Ending Need Indeed:
Harmonizing Humanitarian, Development and Security Priorities in the Horn of Africa

UNDP Africa Sub-Regional Strategic Assessment No. 2

CONSULTATION DRAFT – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
NOVEMBER 2016

Introduction
This report presents an analysis of the sub-regional dynamics affecting development outcomes in the Horn of Africa. It has been published by UNDP as a knowledge product to inform its own and other partners’ future interventions. The report focuses on the countries that traditionally make up the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. It forms part of UNDP’s overall responsiveness to the increasing need to understand and implement sub-regional approaches as a means of advancing more lasting development gains across the continent.¹

Despite huge social, political and economic variations between and within countries in the Horn of Africa region, fundamental challenges and dynamics, which are the subject of this report, closely bind them together. Yet development partners face constraints in responding to the sub-regional dimensions of the development context, here as elsewhere. These constraints stem from the nature of partnerships with national governments on development, which can themselves represent obstacles both to working sub-regionally, and to addressing more sensitive issues.² The prioritization of security imperatives in the Horn may place additional constraints on international partners, as discussed further below.

In addition to casting a deliberately “sub-regional” analytic lens on the Horn of Africa’s development context, this report also explicitly responds to the goal of “Changing People’s Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need”, which is Core Priority 4 of the Agenda for Humanity, debated and agreed at the highest levels at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) that took place in Istanbul in May 2016.³ It takes the seriousness of the commitments made there as its starting point. In this regard, its title statement ‘Ending Need Indeed’ is a direct reference to the normative call to action emerging from the WHS to actualize what are well-recognized maxims around addressing root causes of recurrent crises and building resilience.

¹ UNDP has adopted five ‘regionality principles’ to guide its work in Africa. These are: (a) promotion of regional public goods and services, based on strengthened regional cooperation and integration; (b) management of cross-border externalities (challenges and opportunities) and spill-overs – such as trade, the environment and conflict prevention – that are best addressed collaboratively on an inter-country basis; (c) advancement of awareness, dialogue and action on sensitive and or emerging development issues that benefit strongly from multi-country and regional experiences and perspectives; (d) promotion of experimentation and innovation to overcome institutional, financial and/or informational barriers that may be too high for an individual country to surmount; and (e) generation and sharing of development knowledge, experience and expertise – for instance, through South-South and triangular cooperation. UNDP (2014). Regional Bureau for Africa: Annual Report 2014, p. 4. Available at: http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/mba/docs/Reports/RBA_Annual_Report_2014.pdf. The report is the second in a series of sub-regional strategic assessments focusing on different parts of Africa, whose overall objectives are to contribute analytical perspectives on the sub-regional dimensions of development challenges and opportunities, and to inform UNDP’s own programming. See also UNDP (2016). Central Africa: A Region Falling Behind? Re-considering Approaches to Improving Development Outcomes in Central Africa (forthcoming).

² In the case of the UN, the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), on which UNDP and other agencies in the UN family base their interventions, takes member states’ national development planning as its starting point. The essentially national perspective of the UNDAF tool has been a largely uncontroversial and widely accepted modus operandi to date. See ODI (2006). Review of the Role and Quality of the UNDAFs. While several development partners have for many years directed some part of their development assistance through regional programs that are located more clearly in one or other sub-region, this remains a smaller and less well-established component of overall aid relationships. However, as part of the current Quadrennial Comprehensive Review Policy, adding a regional dimension to UNDAFs is under discussion.

³ UN (2016). One Humanity: Shared Responsibility – Report from the UN Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit. A/70/709. Available at: https://consultations.worldhumanitariansummit.org/bitcache/e4f881ca33e374063f57162857c7629c71e35416d569103&disposition:inline&op=view
As a result of facing what is arguably the biggest interface between disaster risk, climate vulnerability and underdevelopment in the world, the Horn of Africa’s experiences garnered from successive phases of humanitarian disaster have served as important milestones in international perspectives on these issues. The responsibility to act is urgent, particularly with regard to finding ‘new ways of working’ to respond to the needs of people in crisis, breaking down silos between emergency relief, development and related interventions, in order to tackle the root causes of vulnerability. These messages reverberate in their relevance to the Horn of Africa region, and it is UNDP’s hope that this study will contribute to mobilizing the international community towards a new chapter of explicit support to governments and citizens, in order to realize the Agenda for Humanity – and a permanent move towards more peaceful, prosperous, inclusive and resilient societies – in pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals in the region.

**Key findings from the UNDP sub-regional situation analysis of the Horn of Africa development context**

A major factor in determining persistently low human development performance in the Horn overall is its status as one of the world’s most vulnerable regions in terms of humanitarian need, in turn the result of a combination of protracted conflict, economic and climatic factors. The sub-region has experienced long-term structural and persistent crises, with pockets of emergency. The Horn’s fragility is today further underscored by signs of a breakdown in consensus and momentum concerning stabilization efforts in Somalia, as well as renewed insecurity in South Sudan. Anxiety about possible violence linked to electoral competition ahead of the 2017 general elections in Kenya; significant quantities of small arms and light weapons (SALW) present and smuggled into the region; as well as other types of pressure related to violence further afield as well as international interests, also relate. The risk of wider fall-out in the Horn of Africa from mounting insecurity in the Middle East, is all the while escalating.

From a development perspective, the sheer complexity and entrenched nature of the challenges faced, make it hard both to disentangle the causes and effects, and to prioritize entry-points. This report identifies three broad and intersecting clusters of development issues that lie at the heart of continued fragility in the region.

The first relates to both historic, and present-day, armed violence taking place across sovereign state borders, as well as within countries, noting large-scale armed violence in Somalia, Sudan and threatened again in South Sudan, and smaller conflicts across all countries.

**Figure 1: Number of conflicts in the Horn of Africa**

![Number of conflicts](Image)

Source: Uppsala database data compiled by UN OCHA.

---

4 The notion of community ‘resilience’ is now ubiquitous in both government and international agency programs. In the context of vulnerability in the Horn of Africa, a significant literature exists asserting the importance of building the resilience of those communities particularly vulnerable to drought as well as flooding, such as the various pastoralist groups – as summarized in S. Pavanello (2009). *Pastoralists’ Vulnerability in the Horn of Africa: Care and ODI: Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2009*. The UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis established in 2008 developed a Comprehensive Framework for Action, designed to encourage concerted response to the food price crisis of the time, with a twin-track approach that both responds to immediate needs of vulnerable populations, and contribute to longer-term resilience. See [http://www.unfoodsecurity.org/node/842](http://www.unfoodsecurity.org/node/842).

5 Source data includes Rwanda and Burundi.
A review of some of the dynamics informing this violent history immediately reveals the interconnections at play that challenge overly sharp distinctions between inter and intra-state forms of violence – thus emphasizing the legitimacy of the ‘sub-regional’ lens in this domain. The legacy of decades of conflict has left countries in the sub-region intimately connected through a patchwork of trans-boundary allegiances and enmities, with contested borders and cross-border identities important factors. The overall geostrategic positioning of the Horn, and wider insecurity in neighboring regions, creates additional pressure on existing conflicts, both politically, and practically, with regard to spillover in weapons trade and displaced populations. However, failure to build an inclusive national political system that represents the diversity found to different degrees in each country, especially pronounced but by no means limited to borderland communities, is a key factor defining the fragility of each country and the sub-region as a whole. The IGAD region is found to score lowest among African regions in performance on political participation and rights indicators. The way in which diversity – whether of political perspectives and/or identity – is managed in the Horn of Africa thus remains a major source of popular grievance, that is frequently met with extreme levels of state-sponsored violence and repression. This style of governance has served as a brake on socio-political development including with respect to women’s rights, as forces of conservatism, autocracy, patriarchy and control are elevated over the individual rights of the majority. Given the sub-region’s history, the potential for such grievances to feed into further cycles of violent conflict is ever-present.

The second cluster of issues explored relates to the availability of livelihood and economic opportunity for the region’s growing populations, as well as other grievances linked to the development process. Although growth rates in the region have been robust overall, progress with poverty eradication is constrained, including in high-performing countries. While standards of living have improved for large numbers of the region’s citizens, countries are confronting a number of major economic challenges affecting the quality of growth, and compounding pressure from conflict and other factors. Among them, limited progress with structural transformation of economies; accelerating processes of urbanization; population pressure; and a high degree of income inequality, can all be counted. Population growth in the Horn of Africa is among the highest in the world: the population increased over fourfold from about 53 million in 1960 to 230 million today – projected to rise to 400 million by 2050. The livelihood of most of the people in the region strongly depends on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism. Agriculture employs about 60-80% of the population which is in stark contrast with the limited amounts of available arable land. Competition to access these limited natural resources is thus a major factor fueling insecurity that is only set to increase. Against the socio-political and governance backdrop described, rising economic inequality, combined with high multidimensional poverty levels and stark regional disparities, represent serious risks to peace and development. In contexts where citizens’ participation in national and more localized decision-making about development are curtailed by the prevailing political environment, and where inequality is steep and rising, development and change processes themselves are contributing to fueling tensions in society – with elite capture of opportunity a further challenge. These issues relate both to large-scale infrastructure investments such as LAPSET, development of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam in Lake Turkana, and the development of the region’s extractive industries and agri-business in general, as well as with regard to a multitude of smaller and more localized developments and related land acquisition processes.

Finally, despite a well-established policy emphasis on the importance of breaking emergency relief cycles, the region’s vulnerability has persisted, as flagged above, in part as a function of ongoing conflict and limited economic opportunity, as well as persistent climatic pressures. The sub-region has recently moved again into the grip of a major food security emergency related to El Niño in central and eastern Ethiopia, and driven by conflict in parts of Sudan, South Sudan and Yemen (which has had direct implications for the number of refugees coming into the Horn of Africa sub-region). Ethiopia has experienced the worst drought to have affected the country in 50 years. Interventions to improve resilience to shocks in the Horn of Africa has for some time represented an important dimension of interventions, with fresh impetus linked to the present El Niño event, and through expanding support to relevant national and IGAD-level programs and institutes.

Important gains both with regard to early warning and early action, and tacit gains for confidence between states and with regard to the utility of IGAD performing its regional institutional role in this domain have

---

6 Documented for instance by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. See Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2014). Regional Integration: Uniting to Compete.
8 See FEWSNET alert Ethiopia, December 2015. Available at: http://www.fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/alert/deceber-4-2015
been secured. In particular, the results of over a decade of partnership between international partners and governments such as that of Ethiopia and Kenya in growing national-level response architecture and programs such as the Productive Safety Net Program as well as Kenya’s food security policy frameworks, are key and have had positive results. However, despite the gains, the fact remains that a new cycle of food insecurity is underway. Irregular migration linked to all these factors continues to rise with vulnerable refugee and IDP populations scattered across the region’s border areas. The sub-region’s growing population and ongoing vulnerability to climate change will necessarily increase pressure on resources, pointing to the urgent need to deepen and expand resilience going forward.9

Securitization of development?
Today, two additional factors cast a long shadow over the Horn of Africa’s development context, each of which occupies an increasingly central place in international policy perspectives on, and priorities in the region, being closely aligned to security concerns at a global level. These are: (a) the rise of Islamic violent extremism in the sub-region; and (b) the significant levels of migration taking place within the various countries of the sub-region, across borders and, in many cases, transiting from the sub-region to further afield destinations such as Europe.

The initiatives and commitments that have flowed from these two areas of concern have important implications for the way in which international development partners engage in the sub-region. Strong concerns linked to the perceived securitization of aid in the Horn of Africa were voiced by a number of stakeholders during research for this study. While it was beyond the scope of the research to conduct a detailed mapping of the impacts per partner of security priorities in influencing development programming, evidence of a significant shift and reprioritization towards interventions that are overtly framed under either heading was clearly identifiable. The implications of this realignment of powerful international partner attention on the Horn of Africa behind migration and violent extremism focused interventions are likely to be significant, when considering the overall context of fragility and vulnerability and imperative of tackling root causes. A key challenge related to an apparent and creeping securitization of development assistance in the Horn of Africa, as elsewhere, is the way in which strategic partnerships with key states tends to reduce development partners’ readiness to engage on governance and rights-related shortfalls – while at the same time significantly reducing ‘bargaining power’ with states, as a result of reliance on partnership for security objectives. Given the core governance and inclusion issues at the root of fragility in the sub-region, this trend looks set to be potentially counter-productive on all fronts.

A central argument of this report is that privileging of interventions that address these twin ‘security’ factors, at the expense of long-term and comprehensive investment in the endemic development challenges that give rise to them, is myopic and unlikely to achieve lasting results. Mounting insecurity linked to violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, as well as high levels of migration within and out of the region, are most appropriately understood as the result of partial progress, in development terms, with regard to the three identified issue clusters summarized above: (i) transforming violent connections, deepening democracy and uplifting rights; (ii) addressing economic grievances, enhancing opportunity; and (iii) building resilience. In principle, therefore, concerns about violent extremism and migration could be taken as an opportunity to advance the kind of joined-up approaches sought at the WHS, given that meaningful efforts to advance each agenda require attention across the spectrum of humanitarian, development and security dimensions. However, to date in practice, the emphasis of international response has leaned heavily towards security aspects.

Progress with regional integration
As advocated strongly by the African Union Commission through its economic policy frameworks as well as its peace and security architecture and overall Agenda 2063: Unity, Prosperity and Peace, greater levels of regional integration and cooperation will be an essential component of the continent’s future success10 With

---

9 IGAD (2015), op. cit, p. 20.
10 Available at: http://agenda2063.au.int/en/vision. This approach has evolved as a result of globalization, that brought internationalization and integration in the world economy, while also giving rise to the formation of economic blocs, regional unions and sub-regional development strategies to create closer economic linkages across borders in order to increase the competitive edge of diverse regions in the global market. See: A. Kumssa and T. G. McGee (eds.) (2001). Globalization and the New Regional Development.
regard to these goals, it is clear that the search for collaborative sub-regional cooperation in responding to the complex challenges commonly faced by countries in the Horn of Africa have historically been stymied by the enduring pattern of insecurity and bitterness between states. New dynamism is apparent, but polarization and mistrust remains.

On the surface, while poor relations persist – to the extent that two neighbours (Ethiopia and Eritrea) forego all trade and diplomacy at the present time, with Eritrea currently excluded from IGAD – a pattern of relations has begun to emerge, which many have taken to augur a more conducive inter-state context when compared to the Horn’s historical norm. The extent to which efforts to advance multilateral responses to challenges faced in the region, including in the areas such as peace and stability, economic inclusivity and building resilience that are prioritized in the report, can be interpreted as a meaningful shift towards greater integration, or whether narrower political concerns still prevail, are explored throughout this report. Critical nodes of energy driving countries closer together have emerged as a result of Ethiopia’s thirst for growth, and need for infrastructure facilitating sea access in particular, as well as other major economies in the sub-region similarly reaching for growth-enabling infrastructure beyond national borders. Arguably, a key component of Ethiopia’s recent success in development terms has been its embrace of multilateralism as a vehicle for advancing national interests. The emergence of Ethiopia as a stronger regional influence in the Horn of Africa may come to allow for the possibility of a less volatile character to inter-state relations in the coming years. However, some analysts raise overarching questions as to whether economic drivers such as those driving Ethiopia’s dynamism in the region, have the potential to transform endemic conflict among states, or whether political stability is a precondition for advancing economic cooperation.\footnote{See S. Healy (2011). Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. Chatham House, London.}

Meanwhile, the question of whether tensions between states brought together in the IGAD bloc is narrowing, or, as some might argue pointing to splits over the conflict in South Sudan, widening, remains open – as most starkly apparent in the domain of peace and security.

Complementing state-driven momentum are long-standing but expanding trade connections linking informal traders and pastoralist communities at the grassroots. Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) in this context ‘represents a robust resource for market-based cooperation and local economic security’.\footnote{Ibid.} On this basis, in some parts of the Horn of Africa ‘the end state of an economic community practically exists already with free (unregulated) movement of people and capital and free (unrestricted movement of goods across borders’\footnote{Ibid.}. However, this organic grassroots expression of high policy vision is in practice jeopardized by poor political recognition of it as such, and a counter tendency to see border areas and the people who live at them as a potential security liability. Policy recognition of the significance of ICBT to the wider integration project has still yet to firmly take root, though it is growing. However, overall progress with removal of trade barriers, enabling free movement of people and development of common customs regulations lags behind – not helped by prevailing uncertainty as to the proper relationship and respective roles and responsibilities of IGAD as against other important RECs in the wider East Africa region.

This issue of overlapping REC membership – familiar across the continent – further complicates the deeper political economic power shaping sub-regional cooperation and integration.
Table 1: Multiple REC and related institutional membership of IGAD member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IGAD</th>
<th>CEN-SAD</th>
<th>COMESA</th>
<th>EAC</th>
<th>ICGLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On a political level, this multiplicity at times fosters competition among states, with the relatively powerful Kenya and Uganda more drawn to the EAC than IGAD (reflecting the long-standing tensions among IGAD member states, and manifested in non-payment of membership dues to IGAD among other indicators). On a practical level, it creates a lack of clarity as to which REC is the appropriate motor with regard to questions of economic integration in particular (COMESA, EAC, CEN-SAD or IGAD?). Questions of how to manage concurrent conversations and processes in such a way as to minimize duplication of effort and inefficiencies, and avoid de-railing a fledgling degree of confidence in greater levels of integration among states in the sub-region, remain a critical strategic issue for the region. These bureaucratic considerations shadow the unpredictability of inter-state dynamics, and further compromise overall progress in tackling shared sub-regional problems.

Beyond the overlapping membership and mandate issue, as well as delays in advancing the regional integration agenda, IGAD – which is the REC to which this report devotes the greatest attention given its relevance to the geographic area under review – faces a number of its own challenges as an institution, though it has also attracted a considerable level of international partner interest and support throughout its history. Attempting to map the detail of partner support to different components of IGAD work rapidly creates a dizzying impression. With a number of partners working in parallel, the potential for proliferation of initiatives remains high, with direct implications for the Secretariat resource especially with regard to burdensome multiple reporting requirements. High reliance on donor funding as well as delay in transfer of committed funds to IGAD was noted as a key challenge as part of its evaluation of progress and challenges from 2011-15. In addition to covering the major programs, IGAD also relies on donor-funded contracts to staff key functions within the current organization structure. Overall, this partnership structure, in the words of one recent assessment: ‘has implications for power relations between donors, IGAD Member Countries and IGAD governing institutions, as well as for agenda setting and the incentives created for the IGAD Secretariat.’ Key issues emerging from recent reviews of IGAD point to institutional challenges related to responsibility for decision-making, which remains tightly contained at the executive level of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, with limited actual delegation to the multilateral venue of IGAD itself. The Secretariat, though originally intended to serve as the executive body of IGAD, has largely been reduced to a technical and administrative implementing body, unable to take decisions on strategic issues or set policy. Even here, capacity issues related to the small permanent staff and availability of other core resources, act as a constraint on implementation. Other challenges such as the uneven financial contribution of member states act as further obstacles, leading to a situation where the IGAD Secretariat is in constant fund-raising mode. Some key partners are convinced of the need for a new treaty to be drafted and adopted expanding IGAD’s mandate and structures to meet the challenges it faces.

While IGAD is a rapidly evolving organization of potentially pivotal significance to development in the Horn of Africa, its institutional capacities and arrangements are still under review and in flux. The overall regional

---

14 Eritrea withdrew from IGAD in 2007 over disagreement with IGAD’s approach to Somalia. It has applied to be re-admitted however other members have resisted this move.
17 B. Byiers (2016), op. cit.
institutional and political environment inevitably has critical implications for the ability of governments and international partners alike to work collaboratively in response to transnational and/or commonly shared sub-regional priorities. A more robust IGAD will be critical not only to advancing multilateral responses to the ongoing crises discussed so far in this report, but also other sources of future instability such as those related to the use of the Nile waters, access to the Red Sea and other international interests within the wider Horn region and further afield. However, achieving such a reinvigorated institution will be difficult, as long as powerful member states find themselves with opposing agendas on critical issues affecting the region.

Towards achieving harmonized humanitarian, development and security interventions

For international partners, identifying strategic entry-points in the face of such complexity is no easy task. In response, partners have tended to align behind different specific issue areas: comprehensive strategic responses based on overall analysis of sub-regional context are rare. Following are a series of strategic and specific recommendations arising from the analysis laid out in the longer report, intended to guide greater harmonization between humanitarian, development and security priorities of international partners going forward, in the interests of more strategic and effective sub-regional responses and support to ‘ending need indeed’ in the Horn of Africa.

A. Strategic priorities for international partners in the Horn of Africa
   (i) Seize the Agenda for Humanity opportunity to reframe interventions in the Horn

After decades of humanitarian aid and overseas development assistance expenditure in the region, the Horn remains in a critical state of continued on-off emergency. Effective realization of the ‘relief to resilience’ paradigm in terms of long-term transitioning of the sub-region out of emergency mode and firmly onto development-focused trajectories, has still yet to occur. A persistent mismatch in expenditure on resilience-building as against relief, continues to characterize overall international engagement in the region, and mapping conducted by OCHA of the presence of development programs against vulnerability “hotspots” also reveals serious shortfalls. Concerted efforts to ensure closer collaboration between humanitarian and development partners, emerge as a fundamental priority for the region going forward.

Figure 2: Mapping development partner interventions against humanitarian vulnerability

Source: Extract from presentation by OCHA to Inter-Agency Steering Committee, Nairobi, May 2015.

International partners should seize the opportunity to seriously mobilize around Core Priority 4 of the Agenda for Humanity, to find ‘new ways of working’ in order to permanently support the region to transition out of its on-off emergency mode. The principled commitments to people affected by forced migration laid out in Core Priority 3 of the Agenda for Humanity are also profoundly relevant. Short-term and security-driven interventions to stem migration to Europe appear at best a distraction from such higher goals, and at worse to run the risk of working against more meaningful change in the region.

The situation analysis provided by this report highlights the way in which violent extremism and migration are each better viewed as symptoms of other unresolved issues, suggesting that a re-think of the trend of framing these twin issues as ‘security’ issues, and aligning development interventions behind them accordingly, is required. In particular, diverting development assistance away from initiatives to tackle long-term priorities and overly boxing expenditure in migration and CVE envelopes is myopic and will potentially lead to counter-productive results. Instead, seizing the opportunity presented by momentum on each issue to carve out holistic and appropriately integrated responses across each of humanitarian, development and security dimensions, should be the priority. Well-established frameworks for assessing the potentially adverse impacts on conflict dynamics of development interventions such as ‘do no harm’ and conflict-sensitivity are ever more relevant and ought to be a sine qua non of all interventions to the region.

Sustained resourcing of relevant national disaster risk management frameworks and programs is critical, with a continued commitment and emphasis on supporting state capacity to manage and deepen resilience per country overall. In addition, vulnerability and risk assessments systematically informing development programming to ensure its relevance to longer-term change, together with renewed and more tangible commitment to ensuring communities living in vulnerable and risk-prone areas permanently transition out of cyclical crises is also required.

(ii) Commit to responding to the Horn both as a specific region and with integrated financing streams

The goal of thinking and programming sub-regionally is necessarily complex, however the higher goal of regional integration as well as the transnational nature of development challenges themselves, demands such efforts are systematically undertaken. While development partners have been active at country level across IGAD member states throughout the past few decades, too often, bi-lateral and multilateral agencies are set up administratively in ways that render strategic sub-regional perspectives almost impossible to envisage, with countries divided by some agencies between Arab and African divisions; or partially subsumed in a wider East Africa unit; or with other more idiosyncratic groupings that zoom in on particular crisis zones excluding more stable countries. This tendency exacerbates institutional silos on thematic lines to render international partners ill-equipped to respond to the region as a region, and across all the complex areas that need to be held in one frame. Development partners need to consider adjusting institutional structures to accommodate strategic-level response to the Horn of Africa region as such, seizing all opportunities to create multiplier effects for sub-regional integration through programming.

(iii) Engagement based on shared context analysis and coordinated interventions

As called-for in the Agenda for Humanity, shared analysis of context represents a crucial starting point for more effective international engagement.

A new type of Horn of Africa-level program of development assistance has been put forward in the form of the $8 billion Horn of Africa Initiative, a multi-sector, multi-partner intervention framework launched in 2014 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim led by the World Bank Group, together with the African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank and EU. This program responds to some of the priorities put forward in this report, in particular through putting cross-border collaborative responses to the sources of insecurity and fragility at the fore of its intervention rationale.20

20 World Bank (2014). Regional Initiative in Support of the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa Initiative is structured around two pillars: (i) Vulnerability and resilience, with objectives to: a) enhance the productive capacities and coping mechanisms of displaced populations to allow them to contribute to the local economy in their areas of displacement, and promote durable social and economic reintegration for voluntary returns; and b) provide support to communicable disease surveillance, diagnosis and treatment. (ii) Economic opportunity and integration, with objectives to: a) support connectivity through regional transport infrastructure, and increased access to broadband, along with improved enabling environments to encourage
While the opportunity for ongoing collaboration and information sharing through the partner platform created through the Horn of Africa Initiative, and the value of regular exchange among the various institutions, is acknowledged by stakeholders, questions were raised during research for this report with regard to the extent to which the framework is really ‘held’ as such, as against being a collection of parallel initiatives, with no real coordinating mechanism or overall results monitoring. Further, it is notable that a number of priority issues that emerge from this report as key from the development perspective, are not catered to within its framework – particularly with regard to the all-important and critical governance issues raised. The opportunity to develop a shared framework to guide development partner interventions in the sub-region has indeed yet to be capitalized.

The need for such shared analysis of priorities has similarly been highlighted in a recent regional analysis undertaken by IGAD as part of the IDDRSI – framed as an effort to ‘regularize a comprehensive regional analysis report for the Horn of Africa under the leadership of IGAD on a bi-annual basis’, which the IGAD Program Coordination Unit has undertaken to take forward with a twin humanitarian and development focus.

Providing necessary support to this kind of analytical work can yield important dividends for convergence and more effective programming. Perspectives on the Horn need to be rounded out beyond one-dimensional prioritization of security, or disaster-related prerogatives, to take on a more comprehensive analysis of the context, and respond accordingly, whether through an expansion of the Horn of Africa Initiative itself or through complementary interventions. Concerted effort to address root causes across the spectrum of priorities will be key to the success of the overall partner footprint in the sub-region.

(iv) Strategic and harmonized partner support to IGAD

An important dimension of international engagement with the Horn of Africa at sub-regional level relates to engagement with IGAD itself – working to support its institutional development in the interests of effective leadership of member state response to challenges is a clear priority. As discussed, proliferation of partnerships and projects with different donors, leading to multiple reporting lines and responsibilities on the part of the IGAD Secretariat, tends to reinforce weaknesses in the IGAD structure. At the same time, combined diplomatic and partner weight to advance necessary institutional reforms to help empower IGAD to build on the significant gains made to date and sustain its leadership in responding to development and security challenges facing the Horn of Africa into a new era, is required.

Rather than further entrenching the challenges discussed in this report regarding IGAD’s structure and funding base, more calibrated approaches are required. This could entail funding more regular, high-level summits at the regional level rather than the everyday activities of the IGAD Secretariat; while also seeking to amplify the effects of the growing economic interdependency and dynamism around infrastructure, encouraging private sector investment around key transport routes for instance. Avoiding sub-regional level blockages linked to persistent tensions between some states by supporting and enabling bi-lateral agreements in the name of economic integration is a further recommendation. Certainly, supporting political dialogue among member states to build a consensus as to what kind of institutional arrangements will best serve the REC and the region going forward, shared among partners and member states, will be timely and important.

Working to ensure that the chairmanship is rotating in order to enhance IGAD’s multilateral legitimacy will also be key. A further corollary of the increasingly securitized outlook of partners may have been a tacit marginalization of Eritrea by Western countries and institutions. For the long-term stability of the sub-region as well as the authority of IGAD, more pragmatic approaches to facilitate the return of Eritrea to IGAD could potentially help ensure improved relations and more productive engagement going forward.

---

a competitive private sector market; b) foster cross-border growth and stability through support for local governance, border management and trade facilitation; and c) support the regional development of the extractives sector through pipeline development and expansion of tertiary education. A cross-cutting intention to advance greater security and stability in the region, and to promote involvement of the private sector and to give particular attention to the needs of women and the youth, is also noted.
B. Specific priorities for international partners in the Horn of Africa

In addition to the strategic-level priorities laid out above, specific priority intervention areas emerging from this report are presented below. The list is by no means exhaustive given the terrain covered, and each area is noted in note form rather than fully elaborated. The intention is to highlight some key directions proposed by the discussion to which it will be essential to maintain and amplify attention to in the months and years ahead, responding to the situation analysis provided here.

(i) Transform violent connections

- Support diplomatic initiatives to build trust and identify common ground and shared interests among states in the region;
- Amplify support to national, sub-national and sub-regional peacebuilding initiatives that emphasize dialogue, truth-telling and reconciliation, with a particular and immediate emphasis on countries facing open conflict (South Sudan, Somalia and Sudan), however with parallel work in all countries in the region;
- Amplify support to borderland peace and development interventions and enhancement of peace infrastructures, prioritizing vulnerability hotspots identified by OCHA;
- Facilitate a Horn of Africa framework and exchange among state and non-state actors in order to enhance and deepen national and sub-regional peace architecture;
- Establish a sub regional platform for knowledge sharing and advocacy aimed at promoting land/resource governance and policy convergence among states;
- Amplify state-society engagement processes to mitigate threats to human security arising from factors such as SALW proliferation, human rights violations and irregular migration/ trafficking.

(ii) Promote good governance, democracy and human rights in the Horn of Africa at local, national and sub-regional levels

- Ensure harmonized and amplified multi-lateral and bilateral support to governance reforms in all countries in the region, emphasizing inclusion of all citizens (by ethnicity, age and gender) in development process, and improvements in the human rights performance of states;
- Introduce/ extend multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility programs adapted to country contexts across the region and addressing regional perspectives as a mechanism for amplifying civic engagement and voice in promoting democratization, rights and accountability;
- Identify and support platforms for civil society to engage in regional-level policy processes articulating civic perspectives on issues as they present on the ground;
- Strengthen regional mechanisms for promoting good governance;
- Identify and support Horn of Africa networks of women’s leaders from across civil society, business and livelihood sectors, professions, to help amplify intensification of progress towards elimination of discrimination against women in its different forms in the region.

(iii) Renew efforts to build state and citizen resilience to shocks

- Renew commitments to the region with regard to building resilience to climatic and conflict-related shocks, including through support to governments to deepen and expand institutional capacity; and strengthening the sub-regional lens;
- Renew and expand social protection frameworks, facilitating cross-learning at sub-regional level;
Support and scale-up community resilience initiatives, prioritizing hotspot areas, and taking invocative approaches and know-how fully into account (e.g. risk transfer mechanisms/ use of digital technologies, among others).

(iv) Deepen efforts to ensure economic growth is inclusive

- Provide support to governments in creating enabling environments for business and investment at all levels including through addressing energy, infrastructure and access to finance constraints, as well as social protection – including for MSMEs and the informal sector;
- Facilitate cross-learning around inclusive growth at sub-regional level;
- Establish a regional platform for knowledge sharing and advocacy aimed at resolving grievances related to development investments, and policy convergence among states;
- Amplify efforts to tackle corruption and elite capture of economic opportunity in each country, supporting peer review as well as civic actor networking on these issues.

(v) Advance economic integration in the Horn

- Work towards clarity on EAC/ COMESA/ IGAD respective roles and complementarity with regard to economic integration, putting a process in place to harmonize and communicate to all stakeholders;
- Create a platform for states, business and citizens to engage in infrastructure development processes in the Horn of Africa to help amplify the effects of the current dynamic era of change in roads, ports, ICT, electric, while also building capacity to review and monitor impacts/ reduce grievances/ transparency/ benefits;
- Enhance efforts to create One-Stop Border Posts throughout IGAD region;
- Develop ways to enhance livelihoods and other dividends for peace and development accrued from ICBT in the sub-region, working to elevate its standing at policy level;
- Support the IGAD Business Form and other B2B channels/ sector specific associations, creating platforms for entrepreneurs’ advocacy at regional level.

(vi) Ensure response to violent extremism and irregular migration are grounded in context analysis and contribute to wider development objectives

- Articulate development agenda with regard to these twin priorities more clearly, and invest in achieving joined-up responses that do not privilege security dimensions over other facets;
- Apply conflict and rights-sensitivity in designing interventions;
- Scale-up development partner support to return and reintegration processes for migrants, supporting relief and specialized agencies in transition to development;
- Implement awareness-raising with vulnerable communities of risks associated both with migration and violent extremism;
- Scale-up livelihoods and youth participation work across all vulnerable areas;
- Promote development-oriented solutions in national and regional strategies to prevent and respond to the risks of violent extremism and youth migration.