% who believe that more SSC and more brigades will help.

11.1.3 Attitudes towards the Police

Libyans interact more often with the National Police more than any other security body, including the SSC, the sole exception being Libyans from Misrata. This confirms the increasing presence of the National Police, as well as their role as preferred interlocutor as a security provider. The National Police are also seen as more approachable than any other security body.

The top priority for the Ministry of Interior should be the removal of arms from the streets, followed by the reconstruction of police forces. This key finding reinforces the desire of Libyans to see a robust and effective National Police force in charge of security provision. Improving the appearance and training more respectful police officials are the key changes necessary to improving the perception of the police in the eyes of Libyans.

11.1.4 Attitudes towards Semi- and Un-official Security Actors

Individual semi- and un-official security actors are less visible than the National Police, although they are more visible when taken as a whole. The SSC are more present in the West and the LSF in the East.

The degree of visibility and support for independent brigades is low amongst Libyans. Only 16% claim to see independent brigades on a daily basis, relatively low compared to other security actors, and 41% of Libyans believe that they should be fully or partially disbanded.

The majority of Libyans believe that the LSF and the SSC should be integrated into the army or the police. 65% of Libyans support the integration of the LSF into the army, while only 4% believe that they should remain autonomous. Similarly, 51 and 22% of Libyans believe that the SSC should join the police or the army, **while only 5% believe that the SSC should remain autonomous.**

The community's role in preventing crime is seen as globally positive, although very few Libyans see them as strongly helping the local security situation. These results are lower than expected in a country where social, tribal and familial links play a crucial role in dispute resolution. Only 4% of Libyans consider that the community is 'definitely' contributing to crime prevention. The revolution seems to have shaken social structure as well as having toppled a political regime.

11.1.5 Perceptions of the Justice System

More than half of Libyans believe that the justice system is ineffective (52%) and corrupt (56%). These results have been confirmed through fieldwork across the country.

Nevertheless, **the justice system is seen as approachable and accessible**, although in smaller cities and especially those where political and military tensions are high (Bani Walid, Sirte, etc.), the justice system appears to be lagging, notably with regards to criminal cases.

Libyans are moderate in their opinion as to the future of judges, with the most popular approach being to exclude only those who sentenced opponents and revolutionaries (36%). More radical approaches such as trying or excluding all judges were espoused by only 7% and 5% of Libyans respectively.

The majority of Libyans (66%) believe that the law is compliant with Shari'a, although results vary across locations. While 41% of Tripolitarians acknowledge that Libyan law is 'definitely' compliant with Shari'a law, this figure drops to 21% in Misrata, highlighting the more conservative nature of this city. Fieldwork in Misrata suggests that political legitimacy is tied strongly to revolutionary and religious affiliations.

The majority of Libyans (60%) would refer to the state justice system if they were victims of a crime, a finding that is independent of the type of crime, although the second most popular source of justice was 'no one.' It appears that although many Libyans perceive the state judiciary as lacking in efficiency and transparency, the lack of competition from private justice systems (tribal leaders, religious notables, etc.).

11.2 RISKS AND AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY

11.2.1 Risks

The worrying results from southern Libya in terms of the perception of increased crime rates and insecurity point to a **serious risk of general destabilization in the region**, exemplified by the three recent car bombings in late June in Sabha that point to a new scale of violence not seen to date.

The distrust, pessimism and frustration of young Libyans may be the country's most serious risk. Young men in particular are better armed, equipped and more numerous than the majority of the population, but lack access to economic and political opportunities, fueling frustrations, drug use, and extremist tendencies.

Armed individuals have gained political and social influence over elected and other legitimate community and government representatives through the use or the threat of violence. Should these tendencies continue, **they could significantly disrupt other means of access to political influence** such as democratic institutions and civil society.

Travelling between cities was cited as a significant risk by all Libyans, disrupting the ability to travel which could lead to isolating urban centres and communities. Poor security on inter-city roads permits criminal and other security incidents, many of which are politically motivated, **fueling further tensions between different communities and cities.**

The high percentages of Libyans who are very worried about becoming victims of crime indicate a serious need for effective security and justice bodies. **Should the official security providers not step in to fill this gap, more individuals may take security and justice into their own hands, increasing tensions and reprisals.** This gap may also lead to radical brigades and militias enforcing their own brand of justice and security, such as in Sirte where Ansar el-Sharia were called back by local tribes to handle security after having been expelled by the same tribes.

11.2.2 Opportunities

The National Police are widely considered as the best provider of national security. The Ministry of Interior could thus identify areas where the police are popular and respected in order to develop best practices elsewhere.

The majority of Libyans believed that the crime situation has improved over the past 6 months. The government should examine areas where security has improved significantly and isolate factors of success, to be repeated and encouraged in less secure areas.

Libyans prefer the National Police to any other competing body. The Ministry of Interior should share these results with police officers in order to rebuild their confidence and show that Libyans trust and look to them for security.

Libyans on the whole do not see that community as an effective provider of security, **potentially creating a space for official security bodies to step in.**

Concrete, symbolic acts such as handing over prisons to judicial police and installing CCTV across Libyan cities garnered massive support amongst Libyans, **indicating that Libyans want to see concrete, real and visible gestures on behalf of the government.**

11.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The government should intervene quickly in localities where several security or military bodies coexist to coordinate and unify their actions under one legal umbrella, with state actors as the main source of authority. Such interventions, done effectively, could also build up trust in the government as a mediator and authority figure, facilitating the ongoing integration of semi-official security bodies such as the SSC and LSF.

The Ministry of Interior should pursue and reinforce its campaigns to collect arms, and should institute a gradual buy-back campaign for armed individuals and members of brigades once the integration process is well under way. Such a campaign should be designed based on the realities and tensions of each district to avoid any clashes or increase in tension.

To reduce crime on a local level, **the Ministry of Interior could institute a community or neighbourhood police,** where a responsible officer is entrusted to work in a specific neighbourhood and engage and build links with local citizens on a daily basis. This could also create an effective means of collecting information on community tensions and issues.

In order to address the threat posed by armed individuals – the main threat to security as perceived by Libyans nationwide – **the Ministry of Justice could engage with heads of brigades and local notables and tribal leaders to identify persons involved in criminal activities.** When armed individuals involved in criminal activities come under the protection of or belong to semi-official and unofficial security bodies, the Ministry should negotiate with the same local leaders in order to remove this protection and prosecute offenders.

The Ministry of Interior could reinforce the Traffic Police, a largely apolitical security body; increasing their visibility would be an appropriate strategy to further reintroduce official security bodies into the security landscape and to increase the visibility of official security bodies in general.

The Ministry of Interior could increase differentiation between official security bodies on one side and unofficial and semi-official security bodies on the other, as the latter are deliberately blurring lines between both groups. Distinct, new uniforms and cars would help to not only improve the appearance of official security bodies, but also help to distinguish them from other semi- and unofficial actors.

The Ministry of Interior could appoint young figures from semi-official revolutionary brigades to positions of importance within the National Police and other official security and justice bodies, based on their qualifications, trustworthiness and future potential. Such promising young individuals should undergo a significant amount of training.

To encourage trust and buy-in from younger generations, **targeted advertising campaigns including success stories of youth recently employed by government agencies** such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice should be implemented.

Concrete, symbolic gestures such as trials of top regime officials who were implicated in serious crimes and handing over control of prisons to official judicial police would go a long way to improve the perception of the justice system. Based on survey results, the vast majority of Libyans are in favour of such reforms, and are increasingly desperate for signs of action and progress from the government.

12 ANNEX 1: KEY JUSTICE AND SECURITY INDICATORS

The table below presents a series of key national and regional indicators, designed to help the Ministries of Interior and Justice track progress in security and justice sector reform.

Key National and Regional Indicators		2013		2014	
		Spring	Autumn	Spring	Autumn
1	% Security situation in area is good or very good				
	Nationwide	67%			
	Tripoli	85%			
	Benghazi	62%			
	Misrata	80%			
	Sabha	42%			
2	% National Police are the best security provider				
	Nationwide	32%			
	Tripoli	40%			
	Benghazi	25%			
	Misrata	37%			
	Sabha	31%			
3	% National Police are definitely effective				
	Nationwide	26%			
	Tripoli	24%			
	Benghazi	19%			
	Misrata	35%			
	Sabha	25%			
4	% National police definitely contribute to security				
	Nationwide	32%			
	Tripoli	38%			
	Benghazi	26%			
	Misrata	30%			
	Sabha	17%			
5	% Seeing National Police officer daily				
	Nationwide	54%			
	Tripoli	57%			
	Benghazi	52%			
	Misrata	65%			
	Sabha	46%			
6	% Judges definitely effective				
	Nationwide	15%			
	Tripoli	20%			
	Benghazi	9%			
	Misrata	12%			

	Sabha	13%			
7	% Justice system definitely effective				
	Nationwide	11%			
	Tripoli	11%			
	Benghazi	8%			
	Misrata	11%			
	Sabha	9%			