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Welcome Remarks by HE Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission

To the Opening session of the 26th Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)

Addis Ababa, 19 May 2013

Your Excellency, the Ambassador of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the PRC,
Your Excellency the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission and Commissioners,
Chairpersons of AU Organs,
Distinguished Ambassadors, Members of the PRC,
Excellencies and Officials from the Capitals

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by congratulating Ambassador Konjit Sene Giorgis, the Chairperson of the PRC, on her fifty years of service to Ethiopian diplomacy and her unwavering service to the cause of Pan Africanism.

Excellencies, when we met at the January Summit earlier this year, we agreed that 2013 shall be an exciting, but hardworking year for us all. Indeed, the 50th anniversary of the OAU and AU represents yet another moment of destiny for our continent.

There is general acceptance about the rise of Africa for the last decade in terms of economic growth, public investment in infrastructure development, regional integration efforts, as well as improvements in democracy, governance, peace and stability and some human development indicators.

There is also an emerging consensus that Africa’s endowments and future trends present huge opportunities: its human resources and demographic trends, especially its youthful population and its women; its rates of urbanization; the arable land and other natural resources at its disposal; the potential for energy generation, both fossil and renewables; its mineral deposits and its long coastlines, to name but a few.

And yet, we must all agree that this potential was also present when the founders formed the OAU in 1963. As newly independent state they had to construct independent states and develop a vision and plans for continental integration on the foundations of the fragmentation, destruction and structural underdevelopment caused by centuries of colonialism. Though representing thirty two independent states, they still confronted the scourge of colonialism with nearly half of Africa still under its shackles.

The founding generations therefore had to continue the fight, in the spirit of Pan Africanism, for self-determination during most of the existence of the OAU, whilst simultaneously embarking on the tasks of nation and state formation, fighting poverty, ignorance and disease in their countries, and taking forward the vision of African unity, development and integration.

Following Namibian independence and the end of apartheid in 1994, the transformation of the OAU into the African Union signaled a new era for our continent. This is the era that heralded in the current positive trends we see in Africa today.

Your Excellencies,

After a decade of the African Union, and as we celebrate 50 years since the founding of the OAU, it is an opportune moment for reflection on the grand narratives that have been part of the Pan African project for at least the last fifty years and before.

These narratives include our long-term vision of African unity; the paths towards shared prosperity and human security for all African citizens, regions and countries; speeding up the integration agenda; achieving gender equality; tackling the root causes of conflict; celebrating unity in diversity and building inclusive political and human rights cultures.

Excellencies, as we debate the Summit Proclamation, and as we reflect and plan during the Yearlong 50th Anniversary celebrations, we must answer some of these questions:
• What will it take for Africa to be integrated, people-centred, prosperous and at peace with itself over the next five decades?
• Are the milestones we set in various continental frameworks and initiatives, especially around human development, infrastructure, agriculture, women’s empowerment, health and industrialization, and above all on political unity and integration sufficiently bold to achieve our vision?
• What type of paradigms and actions in terms of leadership, people’s participation, resource mobilisation and our implementation, monitoring and evaluation strategies are required to ensure impact and rapid implementation?
• And finally, are our institutional architectures aligned towards the achievement of rapid integration, development and industrialization, how do we improve their impact, efficiency and effectiveness?

There is no question that we have grappled with all these issues since the founders gathered in Addis Ababa in 1963 and before, although in different times and context.

We recall the words of the High Level Panel on the Audit of the African Union when they said that ‘only through introspection can appropriate lessons of history be learnt and Africans, as a people, confidently forge ahead towards the desired future.’

Excellencies, PRC Members, Representatives from Capitals

The first five months of this year have indeed been a period of hard work, yet also exciting because we are beginning to see movement in a number of areas which the Summits entrusted to us, and on which we shall account.

Firstly, Summit instructed the PRC and the Commission to finalise the approach to and preparations for the 50th Anniversary. We have not only adopted the Anniversary Project document and Budget, but your good selves have been engaged in monitoring and providing direction to the preparations for the Anniversary. The first phase of the Anniversary is upon us, and we will soon witness whether we have turned our plans into reality.

Secondly, we were required to finalise the Third Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission (2014-2017). This has been a challenging endeavor, because we needed to agree not only the priorities for the next five years and beyond, but also to effect the paradigm shift in our planning so as to focus on impacts and outcomes rather just on activities.

Thus when we said in the Strategic plan that our people are our most important resource, we had to articulate the strategies to achieve this, as well as set the indicators to measure impact.

The discussions on these matters, and on the AUC 2014 Budget, in PRC and in the Extra-Ordinary Executive Council, are testimony to our seriousness to ensure that our premium continental organisation, the African Union, indeed is serious about accelerating the agenda of creating an integrated, people-centred, prosperous and peaceful Africa.

Your Excellencies,

The third task on which we can report progress is on the review of strategic partnerships. Although we have not started the formal review yet, the broad outline of a different approach has begun to emerge in our practical engagements on partnerships over the last five months.

We not only held the Africa South America Summit, the TICAD Ministerial meeting, the AU and EU college to college meeting and engaged with the BRICS on our continental priorities, we have also started preparations for a number of important initiatives with partners this year, including the TICAD Summit, the Africa-Arab Summit, India Africa Ministerial meeting, as well as preparations for the Africa-Europe Summit next year.

During this period, we also visited China to discuss how to strengthen relations, based on our vision. We have made a follow-up meeting to the Brics Summit by visiting the Russian Federation. At the World Economic Forum we were able to put our priorities, to mention a few.

A key lesson from these engagements is that when the African Union is clear about its priorities and its common positions, we are more likely to have effective partnerships and move forward our continental agendas, whether it is on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) or on our infrastructure priorities. We must therefore use these lessons to inform the partnerships review that we must formalise after this Summit.

Fourthly, Excellencies, we undertook as the Commission, as part of building a People’s Union to ensure that we communicate more effectively. The AUC has begun to develop and executive a communication and outreach strategy, developed with government communicators and journalists from across the continent. Early signals are that the Union is more visible and that important shifts are occurring in perceptions of the continent.

Of course, the 50th anniversary of our Union in and by itself, and the consultative approach towards the development of the Agenda 2063 framework, provide us with good opportunities for raising the AU and continental profile.

We must however caution that we still have to do objective research on the impact of our strategy, and that important elements of our communications strategy have still to be rolled out, especially with regards to radio and social media, in order to reach all regions and sectors of the African citizenry.

Your Excellencies,

A fifth area of reflection is our ongoing work on peace, security, and on governance and democracy. Since January, the Commission has send observer missions to a number of Member states, including the recent elections in Kenya. We continue to learn lessons from these experiences, and they help to inform our paradigm of building inclusive political cultures and national and regional development.

We must repeat the message that there can be no peace without development, and no development without peace. Through implementation of the peace and security, and the good governance architecture, Africa continues to register increasing levels of peace and security. We must highlight that whereas in the 1990’s there were about fifteen countries engulfed in conflicts, this number reduced to five between 2000 and 2010.
Conflict resolution efforts have yielded encouraging results in many parts of the continent, as shown by the tremendous progress recorded in Somalia, the agreements reached between Sudan and South Sudan in their post secession relations and the ongoing initiatives to promote good neighborliness and cooperation for a shared prosperity in the Great Lakes region.

However, as the remaining conflicts and recent crises in Mali and Central African Republic and the ongoing situation in Western Sahara suggest, there is no room for complacency, and we must resolutely tackle the root causes of conflicts and instability, so as to ensure lasting peace.

Excellencies,

There are other areas that we need to pay greater attention to or that we postponed till after the May Summit. These include the strengthening of the AU Commission and organs, including the relationship between Commission and the PRC and implementing the decisions of the AUC and RECs retreat held in April this year.

We will therefore act in the coming months with speed on decisions such as the follow-up on the High Level Panel Audit of the AU review; the issue of the proliferation of AU institutions and agencies; the review on the mandate of the Pan African Parliament and strengthening our capacity to implement decisions of our policy organs, to name but a few.

Your Excellencies,

In conclusion, our debates on the theme over the last few months have brought us closer to a common narrative on the lessons and achievements of the last five decades, including the strengths and weaknesses of our Union. The yearlong anniversary activities, and our engagements with all sectors of society on the theme will continue to build on this African narrative.

However, more importantly during this year, besides the celebratory aspects of our 50th Anniversary, we have before us the task to map out a vision and milestones for the next fifty years. The Proclamation of the Anniversary Summit must provide the framework and set the tone. It must be bold and inclusive; and not shy away from confronting the issues that make it difficult for us to achieve integration, peace and prosperity.

Your Excellencies, let us recall the words of our founders, that Africa must unite or perish. When they formed the OAU on 25 May 1963, they chose to unite behind the mission to rid Africa of colonialism and apartheid.

On 25 May 2013, we must unite behind the mission to rid Africa of poverty, disease, hunger and prosperity.

We must unite, or perish.

Welcome Remarks by HE Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission to the Opening session of the 26th Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)

Statement by H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission at the Opening Ceremony of the 5th Meeting of the African Union Ministers of Women’s Affairs and Gender

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

14 May 2013

Chairperson of the Bureau of Ministers,
Host Minister of Women and Youth Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
Sister and Vice President of Gambia, who has been here for 3 days discussing women issues,
Ministers in charge of Women Affairs,
Experts from Member States
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure that I join you, this morning at this 5th Meeting of the African Union Ministers of Gender and Women’s Affairs. It is the first one I am attending and I am happy that I was asked by the Programme Director to come and speak to you.

I would like to thank you for your messages of congratulations that I received on my election as the Chairperson in July 2012. I also received messages from many women on the continent.

I will concentrate on what is happening at the AUC, as you know more about what is happening at national level.

Honourable Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen
This meeting takes place at a very critical time, when we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU. This celebration should give us a unique opportunity, as citizens and women, to reflect at what has happened around women since the establishment of the OAU in 1963, and ascertain what progress we have made as women, and where we want to go in the next 50 years. We should do this in the context of Africa looking at itself as an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.

As we go forward, the main issues are about unity, an integrated Africa, at peace with its self and driven by its citizens. We have always said this but we have not always put it into practice. The AU is not an organization of governments only; it must be driven by its citizens.

While indeed we have made some progress in the past, we must acknowledge that it is not enough. Even at pre-colonial times, women have always played a critical role in their civilizations. But of course patriarchy has always been part of our systems - except for a few countries, it is a global issue. Even during the fight against slavery and colonialism, and before the establishment of the OAU, African women came together to establish PAWO, in the spirit of Pan Africanism.

Women continued to struggle, not only for themselves, but for the rest of humanity. That is why women emancipation is the emancipation of everyone. Historically, women played an important part in the family. Even today, if you give the resources of the family to a woman, you will know that the family will be looked after. They will make sure the children are fed, they go to school, and ensure that all members of the family are well looked after. Empowering women is therefore empowering a nation. Women rights are human rights. The emancipation of women is not about fighting men, and it cannot be about fighting men. Women give birth to men and women. How can it be that they give birth to men, only to fight them? The emancipation of women is about them reaching their full potential, and contributing to the nation. It should not threaten anyone, but be embraced by everyone. Unfortunately, women have not always received the support that they need.

If we look at the Constitutive Act of the AU, the principles of gender parity are enshrined. The AU also adopted the Protocol to the Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The Rights of Women in Africa, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, (SDGEA), the AU Gender Policy and the declared 2010-2020 as the African Women’s Decade, We therefore have many continental and global instruments. If we were just to implement what we have agreed on, without adding many more legal instruments, we would be very far. Unfortunately, we have not implemented our protocols, declarations, or even our Constitutive Act. Nevertheless, women have been resilient, they struggle, but we would like to invite every one to work with us so that we make progress.

At AU, we need to celebrate the achievements of the continent, and women. We are working with ECA and UNESCO, to see if we can produce a book that will celebrate the achievements of women over the past 50 years. The challenge is that even though women have played an important part, it has not been documented. There is therefore a need to research what they have done. We are seeking the research capacity from UNESCO and ECA so that in the next year we can have a book that celebrates the achievements of women and their participation in the struggle. We will therefore ask you to contribute from your countries, whom you consider as women who have contributed to bringing us to where we are, so that they can be recognized.

The second aspect is about thinking about where we want to go. Our forbearers ensured that today we are all free men and women. They ensured that they bequeathed to us a better Africa than the one they found and lived in. Especially the women, they have bequeathed us a better baseline for women equality. It is incumbent upon us that we leave a better world for our children.

We had a workshop for women on Sunday and Monday (12-13 May), comprising of women from across all sectors and age groups, including founder members of PAWO, and that is where the Vice President and some of you were. We had very important discussions. This is in line with trying to implement what is expected of us; that this Union should be driven by its people. The women had discussions on the theme of the Summit, and reflected on where we want to be as women in the next 50 years.

In the course of the discussion, one women articulated her vision by saying that in the next 50 years, our grand children will be asking: What was this gender discrimination about? This will be because by then, all women will be emancipated. Gender discrimination will be history. In SA for example, people born after 1994 are asking: “what was this apartheid? You mean our women were minors”? This is because if one was not married, they would have their unemployed son to help them to open an account. Women were seen as minors for the rest of their lives. So today, emancipated young women are asking; what that was all about? So, this is the kind of conversation we want our grandchildren to have in 50 years.

We hope that going forward we can define the steps that will take us towards that conversation.

Right now, we think that we have made progress because we can count that we have two female presidents, less than ten countries have 30% women in Parliament, and we have a number of successful women in business. However, real progress should be when we can no longer count. Men do not count when a male president gets elected. Women’s progress should be when we no longer have to count.

During the two days discussion, a young woman asked why we cannot have women Chairpersons of the AU Commission for the next 50 years. Men have done it. It will just mean that we have made progress. We must just decide where we want to be, but also how we want to get there.

At the AUC, we have been tasked with developing our own strategy (2014-2017), and an AU-wide strategy. So we are working on a 50-year framework, which will point to the direction we want to take, and the steps to get us there. Then we can all develop, within that framework our short to medium term action plans. The Framework will not be ready immediately; we need to consult all institutions and citizens in their various formations. When we put this framework together, it must be a framework where Africans have had a say. The two-day workshop I mention earlier was about that. We also said in the workshop that each and every one of the participants must go back, and engage with citizens locally.

The Strategic Plan, which the AUC is working on, has been reviewed by the Executive Council, and will be adjusted as soon as the Heads of State and Government have adopted the 2063 framework.

We have also identified a few priorities, which we have to focus on if we are to be prosperous and peaceful. This does not mean that other things will not be done.

As a start, we have asked ourselves what assets we have, and how we can use them to attain prosperity and peace. We have said that the most precious of our resources/assets is our people. We need to invest in our people. This means investing in women, youth, and everybody. There must be access to healthcare, we must reduce child mortality, and improve the general well being of our people. In the area of education we must go beyond universal education and focus on higher education, science and technology, and innovation, for both young women and men. If we invest enough in the young population we have, this population will be one of the drivers for the future of the continent. But if we do not invest in the youth, they will be our greatest liability. When young people are restless and cannot reach their potential, they will be involved in revolutions.

We also said we must invest in agriculture. 75% of workers in agriculture are women. We must invest so that women also become farmers and entrepreneurs for processing what is being produced.

I am talking at length with you because you are the law-makers. Women must have access to land, finance, technology, so that they can progress to farmers who make a great living from farming. The continent is spending billions importing food, even though we have vast amounts of arable land. The money we spend on importing food can go into funding development. So we would like to work with you so that we convince governments to put money into agriculture.

We have also prioritized infrastructure and transport-in all its diversity; road rail, air and ports.

Indeed, if we are integrating, why can we not dream that those same grandchildren can visit Cairo from Cape Town and Dakar on a speed train. It happens in other continents, so why can it not happen here?

We also need to think how to use technology to leapfrog the various stages of infrastructure development.

In the next few years, India and China will be sending to the world more than 300 million tourists. What proportion of that will be coming to Africa? If we do not have infrastructure, they will not come, despite the endowments we have in tourist products.

We need to invest in energy. If we do not have energy, girls will fetch firewood, instead of going to school. This is in addition to fact that we cannot industrialise. But from a gender perspective, girls and women are disadvantaged, because they are the ones to fetch firewood, firewood smoke is also not good for health.

There is a World Bank study that shows that if we provide energy, women can go into much more productive activities. The same applies with water. Our policies must ensure that we provide water so that women are free to do all the other things that will make Africa prosperous.

ICT is also very important. Africa is second biggest consumer of telephones, after Asia. But we do not make them, we just consume. So when we get our young people into science and technology, they can also innovate and create technology.

Trade can only flourish when we have infrastructure. Compared to other regions, Africa has the lowest level of intra-regional trade. But all this will not happen if we do not have peace, and good governance.

We also have youth and women as priorities. We have also prioritized resource mobilization, as well as strengthening of our institutions.

But if we take women out, we will never be prosperous, never be at peace, if we do not include women and youth.

Women have always been the protectors of the environment, because they survive from the environment.

We also have short-term goals. 3 years into the 10 years of the African Women’s Decade, we need to implement this. We are working with UNDP to implement some of the basket of issues for women in a number of areas, including women in business and agriculture, women in political leadership, as well as budgeting. We want to invite a lot of partners to work with us on this. Women in leadership is very important. If we had enough women leaders in decision making, we would not be talking about access to water. By putting women in position, we ensure that development is people-centred.

We therefore rely on you to ensure that women are part of every endeavor for prosperity and peace, so that our continent can reach its full potential.

Thank you

OPENING SPEECH OF THE DIRECTOR OF WOMEN, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION AT THE 5th ORDINARY MEETING OF AU EXPERTS OF GENDER AND WOMEN’S AFFAIRS

HELD AT THE AU COMMISSION IN ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA ON 8 May 2013

Dear Experts Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and on my own behalf wish to extend a warm welcome to all Addis Ababa, the Headquarters of both the African Union and the Economic Commission for Africa and popularly known as the African Capital. At the outset, please allow me, on behalf of the African Union Commission, and indeed on my own behalf, to welcome you all to the African Union Commission. We are honored to have you, Experts, in our midst and I wish to thank you sincerely for having responded to our invitation despite the short notice.

As you are aware, ideally, ordinary meetings of AU Gender and Women’s Affairs are normally held in October/November in line with the AU calendar. However, due to the importance of capturing your contribution to the theme of the AU 50th Anniversary Celebration of Pan Africanism and African Renaissance H.E The Chairperson
Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma decided to schedule this meeting for May, ahead of the policy meetings leading up to the Assembly of AU Heads of State and Government planned from 18 to 27 May 2013. I believe, Experts, that you understand the importance of moving the Ministers Meeting forward to May.

As you are aware, the AU has taken global leadership in advancing Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment since the transformation of the Organization of African Unity to the African Union. One of the top priorities of the current Commission is the integration of women and gender perspective into all policies, programmes and activities of the AU. My colleague, Director of Strategic Planning is here and will be making a presentation on this, but allow me to say that Gender is now one of the 8 priorities of the Commission has been mainstreamed across the other priorities and also is housed in Pillar no 2 of the 2014 – 2017 Strategic Plan and is also mainstreamed in other pillars.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

As you are aware, the theme for 50th Anniversary of AU is Pan Africanism and African Renaissance while Pan Africanism has been debated on since the founding of the OAU African Renaissance took centre stage during the transformation of OAU to AU. It is about the transformation and reinvention of the African Continent by Africans themselves that is the pre-occupation of them. The African Renaissance seeks to examine Africa’s present position and the efforts made by the peoples in the continent to change what are not working in many African countries, so that African could control their own destiny. Africa is beset by numerous challenges, and the African Renaissance is seen by many Pan-Africanists as a possible panacea for these challenges. It has been seen as a call for the people of Africa to work towards the resurgence of Africa economically, sociologically and politically.

Conditions are not sufficient to many on the continent, and this continue to jeopardize the opportunity by Africans to grasp the full concept of the African Renaissance. Key among these is the fact that the African Renaissance process was not inclusive of women, despite the fact that they constitute 52% which gives them numerical majority on the African Continent. There is need for cultural renaissance that can take place.

In looking at the position of women in Africa and their development, it is important to ensure that the voices of women are heard in this discuss. The African Renaissance has come to epitomize the democratization of the African continent; therefore, the voices of women and their role cannot be ignored. There is a need to ensure that the continuous marginalization of women is addressed. As long as women are not fully incorporated into the development strategies of their countries as active participants, their countries will be operating at half capacity.

Indeed, Pan-Africanist fought for the liberation of Africa and delivered African people from slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. It also seeks the political, economic and social unity of the African continent. Pan-Africanism embraces the intellectual, political and economic cooperation that should lead to the political unity of Africa, and demands that the riches of Africa be used for the benefit, development and enjoyment of the African people. This expert meeting therefore will be receiving presentations from other speakers on the theme of the AU Golden Jubilees, the AU wide strategic plan 2014-2017 and AU agenda 2063 in addition to its core business which I wish to turn to now.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You will observe that this meeting is the first in a series of important preparatory meetings, including the Women Stakeholders Conference on Pan Africanism and African Renaissance which will be held in 12-13 May, followed the Ministerial Committee of 10 and the 5th Meeting of AU Ministers of Gender and Women’s Affairs which will be the climax of these meetings.

Experts will be required to make recommendations for your consideration regarding the Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance to Ministers as AU 50th Anniversary theme. This particular item is extremely important and that is why it is recurring on your own agenda as an item on its own. Your input would go a long way in influencing and shaping the vision of the AU wide strategic plan and the Union’s 2063 development agenda.

As you are aware, 11 July 2013 will mark the 10th Anniversary of the coming into existence of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Even as we commemorate this landmark, we need to reflect on how we can move from advocacy for ratification by countries that are yet to do so, to implementation by countries that have ratified the Protocol.

Another important item is the strategies that will be needed to enhance the capacity of women’s machineries, which are you key Ministers and ensure that the machineries are visible and properly resourced. The issue of gender budgeting has been on the table in our Member States for so long; and we believe that it is high time that we ensured that this matter is taken seriously by all line ministries in our countries.

It is our hope that the proposal to establish an Annual High Level Panel on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment will meet your Ministers approval. The establishment of this High Level Panel, similar to the High Level Panel on Peace and Security, will create space for women scholars, researchers, academia, and gender experts to discuss emerging issues.

We are also aware that you will be considering and recommending projects for the 2012 African Women’s Decade Theme of “Agriculture and Food Security” for approval. It is therefore my hope that discussion will also touch on the establishment, by each Member State, of the African Women’s Decade National Coordinating Committee.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is important in this respect that we consolidate and develop the institutions that guarantee the integration of women and gender issues. Our ability to do so, however, would depend on how seriously we consider women and gender issues and in what spirit.

It is therefore my expectation that this meeting will make contribution to the theme of the Summit and explore the place of gender within the discourse of the African Renaissance and make recommendations on how women can make meaningful contributions to creating an African Renaissance.

I therefore once again welcome you to the African Union Commission and thank you for your expected active participation.

It is therefore my pleasure to declare this 5th Meeting of Expert of AU Gender and Women Affairs open.

I thank you

Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 353rd meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, on 25 January 2013, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) considered the situation in Mali. In communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCLIII) adopted on that occasion, the PSC, after stressing the need to put in place the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of the African Standby Force (ASF), within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), requested the Commission to submit a report on the progress made and the difficulties faced, prior to the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, in May 2013. The 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, on 27 and 28 January 2013, in its Solemn Declaration on the Situation in Mali [Assembly/AU/Decl.3 (XX)], approved the PSC communiqué. In adopting that decision, the Heads of State and Government had in mind the fact that the operationalization of the RDC of the ASF would significantly facilitate the promotion of African solutions to the problems facing the continent, and enhance the ownership of, and leadership by, the continent’s efforts to resolve conflicts and crises in Africa.

2. It is in this context that the Commission took the initiative to organize the 6thmeeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety (STCDSS), preceded by a preparatory meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff, to consider the operationalization of the RDC and enable the finalization of the recommendations to be submitted to the appropriate organs of the AU. The present report has been prepared to facilitate the deliberations of the STCDSS. It gives an account of the status of operationalization of the ASF and its RDC and provides the context within which the PSC and the Assembly of the Union adopted the above-mentioned decisions, highlighting the lessons to be learnt from the Malian crisis, given the limited military capability to react swiftly to emergency situations. The report contains concrete proposals on the establishment of an African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity.

II. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

3. The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000 and of the Protocol Establishing the PSC, in July 2002, marked critical steps in the overall efforts to build Africa’s capacity to address the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent. In particular, the PSC Protocol established the APSA, designed as a set of institutions and standards to facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution. The APSA is underpinned by two main considerations: first, the principle of non-indifference, which means that the AU can be seized with all situations that may threaten peace and security on the continent, including intervening in a Member State in case of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, or at the request of a Member State, to restore peace and security; and second, finding African solutions to African problems, it being understood that this approach does not exclude the development of partnerships with other international actors, particularly the United Nations, whose Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

4. The ASF is one of the key components of the APSA. It consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. The mandate of the ASF covers a wide range of actions, from observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian assistance, to more complex peace support missions, intervention in a Member State in grave circumstances, or at the request of a Member State, to the restoration of peace and security, preventive deployment and peace building.

5. In conformity with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol and the Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (CSC), finalized in May 2003and approved by the 3rdOrdinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, from 6 to 8 July 2004 [Assembly/AU/Dec.35 (III) Rev. 1], the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) have made sustained efforts to operationlize the ASF. The Policy Framework specifies the concept of the ASF, as well as the major stages for its operationalization. Subsequent meetings of the Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Security and Safety Services, as well as of the Ministers of Defense, have provided supplementary guidance on how best to operationalize the ASF. It is in this context that three roadmaps were successively prepared to provide guidance for the efforts of the Commission and of Member States.

6. Roadmap I, adopted in March 2005, for the period June 2006 - March 2008, resulted in the preparation and adoption of the basic documents relating to the ASF. These documents related, particularly, to doctrine, logistics concept, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), training and evaluation, and Command and Control, Communications and Information System (C3IS). A feasibility study on the Continental Basic Logistics (CBL) was launched, while the Planning Elements (PLANELM), , were put in place in almost all regional standby forces.

7. Roadmap II, adopted by the 3rdmeeting of STCDSS, held in Addis Ababa, on 15 May 2009, and endorsed by the Executive Council, at its 15thOrdinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, from 24 to 30 June2009 [EX.CL/510 (XV) Rev.1], covered the period April 2008 -December 2010. This Roadmap, identified measures to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues in the implementation of Roadmap I and consolidate the progress thus far achieved. It also underscored the development of AU capacity in the management of multidimensional peace operations (scenario 5). As for the RECs/RMs, they were expected to continue to build their ability to deploy the Mission Headquarters under Scenario 4 of the ASF (peacekeeping missions). These efforts resulted, in October 2010, in the conduct of a Continental Command Post Exercise (CPX), called AMANI AFRICA, which paved the way for the testing of the deployment and management of a scenario 4 type mission. The Evaluation report on this Exercise concluded that the ASF has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

8. Under Roadmap II, additional staff at all levels was also recruited for PLANELM. Training was intensified to improve the professional skills of the staff. Furthermore, other basic documents were prepared to provide more effective guidance for the development of the ASF .The documents in question focused particularly on the support, including medical support, strategic lift, protection of civilians, the Formed Police Units (FPUs), and the RDC. On this latter point, the Roadmap, after taking note of the work in progress, requested the Commission to organize the planned seminars on the RDC Concept with a view to providing the requisite harmonization and facilitating future actions.

9. The 5thOrdinary meeting of STCDSS, held in Addis Ababa, on 26 October 2011, adopted Roadmap III of the ASF, which was approved by the 20thOrdinary Session of the Executive Council, held in Addis Ababa, from 23 to 27 January 2012 [EX.CL/Dec.681 (XX)]. This Roadmap urged the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs to spare no effort to ensure the timely implementation of the provisions contained therein, in order that the ASF may attain Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2015. More specifically, the Roadmap III has three main objectives, namely to: (i) finalize the pending actions under the Roadmap II, in the operational, legal, logistics and structural areas; (ii) review the ASF Vision to ensure its coherence with Africa’s needs, as determined in APSA (iii) highlight the new priorities and challenges: RDC, humanitarian action, management of the Police component and coordination of the civilian component. Many actions were set in motion for implementation of Roadmap III.

III. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

10. The ASF Policy Framework stipulates that "in an emergency situation, the AU should take a preliminary preventive action, while preparing for a more comprehensive action that could include the participation of the United Nations. The emphasis here is on rapid action and deployment". The RDC is a key component of the ASF, the aim of which is to enable the AU to respond swiftly to crisis situations.

11. In the Declaration adopted at its 2ndOrdinary Meeting, held in Addis Ababa, on 28 March 2008, the STCDSS recommended that the RDC be an integral part of the Regional Standby Forces, it being understood that this capacity would be deployed at the entry point, as a precursor to the deployment of a larger mission. Pursuant to this Declaration, the Commission, together with the Regional Standby Forces, a at a meeting held in Wolisso, Ethiopia, on 15 and 16 April 2010, prepared a Concept Note defining the parameters and timelines for the operationalization of the RDC in five (5) RECs/RMs. Roadmap Ill of the ASF recommended that the RDC be tested, evaluated and operationalized by 2012. This objective could not be attained.

12. In September 2011, in Addis Ababa, the AU, with the support of the European Commission (EC), launched a training cycle, known as AMANI AFRICA II, which is to conclude with a field training exercise (FTX) in 2015. The objective of the FTX is to "validate the capacity of the African Union to grant a mandate for the use of a Rapid Deployment Capability, as an initial operation (Scenario 6) and to lead, in the process, a fully-fledged multidimensional peace support operation (Scenario 5)". The Initial Planning Conference (IPC), held in Addis Ababa, from 7 to 9 March 2012, made it possible to finalize the Exercise Specifications (EXSPEC) and to determine the general framework of the cycle.

13. As part of the preparation for the 6thmeeting of the STCDSS, the Commission sent a questionnaire on the status of operationalization of the RDC to all the Regional Standby Forces. The responses received led to a better evaluation of the progress made in the regions, and the difficulties that need to be overcome and facilitated compilation of recommendations from all stakeholders on the way forward.

IV. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE ASF, INCLUDING THE RDC,IN LIGHT OF AFRICAN INITIATIVESIN THE MALIAN CRISIS

14. The Malian crisis highlighted the need to expedite the operationalization of the RDC and, more generally, to accelerate the establishment of the ASF and start working on the basis of the procedures developed within this framework. It should be recalled that, in the management of the crisis, the AU and ECOWAS endeavored, from the outset, and concurrently with the efforts of the Mediation, to deploy a mission to support the restoration of the authority of the Malian State in the northern part of the country, then occupied by armed, rebel, terrorist and criminal groups and to ensure the security of the Transition institutions, established after the coup d’état of March 2012.

15. To facilitate the mobilization of the necessary international support and the authorization of the planned mission by the United Nations Security Council, the Commission, together with ECOWAS, paid particular attention to the preparation of the documents required by the Security Council under its resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012) of 5 July and 12 October 2012, respectively. It was in this context that the Commission led the process of preparing the Strategic Concept for the resolution of the Malian crises. This document, which was the subject of in-depth consultations with various stakeholders, stipulates the measures to be taken to speed up the resolution of the crises in Mali. The Strategic Concept was adopted by the meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group, held in Bamako on 19 October 2012, endorsed by the PSC on 24 October 2012 and subsequently transmitted to the UN Security Council.

16. It was on this basis that the AU Commission, in close coordination with ECOWAS, the core countries, the UN and other partners, was actively involved in the preparation of a harmonized Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of an operation in Mali. The Draft harmonized CONOPS was endorsed by ECOWAS Summit and the PSC respectively on 11 and 13 November 2012.It provided for the deployment of a 3,300 strong African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). On 20 December 2012, the Security Council adopted resolution 2085 (2012) authorizing the deployment of AFISMA in Mali for an initial period of one year. However, the Security Council has not responded to the AU’s request to establish a support package funded by statutory contributions of the United Nations, merely contenting itself with the establishment of a Special Trust Fund to receive voluntary contributions for AFISMA and another Fund for the Defense and Security Forces of Mali (MDSF). Similarly, the Security Council subjected the launch of possible operations to recapture the north of the country to a series of political and technical conditions.

17. The first quarter of 2013 saw rapid developments in the situation on the ground. Indeed, while the operationalization of AFISMA and mediation efforts were continuing, the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups launched a massive attack on Malian army positions in Konna, in a clear attempt to control Sévaré, the key entry point to the area and the location of the airport, which was to serve as the launchpad for the deployment of AFISMA.

18. On 10 January 2013, the Security Council, expressing grave concern at the situation and, in view of the urgent need to counter the growing terrorist threat in Mali, requested the Member States to provide assistance to MDSF. They also expressed the wish for the urgent deployment of AFISMA. Both the AU Commission and the PSC strongly condemned the attacks by the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups, expressed AU’s solidarity with Mali and appealed to all AU Member States to provide the necessary logistics, financial and capacity building support to the MDSF.

19. At the request of the Government of Mali and, in pursuance of resolution 2085 (2012), France launched the "Operation Serval" to block the attempted advance of the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups. At the same time, several ECOWAS Member States and other African countries pledged troops for AFISMA and/or accelerated their deployment. As a matter of fact, the situation precipitated the deployment of AFISMA, whose initial authorized strength of 3,300 uniformed personnel, was quickly surpassed, in view of the seriousness of the threat. The Operation Serval enabled the recapture of the north of the country and the launching, jointly by the Malian and AFISMA forces, notably the Chadian contingent, of operations to secure and stabilize the north of Mali, which opened the way for the planned deployment of a UN operation.

20. Moreover, the AU and ECOWAS prepared a revised and harmonized CONOPS for AFISMA, during a Planning Conference held in Bamako, from 15 to 20 February 2013. The strength of the Mission was increased to 9,620 troops. The revised Concept, which entrusted the leadership of the Mission to AU, was approved by the 42ndOrdinary Session of ECOWAS Authority, held in Yamoussoukro on 27 and 28 February 2013, and subsequently by the PSC, at its 358thsession held, in Addis Ababa, on 7 March 2013.

21. In light of the aforesaid, three observations are pertinent. First, there was considerable delay in the operational readiness, logistical preparation and strength build-up of the units placed at the disposal of AFISMA, due, in particular, to logistical and financial constraints. It was only after the French intervention that the deployment really began in earnest and in emergency conditions which did not always allow for the requisite preparation. To date, and despite the progress made, AFISMA operates under difficult conditions that negatively impact on its capacity to fulfill its mandate.

22. The second observation relates to Africa’s inability, despite its political commitment to Mali, to confront the emergency situation generated by the offensive launched by the terrorist, criminal and armed groups and to respond adequately to the Malian government’s request for assistance. The only recourse was the French intervention to stop the offensive of the armed groups and launch the process of restoring the authority of the State in the north of the country. It is obvious that the existence of a truly operational capability at continental level would have enabled Africa to play a more effective role on the ground and assert its leadership, on the understanding that this role does not exclude international assistance.

23. Finally, the geographical position of Mali in the Sahel-Sahara region, at the crossroads of the Western, Northern and Central regions of Africa and the deployment of units belonging to two different RECs initially presented challenges in terms of coordination. The revised CONOPS sought to clarify AFISMA’s chain of command, since AU had overall authority over the Mission. In this regard, the Commission established in Addis Ababa, a Mali Integrated Task Force (MITF), comprised mainly of representatives of AU, ECOWAS and UN, with responsibility for strategic coordination of AFISMA. The MITF, in its present form, is an ad hoc structure.

24. Evaluation of all the information gathered on the operationalization of the Regional components of the RDC and the observations made earlier show that the RDC is yet to be operational. Indeed, the initial concept, based on the mobilization of 2,500 troops per regional standby force and the parameters governing its deployment remain valid. Consequently, the implementation of the concept remains a medium-term objective to be pursued as a priority and in a sustained manner.

25. Judging from the current status of their establishment and, given the capacity disparities between the regions and the Member States, it appears unlikely that we can upgrade the regional RDCs to a satisfactory operational level within a reasonable timeframe, in a way that translates the political will expressed at the highest level by the Member States into practical action, to be able effectively to respond with the required urgency to situations such as those that Mali experienced in January 2013. For this reason, a transitional formula should be considered, which would provide Africa with the urgently needed operational collective security instrument. Such a formula should be flexible, action oriented and effective, and driven by the principle of promoting, as far as possible," African solutions to African problems” with its corollary of " collective self-reliance", in which Member States contribute on the basis of equity and their capacity. Such a formula would constitute the “African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC)”.

V. MODALITIES TO OPERATIONALISE THE AFRICAN IMMEDIATE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPACITY

a. General Principles

26. The objective of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity is to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political, decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent. The aim is to establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. The establishment of AICRC will be contingent on the setting up of military capabilities, force multipliers and resources from the continent. To this end, assessment will be conducted and units meeting specific training and equipment standards will be certified and put under a Force Rostering System (FRS). AICRC deployment will be subject to the appropriate decision-making processes of the relevant AU organs.

Indicative Planning Sequence

(for the diagram refer to the report in pdf)

27. The overall objective of inserting a robust continental force in a crisis is to stabilize the situation (that is to say, to neutralize the center of gravity or the sources of the crisis). The composition of the initial capacity will differ according to circumstances, but it must be rapid (within a maximum period of 10 days) and strong enough to contain the situation. Furthermore, it must be sufficiently autonomous, with at minimum period of 30 days of self-sustainment.

b. Roles of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity

28. The roles envisaged for AICRC are the following:

(i) stabilization, peace enforcement and intervention missions;

(ii) neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and

(iii) emergency assistance to Member States within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians.

c. Operational Concept

29. The AICRC concept aims at making the AU more reactive, capable and coherent, by enabling it to respond quickly to crises with military means in the service of a political decision. The AICRC is a military tool, a reservoir of 5,000 troops, with operational modules in the form of tactical battle groups of 1,500 personnel (BG 1500) that can be deployed rapidly. The capacity will be modular in nature, will operate under a centralized command, will have suitable combat and combat service support, with a minimal initial autonomy of thirty (30) days. It should enable the continent to provide an immediate response to crises in the short term, while allowing for a political solution to the crisis or, where appropriate, the adoption of measures for a mandate consolidation and expansion under a fresh mandate by the PSC and/or the UN Security Council.

30. More specifically, the concept is contingent on the identification of specific needs of the BG 1500 in terms of strategic lift and logistics support. The BG of 1500 personnel will operate on the principle of multinationality and can be pledged by a Lead-Nation or by a group of AU Member States. Interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. Member States may also provide specialized capabilities that may be specific elements of high value addition to the BG which must have a minimum initial self-sustainment period of 30 days.

d. Planning, command and control structure

31. The political direction and strategic management, as well as the activation of AICRC fall within the ambit of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, who shall grant general delegation of powers in this matter, to the Commissioner for Peace and Security. A compact and flexible advisory and planning staff, based on existing capacities within the Peace and Security Department will be dedicated to this task. Thus, the planning, mobilization and coordination of AICRC will be directly undertaken at the strategic level of the AU.

32. At the operational level, a BG will have a Force Headquarters (FHQ) deployable with the operational and strategic capabilities (strategic lift and logistics) pre-identified during the theoretical Force generation process. The FHQ, which will have a core nucleus of about 50 staff, shall be an integral part of the AICRC. It shall be organized and equipped to perform the tasks related to the command and control of its level. It shall be deployed in the same conditions as the combat and combat service support units and equipped with the means to establish communications link with the Commission and with the Command Posts of units deployed at the tactical level, as well as with other units if necessary.

33. Member countries contributing troops to the AICRC will be responsible for the administrative control of their Force in the theatre of operations. They shall pledge to support them at least during the initial 30 days in the theatre before the AU and/or the United Nations make up for the possible shortages.

34. The overall chain of command and subordination of the AICRC is as follows:

Generic chain of Command and Control

(for the diagram, please refer to the report in pdf)

e. Composition and Organization

35. The AICRC will be structured around three tactical battle groups, which will be configured on modular basis with three infantry battalions (850 troops each), combat support capability (indirect fire) and light armored elements at squadron level. An Organizational chart is annexed herewith. The "combat service support" function focuses on engineering capabilities (combat and infrastructure) organized within a battalion (600 men) with three companies adaptable to infantry battalions. Each tactical BG and each battalion can be deployed, independently, for specific missions limited in time and space.

36. An airmobile and air component (400 troops) is encompassed in this function and includes, in particular, aircraft and helicopters for Close Air Support (CAS). A tactical air transport component (helicopters and tactical transport aircraft) will be integral to the force. All the means acting in the 3rd dimension will remain committed to the strategic level. They can be placed under the operational control of the FHQ. The Operational and strategic force multipliers will be mobilized, as necessary, from the AU Member States capable of providing them.

37. The support function is organized around the "transport supply", “Level 2 Health Support ", "maintenance ", "human support" and "information and command" components. Part of the initial autonomy of the combat support and combat service support components will be held within this component. The AU Member States make the necessary commitments for this function and assume them within a predetermined framework.

38. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) will be given in detail once the generic structure AICRC is approved.

f. Deployment concept

39. The deployment concept should allow the AICRC units to obtain an IOC within a period of ten (10) days after the mandate is given by the PSC at the appropriate level. Deployment will be in two phases:

(i) Phase 1 - Preparation of the AICRC units and the deployment of their initial elements, including the FHQ with the protection units; and

(ii) Phase 2 - Deployment of other AICRC elements.

g. Preparation, Training and Certification

40. Training is a key requirement for tactical battlegroups. To be effective, the BG 1500 must undergo a specific training and carry out targeted exercises to test the procedures, military skills and readiness. A Training Needs Analysis (TNA) should be conducted, and the results incorporated into the AICRC training programme. For purposes of the AICRC certification, an Evaluation Plan should be included in the Training Programme with a clear division of responsibilities and labour between the Member States concerned and the AU.

41. To be considered as an AU BG 1500, the units must meet defined military capability standards. The standards and criteria will be detailed in the AICRC concept and AU will provide the Member States with specific guidelines and directives for the preparation of their units, to ensure coherence between the building blocks of the complete tactical battlegroups, taking into account the requirements of multinationality and interoperability. A basic principle is that tactical training is the responsibility of the Member States concerned. AU will facilitate coordination between the Member States. The Certification of the BG also remains the responsibility of the contributing Member States. The Peace and Security Department will ensure the certification process, which must be performed according to agreed AU standard procedures.

h. Force generation

42. AICRC shall be established on the basis of national modules pledge by the Member States and which will be selected after a process in compliance with the operational criteria in terms of organization, equipment, interoperability and autonomy. The selected units will be seconded by the Member States to the AU Commission and activated in conformity with the decisions of the appropriate AU decision making organs.

i. Force multipliers

43. Initially, calling upon the resources of the Member States will be the rule for the establishment of the AICRC and ensuring its preparation and use. Eventually, and depending on the availability of sufficient financial resources, outsourcing will be sought systematically. It will, thereby, support the ability, through binding and dedicated service contracts, concluded with state or private operators and to ensure at the outset strategic projection, as well as support at the level of the theatre of operations in areas such as the strategic lift, strategic intelligence, GIS, fuel function, level 3medical evacuation and above, the development of infrastructures, media communication, unsecured or operational communication systems, the reconditioning of equipment and transport, at the end of the initial period of autonomy.

44. This aspect induces the establishment and management, of a high-performance "contract/procurement" function, capable of anticipating the needs.

j. Force Rostering

45. Maintaining troops for a long period of time, with a 10 day notice of movement, is expensive and difficult. The effectiveness decreases after a certain period. A Force Rostering System must be agreed between the AU and the Member States concerned, which will be requested to fulfill an "operational contract".

k. Communication and Information System

46. Effective command and control presupposes the availability of a robust and reliable communications and information system, as it is the means by which command and control is carried out. The AU will be responsible for deploying a mobile FHQ with an integral communications system, relying on the resources of its Member States, capable of providing links (via satellite, HF and other means available), with the strategic HQ, on the one hand, and with all subordinate units, on the other. The communications means for the HQ must be deployable from contributing Member States.

47. Deployed military units must provide their own means of internal communication.

l. Logistical Support

48. The AU will have to support the AICRC after the initial period of a minimum of 30 days of self-sustainment. The strategic deployment will be essentially carried out by air. The BG 1500 engaged with the FHQ should be deployed from their respective Member States directly to the area of operation. The rest of the AICRC, including the logistics detachment and Level 2field hospital, should be deployed in the shortest possible time.

49. After the period of 30 days of self-sustainment, the administrative and logistical support of the AICRC becomes the responsibility of the AU and will be conducted along two lines of support:

(i) 1st line of support: food rations, maintenance and ammunition; and

(ii) 2nd line of support: fuel and water.

50. The third line of support could be established, depending on the development of the mission.

51. The division of responsibilities will be as follows:

a. AU:

(i) launch of the mission;
(ii) communications link between the AU Commission and the FHQ;
(iii) chartering and strategic lift, if necessary;
(iv) Memorandum of Understanding covering the logistical needs; and
(v) interaction with the United Nations and international partners.

b. TCCs/nation framework:

(i) self-sustainment for 30 days;
(ii) logistical support for training;
(iii) strategic deployment; and
(iv) medical evacuation outside the area of operation.

52. Appropriate arrangements are to be made on an ad hoc basis, as regards strategic mobility and transport, military intelligence and all other aspects of the operationalisation of the AICRC. A legal framework between the AU and the Units and/or means contributing Member States to the AICRC will be put in place so as to enable unfettered use of the said units and resources.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

53. The Malian crisis has highlighted the shortcomings of the AU in terms of capability and the need for the continent to urgently take necessary measures to address these shortcomings, pending the full operationalization of the ASFRDC. The political credibility of the AU and its ability to give meaning to the principle of African solutions to African problems are at stake. In so doing, the objective is not to discard the assistance of the international community, particularly that of the United Nation whose Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Rather, the objective is to ensure that Africa contribute in a more active and substantive manner to collective security, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, in a spirit of partnership and burden sharing.

54. The Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU provides an ideal opportunity for Africa to take the decisions called for by the current situation and to give itself means commensurate with its ambitions in the field of peace and security. The establishment of the AICRC will constitute a tangible expression of the will of the African leaders to fulfill, in the spirit of pan-Africanism, the aspirations of the peoples of the continent to peace, security and stability, which are a pre-requisite for Africa’s renaissance.