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Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia

I. INTRODUCTION
1. At its 356th meeting held on 27 February 2013, the Peace and Security Council, having welcomed the outcome of the Commission’s Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), endorsed the recommendation to enhance AMISOM, which notably requires the Mission to: (a) maintain a robust posture, with the required multipliers and enablers, in order to facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab; (b) establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia’s national defense and public safety institutions; and (c) enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation, human rights and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas [PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLVI)]. At its 375th meeting held on 10 May 2013, Council, having reviewed the situation in Somalia, among others, requested the Commission to submit to it, within 30 days, a report on the issues raised in United Nations Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) of 6 March 2013 [PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLXXV)].
2. The present report is submitted in pursuance of these communiqués of Council. It provides an update on the main developments that took place in Somalia during the period under review, as well as on the implementation of AMISOM mandate and other related aspects. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.
II. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA
3. The following paragraphs cover the main developments that occurred in Somalia during the period under review. These cover political, security and humanitarian aspects.

a. Political aspects
4. Since February 2013, the political situation in Somalia has continued to improve. Under the leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the FGS pursued its efforts to implement its Six-Pillar Plan adopted in October 2012, which revolves around the following elements: security and rule of law, economic recovery, dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building collaborative international relations, and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia.
5. On 2 March 2013, President Sheikh Mohamoud opened the second session of the Federal Parliament. This was followed, on 3 March, by the presentation by Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon of the Government’s progress report. The report highlighted the improved security situation, marked by the recovery of major towns from Al Shabaab and the reduction of piracy off the coast of Somalia. It also outlined reforms in the judiciary, with the adoption, by the FGS, of a Justice Sector Action Plan for the period 2013 - 2015. Furthermore, the report covered steps taken to improve the provision of social services, notably a three-year plan to enrol one million children in school and the standardization of the education curriculum in Somalia. The Prime Minister indicated that the FGS had presented a number of bills to Parliament, including draft laws on oil production, fishing, toxic waste, the protection of Somali waters, the media and civil aviation.
6. Between mid-February and March 2013, the Prime Minister undertook a ‘national listening tour’ of the country, during which he visited major towns in Galgaduud, Puntland, Lower Juba, Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions. These visits were undertaken in pursuance of the National Stabilization Plan adopted in February 2013, which includes a roadmap on the establishment of local administrations across the country, particularly in those towns that have been recovered from Al Shabaab by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), with the support of AMISOM.
7. The Prime Minister’s ‘listening tours’ have been largely successful, and tangible progress has been recorded, as exemplified by the issuance by the Government, on 4 February, of a decree regarding the formation of a new interim administration for the Bay region and the appointment, on 8 April 2013, of a new administration for Hiran region. However, the process of establishing a regional administration for Jubbaland faces serious challenges. This process began in Nairobi in June 2012, with a meeting that brought together participants from Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions, under the aegis of the Grand Stabilization Plan adopted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 27 January 2012. Following the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in October 2012, the FGS declared that the processes to establish local administrations should be led from Mogadishu and should be more inclusive.
8. On 28 February 2013, more than 500 delegates gathered in Kismayo, Lower Juba region, to discuss and plan the proposed formation of the Jubbaland state. On 26 March 2013, the Somali Prime Minister travelled to Kismayo and informed the Jubbaland political, clan and religious leaders that the Jubbaland State Conference was unconstitutional and unilateral. He directed that the Conference be disbanded, the Kismayo air and sea ports be handed over to the FGS, and all militias be integrated into the SNSF. Further, the FGS insists that all areas still under Al Shabaab control in the region must be recovered before the state can be formed, on the understanding that it will, thereafter, appoint regional Governors for Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo. However, the delegates gathering at the Jubbaland State Conference continued with their deliberations, insisting that the process was legal under the provisional Constitution of Somalia.
9. At their 21st extraordinary summit held in Addis Ababa, on 3 May 2013, the IGAD Heads of State and Government of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) reiterated the need for all ongoing processes to establish regional administrations to be anchored on a set of principles, namely: leadership by the FGS; respect for the provisional Constitution of Somalia; inclusive consultative process; and fight against Al-Shabaab as the primary focus of the FGS, AMISOM and regional and international partners. They requested that the FGS align its National Stabilization Plan with these principles.
10. On 15 May 2013, the delegates at the Kismayo Conference formally established the “Jubbaland State” and elected Raas Kamboni militia leader, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam aka Madobe, as its President. Shortly thereafter, former Minister of Defense Colonel Barre Adam Shire Hirrale declared himself President of Jubbaland. This development has raised concerns that fighting could erupt between supporters of the rival ‘Presidents’ if an agreement is not swiftly reached to resolve this standoff.
11. In an effort to defuse tension, and following the decision by the 21st extraordinary summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, a high-level fact-finding and confidence-building mission travelled to Mogadishu and Kismayo from 16 to 19 May 2013. At their 22nd extraordinary session, held in Addis Ababa, on 24 May 2013, the IGAD Heads of State and Government, having considered the report of the fact-finding mission, noted with satisfaction the agreement of all stakeholders to respect the Somali provisional Constitution, to accept the Government’s leadership, and to conduct the process in an all-inclusive manner and in a way that helps in the fight against Al-Shabaab. The Heads of State and Government urged the FGS to convene and lead a reconciliation conference, with IGAD’s support, while consulting key stakeholders in the Juba regions to chart a roadmap on the establishment of an interim administration and the formation of a permanent regional administration. They also called on all parties in Mogadishu and Kismayo to uphold the tenets of the five principles enumerated in the communiqué of their 21st extraordinary summit, and re-iterated their previous call for the FGS to, as soon as possible, integrate the various militia forces into a unified national command of the Somali National Army (SNA).
12. In the meantime, on 17 May 2013, a group of 100 Members of Parliament tabled a motion requesting Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon to appear before Parliament for a vote of confidence. They claimed that the Council of Ministers had functioned well below expectations. On 22 May 2013, these Members of Parliament abandoned the vote of confidence against the Prime Minister, but warned the government that it would face further parliamentary interventions if it did not improve governance in the country.
13. During the period under review, the FGS also continued its engagement with Somaliland and Puntland. In the spirit of previous meetings between the FGS and Somaliland held in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) respectively from 20 to 21 June 2012 and on 28 June 2012, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Somaliland President, Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo, in Ankara, Turkey, on 13 April 2013. The two parties agreed to continue dialogue and to consolidate cooperation in the security sector through sharing of intelligence, as well as training for security sector professionals, in order to enhance effectiveness in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters, among others. In its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLXXV), Council welcomed these developments. Regarding Puntland, the FGS and the State of Puntland signed a 7-point cooperation agreement on 11 March 2013, while President Sheikh Mohamoud visited the region from 27 to 29 April 2013.
14. The government has taken steps to enhance financial transparency and accountability, especially through the establishment of a special finance facility with the assistance of Norway. International institutions have renewed their relations with Somalia. Notably, on 12 April 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognized the FGS, paving the way for the resumption of relations after a 22-year hiatus, including the provision of technical support and policy advice to the government. However, the IMF has indicated that it would not lend money to Somalia until the country’s US$ 352 million debt has been cleared. The FGS is also engaging other partners in order to mobilise more development assistance.
15. On 7 May 2013, in London, the UK and Somalia co-hosted the second Somalia Conference. Fifty-four friends and partners of Somalia attended. The Conference agreed that Somalia had made significant progress, stressed the need for sustained commitment of its international partners, and urged for continued results-orientated support. In this regard, Somalia’s partners reiterated their determination to provide long-term support. In its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLXXV), Council welcomed the outcome of the London Conference and called for effective follow-up. A special conference on Somalia, co-organized by the Japanese Government and the AU, took place on the margins of the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) on 31 May 2013, in Yokohama, Japan, to discuss the socio-economic aspects of Somalia’s peace-building efforts, particularly measures to support Somali-led efforts on achieving economic recovery and service delivery.

b. Security Situation
16. The security situation, while still very fragile, continues to improve. At the end of March 2013, AMISOM forces and the SNSF recovered the last stretch of the 240 km Mogadishu-Baidoa road from Al Shabaab. Since then, efforts have focused on consolidating control over the recovered towns. Due to both operational and resource limitations, there have been no major advances to recover more territory from Al Shabaab. Consequently, the following key towns remain under the control of Al Shabaab: the port city of Barawe, in Sector 1; Jamaame, Jilib and Buale, in Sector 2; Baardheere and Dinsoor, in Sector 3; and Bulo Burto, in Sector 4.
17. On 17 March 2013, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), in anticipation of AMISOM deployment in Sector 3 as stipulated in the Mission’s operational benchmarks, withdrew from Huduur in Bakool region. However, AMISOM, because of a lack of enablers (helicopters), was unable to deploy its forces quickly in the positions vacated by the ENDF. Likewise, the SNSF was also unable to retain control of the town because of logistical and command and control challenges. Al Shabaab insurgents seized the opportunity and retook the town. The withdrawal of the ENDF occasioned tension in the region, with a reported exodus of the civilian population fearing an upsurge in Al Shabaab activities. The Ethiopian authorities have subsequently informed the Commission of their intention to withdraw the ENDF from other towns in the Bay region, including Qansax Dheere and Bardale. As indicated below, AMISOM is closely coordinating with the ENDF to put in place a successor arrangement that would ensure that no security vacuum is created by the ENDF withdrawal. However, the lack of force enablers is hampering a quick deployment of the requisite forces, as stipulated in the AMISOM operational benchmarks.
18. Overall, the threat posed by Al Shabaab has decreased, because of power struggles within the hierarchy of the group and the successive defeats it has suffered, as a result of the military operations by the SNSF, AMISOM and the ENDF. However, the group is far from being defeated and hence the fight against Al Shabaab cannot be declared won. Al Shabaab has launched a number of probing and asymmetrical attacks against AMISOM, SNSF and ENDF positions. These operations have increased in tenacity, as demonstrated by the suicide attack on the Supreme Court complex in Mogadishu on 14 April 2013. The group’s fighters have melted into various communities in different regions, seeking to exploit clan rivalries and political disagreements, as well as the absence of effective local administrations and the attendant lack of social services in certain areas. In Mogadishu for instance, the situation has necessitated the launching, since 15 May 2013, of a joint operation involving the SNSF, the Somalia National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and AMISOM, code-named ‘Operation Stabilize Mogadishu’, with the aim to curb Al Shabaab attacks in the capital. The operation is still underway.
19. Meanwhile, in those areas that have not been liberated, Al Shabaab continues to enjoy the freedom to organize, train and access logistics, including weapons and munitions. During the reporting period, there has been an influx of military equipment, notably through Haradheere and the ports of Cadale and Baarawe. In the Juba valley in particular, Al Shabaab continues to operate, using the towns of Jamaame, Jilib and Bua'ale as launching pads. However, there has not been any major incident in the Sector, other than intermittent attacks in Dobley. Furthermore, the security situation in the port city of Kismayo has deteriorated following the election, on 15 May 2013, of the leader of the Raas Kamboni militia as President of the “Jubbaland State”. As indicated above, immediately following his election, former Defense Minister Barre Hirrale also declared himself President, and two additional presumptive “Presidents” have since emerged. There are reports indicating that the two sides have been arming in anticipation of an eventual confrontation. Further, Al Shabaab is reported recently to have infiltrated the city of Kismayo and built up forces in Bulagadud, Kamusuma, Bula Xaji and Jana Cabdalla, with the intention to get involved in any fighting for the city of Kismayo, a major source of revenue that it lost in September 2012.
20. On 7 June, the Minister of Defense, Abdihakim Mohamoud Fiqi, invited one of the self-declared Presidents of Jubbaland, Colonel Iftin Hassan Baasto (Hawiye/Awrmale), to a meeting at his hotel where he has been staying since 15 May 2013. Upon learning about this, Raas Kamboni militia attempted to storm the hotel in order to disrupt the meeting. The militia claimed the meeting was a guise for the Minister to provide money and weapons to Colonel Iftin Hassan Baasto. Immediately afterwards, clashes broke out between Raas Kamboni militia and Colonel Iftin Hassan Baasto, with clan undertones. Four militia members were killed, while 10 others and several civilians were injured. These clashes could draw in other regions on both sides, exacerbate divisions between the two major clans of the Hawiye and Darod and create space for Al Shabaab to exploit the situation. In order to prevent further clashes, my Special Representative, working the UN Special Representative Nicholas Kay, advised the Minister of Defense be recalled to Mogadishu for consultations. Thereafter, AMISOM soldiers escorted the Minister to another hotel near the Kismayo airport. He refuted accusations that he was formenting clan tensions in order to ignite fighting between the Darods and the Hawiyes.

c. Humanitarian Situation
21. Based on UN agencies data there are over 1 million Somali refugees in the region. They are hosted mainly in Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. The number of Internally Displaced persons (IDPs) is estimated at 1 million, living in difficult conditions in camps across the country.
22. Despite the efforts of both traditional humanitarian agencies and other actors, the current humanitarian response remains inadequate, in part because of access restrictions and funding gaps. Although the security situation is improving, there are a number of security incidents which continue to restrict access and, consequently, affect the delivery of assistance to the needy population. The near absence of public infrastructure, including health, education and other social services, contributes to the worsening plight of the war-weary population, particularly the vulnerable groups, including children, women and the disabled, who continue to bear the biggest brunt of the ongoing conflict in Somalia.
III. DEPLOYMENT OF AMISOM
23. During the reporting period, AMISOM attained its mandated uniformed personnel strength of 17,731. With regard to the AMISOM military deployment in Sector 1, there are 85 staff officers at the Force Headquarters, 4,335 Ugandan and 4,252 Burundian troops, making a total of 8,672 troops. In Sector 2, there are 4,040 Kenyan troops and 664 Sierra Leonean troops, who began their deployment in late April 2013. As this report was being finalized, relief-in-place operations between the Kenyan and Sierra Leonean troops were ending – Kenya will draw down its troops by one battalion. A further 186 Sierra-Leonean troops are in Mogadishu awaiting deployment to Kismayo. In Sector 3, there are 1,180 Burundian troops and 1,888 Ugandan troops. Additional troops have been redeployed from Sector 1 to relieve the ENDF in Baidoa town and the outlying areas. In Sector 4, there are 999 Djiboutian troops supported by units of the ENDF and SNSF.
24. Regarding the AMISOM police component, there are currently 490 police officers serving in the Mission. The component includes 2 Formed Police Units (FPUs) of 140 personnel each from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 210 Individual Police Officers (IPOs). Plans are underway to deploy additional IPOs, in order to reach the planned strength of 560. Also, as articulated in the Strategic Concept, one FPU will shortly be relocated from Sector 1 to Sector 2, while IPOs will be deployed to other Sectors, once the requisite infrastructure and security arrangements are in place.
25. As Council is aware, my Special Representative and Head of AMISOM, Ambassador Mahamat Salah Annadif, has assumed duties in Mogadishu, where he is now based. On the ground, he is availing AU’s good offices and closely supporting the FGS and the Somali political leadership. Ambassador Annadif is being supported by a complement of political, civil, humanitarian and gender affairs officers in Mogadishu, who also undertake regular visits to the four Sectors in support of the stabilization efforts of the FGS. Presently, 25 out of the 56 international civilian personnel of the Mission are deployed in Mogadishu, while the remainder, who are mostly procurement, finance and local support staff, remain in Nairobi. The Commission is considering deployment of additional international civilian staff into the Mission area, as security conditions improve and the required administrative and logistical support is made available.
26. The coordination mechanisms outlined in the Strategic Concept, namely the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) and the Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC), continue to provide the platform for guidance and coordination at the strategic level. So far, two meetings of the JCM and nine meetings of the MOCC have been convened, the last of which took place on 14 January and 10 April 2013, respectively. The meetings of the JCM have finalized the recruitment guidelines and operational plans for the expansion operations. The MOCC representation has been expanded to include the Inspector-Generals of the Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), namely Nigeria and Uganda. The scope of its agenda has also been expanded to include discussions on Mission management issues, such as handling of disengaged fighters and policies related to the AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).
27. At the last meeting of the MOCC, important decisions were taken, including the relief of the ENDF in Sector 3. Furthermore, it was agreed that AMISOM had reached its operational limit and should not undertake any further expansion operations because of the major strategic challenges facing the Mission. A number of factors are at play here. While the international community has continued to make pledges for substantial support to the development of an effective SNSF, this has yet to materialize. In the meantime, the effectiveness of AMISOM joint operations with the SNSF are being seriously undermined by the lack of basic logistic supplies to the SNSF, including ammunition, fuel and rations, as well as medical support. As a result, AMISOM has been compelled to use its limited resources to hold the secured areas, instead of handing them over to the Somali authorities and undertaking further expansion operations, as envisaged in the Strategic Concept and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The situation is further compounded by the lack of critical force enablers for the Mission, such as attack helicopters, utility helicopters, and engineering and transport units. Additionally, the present number of serviceable Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs), which provide protected mobility and flexibility to the force, is insufficient. Furthermore, and despite the best efforts deployed by the United Nations Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA), its logistics outreach, especially in Sectors 2, 3 and 4, remain inadequate.
28. As indicated earlier, a significant development has been the relocation of some ENDF troops from certain areas in Sector 3, where they have been deployed at Ethiopia’s own cost and sustenance, in support of the FGS and AMISOM. The Ethiopian government had announced, in addition to the withdrawal from Hudur in March 2013, its intention also to withdraw its troops from Baidoa, Berdale, Qansax Dheere and Manaas, by the end of April 2013. In an effort to avoid an Al Shabaab occupation of the areas to be vacated, and as a follow up to the conclusions of the last MOCC meeting, a Relief-in-Place planning session involving the ENDF, the SNSF and AMISOM took place in Mogadishu on 15 April 2013, during which a reconfiguration of forces for Sectors I and III was agreed to in order to reinforce Baidoa and take over Manaas, while the ENDF continues to secure Bardale. AMISOM has yet to deploy in Qansax Dheere, where the Ethiopian forces continue to maintain a presence. The reconfiguration of forces between Sectors 1 and 3 has resulted in a further outstretching of AMISOM troops, affecting both their capabilities to undertake offensive actions against Al Shabaab and to adequately secure the Mission’s main supply routes.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF AMISOM MANDATE
29. The mandate of AMISOM is spelt out in paragraph 9 of communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLVI) and in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013). During the period under review, AMISOM continued to make sustained efforts towards the implementation of its mandate.

a. Support to Dialogue and Reconciliation
30. AMISOM has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at all levels. At local and regional levels, in areas recovered from Al Shabaab, AMISOM has mobilised clans, elders, religious and political leaders, including Members of Parliament, to resolve political and other differences, improve security and support the FGS, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Bay and Hiraan regions. In the Hiraan region for example, in February, March and April 2013, AMISOM Political and Civil Affairs Officers worked closely with Members of Parliament in the formation of the Hiraan Council of Elders. Subsequently, AMISOM facilitated a formal engagement between federal legislators from the Hiraan region, the local administration and population. AMISOM further engaged the youth population in the region, through the Hilaal Centre for Youth Development, to facilitate their participation in political and development issues in the region.
31. At the national level, AMISOM has continued to support dialogue among the various political actors in the country. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the transitional era, AMISOM Political Unit has remained closely engaged with all political stakeholders in order to avoid a repeat of the incessant problems that characterised the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In particular, my Special Representative continues to exercise his ‘good offices’ to mediate political disputes and to encourage a constructive approach in dealing with the challenges at hand, especially in Baidoa, Jubbaland and Hiraan.

b. Support to Somalia National Security Forces
32. AMISOM has continued to provide multi-faceted support to the SNSF, including through training, mentoring and operational guidance. However, this support has been largely ad hoc, as the AMISOM military component is not appropriately resourced to undertake large-scale training activities. The Mission has only been able to play a role in this important task by pooling the requisite human and other resources from elsewhere, including by diverting critically-needed resources from combat operations.
33. Since 2009, AMISOM has supported the training conducted by the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) of 4,500 soldiers of the SNA in Bihanga, Uganda. The bulk of troops trained so far are mainly from the rank and file, thus leaving gaps in junior and middle leadership positions and resulting in a critical vacuum in terms of command and control of the SNA. In order to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command positions in the SNSF. Accordingly, following weeks of initial training, on 15 April 2013, 96 junior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) completed a Platoon Commander and Senior NCOs training course run by AMISOM at the newly-refurbished Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu.
34. With respect to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, reorganization and professionalization of the SPF though various programmes and activities. During the reporting period, AMISOM police, including the FPUs, worked closely with the SPF at various police establishments in Mogadishu to mentor, train and advise Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and the management of crime.
35. Recognizing the importance of mitigating security challenges, as well as the need for skills transfer in managing police operations to the SPF, the AMISOM police component, with funding support from the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), established and equipped a Joint Police Operations and Coordination Centre (JPOCC), to effectively co-locate AMISOM police and the SPF. The co-location has enhanced the conduct and coordination of police operations in Mogadishu and its environs. During the reporting period, the JPOCC facilitated joint public safety and security activities in Mogadishu and environs, during which several suspects were detained and illegal weapons and ammunition recovered and handed over to the SPF. These actions have contributed to preventing possible attacks from Al Shabaab and other criminal activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the ability of the FGS to ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM FPUs have also continued the 24-hour joint confidence-building and public reassurance joint patrols with the SPF in Mogadishu, thus contributing significantly to improved security situation in the city.
36. The AMISOM police, together with the SPF and in collaboration with the UK Department for International Development (DFID), has developed a Strategic Development Plan for the period 2013 - 2017 that will guide the SPF in its reform, restructuring and development agenda. The Strategic Plan has been adopted by the FGS, and is currently been implemented under the guidance of a Vetting Unit established by the FGS. At the strategic level also, AMISOM police advisors posted to the National Headquarters of the SPF have undertaken a pre-engagement analysis of the systems, structures, and skills of the SPF. The result of the analysis is being compiled and the findings will constitute the foundation for the development of a Reform Action Plan. Furthermore, the AMISOM police advisors are developing a Government Policing Charter, which will serve as a basis for strengthening the partnership between the SPF and the communities and assisting it in fulfilling its mandate.
37. AMISOM has equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily workings of the SPF. With regard to training support, AMISOM police conducted a Public Order Management course in Djibouti for 200 SPF officers, in partnership with the Italian Carabinieri and financial support from the Italian government. This course has enhanced the performance of the SPF in the conduct of day and night time patrols, stop and search and cordon and search operations. A similar training is currently being conducted for 871 SPF Officers at General Kahiye Police Training Academy in Mogadishu. The officers, who are being trained with support from AMISOM police, will be deployed in Mogadishu and other locations across the country. Training has also been provided on database management and data collection for SPF officers at the Mogadishu Airport Police Station. In February 2013, the AMISOM police arranged a field study in Sierra Leone for the senior management of the SPF. This has exposed them to police reform best practice.
38. In the coming period, the AMISOM police component will be extending its deployment to the other Sectors in order to provide support to the SPF in those areas. In this regard, the AMISOM police has already undertaken a technical assessment mission to Sector 2 (Kismayo) and Sector 3 (Baidoa). The technical assessment to Sector 4 (Beletweyne) will be undertaken in the course of the next couple of weeks. The deployment will be effected once UNSOA puts in place the required infrastructure in these Sectors.
c. Creation of Conditions for Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance
39. During the period under review, AMISOM continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Mission continues to coordinate its activities and to cooperate with UN humanitarian agencies and other actors working in Somalia to ensure greater access. The Mission has secured humanitarian entry points and corridors, enabling humanitarian actors to address the needs of the Somali population in the areas under the government control. In coordination with the UN humanitarian agencies, AMISOM also facilitated the voluntary return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs.
40. As has been the case since the inception of the Mission, AMISOM continues to provide lifesaving support to the needy population, especially in those areas where humanitarian actors are absent or have limited access. This support includes provision of potable water, basic healthcare services and basic social services. For instance, during the recent flooding in Jowhar, AMISOM donated medicines to the Governor of Middle Shabelle for distribution to those affected by the floods. During the reporting period, AMISOM also closely worked with the Mayor of Mogadishu to rehabilitate four water wells in Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Wadajir and Dharkenley Districts of Mogadishu. These projects were realized with the funding support of the Government of Sweden.

d. Engagement with Somali Diaspora
41. The Commission, through AMISOM, has begun a formal engagement with the Somali Diaspora in different parts of the world. The first of these engagements took place in London on 9 and 10 May 2013. The meeting was attended by over 50 representatives of different segments of the Somali Diaspora community in the UK. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the FGS and the UN were represented. The main objectives of the meeting were to engage the Somali Diaspora on the situation in Somalia; to mobilize their support for the peace process in general, and AMISOM and the FGS in particular, including for the implementation of the government’s Six-Pillar priorities, with a view to enhancing the stabilization of Somalia; and to mobilize the necessary skills from the Somali Diaspora and to facilitate their return home, in order to provide skilled manpower for the rebuilding of the Somali state. AMISOM, working with the FGS and partners, is following up the conclusions reached.
e. Support to the Public and Civil Service of Somalia
42. During the reporting period, AMISOM facilitated basic and refresher training of 120 civil servants comprised of secretaries, administrative officers and protocol officers. The training, which lasted two weeks, was conducted by the University of South Africa (UNISA), in Bujumbura, Burundi, from 14 to 26 January 2013. Furthermore, in order to improve their working conditions, and therefore facilitate increased public service delivery, in April 2003, AMISOM delivered to the FGS office equipment. The Italian government provided the funding support for both the training and equipment.
V. OTHER RELEVANT ASPECTS OUTLINED IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2093 (2013)
43. In resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council addressed a number of other issues relevant to the operations of AMISOM. These are covered in paragraphs 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the resolution.
a. Establishment of the Guard Force
44. As indicated above, the security situation throughout Somalia remains fragile and unpredictable, and personnel from the international community, particularly from the AU and UN, are targeted by the insurgents. At this critical time, however, these personnel cannot remain barricaded behind secured compounds, as highlighted by both the AU and UN Strategic Reviews and the UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) undertaken in March 2013. They must be able actively to engage local communities and stakeholders to promote reconciliation and peace-building. It is therefore imperative that appropriate security measures are taken to protect all personnel serving in all locations in Somalia.
45. The AU remains committed to providing security for the international community, including through the establishment of an AMISOM guard force. It is within this context that the Commission and the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), as early as March 2012, developed options for the establishment of a guard force. Three options were proposed: option ‘A’ recommended a force of 312 personnel for escort and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) duties; option ‘B’ recommended a force of 149 personnel only for escort duties; and option ‘C’ recommended a force of 1,000 troops for static protection, escorts and QRF. All three recommendations were premised on the deployment of AU and UN civilian personnel in Mogadishu only. In the interim, AMISOM has put in place, in Mogadishu, an ad-hoc unit of 311 soldiers to provide escort duties.
46. Following the renewed request to establish the guard force, as contained in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2093 (2013), as well as resolution 2102 (2013), which mandated the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM), with a presence in Baidoa, Beletweyne and other locations, in addition to Mogadishu, AMISOM and UNSOA constituted a working group to review the guard force concept, including the support requirements. It was determined that the guard force shall perform the following duties: escort personnel to and from designated drop off points; provision of a QRF; manning of base camp sentry towers and the main entry and exit points; provision of overall security at all base camps. AMISOM military experts under the leadership of the Force Commander outlined a comprehensive troop-to-task analysis in order to accomplish these tasks. It has become evident that the ad-hoc unit of 311 troops earmarked for the guard force cannot accomplish the required tasks. In reaching these conclusions, the military experts were cognizant of the fact that AMISOM is already severely overstretched given the vast geographical area it covers and the continuing probing and asymmetrical attacks being launched by Al-Shabaab. In view of this challenge and the imperative to ensure adequate security for international personnel , the Security Council may wish to authorize an increase in the AMISOM force strength by 1,000 additional personnel to enable it deploy an appropriately-sized guard force in all four Sectors. It is anticipated that the United Nations will support the equipping and training of these forces through the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA). This critically required increment in force strength is considered essential for the effective implementation of the respective mandates of AMISOM and UNSOM in Somalia, as failure to put adequate security measures in place will limit both Missions severely. The Commission is ready to provide the details of the troops-to-task analysis which form the basis of the request for additional personnel.

b. Transparency and proper accountability for resources provided to AMISOM
47. Funds availed for AMISOM operations, through the Commission, have been utilized mainly to reimburse the TCCs/PCCs for troop allowances, death and disability compensation, as well as to cover operational costs of managing AMISOM. This has been done in line with AU financial rules and the applicable contribution agreements with the donor partners. The expenditures are subject to periodic external audits by the concerned partners, in addition to internal audits carried out by the Commission. It is gratifying to note that the recent external audits conducted by auditors contracted by the EU had positive conclusions, acknowledging the seriousness and professionalism with which the funds have been managed.
48. The Commission also conducts regular pre-deployment visits to the TCCs/PCCs. Recently, a troop verification exercise was conducted in conjunction with UNSOA to establish the troop levels. The procedure in place for generating the nominal roll is strict and ensures probity and accountability. In order to further improve the information received from the field, the Commission has engaged consultancy services, with the support of the European Commission (EC), on the possibility of deploying a biometric data capture machine.

c. Protection of Civilians
49. In line with the relevant requests of Council and the UN Security Council, in particular in resolutions 2010 (2011), 2036 (2012) and 2093 (2013), the Commission and AMISOM are engaged in efforts to develop a strategy for the mainstreaming of protection of civilians considerations into the operations of the Mission. I am pleased to report that, following extensive consultations, a Mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategy for AMISOM was approved in May 2013. The Strategy provides a comprehensive Mission-wide approach towards mainstreaming protection considerations into all aspects of AMISOM operations, and all necessary efforts will be made to ensure its effective implementation. I would like to acknowledge the support of all relevant partners in this process to date, and request that support for the implementation of this Strategy from UNSOA and the UN system more broadly is provided.
50. As a part of its efforts to strengthen civilian protection in AMISOM’s area of operations, and as a core component of AMISOM’s protection strategy, I am also pleased to report that AMISOM is moving towards the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), as outlined in UN Security Council resolutions 2036(2012) and 2093 (2013). Building on work undertaken by a team of experts in Mogadishu, in March 2013, a framework for the establishment of a robust CCTARC mechanism in AMISOM has been developed. This document sets out the overall design, describes processes and day-to-day operation of the cell, and proposes system requirements, personnel profiles and other resources required for its inception. The framework focuses on three key functions of the CCTARC: to assess civilian harm occurring within AMISOM's area of responsibility; to assist with operational effectiveness and prevention of civilian harm by informing force decision-making; and to respond to any harm caused. These elements have been designed within the current operational reality. The proposed CCTARC framework is undergoing the necessary AU internal consultation and approval procedures, and with requisite funding in place, AMISOM should be able to set up a CCTARC before the end of 2013.
d. Management of Disengaged Fighters
51. AMISOM continues to receive Al Shabaab disengaged fighters, but has limited resources to manage them. The role of AMISOM is to receive and manage defectors at designated reception centres for 48 hours, before handing them over to the FGS for further management. AMISOM, in collaboration with other partners of the FGS, has been developing strategies, policies and plans for the management of both the Captured and Voluntary Disengaged Fighters (CVDF), which were presented to the FGS, for adoption.
52. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the Management of Children Associated with Armed Conflict (CAAC) have also been developed and adopted by the FGS. AMISOM received 249 disengaged fighters who voluntarily surrendered in September 2012. Among them were 7 children who were handed over to UNICEF. The Military Technical Working Group (MTWG) organized training for FGS and AMISOM officers at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), in Kenya, on the management of CVDF at the reception and transit centres. In addition, the FGS, AMISOM and partners recently developed structures and Terms of Reference (ToR) for the reception centres. The FGS will remain the point of reference on the strategies, policies and plans needed to guide the process. In order to assist the FGS, AMISOM will need support to establish the required infrastructure.
e. Strengthening Child and Women Protection
53. In light of concerns which have been raised regarding the recruitment of child soldiers, AMISOM has assisted the FGS in the screening of potential recruits into the SNSF to ensure that they meet the required criteria, especially the accepted age for military and police service. AMISOM, with the support of UNICEF and in collaboration with the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, is also in the process of recruiting a Child Protection Officer. Furthermore, the Commission is working with UNICEF to assess how best child protection considerations can be strengthened at the level of the Commission as well. In addition, AMISOM has printed and circulated brochures sensitizing its uniformed personnel on understanding of Somali culture, including the protection of women rights.
f. Gender Mainstreaming
54. Over the next few months, AMISOM will prioritise the development of a strategy to mainstream gender considerations into all aspects of its operations. In the meantime, initial efforts to strengthen gender mainstreaming into the Mission’s operations are being undertaken, including the establishment of a multi-dimensional gender working group at the level of the Mission, the airing of radio programmes designed to strengthen gender awareness, and the establishment of an information-sharing mechanism with the Directorate of Women and Social Affairs in the Federal Government of Somalia. I welcome the support of the UN in the development and implementation of a comprehensive gender mainstreaming strategy for the Mission.
g. Prevention of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
55. The Commission is fully committed to preventing sexual and gender-based violence in the Mission area. Initial efforts to address these concerns are being undertaken by AMISOM, including through engagement with the FGS to investigate suspected cases of abuses and provide technical advice to military courts established by the FGS. Following the visit to Somalia of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Bangura, during which she held consultations with my Special Representative, AMISOM is now in the process of engaging the SRSG’s Office to support its training initiatives for the SNSF to include the prevention of, and response to, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Steps will be taken to ensure information sharing between AMISOM and the SRSG’s Office, as well as to raise awareness on SGBV in the newly-recovered areas. The development and implementation of an AMISOM strategy on SGBV will be given the highest level of attention in the coming months, and the support of the UN system in this regard is highly appreciated.
h. Conduct and Discipline
56. In 2012, the Commission initiated efforts to establish a comprehensive conduct and discipline framework for its peace support operations. To this effect, initial work to establish the necessary policy frameworks and mechanisms addressing prevention of abuses, staff welfare, reporting, investigation and disciplinary procedures has been undertaken. Two assessments were undertaken in the second half of 2013 to this effect. It is the intention of the Commission to establish an initial conduct and discipline mechanism before the end of 2013, and to establish a Conduct and Discipline Office in AMISOM during the same period. The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) also continues to receive specific attention. Measures undertaken by AMISOM for the prevention of SEA have been focused on pre-deployment and in-theatre training for all AMISOM personnel. Renewed effort to bring these training initiatives in line with a broader conduct and discipline policy framework will be undertaken in the coming months, and the support of the UN in this regard would be appreciated.
i. Support to the FGS with regards to the Lifting of the Arms Embargo
57. The UN Security Council, in its resolution 2093 (2013), authorized a partial lifting of the existing Somalia arms embargo for 12 months, to allow the FGS to acquire specific categories of arms for the sole purpose of enhancing the capacity of the FGS to provide security to its citizens through the SNSF. AMISOM is working with the SNSF to develop its capacity to secure acquired weapons by establishing infrastructure and procedures to ensure the safe storage, maintenance and distribution of arms and equipment. More specifically, AMISOM is planning to assist the SNSF to build armories, train arms store men and arms mechanics; print arms registers; advise the SNSF on the distribution of weapons and ensure that the weapons are issued and used only by the SNSF; and ensure adherence to the terms of the lifting of the arms embargo with the Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG). The establishment of the infrastructure to protect the weapons will require the support of donors due to the financial constraints facing the FGS.
VI. UN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PACKAGE FOR AMISOM AND UN PRESENCE ON THE GROUND
58. In resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council decided to authorize the AU Member States to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 28 February 2014, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. The Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of resolution 2010 (2011), paragraphs 4 and 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 2 of resolution 2073 (2012) for a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel until 28 February 2014, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1910 (2010), and consistent with the requirements of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.
59. The UN logistical support package to AMISOM is provided by UNSOA in the areas of rations, transport, accommodation and engineering, Communication, Information Technology Systems (CITS), medical, aviation, personnel movement and rotations, media and public information support, and general supplies. At the operational level, a joint task force meets on a weekly basis to provide coordination, while at a strategic level a Senior Mission Leadership (SML) meeting between AMISOM and UNSOA has been established and meets on monthly basis. At the tactical level, a Joint Support Coordination (JSOC), under AMISOM leadership, has been revitalized to plan, coordinate and implement the day-to-day support requirements to AMISOM. The support concept has been streamlined to provide greater support to the expanded Mission, with a special focus on the four Sectors. The relocation of UNSOA operations to Mogadishu has enhanced the coordination and delivery of the support package. Joint asset management and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) verification teams have been established to enhance accountability for UN owned assets and timely verification and reimbursement for COE.
60. However, the UN support package, which is anchored on the UN procurement procedures for traditional UN peacekeeping operations, has been challenged by the prevailing security conditions in Somalia, resulting in slow responsiveness to AMISOM operations. It is worth mentioning here the slow roll out of the Forward Logistic Hubs, the relatively low budgetary allocation and the inability of the support package to match the operational tempo. Also, although the induction of two UN civilian contracted utility helicopters has resulted in improved intra-mission movement of personnel, medical evacuation and cargo, the full complement of 12 military utility and attack helicopters has not materialised, thus impacting on AMISOM ability to undertake expansion operations. Additionally, the serviceability of the partner donated equipment, in which responsibility for maintenance lies with UNSOA, is low, and varies between fifty to sixty per cent at any given time, taking into account the existence of a large number of Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs) that need major repairs or replacement.
61. In its resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council, having welcomed the review by the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ presence and engagement in Somalia, agreed that the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) had fulfilled its mandate and should now be dissolved. It further agreed that UNPOS should be replaced by a new expanded Special Political Mission as soon as possible. The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a TAM on the implementation of the new United Nations mission, in full cooperation with the FGS, AU, regional bodies and Member States. The TAM was conducted in March 2013. On 19 April 2013, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Security Council, outlining his recommendations regarding the UN presence in Somalia.
62. On 2 May 2013, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2102 (2013) in which it decided to establish UNSOM by 3 June 2013, under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for an initial period of twelve months with the intention to renew for further periods as appropriate. The Security Council further decided that the mandate of UNSOM shall be as follows:
- to provide United Nations “good offices” functions, supporting the
FGS’ peace and reconciliation process;
- to support the FGS, and AMISOM as appropriate, by providing strategic policy advice on peace building and state building;
- to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support;
- to help build the capacity of the FGS in relevant areas;
- to monitor, help investigate and report to the Security Council on, and help prevent, abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed in Somalia.
63. The Security Council requested the SRSG to coordinate United Nations activities with the FGS, as well as the AU, including AMISOM, IGAD, the EU and other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners in Somalia. It decided that UNSOM shall be based in Mogadishu and deployed further across Somalia, as requested by the FGS and as conditions permit. The newly appointed UN SRSG, Nicholas Kay, took office on 3 June 2013. On 7 June 2013, he visited Addis Ababa for consultations with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. The meeting provided an opportunity to review the situation in Somalia and agree on how best AMISOM and UNSOM can work together in support of the government and the people of Somalia.
VII. SUPPORT TO THE SOMALI LIVESTOCK SECTOR
64. As indicated in earlier reports, livestock is the mainstay of the Somalia economy. It generates 40-50% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80% of its foreign currency. It is the main source of livelihood, with about 65% of the population engaged in livestock production. However, the sector is faced with a number of challenges, notably weak policy, regulatory and institutional environment; low human capacity; livestock diseases; access to markets; and environmental degradation. The AU Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) is providing support to this critical sector.
65. More specifically, AU-IBAR is currently finalizing the design of a project entitled “Reinforcing Animal Health Services in Somalia” to be funded by the EU. This project will be implemented over a period of thirty six (36) months for a total amount of Euro 4 million to be provided by the EU. The project will be implemented by AU-IBAR in partnership with two international NGOs with a long history of involvement in Somalia (COOPI and Terra Nuova), and in close collaboration with the FGS Ministry of Natural Resources and other key stakeholders. The specific objective is to enhance the quality, access and sustainability of animal health services in Somalia.
66. Furthermore, AU-IBAR, in partnership with IGAD and with the financial support of USAID, is implementing the Standard Methods and Procedures in Animal Health (SMP-AH) project to support harmonization of animal health regulations in Somalia and the rest of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHoA) countries, in order to promote livestock trade in the region and with trading partners in the Middle East. Among the activities already carried out, mention should be made of the following: support of a livestock trade mission to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to promote dialogue between the GHoA countries and Middle East; enhancement of the capacity of the Somali veterinary professionals though participation in regional network meetings; and development of Standard Methods and Procedures (SMPs) for disease prevention and control.
67. Within the framework of the EU-funded Project Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organizations (PAN-SPSO), which is implemented by the AU-IBAR and other stakeholders, support was provided for the participation of Somalia in the annual meeting of African Chief Veterinary Officers held in April 2013 in Abidjan. Steps are also underway to facilitate the establishment of a National Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Committee in Somalia. Furthermore, AU-IBAR is planning to support training activities in Somalia as part of the Animal Resources Information System (ARIS2). Through ARIS2, AU-IBAR has been compiling animal health data from Somalia to support policy formulation, and facilitate information-sharing within the region and with other parts of the continent, with the view of enhancing disease control and management, as well as compliance with international requirements.
VIII. OBSERVATIONS
68. Overall, the situation in Somalia continues to evolve positively. The Somali people and leaders must capitalize on the security gains made by AMISOM, the Somali security forces and their allies, to further peace and prosperity. They must seize this opportune moment to bring to an end political wrangling which can only complicate the process of stabilizing Somalia. I urge the Somali leaders to demonstrate the required maturity and goodwill as their country grapples with the challenges of this new page in their history. I welcome the FGS’s initiatives to engage regional authorities through outreach and dialogue, to foster national reconciliation and unity, as well as the efforts to rebuild the armed forces and integrate the militias.
69. As Somalia pursues its path towards lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation, the important contribution of the neighboring countries cannot be overemphasized. For years, these countries have sheltered Somali refugees and extended utmost support in spite of the challenges they face. They have also made and continue to make an invaluable contribution to the military efforts aimed at expanding the authority of the Somali State over its national territory. Their continued involvement will be of paramount importance in the period ahead. I welcome all efforts aimed at enhancing cooperation and confidence between Somalia and its neighbors. The Commission will continue to support these efforts and to take any initiative that could assist in that direction.
70. While the situation in Somalia has significantly improved, the country nonetheless remains confronted with serious challenges at all levels and therefore needs the sustained attention of its partners. Against this background, I welcome the continued engagement of the international community as demonstrated by the second London Conference on Somalia and the Special Conference on Somalia, convened by the UK and Japan respectively, in May 2013.
71. As Council is aware, the current phase of AMISOM military operations has been guided by the Joint AU-UN Strategic Concept adopted by both the Council and the UN Security Council, in January 2012. The Strategic Concept had in fact considered a troop level of 35,500 troops for the successful implementation of the military campaign. Eventually, based on a number of strategic considerations, including the provision of force enablers, specifically helicopters and APCs, availability of engineering and logistics units, the continued ENDF support and provision of immediate operational logistics support to the SNSF who are involved in joint operations with AMISOM, the Strategic Concept recommended the middle path option of raising the troop ceiling to 17,731 troops.
72. However, two of the strategic considerations have not been realized: AMISOM remains without all the required force enablers and the SNSF remain without much required logistical support. Under the present conditions, AMISOM is geographically stretched and has reached its operational limit, making it difficult to undertake further expansion operations without risking the present gains. It was the expectation of the AU that UN Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) will address this situation. While reiterating AU’s appreciation to the UN for the support extended so far, I call upon the Security Council to take the necessary steps, in line with Council’s communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLVI) of 27 February 2013, to address the needs of AMISOM and the SNSF in order to enable them to consolidate their control over recovered territories, continue to extend State authority and empower the SNSF for them to begin to assume primary responsibility for the defense and security of their country. In the meantime, the Commission is taking the necessary steps to mitigate the challenges on the ground, notably by repositioning forces within and outside Sector boundaries to cater for current operational realities.
73. I note that, for the UN, the conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Yet, the situation in some parts of the country has improved to an extent that would allow the UN to play a more active role and establish an enhanced presence on the ground. It is worth recalling here communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CCCII), adopted by Council at its 302nd meeting, which encouraged the Security Council to consider creative and action-oriented steps towards the re-hatting of the Mission. In this respect, the Commission looks forward to the benchmarking exercise to be undertaken by the Secretariat in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 2093 (2013). The Commission is ready to take part in this exercise, which could be coupled with the reconfiguration of forces referred to above.
74. I further note the call by the Security Council, as contained in paragraph 7 of resolution 2093 (2013), for the AU to consider providing funding to AMISOM through its own assessed costs as it has recently done for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). It is important to point out, as underlined by Council, that, in undertaking the operation in Somalia, the AU is acting on behalf of the UN, notably its Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The AU has repeatedly called on the Security Council to deploy an operation in Somalia and to give substance to the much acclaimed principle on the responsibility to protect, for the benefit of the Somali people who have literally been abandoned by the international community for many years.
75. In the meantime, I cannot but reiterate AU’s deep appreciation to the AMISOM TCCs and PCCs. Their contribution and the sacrifices made are, in many aspects, unique in the annals of the history of peacekeeping and peace support operations. They deserve the full recognition of the international community and the Security Council, in particular. The successes of the Mission will never be highlighted enough, and its shortcomings have to be understood against the backdrop of the particularly challenging environment in which it is operating and the limited means at its disposal. There is no exaggeration in saying that without AMISOM and the huge sacrifices made, Somalia would not have been where it is today and the international community would not have had cause for celebration.