Department FrontPage

WELCOME STATEMENT BY H.E. DR. AISHA L. ABDULLAHI
COMMISSIONER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION (AU)AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE 2014 HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

DAKAR, SENEGAL

30 OCTOBER 2014

SALUTATIONS HERE

It is my pleasure and singular honour to be with you again here in Dakar. Let me, from the outset, extend my gratitude to the people and the Government of Senegal for hosting the Third High level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. They have hosted this dialogue forum every year since 2011 for which we are profoundly grateful. The focus of the Third High Level Dialogue is “Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage and Resolve Conflicts in Africa”. This theme is inspired by the 50th Anniversary Declaration adopted by African leaders in May 2013 when the African Union kicked off the OAU/AU Golden Jubilee celebrations under the theme: Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. Whereas the celebrations lasted for one year until May 2014, the mood of celebration and revisioning of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance continues. The Africa Agenda 2063, which is a long-term development vision of the African continent, is a clear demonstration of continuing celebration as we envision our continent over the next fifty years. The Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda is also part of this sense of optimism for our continent as we chart a new social contract for an inclusive, equitable and participatory economic development for Africa over the next fifteen years.
In view of the agenda and development roadmap that African leaders have proposed in the medium-term and long-term through the Post-2015 Development agenda and the Africa Agenda 2063, we all agree that wars and violent conflicts constitute a major barrier for progress on our continent. It is, therefore, befitting that as part of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, Africa leaders unanimously agreed to end all wars and silence guns in Africa by the year 2020. This is a noble goal; it is a clarion call for mass action against violence; it is an inspiration to embrace non-violence; it is an aspiration towards a united, integrated, prosperous Africa driven by its people and representing a dynamic force in international arena. It is the quest for durable peace and sustainable democratic governance anchored on the spirit of Pan-Africanism and inspired by the Africa Agenda 2063.
Africa has surmounted numerous challenges in the past from which the continent can glean lessons as it gears up to silence guns by 2020. We have overcome slavery; we silenced colonial guns through decolonization; we survived the brutal bi-polar ideological divide in the form of the Cold War, which in Africa became a hot war; we have less inter-state wars and military coups. By all indications, Africa has made progress. In fact, even the most ardent critics of our continent have accepted this progress. It is not surprising that in 2001, the Economist perceived Africa as a hopeless continent marred by violence, death and disease. Ten years later (2011), the Economist proclaimed Africa as hopeful and rising continent. Silencing the guns and ending wars in Africa is bound to reinforce the general optimism about Africa’s development prospects over the next fifty years.
Today, I would like to focus less on the root causes of violent conflicts in Africa beyond observing that broadly three major factors account for the wars, instability and violence on our continent: (a) contestation over power; (b) contestation over resources; and (c) identity cleavages. It is evident that at the heart of our conflicts lies development failure and governance deficit. This is the case everywhere including in Somalia, Libya, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I will leave the details of this discussion to the experts in this room. I will focus more on what I consider possible policy interventions to redress this situation as we all strive towards a conflict-free, gun-free, peaceful and democratic Africa.I propose to put forward ten (10) proposals in this regard.
First, there is need to build the institutional and administrative capacity of the state in African countries, so that the state has the requisite authority and leaves less room for rebellions, such as in the DRC and Central African Republic.Effective state capacity is also related to the ability of the government to deliver services to its people. Effective service delivery, combined with decentralization and local democracy will go a long way in silencing guns.
Second, it is imperative that Africa’s socio-cultural diversity is considered a continental resource for greater unity and integration premised upon Pan-Africanism and Africa Renaissance, rather than a curse. It is evident that Africa’s diversity does not necessarily translate into adversity per se. The main problem is the politicization of diversity for political ends as we are witnessing in both Central African Republic and South Sudan. Mismanagement of diversity has been more costly during electoral contests where elections have ignited identity-based violence as witnessed in Kenya in 2007/08. Addressing this problem calls for a greater culture of tolerance and constructive management of diversity. It also calls for entrenchment of the practice of democratic, credible and transparent elections across the continent.
Third,in silencing the guns, Africa still needs to do much more in the area of expanding the frontiers of a human rights culture. Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls must be protected and promoted. It is largely deficiencies in embracing a culture of human rights that has led to some of the tragic cases of mass atrocities and genocide as we witnessed in Rwanda in 1994. Silencing guns in Africa entails committing to eradicating conditions that lead to genocide, such as impunity, among others. The transformation of the OAU to the AU has brought about a leap forward from the old doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states to the new doctrine of non-indifference to human rights violations, crimes against humanity and mass atrocities within member states. This is a positive step towards deeper integration in Africa within the framework of the African Economic Community premised on the notion of pooled sovereignty.
Fourth, ending wars and silencing guns in Africa is not the sole responsibility of African governments. It is equally the responsibility of all non-state actors including civil society organisations, the private sector, the faith-based organisations, the academic community, the women movement, the youth movement, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the international community. It is imperative that all these actors join hands in our quest for peace, democracy and development on our continent. It is encouraging that we already have in place continental mechanisms such the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which aim to strengthen governance in Africa for peace and development bringing together these actors (both state and non-state).
Fifth, mismanagement of Africa’s natural resources has resulted in massive corruption that has left the African economy bleeding as clearly demonstrated by the Thabo Mbeki Panel Report and the Kofi Annan Africa Progress Report on illicit resource outflows and exploitation of Africa’s natural resources respectively.
Sixth, in our efforts to silence the guns, policy interventions will need to address the specific circumstances and situations of women and the youth. These are not only two of the most marginalized social groups on our continent, but they are also the largest sections of our populations. It is imperative that women empowerment and youth empowerment constitute the broader package for silencing guns.
Seventh, demilitarization of African politics is a crucial step in silencing guns. Part of our problem is the politiciztion of the security establishment and securitization of politics. This creates a potent mix where the political elite has a tight grip over the military and the military tends to cross boundaries into politics either covertly or overtly as we are witnessing in the Kingdom of Lesotho today. We need professional security establishments answerable and accountable not to political barons, but to parliament.
Eight, African Union States have already managed to do the difficult part towards silencing the guns. They have developed a robust normative framework in this regard. All that remains now to effectively implement this rich Shared Values Agenda of our Union. The AU Constitutive Act is the main treaty anchoring specific others including the 2003 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Thus, the gap between norm-setting and norm implementation at national level remains a challenge.
Nine, violent conflicts on our continent have also led to massive forced displacement of our people in the form of internally displaced people, refugees, stateless people or irregular migrants especially across the high seas to Europe. We are dealing with massive displacement and refugee populations in most conflict zones in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region, the Great lakes region, Central Africa region and parts of North Africa especially Libya. The November issue of the NewAfrican Magazine reports that 43 000 young Africans have died since the year 2000 trying to cross high seas to seek perceived better opportunities in Europe. While some of these are truly economic migrants, others are political refugees fleeing violence in their own countries. These are some of the costs of war in Africa.
Ten, African states and governments, working closely with their citizens must prioritise establishment and effective functioning of national infrastructures for peace which allow early detection, prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts, at all levels of the nation-state, drawing lessons of experience from some best practices in Ghana, South Africa and Kenya for instance. These national peace architectures are essential if Africa is to play a key role transforming its violent conflicts into durable peace and sustainable democracy. This is where Africa-specific methodologies and culturally embedded strategies for transitional justice and conflict transformation, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, the Ubuntu system in South Africa and Mato-put in Northern Uganda become extremely useful and these should be strengthened and reinforced.
As I conclude my remarks, allow me to also express a special word of appreciation to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for their unwavering support to this Dialogue and its preparatory processes. Also, I want to extend our warm appreciation to the Government of Germany which has significantly supported these processes through GIZ and the Institute of Peace and Security Studies. Of equal mention are International IDEA, Africa Governance Institute and Infonet Africa, among others, who have remained committed partners in our campaign to silence guns and end wars through strengthening democratic and participatory governance in Africa.

As a final word of welcome, allow me also to remind you that this event is accessible to a wider audience through live streams and you may well also want to follow discussion throughout the event through twitter and Facebook accounts. Yes indeed, we have to keep up with the realities of globalization and the opportunities it offers for wider participation.

I thank you for your attention.

Remarks by H. E. Mrs. Fatima Haram Acyl, Commissioner for Trade and Industry, African Union Commission at the Third Meeting of the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee
Responsible for Trade, Finance, Economic Matters, Home and
Internal Affairs, Bujumbura, Burundi

STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION,
HE DR. NKOSAZANA DLAMINI ZUMA
TO THE
IGAD FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, ON THE OCCASION OF THE LAUNCH OF THE HORN OF AFRICA DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE
27 October 2014

UNECA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

 
Excellency, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
Excellency, President of the World Bank Dr. Jim Yong Kim
Excellencies, IGAD Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Leaders of Delegations
Our Host, Executive Secretary of the UNECA
AUC Deputy Chairperson Erastus Mwencha and Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Dr. Maruping
Excellency, IGAD Executive Secretary, Ambassador Mahboub Maalim
Representatives of the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the EU Commission
Excellencies, Delegations from the UN Family
Ladies and Gentlemen
I am honoured to be present at this meeting with the IGAD Foreign Ministers, the World Bank, the UN and other partners at the launch of the Horn of Africa initiative.
The Horn of Africa faced challenges over the last few decades, and yet it has many opportunities: its people, mineral resources, energy, land and oceanic resources.
We congratulate the UN, World Bank and IGAD Foreign Ministers as this initiative comes at the right time, as Africa discusses how to consolidate peace and development, and build shared prosperity in all regions.
The African Union, IGAD and other regional players, are therefor strengthening initiatives to bring about peace in all countries of the Horn of Africa and the rest of the continent; and working with the UN family and others to help address the humanitarian situation in the region.
More broadly, as we consistently say, peace and development must go hand in hand. This includes the priorities we set out in Agenda 2063, investing in people their health. We have seen the lesson from the Ebola Virus epidemic, that health is critical, and that we see health and education not just as social expenditure, but critical to economic development. In addition, we must expand investments in education, sanitation and water; developing infrastructure especially transport, energy and ICT; regional integration; agriculture and food security; and investing in young people and women. We dedicated 2014 as the year of Agriculture and Food security, which is critical to economic development. For the Horn of Africa this is also critical, where we often face hunger, and to reverse the trend where we use our meager resources to import food, when we have the land and other resources to be a net exporter of food.
For all of these things to be taken to a different level, we must ensure that there is peace in the Horn of Africa that refugees are able to return home, rebuild their lives and communities in an environment that is secure, stable and peaceful. Central to this is security sector transformation and most importantly, establishing inclusive, legitimate and accountable governance that can deliver much needed basic services, infrastructure and economic development in all parts of the region. I hope this initiative will indeed address these initiatives, I agree that it should include capacity building and strengthening the capacity of governments in the region.
We therefore welcome the Horn of Africa initiative launched today, and look forward to working with our partners, the UN system and the World Bank on making sure that the Horn of Africa has lasting peace and security, but inclusive government that can deliver basic services and accelerate investments in the region’s people, especially youth and women.
As the AU and IGAD, we will work with our partners on expanding the national and regional infrastructure projects, contributing to agriculture, food security, climate change adaptation and mitigation and economic development and industrialization, as well as accelerated integration in the region, towards the Africa we want which is peaceful, integrated, people-centred and prosperous.

Ladies and Gentlemen
The Ebola Virus Disease crisis exposed the challenges we face in fragile countries. At the epicenter of the disease, the countries that just emerged from conflicts could therefore not lodge the response required.
As the AU, we focus on solidarity amongst our self, in particular the mobilization of health workers in support of the three countries, and to mobilise all our countries to be combat ready, to respond appropriately if there is a case.
We wrote to all our Heads of States and we already seen a response from a range of our Members states, EAC, ECOWAS, Nigeria, Botswana, DRC, Ethiopia and others. Through the AU Emergency Mission for Ebola in West Africa (AWEOSA), we have already deployed volunteers to the three countries, and we learnt important lessons from this early deployment. Our strength is solidarity and we must therefore continue to work together.
We all need to do more. I thank you

I. INTRODUCTION

The present report is submitted pursuant to the relevant decisions of Council. It provides an update on the main developments that took place in Somalia during the period under review, the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other related issues. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The overall political developments in Somalia remain encouraging, with evidence of progress in the State formation process, constitutional review and preparations for elections by 2016.

a) State Formation Process

Since the signing of the August 2013 Addis Ababa Agreement establishing the Interim Jubba Administration, there has been some progress in the implementation of this Agreement. Furthermore, agreements have been reached regarding the establishment of two other States, namely the South-West and Central States. On 23 June 2014, the South West-6 Group and a delegation of South-West-3 Group signed a historic Agreement at Villa Somalia to set up an Interim South-West Administration that would include the regions of Bay, Bakol and Lower Shabelle. A Technical Committee was set up to prepare the roadmap for the creation of an interim South-West Administration. While some stakeholders, including the President of the six-region State, Madobe Nunow, and the Minister of Interior Affairs of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Abdullahi Godah Barre, have refuted its legitimacy, the Baidoa Agreement has attracted the backing of both the international community and some key FGS figures.

The FGS also held consultations with representatives of the central regions, including the “Regional State of Galmudug”, the “Administration of Himan&Heeb” and the leadership of Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, resulting in the signing, on 30 July 2014, of an Agreement in which they committed themselves to form an administration for Mudug and Galguduud. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU signed the Agreement as witnesses. The “Himan&Heeb” leaders, who had not signed the Agreement at the same time as the other parties, eventually signed it on 6 August 2014

The disputed Sool Region continues to experience tension after Somaliland forces seized Taleex town, on 12 June 2014, and disrupted a conference organized by leaders, elders and supporters of the self-declared “Khatumo State”. Susequently, the Puntland Government reinforced its military presence in the contested region. The “Khatumo” leaders relocated to Saaxdheer, an area in the Sool region. On 14 August 2014, Ali Khalif Galayr was elected as the new President of the “Khatumo State”.
Relations between the FGS and Puntland remain strained. On 31 July 2014, Puntland announced a freeze on all cooperative relations and activities with the FGS in reaction to the signing of the Agreement on State formation in Galguduud and Mudug. On 2 August 2014, the President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, suspended co-operation with the FGS and withdrew 10 Parliamentarians following the Government’s endorsement of the new “Central State” in Mudug and Galgudud regions. Puntland officials objected to the announcement by the Government of an administration for Mudug and Galguduud, which is located in Puntland and has been at peace in the past 16 years.

On 18 August 2014, the Puntland authorities offered a 30-day consultation period between Puntland and the FGS in an effort to resolve differences. On 10 October 2014, Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed travelled to Puntland and, on 11 October, alongside Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, launched talks between the FGS and Puntland in a bid to resolve political differences on the interpretation of the Provisional Constitution, sharing of power and resources, and the formation of the Central State. The two parties further agreed to put in place confidence-building measures.

b) Constitutional Review, Electoral Process and other issues

Progress has been registered in the constitutional review process in Somalia. On 21 May 2014, the Somali Parliament formed a Sub-Committee tasked with finalizing the Provisional Constitution and preparing electoral legislation for the 2016 elections. The Committee was given 13 months to finalize the Provisional Constitution and establish suitable laws in readiness for elections in August 2016. On 29 May 2014, the Council of Ministers approved the nomination of five individuals to serve as Commissioners on the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC).

In preparation for the elections, the FGS established an ad hoc Parliamentary Electoral Committee to draft a bill on the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and to review comparative electoral systems. The ad hoc Committee draws members from both the Parliament and the FGS. It has yet to agree on the legislation to establish the NIEC.

Following consultations with various stakeholders, the FGS, on 30 June 2014, issued a revised version of the “Vision 2016” plan for the political transformation of Somalia. On the same day, the Federal Parliament passed the Judicial Service Commission Law. The Commission is the supreme administrative organ of the Somali judiciary, and is a prerequisite to the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the country's highest court.

c) Stabilization Processes

Progress is being made in the stabilization of the country. Local administrators who were selected by the Ministry of Interior and Federalism have taken over responsibility for regional governance from the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM, as part of the ongoing stabilization efforts. Similarly, Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed chaired the third phase of the New Deal Summit (Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility - SDRF) meeting, with the participation of representatives of the international community. The meeting discussed the current security situation in Somalia, and also served as a platform to promote continued dialogue between the FGS and international partners.

The FGS is putting in place appropriate legislation to combat terrorism. On 10 July 2014, the Somali cabinet approved a draft Counter-Terrorism (CT) bill designed to strengthen the fight against insurgency within Somalia. The CT bill provides additional powers to the courts to better equip them to deal with terrorism related cases, using effective legislative measures to ensure that appropriate sentencing can be handed down for terrorist acts.

On 16 September 2014, a reconciliation conference was held in Kismayo. The objective of the conference, which was opened by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was to engage with key stakeholders from Middle and Lower Jubba and Gedo regions on outstanding issues and to agree on the final power sharing modalities to establish a Jubbaland State. The conference was followed by the integration of Colonel Adan Shire ‘Bare Hirale’ into the peace process. Colonel Bare Hirale and the Interim Jubba Administration led by Ahmed Madobe reached a three-point Agreement brokered by the FGS and IGAD. In the Agreement, Colonel Bare Hirale agreed to participate in the second phase of the Jubba reconciliation conference and to integrate his forces within the SNA. A Committee was formed to bring Colonel Bare Hirale’s militia to the outskirt of Kismayo until the Agreement is fully signed. The FGS hopes to finalize the establishment of a federal unit in Jubbaland by December 2014.

d) International Support

On 13 August 2014, the United Nations Security Council made a historic visit to Mogadishu. The Security Council delegation met with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, senior members of the Government, the Federal Parliament and leaders of the Interim Administration of Jubba and Galmudug. The delegation welcomed recent political agreements to form interim regional administrations. It also expressed its expectation that the FGS would urgently establish a national independent electoral commission, lead a process to revise the Provisional Constitution and hold a referendum on it by the end of 2015, and subsequently hold elections in 2016.

On 18 September 2014, the United Kingdom and Somalia co-chaired a meeting on the SNA in London. The meeting discussed ways to enhance support to the SNA in joint operations with AMISOM. On 24 September 2014, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, hosted a high-level meeting on Somalia in the margins of UN General Assembly. The meeting welcomed the progress made and reaffirmed its support to Somalia.

II. SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Despite the peace and security gains recorded in those areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, the overall security situation in Somalia remains volatile. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out a dual-track asymmetric campaign focused on the conventional targeting of vulnerable AMISOM and SNA defensive positions and emplacement of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) at AMISOM and SNA supply lines. On 21 February 2014, a group of 9 Al-Shabaab militants launched a complex attack on Villa Somalia. During the attack, 14 people were killed, including Government officials. On 5 July 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked the Federal Parliament, killing 4 people and injuring 7 others.

On 8 July 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked Villa Somalia, killing 3 and injuring 2 AMISOM soldiers. On 30 August 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) prison in Mogadishu, killing three NISA personnel. Seven of the attackers were also killed during the attack. On 8 September 2014, Al-Shabaab attacked an AMISOM convoy on its way to Afgoye (Lower Shabelle), killing 6 civilians and injuring 4 AMISOM personnel. On 1 Sept 2014, a US air strike killed Al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in Barawe. Al-Shabaab confirmed the death of its leader and named Sheikh Ahmad Abu Ubeyda as his replacement.

AMISOM is working closely with the FGS in Mogadishu, as well as the interim local administrations in the recovered areas, to reassure the local population. The two AMSIOM Formed Police Units (FPUs) deployed in Mogadishu continue to carry out joint police operations with the Somali Police Force (SPF) in the capital. These operations have contributed to reducing significantly the asymmetric threat levels in Mogadishu through search and cordon, random checkpoints, community policing initiatives and community outreach programmes, which have resulted in the recovery of weapons, Explosive Ordinances (EODs) and IEDs, as well as the arrest of many suspected Al-Shabaab insurgents.

The cycle of violence, drought and rising food prices in Somalia continue to have devastating consequences on the Somali people. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 3.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Malnutrition has reached alarming levels. The overall rainfall levels recorded during the April-June rainy season were less than half of normal levels. There are about 1 million Somali refugees and over 1.1 million internally displaced people.

III. AMISOM DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES

The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel deployed across the six Sectors stands at 22,056 out of the authorized strength of 22,126; the difference arises from rotations of the various contingents. The troops in theatre are composed of 6,220 Ugandan soldiers; 5,338 Burundian soldiers; 4, 395 Ethiopian soldiers; 3,664 Kenyan soldiers; 1,000 Djiboutian soldiers; 850 Sierra Leone soldiers; and 75 Staff Officers in the Force Headquarters. The Police component has 383 officers deployed in the Mission area, consisting of 96 Individual Police Officers (IPOs), 280 officers in the FPUs from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 7 officers who make up the Police Senior Leadership Team (PSLT). A detachment of 5 IPOs each has been deployed in the towns of Dhobley, Baidoa, Beletweyne, Jowhar and Kismayo. There are 97 civilian personnel in the Mission, comprising 52 personnel and 45 local Somali personnel. The majority of the internationally recruited staff and the Somali national staff are deployed in Mogadishu.

a) Military Operations

Following the adoption of the revised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the completion of the necessary relocation of troops and equipment across the new Sectors, the first phase of the joint AMISOM-SNA expansion operation, code-named Operation Eagle, was launched on 3 March 2014. The Operation, which ended on 30 March 2014, resulted in the recovery from Al-Shabaab of eight districts, namely Rab Dhuure, Wajid, Xuduur, Bulo Burto, Warshik, Qoryooley, Maxaasand and Ceel Buur. The Operation denied Al-Shabaab freedom of movement, forcing this group to relocate elsewhere.

Phase 2, code-named Operation Indian Ocean, was launched on 25 August 2014, seeking to build on the progress made during Operation Eagle. Each Sector was assigned objectives with instructions to seize, secure and stabilize key districts along the coastline. In Sector 1, the SNA and AMISOM jointly captured Golweyn, on 30 August, Bulo Mareer and Kurtunwareey towns, in Lower Shabelle, on 30 and 31 August. On 6 October, the SNA and AMISOM forces captured Al-Shabaab’s “capital” and last stronghold, Barawe. In Sector 2, the SNA and AMISOM, en route to Jamame, captured the town of Bulo-Gudud (30 km of Kismayo), on 6 October. In Sector 3, the SNA and AMISOM recovered the town of Tayeeglow (Bakol region), on 25 August. In Sector 4, the SNA and AMISOM forces reopened the Beletweyne-Bulo Burto road and successfully escorted 18 trucks loaded with relief aid to Bulo Burto. The SNA and AMISOM forces are now planning to reopen the road between Bulo Burto and Jalalaqsi. In Sector 5, on 30 August 2014, the SNA and AMISOM cleared and secured the towns of Fidow and Jalalaqsi. The SNA and AMISOM later captured the town of Raag Ceel and captured the town of Cadale on 1 October, which was previously used as a supply route by Al-Shabaab.

As a result of these defeats, Al-Shabaab withdrew its forces to the rural areas and the Middle Juba region, in order to preserve its equipment and personnel for a long asymmetrical struggle. Al-Shabaab still controls some areas inland from Kismayo and Barawe, particularly the towns of Dinsoor, Baardheere, Bu’aale, Jamame and Jilib, as well as rural areas around these towns. In the short term, Al-Shabaab will continue its attacks, seeking to create chaos and disruption at every opportunity. Al-Shabaab is also likely to remain a threat to Somalia’s immediate neighbors and the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) to AMISOM.

In the Kismayo Sector, Colonel Barre Hirale surrendered to the Government along with 114 militiamen. Furthermore, an estimated 800 Al-Shabaab have defected in different Sectors following the Government’s offer of a 45-day amnesty to Al-Shabaab fighters at the launch of Operation Indian Ocean.

b) Support to the SNA

In addition to the joint operations being conducted with the SNA, the AMISOM military component is continuing to train and mentor the SNA in the areas of command and control, logistics, unit tactics and medical capabilities. During the reporting period, AMISOM trained 116 SNA soldiers in basic static guard duties and 29 young officers as platoon commanders, while the SNA advanced infantry company (Danaab) completed its induction and basic training. All the trainings were conducted at the Jazeera Training Center in Mogadishu. AMISOM, working with the EU Training Team (EUTM), began the CONOPS Refresher training course in all Sectors. About 7,214 SNA are undergoing the training course. In addition, courses are being prepared for the reintegration of troops returning from training abroad, senior officers refresher course and a generic six-month training programme for resident battalions. However, there is lack of fundamental basic equipment at all training centers, such as beds and training weapons.

c) Police Operations

During the period under review, AMISOM police component continued to provide varied support to the SPF in terms of training, mentoring, operational support and capacity enhancement in Mogadishu, Baidowa, Beletweyne, Kismayo and Dhobley. Pre-deployment assessments were conducted in Jowhar and Dhobley, and deployments of AMISOM police were done accordingly in the two areas during August and September 2014. Joint assessments in the newly-recovered areas, such as Tiyeglow, Kurtunwaarey and others, were also conducted following “Operation Indian Ocean”.

With regard to training, AMISOM police has conducted a community-based policing course for one hundred and sixty (160) police officers, including sixty-nine (69) women, with the objective to enhance the capacity of the SPF in proactive policing, in partnership with the concerned communities. AMISOM police has also developed the necessary curricula for required training programmes on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), in collaboration with UNICEF, and basic police training, in collaboration with the SPF. The curricula for training 200 SPF and 200 community leaders in Mogadishu is being finalized for the Banadir Neighborhood-Watch Project. AMISOM police has also conducted human rights training of trainers for 25 SPF officers; a refresher course for 110 SPF officers in patrols, cordon and search; and professional standards and investigation courses for 35 SPF officers. Furthermore, AMISOM police is currently conducting basic recruitment training for 500 SPF officers, which is expected to end by the close of the year. For the first time, AMISOM police has decentralized training activities to areas outside the capital.

AMISOM police has appointed a Gender Affairs Coordinator, in an effort to improve the management of gender-related issues and support SPF in gender approach to the ongoing reform process and management of SGBV cases. In line with the SPF strategic plan, a needs assessment was carried out at SPF headquarters in Baidoa and Jowhar, to identify gaps in the establishment of women’s desks at police stations. In addition, plans are under way to implement the SPF Gender-Based Violence Strategy, which was jointly developed with AMISOM police and all relevant stakeholders from the FGS. In terms of mentoring, AMISOM police is continuing to co-locate with the SPF in Baidoa, Kismayo, Dhobley, Beletweyne and Mogadishu, where Somali police officers are provided with on-the-job training on core policing functions.

Regarding operational support, the two AMSIOM FPUs deployed to Mogadishu are carrying out joint police operations with the SPF in the capital. During the period under review, the SPF EOD and Canine Team was established, and it is working closely with UNMAS as a Quick Reaction Unit to respond to serious crimes in Mogadishu. Furthermore, with funding from the Italian Government, ten Toyota Pickup Vans were provided to the SPF to enhance its operational mobility. In support of the reform, restructuring and development process in the SPF, AMISOM police, with funding from the Italian Government, completed phase one of renovation works at the SPF Headquarters. AMISOM police also facilitated the renovation of the Medina Police Hospital, and provides medical services to the SPF. AMISOM police also provides advice to the SPF in a number of relevant areas. Finally, thanks to support from partners, AMISOM police initiated a project for the construction of a police station at Mogadishu International Airport.

During the month of August 2014, the AMISOM police and SPF jointly launched a community awareness and response program as a mechanism to involve the community in responding to the persistent asymmetric attacks in Mogadishu and other areas. The aim of this programme is to sensitize members of the public on the need to partner and work with the police, in order to fight crime and also improve on community safety and security.

d) Humanitarian Liaison

In line with the revised CONOPS, AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Office (HLO) is working towards enhancing AMISOM’s relations with the humanitarian community, in order to facilitate the provision of support to the needy populations, particularly in those areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. To this end, AMISOM has established a Joint Operational Information Sharing Forum (JOISF), which brings together relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, the AMISOM HLO, together with the FGS, has carried out field assessments in the newly-recovered areas. The assessment reports have been instrumental in helping the humanitarian community understand the complexity of the needs of the populations in the newly-recovered areas, as well in providing valuable insights into the general situation on the ground. These assessments also facilitate the planning and implementation by AMISOM of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in the newly recovered areas.

The initial assessment findings indicate that there are significant humanitarian needs in all areas visited. It is expected that, through the JOISF process and with information provided by more assessment missions, humanitarian partners will better understand the needs of the affected populations, and be able to access them and provide for their needs in a coordinated way.

e) Gender

The AMISOM Gender Office is continuing efforts to implement the AMISOM Gender Mainstreaming Strategy to enhance the implementation of the Mission’s mandate. To this end, during the reporting period and in addition to establishing gender offices in Beletweyne and Kismayo, the Gender Office has convened sensitization forums on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, as part of the celebrations marking the International Women’s Day 2014, the Gender Office convened a meeting under the theme “Celebrating the Female Peacekeepers and their Contribution to Peace and Stability in Somalia”.

f) Human Rights

During the reporting period, AMISOM, cognizant of its obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law and relevant AU policies and guidelines, has continued to make considerable efforts to ensure that its operations are conducted in compliance with applicable IHL. The Force Commander issued a “Force Commander’s Legal Directives on Operations” to all the Sector Commanders, requiring them to adhere strictly to the UN Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in the conduct of operations. In terms of training, AMISOM, with the support of UNSOA and UNSOM, continued to conduct AU-UN mandatory Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) in IHL and human rights law. The pre-deployment training is reinforced with additional mission-specific training on key principles of IHL for senior AMISOM officers. In addition, since 2012, AMISOM conducts training courses in IHL for junior and senior officers of the SNA.

Pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), which requires UNSOM, UNSOA and AMISOM to collaborate in the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), the three institutions have established a Joint Working Group on HRDDP. The Working Group held its inaugural meeting in Mogadishu on 15 February 2014. Subsequently, the Working Group developed a report on existing AMISOM, SNA and UNSOM mechanisms, highlighting gaps and making recommendations on further measures to ensure better compliance with the HRDDP.

AMISOM is committed to fully implementing the relevant provisions of the 2003 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. It has adopted a policy on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Regarding the allegations of SEA contained in the recent report by Human Rights Watch, the Commission, taking such allegations seriously, has already embarked on a process to carry out a thorough investigation.

Regarding the Civilian Casualty Tracking and Response Cell (CCTARC), AMISOM and UNSOA have established focal points to the CCTARC. In September 2014, a consultant was recruited to mentor the Cell. In addition, the Commission recruited a CCTARC Data Entry Officer. The Cell, which has began its operations, is complemented by the development of a Civilian Casualty Matrix.

g) Civil Affairs

AMISOM Civil Affairs unit continues to complement military operations in support of the FGS efforts to extend State authority by facilitating community confidence-building measures. Ahead of the launch of phase one of Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean, AMISOM Civil Affairs unit engaged community elders at different levels in order both to provide the necessary situational analysis and to mobilize the communities in support of the military operations. Furthermore, AMISOM Civil Affairs unit is working to implement QUIPs, with a particular focus on health, water, infrastructure and education.

The Civil Affairs unit is also working with the FGS Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to sensitize members of Somali civil society on Government policies, particularly regarding Vision 2016. From 18 to 21 August 2014, the FGS and AMISOM organized a conference in Kigali aimed at identifying the role of civil society organizations in supporting inclusive political dialogue and initiating processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities. The participants agreed to create a Somalia Civil Society Consortium that will work with the FGS to implement Vision 2016. The AMISOM Civil Affairs unit working with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, developed programmes aimed at engaging the Somalis youths in dialogue, reconciliation, security and development.

IV. UN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

UNSOA has continued to provide AMISOM with the necessary logistical of support for the implementation of the revised CONOPS. To ensure the effectiveness of the support delivered, strategic-level, senior mission leadership meetings continued to be held, while, at the operational level the revitalized Joint Support Operations Center (JSOC) effectively coordinates the planning and delivery of all logistical support to AMISOM uniformed and civilian personnel deployed in all the six Sectors. During the reporting period, UNSOA provided the requisite support for phase one of Operation Eagle, beginning with the conduct of Relief-In-Place operations across the six Sectors, except for some challenges experienced in Sector 2.

In addition to the support being provided to ongoing joint operations by AMISOM and SNA troops, UNSOA continues to deliver routine support to the three components of AMISOM across the six Sectors of the Mission area. However, the delivery of support to a number of locations is being carried out by air because of concerns over IEDs on the main supply routes. It is, therefore, imperative to increase the current fleet of UN medium lift helicopters, in order to facilitate timely delivery. Following an offer by the Government of Chad to supply AMISOM with combat and utility helicopters, a joint AU-UNSOA technical team travelled to Chad, from 8 to 14 October 2013 to assess the helicopters and the crew. Discussions are underway with the Government of Burundi to realize its offer to provide eight military helicopters to AMISOM.

UNSOA has also begun the construction of facilities at Sector hubs in Baidoa and Beletweyne. UNSOA continues to provide increased Communications and Information Technology Services (CITS) support to AMISOM. Regarding medical support, UNSOA carried out 35 medical evacuation, transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights. However, Sector medical facilities need to be brought up to Level 2 standards, in order to facilitate close medical support in the Sectors. A shortage of specialist doctors, who should be deployed by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), remains a challenge to achieving Level 2 standard in the Sector hubs. On transportation, UNSOA supplied AMISOM with thirty-six assorted motor vehicles, while an additional one hundred and eleven vehicles will soon be delivered to replace those donated to AMISOM in 2009 from the liquidated UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopian (UNMEE). However, UNSOA continues to face challenges with the maintenance of the Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). UNSOA is taking steps to address these challenges.

In line with the relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), UNSOA has put in place mechanisms for the phased roll-out of the targeted logistical support to the SNA, and has also commenced the provision of logistical support to SNA using funds contributed to the SNA Trust Fund, which, to date, received only two and a half million USD ($2.5 million) in contributions and five million USD ($5 million) in pledges. Given that the projected six month- and twelve month-requirements by the SNA stands at twelve and twenty two million USD respectively, it is imperative that the required funding is forthcoming, in order to guarantee the provision of this critical support to the SNA.

Finally the AU and the UN have begun a review of the AU-UN Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2009 for the delivery of logistical support to AMISOM. The aim of the joint review is to strengthen acknowledged areas of weakness and to enhance those aspects that have worked well.

V. OBSERVATIONS

Somalia continues to make progress in spite of the numerous challenges facing it. It is critical, therefore, that the Somali stakeholders continue their efforts, while the international community should enhance its support to Somalia.

The FGS has to be given adequate financial and other support to implement its Vision 2016 agenda. At the first meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum (HLPF) on the implementation of Somalia New Deal Compact, held in Mogadishu on 24 February 2014, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appealed to partners to fulfill their pledged support, in order to enable the Government implement its commitments under the Compact. The FGS needs financial resources to implement its Roadmap, including the stabilization and establishment of State authority across the country, as well as in the newly recovered areas, ahead of the general elections in 2016.

The Roadmap adopted by the FGS demonstrates its commitment to complement and to build upon the security gains being recorded thanks to the joint AMISOM and SNA military operations. The political leadership of Somalia and all other stakeholders should continue to show selfless leadership, resolve and unity of purpose to consolidate the progress made. In this regard, it is critical for the Government to undertake adequate sensitization on the stabilization strategy and state building process under the Local Government Act and Provisional Federal Constitution. Recent outreach efforts and the positive outcomes of the engagements by the President and the Speaker of Parliament in Baidoa, as well as the Prime Minister’s engagements in Bulo Burto, Jowhar and Kismayo, are vivid demonstrations of how effective such sensitization could be in facilitating peace building and state building. At the same time, efforts to ensure constructive engagement between the FGS and Puntland should be encouraged.

The joint AMISOM and SNA operations have resulted in the recovery of sixteen districts, but seven districts remain under Al-Shabaab influence, and their recovery will be the main objective in the next military phase. While applauding the successes recorded so far, it is necessary to also take stock of the challenges that AMISOM and the FGS continue to be faced with going forward. In particular, AMISOM remains short of adequate air assets, which are critical for the movement of troops in-theatre and medical evacuation, as well as for the delivery of logistical support to forward locations. The operational state of the available APCs also needs to be addressed urgently. There is also a shortage of troop carriers, armored vehicles, fuel and water trucks, and ambulances.

An effective, well-resourced and motivated SNA is critical to the achievement of the objectives being pursued. The SNA has demonstrated bravery and growing professionalism during the ongoing joint operations with AMISOM forces. It is, therefore, imperative that all identified capability shortfalls of the SNA be addressed, in order to further enhance their effectiveness in future joint operations with AMISOM. The international community should contribute generously to the Trust Fund in support of the SNA, in order to meet the amount required to cover the costs for targeted logistical support to the SNA.

I would like, once again, to commend the SNA and AMISOM for the progress they continue to make on the ground. I pay tribute to the troop and police contributing countries for their continued commitment and the sacrifices made. I am grateful to all the partners extending support to AMISOM and the SNA. I reiterate my appreciation to IGAD for its critical role and engagement in support of the peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia.