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REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 245th meeting held on 15 October 2010, Council, having reviewed in-depth the situation in Somalia on the basis of the report [PSC/MIN/1(CCLXLV)] I submitted, endorsed a new force strength of 20,000, for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the requisite air and maritime capabilities, and an enhanced civilian and police component of 1,680, comprising 560 police experts on mission and eight (8) Formed Police Units (FPUs) of 140 each. Council called on the United Nations Security Council to take the decisions required of it, in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, by endorsing the revised Concept of Operations (CONOPS), including the newly-authorized strength of AMISOM, and authorizing an enhanced support package for the Mission, funded through UN assessed contributions [PSC/MIN/1(CCXXXV)].

2. On 22 December 2010, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1964 (2010) in which it authorized the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and to increase its force strength from 8,000 to 12,000 troops. The Security Council noted the recommendations made by Council, and underlined its intention to keep the situation on the ground under review. It requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, as called for by resolution 1863(2009), for a maximum of 12,000 troops, comprising equipment and services but not including the transfer of funds. Finally, it encouraged the Member States to support AMISOM and the Somali Security Sector Institutions, as well as to contribute generously and promptly to the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, without caveats, or to make direct bilateral donations in support of AMISOM.

3. On 20 January 2011, Council, at its 258th meeting, deliberated on the situation in Somalia. Recalling its earlier decisions and communiqués, as well as resolution 1964 (2010), Council decided to renew the mandate of AMISOM for a supplementary period of twelve months, beginning from 17 January 2011 [PSC/PR/COMM.3(CCLVIII)].

4. The present report provides an update on the situation in Somalia, covering the political, security and humanitarian aspects, as well as the deployment and operations of AMISOM. The report makes a number of recommendations on the way forward, including the enhancement of the effectiveness of AMISOM, to build on the momentum generated by the extension of the authority of AMISOM and the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to areas previously under the control of Al Shabaab.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

5. In the past five months, several encouraging political developments have been recorded in the Djibouti Peace Process. These mark a welcome departure from the internal squabbles within the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) that characterized the political process in Somalia during the early part of 2011.

6. In my report [PSC/PR/4 (CCLXXIII)] to the 273rd meeting of Council, held on 21 April 2011, I briefed Council on the decision on the situation in Somalia taken by the 17th Extraordinary Summit of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, on 30 January 2011. Having noted that the transitional period for the TFIs ends on 20 August 2011 and stressing the need to avoid a political vacuum, the Summit reached a consensus on the imperative to extend the term of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), while the remaining political dispensation is handled by the people of Somalia. At its 16th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, from 30 to 31st January 2011, the Assembly of the Union endorsed the IGAD decision to extend the term of the TFP.

7. It was on this basis that, on 3 February, the TFP adopted a motion extending its term for three years, starting from the end of the current transitional period. In the same decision, the Parliament called for the election of the President of the TFG, as well as of the Speaker of the TFP and his deputies. As Council would recall, this decision was rejected by the regional administration of Puntland and Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jamma'a. In addition, some members of the international community strongly condemned the extension, which, they observed, was done without due consultations with relevant stakeholders. The TFG rejected the decisions of Parliament, and reiterated its preference for a shorter post-transition period as demanded by the international community. Subsequently, the Cabinet tabled before Parliament a policy proposal to extend the mandate of all the TFIs, including the Executive, for an additional one year (up to August 2012), after which presidential elections would be conducted. That proposal was rejected by the Speaker of Parliament, who announced plans to conduct presidential elections in July 2011. The Parliament thus proceeded with the drafting of a work plan for a 3-year extended mandate, a move that was condemned by the Office of the President as usurpation of executive powers.

8. A United Nations sponsored high-level consultative meeting, held in Nairobi, on 12 and 13 April 2011, did not overcome the impasse. While the Speaker of the TFP, the Presidents of Puntland and Galmudug regions, representatives of Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jama'a and countries of the region, as well as key partners, attended the meeting, the President and the Cabinet, after numerous attempts to cancel the meeting, refused to participate in this gathering, arguing that it was counterproductive and could further factionalize Somalia.

9. It was against this background that, on 9 June 2011, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Speaker Sharif Hassan Aden, during talks facilitated by President Yoweri Museveni, signed the landmark Kampala Accord, which effectively ended the protracted political standoff between the Executive and the Parliament. Under the Accord, the two Somali leaders reached agreement to extend the transitional period by one year, up to 20 August 2012. In addition, the Accord called for the resignation of the Prime Minister and the formation of a new Government. The parties to the Accord also agreed to establish a roadmap with benchmarks, timelines and compliance mechanisms, for the implementation of the priority tasks to end the transition, including improving security in Mogadishu and other areas in southern Somalia; finalizing and adopting the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP); pursuing national reconciliation and outreach; finalizing and adopting the Draft Constitution; implementing institutional reforms in the TFIs; and organizing elections of the President, Speaker and Deputy Speakers prior to 20 August 2012.

10. In a communiqué issued on 20 June 2011, following a meeting in Addis Ababa with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Augustine Mahiga, and my Special Representative for Somalia, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, I welcomed this Accord, stressing that its expeditious implementation would go a long way in consolidating the important military gains made on the ground by TFG and AMISOM forces. I paid tribute to President Museveni for the critical role he played, and acknowledged the contribution of the IGAD current Chair, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, as well as other leaders of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC), in promoting peace, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. The 17th ordinary session of the Assembly, held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, from 30 June to 2 July 2011, also welcomed the signing of the Kampala Accord.

11. Since then, the TFIs and other Somali stakeholders have made commendable progress in the implementation of the Kampala Accord. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Abdulahi Mohamed on 19 June 2011, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali was appointed by the President as the new Prime Minister. This appointment was unanimously approved by the TFP on 28 June 2011. Subsequently, on 28 July 2011, the Parliament overwhelmingly approved the new, clan-balanced Council of Ministers, comprising of 18 Cabinet Ministers, nine Ministers of State and 24 Deputy Ministers. The Prime Minister received parliamentary approval of his political programme, with priority on the improvement of the security sector and completion of the transitional tasks. Earlier on, on 11 July 2011, the Parliament had approved the Kampala Accord.

12. My Special Representative, the UN SRSG, the IGAD Facilitator and other members of the Core Group on Somalia, have continued to work closely with the Somali stakeholders to sustain the momentum in the political process. In this regard, the international partners provided political, technical, financial and logistical support in planning and convening a consultative meeting in Mogadishu, from 4 to 6 September 2011, to discuss the ending of the transition. This meeting was attended by delegates from the TFG, the TFP, Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jamma'a, with the facilitation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and other members of the international community. I am pleased to inform Council that the meeting realized very important outcomes, notably the adoption of a Transitional Roadmap outlining the key deliverables to be accomplished before August 2012, the timelines for the completion of each task and the institutions responsible, the resources required, and the mechanism to ensure compliance by the TFIs.

13. More specifically, the Roadmap defines five major benchmarks for the completion of the transition, under the following broad themes: (a) security (b) outreach and reconciliation, (c) good governance (d) parliamentary reforms and elections. It also sets out a four-tier Roadmap Implementation Mechanism, comprising of the Facilitator (AU High Representative), the Regional Political Initiative (Heads of State and Governments of EAC and IGAD countries with UN-SRSG and AU-SRCC participation), the International Monitoring Group (the TFIs and members of the international community), and a Technical Committee of experts from the TFIs and the international community operating from Mogadishu.

14. On 26 August 2011, I visited Mogadishu, accompanied by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, to assess the situation on the ground. I seized the opportunity to meet with the President of the TFG, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the TFP. I encouraged them to spare no efforts to conclude the transition, in line with the Kampala Accord, and assured them of AU's continued support.

15. The period under review also witnessed developments relating to the implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in relation to Somalia and other situations. In mid-July 2011, the Commission received a Note Verbale from the IGAD Secretariat forwarding the communiqué of the 18th extraordinary session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government on the activities in Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. The communiqué called on “the AU and the UN Security Council to fully implement the existing sanctions and to impose additional sanctions selectively on the Eritrean regime, especially on those economic and mining sectors that the regime draw on, including the Eritrean Diaspora”. The IGAD Secretariat requested the inclusion in the agenda of Council of an item on the “destabilization role of the Eritrea regime in the Horn of Africa”. Immediately thereafter, the Commission forwarded the communication from the IGAD Secretariat to the members of Council in order to consult on the inclusion of the item in the agenda and its possible consideration, in due course, in line with the Rules of Procedure of the Peace and Security Council. The Commission also wrote to the IGAD Secretariat to acknowledge receipt of its communication and to inform it of the steps taken in that respect.

16. In the meantime, on 18 July 2011, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751(1992) and 1907(2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea transmitted the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea to the UN Security Council. The report states, among others, that Eritrea continues to maintain relationship with Al-Shabaab, which is designed “to legitimize and embolden the group rather than to curb its extremist orientation or encourage its participation in a political process”. Eritrea continues to strongly reject these accusations, and has sent communications in this respect to the Commission, including a letter addressed to me by President Issayas Afeworki. The Security Council is yet to pronounce itself on the matter.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

17. Since my last report to Council, there has been a significant improvement in the overall security situation in the country. Somalia TFG and AMISOM forces have continued to gain ground in Mogadishu and to consolidate their control of previous acquired positions. During the 11 May – 22 May period, TFG forces backed by AMISOM took control of the strategically-located Wadnaha Road, including the symbolic Red Mosque, the former military camp, Bondhere district Headquarters, the former Italian Embassy, the former Interior Ministry building and Alimo Hotel. The insurgents suffered another significant setback on 7 June 2011, when TFG police manning a checkpoint at Ex-Control Afgoye killed the Al Qaeda leader in East Africa, Fazul Abdallah Mohammed.

18. The first three weeks of July were marked by insurgent build-up ahead of their planned Ramadan offensive, directly threatening TFG and AMISOM forces and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the thousands of IDPs that had flocked to Mogadishu, fleeing the famine in South Central Somalia. Somalia TFG and AMISOM forces launched a pre-emptive operation on 28 July 2011 and secured the northern part of the city, Ade Aden Junction, Florenzia, Sinai and Monopolio Junction up to Armed Forces Road. The strong pressure from the TFG and AMISOM and internal disputes compelled the insurgents to retreat from almost all of Mogadishu on 6 August 2011. The TFG and AMISOM now control about 95 percent of the capital Mogadishu.

19. The pockets of insurgents remaining in Mogadishu have now resorted to asymmetrical warfare, including grenade, IED and other forms of attacks targeting AMISOM positions and Government installations. In August, over 20 incidents involving grenade and IED attacks were registered in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. The insurgents also carried out beheadings in some parts of Mogadishu to intimidate populations suspected of supporting the TFG. The internal disputes within the group may also lead to the emergence of various factions within Al Shabaab. Some of these factions might compete for supremacy by carrying out attacks that rival each other in violence and brutality, while some other might consider opening talks with the TFG.

20. Clan militias under the command of some politicians have attempted to take advantage of the vacuum created by the sudden departure of the insurgents. In particular, mention should be made here of the establishment of illegal checkpoints in some of the districts of Mogadishu to extort money from the public and, in some cases, the disruption of the delivery of aid or attacks against TFG and AMISOM forces attempting to extend the authority of the Government.

21. Elsewhere in the country, pro-TFG militias have gained further ground in the Hiraan, Galgaduud, Bay and Bakool, Gedo and Lower Jubba regions. During the months of July and August, the insurgents attempted to recapture lost ground in the Gedo and Jubba regions, but were repulsed. In the Bay and Bakool region, military progress was hampered by internal disputes among pro-TFG militias. The security situation in Puntland and Galmudug deteriorated during the period under consideration. Heavy fighting was reported in Galkayo between Puntland security forces and pro-Al Shabaab militias under the command of Sheikh Said Atom. Meanwhile, in Galmudug, two clans, which have long clashed over water, continued hostilities with intermittent clashes in southern Galkayo.

22. The Joint Security Committee (JSC), which coordinates international support to the Somali security sector institutions, held its 9th meeting in Mogadishu, on 23 August 2011. In light of the sudden withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, the meeting focused on the progress that has been made by the TFG in revising the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) to take account of current security sector development priority needs and required actions to consolidate the achievements made. The JSC meeting concluded with (i) a decision on priority security sector development needs for the months to come following the withdrawal of Al-Shabbab; (ii) a draft Mogadishu security action plan; and (iii) a consensus on completing the revised NSSP as an implementation of the JSC directives of June 2011.

23. Piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia continue to be of concern. Both the NSSP and the Roadmap address this issue. In line with its earlier articulated position, the AU will continue to call for a comprehensive strategy to deal not only with piracy, but also with its underlying causes, in particular the collapse of state authority on the mainland, illegal exploitation of Somalia marine resources, which adversely affects the livelihoods of the coastal populations, and dumping of toxic waste. This position will inform the Commission's input to the planned report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1950(2010) of 23 November 2010, in which states and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG are requested to provide information on the efforts undertaken in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

24. The humanitarian emergency in Somalia has been exacerbated by drought and famine, mostly in the Southern and Central regions of the country. Below average rainfall and the heavy toll of the drought on livestock have contributed to high level of food insecurity. According to humanitarian agencies, about 3 million Somalis, that is 1 in 3 Somalis, are in need of humanitarian assistance, as a result of the current drought affecting their country, one of the worst in recent memory, compounded by the conflict that Somalia has been experiencing for the past two decades and the resulting collapse of state structures, as well as by soaring global food prices. This figure represents a sharp increase compared to the 2.4 million people reported in January 2011. It is estimated that 554,000 children were suffering from malnutrition in the first half of 2011.

25. Due to this situation, thousands of Somalis are moving into major urban areas, in particular Mogadishu, as well as to neighbouring countries. Since January 2011, about 1.8 million people have been uprooted as a result of the drought, and most of those are internally displaced in Mogadishu and surrounding regions or have fled across the borders into Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and other neighboring countries, where refugee camps have become even more overcrowded. According to the UNHCR, 5,200 people moved into Mogadishu in the month of June 2011. Between the end of June and early July, 4,800 Somalis were registered at the Dadaab refugee camps, in eastern Kenya, while an average of 1,000 people were daily received at the Doolow Ado camp, in Ethiopia. In the month of June alone, a total of 54,000 Somalis crossed into Ethiopia and Kenya, a three-fold increase compared to the month of May.

26. The funding needs to address the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa have been estimated at US\$2.48 billion, out of which just over US\$1 billion has been mobilized. Many traditional and non-traditional donors, UN humanitarian agencies, local and international non-governmental organizations, among others, have provided humanitarian support to Somalia in the form of aid deliveries and/or funding through bilateral arrangements or as contribution to the Somalia Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) managed by OCHA. Out of the \$45 million of available in 2011 for the second Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) allocation, \$35 million was allocated to drought response activities focusing on food access, livelihoods, water and health sectors. In addition, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated \$15 million from the under-funded window also to address the drought situation in the most affected areas in the south and central regions of Somalia. In December 2010, the Humanitarian Coordinator allocated \$4.5 million from the CHF emergency reserve also to respond to the drought.

27. In my report to Council in April 2011, I expressed concern at the humanitarian situation and the significant reduction in overall funding levels for Somalia over the last two years. I called on all AU Member States and other members of the international community to urgently provide the necessary support. In the press statement concluding its deliberations, Council echoed my appeal. I reiterated my concern in a communiqué dated 17 May 2011 and in my opening statement to the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union. The Panel of the Wise, at its 10th meeting held on 12 May 2011, also made an appeal for urgent humanitarian support to the affected populations in Somalia.

28. On 20 July 2011, and in view of the worsening humanitarian conditions on the ground, I addressed a letter to all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States to underline the need for African countries to do everything in their power to assist the Somali people at their

critical hour of need, in a true spirit of continental solidarity. I also directed AMISOM to continue doing everything in its power to provide security for humanitarian personnel and to facilitate access to those in need. Subsequently, my High Representative for Somalia, former President Jerry John Rawlings, travelled to Somalia in July, to assess the situation. He also travelled to other Member States, namely Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa, the Republic of Congo and Angola, to mobilize support, both financial and in-kind. I also met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Baroness Valerie Amos, while the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission met with the World Food Programme (WFP) Executive Director, Josette Sheeran. These meetings provided an opportunity to discuss the drought situation and how best the AU and its partners could work together in support of the Somali people.

29. The Commission also took the initiative to convene a Pledging Conference, in Addis Ababa, on 25 August 2011, to mobilize resources for the victims of famine in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. More than US\$ 350 million dollars were mobilized, out of which the African Development Bank (AfDB) alone pledged US\$300 million. An additional \$28 million of 'in kind' assistance, including food, medicines and other forms of assistance was also pledged. While recognizing the need to address the current humanitarian emergency to alleviate the suffering of millions of people in the Horn of Africa, the Conference also called on the international community to renew its commitment and support medium- and long-term strategies for food security, as well as mitigate the negative impact of climate change on the continent.

30. During my visit to Mogadishu, I had the opportunity to witness firsthand the suffering of the Somali people. Against this background, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to the Member States that made pledges, as well as to the AfDB for its outstanding contribution. I strongly urge the Member States that have not yet done so to contribute to this effort and to those in a position to do so to provide further assistance. Through the deployment of AMISOM, our continent has demonstrated strong commitment to help the Somali people open a new chapter in their troubled history. Today, as the Somalis face yet another calamity, it is critical that Africa rises to the situation obtaining on the ground.

V. ACTIVITIES ON SOMALIA BY THE INTER-AFRICAN BUREAU ON ANIMAL RESOURCES

31. As Council is aware, livestock is the mainstay of the Somali economy and the basis for the livelihoods of the largely pastoral and agro-pastoral population of Somalia. The export of live animals, hides and skins and chilled carcasses generates the foreign currency needed for importation of food items. Livestock marketing and trade also provides employment and incomes for market operators and associated industry operators, while generating important revenues for local administrations and municipalities. In my October 2010 report, I briefed Council on the activities and programmes being carried out with respect to Somalia by the Inter-African Bureau on Animal Resources (IBAR), an AU regional office based in Nairobi. Council, in turn, noted with satisfaction the significant contribution being made by IBAR.

32. Since then, IBAR has completed a number of activities aimed at mitigating the impact of the drought and food crisis. These include the eradication of rinderpest, a contagious and devastating disease for cattle and other ruminants, through the Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Coordination Unit (SERECU II Project); the enhancement of the capacity of the

Somali authorities to control animal diseases, with the provision of training, laboratory facilities and vehicles, within the framework of the Support Programme for Integrated National Action Plans (SPINAP); and the Somalia Livestock Certification Project (SOLICEP), which enabled the adoption of an Animal Health Certificate Model that promotes the World Organization for Animal Health sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards for livestock.

33. IBAR has also continued to implement the Livestock Emergency Interventions to Mitigate the Food Crisis in Somalia (LEISOM) project, under which the Bureau is carrying out vaccination and treatment of small ruminants in order to enhance their health status, as well as the rehabilitation of livestock trade infrastructure. More specifically, around 4 million animals have been vaccinated in Somalia and two million treated for endemic diseases, while 100 infrastructure facilities have been constructed or renovated. In so doing, the project contributes to increased export trade to the Gulf States, increased incomes and reduction of hunger.

34. A number of other continent-wide activities being carried out by IBAR will also tremendously benefit the Somali people. These relate to the Participation of the African Nations in Sanitary Phyto-sanitary Setting Organization (PAN-SPSO) and the Enhancement of Veterinary Governance in Africa. IBAR also intends to implement additional activities directed specifically at Somalia. Among others, mention should be made here of the Livestock Emergency and Recovery Intervention, whose objective, it is to equip pastoralists and other concerned communities with assets and services that can strengthen their resilience in the face of the current drought; the Somali Livestock Industry Institutional Support Project for Enhancement of Private Sector Capacity for Advocacy, Market Facilitation and Self-Regulation (SLISP); and the Development of Somalia's Coastal and Marine Fisheries, through the provision of technical assistance for the delineation of Somalia Exclusive Economic Zone and the development of policy, legal and regulatory instruments, as well as capacity building activities for artisanal fisheries and trade and marketing infrastructure. I commend the Director and personnel of IBAR for their outstanding work, and thank the EU and all the other partners supporting the Bureau.

VI. AMISOM DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

35. Since my last report to Council, in April, the troop strength of AMISOM force has increased to 9,595, comprising 5 battalions and a fire support unit from Burundi, and 5 battalions, with a support unit and marine elements, from Uganda, under the command of Major General Fred Mugisha, who took over on 5 August 2011 from Major General Nathan Mugisha. Uganda and Burundi have pledged an additional 2,000 and 1,000 troops, respectively, to be deployed before the end of this year, once the required equipment has been mobilized from bilateral partners. Cameroon, Senegal and Zambia have one military staff officer each at the Force Headquarters. I, once again, pay tribute to all the countries contributing personnel to AMISOM, for their commitment to the cause of peace in Somalia.

36. I would like to report that Djibouti has formally confirmed its commitment to deploy a battalion of 850 troops and 100 trainers and interpreters. An AU Commission team is scheduled to travel to Djibouti shortly to discuss the modalities for the deployment of the Djiboutian contingent and to identify the logistical needs. Sierra Leone has also pledged to deploy a battalion of 850 troops; a Sierra Leonean reconnaissance team visited Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Mogadishu in August 2011, as part of the preparations for the deployment of this battalion. The pledge by the Republic of Guinea to contribute a battalion is still pending. Furthermore, and in line with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Commission and the East

Africa Standby Force (EASFCOM), in Addis Ababa, on 18 August 2011, EASFCOM has finalized plans to deploy 14 staff officers and 57 trainers, in October 2011, and a Level II Hospital, in December 2011. This MoU is a milestone in the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) as it provides the framework for the first ever deployment of elements belonging to an ASF regional brigade.

37. Regarding the police component, a total of 50 officers from Burundi, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda have been deployed to AMISOM. 40 officers, including the Senior Leadership Team (SLT), trainers, advisers and mentors, are deployed in Mogadishu, while 10 trainers are deployed at Manyani, Kenya, pending relocation to Mogadishu by October 2011.

38. Progress has been made regarding the relocation of the AMISOM civilian component to Mogadishu, which was delayed due to the prevailing insecurity on the ground and logistical constraints, particularly accommodation. Thus, in May 2011, 14 AMISOM civilian international staff, including members of the senior mission leadership, were deployed in Mogadishu. Additional staff will be deployed as soon as the necessary logistical arrangements are finalized. In the meantime, the insertion of civilian personnel has made it possible to interact in a more sustained manner with the TFIs and other Somali stakeholders, to advance the political and reconciliation process.

39. On the ground, AMISOM forces have, as indicated earlier, consolidated and expanded their areas of control in Mogadishu and its environs. Following the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, AMISOM forces, together with Somalia TFG forces, now control and are fully deployed in all the districts of Mogadishu, except those of Daynille and Huriwa. Plans are underway to deploy to those districts as soon as additional forces are inserted into the mission area. AMISOM continues to protect key installations, such as Villa Somalia, which houses the Presidency and the Office of the Prime Minister, and Villa Baidoa, where other Somali institutions are located. In addition, AMISOM is also securing both the Mogadishu international airport and the seaport, thus facilitating humanitarian access through these vital corridors, which have recorded increased human and cargo traffic in the past few months.

40. As it has been doing since its initial deployment, in 2007, AMISOM continues to provide free medical care to more than 12,000 Somalis every month at two of its hospitals in Mogadishu, and about 60,000 litres of safe drinking water every day to Somalis living near AMISOM camps. AMISOM is also implementing, in partnership with local NGOs, a number of community support projects to better the lives of Somali people. With the prevailing drought, the Mission has taken a number of additional steps to assist the local communities, distributing food, medicine and other relief items, in addition to protecting humanitarian convoys, on request.

41. During the period under review, AMISOM has provided VIP protection to foreign dignitaries and journalists visiting Mogadishu, in relation with the prevailing drought and famine. In the last weeks, AMISOM has facilitated the visits by President Ismael Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the United Kingdom's International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the Executive Director of the WFP, among others. While the request for protection and assistance puts additional strain on the Mission's capability, it was felt necessary

for AMISOM to do everything possible to facilitate such visits, as they help to highlight the plight of the Somali people and the need to mobilize the requisite support for both the peace and relief efforts.

42. AMISOM has continued to support the reform of Somalia's security sector. In this respect, the police component of the Mission continues to carry out mentoring, advisory and training activities in support of the Somalia Police Force (SPF). Besides the development of training manuals and curricula in community policing, criminal investigations and traffic management courses, the AMISOM police component has also conducted several courses for the SPF, including basic police training, junior and middle management, as well as traffic management courses. AMISOM has deployed civil aviation security advisers and mentors at the Mogadishu airport police station, who are providing mentoring and advisory support to the SPF. The AMISOM police component has also developed a bio-metric data base onto which bio-data for 4,850 SPF personnel has been captured and uploaded. Arrangements are also being made for AMISOM police to provide, in the last quarter of 2011, training to the SPF in criminal investigation; counter-terrorism course; gender-based violence; public order management, with the support of the Angolan Government; and English literacy. In addition, AMISOM police will support the UNDP to upgrade the training of 900 Somali police officers to the required international standards.

43. The AMISOM police component has finalized plans to establish its main team site at SPF Headquarters and General Kahiye Police Training Academy, and will deploy police advisers and mentors at key operational service delivery and managerial decision-making levels. It has also finalized project proposals to fund the renovation, rehabilitation and re-equipment of SPF headquarters and 10 other police stations to assist in restoring police services in Mogadishu and its environs.

44. On 30 August 2011, a total of 900 Somali troops completed their six month training at the Bihanga training camp, in Uganda. The troops were trained by the European Union Training Mission (EUTM). The first intake of 1,000 Somali troops trained by the EUTM graduated last year as part of the EU's contribution to the stabilization of Somalia. This training is complemented by AMISOM in the form of induction and reintegration courses conducted in the Gesira training camp in Mogadishu, which is currently undergoing expansion to accommodate more trainees. The objective is eventually to carry out all training activities within Somalia.

45. In line with Council's decision of last October, AMISOM has continued to make sustained efforts to ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and to minimize civilian casualties. The task of the Mission in this respect was made difficult by the tactics employed by Al Shabaab, in particular the use of human shield. The Mission has observed the highest level of restraint in the face of such flagrant violations of the rules of war, accepting to sustain a significant number of casualties in order to spare the lives of the innocent civilians it is tasked to protect.

46. From 6 to 8 July 2011, AMISOM convened a 3-day Roundtable in Kigali, Rwanda, on "*Enhancing the Respect for International Humanitarian Law in the Implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*". The Roundtable was attended by delegates representing the TFG, the Somali civil society, Burundi and Uganda, the United Nations, the EU, USA and France, international humanitarian law, human rights and protection institutions, peace and security research and training institutions, nongovernmental

organizations, and the media. The Roundtable called for the strengthening of AMISOM, including the civilian and police capacities, to enhance the promotion of human rights and protection of civilians. It welcomed the AMISOM Draft Indirect Fire (IDF) Policy, whose implementation will go a long way in enhancing adherence to IHL. The meeting further requested the AU Commission to finalize and adopt the Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians, including protection of children in armed conflict, and assist AMISOM to mainstream relevant parts of the Guidelines into the work of the Mission. I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of Rwanda for the support it provided for the successful convening of this meeting.

47. As part of efforts to mitigate the regional threat posed by Al Shabaab activities in Somalia, the Commission, through AMISOM, convened an information sharing meeting in Kampala, from 19 to 21 July 2011, bringing together relevant stakeholders, including the TCCs, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The meeting identified areas for information exchange regarding armed groups operating in Somalia. The meeting also called for specific actions to be taken to address the threat posed by Al Shabaab in the region, as well as for the early deployment by CISSA of an Information Support Mission to AMISOM in order to enhance its analytical capacity. I thank the Government of Uganda for having hosted the meeting.

VII. UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT PACKAGE TO AMISOM

48. While reiterating AU's appreciation to the partners providing financial and logistical support to AMISOM, I would like to stress that the Mission continues to face serious challenges, particularly with regard to logistics, critical force enablers and reimbursement for contingent owned equipment (COE). Clearly, there is need for greater support from the international community to enable AMISOM more effectively support the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia.

49. As Council is aware, and in line with resolution 1863(2010), the UN is providing a logistical support package funded from UN assessed contributions and implemented by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). This comes in addition to the Trust Fund established to cater for some of the AMISOM requirements. The UN support package, as implemented by UNSOA, is essentially directed at the military component of AMISOM, thus excluding the police and civilian components. This approach negates the very essence of the multi-dimensional nature of AMISOM and affects the effectiveness of the Mission in delivering support to the Somali people. It is the intention of the Commission to engage the UN Secretariat in order to address this situation and take the appropriate measures to extend support to both the police and the civilian components, in line with the spirit and letter of resolution 1863(2010), which refers to AMISOM as a Mission and not as a purely military operation. There is also a need for the AU and the UN to make further efforts to ensure greater integration between the AU mission support concept and UNSOA support for AMISOM.

VIII. REVISED CONOPS AND WAY FORWARD FOR AMISOM

50. Council would recall that, at its 245th meeting, it endorsed the revised CONOPS for AMISOM. This revised CONOPS aimed at bringing the authorized strength to 20,000 military personnel, implying an additional 12,000 to the initially-authorized level of 8,000, with the requisite air and maritime capabilities. The additional 12,000 was to be deployed in two phases. Initially, it was planned to insert 4,000 additional troops in Mogadishu (Sector 2) to pacify the

capital and consolidate the TFG's authority. In the second phase, steps were to be taken to expand gradually to other areas of Somalia, in particular those controlled by groups allied to the TFG, with the intention to concurrently deploy 4,000 troops in Sector 1 and the remaining 4,000 in Sectors 3 and 4. However, the Security Council authorized the provision of the UN support package for only 12,000 troops in Mogadishu.

51. With the completion of most of the tasks provided for in Phase I of the CONOPS, Mogadishu now being under the full control of TFG and AMISOM forces, there is need to build on the recent gains to consolidate security, extend the authority of the TFG beyond the capital and address security requirements for strategic installations and visiting foreign dignitaries. It is against this background that the Commission convened a technical consultative workshop on AMISOM, in Addis Ababa, on 17 and 18 August 2011, attended by IGAD, the UN, the EU, WFP, OCHA, EASFCOM and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AMISOM, as well as the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Having acknowledged the major developments brought about by the signing of the Kampala Accord and the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, as well as the requirements to effectively address the situation created by the drought and the resulting famine, the workshop recommended the following, in order to enable AMISOM proceed with the implementation of the next phase of its mandate:

- (i) the acceleration of the deployment of the additional troops pledged by Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Republic of Guinea and Sierra Leone, to enable the Mission to quickly reach the strength of 12,000 troops covered by the UN support package. In this respect, AU Member States in a position to do so and partners were urged to expeditiously provide the requisite support, including equipment and training, to facilitate the early deployment of the remaining 3,000 troops;
- (ii) the enhancement of the support package provided by the United Nations, under resolutions 1863(2009) and 1964(2010), to take into account the shortcomings identified over the past few months and the fact that AMISOM is a multi-dimensional mission with military, police and civilian components. Priority areas of support include self-sustenance of the TCCs, reimbursement for COE and provision of adequate force enablers (attack and utility helicopters, maritime capability, combat engineering equipment, among others), as well as support for the civilian component of the Mission ;
- (iii) the insertion of FPU's in Mogadishu to bolster the maintenance of law and order in the city. This will make it possible to free the military for operations on the ground;
- (iv) the creation, as part of AMISOM and under its command, of a guard force of an adequate size, to facilitate the deployment of civilian staff and provide protection for AU, the UN and the TFIs in Mogadishu. This force should be above the 12 000 UN-authorized strength and its deployment will make it possible to release additional elements for operations on the ground ; and
- (v) the elaboration of a revised CONOPS, in light of the developments that have taken place since October 2010 and the elements above, including the planned insertion of FPU's, and refine the implementation modalities of the next phases of AMISOM mandate.

52. Subsequently, the Commission developed a revised CONOPS, which provides for the following three phases:

- (i) Phase I (3 to 4 months) will be devoted to the reinforcement of AMISOM up to the UN approved strength of 12,000 troops, supported by FPU, to meet current threats in Mogadishu and its environs, and create further space for political dialogue and reconciliation;
- (ii) Phase II (5 to 12 months) will entail the expansion of AMISOM operations beyond Mogadishu into South and Central Somalia with 8,000 additional troops;
- (iii) Phase III (12 to 24 months) will make it possible to create conditions for the deployment of a UN peace keeping operation, to take over AMISOM and assist in the long-term reconstruction and stabilisation of Somalia.

53. The implementation of this revised CONOPS requires close cooperation with the TFG forces and other allied forces. Significantly, the technical workshop emphasized the key role to be played by the forces of the TFG, calling, in this respect, for enhanced support to the TFG forces and for better coordination between the latter and the allied forces. The revised CONOPS is also premised on the availability of a number of capabilities, including air and maritime capabilities and other force enablers, especially combat engineering capabilities, medical equipment, self-sustenance, as well as enhanced information-gathering capabilities. In particular, the availability of air assets will facilitate the conduct of battlefield air interdiction, the intensification of reconnaissance operations on suspected insurgent areas, the provision of close air support, in-mission troop insertion and extraction, as well as MEDEVAC and CASEVAC, among others.

54. Regarding the police component, the revised CONOPS provides for a progressive deployment, as follows:

- (i) Phase 1 (first quarter 2012): 1 FPU of 140 personnel and 85 police officers, including advisers, trainers, mentors and support services staff;
- (ii) Phase 2 (second quarter 2012): 1 FPU of 140 personnel at bases vacated by AMISOM military in Zone 1 and Zone 2 of Mogadishu and 60 police officers, including advisers, trainers, mentors and support services staff;
- (iii) Phase 3 (third quarter 2012): 55 police officers, including advisers, trainers and mentors and support services staff;
- (iv) Phase 4 (fourth quarter 2012): 2 FPUs of 140 personnel each in Zone 3, in Mogadishu, and 50 police officers including advisers, trainers, mentors and support services staff. The remaining 290 police advisers, trainers and mentors will be deployed outside Mogadishu under Phase 2 of the revised CONOPS.

55. The FPUs will play a key role in supporting the SPF to maintain law and order and act as a bridge through which the SPF will gradually transition from a militarised policing strategy to civilian policing that conforms to international democratic policing standards. In particular, the FPUs will assist SPF to hold, secure and consolidate peace in liberated areas of Mogadishu; conduct joint public order reassurance patrols to reduce the fear of armed violent crime in communities, including coastal patrols and joint checkpoints; provide direct law enforcement

support to SPF to maintain law and order, including containment of public order disturbances; provide armed escorts as may be necessary or requested; perform IDP protection tasks as may be requested; and provide mentoring support to their SPF counterparts. The deployment of FPU will indeed contribute to the reduction of pressure on the military to attend to their core military duties, especially fanning out to liberate areas outside Mogadishu.

56. The revised CONOPS seeks to facilitate the achievement of the desired political end state in Somalia, that is, the creation of an enabling environment for the TFIs to effectively implement their stipulated tasks as enshrined in the Transitional Federal Charter. This will also create conditions for the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance and the commencement of an effective post-conflict reconstruction programme.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

57. During the reporting period, tremendous progress has been recorded in enhancing security and moving the peace process in Somalia forward. Almost all of Mogadishu is now under the effective control of the TFG and AMISOM forces. For the first time in over two decades, Mogadishu and its environs are today free from the tyranny of warlords and extremists. Residents of Mogadishu are now enjoying relative security such that they are able to go about their day-to-day lives without the fear of violence. This achievement has been made possible thanks to the courage of the TFG and AMISOM forces, which, under extremely challenging conditions and with limited resources, compelled Al Shabaab to pull out of the capital.

58. I would like to pay tribute to the TFG and AMISOM forces for the results achieved. I commiserate with the families of the soldiers and officers who lost their lives in the line of duty, showing utmost commitment to the cause of peace and security in Somalia. The Governments of Burundi and Uganda deserve the continued gratitude of the entire continent and the international community, in general, for their contribution to AMISOM and for staying the course, in spite of the many challenges encountered. That AMISOM is today the longest serving peace keeping operation in Somalia, having been on the ground for four years, speaks volumes about the determination of the Governments and the people of both Burundi and Uganda.

59. Equally significant is the signing of the Kampala Accord and the steps taken towards its full implementation. A Roadmap, including benchmarks, timelines and monitoring mechanisms, for ending the transition is now in place. This clearly demonstrates a renewed commitment by the Somali leaders and stakeholders. I commend President Yoweri Museveni for the instrumental role he played in the conclusion of the Kampala Accord. I am also appreciative of the efforts and dynamism of the United Nations Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga.

60. I encourage the TFIs to continue to show the unity of purpose and the determination required in order to fully take advantage of the opportunity thus created to enhance the reconciliation and outreach efforts, improve service delivery and accelerate the implementation of the pending transitional tasks. I call on all Somalis, including those in the Diaspora, to continue to support the peace process in their country. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that for the TFIs to successfully address these challenges, it is necessary that the international community moves away from the half-hearted measures that have characterised its efforts so far and provide a more decisive support, one that is really commensurate with the

challenges at hand.

61. Throughout the period under review, IGAD has continued to play a leading role in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Somalia, ensuring the continued support of the region for the reconciliation efforts, encouraging the Somali stakeholders to remain focussed on the critical transitional tasks and maintaining the situation in Somalia high on the agenda of the international community. I would like, once again, to express my appreciation to the IGAD member states and Chair, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, as well as to the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation, Honourable Kipruto Kirwa, for their tireless efforts. The AU will continue to work closely with IGAD and its member states in addressing the current challenges and bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The East African Community should also be thanked for its involvement and efforts.

62. The need to do whatever is possible to end the conflict in Somalia is made even greater by the drought affecting the country, the worst in decades, and the resulting famine. Millions of Somalis are affected, and many are dying for what could, to a large extent, have been prevented, had the international community acted swiftly and heeded the early warning calls made by the humanitarian organizations. While commending all those who are making contributions to the relief efforts in Somalia, I call for renewed efforts both within the continent and beyond to extend to the Somali people the assistance they so desperately need. I would like to seize this opportunity to highlight the initiative taken by the 11-year old Ghanaian school boy, Andrew Adansi-Bonnah, to mobilize support for the famine affected populations in Somalia, moved as he was by the images of suffering Somalis, in particular women and children. His gesture is not only the expression of an early consciousness and sense of solidarity, but also a call for immediate action by all those in a position to help, both within and outside Africa.

63. As indicated in paragraphs 49 to 55, the Commission, in light of the new developments that have taken place, has elaborated a revised CONOPS for AMISOM. The overall objective is to consolidate the gains made both at the political and military levels. In developing this CONOPS, the Commission carried out a deliberate consultative process, involving all stakeholders, so as to mobilize maximum support for the planned steps. I recommend to Council to endorse this revised CONOPS. In so doing, Council will further demonstrate the continued commitment of the AU to do whatever is necessary to stabilize Somalia and help its people enjoy the peace they are so desperately yearning for. An increasing number of member states have pledged troops for the Mission. At the moment, with the existing commitments, and provided the requisite logistical and financial support is mobilized, the AU can deploy up to 16,000 troops.

64. Against this background, the challenge therefore is to secure adequate support from the partners, in particular the United Nations. Council therefore may wish to request the Security Council to give due consideration to the need to provide AMISOM with the support required, for it to discharge its mandate more effectively. In the immediate term, Council may wish to urgently call on the Security Council to authorize support for the following steps, in line with the recommendations of the technical workshop of 17 and 18 August 2011:

- (i) the enhancement of the support package provided by the United Nations, under resolutions 1863(2009) and 1964(2010), to take into account the shortcomings identified over the past few months and the fact that AMISOM is a multidimensional mission with military, police and civilian components, with focus on self-sustenance of the TCCs, reimbursement for COE and provision of

adequate enablers (attack and utility helicopters, maritime capability, combat engineering equipment, among others), as well as support for the civilian component of the Mission;

- (ii) the insertion of FPUs in Mogadishu to bolster the maintenance of law and order in the city; and
- (iii) the creation, as part of AMISOM and under its command, of a guard force of a battalion size, to provide security for civilian staff and protection for the AU, the UN and the TFIs in Mogadishu, it being understood that this force should be above the 12 000 strength authorized by the UN.

65. In addition, I would like to reiterate the continued relevance of the other requests to the Security Council as contained in Council's communiqué of 15 October 2010, in particular with respect to the steps required to prevent the entry of foreign elements into Somalia, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia which are carrying out attacks against the TFG, AMISOM and the Somali population. It is equally important that the Security Council reaffirm its commitment to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia through the re-hatting of AMISOM and urgently establish a timeline for this deployment. In that respect, the Commission intends to propose to the United Nations Secretariat to undertake a joint assessment mission to evaluate the progress made so far by AMISOM on the ground and identify whatever additional benchmarks need to be met and the corresponding resources to be provided by the UN, for the transformation of AMISOM into a UN operation.

66. AMISOM and the Somali people have come a long way in the struggle for peace. Many have sacrificed their lives for the results that have been achieved thus far, while several partners provided valuable resources. It would be highly regrettable if the progress made was to be reversed because of the collective inability of the international community to assume its responsibility and take the measures called for by the situation. It is critical that the opportunity arising from the most recent developments in Somalia is not squandered.

67. In taking up the challenge of assisting the Somali people, the AU is not only living up to its obligations under its Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security Council Protocol, but also acting on behalf of the Security Council. This organ, by the virtue of the UN Charter, has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is AU's earnest expectation that this responsibility will be fully assumed towards the Somali people, with the urgency called for by the situation.

68. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the AU High Representative for Somalia, former President Jerry John Rawlings, my Special Representative, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, AMISOM Force Commander, Major General Fred Mugisha, and to the entire personnel of the Mission. My gratitude also goes to former Force Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, who led the AMISOM military component for two years. I commend him for his good service, commitment and gallantry. Under his command, AMISOM forces made significant progress in extending their area of control in Mogadishu.