A. INTRODUCTION
At the invitation of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), an independent African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) was deployed in Tanzania and Zanzibar from 14 October to 3 November 2025, to observe the 29 October 2025 General Elections. The Mission was led by H.E. Mokgweetsi E.K. Masisi, former President of the Republic of Botswana, and supported by H.E. Geoffrey Onyeama, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It comprised 72 observers drawn from ambassadors accredited to the AU, Members of the Pan African Parliament, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), gender, youth, media experts, and elections experts from 31 African countries.[1]
As part of the mandate to promote and strengthen democracy and good governance across the continent, the AUEOM was guided by relevant AU instruments, including the 2000 Constitutive Act of the Union, the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, the 2002 AU Guidelines for Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process. The Mission also evaluated the elections in line with international and regional standards for democratic elections, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 2005 Declaration of Principles on International Election Observation, and Tanzania’s legal framework for the conduct of elections.
The objectives of the AUEOM were to: (a) assess whether the 2025 electoral process complies with AU principles, normative frameworks and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as Tanzania’s national legal framework; (b) ascertain that the environment was peaceful for conducting democratic elections that will foster acceptance of the electoral outcomes; (c) evaluate the level of preparedness of the electoral commission and other electoral institutions; (d) provide recommendations for improving future elections and (e) demonstrate the AU’s solidarity and support for Tanzania’s democratic and electoral processes to ensure that the conduct of genuine elections contributes to the consolidation of peace and stability, and promotes inclusive development in the country.
The arrival of the AUEOM was preceded by a Pre-Election Assessment Mission, deployed by the African Union Commission from 11 to 21 June 2025, to assess the preparations for the elections.
Before the election day on 29 October, the AUEOM met with selected electoral stakeholders, including the INEC, the Zanzibar Election Commission (ZEC), government representatives, political parties, CSOs, the media, citizen observer networks, academia, and representatives of the international community. Through these consultations, the Mission gathered diverse perspectives on the level of preparations. It is worth noting that the AUEOM was unable to meet with some stakeholders due to restrictions imposed by the Government of Tanzania.
From 26 October, the Mission deployed 28 teams of 72 observers to 17 regions to observe the remaining campaign period, early voting in Zanzibar, and Election Day (including opening, voting, closing, and counting).
This preliminary statement is based on the assessment of the pre-election period and Election Day activities. The AUEOM was unable to complete election day observations at some polling stations due to outbreaks of deadly protests and the subsequent six-day internet shutdown.
To enhance future electoral processes in Tanzania, the Mission will publish detailed findings, recommendations and key lessons, two months after the official declaration of the elections’ results.
[1]Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Egypt, Eswatini, Guinea Bisau, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
B. PRE-ELECTIONS FINDINGS
1. Political Context
The 2025 General Elections were Tanzania’s seventh since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1995. The political context was characterised by the refusal of the main opposition party, CHADEMA, to sign the Code of Conduct and its subsequent boycott of the General Elections, citing the government’s failure to implement the proposed electoral reforms. The subsequent arrest and prosecution of CHADEMA Chairperson Tundu Lissu on treason charges, and the arrest of Vice Chairperson John Heche on immigration charges, as well as the High Court’s banning of the party from conducting any political activity due to allegations of disproportionate use of party resources, incapacitated the main opposition.
Additionally, the disqualification of Luhaga Mpina, the presidential candidate of ACT-Wazalendo, on the grounds of non-compliance with nomination and endorsement requirements, further characterised the political climate. Compared to previous elections, these developments diminished the competitiveness of the 2025 elections.
The Mission observed that President Samia Suluhu Hassan's assumption of office in 2021, following the death of President John Pombe Magufuli, marked the beginning of the relaxation of restrictions on political rallies, the return of politicians who had been exiled, and the issuing of licences to the media. Although these measures initially expanded the political space for inclusive participation, they were short-lived.
Some electoral reforms were undertaken prior to the 2025 General Elections. However, these did not address major constitutional limitations that could have levelled the playing field and promoted electoral integrity.
Some of the key constitutional reforms that were not implemented before the elections included (a) appointing Commissioners for the INEC through an independent body, (b) amending Article 41(7) of the Constitution to enable presidential election results to be challenged in court, and (c) revising Article 67(1)(b) of the Constitution to allow independent candidates to contest in elections.
Some of the events leading up to the 2025 General Elections therefore conflict with the African Union principles on the right to and freedom of participation in elections, as outlined in Article 4(1)(2) of the ACDEG and Article 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), including the decision of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.
The Mission emphasises that regular elections without genuine competition and adherence to democratic principles result in voter apathy and ultimately lead to citizens' disengagement from political activities. In this regard, the AUEOM underscores the importance of safeguarding political freedoms, ensuring equitable participation for all political actors, and fostering a conducive environment for competitive democratic elections.
2. Legal Framework
The 2025 General Elections in Tanzania were governed by a legal framework that includes: (a) the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977); (b) the Constitution of Zanzibar (1984); (c) the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors’ Elections Act (2024), (d) the Political Parties Act (2019) Zanzibar Elections Act (2020), (e) the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Act (2024), and (f) Election Expenses Act (2024).
The AUEOM noted that Tanzania’s legal framework provides the basis for organising the elections. However, as previously discussed, some provisions in the legal framework are inconsistent with regional, continental and international standards. For further emphasis, Article 41(7) of the Constitution prohibits the right to challenge presidential election results and Article 39(1) of the Constitution prohibits independent candidates from exercising the right to be elected. These provisions violate the core principles of the right to a fair hearing before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal as outlined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 7) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2(3).
In addition to the Union’s elections, Zanzibar conducts its own Presidential, House of Representatives, and local authorities’ elections. The Mission noted that in Zanzibar, the 2020 Constitutional Amendment and the 2024 Electoral Act introduced some reforms. However, critical gaps remained, including a trust deficit related to the management of early voting. The trust deficit mainly concerns how votes cast during early voting are managed overnight until the main election day, as well as the lack of a separate voters’ roll for early voting.
3. The Electoral System
Tanzania’s electoral system combines First Past the Post (FPTP) and proportional representation. The President and 272 Members of Parliament are elected through FPTP in single-member constituencies, with 113 Special Seats for women allocated to parties in proportion to the seats they won.
Zanzibar also maintains its own House of Representatives and President, elected through a similar FPTP system, reflecting its semi-autonomous status. The Zanzibar House of Representatives comprises 76 members, including 50 elected members, seven (7) nominated members, and 18 special seats reserved for women.
The AUEOM acknowledges this hybrid electoral system in both the mainland and Zanzibar as inclusive and in consonance with the AU’s Agenda 2063, the ACDEG, and the Maputo Protocol, which collectively emphasise inclusion, equity, and full participation of women in governance.
4. Election Administration
The AUEOM recognised the preparations carried out by the INEC and the ZEC for the 2025 General Elections, in accordance with the established electoral framework. Among the commendable activities undertaken by the Commissions were the voter registration drive that enrolled new voters, voter education, logistics planning, and the procurement of biometric verification kits, among others.
However, various stakeholders raised concerns about the late release of INEC’s election calendar, citing a lack of transparency, which made it difficult for stakeholders to plan more effectively and engage with the election processes. An earlier and inclusive dissemination would have aligned with regional best practices.
While the legal framework in the Constitution accorded the Commissions some form of independence, the inclusion of senior public officers as returning officers under Section 6(1) of the Electoral Act, combined with oversight by the Prime Minister’s office, undermined the independence of the INEC.
Furthermore, the Constitution and the INEC Act concentrate significant powers in the presidency to appoint all INEC members. This contrasts with the appointment process of the ZEC, where two Commissioners are recommended by the opposition leader or other political parties after consultations.
(a) Voter Registration
The INEC commendably updated its permanent voter register through a two-phase registration process that took place from 20 July 2024 to 23 March 2025 and from 1 May to 4 July 2025. During this period, the Provisional National Voters’ Register (PNVR) was updated and displayed across 40,170 centres nationwide, a measure which contributes to transparency.
Notably, efforts to enhance inclusion in the election included registering voters in 130 prisons across Mainland Tanzania and 10 correctional institutions in Zanzibar. A total of 37,647,235 voters were registered, of whom 50.3% were women and 49.7% were men.
However, the Mission noted concerns from civil society regarding the potential registration of non-citizens in border areas, pointing to persistent trust deficits and highlighting serious risks to electoral credibility.
(b) Voter Education
The INEC granted accreditation to 164 CSOs to conduct voter education, reflecting inclusion in the electoral process. In 2021, the Commission adopted a Strategic Plan (2021/22–2025/26) to guide the implementation of voter education programmes. Subsequently, INEC launched awareness programmes on its election technology tools, particularly the Permanent Voter Registration System (PVR) and the Integrated Electoral Management System (IEMS). The targeted groups for the voter education programmes included youth (18–35), young and new voters (7.5 million), women, persons with disabilities, rural communities, other marginalised groups, and security agencies. Voter education was carried out through various media platforms, including radio and social media. These efforts were deemed progressive by the Mission.
However, stakeholders raised concerns that voter education faced challenges that undermined meaningful citizen participation and democratic accountability. These included the late accreditation of CSOs and media outlets, restrictions on online platforms, which hampered the digital reach of voter education messages; uneven coverage of voter education programmes, which excluded some remote and rural areas, among other issues.
5. Political Party and Candidate Nomination
The nomination process took place from 9 to 15 August 2025 in line with the Elections Act (2024). The nomination fees for mainland were 1,000,000 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately USD 400) for presidential candidates and 50,000 Tanzanian shillings (approximately USD 20) for parliamentary candidates. In Zanzibar, the rates were slightly higher: 2,000,000 Tanzanian shillings (approximately USD 800) for presidential candidates and 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (approximately USD 40) for House of Representatives candidates. Comparatively, these fees were regarded as affordable for candidates, thereby promoting inclusion.
The Mission noted that the Union had 17 Presidential candidates (3 women and 14 men), 1,735 Parliamentary candidates (1,177 men and 558 women), and 7,289 Local Council aspirants (6,589 men and 700 women) competing in the general elections. For the Zanzibar elections, there were 11 presidential candidates, of whom three were women.
As previously discussed, the mission also noted the disqualification of the ACT Wazalendo presidential candidate on the grounds of failing to meet nomination regulations.
6. Electoral Campaign and Finance
The official campaign period lasted from 26 August to 27 October 2025. Compared to previous elections, the 2025 general elections were uncompetitive, and stakeholders attributed this to the main opposition political party, CHADEMA’s boycott of the contest, and the disqualification of the ACT-Wazalendo presidential candidate. Campaign activities were dominated by the ruling CCM, as evidenced by extensive public rallies and very visible billboards and posters across the country.
The revised Election Expenses Act (2024) and Political Parties Act (2024) introduced measures to curb illicit funding in elections and promote fairness. However, stakeholders reported that the ruling CCM party had unequal access to and utilisation of state-owned media and public resources, due to weak enforcement of these two laws. The Mission noted that an uncompetitive political environment did not promote the AU principles for the right and freedom of participation in elections, as outlined in the ACDEG and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
7. Women’s Political Participation
In Tanzania, Article 66(1b) of the Constitution establishes special seats for women in the National Assembly, ensuring a minimum quota for female representation. Article 13 further guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination based on gender. Initially set at 20% in 1998, the quota was increased to 30% and, following the 2015 elections, to 40%, resulting in women holding approximately 37% of parliamentary seats in the most recent parliament.
The Mission observed that Special Seats remained the dominant pathway for women’s representation in Parliament, rather than through competitive electoral contests. This trend indicated that while Tanzania was progressing towards compliance with AU principles on gender equality, full substantive equality—where women compete and succeed in open elections—had yet to be fully achieved. The FPTP electoral system further compounded these challenges, as it tends to favour established political actors and limited opportunities for women, youth, and persons with disabilities.
Despite these efforts, the 2025 elections showed a mixed picture of women’s political participation. According to figures from INEC, the number of women parliamentary candidates increased to 32.2% (558 out of 1,735), a significant rise from 23.3% in 2020 and just 4.4% in 1995. At the presidential level, three women contested out of 17 candidates (18%), and nine of the 17 running mates were women (53%), indicating their growing visibility at the highest political level. However, this upward trend was not consistent across all levels of governance. Women’s participation in Local Council elections remained significantly lower, with only 9.6% (700 out of 7,289 candidates) being women, compared to 90% men.
8. Youth Participation
Article 21(1) of the Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to participate in governance, either directly or through representatives, while Article 5 grants all citizens aged 18 and above the right to vote, including youth as a major demographic. Although these provisions do not establish youth quotas or reserved seats as they do for women, they support principles of inclusion. While the Elections Act (2024) sets the minimum voting age at 18 and requires proof of age for voter registration, it does not address the administrative and procedural barriers young people face in obtaining identification cards. This omission may have indirectly restricted youth participation in the electoral process, falling short of the African Youth Charter’s objective to guarantee young citizens the right to participate in all spheres of society, despite Tanzania’s signature and ratification of the same.
The Mission noted that youth participation in Tanzania’s electoral processes faces significant challenges such as underrepresentation in directly elected positions due to financial constraints, societal stereotypes (assumptions that young people cannot lead), and entrenched party patronage favouring older politicians. The absence of deliberate policies or mechanisms to ensure youth representation in Parliament was very glaring.
Some youth-led organisations were accredited to conduct voter education. In Zanzibar, young people were included, for the first time, in a special advisory committee established by the ZEC to contribute to the electoral process. This committee also comprised representatives of women and persons with disabilities, reflecting institutional efforts to promote inclusivity.
9. Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities
The Mission acknowledged that the Persons with Disabilities Act (2010) reasonably provides for persons with disabilities to be elected to public office and includes accessibility measures for voters, such as access at polling stations and tactile ballot templates.
The Zanzibar Persons with Disabilities Act (2022) mentions political participation of persons with disabilities. However, it does not cover disability issues such as accessibility and reasonable accommodation, leaving persons with disabilities vulnerable in exercising their political rights.
Although the Constitution guarantees their rights to vote and run for public office, there are no dedicated seats in Parliament or local councils specifically set aside for persons with disabilities. The Mission noted that their inclusion largely depends on political parties' discretion, often through women’s special seats rather than a disability-specific mechanism. This lack of structural guarantees persisted despite Tanzania’s legal commitments under the Persons with Disabilities Act (2010).
INEC reported that there are 49,174 voters with disabilities. However, the Mission observed that this data was not disaggregated by gender and age, making it challenging to assess the participation of women with disabilities and young people with disabilities, who face multiple barriers because of their intersecting identities. The Mission also noted that INEC did not provide data on the number of candidates with disabilities to the public. This lack of information impacted the Mission’s ability to evaluate the participation and representation of persons with disabilities as political candidates.
10. Participation of Civil Society Organisations
The INEC accredited 164 CSOs to conduct voter education and 76 to observe the 2025 elections, while ZEC accredited 45 CSOs for voter education and 51 for election observation, recognising their vital role in supporting democratic processes. In Zanzibar, some CSOs received accreditation only four days before Election Day. Such delays in accreditation hindered CSOs’ work in the electoral process.
Overall, CSOs alleged selective treatment in gaining access to electoral processes, with limited information provided on why some groups were not accredited. Despite these challenges and limited resources, CSOs remained active in promoting civil and political rights.
11. The Media Coverage of the Electoral Process
The Mission observed that Tanzania’s media landscape was diverse, including both state-owned and private outlets. However, access to major digital platforms was restricted during the election period under laws such as the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations of 2020, following alleged cyberattacks on government accounts, which subsequently resulted in the blocking of some social media platforms.
Across the country, numerous outlets were deregistered or banned, and journalists worked under restrictive reporting guidelines that curtailed press freedom and public access to diverse information.
Traditional public media, especially radio, television, and print, showed a discernible bias in favour of the ruling CCM, restricting visibility for opposition parties and candidates. These issues highlighted gross inconsistencies with Article 17 of the ACDEG, which advocates for equitable access to both public and private media for all political actors during elections.
The Mission noted with concern a total internet shutdown in Tanzania during the mid-stage of the elections, which persisted until the departure of the AUEOM on 3 November 2025. This unfortunate development hindered citizens' access to information and limited election observers' ability to fully observe and report on crucial elements of the election process, such as voting, closing of polls, and counting of votes.
12. Electoral Security
The Tanzania Police, along with other state security agencies, played a vital role in maintaining order during the electoral process. In the lead-up to the 2025 General Elections, the Police established Gender Desks as part of their response to gender-based violence, especially for women in politics.
However, stakeholders reported challenges such as delayed investigations, lack of gender-sensitive training, funding constraints, and victims’ fear of reporting due to stigma.
The AUEOM noted allegations of politically motivated abductions that remained unresolved ahead of the elections. The lack of prompt and thorough investigations into these incidents, along with insufficient communication on progress, eroded stakeholder confidence in the security institutions.
The Mission also noted with concern, allegations of excessive use of force by the police and the military in maintaining law and order during protests that characterised election day and immediately afterwards.
C. ELECTON DAY FINDINGS
1. Early Voting in Zanzibar (28 October 2025)
The AUEOM deployed three teams of observers to observe early voting on 28 October 2025. The process was established to facilitate voting by security personnel and election officials who would be deployed away from their registered areas on election day.
Early voting in Zanzibar was conducted peacefully.
The Mission observed professional conduct by electoral and security officials in the discharge of their duties. The opening process was largely efficient, timely, and well-resourced with all the necessary materials, although some complaints were raised by election agents alleging that they were not sufficiently informed of or invited to monitor the preparations for the vote before stations opened. The Mission also noted that handwritten signage made access to some early voting stations difficult.
At all stations visited, the Mission observed that voting proceeded uninterrupted with most early voters managing to cast their ballots. However, observers noted one allegation from a candidate that voters at a particular station, who appeared to be marginally younger, were not eligible to vote. No further evidence was provided to support the allegation.
Most stations visited were virtually empty two hours before the close of polls, suggesting that voters were limited and organised to vote in the morning.
It was noted that while enfranchising security and election officials who would be deployed for official duty on election day was commendable, the management of early votes added to those cast on election day for counting could be improved to enhance transparency and accountability.
Two teams from the Mission were denied access to observe the closing of stations for early voting, which raised questions about compliance with regulations facilitating election observation based on regional and continental standards and principles of transparency in election administration.
2. Voting Day (29 October 2025)
The Mission deployed 72 observers across 17 regions to cover 176 constituencies nationwide. On Election Day, the observers visited 352 polling stations to observe the opening, voting, closing, and counting procedures in 202 urban (57.5%), 149 rural (42.5%) areas.
The electoral environment in the morning was generally calm. However, the situation shifted to violent protests, gunfire, road closures, and tyre burning in areas such as Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Mwanza, Kagera, Dodoma, Kigoma, Tebora, Buhungwa, Singinda, among others. Our observers encountered serious security challenges as they could not return to Dar es Salaam immediately due to a sudden imposition of a curfew.
Furthermore, the AUEOM noted the absence of formal communication regarding the curfew, despite the established communication between the Mission and relevant authorities. As a result, some observers and drivers became stranded because they could not return to their accommodation and had to seek shelter in people's homes.
The Mission also experienced a shutdown of internet services, which occurred from around 11:00am on 29 October 2025. This affected the Mission’s communication, as well as the transmission of data and reporting from its observers.
The Mission’s Election Day observations below are based on reports received from our observers through our online reporting platform, phone calls, and in-person briefings.
Opening of polling
The Mission was deployed across 17 regions of Tanzania, observing the opening of 28 polling stations.
Voters were seen arriving early in the morning to cast their votes. Short queues, averaging 1 to 15 voters, were observed outside some stations (37%) before opening. However, at most stations (63%), there were no queues when the polling stations opened.
The Mission noted that INEC made efforts to ensure voter access in 70% of the polling stations visited, which had facilities for persons with disabilities. However, those not accessible were on uneven ground, located upstairs, lacked sign language interpreters, did not have information and instructions in large print and Braille formats, or had inaccessible ballot boxes and booths for wheelchair users, despite the provisions in the Persons with Disabilities Act (2010).
Additionally, voters without a voters’ card were still permitted to vote if identified in the register, and upon presenting either their national ID cards, passports, or drivers’ licences, ensuring that no eligible voter was disenfranchised.
The Mission observed that 11 out of 28 polling stations opened late by between 15 minutes and an hour, mainly due to poor preparations by polling officials, late delivery of voting materials, late arrival of staff, slow arrangement of materials, and delays in setting up the station.
The Mission noted that essential materials were available in most polling stations (96%). However, tactile ballot folders were not supplied.
Voting Process
All polling stations observed exhibited low voter turnout, indicating voter apathy and disengagement from the electoral process.
The secrecy of the vote was guaranteed by the proper layout of certain polling stations visited, which ensured the privacy of the ballot.
The Mission noted good practices, such as prioritising elderly voters. Assistance was also given to voters who needed support, including those who are visually impaired. However, the absence of priority lines in several centres put older persons, pregnant women, and mothers with infants at a disadvantage, and child-friendly measures were absent.
An average of five election officials were deployed at each polling station visited. There was a commendable gender balance, with 50% being women.
Party agents were present at most polling stations observed. The agents were mainly from CCM in 96.9% of the stations visited and ACT-Wazalendo in 39.9% of those stations. INEC cooperated with political party and candidate agents and ensured that they all had hard copies of the voters’ roll to enhance voter verification. However, observers reported receiving limited cooperation from polling officials, some of whom were reluctant to share information to facilitate the work of accredited observers. The Mission observed the presence of the Tanzania Police at all the polling stations visited, from the opening, voting, counting, to the closing of the polls. Their presence was observed to be cooperative, non-intrusive, discreet, and professional at all stations, which contributed to order, safety, and voter confidence.
While voting earlier in the day proceeded slowly but efficiently at most polling stations visited, some observers noted that polling stations with presidential ballots did not have party agents or observers. At some of these stations, certain voters were allowed to vote without their identities being checked on the voter register. These voters were also given multiple ballots to vote in full view of observers.
The Mission managed to continue observing the voting processes at some polling stations but was unable to do so at others due to outbreaks of protests and violence in their deployment areas. In other cases, observers were asked to only observe voting for five minutes at each polling station, which limited their access to the voting process.
Closing and Counting
The Mission observed peaceful closing procedures at several polling stations. In some of these stations, observers noted some compliance with procedures such as reconciliation and tallying. However, at other stations, observers noted that ballot counts did not tally.
The Mission also observed some ballot stuffing at several polling stations, where voters were issued multiple ballots to vote, compromising election integrity. Most of these instances were noted in polling stations where only the presidential ballot box was set up. Such stations did not appear to be manned by political party agents, only having INEC officials, including in Zanzibar.
During the counting, several of our observers were asked to leave polling stations before the process concluded. Such restrictions on observation were not consistent with any of the INEC or ZEC procedures and overall limited the transparency of the vote count.
D. CONCLUSION
The Mission acknowledges commendable efforts undertaken to logistically prepare for the elections, to introduce technology in election administration, and to promote the participation of marginalised groups in voting.
The AUEOM further notes Tanzania’s efforts to comply with its Constitution and relevant legal frameworks in conducting elections.
However, the legal framework’s failure to comply with some AU democratic norms and international standards for democratic elections, non-implementation of recommended reforms from previous election observation missions, the interruption of the polling process in some parts of the country, and the internet shutdown on election day and afterwards compromised the integrity of the 2025 Tanzania General Elections.
At this preliminary stage, the Mission concludes that (a) the 2025 Tanzania General Elections did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections; (b) the environment surrounding the elections—before, during, and immediately after—was not conducive to peaceful conduct and acceptance of electoral outcomes; (c) the preparedness level of the electoral commission and other electoral institutions was inadequate to address the challenges that compromised the integrity of the elections.
In this regard, Tanzania should prioritise electoral and political reforms to address the root causes of its democratic and electoral challenges witnessed ahead of, during, and after the 2025 General Elections. Such reforms should be underpinned by transparent and accountable conduct by state institutions, inclusion and accommodation of divergent views, citizen participation, and the upholding and respect for human rights.
The Mission regrets the loss of lives following election day protests observed. Our heartfelt condolences go to the bereaved families. The Mission further regrets the damage to private property and public infrastructure arising from the election-related protests. Citizens are encouraged to always pursue democratic and peaceful means to express their discontent.
In upholding law and order, the Mission urges security institutions in Tanzania to exercise restraint and respect human rights. Additionally, the Mission encourages thorough investigations that are transparent to ensure justice for those affected by the deadly protests.
The final AUEM report with detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be published within two months.
Issued on 5 November 2025
H.E. Mokgweetsi E.K. Masisi
Head of the African Union Election Observation Mission
(Former President of the Republic of Botswana)
