



**Joint Guidance Note**  
on Integrated Recovery Planning  
using **Post Conflict Needs Assessments**  
and **Transitional Results Frameworks**

United Nations Development Group  
World Bank

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## FOREWORD

### A COMMON INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM FOR POST-CRISIS RECOVERY PLANNING

The onset of peace represents an enormous opportunity for countries which have suffered years of war and marginalization. The people have high expectations of progress - freedom from fear and want, access to education and medical services, government institutions in which they trust.

While many governments of countries emerging from conflict have made efforts to fulfill these expectations, supported by the international community, these processes are fragile – around 50% of all “post” conflict countries fall back into conflict within ten years. Lowering this risk requires a concerted effort to generate jobs and incomes and the kind of accountable institutions which can deliver both security and services to their populations.

The United Nations and the World Bank have worked together for several years in co-coordinating post-conflict needs assessments. This experience has convinced us more than ever of the need for a concerted international response, a truly shared partnership for post-crisis recovery. It has also taught us some lessons – on the need to more closely coordinate political, security, humanitarian and development assistance behind peace-building objectives, on the centrality of national institutional development for a sustainable exit from crisis. Developed in consultation with many partners as well as all parts of the UN system, this paper takes account of those lessons and lays out a revised international platform for post-crisis recovery planning.

In addition to reviewing the lessons of recent post-conflict planning processes (Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia), the paper builds on a number of previous approaches and tools, in particular the first *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations* produced by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in partnership with the UNDG, the World Bank, and UNDP/BCPR; the OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States; and the African Union Framework Document for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

Input from member states across the diplomatic, defense and development areas has been critical to the development of this approach: a series of dedicated workshops in New York with defense and development advisers, as well as sessions at DPKO-hosted workshops in Accra and Ottawa, feedback from members of the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group and a consultation with European Union member states in Brussels were invaluable in this regard. Perspectives of national partners from countries who have undertaken PCNAs were brought in through their active participation in the 2006 PCNA Review and its culminating Validation Workshop. This working draft has also benefited greatly from the contribution of the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme with specific reference to the challenge of statebuilding aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, and from the guidance of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition.

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## ***Acronyms***

CAF	Country Assistance Framework (UN)
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework (World Bank)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
ECHA	UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA)
EU	European Union
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HDI	Human Development Index
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Funds
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination Humanitarian Affairs
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
PBC	Peace-building Commission
PBSO	UN Peace-Building Support Office
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRF/TRM	Transitional Results Framework/Matrix
TSS	Transition Support Strategy
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG(O)	United Nations Development Group (Office)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDP-BCPR	UNDP–Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

# JOINT GUIDANCE NOTE ON INTEGRATED RECOVERY PLANNING USING POST-CONFLICT NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND TRANSITIONAL RESULTS FRAMEWORKS

## I. INTRODUCTION TO THE GUIDANCE NOTE

### Background

1. As a country emerging from conflict engages with the international community, a common platform is needed to identify and focus efforts on key recovery priorities, foster coherence between a multitude of stakeholders, and mobilize human and financial resources. Between 2003 and 2007, the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (Bank) working in partnership co-coordinated six post-conflict needs assessments with this aim<sup>1</sup>. These planning processes were, in most cases, led by national authorities and involved regional institutions, multilateral and bilateral donors.

#### Box 1. What are the PCNA and the TRF?

A Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) maps the terrain of key needs in a country emerging from conflict. The PCNA is usually jointly coordinated by national stakeholders and multilateral agencies. Cluster teams, comprised of national and international technical experts, conduct field and desk assessments, seeking to be comprehensive but recognizing that the reality of the post-conflict context is that data will be incomplete or rudimentary and access to stakeholders and communities may be challenged by logistics and security concerns.

The Transitional Results Framework (TRF) defines the key milestones in the terrain mapped by the PCNA: it lays out a selective group of priority actions and outcomes and their financial implications, and offers a tool that national and international stakeholders use to align efforts to maximize the opportunities for a successful transition and minimize the risk of reversal into violent conflict. Transitional Results Frameworks are an integral part of the OECD-DAC Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and the Paris Declaration on Harmonization.

TRFs are based on five principles: they need to be **simple, selective, integrated across political, security, economic and social aspects of recovery, nationally owned**, and have sufficient **donor buy-in**. They promote the use of outcome indicators and monitorable targets, and therefore function as a management tool for strategic planning and implementation monitoring and an umbrella for donor coordination. TRF indicators focus on results achievable in the short-term, although they may be linked conceptually to expected medium- and long-term efforts to achieve nationalized Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To the extent possible, the monitoring systems and indicators should build on existing systems and data collection efforts.

In this way, the TRF framework becomes a **compact** of joint accountability between country authorities and regional and international partners, which is all the more important in post-conflict countries where an agreed peace-building framework is critical to effective action. By enhancing transparency across the board, TRFs can create incentives to achieve more visible results and provide a basis for participation and domestic scrutiny by a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society and communities.

### Key lessons learned from experience with post-conflict needs assessments

2. In 2006, the UN and Bank reviewed past PCNA processes to identify lessons learned. The review process concluded that PCNAs to date have demonstrated value in providing a baseline of analysis for both national and international actors. They have also been largely successful in generating high international visibility at a crucial stage in various peace processes, resulting in substantial external financing commitments for recovery and reconstruction.

3. However the review also noted that the post-conflict transition efforts in those countries have suffered from:

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<sup>1</sup> Iraq (2003), Liberia (end 2003-early 2004), Haiti (2004), Sudan (2004-2005), Somalia (2005-2006), Darfur (2006)

- a lack of an **agreed overall vision ('storyline')** that sets the strategic direction for **conflict transformation and peace- building**
- **insufficient realism** in the timelines for key recovery outcomes, resulting in **unreasonable expectations** on the part of the population, national leadership and international partners
- **inadequate links** between priorities in the political and security arena and priorities in the economic and social arena;
- **loss of momentum** after the key transition event (peace agreement, international donors conference);
- **insufficient integration of cross-cutting issues;** and
- **insufficient coherence and coordination during post-PCNA implementation.**

#### **Purpose and scope of the Joint Guidance Note**

4. This Joint Guidance Note incorporates the principal lessons of the 2006 review into revised guidance for PCNAs and TRFs. The note seeks to:

- Inform **strategic decision-makers (international and national)** of the purpose, scope, and benefits of this common platform for recovery planning, and how it connects to other critical processes in a post-conflict setting such as the planning of peace-keeping deployments; and
- Guide **technical practitioners – coordinators, sector team leaders, national partners, and donor representatives:** setting the stage for them as they begin work, and introducing the topics addressed in greater detail in the PCNA Toolkit that they will draw upon to fulfill their specific responsibility, depending on the country situation and on their operational role.

5. These guidelines are presented in four sections. The first section introduces the purpose and the target audience of the guidance note, together with a summary of lessons learned from the PCNA review. The second section describes the basic structure for a recommended integrated recovery planning process, drawing on these lessons learned. The third section explores ways to improve the substance of recovery plans, through incorporating a stronger peace-building and state-building focus. The last section suggests ways to improve the process of recovery planning, and outlines critical linkages between the PCNA-TRF and other processes and actors at work in the post-conflict context.

6. This note does not provide detailed operational instructions for the PCNA-TRF – a companion Toolkit provides practical resources, guidance, and tools for teams planning or undertaking a PCNA-TRF. The Toolkit will be regularly updated on-line and made available on CDs, with extended guidance, templates and best practices.

## II. THE BASICS: FOUR KEY ELEMENTS IN RECOVERY PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION

### Timing of recovery planning

7. The guidance note is primarily aimed at situations of initial post-conflict recovery. Recognizing, however, that conflict tends to be cyclical, and that many post-conflict countries go through transitions or periods of set-back which require a re-evaluation of priorities, resource allocation and timelines, the note has been framed as a platform that can accommodate a range of transitions (see box 2). This ensures that the approach is adjustable as needed to accommodate the unique country context and timeline, and maintain appropriate linkages to humanitarian and security planning that may also be underway (see section IV).

#### Box 2: When is recovery planning relevant?

Post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) have primarily been carried out following the signing of a peace agreement (Liberia); post-conflict government transition (Haiti); or in some cases in parallel to a peace process (Sudan). Many post-conflict countries, however, go through several different stages of transition, and the value of recovery planning processes is not limited to the aftermath of long, highly destructive civil wars. This note is therefore flexible on the circumstances where recovery planning may be relevant, accommodating situations where: (i) there is a sudden breakthrough in a peace or political transition process which makes it imperative to have a clear plan and budget to support the process; (ii) a peace or political transition process is at a stage where mediators believe that it would be useful for parties to focus on practical transition planning; (iii) a later transition – for example, from a transitional to an elected government – requires a new process to confirm national priorities; (iv) a political, security, economic or social crisis requires a re-evaluation of priorities and recovery plans.

8. While these criteria help illuminate when recovery planning is particularly relevant, there is no rigid rule on who actually prompts the joint decision to begin a PCNA, or how the decision is taken. Each country-specific situation will have historical, political, and institutional characteristics that give voice to particular national and international actors, and help shape perceptions that the opportunity for a collaborative process exists.

9. The challenges confronting a country emerging from conflict demand that the recovery planning process be “viewed and used as an opportunity for the reconstitution and social, political, economic, and physical transformation of the affected state and society”. In this regard, this guidance note encourages strong linkages with regional institutions. Africa in particular has deep experience of post-conflict reconstruction: this note emphasizes coherence with the principles in the African Union Framework Document on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.<sup>2</sup>

### Elements of Recovery Planning<sup>3</sup>

10. Three lessons learned from previous recovery planning processes, which indicate the need to improve the process include: (i) the lack of an overall vision or storyline for peace-building; (ii) insufficient attention to start-up implementation capacity; (iii) insufficient attention to the capacity to monitor results and adjust the plan.

11. To address this, the revised guidance note includes the full cycle of necessary planning activities, with the explicit understanding that the elements may be combined in a “modular” way based on the optimal coverage and timing that the country-specific conflict situation calls for. The first element, pre-assessment, is designed to provide early guidance on strategic priorities for peace-building. The second element, assessment and recovery planning, aims to lay out an actionable transition plan and budget. The third element, validating and financing, focuses on ensuring that the coordinating agreement


<sup>2</sup> [AU Policy Framework On Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Development \[DOC. EX.CL/274 \(IX\)\]](#)

<sup>3</sup> A generic overview of the steps involved in the Four Basic Elements is provided in Appendix 2. Practical guidance and tools to complete these steps can be found in the PCNA Tool Kit.

and capacity to kick-start recovery activities is in place, along with securing funding. The last element, implementation, aims to ensure that the initial plan is monitored and adjusted as appropriate to reflect difficulties or changes in priorities during implementation.

12. In practice, many conflict and transitional situations are too fluid to allow for highly structured planning – these elements may be combined, collapsed, or overlapping in time. The elements diagrammed in two dimensions below are in practice flexible, and can therefore be adjusted as more or less comprehensive, longer or shorter processes, depending on what the situation allows.

**Figure 1: Key Elements in Recovery Planning**



## I: Pre-assessment<sup>4</sup>

13. Rather than diving straight into assessing recovery and reconstruction needs without a clear sense of strategic priorities, a pre-assessment process can help to identify the key outcomes which will be necessary and sufficient, to keep a peace-building transition on track. If time and capacity is available, a pre-assessment may be an in-depth process in which an overall data platform is assembled to inform a later full assessment, including indicators on social and economic welfare and access to services and infrastructure; with sufficient time, specifically commissioned analysis may be launched in preparation for a full assessment. If events are moving more quickly, the pre-assessment may be as simple as convening a meeting or series of meetings between key international and national actors to identify the key strategic objectives and outcomes which will be important for peace-building. These early discussions are important to help set strategic direction while nurturing an early sense of national ownership.

14. Regardless of the amount of time available for the pre-assessment, identifying causes and characteristics of the conflict will be particularly important; some key historical elements for consideration in understanding the context may be:

- Core nature of the conflict – driven by social, political, economic, geographic factors (e.g. control over natural resources, historical territorial borders, ethnic or religious divisions);
- Extent of international disengagement as a result of the conflict, and hence the relative importance of a needs assessment and new recovery plan to facilitate re-engagement;
- Type of peace – victor's peace, negotiated transition, partial peace.

15. In addition, discussions during the pre-assessment should take into account considerations of the current or near-future milestones, which may cover:

<sup>4</sup> Full practical guidance on these issues can be found in the accompanying Toolkit, Section 3.



- Next steps in the peace, political or national reconciliation process, in order to determine whether a full assessment and support for recovery planning will boost rather than undermine momentum;
- Planning processes for peacekeeping deployment or humanitarian assistance, in order to make appropriate links (see Section IV);
- A risk analysis of the prevailing physical security situation and country access available, identifying future trends (predictably up, predictably down, or unpredictable);

16. The pre-assessment must be grounded in a basic analysis of conflict and risks, to identify key priority outcomes to keep the peace process on track taking into account the terms of the peace agreement. This may focus on identifying key population groups who may constitute a risk to the peace process if they do not perceive the benefits of peace; regions and localities at risk, where visible reconstruction is important; state institutions where reform is critical to avoid undermining the process; actions to stem the flow of resources to spoilers<sup>5</sup>. It may include scenarios that explore how upcoming events (elections, transitional justice processes; events in neighboring countries) may have an impact on risks and opportunities for recovery.

17. Time permitting, the pre-assessment can also build a basic shared analysis of the degree of capacity and legitimacy in state and non-state institutions and actors (where non-state includes community structures as well as civil society), in several dimensions: technical and administrative capacity; credibility and will of key actors and institutions; issues with perceived bias within state and other counterpart structures; and prospects for short and long-term revenue generation. This is important to help identify the needed partners for the full recovery planning process, as well as to inform thinking on implementation arrangements for recovery and reconstruction. In this regard, the pre-assessment offers an opportunity to consider pre-war government traditions that have implications for post-war governance, as well as to identify specific non-state 'resources for peace' that may be available through women's groups or community networks.

18. In sum, the pre-assessment should aim to produce an agreed concept note that will provide a road map for the PCNA process, which communicates:

- A peace-building storyline that articulates peace-building objectives to guide recovery planning – for example, to ensure early social and economic results are delivered in regions vulnerable to renewal of conflict;
- Parameters for selection of national and international counterparts for a full recovery planning process, and for involvement of national institutions in implementation (for example, basic parameters for strengthening of national versus regional or local administrative structures);
- Identification and scope of priority clusters and cross-cutting issues to be considered, based on the analysis and consultations coming out of the pre-assessment;
- Coordination arrangements for the PCNA: Roles and responsibilities for the PCNA cluster leaders and other focal points; structure of the Secretariat organization; and estimated costs of the PCNA exercise (see section IV).

### **Box 3: Vision and peace-building objectives**

Discussion of a peace-building vision at the beginning of a recovery planning process is critical to take into account the unique characteristics of the country and the conflict and gain agreement on an overall direction with all the key actors (for military readers, vision is similar to end state, and results-based planning similar to effects-based planning). This vision or end-state is what "shapes" the planned PCNA-TRF.

For example, in a conflict that divided down ethnic East-West lines, and was fueled by illegal logging, where state institutions have been largely controlled by one ethnic group and are viewed as corrupt and abusive, you might have

<sup>5</sup> Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests and will therefore work to undermine it.

a vision statement that reads “A country which is peaceful, prospering economically and governed by democratic institutions who serve the people; where everyone has opportunities to work in the state or the private sector regardless of their ethnicity or region of origin; and where the riches coming from our natural resources are used to reduce poverty and build a future for our children.” In order to achieve that vision/end-state, specific key peace-building activities and milestones might be defined, perhaps including:

- **Ensure that key commitments in the comprehensive peace agreement are fulfilled;**
- **Ensure that state institutions are associated with basic improvements in public services and job opportunities in both east and west;**
- **Ensure that decision-making bodies and recruitment into state institutions reflect a credible balance in ethnic and regional composition ;**
- **Re-build trust by demonstrating transparent management of forest resources including community and civil society oversight; and**
- **Communicate with population on progress on these key issues.**

The vision that anchors the planned PCNA-TRF may be conceptually linked to a long-term goal of achieving nationalized MDGs – and specific cluster teams may be able to articulate the path towards “their” MDG as the context for the sectoral recovery priorities. However, in recognition of the immediacy and urgency of delivering concrete results that consolidate peace and create space for recovery, the primary focus is on consolidating the peace – even when this means prioritizing population groups who are not always amongst the poorest, such as ex-combatants.

## II: Full assessment and recovery planning<sup>6</sup>

19. A full assessment and recovery planning process will typically involve assessing across different regions of the country or affected territory: (i) the current situation in terms of population location and welfare (disaggregated by both gender and age if possible), service delivery, and physical infrastructure; (ii) institutional capacity (of both state institutions and potential non-state partners and implementing agencies) and needs for capacity-building or reform; (iii) priorities expressed by national and local stakeholders. Priority programs emerging from this assessment will then be drawn together into a transitional results framework (TRF) which lays out key priority outcomes, the realistic timing of these outcomes, and their costs.

20. **Structure of the assessment.** Assessment teams will generally be made up of national and international counterparts (see section IV). Teams are normally organized by priority functional area (usually referred to as sectors or clusters); for example, health and education; or governance and rule of law. Teams will normally spend some time together in one location deciding on the approach to the assessment and reviewing background data, before conducting field visits and consultations, and then regrouping to develop basic design, parameters and costs for priority needs emerging from the assessment. A coordinating team – again, national and international – will provide direction and standard formats for results planning and costing to teams, ensure that linkages are made between cluster or sectoral teams, and take responsibility for communications on the assessment and planning process. On the national side, this small team may be nominated from the parties to peace talks, the transitional leadership (President or Prime Minister’s office, Ministries of Planning or Finance), or others, bearing in mind the phase of peace talks, power-sharing arrangements, and the role played by civil society – all issues which should have emerged from the pre-assessment.

21. Decisions on the structure of teams should be informed by the vision and peace-building objectives identified rather than replicated automatically from previous assessments. For example, while most previous assessments have organized teams by clusters (e.g. infrastructure), a peace-building strategy which puts high emphasis on supporting regional decentralization could indicate the grouping of teams by region rather than functional area. Some clusters are appropriate for almost all post-conflict situations (infrastructure rehabilitation, restoration of basic education and health services), while others will be country-specific (mining or forestry). A strategic cluster can regroup several sectors (health, education, social protection) or encompass a single sector only (private sector development). Many

<sup>6</sup> Full practical guidance on these issues can be found in the accompanying Toolkit, Section 3.

combinations are possible as long as the structure remains sufficiently focused on key priorities which are “implementable” during the transition period.

22. Decisions on how to handle issues that have historically been treated as “cross-cutting” are considered within the country-specific context; there is no automatic position for a specific cross-cutting topic, but in a country where exploitation of natural resources has been a core factor in the conflict, consideration of common environmental resources would logically be a priority topic. The structure of the teams should incorporate lessons from past PCNAs on the elements needed to effectively “mainstream” a cross-cutting issues, and those identified as being of particular importance for the peace process may be best supported by being made a cluster or sub-cluster of their own, with specific additional mechanisms and resources for “cross-fertilization” with other clusters<sup>7</sup>.

23. A cross-cutting issue of particular importance for the sustainability of peace, economic recovery, and social stability, is women’s engagement in post-conflict recovery. It is increasingly recognized that women’s participation is constructive for effective governance systems, for conflict-resolution, particularly at the community level, and for economic recovery particularly in the agricultural sector in rural economies. However, gender issues have, in the past, ‘fallen between the cracks’ in post-conflict planning. Gender issues are likely to be relevant to almost all clusters in post-conflict needs assessment teams, and so the ‘rule of thumb’ for incorporating gender issues is to determine whether and how women and men experienced conflict differently, and in consequence have differing needs, and then translate this into differentiated actions for inclusion in the post-conflict recovery process. A gender-sensitive PCNA will be evident in a TRF with gender-differentiated results where relevant, and financing for recovery will likewise show clearly the costs associated with those TRF results. Gender budgeting methods can be used to track spending to ensure there are adequate resources for agreed priority actions to respond to the needs of women and girls.

24. **Developing a transitional results framework.** The coordinating team also takes responsibility for developing the final transitional results framework (TRF). The TRF should be put together by taking a strategic filter to the sectoral or regional assessments completed by each team. The primary criterion for identifying the priority actions is that a TRF should address the **crucial areas where lack of progress could risk reversal in the transitional and peace-building process**, including re-establishing a legitimate and accountable role for the state. The minimum necessary to do this generally includes progress on national reconciliation, re-establishment of security and public safety, achievement of a minimal level of functioning public finance systems and provision of basic service delivery and economic recovery. Thus, the basic framework for an effective TRF would normally provide coverage of country-appropriate aspects of four functions: political, security, public finances, and social/economic recovery (see Figure 2). Outputs that “fill” the matrix should be crafted to reflect strategic dimensions of peace building and conflict mitigation by referring to gender-, ethnic-, age-, or region-specific actions.

**Figure 2: Basic Structure for a TRF<sup>8</sup>**

<i>Vision</i>				
<i>Cluster/Sector/Theme</i>	<b>Political</b> (Priority Outcome or Objective)	<b>Security</b> (Priority Outcome or Objective)	<b>Economic</b> (Priority Outcome or Objective)	<b>Social</b> (Priority Outcome or Objective)
<b>Baseline</b>				
<b>1<sup>st</sup> six months</b>		Actions or Outputs at Key Intervals		
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> six months</b>				
<b>Costs/Budget</b>				

<sup>7</sup> Additional Cross-Cutting Guidance can be found in the Toolkit, Section 2.

<sup>8</sup> Practical guidance on TRFs can be found in the accompanying Toolkit, Section 2.

25. **Combining visible results with institution-building.** The TRF should provide for some actions that are visible to the general public and can generate modest but tangible “quick wins” that deepen or broaden national ownership and support for the peace or transition process. These should be accompanied by less visible actions – in the area of institutional capacity building and reform, transparency, and governance of natural resources, for example – that must be initiated early on even though their benefits will not be felt for some time. These are critical to underpinning future governance, state capacity and accountability, without which ownership of the process risks becoming nominal, rather than national, and can lead to a reversion of gains at a later date. Incorporating state-building as a central objective of the TRF is discussed in more detail in section III.

26. **The TRF as a compact for recovery.** In many post-conflict situations, effective recovery is dependent on actions not only of the national government and public administration, but also of donors and other key international actors (humanitarian agencies; peace-keeping missions) who bring capacity and resources. In highly aid-dependent post-conflict situations with weak government capacity, government will not directly control many of the resources available for early recovery, and international institutions have a far more direct responsibility for results achieved than in a more stable development context. For example, physical reconstruction may be carried out by government, or by international agencies such as the UN funds and programs, or through bilateral donor execution arrangements; institutional reform actions are generally the responsibility of government, but may be dependent for their success on the timely release of donor funds and/or technical assistance. Hence the TRF is normally framed not as a traditional government-implemented recovery plan, but as a joint compact which describes the actions needed from government, other stakeholders, and the country’s international partners to support recovery. The TRF is therefore an articulation of shared responsibility, and acts not to set conditions on government, but to point the way for government and its national and international partners to work together towards shared recovery goals and to monitor the recovery process.

27. **Costing the recovery plan.** A realistic plan needs to ensure that enough money will be available, at the right time, to achieve the priorities identified. The objective of the costing exercise is to estimate the necessary financial resources to implement priority activities and undertake critical early capacity building, and to thus inform state budget processes, requests for external financing and program commitments made by donors. There is a two-way link between the costing exercise and the government’s budget. While existing budgets and state expenditures will inform the sector teams on the parameters for macroeconomic and fiscal sustainability, the estimated financing requirements for recovery will also be an important input to prepare subsequent budgets. The costing exercise is a forum for capacity-building with national counterparts that can help ensure a better alignment of capacity with function, involve actors from central planning and finance ministries early on, and ensure that macro-economic assumptions provide a practical ceiling for costs without missing key national expenditures for peace-building (including security and political actions).

28. Donors often bypass the government budget in early post-conflict situations to channel resources for recovery needs in a way that ensures speed of response and mitigates risks of corruption. This risks undermining national ownership of recovery and reduces the incentive for coordination between line ministries and the Ministry of Finance, between international partner programs and between donors and government. While fiduciary capacity in the public administration following a prolonged conflict or crisis is often prohibitively low, the recovery planning process offers an opportunity for donors to rally around a common vision and plan for moving progressively back towards an on-budget approach to recovery. If the government budget is not used as a central pillar for aid coordination at the outset, an opportunity to establish transparency, accountability and national ownership over the use of resources is lost.

29. The costing exercise within the joint recovery planning process should therefore mirror as much as possible a basic version of a normal government budgeting process. Responsibility for presenting overall costings will normally rest with the economic and public finance team, with strong representation from the Ministry of Finance. This team should issue indicative guidelines on budget ceilings and formats to sector teams, should allocate personnel to work with each team to develop consistent costings, and

should ensure that teams are aware of the difference between expenditures which are transitional and do not carry any direct recurrent liability for the state (e.g. truth and reconciliation commissions, support to ex-combatants), versus those which do (e.g. building new roads, schools or clinics). As with a normal budget exercise, needs identified may outstrip available resources. The coordinating team will need to consider resource availability issues – short-term access to resources, absorption capacity, and long-term fiscal sustainability – in reaching a prioritized plan. Where normal government processes are functioning, the final decisions on priorities identified during the recovery planning process may be referred to cabinet or a budget sub-committee. Where the normal budget process is not yet functioning, proposals on prioritization may be developed by the coordinating committee and put to national leadership for validation.

### III. Validating and Financing<sup>9</sup>

30. Ideally, a recovery planning exercise is carried out with direct participation of all national technical counterparts and key international partners, and with frequent consultation with national leadership at a political level and with civil society – and validation is thus embedded in the entire process. In some cases, however, it will have proved impossible to include one or more of the key players to the extent needed to ensure full ownership, and in other cases the fluid political situation may have resulted in emerging voices that need to be “brought in” to the discussion. Once the key results have been triaged and reflected in the TRF, final validation will then be needed of the overall storyline and external assistance requirements with all major actors, including those not fully involved in the assessment. This is necessary as much for reasons of cross-checking and validation as it is for safeguarding ownership and commitment of the PCNA process and results. It is important at this point to also re-visit the early conversations with national counterparts and key international partners during the pre-assessment about objectives and trade-offs, using the agreed PCNA objective as the touchstone for prioritizing, addressing difficult trade-offs and agreeing on the rationale for choices made during prioritization and sequencing.

31. The joint coordinating team then produces a final assessment report and recovery plan, including financial tables. Lessons learned on the format of reports and plans include the need to:

- Use easily understood language rather than technical or development jargon. Reports written or guided by national counterparts in language which reflects national realities may be less familiar to donors, but are more likely to resonate with national stakeholders;
- Keep it simple: 200 page reports stand little chance of being used as a regular reference for implementation, no matter how well-analyzed. An overview report may be supported by more detailed technical analysis, but should be kept as brief as possible. The TRF, which is the main implementation framework, should be summarized in a 4-8 page format; and
- Ensure translations are available quickly. Recovery plans developed in English in countries where a very low percentage of the national population speaks the language indicate only too clearly that they are donor-driven, and stand little chance of influencing actions on the ground.

32. A critical lesson learned from earlier PCNAs has been that the momentum and broad ownership developed during the assessment process has too often faltered after the donors’ conference, – and once lost, is very hard to regain. Enormous effort and investment is put into the assessment process, but once completed and a donors’ conference held, action on the ground slowed or stopped entirely;; a gap often emerged in translating donor pledges into program activities; TRF launch and implementation faltered because of over-stressed capacity when international team members left; and communication to the population on the recovery efforts was muted or missing.

33. ***Building the Implementation Platform for the TRF.*** In order to mitigate these problems, joint recovery planning efforts should endeavor to ensure that a series of actions take place after the end of

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<sup>9</sup> Full practical guidance on these issues can be found in the accompanying Toolkit, Section 3.

the assessments, leading up to the time of a donor conference. The TRF should therefore be accompanied by an “implementation platform” that includes:

- As described above, an indication of mutual accountability between national and international partners, or “compact”, to establish the foundation for monitoring consistent with international standards.
- Commitment of modest, targeted and immediate resources for start-up and communications. Key institutions with resources (whether national or international) need to make some modest resources available even in advance of a donor meeting to finance (i) start up; and (ii) communications activities.
- A governance structure for implementation of the TRF including provisions for both technical (e.g. has a school been built, how many ex-combatants have been demobilized?) and financial tracking systems. The tracking system should include a set of indicators that promote commonality across national parties, international implementing organizations, and donors. A key difference between transitional recovery plans which have proven robust to subsequent developments (e.g. Liberia) and those which have quickly gone off track (e.g. Sudan) has been the establishment of a national coordination unit immediately after the planning mission to monitor and coordinate implementation. Such a unit may be established in a key ministry (finance, planning) or in the office of the Prime Minister or cabinet secretariat.<sup>10</sup> But it is critical that it be rapidly resourced from the national budget or donor funds to follow-up with start-up and communications activities.
- Communications. The expectations of the population will often have been raised by the recovery planning process itself, and will certainly be raised by communication on the TV or radio around a donors meeting. To manage these expectations, it is important that the communications effort during the PCNA continues and is sustained after the TRF is agreed and implementation begins, with efforts to clearly explain to the population the realities of donor resources and the likely timing of recovery and reconstruction financing. The communication strategy should be composed of multiple pillars, including print, radio (make best use of UN Radio and related capacities available when PKO missions in place), periodic town hall meetings, TV spots, websites, etc.

34. ***Donor commitments.*** Previous PCNAs have tended to have a disproportionate emphasis on the preparation of a donor pledging conference, in some cases to the detriment of a focus on implementation on the ground, and with a negative effect on expectations over the timing of reconstruction financing. It is crucial to ensure that international partners endorse a recovery plan and commit to mobilizing resources to support it. However, this can be achieved in a number of ways:

- In some cases, government and donors may judge that the moment is not yet ripe for a high profile donor pledging conference. This may be because a transition process is not yet proven and large scale international commitments will not be forthcoming until later down the line. In this case, national leadership and international partners may wish to hold a lower profile meeting focused on the recovery plan and financing of immediate activities, rather than on new pledging, postponing a higher profile pledging conference until later in the transition process
- In other cases, it may be desirable to capitalize on international attention to a conflict or peace agreement by locking in longer-term reconstruction commitments. Because of parliamentary and budget processes within donor countries, it is rarely possible to mobilize firm donor pledges for more than a three-year period; but there may be a value in drawing international attention to longer-term reconstruction costs, to raise awareness in the minds of policy-makers and the media regarding the reality of the long-term commitment needed from the beginning of a transition process in order to consolidate peace and recovery.

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<sup>10</sup> If these parameters are still under negotiation with national authorities when the TRF is drafted, this aspect of the TRF should be revised at the three-month mark.

## IV: Implementation and Monitoring<sup>11</sup>

35. **Updating and monitoring the TRF.** The effectiveness of recovery plans is shown in how often they are used – and to remain usable they need to be regularly updated. As described in the previous section, national responsibility should be established as soon as possible to monitor and update the framework, supported where necessary by institutions and international partners with a strong presence in the field. In the early phases of a transition, the authorities will often lack capacity for data collection and monitoring; to mitigate these constraints, the TRF may propose actions and technical assistance to help develop the government’s monitoring capacity. This is an essential element – no TRF will “monitor itself”, and if basic monitoring of and reporting upon the TRF is not demonstrated in the early months, the matrix risks losing much of its usefulness. National authorities should be able to report on a regular basis on progress on targets and milestones and international partner activities. This requires two capacities: updating and disseminating the matrix document, and actual monitoring of the transition or reform program (which in turn requires commitment from donors and implementing partners to report transparently on their activities and use of their funds).<sup>12</sup>

### Box 4. Monitoring a TRF

Monitoring and implementation of the country-specific TRFs has been highly variable, depending on the type of mechanisms emerging after the PCNA. In Liberia, the Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) matrix was developed and used as a tool for prioritizing needs and negotiating among national actors, and became the basis for all coordination and management activities during the transition period. The National Transitional Government, UN and Bank jointly developed the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) as a mechanism to oversee implementation and monitoring of the RFTF and financial flows, as well as act as a forum for regular donor consultations.

36. **The TRF and the National Budget.** While efforts to deepen the links between the TRF and the budget are important, it is not always realistic to expect that the TRF will serve as a full performance-based budgeting framework. However, Cabinet use of the matrix as a tool to monitor actions and outputs can be done aside routine monitoring of budget execution, and the two processes can together generate a profile of resources and results which may evolve over time into a basic performance budgeting framework. Achieving transparent monitoring and evaluation will also facilitate donor financing and the overall implementation of the matrix, by making the results achieved under a transitional strategy more visible to donors and their constituencies as well as to national stakeholders.

37. **Using the TRF as a Cornerstone of Recovery Communications.** The Transitional Results Framework is an instrument that offers value to the recovery process in several dimensions. It can be used as an *instrument for dialogue* at several levels: national-national, national-international and international-international. An effective TRF clarifies the respective responsibilities and commitments between actors (both national and internationals). For civil society, the matrix can provide a vital input into domestic scrutiny of the government’s policy. By *enhancing transparency*, the TRF can create the right incentives to achieve more visible results. For all of these purposes, wide dissemination of the matrix inside and outside government, and with international partners, is desirable.

38. In the countries where government has been able to use the TRF to create a mechanism for regular discussion of priority targets and areas of interest and concern, it has contributed to creating an ongoing dialogue that is constructive and helps coordinate across sectors. To continue to broaden and deepen ownership of the TRF, and further exploit its usefulness, wide dissemination lower down in government is required, to involve those operational units in, and inform them about, the routine of reviewing performance against the actions shown in the matrix. Finally, the TRF has shown promise in being used as a nationally-unifying instrument, where efforts to inform and educate NGOs and media

<sup>11</sup> Full practical guidance on these issues can be found in the accompanying Toolkit, Section 3.

<sup>12</sup> There is some evidence to suggest that those countries with MDTFs established following the PCNA have better monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place by virtue of the fund administration role. However, these facilities tend to receive a minor proportion of overall aid flows to the country, and so the need is still acute for a systematic mechanism to assure proper monitoring, implementation and reporting including for resources that do not flow through MDTFs.

regarding both the content and the process of implementing the TRF have enabled those civil society actors to engage in greater depth than at the outset.

39. ***Adjusting the recovery plan.*** Post conflict environments are characterized by high volatility. Needs may change (new population displacements for example); priorities may change (subsequent realization that a marginalized region or population segment pose a risk for peace-building if their needs are not addressed); national counterparts may change, with implications for their views on recovery priorities. Reforms or capacity-building may prove to be more difficult than originally envisaged, necessitating changes in timings. The composition of the donor or international support group may change. Last, costs of reconstruction may change, due to security conditions or changes in possible sources of supply of materials and services. The TRF must be sufficiently flexible to take all of these changes into account, but any revisions made to the TRF must be consistent with preserving it as a prioritized and strategic framework.

40. The best way to ensure that the TRF is a useful tool in this kind of dynamic environment is, first, to ensure that it is kept simple and realistic at the beginning; second, a regular periodic review process of monitoring and adjustment is needed. Actions to adjust the recovery plan will normally need to involve both national and international actors, who bring different capacities of decision-making authority and resources to the table. Hence the process of monitoring and adjusting the recovery plan is best achieved through regular meetings between national leadership and international areas of responsibility. In most cases, the national unit established to coordinate the recovery plan will provide a report at regular (three or six months) intervals on what has been achieved in both national and international actions identified as priorities under the plan. This document will then be used as the basis for regular meetings between national authorities and their international partners to consider which areas are off track, and adjust efforts accordingly. More significant adjustments to priorities will normally be made annually, and brought together with the regular government planning and budgeting cycle.

41. ***Ensuring that TRF targets are not conditional.*** It is entirely normal in a fragile transition environment that some actions will go off track: it should not be taken as a failure of either the process or the plan. It is however important that efforts be redirected rapidly to address risk areas, and that targets be periodically readjusted to allow for realism.

42. ***Building in a mechanism for learning lessons from the PCNA-TRF process.*** To assist in the continuous learning and refining of this process, it is important that the PCNA team ensures the codification of best practices and lessons learned, to be shared with appropriate headquarters and capitols in order to systematically capture the experiences and lessons from each country for incorporation into updated guidance.



### III. IMPROVING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RECOVERY PLAN – PEACE-BUILDING AND STATE-BUILDING

#### Conflict Sensitivity and Peace-Building

43. **Mitigating conflict risks.** One of the key challenges of post-conflict recovery consists in recognizing and transforming the structures which contributed to conflict; otherwise, recovery assistance risks rebuilding a society that contains the seeds of future violence. Although violent manifestations may have subsided, conflict risks are always present. An analysis of the conflict is an essential tool for any recovery planning process, to identify the factors which can stabilize or destabilize the situation; understanding the causes of conflict will influence the prioritization of needs. The TRF should also consider actions that address direct conflict risks, with a bias towards those that are critical to peace-building and conflict stabilization, deliver a quick peace dividend to the population, and help create legitimate national institutions. For this reason, a timely conflict analysis exercise focusing on high-risk trigger events such as political or electoral processes, redeployment of troops, disarmament and demobilization, partitioning of high-value resources, and geographical hotspots may help to identify the most suitable programming options in post-conflict settings. When assessing national implementing capacities, conflict analysis can also help teams understand the roles of key institutions and thus inform decisions on possible partnerships and implementing arrangements.

44. **Coherence across political, security and development spheres.** Political and security challenges and economic and social reconstruction are often addressed in a stovepipe fashion, through separate planning processes. This has, in some cases, led to serious operational gaps and shortfalls in funding for critical interventions in the political and security spheres, interventions that are vital for creating a stable environment to allow economic and social programs to deliver peace dividends to the population. Stovepipe planning also risks missing positive linkages between spheres, where well designed economic and social programs can help contribute to political and security stabilization; ill-timed or badly targeted programs can undermine it. It is important to ensure that political and security issues are treated as an integral part of the national planning and budgetary process, rather than through separate fora which may lead to a lack of transparency or the taking of decisions which are unfunded, fiscally unsustainable or undermine other reconstruction efforts.

#### Box 5: Examples of linking economic and social actions to peace-building goals

As Box 3 illustrated, a recovery plan summarized in a TRF should ideally have specific peace-building objectives that reflect the specific nature of the conflict; in the example, these included:

- **Ensure that key commitments in the comprehensive peace agreement are fulfilled;**
- **Ensure that state institutions are associated with basic improvements in public services and job opportunities in both east and west;**
- **Ensure that decision-making bodies and recruitment into state institutions reflect a credible balance in ethnic and regional composition;**
- **Re-build trust by demonstrating transparent management of forest resources, including community and civil society oversight; and**
- **Communicate with population on progress on these key issues.**

The actions needed to achieve these objectives will go beyond provision of financial and technical resources; because of the fragile post-conflict setting, the timing of inputs and investments, the methods used, the linkages with key political or security actions, and the context in which they are communicated, are all critical.

For example: if communities in some regions have been cut off from basic services and access to employment and markets because roads were strategically destroyed during the conflict, then road reconstruction program would want to consider not only the sequencing of roadworks according to economic benefits, but: (i) demonstrating state attention to the population in both east and west; (ii) prioritizing labor intensive techniques for job creation and community mechanisms for determining how workers are chosen; (iii) linking with other issues critical for peace-building, such as humanitarian access, district of origin for demobilized fighters, and civic education or election timetables.

## **State-building as a central objective of recovery planning<sup>13</sup>**

45. Many post-conflict countries have limited institutional capacity (for example, in terms of human resources, financial/managerial skills, monitoring and evaluation systems), which can limit their ability to rapidly implement needed actions. To be able to address these shortcomings, a preliminary analysis of national capacities (in state and non-state actors, complemented by UN agency and NGO implementation capacities) should be part of the pre-assessment work. Capacity considerations should be built into all clusters during the assessment process, with care to avoid skewed partnerships which assist only certain factions or conflict parties.

46. It is important that recovery plans address not only what services are provided, but who provides them. Non-state parallel service delivery channels may initially be necessary, particularly to meet immediate needs, but these can detract from building state capacity in the longer run if there is no explicit transition or “exit” strategy. Perhaps more importantly, while service delivery through NGOs, private sector, donor or international agencies can play a vital role in protecting the welfare of vulnerable groups, efforts are also needed to build the capacity, accountability and credibility of the state in the eyes of the population. If all the positive recovery projects are “branded” with the logos of donor or international agencies rather than being provided under the auspices of the state, the population will associate these services with international partners rather than building a sense of trust and connection with their own institutions and leadership. At a political level there is a clear link between peace-building and state-building – without trust between state institutions and the population and institutional capacity in the state to carry out the functions with which it has been entrusted, there can be little hope for a sustainable peace.

47. It is therefore critical that recovery plans look for some services, however limited, that can be delivered by the state in the short-term, and frame other non-governmental service delivery within a medium-term transition strategy that helps build the capacity of the state to coordinate or fulfill these service delivery functions. This type of strategic transition plan is also likely to make the significant use of non-government channels in the early stages of recovery more acceptable to national leadership, while still acknowledging the important results delivered through humanitarian and early recovery programs already ongoing when the PCNA-TRF is undertaken.

48. Many recovery planning processes will occur in a political/operating environment characterized first by a national transitional authority (often determined by the terms of the peace agreement) leading to the installation of an elected government. In these settings, deliberate attention is required to consider the implications of working with a transitional (as opposed to elected) authority. The focus during the transitional years may be primarily on ensuring broad national ownership, and early capacity building in core governance functions; the focus during elected government years would continue those efforts accompanied by expanded and deepened efforts to increase the capacity of the state to both coordinate and deliver services.

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<sup>13</sup> Additional guidance on these issues can be found in the PCNA Toolkit: Section 2.

#### IV. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE PROCESS

49. ***The need for broad ownership.*** In conflict-affected environments where national stakeholders are divided by the legacy of violence and a multitude of regional and international actors are engaged, recovery priorities will only be implemented if all the key actors have ownership of the plan<sup>14</sup>. No one actor can go it alone: government will typically depend upon the cooperation of key stakeholders outside government and on donor assistance to implement its priorities; and internationally-financed programs will only be implemented if national leadership has a genuine commitment to their execution. Amongst international actors, no one actor can lay out a plan and expect it to be financed and supported by other international partners: if there is limited international involvement in the details of the recovery plan, international partners may pay lip-service to it but will be unlikely to adapt their programming and financing decisions to the priorities identified. Hence widespread understanding and commitment to the recovery plan is not just an admirable goal: it is critical to increase the chances of success in implementation. Going forward, discussions about possible recovery planning efforts should reach out to non-traditional donors who may not have been involved in typical donor groups at either the global or national level, reflecting the changing dynamics of international assistance and the evolving aid architecture.

50. ***National Ownership.*** Because the TRF will articulate the mutual accountability between the national authorities and their people, and between the national and international actors, the needs assessment process should be “owned” by national stakeholders to the maximum extent possible. National ownership will also increase the likelihood of integrating the TRF into national policy making, administrative decisions and budgeting. Building ownership, however, requires enabling conditions in terms of time, capacity (skills, resources) and the political will to consult a wide range of national stakeholders. Additional financial and logistical support is often needed to enable national stakeholders to fully participate in the PCNA process. The following national constituencies are often key to ensuring real commitment to recovery:

- ***Political leadership.*** Recovery planning is sometimes seen by both national leadership and donors as a technical exercise. Post-conflict environments, however, are often highly centralized in decision-making: if top political leadership do not understand and agree with the key elements of the recovery plan, it is likely to face difficulties in implementation. One way of addressing this is to establish a steering committee or other regular consultation process for the planning exercise, ensuring that top political leadership are consulted as it progresses and input to key decisions on priorities;
- ***Involving Conflict Parties.*** The recovery planning process must not further antagonize conflict parties, but involve them in a constructive dialogue on the future priorities for their country. The process itself may be an opportunity to build confidence between parties and focus them on win-win outcomes, as well as to give a voice to those stakeholder groups which do not feel represented by the conflict parties. This requires a carefully built understanding of the various stakeholders to the peace process, their interests, capacities and relations. To ensure that the recovery planning process supports a positive momentum towards peace between the conflict parties, close consultation with mediators on the timing and structure of the recovery planning process is important.
- ***Military leadership.*** In many post-conflict situations, military commanders play a much larger role than in a normal peace-time setting. There may be a strong symbolic role or perception of

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<sup>14</sup> The principles articulated in the African Union Framework Document for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, while developed specifically for the Africa region, resonate strongly in this regard for consideration across the world. Their policy is underpinned by a commitment to “minimum values and standards” that include: African leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness, equity, and non-discrimination; cooperation and coherence; and capacity-building for sustainability.

the armed forces as defenders of national unity; military leadership may command a large popular following; or, more pragmatically, military leadership may have the capacity to block or undermine recovery if they do not buy-in to recovery actions. It is therefore important to inform military leadership of the whole recovery plan, not only those elements directly related to the security sectors, since they will often face questions from their own followers on the recovery process and donor/international involvement. This does need to be carefully balanced with efforts to avoid entrenching an inappropriate role for the military in the longer term in administrative decision-making or economic activities – but if managed carefully such consultations can contribute to longer term efforts for the transformation of the security sectors towards a transparent, accountable and appropriate role.

- **Civil society and community leadership.** Peace mediation processes are often quite narrow in their participation, aiming at gaining agreement from armed groups who may be only partially representative of the population, or indeed may be viewed by much of the population as the source of previous conflict and abuses. Recovery planning processes offer an opportunity to involve a wider group of national stakeholders, including excluded groups such as women, youth and ethnic minorities. In this sense it is important to beware of rewarding conflict in the decision making over recovery, by avoiding only involving conflict parties in recovery planning and capacity building. Concerted efforts need to be made to tap into capacities for peace across the wider society. Civil society also has a significant role to play in holding the government and its international partners accountable for their “share” of delivering the TRF.

## International participation


51. **The multilateral system.** The various UN agencies, regional institutions, and international financing institutions can contribute a broad range of expertise to recovery planning processes and will be key actors in reconstruction and recovery. Within the multilateral system, it is important to balance those who bring political and economic leverage with those who bring implementation knowledge. Since there is a need to keep the numbers of international PCNA team members reasonably limited, both the UN system and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) may want to step back and encourage other bilateral and multilateral donors to participate in sector planning, to ensure a close involvement of those whose diplomatic or financial support will be needed to implement priority actions.

52. **Involving bilateral partners.** Bilateral partners can bring additional country expertise and perspectives to the needs assessment, and their involvement is crucial to ensure that programming decisions are adapted to the priorities identified and to enhance the coherence of the overall international response. In engaging with bilateral actors, it will be important to involve actors from across the spectrum of development, defense, and diplomatic agencies; without this “cross-fertilization” the recovery plan risks being an incomplete assessment that duplicates, leaves gaps, or sends contradictory messages. Bilateral involvement in post-conflict recovery is increasingly a whole of government exercise, and should be sought across three dimensions:

- diplomatic/political, as lead parties supporting a peace process and therefore as potentially important partners in implementing the peace agreement;
- technical and policy, as partners with technical expertise and past and/or current programs in-country, both of which are critical inputs to a coordinated post-conflict recovery effort;
- security (for a limited subset of bilaterals), as partners in multilateral or bilateral efforts across the spectrum of security stabilization and (later) security sector transformation, on the international side of key actions for which the recovery planning process can articulate complementary national activities and national budget requirements.

53. **Forming the Coordination Structure**<sup>15</sup>. In order to support and manage the technical aspects of the needs assessment process and support the discussions and negotiations between national partners and key international donors, the coordinating institutions (in addition to national counterparts, these may be regional organizations, UNDG, bilateral partners, and/or World Bank) each appoint a PCNA Coordinator(s) and agree on mobilization of a PCNA Secretariat. The roles of Coordinators and Secretariat are defined in the Concept Note in close collaboration with national authorities, conflict parties, and the coordinating institutions' country teams. Figure 3 illustrates this coordination model.

**Figure 3: Illustrative Coordination Structure**



54. The PCNA Coordinators steer the overall technical process and facilitate the report writing and the final prioritization of activities. This includes technical support to the political negotiations before, during and after the PCNA in the country and at headquarters. Coordinators are responsible for providing technical guidance notes, cluster TORs, and methodological background papers (e.g., planning frameworks, costing sheets and guidelines, basic scenarios and data). The coordinators are supported by the PCNA Secretariat, which will need sufficient staff to be locally based in order to provide logistical and liaison capacity. Advance planning during the pre-assessment phase is critical; even though several months may pass before the field and cluster work begins, funding processes could potentially delay the launch, and it is critical that the Secretariat be operational in order to liaise and prepare for operational issues such as basic security requirements for in-country travel.

### **Recovery planning in relation to other national and international planning processes**<sup>16</sup>

55. National recovery planning generally takes place in the initial transition phase from violent conflict to peace. It is usually preceded by humanitarian assessments, which may have taken place during the conflict. In countries receiving assistance from peace-keeping or political missions, technical assessments and planning exercises will also take place for these missions<sup>17</sup>. Early steps should be


<sup>15</sup> Full practical guidance, TORs and Templates related to coordination can be found in the PCNA Toolkit: Section 3.

<sup>16</sup> More information on linking to other planning processes, as well as the tools and guidance to those processes can be found in the PCNA Tool Kit, Section 2.

<sup>17</sup> See "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine Draft 3)," August 2007.

taken to establish the contacts and procedures across humanitarian, security and political processes to integrate them as much as is feasible, and in all cases to ensure exchange of information, synchronization of activities, reduce duplication and work overload of national and international staff and bolster realistic and strategic planning.

**Figure 4: Multilateral Planning Processes**



56. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the range of planning processes through which the international community engages in situations of conflict or post-conflict – each with different approaches, timelines, levels of resources, and actors. In summary, there are three main multilateral planning processes (see Figure 4), which are separate for important reasons:

- Planning processes for the set up of a multi-component political mission, deployment of peace-keeping troops, police, electoral and rule of law assistance derive their authority from a Security Council mandate, usually in support of a peace agreement; in the case of UN-led missions the mandate is normally conferred by the Security Council. While national stakeholders are consulted in the course of planning for these missions, they do not have ultimate “ownership” of the plan, with regard to the security component.
- Humanitarian planning exercises while conflict is on-going respond to an international humanitarian imperative, and often cover areas of territory where national authorities have been unable to protect the population. Like the planning of peace-keeping missions, while national authorities are often consulted in planning humanitarian activities during on-going conflict they do not have ultimate full “ownership” of the plan. In later post-conflict recovery periods, humanitarian activities become more closely coordinated by national authorities and hence there is stronger potential to link humanitarian outcomes to a TRF or nationally owned, results focused country strategy process.

- Development processes (PCNA/TRFs, and later PRSPs), are nationally owned: they produce plans focused on the role of national institutions. Unlike early humanitarian activities or peace-keeping missions, the costs of recovery and reconstruction plans often involve some domestic revenues (albeit limited) of the country concerned as well as voluntary donor contributions. Full national ownership of these plans is therefore crucial.

57. While the security, humanitarian and development planning processes have different objectives, mandates, and institutional arrangements, no one will succeed without the others. “Stovepipe planning”, where each actor plans in isolation from the others, can: (i) endanger the peace; (ii) prevent a smooth transition from external responsibility for crucial services to national responsibility; (iii) increase the burden placed on national authorities, and create consultation fatigue among stakeholder and civil society representatives. In preparing for a PCNA, provisions should be made to build institutional and substantive linkages between these different assessment and planning processes, including data sharing, streamlining data collection and consultations, ensuring staff continuity between assessment missions, and building joint coordination mechanisms. Connections to the ongoing programs, work plans, and coordination structures of the cluster approach established by the UN are also critical.

58. Where the country in question is under consideration by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) will convene early strategic discussions with the PCNA team and will be actively involved in the UN-led Strategic Assessment at the outset of integrated mission planning. This may result in an Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) and possible use of the Peacebuilding Fund following the PCNA. Where a PCNA/TRF has been completed for a country on the PBC’s agenda, the development of an IPBS for that country would draw on the elements of the PCNA-TRF.

#### **Box 6. Linkages between planning processes**

Liberia provides a good example of efficient linkages between planning processes. In August 2003 following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, OCHA launched an immediate CAP. At the same time, UN DPKO launched a TAM to plan the UN Mission for Liberia (UNMIL) and the UNDG and Bank coordinated with the UNCT, UNMIL, IMF, ECOWAS, US, EU and other core donors to complete a PCNA. The PCNA produced a plan for transition (the Results Focused Transition Framework or RFTF) in January 2004, which was presented in a coordinated way with the CAP at a donors’ conference, bringing the main humanitarian activities within the same discussion forum as the RFTF to facilitate both financing and implementation. The RFTF also covered the national reforms and some costs for SSR and rule of law, which were critical to fulfilling UNMIL mission objectives.

59. As with more comprehensive national plans, such as the PRS, the TRF should also serve as the analytical platform for all institutional country strategies during the transition period, including UN Transitional Strategies and eventually UNDAFs, Bank Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs) and eventually Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), and bilateral donors’ country strategy papers).

60. The Transitional Results Framework is most effective as common platform for crisis response and recovery when the PCNA process has been carefully linked with other processes and when the prioritized TRF integrates key political, security, and development actions in a focused effort to stabilize the fragile peace.

## GLOSSARY

**Clusters** are thematic groups composed of selected sectors or topics, depending on the specific country setting. For example, the cluster in the Sudan needs assessment entitled “Institutions and Capacity Building” comprised the topics decentralization, capacity building, public administration and expenditure management. A cluster is coordinated by a cluster manager; sectors or topics within a cluster, sometimes called “sub-clusters,” are managed by sector specialists.

**Conflict** is a “relationship between two or more interdependent parties in which at least one of the parties perceives the relationship to be negative or detects and pursues opposing interests and needs.” (GTZ 2001) In the context of this guidance, we focus on situations where conflict has been manifest by, or resulted in, large-scale and persistent violence between two or more parties, usually with significant impacts on noncombatants.

**Conflict sensitivity** is the ability to understand the context where conflict happens, articulate the dynamics involved, and identify the potential interactions with one or more interventions that are proposed or considered. This includes an ability to identify what is ‘needed’ to avoid the recurrence of conflict, often arrived at through an analysis of the conflict itself and through a stocktaking of the existing, often untapped, ‘capacities for peace’.

**Cross-cutting issue** is one that dynamically interacts with all or a substantial number of sectors and, therefore, requires a multi-sectoral approach. The choice to treat an issue as “cross-cutting” as opposed to “sectoral” is considered tactical and should be assessed in each country setting. While a wide range of issues have been treated as cross-cutting in PCNAs, including capacity development and conflict analysis, for the purposes of this guidance the main focus is on gender, environment, human rights and HIV/AIDS.

**Do No Harm** approach seeks to avoid unintended negative impacts of development and other interventions (Anderson 1999). The related *Do Some Good* approach aims to maximize positive contributions of developmental interventions to peace-building.

**Human security** is the freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives. Embraces the twin objectives of “freedom from fear” (referring to the threat of violence, crime and war) and “freedom from want” (referring to economic, health, environmental and other threats to people’s well being) (UN 1994).

**Natural resources** are naturally occurring, valuable elements and resources and can determine or influence national wealth. As such, its abundance or scarcity can cause or fuel conflicts and has the potential to affect sustained peace.

**Needs** emerge from the gap between the existing situation and the desired state, whether a nationally-defined benchmark or an internationally-agreed marker (such as the achievement of an MDG). In post conflict transitions, needs are conditions requiring supply or provision of humanitarian or development interventions to bridge the gap between identified deficits and the envisioned transitional outcomes.

**Needs assessment.** Needs assessments were first introduced by humanitarian agencies, involving the definition of basic needs, the identification of deficits in the fulfillment of these needs (based on standards, and considering vulnerability, risks and capacities), and the assessment of required external assistance to close these deficits. Needs assessments for recovery and reconstruction purposes take a broader view of needs, including institutional, policy, capacity, and infrastructure issues.

**PCNA** since 2003 has been used to refer to all Post Conflict Needs Assessment exercises that follow the UN/Bank methodology contained in our joint guidance. Terms such as Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) are synonymous with PCNA and were used in specific country settings.

**Peacebuilding** involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, support the necessary local capacities and conditions for sustained peace and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objective. In the PCNA-TRF framework, peacebuilding is not an activity or set of activities, but rather a framework that should impose coherence and purpose on the different sorts of post-conflict interventions, embedded in the ‘strategic peace-building storyline’.



**Post-Conflict** in this guidance refers to the period after a distinct action or event during which violent conflict is diminishing (although the territory may not be free of violence); it is comprised of two partly overlapping but notionally distinct stages of the process of emerging from violent conflict:

- *conflict stabilization*, encompassing those actions that expressly and purposefully aim to address conflict risk and minimize the risk of short-term reversion to armed conflict;
- *conflict transformation* and movement to constructive, non-violent patterns, namely those actions that purposefully aim to create the longer-term conditions for development in support of the achievement of the MDGs.

**Recovery** “The recovery approach focuses on how best to restore the capacity of the government and communities to rebuild and recover from crisis and to prevent relapses. In so doing, recovery seeks not only to catalyze sustainable development activities but also to build upon earlier humanitarian programs to ensure that their inputs become assets for development.” (UNDP 2001)

**Recovery needs** are the priority investments in human, material and social development through which a society seeks to overcome the roots and consequences of violent conflict and achieve political stability, security, justice and social equity.

**Results-based planning framework** is the general term for tools like the Transitional Results Matrix that frame a strategy and its implementation around specific and measurable outcomes. Results-based planning amongst civilians is similar to effects-based planning among the military. During the post conflict needs assessment process, use of a results-based tool forces iterative questioning of the strategy and fosters increased selectivity. During implementation the framework is used for management purposes—to help assess if implementation is on track and identify remedial measures needed.

**Security** stabilization and transformation in the context of PCNAs includes:

- *Early security stabilization measures*: deployment of UN and/or other forces, integration of formerly opposing forces, command and control restructuring, and vetting, train and equip programs of the police—critical steps for establishment of minimum conditions of security for PCNA activities.
- Dealing with the *legacies of conflict*: DDR, mines, child soldiers, reconciliation, arms management etc., not designed as stand-alone interventions but as part of a larger recovery framework.
- Longer term *security transformation* (SSR per OECD-DAC definition) including right-sizing, professionalism and accountability.

**Stakeholders.** In general terms, the term stakeholders refers to all those groups which share a common interest in a certain issue or intervention, or which are affected by it in a similar way. Stakeholders in a post-conflict needs assessment involve the parties (formerly) engaged in conflict as well as other groups likely to be involved in or affected by recovery activities.

**State-building** in the post-conflict context refers to the process of restoring (or building) the functionality of state institutions. There is no blueprint for state-building, but there is a shared understanding that a state-building approach is one that seeks a comprehensive view of transformation towards a stable and rule-based society, where state institutions are accountable and responsive to citizens. A key element of this is the identification and supporting of core state functions such as the provision of security, rule of law, basic services, infrastructure and macro-economic policy. Many of these functions go to the heart of political power and resource distribution in a society.

**Strategic peacebuilding storyline** is an conceptually robust and highly prioritized vision of the desired path for the recovery process in a specific country, grounded in a focus on minimizing the risk of reversal into conflict and weaving together key outcomes in socio-economic recovery, political (elections) transition, and human security (including external military assistance and peace keeping operations). PCNAs should articulate a peacebuilding storyline at the outset, to the extent possible using a two to three year time frame.

**Transition (post-conflict).** The period in a crisis characterized by violent conflict when partnerships with the international community are most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity, and socio-economic reconstruction.

**TRM**, or transitional results matrix, is the historical name used for the results framework produced at the conclusion of a PCNA exercise, using the joint UN/Bank methodology contained in our guidance. Now labeled TRF (Transitional Results Framework), the matrices are given specific names in each country setting (e.g., RFTF, ICF).

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





























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**APPENDIX 1: Diagrams on the various post-conflict planning processes**

**Key**

Assessment horizon			
Core planning & lead department		Partially involved	
Implementer		Peripheral involvement	

**Peace Agreement**

	Conflict Period	Post Conflict Period			Discussion
		Short	Medium	Long	
<p><b>CAP</b></p> <p>National Civil Society (NGOs) National Authorities Country Teams (UN agencies) HQ (OCHA / IASC) Donor Community Assessment horizon</p>					<p>The CAP is centrally driven (IASC/OCHA). As a process it is annual and takes only immediate needs and conflict causes into account. National authorities are involved only where appropriate. IASC country teams develop the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) which underpins the CAP.</p>
					
<p><b>PCNA</b></p> <p>National Civil Society (NGOs) National Authorities &amp; conflict parties Country Teams (UN / WB / Other) HQ (UN / WB / Other) Donor Community Assessment horizon</p>					<p>PCNAs are planned centrally, with some pre-peace planning, and implemented in a decentralized way. Country teams are critical to data gathering and analysis. National ownership is critical and national transitional authorities ideally play an important contributing and navigating role. PCNAs have a medium- to long-term horizon for national recovery. Donors and civil society are also consulted.</p>
					
<p><b>DPKO</b></p> <p>National Civil Society National Authorities Country Teams (UN / SRSG) HQ (UN / Embassies) Donor Community Assessment horizon</p>					<p>Peacekeeping operations are planned centrally from DPKO/DPA HQ. National authorities are important as they approve and grant access to the mission; however, they are not part of mission planning. Member states contribute troops, police and funds for the mission. Once the mission is established, further planning &amp; implementation both devolve to the field.</p>
					
<p><b>DPA</b></p> <p>National Civil Society National Authorities Country Teams (UN / WB / Other) HQ (UN / Embassies) Donor Community Assessment horizon</p>					<p>Peacebuilding missions and electoral assistance are planned centrally. Planning starts with 'early warning' and has a medium-term horizon. Decision-making devolves to the field where missions are established. National authorities request the assistance and assessments. However they do not take part in planning. Civil society is consulted as part of the assessment.</p>
					

	World Bank and UNDG	UN-DPKO	UN-DPA	UN-IASC/OCHA
<b>Process Title</b>	Post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA)	Integrated mission planning process (IMPP)	Needs assessment mission (NAM)	Consolidated appeals process (CAP)
<b>Orientation</b>	Consolidation of peace and recovery	Peacekeeping operations	Multi-Component: Conflict prevention (lapse or relapse), peacemaking, peacebuilding and electoral support	Humanitarian resource mobilization
<b>Reports produced</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) (including matrix)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Integrated Strategic Concept</li> <li>Mission plan</li> <li>SG Report to Security Council</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strategic Assessment (with PBSO)</li> <li>Needs assessment mission report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidated Appeal document</li> <li>Flash Appeal</li> <li>Situation Report</li> </ul>
<b>Clear guidelines available</b>	Yes - the Practical Guide (currently being revised)	Revised IMPP, June 2006	No	Yes – technical guidelines for the CAP.
<b>Pre or post international consensus?</b>	Post	Post	Both	Pre
<b>Involvement of national authorities?</b>	Yes	Yes/No (Yes, on the Peacebuilding side)	Yes/No (Yes, on the Peacebuilding side)	No
<b>Involvement of non-state actors?</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Initiative taken by...</b>	National authorities or Bank and UN country teams or International Community	Security Council / PBC	Host country/Security Council/Secretary-General (Article 99)	IASC
<b>Authorizing entity</b>	Host country	Host country / Security Council	Host country / Security Council/General Assembly (sometimes)	ERC in OCHA
<b>Focal point for the process</b>	PCNA Secretariat in field Bank and UNDG in HQ	DPKO (IMTF)	DPA / EAD	RC/HC
<b>Peace agreement?</b>	Not required, but peace process must be fairly advanced	Often, but not always	Often, but not always	No
<b>Immediate Timeframe</b>	2 years (but guided by a medium to long-term perspective – up to 10 years)	Mission specific.	Mission specific. For EAD, usually one election period	1 year (for a CAP) less in the case of a Flash Appeal
<b>Programming document?</b>	Yes, if a prioritized and costed results matrix is included.	In some cases	No	Yes

## Appendix 2: Overview of PCNA Steps and Tools Available

Step	Activity	Responsibility	Tool Kit Section	Products & Outcomes
<b>Preparation and Pre-Assessment</b>				
	Watching Brief	UN, Bank	3.A.	The UN and/or Bank may conduct/publish watching briefs that monitor the changing situation in a country or a specific sector. In a country where the Bank is not present or Bank assistance is not possible, a Watching Brief may be initiated to allow for a minimum level of engagement, monitoring evolving conditions and prospects for change. Current watching brief status tends to improve readiness to respond to transition opportunities.
	Initiative for PCNA	National Partners, Donors, UN, Bank	3.A.	- Agreement on joint initiative to conduct PCNA - Brief (2-3 page max) concept paper on potential PCNA scope
	Pre-Assessment: Conflict and Risk Analysis	UN/Bank	2.E. 3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- typology of conflict setting, which would tentatively indicate scope of actions that a PCNA might need to cover;</li> <li>- impact of the conflict on the physical, institutional infrastructure of the country, to help determine realistic time frame to estimate recovery/reconstruction needs;</li> <li>- impact of the conflict on the existence of widely shared societal goals, to help inform on choice between an in-depth, policy-oriented and consultation-heavy PCNA and a more agile technical assessment of immediate requirements;</li> <li>- impact of the conflict on the human and social capital (including human security), with particular emphasis on the disadvantaged, to underline immediate humanitarian and protection needs, highlight the existence of untapped capacities for peace and modulate the focus on capacity-building objectives.</li> </ul>
	Pre-Assessment: Assembly of background data	Initial PCNA secretariat (UN/Bank)	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- development of annotated bibliography</li> <li>- inventory of baseline data sources</li> <li>- creation and maintenance of key informants including NGOs, academics, technical experts and <i>diaspora</i></li> <li>- setting up PCNA website as information sharing platform</li> </ul>
	Pre-Assessment: Analysis of state and non state actors, institutions and capacity (to the extent possible)	Initial PCNA secretariat (UN/Bank)	3.A.	stakeholder/capacity analysis that puts forward a basic shared analysis of the degree of capacity and legitimacy in state and non-state institutions, in several dimensions: technical and administrative capacity, credibility of key institutions, issues with perceived bias within state and other counterpart structures, prospects for short and long-term revenue generation
	Political consensus on objective and scope of PCNA	UN/Bank/Govt/Donors	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individual consultations can be followed by an initial consultation roundtable or workshop.</li> <li>- Decisions are outlined in Draft Concept Note</li> </ul>
	PCNA Secretariat established	UN/Bank/Govt/Donors	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Senior Technical Coordinators and Coordination Officer selected</li> <li>- Physical secretariat established</li> <li>- PCNA Budget produced</li> <li>- UN/Bank PCNA Joint Programme initiated</li> </ul>
	Priority Clusters and Cross-cutting issues identified	UN/Bank/Govt/Donors	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individual consultations can be followed by an initial consultation roundtable or workshop.</li> <li>- Decisions are outlined in Draft Concept Note</li> </ul>
	CCG Established	Govt/Donors/UN/Bank	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TORs agreed and circulated</li> </ul>
	PCNA Team (technical experts) nominated and selected	PCNA Secretariat UN/Bank/Govt/Donors	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TORs and contact lists established for Cluster leaders, Cross-cutting focal points and Conflict Advisor</li> </ul>
	Communication Strategy	PCNA Secretariat	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Communication Strategy and initial outreach</li> </ul>
	Concept Note	PCNA Secretariat/CCG	3.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Concept Note completed, in line with the results of the pre-assessment, which articulates the national vision for reconstruction and recovery as well as the scope and modalities of the PCNA exercise.</li> </ul>

Step	Activity	Responsibility	Tool Kit Section	Products & Outcomes
<b>Assessment and Analysis</b>				
	Inception Workshop	PCNA Secretariat and full PCNA Team	3.B. plus training materials from Section 2	Inception Workshop conducted to review key results of the pre-assessment and familiarize participants on the common methodology and technical guidance for conducting the assessments (including TRF training, cross-cutting sensitization, costing guidance, etc), - Agreements reached on timelines and deliverables, cluster work plans developed, including mission schedules and inter-cluster linkages, etc.
	Data collection, consultations and analysis	PCNA Team (cluster teams)	2.A., 2.F. 3.B., 3.B.	Cluster teams, in close co-ordination with the conflict adviser and cross-cutting focal points, collect data on the respective sectors. - Mission TORs and aide memoires drafted and circulated
	Cluster report drafting	Cluster teams	Section 2, 3.B.	Cluster teams develop recovery priorities based on needs assessment and in view of the overall objectives of the PCNA, and prepare estimates of external assistance needed.
	Cluster validation workshops	Cluster teams, PCNA Secretariat, PCNA Stakeholders	3.B.	Sectoral validation workshops are held to gather stakeholder input on recovery needs and priorities identified and discuss possible strategies to address them.
	Cluster reports/TRFs finalized and costed	Cluster teams, PCNA Secretariat,	Section 2, 3.B.	Based on their findings, consultations and validation workshops, cluster teams develop strategies to address sectoral recovery needs, calculate external assistance requirements and elaborate a TRF.
<b>Validation and Financing</b>				
	Consolidation of sectoral findings, articulation of the overall strategic peace-building storyline.	PCNA Secretariat, CCG focal points	2.A. 3.C.	Internal consolidation retreat can be held to review sectoral assessment findings for their overall quality and relation to the post-conflict country vision. Prioritization between sectors may be necessary to enhance the coherence of the overall recovery strategy. - Sectoral priorities are prioritized, synthesis report/storyline and consolidated TRF drafted
	Validation of PCNA report/TRF and implementation arrangements	PCNA Secretariat, CCG, State and non-state actors	2.A. 3.B. 3.D.	- Validation Workshop held to reach consensus between major stakeholders on all the elements of the strategic peace-building storyline, priorities identified, external assistance required. - Financing and Implementation mechanisms designed and negotiated - Synthesis report and costed TRF cleared, finalized, published and circulated.
	PCNA findings launched at pledging conference	PCNA Secretariat, Host Country, CCG, Government, Donors	2.A. 3.B.	Usually done within the confines of an international donors' conference, built specifically around the PCNA/TRF, which is presented by the National Authorities, against which individual donors make their pledges. For maximum impact, the commitment of resources by donors at the conference would be a commitment towards implementing the priorities of the TRF, regardless of the funding channel (MDTFs, grants to NGOs, bilateral projects through own contractors, etc.). The Implementation Platform would also be confirmed/launched at the event.
<b>Implementation and Monitoring</b>				
	Operationalize the Implementation Platform and Communication Strategy	UN/Bank/Govt./ Donors	3.D.	- Operationalize governance structure for implementation platform - Conduct outreach on the components, ownership and expectations surrounding the TRF and agree on communication strategy for external reporting of TRF progress
	PCNA/TRF Lessons Learned/Review	UN/Bank/Govt./ Donors (including HQs)	3.D.	Lessons Learned exercise conducted by PCNA Coordinators, supported by joint HQ teams.
	Regular monitoring and reporting on implementation of TRF	UN/Bank/Govt./ Donors	3.D.	Monitoring and reporting of all progress implementing the TRF priorities.
	Periodic review/update of the TRF	UN/Bank/Govt./ Donors	3.D.	Periodic reviews and adjustments of the TRF are necessary (for example at the 12 month mark or 24 month mark) in order to account for national changes, increased/decreased needs, new priorities, changing timelines, new costs, etc.